Putting all the sustainable development eggs in the private sector basket

An investigation into hegemonic struggle in the Danish development community over increasing private sector-driven development

Louise Maria Skotte Møller

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

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Supervisor: Turaj Faran, LUCSUS, Lund University

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Abstract:

How sustainable development (SD) is envisioned, practiced and financed is a crucial question today. In Denmark, the former government introduced private sector-driven development (PSDD) at the heart of Danish development cooperation. In this thesis, I seek to understand how the Danish development community (represented in this study by four large civil society NGOs) have positioned themselves to this government paradigm, using critical discourse analysis and Gramsci's concept of hegemony. I then seek to uncover how hegemony can be explained and challenged in this context.

The thesis shows that despite little evidence to the efficiency of blended finance and partnerships (core tenets of PSDD) as a pathway for SD, the government discourse has largely colonized the Danish development community. This discourse is characterized by urgency, necessity, and optimism for PSDD as a win-win solution. The hegemonic NGO discourse reiterates this to a large extent and urges participation in order to guarantee ethics. A counter-hegemonic NGO discourse challenges this with a counter-alternative, 'public finance for public goods'. All use the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to justify their position.

The vulnerability of the Danish development community to hegemony can be seen as a result of existing social practices, including the universality of broad SD agendas, the allure of win-win solutions, corporate capture of civil society purpose and language and NGOization of civil society. As the last step, pathways for the counter-hegemonic movement to pose a stronger challenge to the PSDD hegemony are discussed. I argue that the discursive struggle must be complemented by praxis and efforts to change the material conditions of the development community. A stronger counter-movement may be built on turning away from the SDGs as a final end and with it the growth-centered weak sustainability of the government and exploring other conceptualizations better fundamentally challenge the hegemony.

Keywords

Sustainable development, development finance, private sector-driven development, civil society, critical discourse analysis, hegemony

Word count: 13.999

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List of abbreviations

AAAA: Addis Ababa Action Agenda

AAD: ActionAid Denmark (Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke)

BF: Blended finance

CD: CARE Denmark

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis

CSR: Corporate social responsibility

DCA: DanChurchAid (Folkekirkens Nødhjælp)

DANIDA: Danish International Development Agency

DIIS: Danish Institute for International Studies

DMDP: DANIDA Market Development Partnerships

DRM: Domestic resource mobilization

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

IFU: Danish Investment Fund for Developing Countries

NGO: Non-governmental organization

ODA: Official Development Assistance

PPPs: Public-private partnerships

PSDD: Private sector-driven development

RQ: Research question

SD: Sustainable development

SDG17: Sustainable Development Goal 17: Partnerships for the Goals

SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals

SG: Secretary-General

StCD: Save the Children Denmark (Red Barnet)

UN: United Nations

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Prologue

In the years following the worldwide adoption of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a true SDG-hype seemed to roll over parts of Danish society - political sphere, civil society, and private sector alike. Politicians sported the colorful SDG pin, businesses added SDG emblems to their websites, and NGO officers posed for pictures with SDG cubes on social media. The then Danish government introduced a new development strategy for 2030 based on the SDGs. The Social Democratic Party cleverly claimed the SDGs as "Social Democratic Goals" while the Confederation of Danish Industry held seminars and conferences showcasing how aligned Danish businesses were with the global sustainability agenda.

This scene made me wonder: How could this one framework for global sustainable development be so uncritically endorsed across societal sectors and ideological divides? Having spent two years studying sustainability science, I knew that 'sustainability' and 'sustainable development' in were contested terms. I quickly saw Danish civil society as an arena for contestation following the introduction of the new SDG-based development strategy. This was confirmed as the strategy prompted a debate in civil society about private sector-driven development during 2018 and 2019, with some in favor and others in opposition. This is where this thesis takes its point of departure.

1. Introduction

In a world facing multiple social and ecological crises, achieving and advancing sustainable development (SD) has become a key question of our time. In 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were introduced and adopted by all 193 United Nations (UN) member states as a common global framework for SD, hailed for its universality, transformative potential and vow to 'leave no one behind' (Sustainable Development Summit, 2015).

In Denmark, a new 2030 development cooperation strategy explicitly based on the SDGs was adopted by the Parliament in 2017, setting new goals for Danish development cooperation abroad. The Liberal

government (2015-2019) branded this new strategy as a "paradigm shift"[1] in development policy, as it sought to bring together different actors in partnerships and employ public finance to catalyze private investments in pursuit of SD - all with specific reference to SDG 17: Partnerships for the Global Goals (Verden 2030, 2017). The main actor in focus was the private sector, which through different DANIDA[2] instruments and programmes was urged to play a much larger role in development cooperation (Engberg & Fejerskov, 2018). More than anything, the government's paradigm shift, as materialized in the new strategy, worked to centralize the private sector in Denmark's international SD work, marking a shift towards private sector-driven development (PSDD).[3]

However, sustainability and SD are inherently contested terms, which can be used to further many, and often conflicting, agendas (Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005). This beckons questions of who holds the power to define SD and SD pathways, with what benefits and material consequences for whom. SD can therefore be seen as an arena for contestation.

Nowhere in Denmark was this contestation more present following the introduction of the strategy than in the part of civil society that directly works with development in the Global South - by practitioners called the Danish 'development community'. It comprises NGOs, most of whom are dependent on Official Development Aid (ODA) through DANIDA to carry out their programs and projects abroad (Pratt, Adams & Warren, 2005). Albeit having a shared NGO-imperative to "do good", these organizations have different interpretations, ideals, and values in their work to achieve SD.[4] Therefore, I take the Danish development community as my field of inquiry to understand the discursive power struggles that play out over SD in this context.

[1]Perhaps inspired by then-UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon's announcing the SDGs as a *"paradigm shift for people and the planet"* (Scheywens, Banks & Hughes, 2016, p. 371).
[2]Danish International Development Agency
[3]Development cooperation and SD are not necessarily the same. SD should be aspired for nationally as well as abroad, in the Global South and the Global North, as is also recognized in the universality of the SDGs. This thesis looks particularly at development cooperation as an intentional intervention in the Global South (Mitlin, Hickey & Bebbington, 2007). However, as the work of the development community is directly guided by the SDGs in the new strategy (Verden, 2030) and in many ways has become unanimous with SD through that, I take those to be interrelated.
[4]These observations about the Danish development community are based on background interviews.

1.1 Research: Aim, questions and scientific grounding

In this thesis, I aim to investigate how actors in the Danish development community have reacted and positioned themselves to the strategy and the government's interpretation and operationalization of the SDGs. I do so by means of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and Gramsci's concept of hegemonic struggle in order to understand the implications of the imposition of a definition of a contestable term onto a diverse civil society. Understanding this is important because how SD is defined in the Global North, which still predominantly holds and disperses the funds for development cooperation[5] (Williams, 2015), has material significance for those tasked with driving SD efforts and not least for those on the receiving end (Stokke, 2019b).

Recognizing this, I ground myself scientifically in critical realism, which recognizes a material reality separate of human interpretation (Bhaskar, 2011). While recognizing the role of human interpretation of social events epistemologically, critical realism maintains a realist ontology, in which a material reality exists regardless of the human experience of it (Bhaskar, 2011).

For this reason, this thesis pays much attention to the socio-historical developments and material outcomes of PSDD (Section 2 and 3), before engaging with the CDA which seeks to uncover the human interpretation of it. This is guided by the following questions guide my research (Figure 1):



Figure 1: Research questions *(Own illustration)*

[5]Although South-South development cooperation has been increasing (Mawdsley, 2015).

RQ1 and RQ2 will be answered by analyzing collected empirical material, namely interviews with NGO employees, observation notes from conferences and panel debates, and statements to the press. RQ3 will be answered by drawing on theory.

1.3 Contribution to sustainability science

Sustainability science is based on the normative ideal that a transition towards sustainability and away from the status quo (be it political or economic) is imperative given the nature of the pressing and coupled sustainability crises (Clark & Dickson, 2003). Jerneck et al. (2010) define respectively scientific understanding, sustainability goals, and sustainability pathways and strategies as core themes in sustainability science. In this thesis, I focus in on the intersection between the latter two. Sustainability goals being a process where *"society formulates and negotiates goals, for one of multiple challenges, in political dialogues between society and science"* (Jerneck et al. 2010, p. 72.) and sustainability pathways and strategies where *"society takes political decisions on pathways and strategies to fulfil the goals"* (Jerneck et al. 2010, p. 72). The SDGs are in all regards the most ambitious sustainability goals today and play an increasing role in both local, national and regional policymaking (Kanie & Biermann, 2017). However, the pathways and strategies to fulfill them are inherently as political and therefore contestable, as SD itself. What strategies are taken to fulfill them, and what political decisions lie behind those strategies shape the material outcomes. For this reason, it is pivotal that we understand the underlying ideologies and agendas that are being furthered in reach of the SDGs. That is my attempt and contribution to sustainability science.

1.5 Defining civil society

This thesis takes the Danish development community within Danish civil society as its field of inquiry, specifically looking at four large NGOs (further explained in 5.1). To avoid confusion about these terms (civil society, development community, NGOs) I will lend a few words to explain their interconnection.

For Gramsci, civil society and state existed with close ties to one another rather than autonomously (Burawoy, 2001). Civil society in a modern capitalist society is understood as muddled, complex and heterogeneous, characterized by differing interests (Callinicos, 2007). According to Kamat (2013), large and professionalized NGOs can be seen to occupy a space between these, having the potential for

contention against state policy but also having strong institutional ties to the state as they rely on state funding.[6] The Danish development community (comprised mainly of such NGOs) can through this lens be seen as a co-extension of state and civil society, in which NGOs belong fully to neither but instead become a site of contention between the interests of both (Kamat, 2013).

Bearing this in mind, in this thesis, the Danish development community is seen as a part of a diverse and large Danish civil society. However, different scholars I draw on use these terms interchangeably and, in those cases,, to stay true to their work, so do I. Therefore, all three terms (civil society, development community, NGOs) are used interchangeably throughout.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

The thesis is divided into the following parts: First, a contextualization will situate the Danish "paradigm shift" in the international debate on SD (historically, globally and nationally). Following this, two major tenets of PSDD (financing and collaboration) will be critically scrutinized drawing on current research. Secondly, I introduce the theory, methodology and empirical material used to carry out the ensuing CDA of the development strategy, government discourse and two identified NGO discourses in pursuit of RQ1 and RQ2. Finally, pertaining to RQ3, a discussion will shed light on social practice mechanisms that make the Danish development community vulnerable to hegemony, as well as different pathways for challenging hegemony, grounded in theory.

2. Contextualizing the "paradigm shift"

The government's "paradigm shift" towards PSDD in Danish development policy is far from an isolated geographic phenomenon. In fact, scholars in the critical geography and development fields have been marking a trend towards a policy preference for private sector engagement in national and global development strategies (e.g. Mawdsley, 2015; Romero, 2016; Weber, 2017), and call it by many names.[7] Whatever the name, it often comprises some key aspects: A centering of economic growth agendas; the private sector as a central actor in achieving SD, partnerships - commonly understood as between the private sector and the state or/and civil society (Engberg-Pedersen, 2019); and blended finance (BF), in

[6]Compared to e.g. social movements or other more loosely organized entities of civil society (Kamat, 2013)
[7]The 'private turn' (Romero, 2016); the market-driven approach (Florini & Pauli, 2018), the financialization-development nexus (Mawdsley, 2018a), the sustainable development-neoliberalism nexus (Kumin, Arhin & Yeboah, 2014), the neoliberal development episteme (Weber, 2017) and more.

which public funds (ODA) are used to leverage and de-risk private investments in certain sectors or areas in pursuit of SD (Mawdsley, 2018b). For simplicity's sake, I refer to this trend as PSDD throughout. The emergence and popularization of PSDD is rooted in historical developments and international institutions, expanded on below.

2.1 Global developments in SD

The global landscape of SD policy and financing has seen major changes during the last decades (Romero, 2016), following both trends of globalization and neoliberalism (Smith, 2010; O'Hara, 2006). Below I draw on existing research to shed light on the developments, grouped in what I name two major but linked shifts concerning respectively financing and governance of SD.

2.1.1 From ODA to development finance

Mawdsley (2018a) juxtaposes PSDD to the preeminent traditional development financing model, consisting mainly of ODA, remittances, foreign direct investment (FDI) and debt relief.[8] Much in the traditional model has been criticized, including the model's ineffectiveness, financial insufficiency to meet the needs of developing countries, the creation of aid dependency between the donor and recipient countries, as well as geographical asymmetry of funds dispersion (Mawdsley, 2018a).

Especially the insufficiency of funds conjured by this model laid the way for a shift in development finance policy, as today seen in the SDGs (see 2.1.3). This was further prompted, as aid budgets in the Global North took a hard toll following the 2008 financial crisis, (Romero, 2016). Discursively, this shift can be seen in the moving away from centering public funds (ODA) and towards the more encompassing 'development finance', which opens up for other sources of finance (Mawdsley, 2018a).[9] This mirrors the reality that available public finance is inadequate to meet SD needs on a global scale, creating a so-called financing gap in order to reach the SDGs (Romero, 2016) - to go from 'billions to trillions', as often repeated under UN auspices (Mawdsley, 2018b). OECD estimates this financing gap to be 2.5 trillion USD (OECD, 2018).

