A Politics of Sensitivity: Sub-Saharan Migration as an Algerian Field of Practice

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of
Master of Arts
in Middle Eastern Studies

Author: Linda El-Naggar
Advisor: Torsten Janson
Examiner: Dalia Abdelhady
Date: November 15, 2019

Abstract

Despite Algeria's status as a transit and a destination for sub-Saharan migrants, there is no official migration policy in the country. This study explores how state and non-state actors construct a distinct field of practice of sub-Saharan migration in the vacuum of a missing formulated Algerian migration policy. Through qualitative research methods, thirteen key actors in the area of sub-Saharan migration in Algeria were interviewed about their perceptions of the field of practice of migration and of their roles in the field, their responses to the conditions of migration, and their ways of exercising agency and power in the field. By bridging theoretical perspectives from sociology, political science and international relations, this study demonstrates that migration practices are executed on a national as well as an international level, intersected by expressions of power and agency. Ultimately, I argue that the field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration in Algeria is principally driven by a notion of securitization and sovereignty principles. Thus, assertions of the EU's extensive influence on migration politics in Algeria are questioned. This study also shows that other state and non-state actors contribute to the field of practice of migration, mainly through diplomatic and humanitarian practices, as well as exchanges and strategies. Due to the interplay of flows of agency and structures connecting the national level to the international one, the Algerian field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration constitutes a politics of sensitivity.

Keywords: Sub-Saharan Migration, Practice, Multilateralism, Civil Society, Agency, Power, Algeria

Acknowledgements

Contents

Maps

Map 1. Sub-Saharan migration routes in West Africa, the Maghreb and the Mediterranean (Migration Policy Institute 2015).

Map 2: Map of Algeria (Geographic Guide n.d.).

CHAPTER I

Introduction

During the peak of the 'migration crisis' of 2015-2016, the Mediterranean Sea became known to the world as a deadly crossing for migrants. What is less known, yet just as deadly, is how the Sahara Desert is used as a crossing by migrants seeking employment and better living conditions in Europe or the Maghreb. While no one knows how many people have died during their attempts of crossing the Sahara, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has rescued around 20,000 migrants since the onset of their operations in April 2016 (IOM 2019). Following conflicts and climate crisis in Mali and the Sahel, as well as civil war in Libya, many migrants have oriented themselves to Algeria, transforming the country into a transit and increasingly a destination for sub-Saharan migrants (Salim 2016). Algeria's main response to this development has been the arrangement of 'return operations' of migrants to neighboring Niger (Ibid; Baghzouz 2017; Bensaâd 2017). These operations have caused an outcry against human rights violations (Amnesty 2018), as well as diplomatic tensions between Algeria and the migrants' countries of origin, such as Mali and Guinea (Ben Yahia 2018; Bensâad 2017).

Ever since the watershed moment when former president Houari Boumedienne unilaterally banned Algerians from emigrating to France in 1973, international migration and the activities of migrants have been situated much outside government control (Collyer 2012). Sub-Saharan migration started to gain momentum in Algeria in the early 2000s (Salim 2016). However, it was not until 2015 that the Algerian authorities started discussing a national migration profile (Baghzouz 2017, 31). In 2017, the Prime Minister as well as the Minister of Interior declared that the documents for regularization of sub-Saharan migrants were underway (Le Quotidien d'Oran, n.d.; Huffpost Maghreb 2017). Shortly afterwards, the president's chief of staff accused migrants of bringing 'crime, drugs, and several other plagues' into Algeria, dismissing any regularization (L'Obs 2017). Thus, migration in Algeria has increasingly been transformed into a security problem through the process of 'securitization', portraying migrants as threats (Salim 2016, 16, 34). Algeria is therefore yet another example of how international migration has been placed on the top of the international security agenda (Adamson 2006).

Migration is one of the Partnership Priorities between Algeria and the EU for the period 2017-2020 (European Council & Council of the European Union 2017). The specificity of the Maghreb is that

a segment of its most recent immigration is an effect of stricter European border control, leaving large numbers of migrants originally bound for the EU stuck at its external borders. This way, both immigration and emigration in the Maghreb are connected to European states (Fargues 2013, 33). Insights into the EU's role in migration policy in Algeria are therefore vital to understand migration policies and practices in the country. At the same time, Algeria is one of the most 'association dense' countries in the Middle East (see Liverani 2008, 15). In the vacuum left by the weak, authoritarian Algerian state within the area of sub-Saharan migration, other actors likely exercise action in the international normative sphere, as in a notion of the 'international society' (see Buzan 2004). Nonetheless, the practices of transnational and local actors within the field of practice of migration in Algeria in lieu of a missing formulated migration policy have not been discussed by research.

To make sense of this puzzling problem, I investigate how state and non-state actors perceive and respond to a distinct *field of practice* of sub-Saharan migration. This term builds on Bourdieu's concepts of 'field' and 'practice' and is also used in other studies (Bourdieu 1984; see also Wæver 1995). As a field, migration in Algeria is a social sphere with its own relatively independent logic. Consisting of individual actors possessing various resources, positioned in a set of social relations, this field makes up the space in which the actors struggle for influence (Bourdieu 1984., 226, 232-33). Practice is in this study simply understood as a performance, the exercise of an action (Ibid). Thus, the field of practice of migration refers to the activities and interactions within the area of migration. With the aim of scrutinizing the logic of the field of practice of migration in Algeria, I examine how key state and non-state actors perceive this field of practice and of their own roles in the field in Algeria, how they respond to the conditions of migration and in which ways they exercise agency and power. I explore this last aspect through Giddens' *structuration theory*, investigating how agency and power are interconnected as different aspects of all social practices, including migration (Giddens 1979).

I ask the following research questions:

❑ How do state and non-state actors perceive the field of practice of migration in Algeria and their own role(s) in this field?
❑ How do state and non-state actors respond to the conditions of migration in Algeria?

❏ In which ways do state and non-state actors exercise agency and power in the field of practice of migration in Algeria?

1.1 Research Purpose

The purpose of this study is to establish a broader understanding of how the field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration in Algeria is constructed, by exploring how state and non-state actors perceive this field of practice and respond to the conditions of migration. By conceptualizing responses as a way of either supporting or countering social structures, I investigate in which ways state and non-state actors exercise agency and power within the social structure of an authoritarian and weak state in the field of practice of migration. Thus, my three research questions are interlinked.

This study is important for several reasons. Firstly, I fill a gap in the literature, by showing how state and non-state actors construct a field of practice of migration in the vacuum left by the state. Secondly, perspectives of actors in this field of practice are crucial for understanding the conditions of migration, as they are in contact with the Algerian authorities as well as with the migrants themselves. Third, insights about how state and non-state actors have agency and power in the field of practice pertaining to migration are essential to grasp the possibilities of pressuring the Algerian state, exercising practices in migration assistance and implementing independent strategies. Finally, in contrast to the main trend in studies on migration in the Middle East – that is, focusing either solely on migration within the region or its interconnections with the 'West' – this study exposes how the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Europe are interconnected.[1]

In essence, I argue that in lieu of a missing formulated migration policy, state and non-state actors perceive the field of practice of sub-Saharan migration in Algeria as principally driven by a notion of securitization and sovereignty principles, due to its structure as a weak, authoritarian state fueled by rents in the form of oil and gas. The significance of these findings is that statements concerning the EU's far-reaching influence on migration practices in Algeria appear exaggerated. State and non-state actors in this field of practice perceive the Algerian state as the main actor in the field, yet they partially consider that they make a difference, by carrying out other practices than the

---

[1] I use the term the 'West' as it is a prevalent denomination of Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand. However, I put the term within brackets since it is a simplified construction of this part of the world as essentially distinguished from the rest.

Algerian authorities. In response to these conditions of migration, these actors construct a distinct field of practice of migration, consisting of diplomatic and humanitarian practices, as well as exchanges and strategies. While some of these practices are adapted to the Algerian state logic of securitization and sovereignty, others counter this structure by exercising agency and power – they pressure the state, assist migrants, establish coordination platforms, and execute their own independent strategies.

1.2 Outline

In chapter two, I give an account of the conditions of sub-Saharan migration and the broader political context in Algeria. Next, in chapter three, I engage with the literature on migration in the Maghreb, Algerian foreign policy and Middle Eastern civil society, with the aim of situating research on sub-Saharan migration in Algeria within the wider region, as well as connecting it to Algeria's policies concerning state and non-state actors. Thereafter, in chapter four, I present my theoretical framework, addressing (1) power, agency and structure through *structuration theory,* (2) the authoritarian state through the concept of the *coercive apparatus* and (3) internationalization through the notion of the normative structure of the *international society*, one of the main pillars of the English School of international relations theory. Turning then to chapter five, I explain my methodological framework, building on constructivism and qualitative semi-structured interviews. Following this, in chapter six, I present the profiles of the participants, the data of the study and my findings, organized into two theoretically-based categories: *the level of the authoritarian state* and *the level of the international society*. These categories illustrate that the field of practice pertaining to migration consists of both a state level and an international level. Continuing to chapter seven, I examine the findings in relation to the literature and the theoretical framework, situating them in their broader context. Finally, in chapter eight, I conclude and summarize my main arguments and contributions, discuss the normative question of sub-Saharan migration, and formulate suggestions for future research.

1.3 Note on Terminology

Throughout the study, I use the broad term 'migrants' when referring to sub-Saharan Africans residing in Algeria, as it concerns anyone who has moved from his/her country to settle in another country. Most sub-Saharans in Algeria have left their homes in the quest of economic opportunities. While this means that the majority is not considered refugees, it does not, however, imply that they

did not leave harsh living conditions behind them.[2] Moreover, I employ the terms the 'Maghreb' and the 'Mashriq', when referring to the states in the western and eastern part of the Arab world respectively.[3]

---

[2] I reserve the terms 'asylum seekers' and 'refugees' for when scholars or participants are specifically discussing these groups.
[3] By the 'Maghreb', I mean Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya.

CHAPTER II

Context: Sub-Saharan Migration in an Authoritarian Weak State

In this chapter, I delineate the conditions of sub-Saharan migration in Algeria. I also describe the political system of the country, with the aim of illustrating the context in which migrants as well as state and non-state actors operate.

2.1 Conditions of Sub-Saharan Migration in Algeria

Migration in Algeria has been a regional trend for centuries, as the southern desert town of Tamanrasset used to make up an important transport hub on the trans-Saharan trade route, connecting Algeria to West Africa. Most of the contemporary sub-Saharan migrants come from Niger and Mali, yet nationals from Guinea, Senegal, the Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo are also present (Baghzouz 2017, 40; Salim 2016, 21). The army is very active in the south of the country, due to the presence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), presenting an essential security challenge for Algeria (Salim 2016, 45-46; Baghzouz 2017, 32).

New laws on migration in Algeria were introduced in 2008 and 2009. The first law, no. 08-11, regulated the conditions of entry, sojourn and exit of foreigners in the country and specifically targeted sub-Saharan migrants (Fargues 2013, 30; Collyer 2012, 119). This law regards irregular migration as a crime, leading to up to two years in prison. Not complying to an expulsion order is punishable by up to five years in prison (Amnesty 2018, 3). Following this law, it became more difficult for sub-Saharan migrants to regulate their status in Algeria, forcing many to leave or enter the informal labor market (Del Pistoia 2018). The second law, no. 09-11, altered the Penal Code by adding the offense of irregular exit of its territory for Algerians and foreign nationals, which is punished by up to six months in prison (Fargues 2013, 30; Amnesty 2018, 3).

