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Reconstructing Radicalisation – A Risk Analysis Perspective of Radical Attitudes in a Swedish Muslim Sample

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Abstract

Radicalisation is an extremely popular topic in the terrorism discourse, yet it has seen extensive criticism for being a blurry concept. The present study evaluates the conceptual strength of radicalisation and reconstructs it with a focus on the empirical study of radicalisation from a risk perspective. Framed as a major risk factor in Islamic radicalisation, radical attitudes were examined in a sample of seventy-seven Muslim students from Malmö University. The study employed a cross-sectional survey research design. A frequency analysis found that up to 37.7% of participants expressed some form of radical attitudes, whilst a multiple regression analysis identified activism, gender, social isolation, vulnerability, and mental health as statistically significant risk factors. Religiosity and religious fundamentalism were not shown to be significant. It is argued that future studies must focus on the pursuit of further empirical data to elevate radicalisation to a more robust construct, and that multinational collaborations situating radicalisation in different cultural contexts may be key for the long-term health of the field.

Key words: Radicalisation, terrorism, radical attitudes, extremism, Islamic radicalisation.

Introduction

On September 11th, 2001, the actions of 19 young men shocked the world, and the subsequent fallout created tremors of political and societal change which are still being felt today. Organized by the Islamic terrorist organization al-Qaeda, the four plane hijackings that took place in the United States on '9/11' resulted in the deadliest single event attributed to terrorism in history, culminating in the deaths of 2,996 people, over 6,000 casualties, and over \$10bn dollars in damages to infrastructure and property (Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, 2014). These attacks have been viewed by some as a marker for the beginning of a new era of terrorism, an era in which Western democracies have had to contend not only with the fear and anxiety that the threat of an imminent attack creates, but with the challenges posed by addressing these threats in an effective, and moral, way (Silke, 2003).

The 'War on Terror', waged primarily by the United States and her allies, represents the most visible direct response to terrorism in the form of extensive military action. This response has seen the military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the increasingly extensive use of drones in extra-judiciary actions throughout the Middle East, and a legacy of political instability and turmoil within the region that arguably can be indirectly attributed to the formation of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), more commonly known as IS or ISIS in Western media (Krieg, 2016). The true human cost of the War on Terror is difficult to estimate, ranging potentially up to 2 million in casualties (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 2015).

The staggering consequences that stemmed from the '9/11' attacks have created an enormous stimulus for research. Whilst the field of research devoted to terrorism and radicalisation was certainly active long before the 2001 attacks, it is not unreasonable to state that there has been nothing short of a meteoric rise in terrorism-related publications in the

aftermath, with a huge increase both in the availability of funding and the number of researchers devoting themselves to studying this phenomenon (Silke & Schmidt-Petersen, 2015). The field has become flooded with research publications from a variety of different disciplines, most dominantly political science, but also including psychology, criminology, theology, history, and more (Silke, 2004).

Of the many pertinent questions that pertain to terrorism, one of the most intriguing and important questions concerns why terrorists do what they do. In the initial surge of research following '9/11', the motivations and ideology of the al-Qaeda organisation itself was the focus, with an emphasis on the strategic security threat that it could pose to the Western World, its recruitment techniques, use of propaganda, and other mechanisms that allowed it to function and succeed as an extremist organisation (Silke, 2003). However, following the 2005 bombings in London, perpetrated by four young men who were all British citizens with extensive familial ties to the United Kingdom, this focus began to shift elsewhere (Silke, 2008). Although al-Qaeda had struck the heartland of the United States, it had done so with foreign attackers, all of whom came from the Middle East, the vast majority from Saudi Arabia. The '7/7' bombings, as they became more commonly known, brought the concept of home-grown terrorism to the forefront of public, and academic, interest (Kirby, 2007).

With this interest came the growth in popularity of the term 'radicalisation,' one that had rarely seen use in terrorism studies prior to the events of '9/11' and beyond (Silke, 2016). This much-debated concept is believed to form a general representation of the stages through which an individual, or a group, go through in order to join extremist groups and carry out violent attacks of terror. It has sometimes been described quite simply as 'what goes on before the bomb goes off' (Neumann, 2008). The enormous amount of research into radicalisation has formed the backbone of numerous preventative counter-terrorism

strategies, such as the United Kingdom's *Prevent* strategy (HM Government, 2011). It is commonplace in the media to see the term used to refer to jihadi-inspired attackers as being 'radicalised Muslims', and numerous official government bodies in the West make frequent references to radicalisation, in a variety of different contexts, in policy documents (Sedgwick, 2010).

Research into radicalisation over the past 17 years has focused extensively on Islamic extremists (Silke & Schmidt-Petersen, 2015; Silva, 2018), which should in itself not be considered at all surprising. Whilst the '9/11' and '7/7' attacks acted as a major initial stimulus for researchers to address Islamic radicalisation, the growth of IS and the subsequent terror wave in Western Europe has only doubled down on that stimulus. According to the Global Terrorism Database (START, 2016), 1037 known acts of terrorism occurred in Western Europe during the 2013-2016 period. With the notable exceptions of the Munich shootings in Germany and the as of yet unclaimed bombing of EgyptAir flight 804, all attacks with at least five fatalities during this peak for terrorist activity were believed to have been carried out by Jihadi-inspired extremists, with the IS claiming responsibility for the majority (START, 2016).

Despite the large body of work that concerns itself with Islamic radicalisation, there is as yet a lacking academic consensus on the processes that an individual may or may not go through in order to become a member of a violent organization, such as al-Qaeda or IS. Less still is known concerning what may make a 'radicalised' individual make the jump from just being a member of an extremist organisation, to carrying out a terrorist act (Silke & Schmidt-Petersen, 2015). Radicalisation as a concept itself has come under fierce criticism, described as being too vague, too broad, and at its worst, a justification for the organized oppression of, and violence against, Muslim minorities in Western democracies (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010; Sedgwick, 2010; Kundnani, 2012; Pruyt & Kwakkel, 2014).

The present study seeks to address numerous issues within the field of radicalisation research by offering a new perspective and approach to the concept, that of risk analysis. In order to delve deeper into the logic behind taking this perspective, it is first important to thoroughly consider the issues that have been raised concerning radicalisation as a concept, to examine established theories of radicalisation and risk, and to explain the importance of considering social and political contexts when attempting to study radicalisation. These subjects will be discussed in depth in the subsequent sections.

Radicalisation: A Problematic Concept?

In recent years, there has been much made of radicalisation on a conceptual level. Although the term itself is not new, there are few mentions of radicalisation in academic discourse concerning terrorism prior to the millennium (Neumann, 2013). In the politically charged environment following the ‘9/11’ and ‘7/7’ attacks, the proliferation of the term and its widespread use by the media, government officials, and academia allowed for, in the words of Paul Neumann (2008), “a discussion about the political, economic, social and psychological forces that underpin terrorism and political violence” to become possible again.

The processes associated with radicalisation were viewed with, when allowing for the value of hindsight, a naïve optimism. It was to be a concept that could be broken down into clear stages and objectively measured, then used by governmental organizations to prevent future acts of terrorism. Indeed, so optimistic was the initial view of radicalisation that France attributed their apparent immunity to home-grown Islamic terrorism to their policy of secularisation, in turn, inspired by radicalisation research that had determined the ‘roots’ of Islamic terrorism to be religious in nature (Kepel, Rothschild & Ghazaleh, 2005). Yet France’s illusion of invulnerability was tragically dispelled, first with the Charlie Hebdo shootings in 2015, and further subsequent attacks in the following years, most notably the 13-14th November attacks in Paris that left 130 people dead, and the 14th July vehicle ramming in

Nice which killed a further 86 people. The majority of the attackers were considered to be 'home-grown', either in France or Belgium, and all swore loyalty to IS, an organisation infamous for its extreme ideological rejection of the secular West.

A closer inspection of the harrowing attacks in France begins to highlight the inherently reckless danger in viewing radicalisation as an absolute concept (Sedgwick, 2010). The likes of Silke (2004) and Sageman (2014) warned that much of the emerging research in the field appeared to be rushed in order to keep up with the trend, with very few studies providing any significant new data, and the vast majority instead making use of literary reviews or secondary data analysis. Despite such warnings, this new field of research has been enormously influential, shaping the image of what makes a terrorist both in the media and for government bodies. The concept of radicalisation is pervasive in its influence at all levels of government in the Western nations most threatened by the spectre of Islamic terror, significantly influencing domestic and foreign policy (Kundnani, 2012).

With such enormous influence, there comes an expectation of a responsibly robust concept, one with resounding empirical support. In reality, there is as of yet no consensus on a model for radicalisation, and one finds in the literature a growing amount of publications that offer severe criticisms for radicalisation as it has been described to date. The concept has been accused of possessing entirely too much subjectivity for an area of empirical study (Githens-Mazer, 2012), and this subjective nature is particularly well illustrated by Sedgwick (2010), who demonstrates that radicalisation can be seen to mean something entirely different when used in a foreign policy context, an integration context, and a security context. Even committed defenders such as Neumann (2013), once so keen to praise the value of the concept, have been forced to concede that it lacks clarity.