[8]The traditional development finance model was the main component in financing the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), which were set on raising developed countries' ODA contributions to the desired UN-target 0.7 % of GDP (while a less significant focus was on attracting private capital to development efforts) (Mawdsley, 2018b). Although this 0,7% target was agreed on in 1970 with the ambition to fulfill it by 1975, only few developed countries ever met it (notably the Scandinavian countries and few other European countries) (Stokke, 2019a).
[9]Mawdsley (2018b) argues that this shift is similarly reflected in a shift in development cooperation away from poverty reduction and towards economic growth.

However, pathways to closing the financing gap have been contested. The Third International Conference on Financing for Development in 2015, which sprung from the SDG process and birthed the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA)[10], set the scene for this contention (Romero, 2016). The main contenders were those who wished to close the gap primarily via enhancing public funds (by domestic resource mobilization (DRM)[11], stopping capital flight, tax evasion, and ensuring redistribution, i.e. the traditional development finance model) and those who saw opportunities in utilizing public funds like ODA for leveraging private investments to SD efforts (known as blended finance (BF)) and overall further PSDD. The latter won (Mawdsley, 2018b; Romero, 2016), although references to the traditional development finance model exist in the indicators of SDG17 (this is exemplified in 2.1.3).

2.1.2 From multilateralism to multistakeholderism

An equally important shift in this period concerns governance. Gleckman (2018) argues that we are seeing a shift away from the 400-year Westphalian history of holding states as central governors in international relations, a multilateral mode of governance. Increasingly, and in many ways visible in the SDG negotiation processes (McKeon, 2017), a new mode of global governance is emerging: Multistakeholderism. This mode replaces the state as the central governing unit with stakeholders, be it state or non-state actors such as corporations or civil society groups (Gleckman, 2018), and prompts partnerships as a collaboration mode to achieve SD. This is reflected in the SDG-associated trope 'All hands on deck [for the SDGs]', calling for the involvement of actors across sectors, as explained by the UN Secretary-General: "I am calling on civil society, grass-roots organizations, media, private sector, unions, academia and others to mobilize partnerships like never before." (UN Secretary-General, 2019).

According to Biermann, Chan, Mert & Pattberg (2007), whereas proponents argue that this shift holds democratic potential in allowing more voices direct influence in participatory governance processes, critics problematize this development for a number of reasons. Firstly, the unit stakeholder itself has yet to be properly defined and there is no clear nor democratic process for achieving stakeholder status, which by implication is a global governor status (Gleckman, 2018). Secondly, there is a lack of legitimacy and accountability in such processes as there are no global frameworks or guidelines (Biermann et al., 2007).[12] According to McKeon (2017), a key proponent of the multistakeholder approach, that has

[10]The AAAA is a global framework for financing the SDGs (Addis Ababa Action Agenda, 2015).
[11]Domestic resource mobilization refers to the process of countries raising their own funds for national development through taxation or non-tax sources (such as royalties etc.) (Domestic Resource Mobilization, 2019).
[12]According to Biermann et al., (2007), critics have argued that multistakeholder-partnerships *"might privilege*

accelerated in the past 15 years, is the private sector. She points out that multistakeholderism has allowed the private sector privileged access, not just as a participant, but as a co-convener of international policy deliberation processes (McKeon, 2017).

2.1.3 SDG17: Envisioning the pathway

Here, I will lend a few words to understanding SDG17, which holds special importance in the debate on SD and development finance. The above-described shifts and the struggles over them within the SDG context is most prominently expressed in SDG17. SDG17 serves as a means to achieving the SDGs (through strengthening the global partnership) and as a goal in itself and so is instructive in understanding how the pathway to SD is envisioned within this framework. In many ways reflecting the AAAA debate, SDG17 comprises targets both attaining to strengthening DRM and increasing local capacity for taxation (target 17.1), amplifying ODA (target 17.2), as well as increasing private sector engagement and financing through multi-stakeholder partnerships (targets 17.3, 17.16 and 17.17) (SDG17, 2015). As such, like the SDGs themselves, differing interests can interpret, emphasize and utilize SDG17 to fit their agenda.[13]

2.2 The Danish context

Finally, the Danish context frames the field of inquiry. Once an ODA frontrunner, Denmark has long lived up to the OECD-obligation of delivering 0.7 % of its GDP in ODA (Olesen, 2015), peaking at 1,06 % in 2000 and making Denmark the largest national donor relative to its size (Timbuktu Fonden & Heldgaard, 2016).[14] A longstanding trademark of Danish development policy has been poverty reduction and program-based bilateral cooperation (Due-Nielsen & Petersen, 2008), based on a blend of solidarity imperatives and self-interest (Stokke, 2019c). The 90s are often described as the 'heyday' of Danish development cooperation in terms of funding volume, political backing and commitment to long-term development programs (Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov, 2018). In the late 90s, Danish development policy resisted to some degree the otherwise dominant neoliberal "aid to trade" regime of the WTO, maintaining its poverty reduction focus, albeit becoming more conditional and market oriented (Olesen, 2015).

more powerful actors, in particular "the North" and "big business", and consolidate the privatization of governance and dominant neo-liberal modes of globalization" (Biermann et al., 2007, p. 239).

[13]Critical scholarship argues that SDG17 has brought with it a deepening financialization of development practices as policy operationalization is increasingly put on PSDD, BF, public-private partnerships (PPPs), microfinance and free trade (see e.g. Mawdsley, 2018a; Livermann, 2015).

[14]During the 1990s, as the then Social Democratic government had simultaneous additional funding programmes for peacekeeping and environmental conservation efforts, the total percentage of GDP spent on broad development efforts totaled 1.5 % (Olesen, 2015).

Since 2001 however, the Danish development community has experienced continued constraints and funding cuts from the state[15] and in 2015 ODA was cut to 0.7 % (Timbuktu Fonden & Heldgaard, 2016)[16]. In 2017, the SDG-based development strategy was implemented. Based explicitly on SDG17 (Verden 2030, 2017), the strategy moves Danish development cooperation towards PSDD and away from the traditional development model:

> *With the SDGs as a starting point, we will organize our development cooperation in a way that can help set the individual and its potential free in developing countries. Market-driven economic growth and greater freedom for individuals go hand in hand. The foremost task of development assistance is to make itself redundant. We do this not least through initiatives that can remove barriers to the individual's motivation, stimulate entrepreneurship, including combating corruption, and exploit the great potential for market-driven economic growth and free trade* (Verden 2030, 2017, p. 1).

Whilst underscoring that ODA still plays a vital role in low-income countries, it is stated that the decisive factor is how well publicly funded development cooperation "through partnerships can contribute to catalyzing and mobilizing private finance, knowledge and new technology to developing countries" (Verden 2030, 2017, p. 4). (See appendix 1 for a summary of the document).

With it, the government has centralized PSDD through different instruments and programs, including: DANIDA Market Development Partnerships (DMDP) and Partnering for Green Growth and the Global Goals (P4G) (to stimulate partnerships between business and NGOs on national and international scales), DANIDA Business Explorer (offering ODA to businesses to explore SDG-related business opportunities in developing countries), the Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) and the adjacent SDG Investment Fund (both development finance institutions which manage BF) (Engberg & Fejerskov, 2018). As such, the shifts and debates on the global level are visible in the developments in the Danish context.

[15]These cuts have been justified by the government as a way to invest more into and thereby safeguard the Danish economy. (Timbuktu Fonden & Heldgaard, 2016).

[16]Notably, a political majority in the parliament concurrently approved a decision to utilize ODA to cover costs for reception of refugees, making Denmark the largest national recipient of Danish ODA in 2016 at 17,4 % (or 2,8 billion DKK) of total ODA (Ravnborg, 2019). As refugee numbers have fallen dramatically since, so has this number and was at 2,8 % or 0,5 billion DKK in 2018 (Ravnborg, 2019).

3. Material outcomes of PSDD

Having situated the paradigm shift historically, internationally and nationally, I now look at PSDD's material outcomes as of yet in order to shed light on its viability as a pathway to SD. As outlined above, the increasing centralization of PSDD in development policy comprises two major shifts regarding respectively finance (with a turn towards development finance and particularly BF) and collaboration modes (with a turn towards multi-stakeholder partnerships). Both are explained below:

3.1 Blended finance

OECD defines blended finance (BF) as "the strategic use of development finance for the mobilization of additional finance towards sustainable development in developing countries". (Blended Finance, 2019). Despite the BF market more than doubling in size from 2017 to 2018 (Convergence, 2018), much is still unknown about its material outcomes in pursuit of SD in terms of financial volume and interest from the private sector (Moe Fejerskov et al., 2016). In 2019, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)[17] found that every $1 USD invested by a development finance institution or multilateral development bank mobilized an average $0.75 USD in private sector finance for developing countries while only mobilizing $0.37 USD for the lowest income countries[18] (Attridge & Engen, 2019, p. 11). This is in stark contrast to the optimistic position of the then-Danish government, which claimed that 1 DKK of public finance would generate 15-20 DKK in private capital (Samråd: Finansiering af grøn omstilling, 2019). These very low leverage ratios[19] render the hopes for BF to bridge the financing gap unrealistic (Attridge & Engen2019). Similar results and assessments have been reached in the Danish context, where only 7% of IFU's investments fund projects in low-income countries (Engberg-Pedersen, 2019).

Attridge & Engen (2019) furthermore problematize that increasing BF risks undermining the purpose of ODA by redirecting funds away from poverty eradication and social sectors, as BF investments to a much higher degree are attracted to hard economic sectors (e.g. financial services and infrastructure), which provide better investment opportunities than softer economic sectors (e.g. education and health) that

[17] The report examined outcomes of blended finance initiatives amongst the most prominent and sizeable global actors in the field's investment portfolios within the latest four year period (Attridge & Engen, 2019).
[18] As well as $1.06 USD in lower-middle-income countries and $0.65 USD in upper-middle-income countries. The report points to lack of enabling investment climate and opportunities as major barriers to channeling BF to lowest-income countries. (Attridge & Engen 2019, p. 11)
[19] OECD similarly published results in 2018, showcasing that contradictory to the purpose, BF initiatives still to a large extent consist of far more public than private capital (Engberg-Pedersen, 2018).

play a crucial role in poverty eradication.[20] Moe Fejerskov et al. (2016) warned that private sector engagement can only be presumed if there is potential for economic gain, which several sectors that are core to SD cannot provide. They problematize a lack of regulations and protection within the area to warrant that such investments reach those most needing and live up to sustainability standards (Moe Fejerskov et al., 2016).[21]

Finally, BF should provide additionality, i.e. channel additional funds and resources to sectors that would not otherwise receive it (Engberg-Pedersen, 2018). But additionality is very difficult to assess, as most BF ventures are directed towards middle-income countries and hard economic sectors, which regardless are likely to attract private investments (Engberg-Pedersen, 2018).[22]

3.2 Partnerships

Partnerships as a mode of collaboration is central to multistakeholderism and the SDGs. Engberg-Pedersen (2019) distinguishes between three categories of partnerships within the SDGs: Multi-stakeholder partnerships between several actors, public-private partnerships (PPPs) between the state and business, and partnerships between civil society (NGOs) and business working together towards a SD objective. The latter is the most relevant for the scope of this thesis.[23]

However, this classification is not universal and existing research on partnerships for SD often use the definitions interchangeably. This is not least due to the fact that there is no universally agreed upon definition of what a partnership is - in fact, BF itself can be seen as a partnership between a private sector actor and a donor, i.e. a development agency (Jomo, Chowdhury, Sharma & Platz, 2016). The below examines research on partnerships for SD wherein at least one party is business.

[20]Another estimation shows that 62% of BF initiatives are aimed at financial services and infrastructure, with 50% of those aimed at financial services targeting microfinance schemes (Convergence, 2018). This speaks to what Mawdsley (2018a) calls a deepening financialization of development brought about by PSDD under SDG auspices.
[21]As do Attridge & Engen (2019), who highlight inadequate data availability and the absence of a common global structure for BF as factors that increase deficiencies in accountability and transparency.
[22]Enberg-Pedersen (2018) applies the issue of additionality as much to other tenets of PSDD such as partnerships with the private sector.
[23]Whereas some may be in a simple set-up in which the company donates to an NGO and in return can use the partnership for branding purposes, others go deeper yet, in which the partners seek to combine the technological know-how of the business to solve sustainability issues, while the NGO can provide local context knowledge to this business, so that it can enter the market of the recipient country (based on interviews).

Analyses of partnerships for SD have shown that they often fail at delivering the promised output (Jomo et al., 2016) in terms of regulation, implementation, increasing participation and inclusiveness of marginalized groups (Biermann et al., 2007). Some argue that this failure is due to the ultimately contradictory objectives of the public and private sectors (i.e. providing welfare and maximizing profit) (Hall, 2015). This contradiction between organizational goals and structures, that also exist between NGOs and business, is what Sharma & Bansal (2017) call the *commercial-social paradox*.