There is no national legislation on asylum in Algeria. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible for the determination of the right to asylum (Baghzouz 2017, 44-45). Algeria has joined fundamental human rights conventions, such as the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol as well as the 1990 Migration Workers Convention, yet the authorities do not follow them (Baghzouz 2017, 45; Bensaâd 2017, 28; Wihtol de Wenden 2010, 140). Sub-Saharan migrants in Algeria are subjected to

socioeconomic marginalization, racist campaigns and deportations based upon skin color (Bensâad 2017; Salim 2016; Baghzouz 2017).[4] In 2014, an agreement was set up between Algeria and Niger, regulating the return operations of Nigerien nationals. However, asylum seekers, refugees and non-Nigerien nationals are also sent to Niger, which counters international law. Reports disclose that these operations occur under brutal conditions: migrants endure raids in their homes, arbitrary arrests, detentions, violence, ill-treatment and being dropped in the desert between Algeria and Niger (UN News 2018; Amnesty 2018).

2.2 Algeria's Political System: An Authoritarian Weak State

Algeria was incorporated into France from 1830 to 1962. Following a protracted and violent war of independence that killed hundreds of thousands, lasting from 1954-1962, Algeria launched a populist form of socialism, characterized by a one-party rule and a state-controlled economy. Its institutions became dependent on the army and its economy on petroleum revenues, features that distinguish the Algerian political system up until today (Addi 2017, 403). Algeria's populist ideology stems from the National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*, FLN), the leading movement in the anti-colonial struggle, transformed into the party of government after independence (Ibid). Military leaders rule from behind the scenes and form the locus of power in Algeria (Ibid., 409-10; Roberts 2003, 109). Through the FLN's continuous simplified rhetoric about heroic resistance against the French, the army has become the embodiment of the war of liberation, justifying its power (Evan and Philipps 2007, 5, 74; Addi 2017, 410).

Political instability has been one of the key characteristics of post-independence political development in Algeria. Since the rise of social unrest in the 1980s, culminating in the nationwide riots of 'Black October' in 1988, political violence has become the norm (Addi 2017, 406; Liverani 2008, 16). First, the country was shaken by a decade long conflict between the army and Islamist insurgents in the 1990s, resulting in 250,000 casualties and known as *la décennie noire*. During this time, the guerrillas were gaining ground at more than one point, rendering the collapse of the Algerian state possible (Zartman 1995; Nicholson 1998). Second, low intensity violence has continued to thrive even following the army's declaration of victory (Liverani 2008, 16). Third, mass upheavals have taken place, such as the one flaring up in the region of Kabylia in 2001 (Ibid; Roberts 2003, 287-91). Fourth, riots occur frequently all over the country, interrupting local

---

[4] Racism appears to be an important factor in the treatment of sub-Saharan migrants in Algeria. Due to the limited scope of this study, I will not, however, explore this factor.

political life (Liverani 2008, 16; Henry 2014, 91). Finally, massive protests erupted in February 2019, following former president Abdelaziz Bouteflika's announcement to stand a fifth presidential term. Bouteflika was forced to leave his post in April 2019, after 20 years in power (BBC 2019). The protests have continued until now (November 2019), as the protesters are demanding *le pouvoir* to step down.[5] Algeria represents a case of political instability in the Middle East, as considerable segments of the population contest the state institutions, sometimes even the idea of stateness, through anti-systemic groups who may turn to violence (Buzan 1983, 45-61; Liverani 2008, 16). Thus, the Algerian state embodies a weak state, resorting to violence in its attempts to infiltrate society, form social relationships and withdraw resources (Migdal 1988; Lust 2017, 161-64; Roberts 2015, 175).

Following the riots of Black October in 1988, the regime initiated substantial reforms, such as a liberalization of the economy and a multi-party system (Addi 2017, 408). However, these reforms were only democratic façades, as a militarization of Algerian political life took place simultaneously (Ibid., Martinez 2000). In about the same period, from the mid-1980s to the army coup in 1992, Algeria experienced an 'associative spring', as a myriad of associations representing various political interests emerged (Liverani 2008, 29). The Algerian authorities control associational life through the 2012 law on associations, no. 12-06 (European Parliament, n.d). According to this law, associations must be authorized by the authorities in order to operate, their financial resources are dependent on subventions of 'consensus', their possibilities of cooperating with international organizations are constrained, and international associations have very limited possibilities of shaping their activities as they wish (Ibid; EuroMed Rights 2012).

---

[5] *Le pouvoir* refers to the 'power' or 'system' in place in Algeria, consisting of the army, the president, party officials and wealthy businessmen.

CHAPTER III

Literature Review: The Migration Frontier in Algeria

In this chapter, I start out by providing an overview of the debates within research on sub-Saharan migration in Algeria. Turning to the literature on migration in the Maghreb, I examine regional trends and tendencies, with the purpose of contextualizing this study. Thereafter, I investigate the discussions on Algeria's external relations, by scrutinizing the literature on foreign policy. With the aim of exploring the roles of non-state actors in Algeria, I finally highlight scholars' conclusions about the functions of civil society in the Middle East.

3.1 The Algerian Case: Security, Strict Migration Laws and the EU

In his study based on interviews with migrants, Salim (2016) stresses that the Algerian authorities construct an image of sub-Saharan migrants as criminals. In their discourse, links are made between migrants and various security domains, such as economy (fake money), military (connections to terrorist organizations), politics (criminality) and environment/sanitation (diseases, such as HIV) (Ibid., 16, 34). According to Salim, a dichotomy of 'us' and 'them' is constructed through a process of dehumanization of migrants, with the goal of portraying migrants as potential enemies (Ibid., 36). In contrast to Salim, who discusses security from a human security perspective, Adamson (2006) puts the perspective of national security in the forefront of her analysis. She argues that international migration flows challenge states' ability to uphold state capacity and state autonomy, two interconnected aspects of sovereignty. This is especially true for weak states such as Algeria, lacking the institutional capacity necessary to cope with the challenges coming with migration (Ibid, 175-76). Noting that globalization influences the increasing disparity between state capacity and state autonomy as measures of state effectiveness, Adamson concludes that increased state cooperation in migration is an effective tool of international migration management and the improvement of state capacity (Ibid., 176-80). While Adamson's study is focused on the international community in general, I contribute to the understanding of state cooperation in the field of practice of migration by examining how state (and non-state) actors respond to the conditions of migration in Algeria.

Policy-oriented research on migration in Algeria mainly revolves around the introduction of the migration laws of 2008 and 2009. There is widespread support for the notion that the migration

laws were at least partly a response to European pressure on tightened migration control in the Maghreb (Fargues 2013; Collyer 2012; Salim 2016; Bensaâd 2017; Baghzouz 2017). Spurred by their concern to curb irregular migration originating in or transiting through the Maghreb, Mediterranean European states aspired to establish cooperation with Maghreb states on the control of movements towards European borders. Europe's wish was incorporated into measures such as criminalizing irregular migrants and returning them to the border. In Algeria, this process started with the signature of the Association Agreement in 2005 (Fargues 2013, 33; Salim 2016, 8; Bensaâd 2017; Baghzouz 2017).

There are two camps in the debate on European influence of these migration laws. What is characteristic of the debate, despite the involvement of some scholars of good repute, is that these studies have been cited very few times - manifesting the lack of scholarly interest in research on migration in Algeria. On the one hand, Fargues (2013) and Collyer (2012) view the migration laws as being *partly* a response to the EU. Fargues asserts that Maghreb states only accepted to control irregular migration as it was a part of a broader approach. For them, tightened migration control was a response to the EU's agenda (security) as well as to their own agenda (development through labor migration and national security) (Ibid., 33). Moreover, migration control has become a 'bargaining chip' for Maghreb states to negotiate more favorable visa policies (Ibid). Collyer agrees on this last point, claiming that liberalization of the movement of people between Algeria and the EU is a declared long-term aim of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) (Ibid., 119). In addition, he perceives the laws as a reaction to a changing social situation in Algeria, including worries about rising immigration (Ibid). Collyer's work stands out in the review of the literature, as he is the only one who partly justifies these laws.

On the other hand, Baghzouz (2017) and Bensaâd (2017) perceive the migration laws as being *fully* a response to the EU. Baghzouz interprets the laws as an adaption on behalf of Algeria to the circumstances of a Euro-Mediterranean system appearing under the influence of the EU (Ibid, 45). Questioning whether Algeria has a migration policy, he points out that the establishment of public politics in the country is too recent for an efficient legislative application regarding principles, methods and evaluation tools (Ibid., 31). On a similar note, Bensaâd discusses an 'Europeanization' of the question of sub-Saharan migration. For Bensaâd, the EU has the ownership of this question, which is reflected by the migration laws and their 'standardized' measures, inspired by the European context to a great extent (Ibid., 24-25). He stresses that the realities of deep regional

interpenetration through human and informal economic exchanges between the Sahel and the Maghreb remain overlooked (Ibid., 24).

What is common for all the scholars in this debate is that they fail to present any convincing explanations to why the laws should be interpreted as a response to the EU, rather than as a national state policy. The 'compromise' between Algeria's own interests and their adaptations to the EU is best represented by the studies of Fargues (2013) and Collyer (2010). Nonetheless, they do not extend their discussions beyond the migration laws, leaving the area of state and non-state actors and their responses to migration in Algeria remarkably untouched. With the aim of contextualizing the Algerian case, I will now broaden the perspectives by incorporating studies on migration in the Maghreb.

3.2. Migration in the Maghreb: Regional Trends and Tendencies

In this section, I focus mainly on migration in the Maghreb, instead of the entire Middle East. Migration in the Maghreb has principally been characterized by labor migration to Europe, whereas migration in the Mashriq has primarily been ingrained by war and conflict (Fargues 2013, 11). According to Fargues, migration in the Maghreb operates in line with a Euro-Mediterranean context, due to its proximity to the EU and the significant proportions of Maghrebi nationals in the EU (Ibid., 13). I partly agree with this last point, as I also demonstrate how the Maghreb functions in line with other regional contexts.

In her rich historical account of mobilities and displacements in the Mediterranean world, Clancy-Smith (2012) illustrates the causes, contexts and consequences of the emigration of tens of thousands of Southern Europeans to the Middle East in the 19th century. Opposing binaries such as 'the colonized and the colonizer' and 'North Africans and Europeans', Clancy-Smith views the central Mediterranean as layered zones of contact, distinguished by fluctuating levels of internal social coherence formed by high degrees of exchange (Ibid., 11). Her contribution to the literature is the manifestation of diverse interactions within the Mediterranean area, with migration patterns moving other ways than south-north, presenting migration as a highly fluid and dynamic social process. In contrast, De Haas (2007) demonstrates that the Maghreb has primarily been a site of emigration since decolonization. Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians have emigrated to Western European countries to a great extent, due to colonial ties, formal 'guest worker' agreements and family migration (Ibid., 7-10, 17). De Haas argues that this 'migration system' seems to have entered into a migration transition. The most salient features of this development have been

sustained emigration, along with sub-Saharan immigration and a transformation of the Maghreb as a transit zone for sub-Saharans aiming to cross over to Europe (Ibid., 3-4). However, neither De Haas nor Clancy-Smith properly examine the ways in which the Mediterranean is connected to sub-Saharan Africa. Here, Wihtol de Wenden's (2010) contribution is fruitful, as she suggests that migration in the Mediterranean area falls into three interconnected systems of regional mobility: the Euro-Mediterranean area, the inter-Arab area, and the inter-African area (Ibid., 133). Opposing the tendency of viewing the Mediterranean as a place where the Euro-Mediterranean dynamics surpass all others, Wihtol de Wenden sheds light on south-south mobilities, such as the sub-Saharan migration flows in Algeria and Libya.