Therefore, radicalisation appears to be too blurry, emerging as a point of confusion rather than clarity, lacking a formal and widely accepted definition (Kundnani, 2012). To a

great extent, this blurriness can be attributed to questions of religion. If one were to speak the word 'radicalisation' to a layperson, it is quite likely they would assume that the conversation would soon turn to the topics of jihad, radical Islam, and suicide bombings. Yet, one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in recent history was carried out by Fjotolf Hansen (then Anders Behring Breivik) in 2011, a native Norwegian who describes himself as a Germanic Neopagan. Few would argue that Breivik was not a 'radical' in some sense, but there have been few if any publications that concern his motivations in a radicalisation context. It may be the case, as Kundnani (2012) suggests, that the existing paradigm of radicalisation is so focused on Islamic extremism that it has significantly limited the potential for a discourse concerning other forms of terrorism and radical political action.

Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) describe radicalisation as having become responsible for a 'failed discourse,' owing to the reliance on the 'conventional wisdom' that Islamic extremism stems from a religious dogma, and that there exists a fundamental incompatibility between Islamic beliefs and Western democracy. These authors highlight the case of Anthony Garcia (then Rahman Adam), sentenced to life in a UK prison for conspiring to carry out a bombing. Garcia demonstrated little coherence in his Islamic beliefs in contrast to his older brother Lamine, who was much better versed in the ultra-conservative Salafi movement of Islam. By all accounts, Garcia was well integrated into British society and dreamed of becoming a male model. Despite his older brother fitting the profile offered up by the 'conventional wisdom' of radicalisation, it was Garcia who conspired and was ultimately convicted.

Similarly, Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) also detail the efforts of the Salafi-run STREET (Strategy to Re-Empower and Educate Teenagers) programme as being highly influential in combatting jihadi-inspired recruitment. Both cases are very much at odds with

the conventional story of radicalisation and the central role that Islamic fundamentalism is thought to play.

Addressing the broad remit of radicalisation and the way that the theories spawned from the concept have been implemented, Richards (2011) castigates the UK's *Prevent* strategy as being entirely too broad in its approach, justifying mass surveillance of the country's young Muslim population and attempting to address issues of integration alongside issues of counter-terrorism. Similar allegations have been levied by Kundnani (2012), who details the extensive surveillance of New York Muslims by the NYPD. In both cases, these actions are justified by the prevailing belief that fundamentalist Islamic beliefs are at the heart of the terrorist threat.

Young Muslims in Western societies find themselves at risk of being labelled by the rhetoric as 'psychologically vulnerable to extremism' (Kundnani, 2012; Coppock & McGovern, 2014). It would be unfair to say that these beliefs even form the core of radicalisation theory, simply because there is *no* core to radicalisation theory at the time of this writing. Yet, as we will explore in detail in a later section, these ideas of psychological vulnerability and inherent religious grievances do form significant components of major models in radicalisation. The empirical basis for these models is sparing at best, and non-existent in the worst cases (Sageman, 2014).

As Kundnani (2012) astutely points out, as a concept, radicalisation is not only inconsistent, it is fundamentally lacking in its ability to capture the complexity of events and motivations that conspire to create a terrorist. As much of the research in the field has been funded directly by institutions with military funding, there exists the possibility for extensive bias (Kundnani, 2012), a potential for politically contaminated research that exists primarily to create a useful narrative for aggressive foreign and domestic policy. This potential bias may explain why the bulk of radicalisation research to date has focused extensively on addressing

the processes that occur purely within the context of the individual, or group that is said to have been radicalised. Not enough focus has been given to the obvious elephant in the room, the foreign policy decisions made by nations such as the United States during the ‘War on Terror’, and how these decisions might factor into a model of radicalisation.

Revisiting Kundnani’s extensive criticism, Silva (2018) describes a present-day radicalisation that has, in spite of the rise and fall of IS, shown only limited signs of evolving. With this extensive criticism taken into consideration, and the relative stagnation of efforts made to further develop the concept, radicalisation in its current state appears to be anaemic, lacking the rigorous structure and breadth of empirical research necessary to earn it such a key role in academic discourse, the media, and policy making. It is the view of the present author that, if radicalisation cannot be made fit for purpose, then it must be reconstructed. In the next section, we will examine the most notable of the knowledge claims, both conceptual and empirical, that the field has yielded thus far, in an effort to reconstruct radicalisation for the sake of a more coherent field of research.

Theoretical and Empirical Insights into Radicalisation

The field of research that radicalisation has inspired is enormous, and to attempt to cover it completely would be far beyond the scope of this paper. As has been already discussed in the prior section, a great deal of this research is based upon literary reviews or secondary data analysis. The field is typified by a general shortage of empirical research, particularly quantitative research (Silke & Schmidt-Petersen, 2015). The field is also characterized by its intense focus on Islamic radicalisation, and much of the dominant citations on this topic were written with al-Qaeda related terrorism in mind. There is a substantial lack of impactful research on the influence of the Islamic State and the newer generation of radicalised young Muslims, who either travelled to Iraq and Syria to join them as fighters, or orchestrated terror attacks in the West. Despite these criticisms and the obvious

holes in the field, there is room for optimism, as efforts still persist to elevate the field to an empirically respected level (Silke & Schmidt-Petersen, 2015). We will now briefly review some of the literature produced by the researchers that have taken up this task, and have been able to provide new, useful knowledge towards the solving of the radicalisation puzzle.

In trying to describe what the typical radicalised individual looks like, attempts to psychologically profile terrorists have proven completely futile to date. Initially, and not without some basis in common sense, it was suspected that any individual that could carry out an act of mass violence must surely be mentally ill. This is certainly a view that has often been prevalent in the media, with the notion of ‘deranged radicals’ or ‘insane gunmen’ coming to mind as popular headlines. If there is any true consensus to be found in the wealth of research on radicalisation however, it is that there is no such derangement or insanity to be widely found in radical groups (Silke, 2008). Not only have the vast majority of the terrorists to date been found to be psychologically ‘normal’ on most metrics, they also appear to exhibit much better mental health than other kinds of violent criminals (Lyons & Harbinson, 1986; Silke 2003; Horgan 2005).

When one considers the inherent dangers of being a terrorist, particularly in a post ‘9/11’ environment, the challenges faced in eluding counter-terrorist pursuits and security measures, it stands to reason that particularly unstable radicals would not be able to go long without being apprehended (Taylor, 1988; Silke, 2008). Whilst there are certainly mentally ill radicals, and indeed quite a few examples of ‘lone wolf’ terrorists have been identified as being highly unstable, they are often on the fringes of organised Islamic terrorism (Silke, 2008). Even in the more recent examples of terrorist attacks influenced by the Islamic State, only 27.6% of the perpetrators were found to have a history of mental illness, a rate that is comparable to the general population (Corner & Gill, 2017). Psychopathology does not,

therefore, hold any significant weight as a 'silver bullet' for predicting radicalisation, and is better viewed only as a potential contributory risk factor.

The initial trend of publications in the radicalisation 'frenzy' following 9/11 may have been harmful to the influence of psychological methods and their potential for explaining radicalisation. In a highly influential review and critique of existing psychological theories in the field, Victoroff (2005) describes a striking imbalance, where he alleges there are more publications with psychologically-derived theories of radicalisation than there are empirical publications actually testing these theories. This imbalance may be due to the general lack of empirically trained academic psychologists operating within the field, as many of the theoretical publications critiqued by Victoroff seemed more driven by the dated psychoanalytic techniques of the 1920s than modern psychology (Victoroff, 2005). Although it is without a doubt that terrorists do not follow any specific psychological profile, it is entirely too early to dismiss the role that psychology could play in their radicalisation. Victoroff upheld this viewpoint, calling for a new generation of empirically tested models that better capture the complexity of factors that come together in the radicalisation process to make any given individual consider becoming a terrorist.

McCauley and Moskaleiko (2008) describe twelve differing psychological mechanisms through which radicalisation occurs. The twelve mechanisms are particularly useful for their descriptive value, as the authors are able to cite real-world examples of terrorist groups and individuals which reflect the exact processes through which each mechanism works. Also of importance is that these mechanisms are seen to work in any radicalisation context, not just an Islamic one. Of particular interest is that the mechanisms can be found to apply not just to terrorists, but to entire populations, with the authors using the example of the US population's reaction to the 9/11 attacks and the change it brought about in their behaviour, citing a rise in patriotism, discrimination against Muslims, and a

support for military action in the Middle East. Ten of these mechanisms reflect group-level radicalisation, whilst two reflect individual radicalisation, sometimes referred to in the field as authors as auto-radicalisation or self-radicalisation (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). To describe each mechanism in detail would be beyond the scope of this article, but the types of mechanisms outlined can be seen throughout much of the research outlined in this section.

Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) provides a thorough summary of three major sources of influential thought on Islamic radicalisation: French sociology, Social Movement and Network Theory, and Empiricism. The French sociologists, notably Kepel, Khosrokhavar, and Roy, portray Islamic radicalisation as a question primarily of identity, specifically an attempt to find one's true self in the Western world that seems otherwise hostile and discriminatory (Khosrokhavar & Macey, 2005). Although these scholars include sociological risk factors such as poverty, political marginalisation, in-group pressure, racism, and educational deficits, the crux of their argument boils down to a 'double sense of non-belonging,' referring to the sense of identity dysphoria that a second or third generation young Muslim immigrant might feel, too disconnected from their heritage to feel authentically foreign and too marginalized in their new homeland to feel like they really belong (Roy, 2004; Khosrokhavar & Macey, 2005).

Kruglanski et al. (2014) similarly present the case for the key role of identity in the context of Islamic radicalisation, describing an individual's journey to extremism as a 'quest for significance.' They portray the potential radical as experiencing feelings of vulnerability and increasing marginalisation, that in turn threatens their own significance, with this perceived threat being further reinforced by personal losses, humiliations, and feelings of stigmatisation. There is a religious context to these threats, as for many Muslims, their faith plays a vital role in their identity and, subsequently, their feelings of significance. They may come to feel that their sacred values are being 'trampled upon' by Western antagonists,

creating an ideological narrative which puts them at odds with the world around them. In the rare cases where an individual radicalises to violent action, they internalise these threats to their significance and come to view violence as a way of defending themselves.

Furthering the notion of 'sacred values', numerous scholars have made assertions regarding the importance of religion to the Muslim identity and the key role that it might play in Islamic radicalisation. As discussed in the prior section, the assumption that holds that Islam and the Western World are incompatible, and the notion of an inherent vulnerability of Muslim youth because of this incompatibility, has little actual basis in empirical research (Kundnani, 2012; Silva, 2018). The role that religion is thought to play in radicalisation is a reflection of the concept itself, muddled, with several major models of radicalisation excluding religion entirely due to a lack of a general consensus on its role (King & Taylor, 2011).

If there was an inherent vulnerability, one would expect to find that previous examples of radicalised Muslims held strongly fundamentalist religious views even prior to their radicalisation. However, Sageman (2004) instead reported that 82% of jihadi-inspired extremists that he had studied went to secular schools, and that a significant shift in religious devotion could be seen, with 99% of these individuals having shown religious devotion prior to joining an extremist organisation, but not earlier in their lives. This is evidence less of an inherent vulnerability, and more a story of a deliberate embracing of an identity that better fits the role of a jihadist.

What is clear is that religion plays a key part in the ideology of Islamic radicalisation, as the propaganda of organisations such as al-Qaeda, Hamas and ISIL clearly demonstrate. The study of propaganda and how it relates to radicalisation is a valuable pursuit in itself, but it is important to delineate the importance that religion can play in terrorist seduction, and the role that it plays in individual radicalisation. Religion should not be viewed as the 'root' of

radicalisation. Not only does that limit the concept itself entirely to an Islamic context and ignores the history of religiously unaffiliated terror, it sets a dangerous tone to the discourse that can result in widespread discrimination and misinterpretations of the Islamic religion (Kundnani, 2012). To underline this point, one study reports that of more than four thousand ISIL recruits taken in between 2013 and 2014, only 5% of them claimed to have a comprehensive understanding of the Sharia (Dodwell, Milton, & Rassler, 2016). One does not have to be devout to become a terrorist.

Moving from questions of individual identity to those of group identities and dynamics, Social Movement Theory and Network Theory provide valuable insights (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). In summary, these theories describe the mobilization of individuals and groups into radical organisations as being socially driven, dependent on the forming of close-knit communities, a growing mutual understanding and a sharing of grievances. These groups, described in the context of Islamic radicalisation as often being composed of close friends or even relatives, come together and form a shared worldview, bonding intensely over points of mutual interest, whether it be their religious faith, their experiences of discrimination and marginalisation, or other more personal grievances. In each other, the group members find a sense of brotherhood and comfort, and when radical actions are taken, they are often taken together (Neumann, Rogers, Alonso & Martinez, 2007). The eminent scholars in this field of thought, Sageman and Wiktorowicz, underpin their theoretical observations with empirical evidence, primarily qualitative studies (Sageman, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2004).

Empiricist thought on radicalisation is, as described by Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010), less guided by particular theoretical viewpoints and more concerned with individual motivations and in-depth case studies, providing small pieces of a greater puzzle and doing so with academically rigorous empirical research. Whilst smaller in scope, these sorts of

contributions are vital for any scholar attempting to piece together a structured model of radicalisation, and given the purpose of the present article, it is these sorts of empiricist knowledge claims that are especially important.

One consistently stable finding amongst Islamic radicals is that they tend to be young men (Silke, 2008). Criminologists have long found that young males appear to be more often involved in violent crime, drug use, and other dangerous or risky pursuits (Farrington, 2003). Silke reports the stability of these findings, with males aged between 15 and 25 being the most likely to be involved in violent crimes, across numerous cultures (Schönteich 1999; Budd et al., 2005). These findings appear to hold true for the majority of radicalised Muslims, with Bakker (2006) reporting that, out of a sample of 242 jihadi-inspired extremists involved in violent terrorism, only 5 were women. The majority were men in their teens to mid-twenties. However, as Silke (2008) rightly observes, the vast majority of young men who commit violent crimes do not go on to become terrorists, suggesting that whilst gender may be one factor in radicalisation, there are still likely other contributors at work.

Nesser (2004) examined different cases of radicalisation across Europe, observing several trends: one, that it was impossible to generalise the socioeconomic statuses of most radicals, and secondly, that most radicalised groups or terrorist cells had distinct roles played out amongst their members; that of the influential *leaders*, the intellectual *protégés* that act as the leaders' closest followers, troubled *misfits* that exhibit impulsive behaviour and may have criminal backgrounds, and *drifters*, who become part of the cell primarily through their personal connections to an existing member. Nesser particularly emphasised the role of a charismatic leader figure, resourceful and able to eloquently use their ideology to influence other members. This is a valuable insight, as the role that leadership plays in radicalisation is an infrequent topic for empirical research to date, despite the obvious role of terrorist leaders

like Osama bin Laden, or radical clerics like Anjem Choudary and Abu Hamza al-Masri in the UK.

Slootman and Tillie (2006) further develop the knowledge base regarding the role of leaders. In contrast to the prevailing myths, most often fuelled by the media, Muslims that do radicalise rarely do so in Mosques under the command of an *Imam*. In most cases, they have in fact been primarily influenced by a particularly charismatic leader. A leader who was skilled in appealing to them, and able above all else, to provide the answers to the questions they themselves were unable to answer. These leaders exhibited some general characteristics that allowed them to command respect and influence their followers, often being older, better educated, and holding a deep understanding of political and religious ideology. Another important contribution is the finding that the followers were often extremely inarticulate and lacked the ability to describe their religious ideology and how it justified extreme action and violence on their part, whereas the leaders were able to argue their points with conviction. It is possible that the central role that extreme interpretations of Islam are thought to play in radicalisation has been wrongly attributed as a motivation to an entire group of radicals, when it could, in reality, be an intense motivator for a radical leader, but only a cognitive tool for followers, used to make their extreme actions permissible.

Whilst it is clear that radicalised individuals come from all walks of life and that their socioeconomic profiles can significantly differ (Nesser, 2004), there is some evidence to suggest that economic deprivation and imbalanced opportunities can be a motivational factor for individuals to, at the very least, support radical action. Using evidence from the many historical cases of radicalisation and terrorism in Northern Ireland, O'Leary (2007) observes that the Catholic population suffered economically, were less represented in higher education, and had very little political influence at a governmental level, and that these factors correlated to their support for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and other splinter groups.

Silke (2008) noted that many Muslims in Western Europe are, by contemporary standards, exposed to even worse deprivation than Catholics in Northern Ireland were. Using the UK as an example, Muslims were three times more likely to be unemployed, a greater percentage of the Muslim population were likely to lack higher educational qualifications and were found to be underperforming relative to their peers in secondary education, and the amount of Muslims who served as Members of Parliament was only 4 at the time of Silke's writing (National Statistics Online, 2007). There are now 14, although this is still short of the target goal of 19 that would be required for a proportionate level of political representation relative to the Muslim population in the UK. Silke observed that this was not just a problem in the UK, but was typical of the Muslim population across Europe.

Despite the above findings that provide a link between deprivation and support for radical action, it is a curious finding that many radicalised Muslims studied to date are in fact better educated, and more economically well off, than the average population from which they are drawn. Sageman (2004) found that 60% of the jihadi-inspired extremists studied were well educated, often with a bachelors-level University degree or higher. Additionally, 73% of this sample came from upper class or middle-class backgrounds. These findings initially suggest that deprivation alone isn't enough to turn support for radical political action into actual direct involvement with terrorist violence.