In their literature review of contemporary research on the efficiency of PPPs in delivering SD, Jomo et al. (2016) concluded that PPPs "... have failed to yield 'value for money' in its broadest sense taking into account not just the financial costs and efficiency gains [...] as well as the broader welfare benefits for society such as the impact on poverty and sustainable development." (p. 22).[24] They find that, like BF, such partnerships are better suited to deliver efficiency gains in economic infrastructure development and hard sectors, but not in social sectors that should be equitable and accessible (Jomo et al., 2016). They conclude that donor funding for capacity building of the public sector in developing countries "may be better spent than the current trend of blended finance, which frequently channels aid money directly to the private sector, including for PPPs." (Jomo et al., 2016, p. 22).

Despite efforts to increase accountability, transparency and to make an institutional framework for partnerships (Jomo et al., 2016), their overall effect has as of yet proven negative. This is echoed by Voituriez et al. (2017), who argue that not only do BF and PPPs have a poor track record, both will increase global inequality if practices of skewed risk-taking by the public sectors are not changed.

3.3 Summary of material outcomes

BF and partnerships are understood as the two main tenets of PSDD, a pathway and strategy to fulfill the sustainability goals of the SDGs. Although successful examples of both BF and partnerships surely exist, the common understanding in contemporary research is that results so far are at best inconclusive, while indicating mainly insufficiency. Both have proven to channel resources away from softer sectors (that should be prioritized to live up to the SDG mantra 'leave no one behind'), and towards hard economic sectors, as well as from public to private sectors while not being able to prove additionality. Despite their centrality in the debate, these therefore do not currently present a convincing argument for PSDD as a

[24]However, most research is based in the Global North, with little research going into the efficiency of partnerships for SD in the Global South (Jomo et al., 2016).

pathway to achieve SD.

4. Theoretical grounding

Having established the background and context to the PSDD turn, I now introduce the theory in which I ground the analysis of government and NGO discursive struggle in pursuit of RQ1 and RQ2.

I contend that SD pathways can ultimately be seen as a matter of power: who has the power to decide and impose how SD is to be financed, and as such, determine the workings of the major complex and multi-spherical industry, that is the field of SD? As a result, my approach is based on theories that work to unveil such power dynamics. To this end, I use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and in addition, apply the Gramscian concept of hegemonic struggle.

4.1 On power practice

Power can be practiced in different ways, both internally and externally in networks of practice and in more or less direct ways (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). The government in this case may practice more direct forms of power by securing parliamentary support for a new development strategy, which instates different mechanisms, such as DMDP and by imposing certain guidelines for the NGOs to achieve funding. This can happen because ultimately, the NGOs depend on funding from the state. However, all interviewed NGO actors expressed that - despite changes in development policy - DANIDA does not apply direct pressure to the funding-dependent NGOs to engage with PSDD.[25] Therefore, I choose to look at how power is practiced in a more indirect sense through CDA.

4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

CDA is motivated by social wrongs and takes discourse as its point of departure in order to create "change through critical understanding" (van Dijk, 1993, p. 252). In CDA, language is seen and critically scrutinized as a form of social practice. All social practice is in-turn situated within a socio-historical context, which it reproduces and is reproduced by (Fairclough, 2010). As part of its critical direction, CDA is concerned with ideology as a modality of power and seeks to uncover it as ideology contributes to "establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination and exploitation". (Fairclough, 2003, p. 9). In critiquing a discourse, there is as such also a normative critique of the powerholders that convey

[25]Some stated that indirectly, they felt a pressure from DANIDA to comply but most argued that this was not the case.

this discourse and its ideology as well as the structures that facilitate it (van Dijk, 1993). To this end, Fairclough prompts a three-tiered model of the text itself (understood in a broad sense), of the discursive practice in which it is constituted, and of the social practice, in which it is situated (see Figure 2). As such, the text is seen as an element within a social process.



Figure 2: Fairclough's three-dimensional model. *Based on Fairclough (2010, p. 59), (own illustration).*

CDA is not merely a constructivist discourse analysis, in which words and discursive actions are seen to shape or constitute reality. Rather, it is seen as a dialectical relation in which discourse shapes reality and vice-versa (Fairclough, 2003). This acknowledges the existence of reality and materiality, in-line with the critical realist philosophy of science (Bhaskar, 2011) and the realist approach undertaken by Fairclough himself in which "reality (the potential, the actual) cannot be reduced to our knowledge about reality" (Fairclough, 2003, p. 14).

When working with this field, in which finance and policy decisions inform outcomes for the world's poorest, yielding tangible material results and tensions, this approach recognizes the need to know the social practice and material conditions which form the dialectical relations with discourse. In this thesis, sections 2 and 3 make out this step. The latter also serves as an important step in uncovering the 'social wrong', which can be understood as being something that does not work to ensure human wellbeing (Fairclough, 2009). In its critical nature, the critical discourse analyst should be explicit in taking a stance against the identified social wrong (van Dijk, 1993, p. 252). This is necessary in order to, through critical understanding, expose the workings of dominance and exploitation exposed through the CDA. Therefore, in this thesis, PSDD is normatively regarded as a social wrong for the reasons described in Section 3.3.

While the ensuing CDA will be less concerned with semiotics, it will take a point of departure in the CDA three-dimensional framework, identifying concrete discourses in the textual analysis and examining the discursive practice, in order to understand their relation with the social practice and the hegemonic struggles that play out in it. According to Fairclough (2010), the nature of discourse itself as an element in a dialectical-relational process requires the CDA to be complemented by other forms of social theoretical analysis. Accordingly, I invoke a Gramscian lens to deepen and complement the CDA.

4.3 Gramscian concept of hegemonic struggle

As the works and theories of Gramsci extend well beyond the limitations of this paper, in the following I present but a few of his concepts related to hegemonic struggle, which I apply in the subsequent analysis and discussion.

In its essence, Gramsci's concept of hegemony is a form of domination through manipulation of civil society by the ruling class in order to serve their own interests (Callinicos, 2007). This manipulation is a form of soft power, as it is conveyed through social, cultural and educational institutions, media and discourse, instating a cultural hegemony of the ruling class that colonizes a diverse public and institutionalizes the hegemonic discourse (Callinicos, 2007). It is done by imposing values, beliefs and ideas tied to the specific worldview and ideology of the ruling class in a way that naturalizes and legitimizes them, as they are made to appear unavoidable and everlasting as well as inherently favorable for the common good (Callinicos, 2007). This produces and upholds public consent to the status quo of the socio-political and economic order, while hiding ideological struggles and smoothing over tensions (Lears, 1985). However, civil society, in which this power is practiced, imposed, and institutionalized, also provides an arena for hegemonic struggle as counter-hegemonic discourses can seek to expose the hegemonic power as a construct that can be challenged and provide alternatives (Bebbington & Hickey, 2006). Gramsci termed such hegemonic struggle a 'war of position' in which individuals' positions on the matter are gradually persuaded and won over (Callinicos, 2007).

4.4 Theory informing discussion

In answering RQ3 (in section 7: Discussion), I will draw mainly on Fairclough and Gramsci. Additionally, I will draw on other scholars of sustainability science, social movement studies, neo-Gramscianism and CSR

where relevant.[26] As these do not make out the theoretical framework but rather serve to add nuances in understanding to the discussion, these will be introduced as they appear in Section 7.

5. CDA: Methodology and empirical material

5.1 Field of inquiry: The Danish development community

Focusing on the Danish development community as a field of inquiry should be seen in relation to the international and national politics surrounding SD in which this field is embedded (Figure 3).



Figure 3: The Danish development community situated. *The Danish development community in the broader social context (being in the question of SD, specifically development assistance, going from the Global North to the Global South). It illustrates the way in which national politics are influenced by international politics and vice versa, while debates in international politics permeate to national civil society, and national politics interact with national civil society (Own illustration).*

In section 2 I demonstrated how the shift in discourse on an international level has permeated to the

[26]This similarly becomes relevant in 6.1.4: Ideological implications of government discourse for SD.

Danish national level, which creates the background to understanding how SD practitioners within the Danish development community react and position themselves in debates on SD.

5.1.1 Why this field of inquiry?

Studying the reactions of the development community in the Global North (in this case in Denmark) is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, traditionally and to this day, there are substantial ODA flows from the Global North to the Global South which direct efforts for the achievement of SD. A large part of ODA is first transferred to NGOs in the Global North, through which it is channeled to the Global South (Williams, 2015). As such, national policy change and discourse can affect not only the work of Global North-based NGOs but also the final beneficiaries in the Global South. Ultimately, this makes for an important link in the chain of development finance and SD itself. Secondly, Denmark has strong social democratic traditions and an active and organized civil society, marked by strong group formations (Wollebæk & Selle, 2008). As an extension of this, it can be assumed that the Danish development community will organize to contend with imposed hegemony. Thirdly, I am personally familiar with the Danish development community, having held positions in NGOs for a number of years, putting me in an advantageous position to study this field (see 5.3: Reflections on the role of the researcher).

5.1.2 Characteristics of the field of inquiry: NGOs in the study

The Danish development community is large and comprised of many small, medium and large-scale NGOs as well as umbrella organizations (e.g. Globalt Fokus and 92-gruppen) through which these organize e.g. for political influence in different areas tied to SD. To limit this study, I chose to focus on four larger NGOs[27]: Save the Children Denmark (StCD), ActionAid Denmark (AAD), CARE Denmark (CD) and DanChurchAid (DCA), all of whom work with long-term development[28] and have been active in the debate on SD and development finance. The choice of these NGOs was grounded in my preexisting knowledge of their prominent roles in civil society and in debates on development finance, which was in turn

[27]Originally, I also planned to include a fifth NGO which met the above-mentioned criteria in the study, Oxfam IBIS. However, it became clear that I would not be able to obtain the same degree of information from Oxfam IBIS, as the other four, as I was not able to observe the Secretary General (SG) of Oxfam IBIS in public discourse on PSDD, as was the case with the others. I interviewed an employee of Oxfam IBIS, but this left me with incomplete information in comparison to the others and a skewed entrance to understanding the organization. In order to follow the same methodology for all subjects of analysis, I chose to omit Oxfam IBIS from the study. As their position was middle-ground, I do not believe this has implications for the results.

[28]Albeit some work equally with emergency relief efforts, in which cases the interviews focused solely on long-term development efforts.

reconfirmed through dialogue with my background interviewees (see 5.4.3: Qualitative interviews).[29] Furthermore, they are all Strategic Partner organizations to DANIDA, meaning they are all subject to the same guidelines and reviews, from which they also obtain a majority of their funding for the period 2018-2021 (16 strategiske partnerskaber, n.d.). As such, I take these four NGOs to represent the Danish development community in this thesis (see 5.6: Delineation for further reflections on this). Descriptions of each NGO can be found in appendix 2.

5.2 Research period

The debate on SD and development finance in Denmark took off after the introduction of the new development strategy in the beginning of 2017 and continued throughout 2018 and 2019, as NGO actors positioned themselves and their policies.[30] In this period, the development strategy and development finance was debated publicly by the NGOs in the study, e.g. in public panel debates, conferences and media.[31]

5.3 Reflections on the role of the researcher

In approaching this topic, I have reflected on my role as a researcher in a field, that I myself have participated in professionally and on a voluntary basis. To understand my role and use my pre-existing knowledge and sentiments as a leverage, I have drawn inspiration[32] from Burawoy's extended case method (1998). This approach acknowledges the subjectivity of the researcher and seeks to turn this into an advantage, as "we thematize our participation in the world we study." (Burawoy, 1998, p. 2). Instead of premising the detachment of the researcher, as in positivist science, it welcomes engagement as a way to create knowledge, whilst always keeping oneself grounded and guided by theory. Importantly, neither does this reduce science only to hermeneutics, the role of the researcher to interpreter nor social science to mere dialogue. Instead, it "takes context as point of departure but not point of conclusion." (Burawoy, 1998, p. 13).

[29]Given their size, they can be presumed to be more influential and hold greater ability to set the tone in the public debate than smaller NGOs with fewer resources.
[30]My research was conducted between November 2018 and May 2019.
[31]Both in mainstream media and media which cater directly to and provide a platform for debate for the Danish development community such as Altinget:udvikling and Globalnyt.dk
[32]I wish to stress that I have merely drawn inspiration from this approach and do not follow the extended case methodology further.

5.4 Triangulation of methods of data collection

I triangulate three complementary qualitative methods to obtain data: interviews, observations and statements to the press in order to capture different dimensions of the topic and cross-check findings (Bryman, 2012). Below I describe each method of data collection.

5.4.1 Statements to the press

To fully understand the government discourse, I collected a number of statements to the press about the development strategy in online news articles and opinion pieces, put forth by the then-Minister of Development Cooperation Ulla Tørnæs in the period 2017-2019.[33] These serve to shed light on the government's interpretation and highlights of the development strategy.