Taking the same multi-system approach to migration as Wihtol de Wenden, Baldwin-Edwards (2006) argues that Morocco largely applies immigration policy as a matter of security. A new migration law was introduced in 2003, criminalizing trafficking, yet granting foreigners with some rights. Morocco has extensive cooperation with Spain in the form of joint naval patrols, readmission agreements with both Spain and Italy, and was engaged in cooperation with Nigeria on the readmission of irregular migrants in 2004 (Ibid., 318). This cooperation with Nigeria bears a striking resemblance to Algerian cooperation with Niger on the readmission of irregular migrants. Moreover, Boubakri (2004) discusses the introduction of new migration laws in Tunisia in 2004, arguing that the aim was to restrict migration and criminal networks (Ibid., 106). Tunisia collaborates with Italy on migration through a readmission agreement, and police and naval cooperation, monitoring the Tunisian coast (Ibid., 92). In similarity to Algeria, both Morocco and Tunisia have sent back irregular migrants to their borders on a regular basis, where they are abandoned (De Haas 2008, 1309). However, whereas Algeria has readmission agreements with Spain and Italy, information on police or naval cooperation is missing (Baldwin-Edwards 2006, 318-319). This suggests that Algeria is more restrained than its Maghrebi neighbors on migration-oriented cooperation with European states. Scholars agree to a high extent that the migration laws, the readmission agreements and the joint and naval cooperation should be understood as an externalization of European border control (Fargues 2013; de Haas 2008, Hamood 2006; Boubakri 2004). Nevertheless, explorations of other sorts of influence on migration policy in the Maghreb are missing.

In his account of migration policy in Libya, Fargues (2013) points out that the country made up the main hub of labor migration in the Maghreb prior to the uprisings in 2011. In the 1970s, Libya was transformed into an important labor market for migrants, yet visas were suddenly imposed on Arab

and sub-Saharan migrants in 2007 (Ibid., 24-25). Fargues claims that this move should be understood as a bargaining chip in acquiring international rehabilitation, traded for the control of Europe's external border, at a point when Libya had turned into a transit for irregular migrants aiming for Europe (Ibid). This development was preceded by the establishment of a permanent liaison on organized crime and irregular migration between Libya and Italy in 2003, including cooperation between the states' police forces (Hamood 2006, 65). Fargues' remark manifests that migration is an element of calculation in the relations between Maghrebi and European states, strongly associated with the security area. However, the way the security question is combined with other, more rights-based concerns in the cooperation between European states and the Maghreb remains unknown. Another potentially sensitive question, untouched by the literature, concerns the range of possibilities that state and non-state actors have in their actions on migration in Algeria.

Thus far, I have reviewed the literature on migration dynamics in general, and migration policies in particular, in Algeria and the Maghreb. I have shed light on debates concerning the EU's influence on migration policy in the region and argued that claims about the EU's far-reaching influence seem speculative, and rather exaggerated in the case of Algeria. To enhance this discussion and the understanding of the relations between Algeria, the EU and other actors, it is necessary to turn to the foreign policy of Algeria.

3.3 The Foreign Policy of Algeria: in the Nexus of Sovereignty and Security

During the 1990s and 2000s, Algeria manifested a newfound interest in the Mediterranean, by joining the 5+5 dialogue, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Baghzouz 2014, 25). Nevertheless, Baghzouz claims that Algeria gradually started considering the Association Agreement as being primarily to the EU's advantage after its implementation. The EU principle 'more for more: give more to the one who does more', offends Algeria and its sacred principle of sovereignty. Furthermore, the sensitivity concerning Algerian-French relations due to colonialism, and France's position as a heavyweight in Euro-Mediterranean politics, contribute to Algeria's skepticism towards EU cooperation (Ibid). Daguzan (2015) agrees, stressing that the Algeria-EU relations have always been sensitive. As a result of Algeria's profound distrust of the 'intrusive character' of the EU in the areas of human rights and democracy, its engagement in the relations are marked by 'suspicion and little steps' (Ibid., 38). In addition, Daguzan stresses that Algeria is trapped in an illusion of the world in the era of post-decolonization, seeing actors as divided into blocks, and politics as a

formulation of independence (Ibid., 1). Both Baghzouz and Daguzan assert that Algeria applies a diversification of partners in foreign policy (Baghzouz 2014, 28; Daguzan 2015, 32-39) However, whereas Baghzouz contends that Algeria prioritizes its bilateral relations, Daguzan claims that multilateralism is a marker of Algerian foreign policy (Baghzouz 2014, 28; Daguzan 2015, 40).

Algeria re-adjusted its focus to the Maghreb-Sahel area in 2010, where the security imperatives override all other issues (Baghzouz 2014, 25). Addi (2017) and Baghzouz (2014) argue that Algeria adopted a new role on the international scene following the Arab uprisings in 2011, as 'Western' states called for Algeria's support to fend off the Islamist threat and assist Mali in their fight against the Islamists. Hinnebusch (2014) also emphasizes the prominent role security plays in the foreign policy of Middle Eastern states, arguing that Middle Eastern policy makers formulate foreign policies that attempt to counter security threats - to regime survival, sovereignty and territorial integrity (Ibid., 1). Although the aim of the rather well-cited work of Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (2014) is to explain foreign policy in the entire Middle East, Algeria is ignored in their analysis.

What becomes clear in the debates on migration and foreign policy in Algeria is that security, and to a certain extent sovereignty, run steadily as red lines through both debates. What becomes confusing, however, is that the literature on foreign policy suggests that the relations between Algeria and the EU are rather insignificant, as Algeria's perception of sovereignty and past experiences of colonialism obstruct their relations. Thus, the literature on foreign policy is opposing the very cornerstone of the literature on migration. Furthermore, the literature on foreign policy does not discuss the roles and practices of external actors on migration in Algeria. Shifting now to the literature on civil society in Algeria, my aim is to examine their roles in society and the area of migration.

3.4 Algerian Civil Society - Consolidating Authoritarian Rule

Literature on civil society in the Middle East is mainly distinguished by its focus on the connection between civil society and democratic transition. Civil society is understood as 'the zone of voluntary associative life beyond family and clan affiliations but separate from the state and the market' (Hawthorne 2004, 5). Norton (1993) claims that women's movements are potentially 'the leading edge of a democratization trend' in Algeria and numerous other places in the Middle East (Ibid., 209). Conceptualizing civil society as the 'home' of democracy, due to its core position in participant political systems, Norton stresses that the development of civil society is an essential

step in the democratic transition of the Middle East (Ibid., 211). In a similar way, Moghadam (2003) views the expansion of women's organizations in the Middle East in the 1990s in the context of political liberalization and expansion of rights (Ibid., 72). Her study manifests that women's organizations in Algeria have made political gains through long and persistent demands, resulting in the state's decision to amend the Family Code in 2001 (Ibid., 78).

In contrast to these studies, which were published in the wake of nascent democracy in Eastern Europe, several scholars rightly question the existence of a connection between civil society and democratic transition in the Middle East (Liverani 2008; Cavatorta & Elananza 2008; Henry 2014). Liverani stresses that civil society seems to be an 'element of conservation', employed by a weakened state to regain legitimacy and strengthen its capacity to obtain voluntary acquiescence in its reign (Ibid., 2). Algerian state conduct in regard to civil society has been characterized by repressive measures (Ibid., 35). On several occasions, the authorities have sought the cooperation of civil society when they lacked the willingness or the resources needed to manage a situation, only to later redirect popular discontent from the former to the latter (Ibid., 45-57). By using this strategy, associations that were once viewed as relatively independent, become part of *le pouvoir*. In a similar fashion, Henry (2014) argues that the dramatic expansion of NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s must be analyzed in the light of the Algerian government's need to 'act' in response to escalating social pressure (Ibid. 90) Patron-client networks pierce associational life and regularly weaken autonomous leadership (Ibid., 92-95). Another strategy to hinder the emergence of a strong civil society is to 'divide and conquer', as demonstrated in Cavatorta & Elananza's (2008) study on secular and religious associations in Algeria and Jordan. These associations compete for influence in society, and by doing so, they fail to unite in strong coalitions and common platforms that could put substantial pressure on the regime (Ibid., 570). Nonetheless, secular and religious associations also collaborate, on local and well-defined issues, a case-by-case basis or a fixed time-scale (Ibid). While the studies of Liverani, Henry and Cavatorta and al offer grim, yet important insights into the functions of civil society in Algeria, it remains unclear whether associations working on migration matters operate in similar ways. Generally, studies on civil society in Algeria have focused on women's organizations, Berber associations and Islamist movements, leaving yet another facet of agency in the area of migration in Algeria unexplored. Moreover, organizations may execute important roles in the field of practice of migration even if they are connected to the regime.

3.5 Conclusion

In this literature review, I examined the research debates on migration in Algeria and the Maghreb, Algerian foreign policy and Algerian civil society, arguing that the EU's alleged influence on migration policy in Algeria appears exaggerated. I highlighted the disparity between the literature on migration and the literature on foreign policy concerning Algeria's perception of sovereignty and pointed out that scholars have adopted a narrow focus on migration laws, excluding the roles and practices of state and non-state actors. In order to address this distinct gap, I examine how state and non-state actors construct a field of practice of migration in Algeria, by scrutinizing their perceptions of this field of practice in the country as well as their roles, their responses to the conditions of migration, and in which ways they exercise agency and power.

As previously mentioned, scholars have mainly studied migration in Algeria through texts of the migration laws. Yet the lack of a written migration policy suggests that a full understanding of the issue at stake requires conversations with actors. This need forms the methodological approach of this study, discussed in chapter five. Before detailing the methodological orientation and design of this research, however, I will unpack some of the central theoretical perspectives touched upon in the literature, focusing on notions of agency, structure and power; authoritarianism, security, and sovereignty; as well as internationalization through the notion of the normative structure of international society, in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV

Theoretical Framework: Agency, Power and the Authoritarian State Apparatus in the International Society

In this chapter, I develop key concepts for analyzing state and non-state perceptions of the field of practice of sub-Saharan migration in Algeria and their own roles in this field, their responses to the conditions of migration and their exercise of agency and power. In the first section, I discuss Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of *field* and *practice* as well as the concepts of *power*, *agency* and *structure* through Anthony Giddens' *structuration theory*, with an emphasis of the latter. In the second section, I explore the notion of *authoritarian state apparatus* through Eva Bellin's conceptualization of the *coercive apparatus*. Finally, in the third section, I examine the concept of *internationalization*, discussing the relations of states and non-state actors, as I highlight *the international society* in capacity of a normative structure, building on the work of Barry Buzan. I adhere to the idea that migration is a process influencing every dimension of social existence, which makes research on migration interdisciplinary per se (Castles and Miller 2009, 21). As the literature review has shown, there is a need to bring together different disciplines in migration research. Therefore, I aim to establish a 'middle ground' through this study, bridging traditions from sociology, political science and international relations.