However, it is important to note the context of these influential studies, many of which were conducted before the days of IS. A recent study of IS recruits found that, on average, they were likely to be better educated than the population from which they'd been recruited, suggesting that the prior findings in the field continue to hold weight. These recruits were also, on average, underemployed for their level of qualification (Dodwell, Milton, & Ressler, 2016). Underemployment has been corroborated as a potential risk factor by numerous studies (Stern, 2016). It may be that the lack of economic opportunities, despite

the hard work that these individuals have put in to earn their qualifications, contributed to feelings of alienation, discrimination, and marginalisation. This line of thought, at least superficially, resonates with the backdrop of the economic recession that many Western economies have endured over the past decade.

In relation to the rise of IS, much of the recent research into radicalisation has focused on the way the organisation has manipulated social media to their advantage in order to gain supporters abroad and to entice recruits (Awan, 2017). Sloodman and Tillie (2006) had prior identified that some young Muslims were enticed to join al-Qaeda by perceiving a certain ‘cool-factor’ in being an Islamic extremist, particularly the traditional image of the Afghan *mujahideen*. This ‘cool-factor’ was exhibited by al-Qaeda through videos showing ‘freedom fighters’ training with AK-47s and RPGs, often edited in such a way as to portray their heroism and the action-packed lives they lived (Rudner, 2017).

Likely drawing influence from those who came before them, IS has doubled down on this approach. The spread of violent videos by IS has become almost infamous in the media, with countless graphic beheadings and other executions readily available simply with a Google search (Farwell, 2014). Previous research has found that exposure to extremely violent content can trigger feelings of *mortality salience*, which in a radicalisation context can invoke a sense of pride in one’s in-group and increase identification with radical groups (van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema & van den Ham, 2005; Silke, 2008; LaFree & Ackerman, 2009). The readily available free access to online video material of this nature, particularly on sites like YouTube, has been suggested as a risk factor for auto-radicalisation (Conway & McInery, 2008; Birmingham, Conway, McInerney, O’Hare & Smeaton, 2009). It is not only videos through which IS and other aspiring groups can send their message, however. Twitter and Facebook have been popular avenues for IS to spread their propaganda,

and it is believed that many of those who left their homelands to travel to fight for IS had at least some exposure to online propaganda of this kind (Stern 2016; Awan, 2017).

Additionally, it may be possible that Muslims share a greater sense of global community than other groups. In the Muslim faith, the term *umma* refers to the ‘community of believers’, a community that surpasses national borders. Known Islamic terrorists have previously invoked the ill-treatment of the *umma* to explain their actions, as Kirby (2007) describes in the case of Mohammad Sidique Khan, believed to be the leader of the homegrown London bombers in the ‘7/7’ attacks. The sense of *umma* can be exploited in various ways by radical groups in an effort to seduce followers, whether by showing that Muslims around the world are being killed or injured by Western forces, or by appealing to the image of a better world where Muslims are not discriminated against. Both of these approaches are common amongst IS and al-Qaeda (Awan, 2017).

To summarise the research field to date, there are an enormous amount of differing approaches to radicalisation, the vast majority making Islamic extremism their point of reference. Psychological theories are commonplace in the field, but the empirical validity of many such theories has often been questioned by critics. There is no dominant model of radicalisation, perhaps because the phenomenon is entirely too complex to model generally. The most valuable research demonstrates a need for understanding the different contexts in which radicalisation takes place, and the individual motivators that may be important for one radical, but irrelevant for another. The evidence points towards a need for clarity within the concept of radicalisation, so that future research can benefit from a coherent and empirical structure to guide their thinking. It is this need for clarity and structure that we will now address.

Restructuring the Concept – A Risk-Based Approach

On the weight of the evidence available, it is the opinion of the present author that as a concept, radicalisation is deeply flawed and requires significant revision. As it is such a pervasive term and it is highly unlikely to fade from use as long as terrorism remains a significant security threat (Neumann, 2013), the concept itself cannot be dismissed entirely. Instead, the field stands to benefit from adding structure to the definition. The snapshot of the field given in the previous section depicts a general lack of consensus on what makes a terrorist. There are seldom few widespread commonalities between the different types of terrorists that have been studied throughout history, and the low base-rate of terrorist incidents makes it unlikely that there will ever be any great consensus on the exact nature of radicalisation in any given context. How then should radicalisation be studied, if no such consensus is possible? If one breaks down radicalisation into a system of risk factors, and posits these risk factors into a specific research context, it creates a more obvious pathway for empirical study.

In a general scientific context, the concept of risk can mean many things to many people, but in the context of radicalisation, we shall define risk as the following: the possibility of an outcome occurring sometime within the future that is undesirable and will likely have negative effects on one or more people (Covello & Merkhofer, 1993; Hansen & Hammann, 2017). A risk factor is, therefore, an incident, characteristic or another attribute that has a contributory relationship to the aforementioned risk becoming reality. The risk in the case of radicalisation could be two-fold, depending on where one wishes to place the criterion: either that the individual has become willing to carry out an act of political violence, or that they actually commit this act. For the sake of a more concise model, we will focus on the latter.

To decide upon which risk factors should be included in such a system, it is first important to identify the research context. Islamic terrorism is the most common context to date, and so it is a logical choice to serve as an example. However, it is not enough to merely seek to study Islamic extremism, it is also important to regard the context in which it is being studied. Evidence suggests that Muslims radicalise differently depending on their country of residence and their social background (Silke, 2008; Stern, 2013). Using existing empirical research and the more influential theories, we can identify numerous potential *major risk factors*. The expression of support for activism and radical attitudes may perhaps be the most commonly observed shared trait in Islamic extremists (Silke, 2008). It is important to note that these attitudinal dispositions have not been found to be universally expressed by all terrorists, and there have likely been numerous individuals that carry out terrorist attacks without expressing radical sentiments previously. It is therefore important to consider other major risk factors of significance when trying to establish a baseline for this approach. As primary data collection in this field can be difficult, particularly if one wishes to study imprisoned terrorists or active radicals, studying one major risk factor at a time is likely the most practical option.

When a major risk factor has been identified in a particular population, it is then important to consider which factors make this risk factor more likely to be found or developed in the population. In the example of radical attitudes, the existing literature points to countless potential factors which could cause such attitudes to form. Investigating these factors, which we shall label *minor risk factors* for the purpose of this article, and determining which of them have the most significant impact, demands the use of quantitative empirical research designs in the target population.




Figure 1. A conceptual model of radicalisation for the purpose of empirical research

It is important to consider how we should best delineate major and minor risk factors. It is entirely possible that in certain research contexts, a minor risk factor may, in fact, be a major one, or vice versa. The innate complexity of radicalisation as a phenomenon demands that any structure dedicated to studying it be at least partially flexible, and therefore the use of this model requires an allowance for fluidity in terms. There should be no issue in reclassifying risk factors as major or minor in a certain research context, as long as there is empirical evidence to support it. It is key that a major risk factor should be identified extensively in the literature as one of the ‘prime movers’ of radicalisation, and should, therefore, have an empirical base of support for its potential to predict radical behaviour.

In summary, a risk based approach breaks radicalisation down into major and minor risk factors. It is highly likely given the complex nature of radicalisation that several of these risk factors are interrelated. By structuring radicalisation in this fashion and establishing a clear research context, it allows for a more rigorous empirical process. This approach is limited by

its call for extensive empirical data, although given the much-criticised prevalence of publications in the field without an empirical basis, this limitation seems acceptable. Figure 1 depicts a conceptual model of how this approach could be executed. In the present study, this approach will be put into practice. Figure 2 provides a second demonstration of the conceptual model outside of an Islamic context, in this case, historical Catholic radicalisation in Northern Ireland, using a sample of potential risk factors taken from the conflict literature (Birrell, 1972; McGrattan, 2010). In the case of this example, experiences of relative deprivation would be the target major risk factor. Relative deprivation has been previously identified as being at the heart of the conflict in Northern Ireland (Birrell, 1972), with Catholics experiencing severe relative deprivation being more likely to support or even join the IRA during the period of extensive violence known as ‘The Troubles’ (1968-1998). Contributory factors to these feelings of relative deprivation are explored within the model, and might include widespread societal segregation, gender, employment status, and criminal history.




Figure 2. A second example of the conceptual model focusing on Northern Irish radicalisation.