5.4.2 Observations

I conducted observations at two panel debates and one two-day conference.[34] The first panel debate 'Innovative Partnerships in an SDG-time'[35] featured the Secretary Generals (SGs) from the four NGOs in this study. The other panel debate 'SDGs - A Profitable Business?' featured among others the then-Minister of Finance, Kristian Jensen, a key player in centralizing the SDGs in Danish development cooperation. The two-day conference 'Financing the SDGs: Wealth taxes, development aid, ending extreme poverty' was organized by AAD and featured several NGO representatives, politicians and experts on development finance.

The first event brought together NGOs to debate development finance and private sector partnerships which allowed for an understanding of the contestation between discourses and counter-discourses of the NGOs, whereas the second gave further and first-hand insight into the government's discourse surrounding the development strategy. The two-day conference gave insight into the counter-hegemonic

[33]The criteria for these were that they specifically explained, justified of defended the development strategy and/or the paradigm shift. These were not collected through a systematic method as such. I searched for and skimmed communication pieces released by or featuring Ulla Tørnæs in national media within the research period, and when it reached a point of saturation, I chose some that I deemed to represent the general message best for further analysis.

[34]At all of these I took the role of a spectator, not a participant.

[35]The first panel debate was held at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) on November 22nd 2018, and the second was held at the Copenhagen Business School (CBS) on April 25th 2019. The conference was held at the Danish Parliament on March 27th-28th 2019 and was co-convened with Move Humanity and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN).

discourse and its proposed alternative. At all events, I took observation notes and in some instances recorded and transcribed certain interventions.

5.4.3 Qualitative interviews

To deepen my understanding, I conducted two background interviews, one with Lars Engberg-Pedersen, Senior Researcher at DIIS who specializes in international and Danish development cooperation, and one with two employees of Globalt Fokus, a membership body for Danish NGOs which tracks the developments within the sector.

Thereto, I conducted four[36] in-depth empirical interviews, each with an employee of each of the four NGOs in this study. All interviewed employees worked directly with policy regarding the private sector at a senior level, e.g. as Policy Director, Policy Advisor or Head of Global Partnerships.

5.4.3.1 Interview technique and considerations

All interviews were conducted in-line with Kvale & Brinkmann's (2009) prescriptions for semi-structured interviews. For the five empirical interviews, I used the same interview guide (appendix 3) as a basis, but allowed for departures from the guide when something came up that I deemed worth following up on, saw a need for clarification, or to verify my interpretation in the course of the interview. As such, the interview at times took a dialogical form, which allowed me to dig into the arguments presented and further explicate them by testing counter-arguments (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). I used the same interview guide for each interview. This was divided into four overall themes[37] (see Appendix 3), guided by my research questions and pre-existing knowledge.

The in-depth interviews allowed for a deeper understanding of the views, values and ideas behind the position of each NGO. I conducted them in the expectation that the SGs in public discursive situations might not offer the same nuances, as they draw the political line of the NGO and might be more prone to speaking in ultimatives. Wanting to gain a more nuanced understanding, I opted to complement this by setting different conditions for the discursive practice in one-on-one interviews. I furthermore chose to anonymize the interviewees in order to secure a more-open interview situation.

[36] I also conducted an interview with the employee of Oxfam IBIS, which was later omitted. See footnote 27.
[37] 1. Partnerships; 2. SDGs, 3. Overall developments in the development community, 4. Financing for development

5.5 Analytical approach

Having collected the above-described material, I triangulated this in order to carry out two analyses using CDA. Figure 4 depicts the analytical approach:



Figure 4: Analytical approach. *Figure 4 depicts the analytical approach to the CDA. For the government discourse, statements to the press and observation notes from one panel debate were triangulated. For the analytical approach, observation notes from another panel debate and a conference were triangulated with transcriptions from the NGO employee interviews. (Own illustration)*

My analytical approach to the vast material I collected followed a thematic analysis (Aronson, 1995), in which I, through several readings, identified themes and sub-themes in the triangulated material following this process: 1) Identification and analysis of cross-cutting characteristics[38] (in place of sub-themes) for each discourse. These are exemplified for each discourse in Section 6. 2) Synthesis of central themes

[38]Although some were similar to those I had presupposed in my interview guide, others became clear during this step and were therefore included. Similarly, the characteristics for the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic NGO discourse differ due to their different nature.

across all analyses (Table 1). 3) Identification of each discourse's position towards each central theme based on analysis (Table 2).

5.6 Delineation

It is important to acknowledge that there are other groups with other discourses surrounding SD within the Danish development community, which for purposes of limitation are not included in this research. For instance, one wing comprising smaller NGOs have been vocally critical towards the SDGs and PSDD. However, due to consistency in methodology,[39] I have chosen to look only at the major NGOs, of which I was able to acquire the same level of information.

Similarly, it is important to note that the NGOs studied are large organizations comprised of many employees that may not all share similar views and values, and although the interviewed employees spoke on behalf of their organization (unless stated otherwise), they too brought with them their personal views and biases to the interview. However, as the employees were all in higher leadership positions, I assume that their statements can to a degree be synonymous with that of the NGO they represent.

[39]Notably, these smaller NGOs do not meet the same criteria as those under study e.g. in regards to funding as they are not Strategic Partner organizations to DANIDA. Additionally, these rarely participate in debate events with the four NGOs in this study on the matter of development finance, and as such I was not able to observe them in direct debates together. Similarly, none of them were invited to the events in which I conducted research.

6. CDA: Government and NGO discourses

Drawing on Sections 2 and 3, which make out the social practice, Fairclough's three-dimensional framework can now be filled out (Figure 5):



Figure 5. Fairclough's three-dimensional framework applied. *The global and national developments (Sections 2.1 and 2.2) make out the socio-historical context, while the international political shifts (Section 2.1.1 and 2.1.2) as well as their influence on national developments (also described in Section 2.2) make out the social practice. The discursive practice is described in Section 5 and make out the discursive situations (conferences, media, qualitative interviews) in which the analyzed texts (speeches, observation notes, statements to the press and interviews) are situated.*

The ensuing CDA will present three discourses, the government discourse, the hegemonic NGO discourse and the counter-hegemonic NGO discourse, in the debate on PSDD[40] and at the end classify how each relate to six identified defining six themes that hold pertinence to the debate (Table 1).

[40]The discourses concern PSDD broadly, as such comprising both BF and PPPs. As mentioned above, when understood in a Danish context, partnerships almost always refer to partnerships with the private sector (Engberg-Pedersen, 2019). This can be in the form of partnerships between the state aid agency (DANIDA) and the private sector (as several of the instruments mentioned in section 2.2 facilitate) and between civil society (NGOs) and the private sector. The analysis of the government discourse premises both these kinds, while the analysis of NGO discourses focus specifically on NGO-private sector partnerships.

Table 1: Central themes. *Depiction of six central themes to the debate on PSDD. The CDA aims uncover the relation of each identified discourse to these six themes.*

1. Solution to closing the financing gap
2. Perception of implications (potentials/risks) of PSDD
3. Who should drive SD (main valued change agent)
4. Perception of other views on development cooperation
5. Role of civil society
6. SDGs

For each discourse, I present a summary of the CDA, drawing on few select quotes to exemplify each point.

6.1 The government discourse

In pursuit of RQ2, this section analyzes key political figures' (the then-Minister of Development Cooperation Ulla Tørnæs and then-Minister of Finance Kristian Jensen) communications around the development strategy and in the promotion of the "paradigm shift". Three notable characteristics were recurrent. Examining these aids in understanding the logic, reasoning, and ideology that underwrite this turn towards increasing PSDD and understanding the major discourse being pushed from state-level which has power to influence civil society.

6.1.1 From billions to trillions: the necessity and urgency of PSDD

The government discourse repeatedly argues that PSDD is not just a desirable pathway to achieve SD, but in fact, it is what the SDGs prescribe: "I see no barriers to seeing the development in the world's hotspots as a business. It is actually what the SDGs are proposing, you should do." (Tørnæs in Hvide Beim & Bæksgaard, 2017). One major argument used continuously is a direct replica of the SDG tropes: the need to go 'from billions to trillions' and to ensure that in this effort, we have 'all hands on deck'. This is used directly to justify and underscore the necessity and urgency of specifically engaging and leveraging the private sector and private sector investments: "If we are to reach the UN's 17 goals for sustainable development by the 2030 target date, it is not a question of whether the private sector should be involved in development work. It is a question of how and how quickly companies and investors can be engaged." (Tørnæs & Brückner, 2019). It is backed by the claim that it is not realistic to expect to expect the world's leaders to amplify their ODA contributions, and therefore - in light of the urgent sustainability crises -

engaging with PSDD is simply the only way to 'close the financing gap', as stated by Jensen at CBS panel debate.

6.1.2 Win-win solutions

Another recurring characteristic is regarding PSDD as a win-win solution, to which there are no trade-offs, as SD goals can be reached while Danish corporations can establish themselves in new markets (see e.g. Hvide Beim & Bæksgaard, 2017; Tørnæs, 2019), stating that "it is not a problem that a Danish company makes money on a development project. A large refugee camp may well be a huge business case" (Tørnæs in Hvide Beim & Bæksgaard, 2017). This is accompanied by an overarching message of hope, following the logic: not only will PSDD solve the coupled sustainability crises, it will lead to more Danish exports, and as such strengthen the Danish economy. This includes an understanding that the market should be the main driver for SD as "in that case, with great strides, we will be able to create progress both in developing countries and globally in the transition to a sustainable economy for the benefit of all of us" (Tørnæs in Tørnæs & Brückner, 2019). Similarly, this discourse builds on an understanding that developing countries themselves would rather have Danish "CEOs than ODA" (Jensen, CBS panel debate). Whilst bringing up a relevant critique of the innate dependency problematics tied to the traditional development model, this assumes that PSDD is desired by all in the Global South and that revenue would in fact be invested in SD and redistributed to the public sectors of these countries. Finally, tied to this is a rejection that potential conflicts could arise from the corporate-social paradox[41]: "that I think is an imaginary example. If we are wise, it will be win-win. And if the alternative is that nothing happens at all, is it not better that something happens?" (Tørnæs in Hvide Beim & Bæksgaard, 2017).

6.1.3 A better way of regarding development

Finally, it is repeatedly highlighted that the paradigm shift is made possible because old ways of regarding development, i.e. pertaining to the traditional development model, have been largely abandoned by all sectors, as stated by Jensen at the CBS panel debate:

[41]Explained in section 3.2, p. 12.

> *With the Funding [sic.] for Development [AAA], we realized and opened for the first time, that we need to unlock the potential of businesses going into development, creating platforms, where corporate profits and development go hand in hand. Where profit is not a bad word in the development sector. It used to be. Trust me. I was there in the eighties and in the nineties, and profit and development were just like fire and water, you couldn't have those two together.*

Here, Jensen sets up a dichotomy between an outdated view of development as an endeavour that should be separate from business - in the past upheld by the development community - and the current paradigm, which is portrayed as visionary and universally accepted. Similarly, Tørnæs applauds what she describes as a newfound willingness from civil society to enter into partnerships with the private sector: "fortunately, I have seen a tremendous positive change in the approach to cooperation between the private sector and the NGOs since I was last minister [from 2005-2010]. Where the NGOs previously did not work with the private sector at all, this is largely done today" (Hvide Beim & Bæksgaard, 2017).

6.1.4 Ideological implications of government discourse for SD

The ideology that underwrites the government discourse portrays some core tenets of neoliberalism, in centering markets as the main driver, while upholding individualism as a core virtue and advocating privatization (Heywood, 2012). This can be seen in the wording of the strategy (Section 2.2), the establishment of numerous private sector-initiatives to center market players and in the discourse exemplified above. This is in many ways adjacent to the typology of sustainability called weak sustainability (Faran, 2010). In determining different typologies of sustainability, this framework beckons the following questions: what is to be sustained and what is to be developed? The government discourse and to an extent the strategy 2030 (Section 2.2. and Appendix 1) most aptly fits into a typology of weak sustainability (Faran, 2010), in which what are to be sustained in SD are levels of GDP, and what is to be developed is the economic productive power. Like the government, weak sustainability holds that the market mechanism is the best means to solving sustainability crises, which necessitates privatization and the creation of markets (Faran, 2010). This is in-line with the government's discourse, in which the entry of Danish businesses into new markets for sustainable solutions are seen as the way forward. As these are emerging, this then prompts the enthusiasm shown in this discourse related to win-win solutions.

6.2 NGO discourses

In pursuit of RQ3, the following section examines how the government discourse is reiterated or opposed within the development community. I identified two major discourses (Figure 6), one which most reiterates the government discourse (represented by StCD, DCA and CD) and one which opposes this discourse and attempts to push an alternative (represented by AAD) .[42] As the former is represented by most NGOs and to a large extent aligns the government discourse, I deem this to be the hegemonic NGO discourse. The latter, which opposes it, is regarded as the counter-hegemonic discourse.