4.1 Agency, Structure and Power in the Field of Practice of Migration

Chatty (2010) highlights that the relationship between social and political constraints on the one hand, and individual choice on the other hand, constitutes a crucial concern in the study of forced migration, as well as within sociology, political science and philosophy (Ibid., 16). While critical theorists as Habermas, Hall, Bourdieu and Giddens all explore the dynamics of *agency* and *structure*, I combine Bourdieu's concepts of *practice* and *field*, and Gidden's *structuration theory*, with the latter forming the analytical foundation of this study. Both Bourdieu and Giddens aim to surmount the dualism of agency and structure through 'structural' theory, and employ practice as way of conceiving social life (Seidman 2016, 145). However, I exclude Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* – a general and unconscious array of interpretive and motivational guidelines that individuals obtain according to their social class – in favor of Gidden's structuration theory, for the following reasons: 1) Structure is the point of departure of Bourdieu's analysis. As I study the possibilities of agents to counter structures, a concept with a more positive outlook on agency is

beneficial; 2) In line with Giddens, I view individuals as knowledgeable and conscious agents; 3) I do not study class dynamics (Bourdieu 1984; Giddens 1979).

4.1.1 Migration as a Field of Practice

As mentioned earlier, I merge the concepts of practice and field into a *field of practice,* referring to state and non-state actors' activities and interactions within the area of migration. Individual actors possess various kinds of resources, as they are positioned in a set of social relations in the field, where they strife for influence (Bourdieu 1984., 226, 232-33). I examine state and non-state actors' responses to the conditions of migration in Algeria with a focus on their resources.

4.1.2 Structuration Theory

I further explore the dynamics of agency, structure and power through Giddens' structuration theory. Countering a static view of social structures, Giddens (1979) suggests a consideration of agency and structure as contrasting aspects of all social practices (Ibid., 53). Agency emphasizes the individual and his/her actions and self-consciousness, and is conceptualized as 'the capability to have done otherwise', that is, to execute a differential action (Ibid., 55-56). Structure focuses on social processes in the form of recurrent practices forming institutions, and is understood as *rules* and *resources*, being 'both the precondition and the unintended outcome of people's agency' (Ibid., 60-66).

Giddens discusses the dual aspect of social practice through the concept of the 'duality of structure'. Social structures are regarded as both the means of action and to render action possible, and are reproduced through social action (Ibid., 69-70). In this view, social structure is considered as a 'virtual order', signifying that social structure exists in individuals' minds as practical knowledge of what rules (presumed processes or traditions) and what resources (material and social tools employed to exercise action) are imperative and suitable for social conduct in various contexts (Ibid., 63-69). Furthermore, by applying the duality of structure, Giddens argues that the structural properties of human action are constraining, yet as mentioned, they also enable individuals to exercise social action (Ibid., 81-85).

Through a 'structuration' process, social practices become molded into social systems and institutions (Giddens & Pierson 1998, 76). Nonetheless, Giddens stresses that individuals are knowledgeable and reflexive actors, learning the general principles of social life and incorporating them into their behavior, and employing this knowledge to act in ways opposing social principles.

Thus, individuals play an active role in forming society (Giddens & Pierson 1998, 78, 83-84, 92-93). Power is intrinsic in agency, and is found in processes of negotiation between individuals in society. For Giddens, power is a transformative capacity, meaning the power of an individual to 'intervene casually in a series of events' and 'accomplish outcomes in strategic conduct' (Giddens 1979, 88, 91). However, power should be approached within the context of the duality of structure, as power is continuously exercised within structures, drawing on rules and resources, as domination (Ibid., 91-92). Alsop, Bertelsen & Holland (2006) view structuration theory as a 'middle ground' theory of power, as power is a force produced by consent and the capacity to achieve outcomes, and simultaneously, power is distinguished by conflict and an instrument that one group uses to protect its interests against another group (Ibid., 236). The bottom line in structuration theory is that social life is perceived as a process, in which the central concept is social practice, consisting of 'agentic' and 'structural' aspects.

Criticism of structuration theory include claims of persevering dualism of agency and structure regardless of Gidden's assertion of having overcome it (Callinicos 1985) and a privileging of agency over structure, among others (Ibid.; Alsop et al. 2006; Gaventa 2003). Indeed, agency and structure are still positioned in a dual relationship in structuration theory, and as agency presupposes structure, this theory may not be easily applied to contexts where individuals have little capacity to influence their situations. Yet, as I will discuss in the next section, even authoritarian states allow certain opposition. Therefore, I will apply structuration theory by examining how state and non-state actors carry out practices that can be perceived as 'contradicting' in relation to the authoritarian, security-oriented state, as they respond to conditions of migration and exercise agency and power. I scrutinize how their migration practices become patterned into a field of practice of migration by investigating the specific rules, resources and power dynamics of the actors. Turning now to the concept of the authoritarian state apparatus, I investigate how Algeria's security institutions form a coercive structure and source of power within the field of practice pertaining to migration.

4.2 The Authoritarian State Apparatus

To explain a state's policy within a certain domain - or in the case of migration in Algeria, the lack of state's policy - it is necessary to look within the state itself (Halliday 2005, 46). Adopting the institutional concept of a state, Bellin (2004) argues that the strength of the state and its capacity to maintain a monopoly on the means of coercion is crucial to understand the endurance of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East (Ibid., 143). She highlights the coercive apparatus of the

state, consisting of diverse branches of the military (army, navy, air force), the *mukhabarat* (intelligence agencies), the police, and often a praetorian guard. These institutions serve the security needs of authoritarian regimes (Bellin 2012, 130). If a state's coercive apparatus is coherent and effective, it can oppress popular discontent, survive substantial illegitimacy and an exhaustive sense of relative deprivation among its population (Bellin 2004, 143; AbuKhalil 2014, 47).

I employ the concept of the coercive apparatus to grasp how the Algerian state operates in the field of practice of migration in the light of a missing formulated state policy, and in which ways it enables and constrains the practices of other state or non-state actors. The robustness of the coercive apparatus is shaped by four factors, of which the first two Bellin assesses as exceptional to the Middle East: 1) *the fiscal health of the coercive apparatus*; 2) *the maintenance of international support networks*; 3) *the low level of institutionalization of the coercive apparatus* and 4) *the low level of popular mobilization* (Bellin, 2004, 144-47). These factors furnish the coercive apparatuses in the Middle East with an extraordinary capacity and will to repress, rendering a democratic transition very difficult (Ibid., 129; see also King 2009; Volpi 2013; Lust 2017).

The security establishment is most likely to abandon its claims if its financial foundation is severely curtailed (Bellin 2004, 144-46; Volpi 2013, 109-112). Just as many other rentier economies in the Middle East, the Algerian state possesses massive gas and oil resources that continuously have been used to support the coercive apparatus (Bellin 2004, 148; King 2009, 4-5, 29; Volpi 2013, 109-112). Even in the early 2000s, when the Algerian economy was left in ruins after the civil war, the army was still paid. As long as the state has access to rent, they have no or little incentive to liberalize their political systems (Luciani 2013, 115-116; Norton 2013, 135; see also Crystal 1990; Chaudry 1997). The 'rentier factor' in Algeria suggests that the practices of other state and non-state actors in the field of practice of migration are restricted, since there is no incentive to liberalize the political system. Similarly, the security establishment is most likely to 'lose its will and capacity to hold on to power', if it loses essential international support (Bellin 2004, 144-46; Lust 2017, 190). Algeria is surrounded by international support networks even in the post-Cold War era. By depicting the Islamist mobilization in the 1990s as a serious security threat for both national and international constituencies, Algeria could rely on continued French patronage for a long time, since 'Western' interests in the region have been spurred by multiple security interests, especially since 9/11 (Bellin 2004, 150; Collyer 2012, 115; Lust 2017, 190). Moreover, Algeria's reliable oil supply is another important factor in the maintenance of international support networks (Bellin

2004, 150; Lust 170, 190). As it still enjoys full international support, the Algerian state is inclined to continue repressing democratic practices, such as migration-oriented activities.

The higher level of institutionalization the security establishment attains, the more willing it will be to withdraw from power and permit political reform (Bellin 2004, 144-6). The boundaries between the state and the private are often blurred in rentier states, and the state tends to be more secretive and factionalized (Halliday 2005, 29; Hinnebusch 2006, 382). As one analyst once said about Algeria: 'Every state has an army but in Algeria the army has a state' (Bellin 2004, 143). Consequently, the level of institutionalization of the security establishment in Algeria is low (Entelis 1999; King 2009, 4-5, 29-30; Volpi 2013, 109-112). The salient roles of military and intelligence agencies in Algeria and other Middle Eastern states, and the relative fragility and limited professionalism of most foreign ministries, may lead to biased policies favoring coercive options and prioritizing national security matters over other issues, such as migration (Ehteshami & Hinnebusch 2013, 230). Finally, if thousands of people mobilize, violent repression of them is a costly action, since public opinion matters even in the most authoritarian societies (Bellin 2004, 144-6; Halliday 2005, 56; Volpi 2013, 108-109) Until recently, popular mobilization in Algeria has mostly consisted of high level of mobilization of Islamists in the 1990s. Prevailing societal exhaustion from the civil war in the 1990s and the following desire for calm is highlighted as an explanation for the low level of popular mobilization in Algeria during the 'Arab Spring' in 2011 (Bellin 2012, 130; Volpi 2013, 112; Daguzan 2015, 36). Despite Algeria's recent large-scale demonstrations and the resignation of the president, the same state system is still in place, implying that the space that state and non-state actors have to carry out migration practices is still strictly curtailed.

As a consequence, Algeria's security establishment is shaped by its rentier economy, its maintenance of international support networks, its low institutionalization and its low level of popular mobilization. To a significant measure, power remains in the hands of the military, favoring national security perspectives over other political concerns. Holding a central role within the coercive apparatus, the military sees itself as responsible for three primary tasks: 1) *defend the country*; 2) *maintain security and order;* and 3) *look out for the military's institutional interests* (Bellin 2012, 131). The military's interest in presenting itself as the defender of the nation and its task of maintaining security may circumscribe other state and non-state actors in their activities within the field of practice of migration.

While the coercive apparatus offers an institutional account of authoritarian robustness in Algeria, it is not the only concept explaining the persistence of authoritarianism in the country. Factors such as policies, ruling coalition and legitimacy, among others, also matter (King 2009). Nonetheless, the coercive apparatus is a fruitful concept to use in examinations of how the Algerian security institutions operate in relation to other actors in the field of practice pertaining to migration in the country. To shed more light on these interactions, I now turn to an examination of international and local actors.

4.3 The Normative Structure of the International Society

With the aim of understanding how state and non-state actors construct a field of practice of migration in Algeria, I draw on theorization of internationalization through the notion of the *international society* as developed within the English school of international relations theory, focusing on its normative structure. Within this theoretical realm, ideas form the conduct of international politics, in contrast to material capabilities.

4.3.1 Internationalization of Politics

Buzan (2004) argues that the international society represents the political arrangement that arose during the twentieth century. The essential political and legal frame is decided by the states-system, with individuals and transnational actors being granted rights and participation by states, yet not recognized as members of the international society (Ibid., 202, 119).[6] The term 'society' refers to agreed arrangements involving expected behavior, in the form of norms, rules and institutions (Ibid., 64, 111). Institutionalization of shared interest and identity among states is the focal point of the international society, stressing the establishment and preservation of shared norms, rules and institutions. Sharing a common identity (a religion, a system of governance, a language) or a common set of rules (about how to determine relative status, how to conduct diplomacy) provides actors in the international society with intersubjective understandings, conditioning behavior and demarcating the boundaries of a social system (Ibid., 7-8).[7]

Globalization is a central aspect of the international society. Scholte (2000) understands it as deterritorialization of social life, establishing new actors and networks beside the existing territorial

---

[6] 'Transnational' refers to actors and activities within society that are not controlled by the state, obtaining most of their substance and character from interaction with the external, across borders.