Aims of the Present Study

The present study makes use of a risk based approach to radicalisation, examining radical attitudes as a major risk factor in a Swedish Muslim sample. To establish the research context, it is important to provide some basic demographic information. Sweden has a significant Muslim population, with 8.1% of its citizens identifying as Muslim. Relative to their own population, Sweden has the third largest concentration of Muslims in Europe, behind France and Bulgaria (Pew Research Center, 2017). It has recently been affected by Islamic terrorism, with a truck attack killing 5 and injuring 14 in Stockholm on the 7th April, 2017. The perpetrator, a 39 year old Uzbekistani national, claimed allegiance to the Islamic State (Mamatkulov, Rundstrom, Auyezov, Golubkova, & Stonestreet, 2017). In a listing of the 50 countries from which most IS fighters had been recruited from, Sweden was ranked 19th, contributing an estimated 300 recruits. With their contribution made relative to the size of their Muslim population, however, Sweden was ranked 4th (Benmelech & Klor, 2016).

Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that Muslims are subject to different forms of discrimination in Sweden. Larsson and Stjernholm (2016) noted that, although publically available statistics for hate crimes against Muslims in Sweden seemed low, there was evidence to suggest that these crimes are actually massively underreported and that the real rate may be much higher. Swedish Muslims have reported being the victims of Islamophobia and racial attacks (Sander, 2006), and there is a body of evidence to suggest that Swedish Muslims experience discrimination in the labour market (Agerström & Rooth, 2009; Åslund, & Rooth, 2005), and at the hands of government agencies (Ahmed, 2010). This body of information suggests that some Muslims in Sweden may be susceptible to radicalisation, and therefore makes for a sensible research context in which to conduct a risk-based study.

As past research has found that many Muslim terrorists have come from educated backgrounds, it was decided that the present study would examine radical attitudes within

students, particularly those at a University-level of education. There were numerous minor risk factors that could be identified through the existing literature that could be relevant to this population. As the present study is, to the author's knowledge, the first of its kind in Sweden, the decisions on which risk factors to include in the study were made on a case by case basis, with the acknowledgement of the time limitations placed upon the study as a Master's thesis.

The minor risk factors measured by the study as independent variables were: gender, vulnerability (how safe the participant feels in their neighbourhood), isolation (how much contact does the participant have with their friends and family), religiosity (how personally important is religion to the participant), religious fundamentalism (how important does the participant feel their religion should be for everyone), activist attitudes (the participants attitudes towards political activism to support their religious group), and general mental health (depression and anxiety specifically).

In light of the more sceptical research on the role that Islamic religious beliefs actually play in radicalisation, it was predicted that both religiosity and religious fundamentalism would not prove to be significantly related to the holding of radical attitudes (Silke, 2008; King & Taylor, 2011; Dodwell, Milton, & Ressler, 2016). Reflecting upon existing theory within the field concerning Muslim radicals describing an experience of disparity and marginalisation in the West, it was predicted that the participant's reported feelings of social isolation and vulnerability would be significantly related to radical attitudes (Sageman, 2004; Slooman & Tillie, 2006).

Although one can be an activist without also being a radical, it seems logical that if one is willing to engage in violent political activity, they may also be willing to engage in peaceful political activity as well. Past research has also indicated that attitudes towards activism of any sort may be more prevalent in the Muslim community (Nesser, 2004; Slooman & Tillie,

2006). Therefore, activist attitudes were also predicted to have a significant relationship with radical attitudes. As the vast literary consensus suggests that most terrorists are mentally stable individuals, it was predicted that the participant's general mental health would not be significantly associated with radical attitudes (Silke, 2008). Finally, given the considerable stability of research findings that links males towards violent crime and to terrorist activities (Farrington, 2003; Silke, 2008), it was predicted that gender would be significantly associated with radical attitudes, specifically that males would be more likely to express them than females.

Method

Participants

Seventy-seven participants took part in the present study, 30 males and 46 females (one participant declined to provide their gender), the participants were aged between 19-41 years old, with a mean age of 24.14 ($SD = 4.12$). This final sample of Muslim students was taken from a larger study of 151 participants in total, of varying religious attitudes (e.g Christian, non-religious, etc). All 77 participants identified as Muslims, and 73 of them reported that they were Swedish citizens. The entirety of the sample group were students recruited from Malmö University, who were found on-site, primarily in the campus library, and asked if they would like to participate in the study. Participation in the study was entirely voluntary and no incentives, monetary or otherwise, were offered in exchange. The only inclusion criteria involved for participation was that (a) they must be current students at a university or other higher education institution in the south of Sweden, (b) they must be over 18, and (c) they must speak English.

Materials

Vulnerability. Three items were used to measure the participant's feelings of satisfaction and safety in their local neighbourhood and trust in their neighbours. The content

of the three items used was: “*I feel happy with where I live*”, “*I trust my neighbours*”, and “*I feel safe where I live*”. These items were rated on a 5-point scale, ranging from “1 = Do not agree at all” to “5 = Completely agree”, therefore lower scores on this measure indicate higher feelings of vulnerability. Cronbach’s alpha was $\alpha = .88$, indicating an acceptable level of internal reliability.

Isolation. Three items were used to measure the participant’s level of social engagement with friends and family. Participants were asked how often they engaged in the following activities: “*Talked on the phone*”, “*Written an email or chatted online*”, and “*Socialized in person*”. Each item was rated on a 5-point scale, ranging from “1 = Never” to “5 = All the time”, therefore lower scores on this measure indicate higher social isolation. Cronbach’s alpha was $\alpha = .63$, suggesting acceptable reliability.

Religious Commitment. Religious commitment was measured through the use of the Religious Commitment Inventory (RCI-10; Worthington et al., 2003). This scale consists of ten items that assess the participant’s level of commitment to their religious faith, both in terms of its personal importance in their lives, and in terms of their active engagement with their faith in an organized context. Participants were asked to rate how true a statement was of them on a 5-point scale, ranging from “1 = Not true at all of me” to “5 = Totally true of me”. Examples of the items include: “*I often read books and magazines about my faith*” and “*My religious beliefs lie behind my whole approach to life*”. Worthington et al. (2003) found the RCI-10 to have a Cronbach’s alpha of $\alpha = .96$, whilst the current study found an alpha of $\alpha = .93$, both cases indicating good reliability.

Religious Fundamentalism. Religious fundamentalism was measured through the use of an adapted Islamic Fundamentalism Scale (IFS; Putra & Sukabdi, 2014). This 9 item scale was originally intended to measure fundamentalism in the specific context of the Islamic

faith, but for the purposes of this study, it was adapted to be an indirect, universal scale of fundamentalist beliefs. The content of the items aims to measure the participant's belief in the truth of their religion's teachings and how they should be applied to the greater world, e.g in law, governance, and society. Participants were asked to rate how much they agreed with the items on a 6-point scale, ranging from "1 = Strongly disagree" to "6 = Strongly agree". Examples of the items include: "*My religion's teachings are the perfect guidance so no one should question any of its elements*" and "*The system of government practiced within my religion's teachings can be implemented at any time and any place*". The original IFS was found to have a reliability coefficient of $\alpha = .75$ (Putra & Sukabdi, 2014), whilst the adapted scale in the present study had a Cronbach's alpha of $\alpha = .98$, suggesting very high internal reliability.

Activist and Radical Attitudes. Both activist and radical attitudes, henceforth referred to as activism and radicalism, respectively, were measured using an adaptation of the Activism and Radicalism Intention Scales (ARIS; Moskaleiko & McCauley, 2009). The full ten item variant of the scale used in the original manuscript was used in the current study, with the first 4 items used to assess activism and the final six items used to assess radicalism. Whilst Moskaleiko and McCauley excluded the ninth and tenth items from their final version of the ARIS, they were included in this current study given the context of radicalisation and terrorism, and these items explicit relevance to these topics. Participants were asked to assess on a 7-point scale how much they agreed with statements relating to political and radical action in the specific context of their religion, with ratings ranking from "1 = Strongly Disagree" to "7 = Strongly Agree". An example item for activist attitudes is: "*I would join/belong to an organization that fights for my religious group's political and legal rights*", whilst an example for radical attitudes is: "*I would attack police or security forces if I saw them beating members of my religious group*". The activism items were found to have a

Cronbach's alpha of $\alpha = .93$, whilst the radicalism items had an alpha of $\alpha = .88$, both indicating good internal reliability.

Mental Health. Two scales were used in the measurement of the participant's mental health, the General Anxiety Disorder Assessment 7 (GAD-7; Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, & Löwe, 2006), used as brief a measure of anxiety, and the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9; Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001), used as a brief measure of depression. Both scales were combined into a single battery of questions for the purposes of the current study. Participants were asked to rate, on a 4-point scale, how often they experienced different issues relating to their mental health and well-being, ranging from "1 = Not at all" to "4 = Nearly every day", therefore higher scores on this measure indicate poorer mental health. Example items include: "*Feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge?*" and "*Feeling tired or having little energy?*". Prior studies found a Cronbach's alpha of $\alpha = .89$ for the PHQ-9 and an alpha of $\alpha = .93$ for the GAD-7, whilst the current study found alphas of $\alpha = .86$ and $\alpha = .90$ for both scales respectively, indicating good internal reliability.