Figure 6: NGOs aligned with hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourses. *Interviewed NGOs arranged on a scale from most aligned with the government discourse (left) to least aligned with it (right). The placements of the NGOs on this are based on the empirical material and background interviews. The NGOs representing the hegemonic NGO discourse are Save the Children Denmark (StCD), DanCurchAid (DAC) and CARE Denmark (CD). The NGO representing the counter-hegemonic NGO discourse is ActionAid Denmark (AAD).*

6.2.1 The hegemonic NGO discourse

The below exemplifies the main characteristics identified within this hegemonic NGO discourse:

6.2.1.1 Private sector engagement is not new but deepening

The SGs of DCA and StCD, like their respective employees in the one-on-one interviews, underlined that working with the private sector is nothing new in the sense that these organizations have always done so. As the employee in CD put it, it might be more suitable to talk of a rhetorical shift from the government

[42]However, nothing is black and white, which became clear in the in-depth interviews, all actors were reflexive about their position and saw risks and drawbacks in both discourses. Similarly, the General Secretaries had tendencies to draw a stronger position in public discursive situations (e.g. panel debates and conferences), than employees in one-on-one interview situations. However, the characteristics were comparable between employees and SGs, and the employees often provided more nuanced understanding to the motivations of their NGOs.

side permeating the development community, than an actual paradigm shift. However, most added that whereas the work before was more centered on corporate donor-relations[43], the change today is that NGOs work in collaborative processes with the private sector in order to 'co-create' solutions to development problems, as-such tightening the relationship with the corporate sector. The employee of DCA pointed out that what is new is rather the prominence of PSDD itself "because business has always been there, ODA just hasn't necessarily been used promote it more or push it in a certain direction, but it's always been there."

6.2.1.2 Sees potential for win-win situations in PSDD, innovation and disruption

Like the government discourse, several actors hoped that PSDD would be able to yield win-win solutions. Several saw private sector partnerships as an exchange of benefits, in which companies contribute with innovative know-how and technological expertise, while NGOs help them become more sustainable and supply local context knowledge. Furthermore, they hoped partnering with businesses would provide them with much needed 'innovation' and 'disruption' (buzzwords used by several of the SGs in this discourse). The SG of DCA stated that without these ideals, they would not consider working with the private sector: "So it is really important that when we do something together with the private sector it must be genuine innovation or disruption, it must be something we have not thought of before."

6.2.1.3 The market as an important driver of SD

A view held by a majority of actors in this discourse is that in order for development to be sustainable, it must be "market-owned" and "market-relevant" (employee of StCD), so as to become less dependent on state-funded ODA, which "is always going to be an artificial thing" as stated by the employee of DCA. Several argued that the need for PSDD is a logical conclusion of the development community's failure in making itself redundant (i.e. solving the challenges) and evaluating its own efforts over the past 20-30 years - and that doing so might make the need to engage with the private sectors more apparent. Feeding into this logic was also an explicit acceptance of ODA being channeled towards businesses in this endeavor, as stated by the employee of StCD: "I think DANIDA's instruments [for PSDD] are super good, but they are just as much for Danish companies. (...) Personally, I have no problem with that, it's Danish taxes, it's Danish companies, nice that we help them as well."

[43]E.g. taking employees of a specific enterprise on a trip to one of the developing countries to see how the corporate donations were being put to use and create employee pride, as explained by several the interviewed employees in the hegemonic NGO discourse.

6.2.1.4 See other views as outdated

Identical to the government discourse, the hegemonic NGO discourse sees other views, i.e. that development efforts of NGOs and profit motifs of business are non-compatible, as outdated. Some speculated that this was related to older generations of NGO staff being more ideological, echoed by others who referred to this view as belonging to 'the old days' and portraying a general lack of agility and unwillingness to adapt. The employee from DCA elaborated that those who held this outdated view were stuck in old dogmas where:

> *...somehow the practical world around us is ignored, and people are holding on to this - that when working with civil society, then the government agencies, especially local, and businesses are "the bad guys", you know. It's civil society against some others who have some other interests that are evil to civil society - and that's also artificial because that is obviously not the way it is ultimately connected. (...) So I also think you know it is a tough awakening for many civil society organizations to be forced into that sphere, and then you are just not relevant unless you can speak that language and if you cannot look wider than only civil society.*

Here, a juxtaposition is described between being ideological, interpreted as relating to the past and to older generations, and being pragmatic and in touch with the surrounding world and its workings. The former is implied to be the parts of the development community whose theory of change only pertains to civil society and who becomes irrelevant if they continually refuse to work with business.

6.2.1.5 A pragmatic approach - civil society as a guarantor of ethics

In general, actors within this discourse see themselves as pragmatic in engaging with PSDD: "[...] so all these players are on the field regardless. So let's play together towards the goal, rather than against each other" (employee of StCD). This echoes the 'All hands on deck' trope of the SDGs. Several actors stated that there simply is no way around PSDD, it is happening regardless and not engaging with it would mean putting them as civil society outside the sphere of influence of SD. This was not an option, as civil society had an important role in influencing businesses involved in SD in a desirable way, "and it's right now, I believe, that we as civil society have to go in and seize this. And seize it, because we are the ones who want to pull it in a specific direction based on some very special ideas and principles, and if we let go of this, then I think there is a huge risk associated with it" (SG of CARE). Every actor in this discourse stated that engaging in partnerships with the private sector should never impede their mandate, e.g. ability to take on the role of a watchdog or speak out about corporate behavior that is harmful to their target groups. However, some conceded that difficulties may arise from balancing considerations towards their

corporate partners. The SG of StCD said that conflict can arise with their corporate partners when they as an NGO speak out on controversial topics, “and we will not deviate from our principles, but of course we have to think about a different way of dealing with stakeholders, as we now have another circle of stakeholders around the table who want to be apolitical [...].” This gives some concessions to concerns[44] that civil society actors might lose some operational room with regards to their mandate when tightening the relationship to corporations. Finally, another pragmatic reason for pursuing business partnerships was a hope that the reputation it creates for them in business circles as a potential civil society partner can open up for potential future funding, portraying the pragmatic and ultimately utilitarian approach held by actors in this discourse to PSDD.

6.2.1.6 Internal doubts

However, several employees within this discourse in one-on-one interview situations expressed doubts that engaging with PSDD would not in-fact achieve their objectives, nor be worthwhile financially, as engaging with the private sector is very costly in time and money and has of yet not yielded any tangible results. This was expressed most prominently by the employee from DCA who stated, “let me put it like this: I do not necessarily see this as being the wisest way. But time will tell. I hope it is the wisest way, because now we have used so much time and also funds to start it, so I hope it turns out to be a better way”. Similarly, the employee from StCD when asked to give an example of a partnership that succeeded in releasing the innovation and transformative potential it promised, answered that she was still waiting to see such an example, but saw no other viable ways forward.

6.2.2 The counter-hegemonic NGO discourse

The below exemplifies the main characteristics identified within the counter-hegemonic discourse, represented by AAD.

6.2.2.1 Fear of corporate capture

Inherent to counter-hegemonic discourse is a fear that tightening the relations with the private sector poses a risk for corporate capture of civil society and its agendas. They already see this happening, describing how “we have become bureaucratic while they [the business community] have taken over our purpose" (employee AAD). They argue that NGOs in the hegemonic discourse have become profit-driven themselves, warning that it could lead to the development community losing sight of other solutions, “so

[44]As will be elaborated in the counter-hegemonic CDA (6.2.2.1).

we are simply advocating this so much that we are almost in favor of it per definition. Saying that if there is a problem, then there must be a private sector solution to that problem. And it's incredibly dangerous" (SG of AAD). They also voice concerns that tightening relations with the private sector will impede on the mandate and operational room of civil society. This positions AAD as a challenger of the government's paradigm shift rather than just elements of it. They explicitly call out the logics and modus operandi of the private sector, warning it not become guiding posts of civil society.

6.2.2.2 Calling out misreading of SDGs

The counter-hegemonic discourse contains a frustration with what is regarded as using the SDGs to legitimize PSDD. Instead they attempt to reclaim the SDGs for their position: "listen, this is our agenda! It is civil society who is, by the way, the bearer of the agenda, the transformative agenda" (employee of AAD). Just as the government and hegemonic discourse utilize the SDG agenda and select related buzzwords[45], the counter-hegemonic discourse uses the SDG-term 'leave no one behind' to build their position, arguing that PSDD will not be able to reach 'those left behind' and so cannot fulfill the SDGs. They challenge their opponents' reading of the SDGs as being a 'transformative agenda', asking: "... does it also apply to the economy? Should it also be transformed? I don't think many of them think so. We probably do. So, you are being fed this agenda [PSDD] where you are [...] doing some exciting things, but not having the big changes in sight" (employee of AAD), calling out a lack of structural perspective in this interpretation. This contrasts the utilitarian approach of the hegemonic discourse and attempts to shift the understanding of what the SDGs entail towards larger structural transformations of society. They similarly attempt to call out common conceptions of 'innovation' and 'partnerships', arguing that these should not be automatically understood as linked to the private sector and that partnerships in their interpretation are partnerships with social movements.[46]

6.2.2.3 "Public finance for public goods" - exporting the welfare state

As a counter-alternative to PSDD, which is feared in this discourse to bring about increasing privatization of public services, AAD instead propose to 'close the financing gap' by 'public finance for public goods'. This entails reducing inequality via redistribution to public sectors, via taxation on wealth, carbon and

[45]'From billions to trillions' and 'All hands on deck'.

[46]At the DIIS debate, the SG of AAD proposed an innovative partnership being a group of countries coming together to end extreme poverty and ensure fair taxation of corporations and the extreme rich. At the AAD conference, he addressed the head of DANIDA, proposing a partnership between the state and Danish civil society organizations in the form of a Danish public diplomacy intervention in to promote financing public goods with public investments abroad in order to *"balance the public messaging"* towards global society.

corporations, DRM and for Denmark to pressure other OECD countries to raise ODA to minimum 0.7% of GDP and to raise Denmark's to 1%, while redirecting Danish development efforts towards poverty reduction and capacity building of local institutions. In several ways, this aligns with the losing side during the AAAA (see Section 2.1.1.). They base their alternative on arguments centering around the Danish welfare state:

> *… in terms of our international work, I think we've left some of our best cards on the table by not wanting to talk about how we can reduce inequalities globally, because that's where Denmark has such great history. That's where some of our best stories are. And I think the question of how we built up the welfare state - we didn't build up the welfare state through leveraging private funds alone. We built up the welfare state through taxes, we built up the welfare state by providing public services. [...] We can continue these band-aid solution from now till 2030, but if we really want to do something, the role of the government in providing basic services is crucial and we can't forget that. (SG of AAD)*

They argue that ODA should be "a clear kind of poverty reduction, solidarity, an extension of the Danish welfare state mindset to the global level to some extent" (employee AAD), fearing that with PSDD Denmark is at risk of exporting privatization rather than welfare state ideals: "and the more we lose track of that, especially in developing countries where we sometimes are imposing ideas that we wouldn't accept in our own countries - [...] if you pursue this path of privatization and public-private partnerships, in many cases, the poorest are the ones who lose basic rights" (SG of AAD). This final point, that the poor stand to lose in PSDD, is a central and often-reiterated argument which directly counter-poses the win-win solutions of the government by pointing to trade-offs.

6.2.2.4 Principled approach and historic arguments - civil society as driver of SD

Finally, this discourse sharply breaks with the unproblematic approach to the corporate-social-paradox of the hegemonic discourse: "we should not be part of this as civil society [...] because many of the biggest challenges we face, such as access to education and health etc. for the extremely poor in poor countries, they simply are not solved by the private sector because there is no money in it" (SG AAD). In line with their theory of change, they regard civil society as the main driver of SD: "... it's really about us believing that change comes from people who organize and to defend their interests, a rights-based approach to things" (employee of AAD). They invoke emotive arguments of historic civil society victories over the private sector to appeal to their colleagues in the hegemonic discourse.[47] This places AAD's view as what

[47]As said by SG of AAD at the DIIS panel debate: *"If we look back historically, it is also one of the ways that civil*

has been termed 'outdated' in the other discourses and contrasts their optimism of merging the civil society and business to achieve societal transformation. It furthermore warns that in pursuit of PSDD civil society risks abandoning its purpose and historical mandate to stand "shoulder by shoulder with extremely poor people and ensuring that it is their rights and access to services that is what's primary" (SG of AAD).

6.3 Summary of CDA

Synthesizing these three discourses following the six overall themes allows us to see the direct influence from the government discourse onto the hegemonic NGO discourse (see Table 2).