[7] Here, I adopt the terms used in political science. However, I do not suggest that states have one single identity, or that they have a fixed set of attributes which are necessary to their character and function.

ones: 'territoriality and supraterritoriality coexist in complex interrelation' (Ibid., 8, 59-61). Buzan (2004) points out that despite the consequential deterritorialization occurring in human affairs, territory remains a critical factor for many central aspects of social, economic and especially political structures (Ibid., 92). Scholte (2000), Woods (2000) and Held et al. (1999) agree that the states-system and the non-states-system exist side by side. In the field of practice of migration in Algeria, the concept of the international society allows me to analyze two levels of activities, which coexist: the state level (the Algerian authorities) and the non-state level (the UN, the EU, NGOs). Moreover, it sheds light on how local NGOs have been accompanied by international ones in the field of practice of migration. International society is thus a useful concept to use, in order to explore how these actors respond to the conditions of migration and how they exercise agency and power in relation to the normative structure.

State and non-state spheres embody distinct social domains that are reciprocally supporting and in tension with each other, at the same time (Buzan 2004, 90-91). Almost all social structures are conflated by some combination of *coercion*, *calculation* (potential advantages) and *belief* (values, norms and rules). Politics are defined by the necessity of this combination and questions of how to deal with it, as these three elements are always at play to some extent (Buzan 2004, 130-31). Consequently, coercion is seen as an important element for understanding the operation of the authoritarian state apparatus as well as the dynamics in the more open, yet state-centered, international society. Belief is useful for understanding how actions are motivated by values, whereas calculation is beneficial for the comparison of values, norms, rules and potential gains before carrying out an action.

4.3.2 Sovereignty

Sovereignty is the most important norm in the international society and one of the defining social elements of the structure in Arab politics (Jackson 2000, 16-17; Hinnebusch & Ehteshami 2014; Barnett 1998, 31). This study is concerned with three aspects of sovereignty identified by Krasner (2001): *interdependence sovereignty*, defined as 'the ability of a government to regulate the movement of goods, capital, people, and ideas across its borders'; *domestic sovereignty*, which refers to 'the structure of authority within a state and to the state's effectiveness or control'; and *Westphalian sovereignty*, defined as 'the autonomy of domestic authority structures' and 'the absence of authoritative external influences' (Ibid., 2). I use the concept of sovereignty to shed light on how Algeria emphasizes its right to control flows of people across its borders in an autonomous way, in the absence of an authoritative external actor.

4.3.3 Securitization

The inviolability of frontiers is another of the most important norms in the international society, referring to sovereignty as well as security (Jackson 2000, 17). Security is another defining element in the structure of Arab politics (Halliday 2005, 167; Hinnebusch & Ehteshami 2014; Bilgin 2005). 'Security' is a move that places politics 'beyond the established rules of the game', by framing the issue as a 'special kind of politics' or 'above politics' (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde 1998, 23). A 'security problem' is established when developments constitute an *extreme* threat to the sovereignty of a state, and divest it of the ability to manage by itself. The particular development undermines the political order, and accordingly, it constitutes a threat that must be treated with a maximal level of mobilization (Wæver 1995; Huysmans 1995; Buzan et al 1998, 21-24). 'In naming a certain development a security problem, the "state" can claim a special right', which will always be defined by the state and its elites (Wæver 1995). Under any circumstances, power holders can attempt to adopt the tool of *securitization* of an issue to obtain control of it.[8]

Migration is frequently perceived as a threat to *societal security*, that is, the security of a nation (Buzan et al 1998, 23, 121; Huysmans 1995). The development of security-oriented migration policies is often framed as an inevitable response to the challenges for public order and domestic stability of the rising numbers of migrants (Ibid.; Ibrahim 2005; Kaya 2009). I apply the concept of securitization to capture how the Algerian authorities respond to sub-Saharan migration flows in security measures, in the light of a missing state policy.

4.3.4 Human rights, Cooperation and International Law

Other important norms in the international society, as well as in the Middle East, are respect for human rights, bilateral and to a lesser extent multilateral co-operation, and fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law (Jackson 2000, 17; Buzan & Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009; Wheeler 2003). In the international society, however, they are significantly less prioritized (Jackson 2000, 17). Nonetheless, I employ the concepts of human rights, cooperation and international law, to investigate how these norms govern actors in the Algerian field of practice of migration.

As all theories, the concept of the international society and the English school theory have their flaws. Halliday (2009) notes the exclusion of economics as an aspect in foreign policy, the lack of

---

[8] Securitization refers to 'the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects' (Buzan et al 1998, 25).

structuring of the international system as well as the inability to integrate an analysis of domestic politics (Ibid., 17). I aim to overcome these pitfalls through the combination of the international society and the two other concepts/theories discussed above: by using the coercive apparatus, I capture both domestic politics and economic aspects of foreign policy, and through power and agency in structuration theory, I investigate the power relations between the Algerian state and other actors in the international society.

4.4 Conclusion

In this theoretical framework, I establish a middle ground in migration research, by bridging perspectives from sociology, political science and international relations. Throughout this, I present different ways of interpreting how state and non-state actors form a field of practice of migration in Algeria, in lieu of a formulated migration policy. By focusing on agency and power as understood in structuration theory, I show how actors respond to the conditions of migration, how they exercise agency and power, and relate to other actors. Through an application of the coercive apparatus, I demonstrate how the Algerian state operates within the field of practice of migration. Finally, by looking at the notion of the normative structure of the international society, I expose how actors in this field of practice are affected by concepts such as sovereignty, securitization, human rights, cooperation and international law.

CHAPTER V

Methodology: A Constructivist Approach

In this chapter, I give an account of the analytical assumptions and methodological tools I employ when examining how state and non-state actors perceive the field of practice of migration in Algeria and their own roles, respond to the conditions of migration and exercise agency and power. In contrast to much policy-oriented work on written policies, I have chosen to conduct qualitative interviews with key informants on sub-Saharan migration in Algeria.

5.1 Analytical Lens: Constructivism

Constructivism provides the analytical lens through which I perceive the world in this study. Through an in-depth examination of my participants' active constructions of the Algerian field of practice of migration, I scrutinize how multiple 'knowledges' of the field coexist, by virtue of disparate social, political, cultural and economic factors (Guba & Lincoln 2005, 113). Their 'understandings' of this field of practice are subjective and diversified, arising from individual experiences, negotiated in accordance with social and historical norms and constructed through interaction (Creswell & Poth 2018, 24). By interviewing key informants on sub-Saharan migration in Algeria, thoroughly revising and comparing individual constructions of the field of practice of migration, I aim to establish a relative 'consensus construction' of more sophisticated and informed content (Guba & Lincoln 2005, 111-114).

5.2. Qualitative Method: Semi-structured Interviews

With the aim of partially filling the need for qualitative research on sub-Saharan migration in Algeria, I have conducted twelve semi-structured interviews with key actors in the field. The questions, stated in an interview guide, were broad and open-ended, with the purpose of encouraging the participants' own perspectives. I varied the wording and the order of the questions depending on the direction of the conversation and asked follow-up questions when I required more detailed answers. Moreover, I listened actively and took notes during the interviews. As this study heavily relies on the views of the participants, I let the participants 'go off' in the direction they wanted during our conversations, as long as it was relevant for my research topic (Babbie 2013, 345-48).

As an intern at a diplomatic representation in Algiers, I was immersed in the Algerian political context for five months. During that time, I made regular observations of actors in the field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration. Prior to the interviews, I spent one day observing the work of one of the organizations in this study, and attended a presentation of another organization. In that way, I developed a measure of familiarity with the professional undertakings and priorities of my participants already in anticipation of the interviews (Bryman 2016, 423).

As Bryman (2016) points out, qualitative research is sometimes criticized for being too subjective and lacking in transparency (Ibid, 398-99). While it is true that the subjective roles of the researcher and the research objects in qualitative research are particularly salient, it is highly debatable whether any research is objective. Moreover, in this study the perspectives of the participants are highly needed, as they unmask realities about sub-Saharan migration that do not exist on official papers. As I closely evaluate each statement in accordance with the participant's profile, the other participants, and research, I ensure that the picture I paint of the field of practice of migration in Algeria is well-founded. I aim to overcome the problem of 'lack of transparency' by describing in detail how I draw my conclusions. Importantly, Miles, Huberman and Saldaña (2014) emphasize that the possibility of comprehending latent or underlying issues, presenting rich and holistic data that is deeply rooted in reality, and linking the meanings people attach to events, processes and structures to the social world surrounding them are clear strengths of qualitative research (Ibid., 11).

5.3. Case Study

Designed as a case study, this study is focused on a single instance of a social phenomenon, the contemporary field of practice of sub-Saharan migration in Algeria, which is my unit of analysis (Babbie 2013, 338). This design is fruitful as it allows me to scrutinize the specifics of the case and situate it within its specific geographical, social and political context, and by doing so, accumulating in-depth understanding of the case (Creswell & Poth 2018., 98). With this aim, I have interviewed different categories of actors, situated in diverse geographical locations in the field of practice of sub-Saharan migration in Algeria.

5.4. Data Collection

The data was collected from November 2018 to March 2019. I conducted twelve interviews with thirteen participants, representing state, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations in

the field of practice pertaining to migration in Algeria. While most of the participants represent foreign actors, two of the NGOs were Algerian. Eleven of my interviews were one-on-one, whereas one interview was held with two representatives of the same organization. This was unplanned, as I was notified of the participant's choice to bring along her colleague when I arrived for the interview. I accepted this initiative, as I perceived it as a way of incorporating an element of participatory research. Six of the interviews took place in Algiers. Four interviews were held in the offices of the participants, one in a café and one on the phone, as the participant was too busy to meet up with me. The locations worked out fine, as we were always able to privately discuss the participant's views and activities in the field of practice of migration. However, I was unable to conduct the rest of my interviews in Algeria, due to my full-time internship and the sensitivity concerning the topic of migration. Therefore, I conducted the six other interviews on Skype/phone after I left Algeria. These interviews were not different from the other ones, as I followed the same interview guide and principles as previously. The details presented in these interviews were generally just as detailed as in the face-to-face interviews.

The interviews lasted from 30 to 120 min, most of them were around 60 min. Half of the interviews were conducted in English and the other half in French, depending on what the participants preferred. Neither of these languages is my native language, nor the native language of most of my participants. Nonetheless, they were good means of communication. One of the participants, whose native language was Spanish, used the Spanish terms for some institutions, such as 'la Guardia Civil', 'the civil guard'. Yet, these words did not obstruct the flow of the conversation. Some of the participants expressed doubts on whether their contributions had been helpful. In these cases, I always reassured them that their participation was valuable.

I recorded nine of twelve interviews, with the consent of these participants. The recording allowed me to aim my full attention at what the participants were saying. I took brief notes of relevant issues that participants raised for potential follow-up questions, without disturbing the flow of the discussion (Bryman 2016, 479). These interviews were later transcribed verbatim. Three participants refused to be recorded, despite the confidentiality it entailed, thus manifesting the sensitivity surrounding the issue of migration in Algeria. In these cases, I took detailed notes during the interviews. The lack of recording did not affect my understanding of the interviews. After each interview, I noted the pieces of information I viewed as meaningful, such as the key concepts that emerged from the discussion. I also took notes of the expressions of feelings, reactions and

impressions that I sensed from the participants. During my data analysis, these notes helped me understand the patterns that appeared in the material.