Procedure

The data were collected almost completely on campus at Malmö University, split between the university library in the Orkanen building, and the Niagara building. Participants were approached by the researcher and asked if they would like to take part in the study. Due to the sensitive content of the study in question, the self-report questionnaire handed out to participants was presented as a general study of theological and political attitudes, and was therefore handed out not only to Muslim students, but to students of other religious affiliations (or lack of them).

Many participants were found in small groups, and in these cases, they were informed that the questionnaires should be filled in privately, and that no within-group discussion

should take place regarding the contents. Participants were given as much time as they needed to complete the questionnaires and were allowed to do so in private without being actively monitored by the researcher. They were instructed to leave the completed questionnaires in plain sight on their tables or desks whenever they were finished, at which point the completed forms were collected by the researcher, and the participants were thanked for their time and provided the opportunity to ask questions or raise issues, if there were any.

As a note, it was first intended that the study would use an indirect measure of dehumanisation as part of its research design through the use of the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow & Swann, 2003). The TIPI can be used to indirectly measure dehumanisation, as previously demonstrated by Hodson and Costello (2007), by asking participants to attribute Big 5 personality traits to out-group members and then evaluating which of these traits are 'more human' and 'less human'. However, the implementation and reliability of this measure proved inappropriate for the current study and was therefore excluded from the data analysis and subsequent results.

Ethical issues

The politically charged nature of the current study called for some deception, which in turn raises the question of ethics. The self-report questionnaire was designed to approach the subject of radicalisation from as indirect an angle as possible, in an effort to both avoid offending its participants, and to set a less confrontational angle on what could otherwise be some very difficult questions. The participants were clearly informed, both through the briefing text on the questionnaire itself and through the researcher, that their participation was completely voluntary, that their anonymity would be protected, and that their answers would in no way be considered right or wrong, or be able to be used against them.

A comments and feedback section was added after some initial issues were raised, where participants could express their feelings regarding the study and the questions asked.

When issues were raised to the researcher, time and effort was spent to listen to the concerns and to reassure any worries concerning the purpose of the study and how the data might be used. Finally, the participants were all provided with contact information both for the researcher and for their supervisor, should they wish to take their concerns further.

Data preparation and analysis

The data analysis was conducted entirely through the use of IBM's SPSS Statistics software on a Windows-based operating system. During the data entry process, several samples were excluded due to extensive missing data, in cases where 50% or more of the data was missing. The remaining 77 data entries were then screened for missing values. Missing values that were found were replaced by the mean value taken from the other existing data, in line with the recommendations given by Tabachnik and Fidell (2007). The data were additionally screened for outliers and multicollinearity. No significant univariate or multivariate outliers were found during an analysis, and the tolerance values of the variables used in the study were found to be well within an acceptable threshold, ruling out any instances of multicollinearity.

The data were found to generally exhibit patterns of normal distribution, and when the variables were transformed into rank-order and entered into the multiple regression analyses, it was found that the variable of Vulnerability was non-significant ($p = .074$), the only significant deviation from the regular variables. For significance testing, all analyses used a two-tailed alpha level (.05). The reliability of all scales used in the study was assessed through the use of Cronbach's alpha (α). To examine the relationships in existence between the independent variables used in the study, Pearson correlations were employed. All predictions were investigated through the use of standard multiple regression analyses.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

The means and standard deviations for all applicable variables used in the study are presented in Table 1. There were moderately high levels of religiosity and fundamentalism demonstrated across the sample, whilst mental health scores (with a higher value signifying worse mental health) were also quite high.

Table 1

Means and standard deviations.

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Religiosity	30.57	10.83
Fundamentalism	30.87	15.03
Activism	15.99	8.61
Vulnerability	10.67	3.33
Isolation	11.64	2.60
Mental Health	26.38	9.66
Radicalism	13.95	8.33

Table 2 presents a Pearson's correlation matrix examining the relationships between the research variables. With the exception of mental health, all of the predictor variables were found to be significantly inter-correlated with radicalism. Activism was most strongly correlated, suggesting that participants with higher scores on the activism scale would also have higher scores on radicalism. Similar relationships with radicalism were observed with fundamentalism and religiosity. Gender was found to be significantly correlated with radicalism, with males being more likely to score highly. Lower scores on vulnerability and isolation, indicating that participants felt unsafe in their neighbourhood and engaged less socially with friends and family, were also found to be significantly correlated with higher radicalism scores.

Table 2*Bivariate correlations.*

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Religiosity	-							
2. Fundamentalism	.64**	-						
3. Activism	.67**	.74**	-					
4. Vulnerability	-.05	-.37**	-.33**	-				
5. Isolation	-.02	-.30**	-.12	.25**	-			
6. Mental Health	.08	.08	.04	-.04	.04	-		
7. Gender	-.05	-.30**	-.35**	.09	.16	.19	-	
8. Radicalism	.41**	.66**	.67**	-.43**	-.35**	.12	-.52**	-

Note: * = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$

Exploring the frequency of radical attitudes among participants

Table 3 presents the results of a frequency analysis of the radicalism variable, specifically focusing on values from the upper-half of the scale (5-7), therefore values which express positive support. It was found that of the 77 participants, 29 demonstrated support for, at the very least, one item on the scale, with an average of 15 participants demonstrating some support for items across the entire scale. The item that received the most support among the participants was “*I would go to war to protect the rights of my religious group*”, with 37.7% of all participants agreeing with this statement to some extent, including 16.9% fully endorsing it. Notably, none of the participants exhibited any support for item six on the scale (“*I would retaliate against ...*”).

Table 3*Frequencies of Radical Attitudes expressed in the present study*.*

Radical attitudes	Frequency (%)
1. I would continue to support an organization that fights for my religious group’s political and legal rights even if the organization sometimes breaks the law.	20.8
2. I would continue to support an organization that fights for my religious group’s political and legal rights even if the organization sometimes resorts to violence.	18.2
3. I would participate in a public protest against oppression of my religious group even if I thought the protest might turn violent.	23.4
4. I would attack police or security forces if I saw them beating members of my religious group.	18.2

5. I would go to war to protect the rights of my religious group.	37.7
6. I would retaliate against members of a group that had attacked my religious group, even if I couldn't be sure I was retaliating against the guilty party.	0

Note: The frequencies here reference only responses in the upper half of the scale.

Prediction of radical attitudes

A standard multiple regression analysis was used to investigate the relationship between the predictor variables and the dependent variable, radical attitudes. The regression equation was significant ($F(7,68)=20.17; p < .001, Adjusted R^2=.64$), accounting for 64% of the variance in radicalism. Gender emerged as the most strongly significant predictor of radicalism ($\beta = -.34; p < .001$), with males being much more likely to hold radical attitudes than females. Activism ($\beta = .29; p < .05$), was the second strongest positive predictor of radicalism, suggesting that those who hold radical attitudes were also likely to hold activist attitudes too.

Isolation ($\beta = -.16; p < .05$) and vulnerability ($\beta = -.18; p < .05$) were also found to be significant predictors of radicalism, with a negative correlation suggesting that participants who felt more isolated, and more vulnerable, were more likely to express radical attitudes. Finally, mental health ($\beta = .16, p < .05$) emerged as a significant positive predictor as well, with poorer reported mental health correlating to holding radical attitudes. Religiosity was found to be non-significant, as was fundamentalism.

The findings of the regression analysis largely serve to corroborate the predictions made in the present study, with gender, isolation, vulnerability, and activism all serving as positive predictors of the dependent variable, and religiosity and fundamentalism being found to be non-significant. The one notable exception to this statement is mental health, which proved to be significant in the regression model with all other variables controlled for. The implications of these findings and their role in future research will be discussed in the following section.

Table 4*Standardized regression coefficients predicting Radical Attitudes.*

Predictor	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	β
Religiosity	.04	.08	.06
Fundamentalism	.10	.06	.17
Activism	.29	.12	.29*
Vulnerability	-.46	.20	-.18*
Isolation	-.53	.24	-.16*
Mental Health	.14	.06	.16*
Gender	-5.84	1.38	-.34**
<i>Adjusted R²</i>		.64	
<i>F</i>		20.17	

Note: * = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$

Discussion

Main Findings

The present study sought to examine the relationship between radical attitudes and several possible predictor variables in a Swedish Muslim sample. The possession of radical attitudes has been framed, both by this study and in the literature, as a potential major risk factor in radicalisation. The predictors used in the present study were framed as minor risk factors in direct relation to the formation of radical attitudes. It is important to note the distinction between radical attitudes and radicalisation itself, as radical attitudes are only an expression of a support for more extreme forms of political action, and do not yet represent radicalised behaviour.

The results show that, of the minor risk factors examined by the study, gender, activism, vulnerability, isolation, and mental health were all significant predictors, whilst religiosity and fundamentalism were not. These findings suggest that men are more likely than women to possess radical attitudes, and that this likelihood increases considerably if they engage, or would like to engage, in activism. Feeling unsafe in one's own neighbourhood and

engaging sparsely with friends and family also increases the risk, as does feeling depressed or anxious.