Table 2: All discourses' position in regard to central themes. *Column furthest to the left indicates theme corresponding to Table 1.*

	Government discourse: Characteristics	Hegemonic NGO discourse	Counterhegemonic NGO discourse
1	**The finance gap should be closed by increasing PSDD** PSDD is not only *urgent* due to pressing sustainability crises, but also *necessary* due to lack of funds and political will.	**PSDD is happening regardless, so CS should be involved** Working with the private sector is not new, but it is deepening, hence there is an imperative to be involved in order to influence it. However, worried that PSDD will not work.	**The financing gap should be closed by 'public finance for public goods'** Proposes alternative: Progressive taxation, DRM, ending tax havens and capital flight instead of PSDD.
2	**Win-win solutions** PSDD is a win-win-win solution, as it solves local and global sustainability crises, generates economic growth and further Danish business interests.	**Potential for win-win solutions** There are potential for win-win situations in PSDD, hoping it will bring much-needed innovation and disruption to CS.	**Fear of corporate capture** Fears that PSDD will increase privatization of public services and cause negative impacts for vulnerable groups with the support of CS.
3	**Markets as main driver of SD** Profit-seeking and development are fully compatible - in fact, it is better than nothing happening at all.	**The market as important driver of SD** The market can/should be the main driver for SD, and/or that market-owned interventions are more sustainable. SD can be a good business case.	**CS as main driver of SD** Acknowledging market role in some sectors, but more concerned with CS as drivers for change. Fear that profit-seeking will overrule SD objectives. CS and private sector are not very compatible.

society has been successful in pushing some of the biggest changes we know of. If we look at [...] the transatlantic slave trade, which was, after all, a hugely profitable private sector enterprise [...] how was it abolished? Well, it was not abolished by doing an exciting project with them - it was abolished through a very targeted campaign, which, incidentally, used many of the same grips that human rights organizations use today."

4	**Other views are outdated** Other views tied to the traditional development model are outdated and no longer valid	**Other views are outdated** Other views are somewhat outdated and ideological/out of touch with reality.	**Other views are mistaken** Others are blind to negative impacts and risk wasting time and effort.
5	**Claim to be supported by civil society** Danish civil society is increasingly supportive of this line.	**Pragmatic approach: CS role as guarantor of ethics** Takes a pragmatic approach - civil society should act as a guarantor of ethics in PSDD.	**Principled approach: Historic arguments of CS role** Attempt to revive CS as main change agent by drawing on past CS victories.
6	**In line with SDGs** The paradigm shift towards PSDD is entirely in line with the SDGs, in fact the SDGs prescribe this take on development cooperation. 'All hands on deck/From billion to trillions'.	**In line with SDGs** Closing the finance gap requires private sector funds and know-how. 'All hands on deck/From billion to trillions' CS should make sure that 'no one is left behind' in this.	**In line with SDGs** Others misread the SDGs. Claim CS ownership of SDGs. 'Leave no one behind'. Also challenge others' understanding of 'innovation', 'partnerships' and other PSDD related terms.

6.4 The workings of hegemony

The workings of hegemony in the debate on SD in Danish civil society are visible in Table 2. Through Gramscian lenses, the government has colonized large parts of the development community through media and discourse and established a hegemony that has naturalized and legitimized the values and ideas tied to their worldview and ideology. This is reflected in the many ideas within government discourse that is reiterated in the hegemonic NGO discourse, including denouncing other views of development as outdated, that business and civil society are no longer dichotomous, and that PSDD has no trade-offs - in fact, it can create win-win solutions. The creation of hegemony makes these ideas, beliefs and values seem unavoidable (Bebbington & Hickey, 2006). This is expressed by several NGO actors within the hegemonic discourse who see this as an inevitable course that civil society must join in order to remain relevant. The analysis also showed that the government utilizes the SDGs and the urgency of fulfilling these to justify their policy. In a Gramscian sense, this has major implications: it establishes the government policy as being inherently favorable to the common good and produces public consent, as reaching the SDGs has become synonymous with SD in general, while hiding the hegemonic struggle. This can be done because the SDGs themselves are never disputed as all sides claim to champion them - what is disputed is the means to reach them. As such, when hegemony is established about how to reach them, the hegemonic

side is naturalized and legitimized as the champion of the agenda, making counter-hegemonic struggle difficult.

However, as the analysis shows, the development community on which this hegemony is imposed also forms an arena for contestation. The counter-hegemonic discourse aims to challenge the very ideas, beliefs, and values which are imposed on them by questioning the idea that profit-seeking and development efforts can be non-conflictually combined, directing attention towards structural issues and by putting forth their alternative, 'public finance for public goods'. They similarly seek to expose the hegemonic power by calling out a misreading of the SDGs by the hegemonic side and by invoking historic and principled arguments to convince their colleagues of risks associated with buying into the government discourse.

This forms the 'war of position' in which the hegemonic struggle is fought, and in which, through differing discursive practices, the two sides seek to convince the other and the public (Callinicos, 2007).

7. Discussion

7.1 Social practice mechanisms

Thus far, I have demonstrated how both on the international and Danish national level, proponents of PSDD have gained hegemony in debates on SD and development finance - despite its deficiencies, as described in Section 3. Similarly, several actors within the hegemonic discourse expressed concern that PSDD would not work and that they had yet to see a successful example of it (Section 6.2.1.6). This beckons the question: how then is PSDD so hegemonically successful in the Danish development community? The ensuing discussion seeks to offer explanations of this conundrum, drawing on Fairclough, Gramsci and other scholars where relevant in pursuit of the first leg of RQ3: how can the practice of hegemony be explained in this context?

According to Fairclough, discourse is constituted and reconstituted in a relational process with the social practices that surround the discursive practice (Fairclough, 2010). As such, it is worth exploring different mechanisms related to the social practice to explore potential explanations to how the Danish

development community has become vulnerable to the hegemony of the government. The following will explore different mechanisms[48] related to the identified social practice focusing on two major themes: Broad SD agendas and the role of civil society in these.

7.1.1 Social practice mechanism I: Broad SD agendas and its pitfalls

7.1.1.1 Broad SD agendas impeding political struggle

As shown in the analysis, a main hegemonic struggle is over the ownership of the SDG agenda (theme 6, Table 4). This, I argue, is a symptom of such consensus-seeking SD agendas, that seek to appear apolitical and non-conflictual in order to gain broad societal support, despite the fact that SD and sustainability itself are highly contested terms and ideas (Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005). This is problematic because broad development agendas may actually serve to undermine the radical transformations the counter-hegemonic movement to an extent ask for and cover up power relations, as the below suggests.

Problematizing broad SD agendas, several critical analyses suggest that SD discourse has in fact transitioned away from "a radical call for societal change towards a neoliberal reformist agenda emphasizing piecemeal change, framed within a capitalist framework of ecological modernization" (Burchell & Cook, 2013, p. 745). Identifying this as a key tenet of the SDGs, Weber (2017) argues that the notion to 'leave no one behind' serves to justify a neoliberal project, which in actuality caters to commercial interests rather than universal rights. She bases this specifically on the hegemony of PSDD in SDG17. In doing so, she argues, social and political struggles for a transformation that relies on principles for ecological and social justice are strategically undermined (Weber, 2017). Brand (2016) takes issue with the SDG-linked promise of a 'transformation', arguing that it is a broad and problematic umbrella term that in the SDGs are used to describe a status-quo operation, promoting incremental changes and existing institutional practices, while omitting to challenge underlying power relations.

Building on these observations, it can be questioned whether opposing the hegemonic discourse while not opposing the project it seeks to implement, because of its broad appeal and benevolent goals, is a viable strategy for pushing for real societal transformation (this is further discussed in Section 7.3.3). These aspects are exacerbated by two prominent aspects related to broad SD agendas, that create

[48]Several other points of entry could have been taken to discussing the mechanisms of vulnerability to hegemony within the social practice. These were deduced from the results of the analysis.

potential pitfalls for civil society in engaging with them: win-win solutions and the universality of their language, both discussed below.

7.1.1.2 The allure of win-win solutions

As exemplified (theme two, Table 4), the government and hegemonic NGO discourse relies on the attractive narrative of win-win solutions by bringing actors across sectors and financing together to achieve the SDG project. I identified this as a keystone of PSDD, and one which deserves scrutiny, as its appeal can make counter-hegemonic struggle difficult if not addressed. In critical scholarship, win-win solutions have been problematized in several arenas where the narrative has gained dominance. Already in 1993, Jackson (1993) disputed win-win narratives related to gender policy aspects in SD, warning that such "convergence of opinion" creates an unfounded synergism which assumes that trade-offs and policy conflicts are entirely avoidable which is convenient when rooted in urgency for action (Jackson, 1993, p. 651). Similarly, urgency is a major characteristic of the government and hegemonic discourse (theme one, Table 4), utilized to frame their position as the best possible solution available and to quell criticisms by claiming their non-existence (Section 6.1.1.).

Muradian et al. (2012)[49] state that for decades, the allure of win-win solutions has lulled society into complacency and distracted policy-makers from core matters such as regulating for sustainability and "the quality and effectiveness of rule-making where there are conflicting interests, the validity of assumptions underlying such decisions and how to face trade-offs" (Muradian et al. 2012, p. 277). Instead, they argue, win-win solutions prescribe simplistic policy instruments to sustainability problems, not considering their complexity and conflictual nature. Claiming such trade-offs do not exist, are what Fletcher & Rammelt (2017) call a key fantasy of the SDGs, namely that economic growth and environmental sustainability can be de-coupled and simultaneously achieved, without one impacting on the achievability of the other. This 'fantasy of decoupling' is present in the government and hegemonic NGO discourses through their commitment to win-win solutions.[50]

[49]In examining Payments for Ecosystem Services.

[50]Offering an explanation for the widespread use of win-win solutions, Giridharadas (2019) argues that as an idea it has particularly won traction with the corporate elite, and those who are already the winners in "the age of market supremacy" (Giridharadas 2019, p. 37), its allure lying in the "promise of painlessness" while ignoring root causes and sustainability issues as well as the elite's embroilment in them (Giridharadas 2019, p. 38-39).

7.1.1.3 Universality of SD discourse

A final argument pertaining to broad SD agendas is how the universality of its language makes it vulnerable to capture by powerful interests. Giridharadas (2019) argues that the corporate elite has essentially taken over the sympathetic purpose of "changing the world" and have repositioned themselves as the saviors of rather than complicit in multiple sustainability crises. Controlling the discourse is an important strategy to achieve this favorable reframing (Springett, 2001). A tool to owning the debate in this sense is to create hybridized discourses that overtake the debate, rather than replacing one discourse with another (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). Burchell & Cook (2013) argue that in responding to anti-corporate discourses concerned with just societal transformations, business has overtaken SD language and hybridized it into one in which critics are silenced, as it portrays the business approach (or PSDD) to SD as the best viable option. They draw on cases of SD which demonstrate how mastering the discourse holds pertinence when "the central concepts are open to contrasting interpretations" (Burchell & Cook, 2013, p. 744). As SD is open to interpretation, this can be seen as a means of quelling contention and to further large-scale SD agendas which, while seeming universal, are in fact an expression of hierarchical dominance. This mechanism serves to reframe the agenda of civil society to fit that of PSDD within the hegemonic discourses surrounding SD, making it increasingly difficult to challenge.

7.1.2 Social practice mechanism II: Civil society, its constraints and contentions

7.1.2.1 NGOization of civil society: bureaucracy, pragmatism and utilitarianism

A pertinent development to explain the vulnerability of civil society to hegemony is "the NGOization of civil society" (Lang, 2013). It describes a process in which "social movements professionalize, institutionalize and bureaucratize in vertically-structured, policy-outcome-oriented organizations that focus to generate issue-specific results and to some degree marketable expert knowledge or services" (Lang, 2013, pp. 63-64). This process leads to a refocusing by the organizations on institutional advocacy and cultivation of funding resources, as they become dependent on large funding agencies and can result in their softening or reframing radical messages in order to be perceived as legitimate by donors, government and business (Lang, 2013).

The implications of NGOization, particularly bureaucratization, was expressed by the employee from AAD who voiced his frustration with being subjected to 'New Public Management', while he saw business taking over the original purposes of civil society. This bureaucracy can have implications for the NGOs'

ability to contend hegemony and wage the war of position, as they are both dependent on state funding and have many resources tied up in the administration of this. This tendency may shed some light on the pragmatism and utilitarianism displayed by the NGOs within the hegemonic discourse.[51] Engaging further with business in order to 'close the financing gap' although so-far futile in generating income for the NGO (Section 6.2.1.6) is regarded by the NGOs within the hegemonic discourse as a chance to increase and find new modes of funding.

NGOization also carries with it risks of what Burchell & Cook (2013) call *appropriation via engagement* - in which by bringing civil society and business close, in this case through partnerships, the risk of appropriation and thereby a loss of agency increases. This risk increases with the professionalization (Della Porta and Diani, 1998) and institutionalization (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998) of social movements[52], both central processes to NGOization, which take actors from a starting point of confrontation towards negotiation and finally to co-operation with power holders, a stage which they argue brings a halt to the potential of social movements as challengers of power (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). This was a worry of the counter-hegemonic discourse, and although mostly dismissed by NGOs in the hegemonic discourse themselves, it was to some degree concessed by the SG of StCD (6.2.1.5).

Overall, the NGOization of civil society in Denmark can be seen to have made NGO actors more vulnerable to the imposition of hegemony by the government due to the increase in bureaucratization and reliance on funding from external donors, such as state and business.