5.5 Access to the Field

I gained access to the first participants through my internship at a diplomatic representation in Algiers. At the start of the internship, I told my colleagues about my research and they advised me about actors in the field of practice of migration. It would probably have been very difficult for me to get in contact with these people had I not been working at a diplomatic representation, as their contact details were not available online and as I lacked personal networks in Algeria. At the end of the interviews, I always asked the participants whether they could advise me of other people to interview. I will explain these strategies, which may be characterized as a combined purposive and snowball sampling, in the next section.

One of the obstacles I encountered when interviewing people in the diplomatic sphere was that they were very busy, and sometimes difficult to get a hold of. I was in contact with a representative for Italy for weeks, and he agreed to an interview twice. However, when I e-mailed him to set up a meeting for the interview, he never responded. Another obstacle I encountered was that some participants seemed to have difficulties in separating my role as an intern at a diplomatic representation with my role as a researcher. Although I stated the purpose of the interview in my initial contact with them as well as in the beginning of the interviews, I sometimes needed to restate this during the course of the interview.

During the last interview I held in Algeria with Fatima and Rachid, representatives for an international NGO, I reached somewhat of a breakthrough as they gave me a list with the contact details of all their civil society partners in the field of practice of migration. This list was very helpful for my conceptualization of the scope of Algerian NGOs in this field of practice in Algeria, as the information was difficult to find online. Although many people on the list did not respond to my emails, or responded but then did not show up for the interview, I managed to interview two of their partners.

5.6 Sampling Strategies: Combined Purposive and Snowball Sampling

I relied on combined purposive and snowball sampling as strategies for finding participants.

The sampling process started as my colleagues suggested individuals representing state and non-state actors, whom I could contact for interviews. At this stage in the process, purposive sampling was used, as the criteria for choosing my participants was that they had to represent states, IGOs or NGOs in the field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration in Algeria. I chose a rather broad sample of actors, as I wanted to attain a certain level of representativity of this field of practice.

I applied the snowball strategy by asking all participants to suggest other participants who had the pertinent characteristics to my research. Snowball sampling rendered it possible to interview some people who I otherwise would not have been able to contact. As indicated in the previous section, snowball sampling is a useful strategy to disclose the connectedness of individuals in networks, which was fruitful for my understanding of the field of practice of migration (Bryman 2016, 415). However, I also used purposive sampling at a later stage in the sampling process, as I hand-picked one of the participants of this study, Sofia, representing an IGO based in Europe. This actor is not active in Algeria, yet they have a Euro-Mediterranean program on migration which Algeria is engaged in. That way, I considered that I could attain interesting perspectives from an actor having migration-oriented relations with Algeria, outside its borders.

I started to reach data saturation during my tenth interview, with Yousef, representing an Algerian NGO. He contributed with important insights to some of the topics other participants had previously discussed, yet the information he shared with me did not shed light on any new categories emerging from my material. Although the sample size in this study is rather modest, it is based on the understanding that smaller samples enhance the qualitative researcher's chances of getting closely involved with their participants in interview-based studies, and by doing so, producing fine-grained data (Crouch & McKenzie 2006).

5.7 Data Analysis

For the data analysis, I reviewed transcripts and field notes, coding component parts that appeared to be of potential significance or particularly pertinent to the participants' perceptions and activities in the field of practice of migration in Algeria. I employed Strauss and Corbin's (1990) approach to coding, meaning that I initiated the coding process with open coding. The aim was to break down, examine, compare, conceptualize and categorize data, and later identify concepts. Following this, the concepts were grouped and transformed into categories (Ibid, 61). The next step was axial coding, meaning that I put back the data in new ways, as I made connections between the categories

by associating codes with contexts, consequences, patterns of interaction and causes (Ibid, 63). Finally, I entered the phase of selective coding, as I selected a core category – 'a storyline that frames an analytical account of the phenomenon of interest' – by examining the principal issue around which all other categories are merged (Ibid, 116). In a systematic way, I linked the core category to other categories and examined the relationships between them (Ibid).

During the data analysis, I maintained an attitude of skepticism, as I viewed all my initial interpretations as provisional. I returned to the field and interviewed more participants for the purpose of testing those initial observations (Babbie 2013, 336). I also maintained a close connection between data and conceptualization, with the aim of not losing the coherence between concepts and categories, and their indicators. Therefore, I constantly compared phenomena that was coded under a certain category, as I prepared the way for a theoretical refinement of that category to emerge.

5.8 Limitations

This study is limited by a number of factors. The most salient factor is the limited time frame, as I only had five months to conduct field work in Algeria, at the same time as I was doing a full-time internship. As a consequence, I was only able to conduct twelve interviews with thirteen participants, of whom the majority were based in Algiers, and I was unable to conduct field trips to other parts of the country. Although my position at a diplomatic representation provided access to the field, it also constituted a limitation in itself. I was not able to interview actors lacking relations with the diplomatic representation where I was an intern, which excluded Algerian NGOs. I contacted these NGOs when I left Algeria, yet many people either ignored my emails or did not show up for our agreed Skype interviews. Another limitation was that I did not manage to get in touch with representatives from the Algerian authorities and get a state perspective of the practices in the field of practice pertaining to migration. Both my colleague and one of the participants argued that it would be impossible for me to get in contact with them, as they experienced trouble getting in contact with the Algerian authorities themselves. A final limitation of the study is the sensitivity surrounding migration in Algeria. Three of the participants did not want to be recorded, and one of the participants did not even want to be quoted in the study, despite our 90 min long interview and the anonymity and confidentiality it entailed.

5.9 Ethical Considerations

As the data of this study is based on interactions with actors in a politically sensitive field, ethical considerations were crucial during the entire research process. Informed consent was one important aspect. In the beginning of each interview, I read aloud an introduction to the participant, describing the purpose and use of my research, the scope of the interview and the issues that we would discuss. Informing my participants in this way was essential, as they had the right to know more about the project they were engaging themselves in. I told the participants that they had the possibility to ask questions at any time during the interview, refuse to answer any question, and withdraw from the interview at any point. Furthermore, I requested their permission to record the interviews. As mentioned before, three participants refused recording, which I accepted. Although no participant refused to answer my questions or withdrew from the interview, one participant informed me that she did not want to be quoted in the study, which I respected.

Anonymity was also an essential aspect. I changed the names of all the participants and the organizations they represent, due to the sensitivity of migration in Algeria. I only reveal a part or the full identity of states, the EU, and the UN agencies, as I deem that the participants representing these actors in the study cannot be traced. I do not include any information about the professional positions of the participants, or other details that could reveal their identities. Confidentiality was another vital aspect. I stored all recordings, transcripts and field notes safely, and made sure not to disclose participants' identities to other participants or to anyone else. I also regarded the position of power I held as a researcher, by always reassuring the participants that their participation was valuable whenever they expressed doubts about it. In addition, I do not 'take anyone's side' in the reporting of the findings. Rather, I present multiple and sometimes contrary findings.

5.10 Reflexivity

I am aware that my personal perspectives on migration as well as my own values and biases have affected the ways I have understood and presented the findings of this study (May and Perry 2014, 109). My own experience of being a second-generation immigrant in Sweden and my five years of studying Political Science and Middle Eastern studies, with a focus on migration, have influenced the ways I perceive migration as a social dynamic process. Although I undertook the research process in an open and critical way, the questions and probes I employed during the interviews, the constructivist analytical lens I embraced and the categories that emerged from the data were all dependent on my own preconceptions. The findings, in the form of the aspects I have chosen to

focus on and what I have classified as of lesser importance, are a direct outcome of my choices. As I did an internship at a diplomatic representation during my entire stay in Algeria, the perspectives I attained there have affected the ways I viewed migration practices in the country, the Algerian authorities as well some of the participants in this study. Furthermore, I interviewed every participant only once, meaning that the perceptions and stories they shared with me at that point may have been different on another day. In this way, participants' personal lives at the time of the interview have potentially influenced the data (Babbie 2013, 189). Finally, I am aware that my position at a diplomatic representation granted me access to the participants in the diplomatic sphere, whereas my role as a European researcher – thus, not presenting a threat – granted me access to the NGOs. As a foreigner, it took me some time to understand the processes of sub-Saharan migration and its interplay with the diverse actors in the country.

CHAPTER VI

Findings: Constructing a sub-Saharan Field of Practice of Migration

In this chapter, I present the findings that I have extracted from my interviews. First, I present the profiles of the participants and the data of the study. Second, I account for the ways in which the data has been analyzed. Subsequently, quotes from the participants are discussed, to elucidate the relations between the categories that I have constructed through data analysis, and the perceptions and activities of key actors in the field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration in Algeria.

The findings are organized into two categories. *The Level of the Authoritarian Regime* is a core category, around which *the Level of the International Society* pivots. I demonstrate that in lieu of a missing formulated state policy on migration in Algeria, actors form a distinct field of practice of migration on two levels: state level and international level. According to state and non-state actors, the *modus operandi* of the field of practice of migration in Algeria is primarily characterized by a notion of securitization and sovereignty principles, as a result of the Algerian authoritarian state apparatus, fueled by rent. The significance of these findings is that assertions concerning the EU's extensive influence on migration practices in Algeria appear exaggerated. Moreover, while the participants perceive the Algerian state as the predominant actor in the field of practice, they partially also view their own roles as important. They mainly respond to the conditions of migration by exercising diplomatic and humanitarian practices, as well as exchanges and strategies. Some of these practices are adjusted to the Algerian state logic of securitization and sovereignty, whereas others oppose this structure through their activities: they pressure the state, assist migrants, establish coordination platforms, and carry out their own independent strategies. By doing so, they exercise agency and power.

I present the findings in detail, with the aim of properly exposing the participants' perspectives and the areas of consent and conflict. The findings are organized into constructed categories, building on the theoretical concepts discussed in the previous chapter. The subsequent Analysis chapter will add another layer of analysis, as I discuss how these findings relate to the existing literature and my theoretical framework, as well as the latent meanings of my findings.

6.1. Presentation of Participants' Profiles and Data

The data consists of twelve interviews with thirteen participants, as one of the interviews I conducted was a group interview. Twelve of thirteen participants in the study represent either state, intergovernmental or non-governmental actors within the sub-Saharan field of practice of migration in Algeria. Two of the interviews were conducted with two different participants representing the same actor, the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Finally, one participant represents an intergovernmental organization based in Europe, that has a program on migration in which Algeria is involved. They are presented in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1. - List of Participants

Participant	Role in Relation to the Case Study	Geographical position in Algeria
Participant 1 – François	Representative of UN Agency 1	Algiers
Participant 2 – Elena	Representative of UN Agency 2	Mainly Algiers
Participant 3 – Sara	Representative of the EU	Algiers
Participant 4 – Vanessa	Representative of UN Agency 3	Algiers
Participant 5 – José	Representative of the Spanish Ministry of Interior	Algiers
Participant 6 & 7 – Fatima & Rachid	Representatives of International NGO 1	Algiers, Oran and Annaba
Participant 8 – Caroline	Representative of International NGO 2	Algiers
Participant 9 – Hamza	Representative of Algerian NGO 1	Present in all 48 *wilayat* [9]
Participant 10 – Sofia	Representative of an IGO	No office in Algeria

---

[9] *Wilayat* refers to a provinces in Algeria.