As no previous studies of this kind have been conducted in the Swedish context, it is difficult to make direct comparisons. However, several of the findings present in the current study are in line with the expectations formed from the existing quantitative and qualitative literature. The vast majority of radicalised individuals studied in the literature have been male (Silke 2008), and the present study provides further evidence to suggest that radicalism is a more attractive proposition to men than it is to women. The role of activism in forming radical attitudes is expected, and perhaps serves as a logical progression for those individuals who do not think that they are currently doing enough to make a change, or who have grown frustrated with more peaceful efforts (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Feelings of vulnerability and marginalisation may lead to an individual seeking solace in the arms of radicals (Silke, 2003; Nesser, 2004), or may lead to a crisis of identity, the sense of ‘double non-belonging’ the viewpoint held within French sociology (Roy, 2004; Khosrokhavar & Macey, 2005)

The predictive role of mental health found by this study is perhaps the odd one out. It is possible that in this specific research context, mental health is relevant, given the relatively higher levels of stress, anxiety, and depression experienced by University students compared to the general population (Elsenberg, Gollust, Golberstein, & Hefner, 2007). Another potential explanation could be that past studies that have focused on mental health in radicalisation have focused primarily on abnormal mental health, whereas the present study measured general mental health, and did not attempt to measure anything that would be indicative of more severe mental illnesses.

Finally, with regards to the literature, the present study provides more evidence in favour of the assertion that religious beliefs, at least in the Islamic context, are not a

requirement in the process of radicalisation, as neither fundamentalism nor religiosity was found to be predictive (Silke, 2008; Kundani 2012; Silva, 2018). Whilst it remains likely that people who do fall deep down into the rabbit hole of radicalisation are likely to present themselves as devout and fundamentalist in their thinking, it seems increasingly doubtful that the Islamic religion itself guides them down the path of radicalisation in any meaningful way. Instead, it may be better used as a cognitive tool, employed both in self-radicalisation and in group radicalisation as a justification for actions and a way to bond with fellow radicals (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Kruglanski et al., 2014). The rather high frequency (37.7%) of participants who suggested that they would be willing to go to war to fight for their religious group's rights may be a point in support of this view, as Islamic extremists often describe their fight as being a part of the 'lesser Jihad' – indeed, this framing of terrorism as a holy war has been very stable throughout the usage of propaganda by Islamic terror groups, particularly al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (Dodwell, Milton, & Ressler, 2016; Rudner, 2017).

Limitations and Implications for Future Research

There are several important limitations that should be noted when considering the findings of the present study. Firstly, as a Master's thesis, there was a relatively short time allotment for the collection of data. Although the acquisition of data was made fairly simple through the use of self-report questionnaires, finding willing participants was a much more difficult task. It is quite likely that, owing to the often discriminatory or sensationalist coverage in the media, that young Muslims may feel that they are being specifically targeted by a study that concerns itself in any way with radicalisation. Active efforts were made to avoid this in the present study, particularly through the use of indirectly formed questions in the research materials, and by handing out the questionnaires to a diverse group of ethnicities and religions.

Despite these efforts, the sample size was ultimately quite low, and although it is within an acceptable size for the method of analysis used, it is still not ideal. Given more time for extensive data collection, and the use of additional data streams such as online questionnaires and mailing lists, more participants could have been acquired.

An additional limitation concerns the nature of the sample being made up entirely of students. Although this was justified within the context of existing literature, specifically that most radicalised Muslims have some form of higher education (Sageman, 2004), it is still difficult to make any generalisations concerning the Muslim population at large. Indeed, these sorts of generalisations have been made previously and have proven to be damaging to the field at large (Kundnani 2012, Silva 2018), so the present author cautions strongly against any such judgements. Further research would be necessary, both at different levels of education and outside of it, in order to come to any form of consensus.

Given the low sample size and the limited time available, it was necessary to make value judgements concerning what minor risk factors could be examined. There is considerable evidence in the literature for many different minor risk factors that have not been taken into account by the current study, such as age, economic deprivation, past criminal history, experiences of racial and/or religious discrimination, employment status, and many more (Silke, 2008; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010).

Considerations had to be made based on realistic expectations concerning the data collection, particularly with regards to what sort of information the participants would be willing to share. Efforts were made to make the research materials as neutral and inoffensive as possible to avoid further marginalising a group that already often is the victim of extensive prejudice and discrimination (Åslund, & Rooth, 2005; Sander, 2006; Agerström & Rooth, 2009; Ahmed, 2010; Larsson & Stjernholm, 2016). It would be ideal to study a more extensive list of risk factors, in a larger and more diverse sample, though it is likely that this

would require more extensive preparation to build a relationship of trust with the sample group.

A final limitation, which also relates to recommendations for future study, is the focus on a single major risk factor. Past research has shown that radical attitudes alone are not required for an individual to carry out an act of terrorism (Silke, 2008). Indeed, it is highly likely that not a single participant in the present study that did hold strongly radical attitudes will ever actually carry out a violent act. It is therefore important to revisit the structure argued for in the introduction, a rigorously empirical approach to radicalisation that advocates for the continued study of risk factors in different research contexts. There is likely to be a significant difference in the risk factors that play a part in radicalisation across different cultural contexts, for example between a Western European context and an African context, or an East Asian context. Notably, there has been very little research done on radicalisation in the Chinese Uighur population, who have been subject to government crackdowns in recent years (Shan & Ping, 2015), and from which IS has recruited several fighters (Clarke & Kan, 2017).

It has been argued by the present author that it is important to iterate on the research process, identifying and studying both major and minor risk factors in radicalisation in an attempt to create a consensus on which of these risk factors is ultimately the most predictive of radicalisation in a given context. The present study has only just begun this iterative process by focusing on radical attitudes. The results show that these attitudes are prevalent in at least a small sample of Swedish Muslims, and that several minor risk factors may predict the formation of these attitudes. The present study does not, and indeed cannot, offer a conclusive point of view on whether radical attitudes are the major predictor of radicalisation in Sweden. Nor, as the study is a cross-sectional one, can we discuss implications for causality in radicalisation. The present study is only able to identify the prevalence of radical

attitudes in a cross-section of the population, and explore potential risk factors for the development of these attitudes. The results shown here cannot be used as an indication of radical behaviour.

In order to provide a more conclusive viewpoint, there would first need to be a considerable base of empirical research that examines both radical attitudes and other major risk factors, preferably analysing several major risk factors together at once in a large, diverse sample. We are far from that point at the time of writing, but the present study has laid the groundwork and provides foundations upon which empirical investigation can build upon.

Future studies are therefore recommended to focus on identifying and examining other major risk factors for radicalisation that may affect the Swedish Muslim population. The existing global literature provides numerous examples which could be explored further, and it would be particularly valuable for the field's growth to try and examine those that have seen less study. It is important also that future studies do not allow themselves to be too influenced by the early work in the field, much of which has focused on 'organised terror' in the form of al-Qaeda and other such groups, whilst the more recent terrorist threats in Western Europe and the United States have been characterised by the more loose organisation and widespread influence of the Islamic State.

Within this context, social media usage is an obvious target for study, as the exploitation of social media by the likes of IS and similar groups in recent years has been particularly successful in the recruitment of young Muslims, either to venture off to Syria and Iraq to fight, or to conduct lone or group acts of violent terrorism in Western countries (Dodwell, Milton, & Ressler, 2016). An exploratory study that frames social media usage as a major risk factor for radicalisation and subsequently identifies minor risk factors in relation to this would be a good starting point. It is important for such a study to differentiate normal social media usage from social media usage in a radicalisation context, clearly delineating

simply using the likes of Facebook and Twitter to chat with friends, to using it to actively pursue and/or support IS propaganda. Suggested minor risk factors to explore within the context of social media usage could range from the obvious such as age, economic status, employment, to more fringe factors like personality or abnormal mental health.

The difficulties encountered by the present study in finding participants highlight an existing issue within the field, in that the availability of good research materials can often prove to be a limitation. In preparing to carry out this study, an extensive list of scales to measure radicalisation was consulted (Scarcella, Page, & Furtado, 2016). In this list, the vast majority of scales were considered to highly direct in their inferences towards terrorism, and could very likely be perceived as offensive by Muslim participants. This may owe to the field's dubious history with regards to research ethics (Kundnani, 2012). There is a clear need for better measures in this field that can accurately capture important constructs without alienating participants. It is vitally important going forward that research within this field strives to be ethical and avoids the sort of discriminatory discourse and rhetoric that often dominates public debate. The empirical pursuit of radicalisation is absolutely vital, and it should not be hindered by the reckless use of crudely worded questionnaires or prompts.