7.1.2.2 Contending the normative role of civil society in broad development agendas

A related theme of hegemonic struggle is the role of civil society (theme five, Table 4). As demonstrated, the counter-hegemonic discourse is more inclined to view civil-society-business relations as conflictual or even confrontational due to the commercial-social-paradox and draw on arguments of civil society's historical achievements as agitators to underscore this point. This is in turn stamped as an outdated view by the hegemonic discourse (echoing the government's discourse), which claims to have surpassed this

[51]As entering into partnerships with businesses, although futile as of yet in terms of income, allowed them to position themselves as a favorable partner for businesses in the future. Similarly, several actors in this discourse explained how they could benefit from PSDD, e.g. through innovation and disruption.

[52]Albeit these apply to social movements, which can in a different stage (e.g. less professionalized and institutionalized than the NGOs in this study), drawing on research in this field can still be helpful to understand the risks faced by the development community.

and instead see it as a chance for added value for all parties, as they believe that they are now all working towards the same goal: fulfillment of the SDGs.

This struggle (theme four, Table 4) is reflected in contemporary debates in SD. Much like the former Danish Minister of Finance, Bendell (2017) claims that civil society and the private sector are no longer adversaries, as the two now benefit from using each others' differences as advantages. It follows that old divides have been replaced by a cooperative modus that aligns values and creates common interests, as such making contention obsolete. As a counterpoint to this view stands neo-Gramscian scholars Laclau & Mouffe's (2001) theory of antagonism and conflict as being vital for sound democratic practice - in this view, antagonism is an inherent part of any political deliberation, and attempting to smooth over contention and achieve consensus is in itself an erroneous endeavor, as there will always be contention albeit further removed. Consensus is but a passing illustration of hegemony, that given the nature of politics in a democracy will inevitably be challenged (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001)[53]. Applying this, it can be argued that the success of the government in imposing hegemony on the Danish development community is an expression of near but temporary hegemony, which is already being challenged by the counter-hegemonic discourse from within.

7.2 Challenging hegemony

Above I have discussed different mechanisms related to the social practice that may offer explanation to the vulnerability of the Danish development community to imposed hegemony, namely the allure of broad development agendas and win-win solutions, elite capture of purpose and language, NGOization of civil society and the end of contention between civil society and business as a result of appropriation via engagement.

This beckons the questions, what conditions must be changed or strategies be followed for the counter-hegemonic movement to successfully challenge the current hegemony? Drawing on Gramsci and Fairclough, in this section I attempt to offer theoretical insights in pursuit of the second leg of RQ3: How can the practice of hegemony be challenged in this context?

[53]This is in line with Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999), who stress that consensus is no natural implication of dialogue nor discursive practice.

7.2.1 Material conditions and social practice

Through their discourse, the counter-hegemonic NGO actor works to expose the hegemony of PSDD whilst offering up an alternative in the form of "public finance for public goods". However, as shown above, there are a number of mechanisms in the contemporary social practice (or material conditions, following Gramsci) that impede this struggle, as shown above. A logical outcome would thereby be that the material conditions would need to be changed or at least circumvented in order to, following Fairclough (2010), alter the influence of the social practice onto the discourse - albeit some may be easier changed than others.

As discussed, the bureaucratization of the Danish development community can be seen as one such material condition that following this line of logic would need changing. The viability of this however may be low, as the organizational setup of the professionalized NGOs requires large-scale state funding which comes with high levels of compulsory administration. Advocating to change this would however be favorable, just as reducing the reliance on administration-heavy funding. This poses a dilemma though, as the exact attempt to diversify funding and thereby become less dependent on state funding can explain the orientation of the NGOs in the hegemonic discourse towards the private sector. As such, other sources of income with fewer administrative tasks need to be sought out.[54]

Also related to the social practice, I have earlier discussed the risks of broad sustainability agendas and the related allure of win-win solutions and potential for elite capture. A way to reject, if not change, this social practice would be to denounce the SDGs as the end goal. This is further discussed in Section 7.2.3.

7.2.2 From discourse to praxis

To change the material conditions and to win over the opinions needed to successfully challenge hegemony in the war of position, it is imperative to extend from the level of discourse to also engage with action (Burawoy, 2001). To this purpose, Gramsci's "Philosophy of Praxis" may be invoked. Gramsci's "Philosophy of Praxis" has been widely debated and interpreted but following Burawoy (2001), praxis itself can be understood as proving one's theories through action as "truth is not what intellectuals concoct in their cocoon and foist on the "masses" but something that emerges from subaltern groups,

[54]To this regard, AAD runs a volunteering service to their projects abroad as well as a hostel in Copenhagen, both form which proceeds go to their work (see appendix 2).

from a critique of their "common sense"." (Burawoy, 2001, p. 13).

Drawing on this, invoking a pragmatic view of truth as being "something that works" (Burawoy, 2001, p. 14), the counter-hegemonic movement should not only expose hegemony and point to PSDD's shortcomings but lead by example and showcase their alternative in action to prove their theory. In other words: there is potential through praxis to foster a practical critique of hegemony based on common sense by simply showcasing an alternative that works (Burawoy, 2001).

The counter-hegemonic side's proposed alternative 'public finance for public goods' and their intervention to claim 'partnerships' as partnerships with social movements can be seen as their pathway and strategy to reach sustainability goals (following Jerneck et al., 2010). This should therefore as far as possible be showcased in practice to win hegemony[55] and speaks to the hegemonic struggle over whom should drive SD (theme 2, Table 4). In their conviction that civil society should be the main driver of SD over the market, they should go further than invoking historical arguments of civil society victories, by showcasing successful examples of such. Given that PSDD as of yet has not yielded results (as described in Sections 3 and 6.2.1.6), it may likewise also prove difficult for the hegemonic side to succeed in praxis, as such strengthening the case for the counter-hegemonic side.

7.2.3 Going beyond the SDGs

Finally, I contend that a major caveat for the counter-hegemonic movement could be overcome by abandoning the SDGs altogether. In their attempt to reclaim the SDGs, the counter-hegemonic side endorses the same ends as those in hegemony which leaves them with a weakened political project. Through their portrayal as universal, the SDGs have gained a status as almost equating SD itself. This is problematic, as I have demonstrated in this thesis, as their apolitical appearance allows the government to utilize them to further a neoliberal ideology and own interests. Ziai (2016) argues that the notion of 'development' itself has historically been equated to the expansion of capitalism. He holds that if development, or SD, is uncritically adopted as the framework for transformation, this has implications for the potential of achieving global justice as this does not proposit political struggle nor transformation of

[55]This of course in reality presents itself with opportunities and restraints. In terms of opportunities, ActionAid Denmark already engages in partnerships with social movements in the Global South, and as such can consider emphasizing successful examples of this in their discourse. Realizing their alternative "public finance for public goods" may prove harder, as the full realization of such would imply policy changes which are outside of their scope of action. However, smaller actions which would prove this 'theory' might be practiced in place of.

existing relations of growth, capitalism and power (Ziai 2019, p. 179).

In order to be successful in their counter-revolution, AAD therefore needs to abandon the growth-oriented logics and neoliberal assumptions of the government's ideology and weak sustainability. This cannot be done while still endorsing the SDGs as the final end, as I have argued above. Broad consensus-seeking agendas like the SDGs occur in the absence of an alternative. Staying within the SDG-framework creates a risk of diversion, as the debate centers on the technical means to fulfillment of one particular SD agenda, rather than on the fundamental questions of SD: what is to be sustained, what is to be developed? (Faran, 2010). Therefore, in order to counter PSDD, a counter-paradigm could be presented which more fundamentally challenges the role and purpose of SD.

As an example, Faran (2010) names Human Development (as formulated by Sen) as a typology of SD. In this, what is to be sustained is freedom through the expansion of human capabilities such as education, health, disposable income, community participation, longer life expectancy etc. (Sen, 2000). This forms a break with weak sustainability and its GDP-focus, furthered under the SDGs. Other alternatives that break with the growth-centering of PSDD also exist in global civil society (such as post-growth agendas). Whichever the alternative, the counter-hegemonic side needs to find critical masses of people-driven movements with which to organize and from where 'intellectual and moral leadership' can be invoked, which according to Gramsci is necessary to dominate hegemonic struggle (Callinicos 2007, p. 213).

8. Conclusion

Understanding the underlying ideologies and political agendas that are being furthered in reach of fulfilling the SDGs is vital, as the political decisions and strategies that are born from them shape material outcomes. I have attempted to do so in this thesis by showing how the Danish government utilizes the SDGs to justify a neoliberal turn towards PSDD, branding this as 'paradigm shift'. As a result of this, the Danish development community, as part of civil society, has become a site for contention, as the government discourse has gained hegemony over large parts, while also being contested by a counter-hegemonic discourse.

In contextualizing the field of inquiry, I have shown how debates of SD and development finance on the international level are marked by two major shifts - in governance: going from multilateralism to

multistakeholderism, and in finance: from a traditional development aid model to development finance, debates which have permeated to Danish national level politics. On both international and national levels, PSDD has dominated the debate, despite lacking evidence for its efficiency in reaching SD.

In the CDA, I found that the government discourse was characterized by optimism and faith in win-win solutions and drew a picture of PSDD as urgent and necessary in order to reach the SDGs. It furthermore claimed an end to business-civil society relations as adversarial. The CDA of four large Danish NGOs showed how the government discourse has colonized the Danish development community, in that it was reiterated by three of the four NGOs in a hegemonic discourse. This was characterized by pragmatism in engaging with PSDD as it was understood to be happening regardless, and to some extent reiterated the government discourse in its optimism and view on business-civil society relations. The market was seen as an important driver of SD and civil society's role in PSDD was to guarantee ethics. Meanwhile, some expressed doubts that PSDD would actually work. The fourth NGO presented a counter-hegemonic discourse, seeking to challenge PSDD and call out a misreading of the SDGs in the hegemonic NGO discourse. Instead, they sought to reclaim the SDGs and push an alternative of 'public finance for public goods' as a pathway. They were more inclined to see business-civil society relations as conflictual and attempted to revive civil society's role as the main driver of SD.

The vulnerability of the Danish development community can be explained partially by the social practices surrounding the debate on SD and development finance. These include NGOization and with it bureaucratization of Danish civil society. as well as broad and seemingly apolitical SD agendas like the SDGs. These bring with them risks of elite capture of language and of civil society purpose as well as promises of win-win solutions that ignore trade-offs.

Drawing on theory, I further explored pathways for the counter-hegemonic side in waging the war of position. Discursive struggle must be complemented by praxis and efforts to change the material conditions that the development community are subjected to as well as the social practices surrounding the debate. A stronger countermovement may be built on turning away from the SDGs as a final end and with it the growth-centered weak sustainability of the government and exploring other conceptualizations better fundamentally challenge the hegemony.

8.1 Further research

Further research could go deeper in exploring strategies for civil society to avoid co-optation and successfully counter large-scale SD agendas both in the realm of discourse and of praxis.

Furthermore, as mentioned in 3.2, little research exists pertaining to the effect of PSDD (specifically PPPs) in the Global South (Jomo et al., 2016). This thesis has explored the hegemonic implications of the PSDD paradigm on a development community in the Global North. Therefore, further research could investigate the implications of the PSDD paradigm in countries and communities that are "beneficiaries" of such development projects.

Finally, further research could look into viability and pathways for the 'public finance for public goods' alternative, including ways to design and conduct it in praxis on different levels. It could also compare other conceptualizations of SD (as described in Section 7.2.3) to determine their viability as counter-alternatives to PSDD.

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Appendices

List of appendices

Appendix 1. The 2017 Strategy for Development Cooperation

In this appendix, I take a deeper look at the 2017 strategy for development cooperation and highlight how PSDD is centralized in the document.

The strategy document *Verden 2030* sets the line for Danish development work abroad and guides state funding.

The document sets four clear guideposts for Danish development efforts:

1. Ensuring safety, peace and protection as, amongst other things, as "in this way, we will also help prevent the refugee press against the borders of Europe" (Verden 2030, 2017, p. 5);
2. Preventing irregular migration;
3. Ensure sustainable growth that benefits everyone - in developing countries by investing in sustainable economic growth, as well as it being "in favor of the Danish economy and trade" (Verden 2030, 2017, p. 5);
4. Freedom - democracy, human rights and equality.

Meeting national and global interests simultaneously is explicitly stated and presented not as dichotomous, but harmonious in the strategy:

> *"We will be driven by promoting Danish foreign and domestic policy interests at the same time. We will fight poverty, promote sustainable growth and development, economic freedom, peace, stability, equality and a rule-based international order. In doing so, we will at the same time address threats to our own security and way of life, create impetus for trade, economic diplomacy and commercial interests, and promote the principles, values and human rights on which our own open, democratic society rests."* (Verden 2030, 2017, p. 1).