Participant 11 – Yousef	Representative of Algerian NGO 2	Algiers, Tamanrasset and 10 other *wilayat*
Participant 12 – Adèle	Representative of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1	Algiers
Participant 13 – Julie	Representative of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2	Algiers

6.2 Coding

As mentioned previously, the interviews were coded, with the aim of identifying recurrent concepts. The qualitative approach used in this study allows me to treat the recurrence of a concept in more than one interview as an important concept, dependent on whether the concept seems significant for the understanding of the participants' perceptions of the field of practice of migration in Algeria, and of their own roles in the field, as well as their responses to the conditions of migration and the ways they exercise agency and power. That way, I encapsulate major trends as well as minor, but nonetheless important, tendencies in the data. The analytical process is presented in Table 6.2, which demonstrates how I have grouped the concepts together and turned them into categories.

Table 6.2 Formation of Categories

Open Codes	Axial Codes	Categories
Securitization Sovereignty	Bias to Security and Sovereignty Principles	Level of he authoritarian Regime
Obscure Migration Policy Strictly Regulated Space for the UN and the Civil Society	Authoritarian Governance	
Bilateral vs. Multilateral relations	Diplomatic Practices	Level of the International Society
Humanitarian Action	Humanitarian Practices	
Coordination, Dialogue and Capacity-building	Exchanges and Strategies	

UN and Civil Society Strategies		

6.3 Level of the Authoritarian Regime

As clear from Table 6.2, the Level of the Authoritarian Regime was a category that emerged from the data analysis as a core category, since the other category – the Level of the International Society - depends on the authoritarian regime. At this political level, the Algerian state is the dominant actor in the field of practice of sub-Saharan migration. Most participants perceived their roles on this level as very limited. However, the two Algerian NGO's both seemed to perceive their roles as aligned with those of the government. The ability of actors to exercise agency and power on this level was generally strictly circumscribed. More specifically, this category is made up by the following concepts: *Securitization*, *Sovereignty, Obscure Migration Policy* and *Strictly Regulated Space for the UN and the Civil Society.*

6.3.1. Bias to Security and Sovereignty Principles

At the Level of the Authoritarian Regime, the activities in the field of practice of migration are marked by a clear bias to security and sovereignty principles. Almost all participants in this study highlighted security as the principal political priority for the Algerian authorities, ranked above all other political considerations. They argued that all flows across borders, including migration flows, were seen as a threat to national security. While half of the participants partly or fully problematized the one-sidedness of the 'security approach', José, representative of the Spanish Ministry of Interior, stood out as he uncritically defended this approach of the Algerian regime:

> [The Algerian authorities] have a very important deployment because they always defend that there is a relation, and it's true, between organized crime, migration, terrorism. […] And for them, it's very important to control all entries of people at the border. […] There are almost 10,000 soldiers at the borders.

By connecting the migration flows to organized crime and terrorism, migration is portrayed as an extreme threat to the domestic and interdependence sovereignty of the state – that is, to the ability of a government to regulate the movement of goods, capital, people and ideas across borders, and to exert effective state control (Wæver 1995; Krasner 2001). Moreover, the deployment of a very high number of soldiers also suggests that the migration flows are turned into a security problem, since security institutions are mobilized with a maximum level of efforts (see Wæver 1995;

43

Huysmans 1995; Buzan et al 1998). Algerian-Spanish relations on migration lie in the field of security, as Spain has established cooperation protocols with Algerian security institutions: the General Directorate of National Security, the gendarmerie and the coast guard. In line with other participants, José depicted the high numbers of sub-Saharans daily passing the Algerian borders as a security risk: *'they don't have any other option than controlling the borders and try to repatriate all the irregular migrants who are in the country'*.

Some participants emphasized that 'the security question' override issues such as human rights. Sara, representative of the EU, was concerned by reports revealing that non-Nigerien nationals were forcefully sent to Niger under harsh conditions, sometimes abandoned in the desert. Nevertheless, Sara also made a connection between the fight against irregular migration on Algerian territory and the EU's own migration policy: *'They are not doing the job as we would like them to do...not in line with our norms and values. But they are doing the job, and they are keeping the sub-Saharan migrants from arriving at the European borders'*. The EU walks a tightrope in Algeria – on the one hand, they aim to advocate for human rights and the rule of law, on the other, they require their southern neighbors to manage the 'migration issue' for them. The two representatives for the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Adèle and Julie, argued along the same line as Sara on this point. Despite criticizing Algeria's migration practices, the EU acknowledges that the Algerian authorities *'are doing the job'* – manifesting that when a political area is securitized, politics are established beyond the rules of the game for Algeria as well as the EU and its member states (see Buzan et al 1998; Huysmans 1995).

Three participants stood out, as they were exclusively critical of the Algerian security approach and the return operations. Elena, representative of UN Agency 2, explained that *'there is a context of regular expulsions'*. She said that refugees registered with the UNHCR were also victims, arguing: *'this is a violation – it should not happen. It's a collective expulsion, which is against international law'*. The treatment of refugees and asylum seekers as collective cases rather than individual ones suggests that sub-Saharan migrants are perceived as a threat to societal security (see Buzan et al 1998).

On the note of *'collective expulsions'*, Rachid, representative of International NGO 2, argued that Algeria *'takes all black people'*, as *'they are not going to look for whether it's a Nigerien'*. This aspect was also raised by other participants. His colleague, Fatima, explained how the authorities' security approach have affected their programs as well as the migrants themselves:

And it [governmental policies] have completely stopped our programs. […] People do not want to go to the hospital anymore, because they are afraid of getting arrested. […] The women who are pregnant, they don't want to follow their pregnancy. They don't want to bring their children to get vaccinated...it has really had a direct impact on our programs and our recipients.

The fear of sub-Saharan migrants to appear in public even when they are in desperate need of health care, illustrates that the coercive apparatus in Algeria possesses an extraordinary capacity and will to repress (see Bellin 2004; Waever 1995). Since the defense of the state is the main mission of the military and a major aspect of the coercive apparatus, security constitutes a crucial norm for the Algerian authorities, providing the state with an element to their identity, and informing them how to act (See Buzan 2004; Bellin 2004).

A majority of the participants also expressed that sovereignty was an important characteristic of Algeria's migration policy. François, representative of UN Agency 1, argued that there was a need to guarantee the sovereignty of Algeria: *'We just have to remember that Algeria comes from, and is still a part, of the non-aligned countries'* and added *'whatever that means in the 21st century'*. In the field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration, it means that the migration flows are transformed into a very sensitive issue, challenging sovereignty in form of the autonomy of domestic authority structures and the absence of authoritative external influences (see Krasner 2001). Hence, Algeria is not involved in close alliances with other actors, since for them, that is incompatible with the sovereign basis of their power (see Barnett 1998). Sara, representative of the EU, explained that the Algerian authorities fear the control that certain forms of partnerships in migration would entail:

They don't want to be part of it [The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa].[10] And I think that one of the things that they probably fear is all the control that comes with preparing and assessing the EUTF project. […] Because if they were to agree to this, they would have to allow for EU-officials to look into their policy, to look into their instrument.

---

[10] The purpose of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa) is to promote stability, improve migration management and address the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and irregular migration in Africa.

Since the principle of sovereignty is highly valued by the Algerian authorities, sovereignty makes up an essential norm for them as a direct expression of Algeria's identity as a sovereign state and a determinant for Algeria's actions (see Buzan 2004). Julie, representative of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, also interconnected Algeria's application of sovereignty and its lack of willingness to cooperate on migration issues, referring to the Global Compact on Migration: *'Algeria did not support, did not sign the pact...and that translates into, I think very clearly the fact that Algeria wants to remain sovereign of its migration policy and 'free' of all engagements that could force them to them to do something differently'*.[11] Algeria's refusal to sign a pact that the vast majority of states have signed implies that the country stands out in the field of practice of migration on a global level, as an actor with a restrictive understanding of what it means to be sovereign. The bias of security and sovereignty principles constitute a normative structure in the field of migration in Algeria, forming political constraints for actors within this field of practice.

6.3.2. Authoritarian Governance

At the national level, the field of practice of migration is characterized by authoritarian governance in the form of an obscure migration policy and a strictly regulated space for the UN and the civil society. A majority of the participants found it either difficult to describe Algerian migration policy towards sub-Saharan migrants or considered it to be lacking in transparency. Several of them highlighted the difficulty of obtaining information on Algerian migration policy, some doubting that a real migration policy even existed. François, representative of UN Agency 1, raised the obscurity surrounding non-Nigerien migrants sent towards Niger:

> I mean, there is an exchange of letter with Niger, but we also know that basically you might end up with people who are not from Niger in Tamanrasset, so what do you do with them? […] That's the question that I asked the counsel of Niger when I was down there in Tam. […] And the answer wasn't clear.

As Algeria is run by a rent-driven coercive apparatus with a low level of institutionalization, it can introduce policies with a certain degree of independence and is not guided by a sense of responsiveness towards society, hence producing obscure policies (see Bellin 2004; Luciani 2013, 115-116; Norton 2013). Sara, representative of the EU pointed out that *'sub-Saharan migrants are illegal here'* and the *'rights of the migrants with the rights of the base of the Refugee Treaty are*

---

[11] The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) is the first negotiated agreement on an intergovernmental level, adopting a holistic approach to international migration.

not respected', adding *'there is access to schools and medical care… it's not guaranteed'*. By treating all sub-Saharans as illegal in society, Algerian migration practice seems to be imbued by arbitrariness. Thus, fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law does not seem to be high on the Algerian agenda (see Jackson 2000). According to Julie, representative of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Algerian authorities as well as Algerian NGOs favor Arab refugees rather than sub-Saharan migrants: *'We saw, at the occasion of Ramadan for example, Algerian associations that gave food to the Syrians or the Palestinians'*. This aspect was also raised by other participants. As a consequence of Algeria's inability and unwillingness to formulate coherent, transparent and balanced policies, there is a high level of discrimination in migration practices towards sub-Saharan migrants at the state level.

Nearly half of the participants discussed a strictly regulated space for the UN and the civil society. Several of them stressed the sensitivity surrounding work with migration in Algeria. The processes of authorization and implementation of migration practices were lengthier than such processes in other areas, and it was difficult for NGOs to receive support from foreign institutions. François, representative of the UN Agency 1, pointed out that partnership constituted one of their primary challenges. Their main partner was the Algerian Red Crescent. François shed light on the ways in which their partnership opportunities were constrained:

> We work informally with a variety of actors. […] But basically, at this stage, we are not in position to engage whatsoever in a formal partnership with them...due to their absence of status, recognized by the authorities. And the next step would be for us, would they be recognized […] then we would need some kind of tripartite agreement...or basically the blessing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The law on associations represents an obstacle for the NGOs as well as for the UN, as they cannot collaborate with international and national associations. The law is part of the authoritarian structure in Algerian politics, and as such a political constraint to actors in the field of practice of sub-Saharan migration, circumscribing their agency. In contrast to the UN, the Algerian NGOs have access to the entire geographical field of practice pertaining to migration in Algeria. Strict regulations of civil society fit well with the logic of the coercive apparatus in Algeria, as it possesses all means to effectively repress. Fatima represents International NGO 1, the only organization in this study that is unauthorized in Algeria. She described the general situation for civil society and the law on associations as the main challenges in their work:

> Firstly, it is simply difficult to work…not having an authorization, means not having a bank account. To not have possibilities of asking for an authorization of meeting...that restrains totally the possibilities for associations of working.