The points for future research discussed to date have primarily focused on the problems faced by the field concerning Islamic radicalisation, but it is of vital importance that we continue to strive to view radicalisation as not an inherently Islamic problem, but a universal one. Historically, before the 'radicalisation of today' came to dominate the field, the focus was often on the political identity and aspirations of the terrorist, rather than their religion. For example, the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland may have been a largely Catholic organisation, but it was not Catholic doctrine that characterised their actions, but a political goal of achieving a united socialist Irish Republic (Silke & Brown, 2016). Too much of the discourse to date has focused on situating the 'why' purely in a religious context, or in

the context of revenge against an uncaring West. There is not enough research on what extremists from the likes of al-Qaeda or the Islamic State actually wish to achieve politically. If, as some researchers suggest, the establishment of widespread Sharia law or a 'caliphate' are irrational and unrealistic goals (Silke, 2008), then we must either view these groups as inherently irrational, an unlikely conclusion, or we must learn to read between the propaganda lines and establish what is really being fought for.

In a similar vein, it is important that future researchers do not fixate entirely on the phenomenon of Islamic extremists. Acts of terrorist violence can be carried out by individuals of any identity, whether it be Muslim or otherwise. The present article discusses radicalisation and risk factors within a specific research context, but there absolutely exists the possibility that there are major risk factors shared across multiple populations in which there is a risk at radicalisation. The model for the empirical study of radicalisation within this article can be applied to any research context where radicalisation is a factor, including non-Muslim radicalisation.

In light of the current political climate in the West, particularly in the United States, it would be valuable to address radicalisation in largely white, right-wing groups, particularly the 'alt-right' movement that has grown considerably in the last several years, and often exploits social media in much the same way as the Islamic State (Gerbaudo, 2018). If there are similarities between the likes of the alt-right, a loosely organised movement with no central leadership, and Muslim terrorist organisations, just as there are noted similarities between the past era terrorist groups like the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), or the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and our modern terrorist organisations, then the field can be brought closer to a universal understanding of radicalisation. This would also prove valuable in shifting the prevalent discourse away from purely Islamic radicalisation towards a more balanced, diverse viewpoint.

Apparent similarities between terrorist organisations situated in different cultural contexts also highlight the need for collaboration between researchers situated in different nations. If there are common trends to be observed in radicalisation, the use of comparative studies could better identify these trends and provide new, highly valuable information towards our understanding of which risk factors are universally relevant. Making use of the wealth of conflict research available in the likes of Northern Ireland, and the potential availability of formerly radicalised individuals for study, would be an excellent first step towards establishing a more multinational research effort towards the study of radicalisation in all its forms.

Given the notable deficit in the field concerning the leadership of radical groups (Nesser, 2004), future research could also benefit from the kind of conceptual model outlined in the present article. There is an inherent difficulty in studying the leaders of radical groups, as they often hold the most extensively radical views and have no interest in engaging with researchers (Silke, 2008). However, the structure of the empirical model described in the present article allows for the study of risk factors alongside other robust psychological constructs. Leadership could be measured in concert with risk factors, and it could be possible then to explore whether there are significant differences in the sorts of risk factors that apply to individuals who score highly in psychometric measures of leadership, and those who do not. It would be a worthwhile endeavour to consider the distinct types of leadership worth measuring and which scales to employ. Given the past literature, charismatic leadership styles seem to be the logical 'best fit' for a radicalisation context, but this would require further study.

As a final recommendation for future study, if the present study was to be revisited and radical attitudes were further explored with a much larger sample size, the use of a path-analysis could be employed. The present study has clearly identified some interesting

relationships between risk factors that a simple multiple regression is incapable of fully exploring, whilst a path-analysis could better illuminate these relationships. This would be particularly helpful in understanding the role that mental health plays in predicting radical attitudes amongst students, given that this particular finding stood out amongst the rest in its departure from established literature.

Conclusion

The present study argues for a restructuring of radicalisation as a concept, stripping away its overly broad remit and ‘blurry’ qualities in favour of straightforward, iterative empirical process. As a proof of concept, the present study took this proposed structural model and examined radical attitudes in a Swedish Muslim sample as a major risk factor in radicalisation. The results of this study demonstrate the effectiveness of structure and quantitative research when approaching complex phenomena like radicalisation. Going forward, it is important that researchers strive to avoid the sort of generalisations and ‘hype’ that often orbit radicalisation, and instead rely on clear concepts and the use of empirical data to orientate themselves in what it is, unquestionably, a highly difficult field to study.

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Appendix A. Questionnaire

A Study of Theological and Political Opinions Among Swedish Students

Hi there! My name is Zach Loughery, I'm a Masters student from the Department of Psychology at Lund University. I am conducting a study on the different attitudes and opinions held by students across southern Sweden towards religion and political action. The aim of this study is to discover how students feel about religion and how their religious views align alongside their views on political action. This study will also examine the mental health of its participants to investigate whether there are any interesting relationships at work. It would be really helpful if you would participate!

To take part in the study, you should fill out the questions in the pages that follow, as fully and truthfully as you can. Your answers will be completely anonymous and will not be used against you in any way, or presented individually in the results of the study. You should feel confident that there are no answers to any of the questions that are considered right or wrong.

The questionnaire should take no more than 10 minutes to complete.

If you have any concerns or questions about the study, please feel free to contact either myself or my supervisor using the contact details below.

Researcher: Zach Loughery (za5016lo-s@student.lu.se)

Supervisor: Magnus Lindén, Associate Professor; Senior Lecturer
(magnus.linden@psy.lu.se)

Telephone: 0046-46-2221723



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Theme 1 - Background**1. What gender do you identify as?**

Male	<input type="checkbox"/>
Female	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>

2. What age are you?

3. Are you religious? If so, which religious group do you belong to?

Christianity	<input type="checkbox"/>
Islam	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hinduism	<input type="checkbox"/>
Buddhism	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other Spirituality	<input type="checkbox"/>
Not Religious	<input type="checkbox"/>

4. Are you a Swedish citizen?

Yes	No
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How much do you agree with the following statements concerning where you live? (e.g Your apartment complex, your residential area, etc.)

		1	2	3	4	5
		Do not agree at all				Completely agree
5.	I feel happy with where I live.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6.	I trust my neighbours.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7.	I feel safe where I live.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Theme 2 - Social Network

In the last two weeks, how often have you engaged in the following social activities with friends and/or relatives?

		1	2	3	4	5
		Never				All the time
8.	Talked on the phone.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9.	Written an email or chatted online.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10.	Socialized in person.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

11. How many of your friends share your ethnic background?

All	A lot	About half	Very few	None
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Theme 3 – Religious and Political Attitudes (Skip if Not Religious)

The following questions relate to your views on religion and how important it is to you.

		1	2	3	4	5
		Not at all true of me				Totally true of me
12.	I often read books and magazines about my faith.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13.	I make financial contributions to my religious organization.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14.	I spend time trying to grow in understanding of my faith.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15.	Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the meaning of life.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16.	My religious beliefs lie behind my whole approach to life.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17.	I enjoy spending time with others of my religious affiliation.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18.	Religious beliefs influence all my dealings in life.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19.	It is important to me to spend periods of time in private religious thought and reflection.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.	I enjoy working in the activities of my religious organization.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

		1 Strongly disagree	2	3	4	5	6	7 Strongly agree
46.	I would continue to support an organization that fights for my religious group’s political and legal rights even if the organization sometimes resorts to violence.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
47.	I would participate in a public protest against oppression of my religious group even if I thought the protest might turn violent.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
48.	I would attack police or security forces if I saw them beating members of my religious group.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
49.	I would go to war to protect the rights of my religious group.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
50.	I would retaliate against members of a group that had attacked my religious group, even if I couldn’t be sure I was retaliating against the guilty party.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Theme 4 – Mental Health

Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by any of the following problems?

		1 Not at all	2 Several days	3 More than half of the days	4 Nearly every day
51.	Feeling nervous, anxious or on edge?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
52.	Not being able to stop or control worrying?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
53.	Worrying too much about different things?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
54.	Trouble relaxing?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
55.	Being so restless that it is hard to sit still?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
56.	Becoming easily annoyed or irritable?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
57.	Feeling afraid as if something awful might happen?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
58.	Little interest or pleasure in doing things?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
59.	Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
60.	Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
61.	Feeling tired or having little energy?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

		1 Not at all	2 Several days	3 More than half of the days	4 Nearly every day
62.	Poor appetite or overeating?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
63.	Feeling bad about yourself - or that you are a failure or have let yourself or your family down?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
64.	Trouble concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or watching television.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
65.	Moving or speaking so slowly that other people could have noticed? Or the opposite - being so fidgety or restless that you have been moving around a lot more than usual?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
66.	Thoughts that you would be better off dead, or of hurting yourself in some way?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

The questionnaire is now finished. Please turn it back in to the researcher.

If you have any comments or other feedback, please feel free to leave it below.

Thank you for your participation!