The strategy is based on and centers around the SDGs, however focusing specifically on a selected handful SDGs. Notably, SDG17 is seen as *"the essential choice for our entire commitment and as a foundation for creating results within all other goals"* (Verden 2030, 2017, p. 6). The reading of SDG17 is singularly focused on partnerships, only mentioning that *"it highlights how entrepreneurship and partnerships with different actors - civil society, research, businesses, investors, and more - are vital to creating, with local partners, the right results."* (Verden 2030, 2017, p. 11). This reading omits the many targets under SDG17

focusing on improving taxation systems, raising publicly funded development cooperation and ensuring domestic resource mobilization (see 2.1.3). A large part of the document is dedicated to dealing with public-private partnerships and increasing BF (see e.g. Verden 2030, 2017, p. 11), moving explicitly towards PSDD and away from the traditional development model: *"Development assistance will continue to be crucial, but assistance will in future be more catalytic. It is therefore a definite break with seeing development as a task that primarily requires development assistance."* (Verden 2030, 2017, p. 2).

Whilst conceding that ODA still plays a vital role in low-income countries, it states that the decisive factor is how well publicly funded development cooperation *"through partnerships can contribute to catalyzing and mobilizing private finance, knowledge and new technology to developing countries"* (Verden 2030, 2017, p. 4). Simultaneously, it is stated that developing countries increasingly must ensure their *own* domestic resource mobilization, e.g. *"through enhanced tax systems, fighting tax havens and a better business environment for private investment, financial freedom and respect for private property."* (Verden 2030, 2017, p. 4). While developing countries are expected to do so on their own, Danish development cooperation will increasingly focus on PSDD:

> *"With the SDGs as a starting point, we will organize our development cooperation in a way that can help set the individual and its potential free in developing countries. Market-driven economic growth and greater freedom for individuals go hand in hand. The foremost task of development assistance is to make itself redundant. We do this not least through initiatives that can remove barriers to the individual's motivation, stimulate entrepreneurship, including combating corruption, and exploit the great potential for market-driven economic growth and free trade."* (Verden 2030, 2017, p. 1)

The above exemplifies how the SDGs in this strategy are used to validate a neoliberal ideology that sees free trade, entrepreneurship, private property, economic growth and the market as the building blocks of what constitutes good development.

Appendix 2. Description of NGOs

Save the Children Denmark

Save the Children Denmark[56] (in Danish, Red Barnet) is focused on children's rights and protection. It is the Danish chapter of Save the Children International. Save the Children Denmark works with emergency response in fragile countries and have development-oriented programs in 120 countries across all continents, amongst others focused on education and poverty eradication (through Save the Children International). Save the Children Denmark work with the private sector in a number of different constellations, including corporate donor-relations and in partnerships for protection of children's rights in the Global South.[57] It received 151,9 mil. DKK from DANIDA in 2017 (latest annual report, 2017)[58].

ActionAid Denmark

ActionAid Denmark[59] (in Danish, Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke) is focused on youth who are subjected to poverty or discrimination by supporting political participation, a just economy, and social cohesion. They are the Danish chapter of ActionAid International. Action Aid Denmark works in 45 countries, mainly in Africa and the Middle East, and their work spans long-term development programs (amongst them land rights, women and youth empowerment) and emergency response. Action Aid Denmark does not enter into formalized financial partnerships with the private sector but has entered into dialogue-based partnerships.[60] They run a hostel (Globalhagen) and a travelling service for volunteers (Global Platform). It receives 128,1 mil. DKK from DANIDA (latest annual report 2018).[61]

CARE Denmark

CARE Denmark[62] is focused on long-term development interventions in 10 countries across Africa and Asia. CARE Denmark is the Danish chapter of CARE International. CARE Denmark works with climate adaptation, land rights, and sustainable trade and supply-chains. Their strategy is built on entering into partnerships. CARE Denmark works in partnerships with the private sector in strategic, CSR- and dialogue-

[56]Source (unless otherwise stated): https://redbarnet.dk/om-red-barnet/
[57] Based on empirical interview employee and observation notes from DIIS panel debate
[58]https://redbarnet.dk/media/4801/red-barnet-aarsrapport-2017.pdf
[59]Source (unless otherwise stated): https://www.ms.dk/om-os
[60] Based on empirical interview employee and observation notes from DIIS panel debate
[61]https://www.ms.dk/sites/default/files/udgivelser/aarsrapport_2018_0.pdf
[62]Source (unless otherwise stated): https://care.dk/saadan-arbejder-care/

based partnerships, among others through DANIDA Market Development Partnerships (DMDP)[63]. It received 54 mils. DKK from DANIDA through the Strategic Partnership Agreement (latest annual report, 2018).[64]

DanChurchAid

DanChurchAid (in Danish, Folkekirkens Nødhjælp)[65] is a church-based organization focused on long-term development interventions and emergency relief in 19 countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. They are the Danish chapter of ActAlliance, a coalition of Protestant and Orthodox churches and church-related organizations engaged in humanitarian and development work. DanChurchAid's development work is among other things focused on poverty eradication, land rights, political access and ending inequality. It receives 200,9 mil. DKK from DANIDA in 2018 (latest annual report, 2018)[66].

[63]Based on empirical interview employee and observation notes from DIIS panel debate
[64]https://care.dk/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/%C3%85rsregn-eng-final-samlet-signed.pdf
[65]Source (unless otherwise stated): https://www.noedhjaelp.dk/det-goer-vi
[66]https://www.noedhjaelp.dk/det-goer-vi/om-os/regnskab/aarsregnskaber

Appendix 3. Interview guide

In English with Danish translation in brackets. All interviewees chose to do the interview in Danish.

Interview guide
NGO actor:

Briefing/Intro:

Thank you for agreeing to do this interview with me for my MSc thesis in Environmental Studies and Sustainability Science. In my thesis, I am investigating current trends in development financing, looking at the Danish development community as a case. My research thus far has shown me that there is an increase of private sector focus in development finance policy, for instance in terms of blended finance initiatives (like IFU) and partnerships with private sector actors. In my thesis, I am asking, how Danish civil society - specifically the "development community" - are experiencing and responding to this. I am especially interested to find out how civil society actors are linking these developments to the SDGs, and how the SDGs are being viewed/utilized in light of this.
My questions are grouped into four categories in the following order: General questions about the approach of your organization to the SDGs; Questions on the approach and perception of your organization to Partnerships; Questions on your (organization's) perception of the general developments within development finance within the last 10-15 years and the role for civil society today; Question regarding to your (organization's) views on financing for development.
All though several of these issues do overlap, please try to relate your answers to the specific questions.
I will stick to this structure overall, but might divert from it, if something interesting comes up, that would be worth pursuing. The interview will be recorded, possibly transcribed, and will be included in my analysis. You have the option of partial anonymity, if you feel that it is necessary.

Choice of language: Danish/English

[Tak fordi du har indvilget i at deltage i dette interview til mit speciale i Environmental Studies and Sustainability Science. I mit speciale undersøger jeg de nuværende tendenser i udviklingsfinansiering, og ser specifikt på det danske 'udviklingssamfund' som en case. Min research hidtil har vist mig, at der er en tendens for stigende fokus på det private erhvervslivs rolle i udviklingsspørgsmål og udviklingsfinansiering, f.eks. i form af blended finance initiativer (som IFU) og partnerskaber med private aktører. I mit speciale spørger jeg, hvordan det danske civilsamfund - særligt de aktører, der beskæftiger sig med udvikling - oplever og reagerer på disse tendenser. Jeg er især interesseret i at finde ud af, hvordan civilsamfundets aktører forbinder disse udviklinger med Verdensmålene, og hvordan Verdensmålene ses / bruges i lyset heraf.
Mine spørgsmål er grupperet i fire kategorier i følgende rækkefølge: Generelle spørgsmål om jeres tilgang til Verdensmålene; Spørgsmål om jeres tilgang til og opfattelse af partnerskaber; Spørgsmål om jeres opfattelse af de generelle udviklinger inden for udviklingsfinansiering inden for de sidste 10-15 år (i

Danmark) og civilsamfundets rolle i dag; Spørgsmål vedrørende din (organisations) syn på finansiering af udvikling.
Selvom flere af disse problemstillinger overlapper hinanden, så prøv at forhold dig til hvert spørgsmål så specifikt som muligt.
Jeg vil overordnet holde fast i denne struktur, men vil afvige fra den, hvis noget interessant kommer op undervejs, som vil være værd at følge op på. Interviewet bliver optaget, eventuelt transskriberet, og vil indgå i min analyse. Du har mulighed for delvis anonymitet, hvis du føler at det er nødvendigt.

Sprog valg: Dansk / Engelsk]

1. **The SDGs *[Verdensmålene]***

1.1 What is your organization's approach to and view on the SDGs as a whole?
[Hvad er din organisations tilgang til og syn på Verdensmålene, som en helhed?]

1.2 What possible potentials and/or pitfalls do you see in the SDGs?
[Hvilke eventuelle potentialer og/eller faldgruber ser du/I ved dem?]

1.3 How can or does your organization use/relate your work to the SDGs?
[*Hvordan kan eller gør din organisation brug af / relaterer jeres arbejde til Verdensmålene?*]

1.4 Hvor udbredt oplever du/I at netop jeres tilgang/holdning til Verdensmålene er i det danske civilsamfund?
[How widespread do you experience that your approach / attitude towards the SDGs is in Danish civil society?]

3. Partnerships *[Partnerskaber]*

2.1 Does your organization enter into any kind of private sector cooperation?
[Indgår din organisation i nogen form for privat sektorsamarbejde?]

2.1.1 If so, on what premises? (For example, in the form of partnerships?)
[Hvis ja, på hvilke præmisser? (F.eks. I form af partnerskaber?)]

2.1.1.1 If so, what is your motivation for this?
[Hvis ja, hvad er jeres motivation herfor? (Finansielle, ideologiske)]

2.1.1.2 Is your strategy in this field linked to your work with the SDGS?
[Hænger jeres strategi på dette område sammen med jeres arbejde med Verdensmålene?]

2.1.1.3 Do you see any pitfalls in this? Which?
[Ser I nogle faldgruber heri? Hvilke?]

2.1.2 If no, why not?
[Hvis nej, hvorfor ikke?]

2.2 Do you / your organization experience any expectations/pressure/demands that you in your work must be more involved in partnerships?
[Oplever du/din organisation, at der stilles forventninger/krav til, at I i jeres arbejde i højere grad skal indgå i partnerskaber?]

2.2.1 If yes, how and by whom? What is the nature of such expectations/pressure/ demands, e.g. formalized, political, peer pressure, agenda-setting-wise
[Hvis ja, hvordan og af hvem? Hvad er karakteren af sådanne forventninger/krav, f.eks. formaliseret, politisk, "peer pressure" i miljøet, den overordnede udviklingsdagsorden?]

3. The overall developments in the development community/area [Den overordnede udvikling på udviklings/bistandsområdet]

3.1 How would you characterize the developments in the development area over the past 10-15 years? (Particularly in relation to the role of civil society and private sector influence)- in Denmark, and feel free to comment on international developments as well.
[Hvordan ville du/I karakterisere udviklingen på udviklingsområdet de seneste 10-15 år? (Særligt i forhold til civilsamfundets rolle og privatsektorindflydelse) - i Danmark, men også internationalt, hvis du vil kommentere på det.]

3.2 How did you as an organization experience the development policy strategy from 2017? *[Hvordan oplever/oplevede I som organisation den udviklingspolitiske strategi anno 2017?]*

3.3 Do you see the government's development strategy as interconnected with the SDGs?
[Ser I regeringens udviklingspolitiske strategi som hængende sammen med Verdensmålene?]

3.3.1 Why / why not? (If so, how?)
[Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke? (Hvis ja, hvordan?)]

3.4 How do you see the role of Danish civil society? (How) is it living up to its role today?
[Hvordan ser du det danske civilsamfunds rolle - og varetagen af denne rolle, i dag?]

3.5 Do you find that Danish civil society is under pressure? (If not, please expand)
[Oplever du, at det danske civilsamfund er under pres? (Hvis ikke, uddyb)]

3.5.1 If so, what kind of pressure and from where?
[I så fald hvilken form for pres, og hvorfra?]

3.5.2 Hvad skal der til for, at dansk civilsamfund* kan overkomme dette? Hvad er der brug for?
[*What is needed for Danish civil society * to overcome this?*]

3.5.3 Can the world goals play a specific role in this? How / why not?
[Kan Verdensmålene spille en bestemt rolle heri? Hvordan/hvorfor ikke?]

*especially focusing on the development community
*[*særligt fokus på udviklingsorganisationer]*

4. **Financing for development (broadly)** ***[Finansiering af udvikling (på bredt plan)]***

4.1 Overall - how should development ideally be financed?
[Helt overordnet - hvordan skal udvikling ideelt set finansieres?]

4.1.1 Why? Why not other options? Expand)
[Hvorfor? Hvorfor ikke andre muligheder? Uddyb.]

4.2 Has your attitude to this changed with the SDGS? How/why not?
[Har jeres holdninger hertil ændret sig med Verdensmålene? Hvordan/hvorfor ikke?]

Debriefing:
Thank you for this. I have no further questions.
Do you have anything to add? Or any questions of your own?

[Tak for dette. Jeg har ingen yderligere spørgsmål.
Har du noget at tilføje? Eller har du selv nogle spørgsmål?]