Fatima and Rachid hesitate whether they can exercise certain actions, since they do not know what the *'line of their actions'* is. According to Fatima, they are nonetheless *'tolerated'*, otherwise they would have closed their offices a long time ago. The case of International NGO 1 illuminates the constraints on the Algerian field of practice of migration in several ways: first, the Algerian coercive apparatus is likely to repress initiatives that do not serve the interests of state officials (see Bellin 2004), second, a lack of willingness to formulate a clear migration policy leads to obscure policies, and third; normative expectations of sovereignty is related to an emphasis of an 'exclusivity to the state' (see Krasner 2001).

Some associations have left the coordination project on migration that International NGO 1 has set up in collaboration with another association. According to Fatima, the project is *'extremely difficult'* to implement, due to the law on authorization of associations. Associations who have established relations with the Algerian authorities cannot be involved in activities with unauthorized associations. Fatima pointed out that Algerian NGO 2 left the platform following its authorization with the authorities. Yousef, representative of Algerian NGO 2, argued that it was rather the platform's choice to apply a *'single strategy of advocacy'* that is *'not really adapted to the Algerian context'*, that made the organization leave the platform. He mentioned *'meetings with journalists'* as an example. Furthermore, Yousef was one of few participants arguing that sub-Saharan migrants faced neither stigmatization nor aggressions in the country, arguing as a state representative. In a similar way, the most distinctive aspect of the interview with Hamza, representative of Algerian NGO 1, was that he referred to the Algerian authorities by saying *'we'* and *'for us'*, suggesting that the NGO is closely connected to the government, and portraying Algeria as 'united' on the issue of sub-Saharan migration.

6.4 Level of the International Society

The Level of the International Society was another category that emerged from data analysis. Although this level pivots on the Level of the Authoritarian Regime, it is distinct from it since several actors take place on the field of practice of migration. The Level of the International Society was distinguished by a multiplicity of practices: diplomatic and humanitarian practices, exchanges and strategies, as well as an apparent willingness of the Algerian authorities to adapt their migration

practices to international norms. On this level, exercises of agency and power were more salient, and the participants partially perceived themselves as influential. More specifically, this category is made up by the following concepts: *Bilateral vs. Multilateral relations*, *Coordination*, *Dialogue and Capacity-building*, *Humanitarian Action* and *UN and Civil Society Strategies*.

6.4.1. Diplomatic Practices

A majority of the participants discussed Algeria's preference to work within a bilateral framework, rather than a multilateral one. The notion that *'states are on the same level'* was described as crucial to Algeria. The participants highlighted that Algeria had close relations to European states such as Spain, Italy and France, whereas the relations with the EU had stagnated, or even deteriorated, following the EU's proposal of detention centers in the Maghreb, the externalization of borders and a worsened EU-image. Sara, representative of the EU, explained that the EU and Algeria are *'stuck'* in their relations on migration:

> We already had four dialogues [on migration]. Which means, four times, two delegations, extensive delegations…sitting around the table, agreeing to cooperate. […] And now we are four years later, and still there is no cooperation. […] And when we request for meetings, we don't get an answer.

Sara argued that despite the ranking of migration as one of the 'Partnership priorities' between the EU and Algeria, they *'had not achieved anything'*. The EU had offered Algeria the EU Trust Fund (EUTF) several times, but Algeria refused. Moreover, Sara pointed out that Algeria wanted something in return for cooperation, such as visas for Algerian nationals. As the EU experienced troubles in reaching out to Algeria in formal ways, they attempt to get in touch with Algerian representatives in the margins of conferences and receptions. Nonetheless, Sara expressed skepticism about the EU's ability to generate change in the field of practice of migration.

Julie, representative of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, construed the bilateral dialogue between France and Algeria as one on *'a quite good level'*. France had exchanges of information with the Algerian authorities on migration issues *'in a broad sense'*. Nonetheless, she claimed that *'sub-Saharan migration has a weak place in Franco-Algerian relations'* and that although they had a regular dialogue, *'it's a relatively closed discussion'*. In addition, she stated that *'it would be very strange'* if France had activities on migration in Algeria, thus pointing at sovereignty. Julie's colleague, Adèle, stressed that the Franco-Algerian relations *'were very complicated for historical*

reasons'. Simultaneously, Spain stood out as a privileged partner of Algeria in the domain of migration. José, representative of the Spanish Ministry of Interior, asserted that they had a *'very satisfying cooperation, political and operational, in all areas'* with Algeria. José proudly asserted that *'the Civil Guard, it is the only European security institution that has a cooperation protocol with the coast guard'*. Nevertheless, it does not seem like Spain and Algeria exercise joint naval patrols, as Spain and Morocco do, as José stressed that *'Algeria is not Morocco'*, indicating that resemblances between the Maghreb states should not be exaggerated.

Thus, while it seems like Julie and Adèle perceive the role of France as quite limited, José regards Spain as having an important role in the field of practice pertaining to migration in Algeria. For Algeria, the international society is a space mainly for equal state units, meaning that institutions such as the EU should exercise a minimum level of influence. This is probably partly a result of a differentiation between Algeria and the EU on the rules concerning the conduct of diplomacy (see Buzan 2004). Nonetheless, due to its colonial past in Algeria, France sees its actions being more circumscribed than its southwestern neighbor.

6.4.2 Humanitarian Practices

A majority of the participants raised activities in the humanitarian area targeting sub-Saharan migrants in Algeria. François, representative of UN Agency 1, gave an account of the functions of a detention center in the outskirts of Algiers, stating that medical assessment, the support of Red Crescent services, food, shelter and clothing for the migrants were available. He added that during the return operations, the migrants were transported in air-conditioned buses, given food and had access to toilets and showers. UN Agency 1 had a partnership with the Ministry of Health on access to health care for mobile populations. Elena, representative for UN Agency 2, illustrated that they have a program for assisting refugees: *'we have safe housing, a cash grant, and a living allowance'*. They had also set up a hotline number that refugees and asylum seekers could call in case they get arrested. She said that in the lack of a law protecting refugees and asylum seekers, *'the UN Agency 2 is undertaking the tasks that the government should do'*. In the vacuum of an official migration policy, other actors perform the duties of the authorities.

International NGO 1 and Algerian NGO 2 work with referencing of migrants to public health institutions. Fatima, representative of International NGO 1, described their practices:

[Community working team] that detects worrying medical cases and who orient these people towards Algerian health services. […] So we incite these people to go to the hospitals…we reimburse the medical fees […] We do the work of being a connection between the migrants and the health structures of the country.

International NGO 1 offers a confidential space for migrant women. There, women have access to a gynecologist, a doctor, contraceptives and counselling about sexual and reproductive health as well as access to a lawyer and a psychologist. Algerian NGO 2 also provides a center for women, where practices relating to women's rights and women's health, such as sexual and reproductive health, form the focal point. By providing specific services adapted to migrants' needs in the Algerian context, International NGO 1 and Algerian NGO 2 exercise agency as well as power (see Giddens 1979). Algeria devotes itself to a certain degree of humanitarian activities, and allows for such activities by other actors, as a result of normative expectations of the respect of human rights in the international society (see Barnett 1998; Jackson 2000).

6.4.3 Exchanges and Strategies

All participants spoke of coordination, dialogue and capacity-building in the field of practice of migration. Several participants raised that the UN has a central role in the 'migration hub' of Algiers. The UN is in direct contact with the Algerian authorities, the Algerian Red Crescent, the diplomatic representations and the civil society. Furthermore, UN Agency 1 and 2 observed a return operation of Nigerien nationals from Algiers to Tamanrasset in 2018. The primary remark of François, representative of UN Agency 1, was that the *'capacity of coordination amongst the different services from the Algerian perspective is very, very high'* as *'services from the civil protection, Ministry of Health, Red Crescent, police forces, Ministry of Transport'* were all involved, as well as the *wilayat*. According to François, the Algerian coordination of services was *'completely in line with the international setting'*. The rationale of the invitation to UN Agency 1 to observe the return operation was probably to prove that Algeria respects norms of human rights in the international society (see Buzan 2004; Jackson 2000). This idea was supported by Julie, representative of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stressing that Algeria's engagement in migration practices is a *'question of image'*. UN Agency 1 has made a policy proposal to the Algerian authorities on the organization of return and integration of non-Nigerien nationals. Their exchange with the Algerian authorities on policy dissolvements is concentrated on exchanges of information on conferences and workshops on migration, with the aim of facilitating the engagement of the Algerian authorities. In addition, UN Agency 1 supports the implementation of

an Algerian initiative on trafficking and promoted a dialogue between Algeria and Niger on migration. It appeared as François perceived UN Agency 1 to have a quite important role in the field of practice of migration in Algeria, as they were involved in numerous practices and were in regular contact with the Algerian authorities as well as with other actors on migration-related issues. Nonetheless, through their work on return operations and trafficking, they reinforce the securitization of migration, as well as a treatment of migrants as victims, rather than agents.

Elena, representative of the UN Agency 2, explained that certain activities within the field of practice of sub-Saharan migration, such as assistance to refugees, were carried out by implementation partners. She emphasized that the organization is working for Algeria to adopt an asylum regime. Moreover, they contact the Algerian authorities and *'remind them of their obligations'* when return operations take place. Through these activities, UN Agency 2 counters the authoritarian structure of the Algerian authorities, exercising agency and power (see Giddens 1979). Elena stated that they *'have good cooperation'* with regard to capacity-building:

> We are sending the government to San Remo in Italy, where there is an International Law Institute. The UN organization 2 has a program there, with two courses on refugee law and statelessness, which are in several languages, like French and Arabic. They are good for raising awareness. And there is actually a good interest from the authorities in continuing the training.

Due to normative expectations concerning exchanges between actors in the international society, Algeria takes part in capacity-building programs (See Buzan 2004; Jackson 2000). Hamza, representative of Algerian NGO 1, described his organization as a network of *'150 organizations that work with children's' rights'*. Algerian NGO 1 has a partnership with the authorities on education. Hamza pointed out that the NGO has better possibilities of reaching out to refugee children on a national level than its partner UN organization 2, since they are restricted in their movement. Yousef, representative of Algerian NGO 2, shared a similar view. Algerian NGO 2 has partnerships with UN organization 2 as well as with the authorities in the area of health.

Rachid, representative of International NGO 1, explained that their coordination project on migration is a space for *'strengthening the capacities and common actions, when that's possible'*. Fifteen associations are coalesced in the EU-funded project, and thus, it seems to offer a distinct

space of coordination in the field of practice pertaining to migration in Algeria. Fatima, the other representative of the NGO, highlighted their view of the role of the organization:

> [International NGO 1] has accumulated, saved an amount of knowledge in the vision of migration and the question of protection of vulnerable people. […] Our role is really to share this knowledge. To put in place, as a first step, consultation with the civil society, projects, and accompany them, so that one day it's the Algerian civil society that can have the keys and the tools to accomplish this work.

Fatima perceived International NGO 1 as a leader in the associative area within the field of practice of migration, supporting other NGOs. Although the space for civil society is strictly regulated as a result of sovereignty principles and a narrow interpretation of the international society (see Krasner 2001, Buzan 2004), NGOs still occupy relevant roles in this field of practice. By allowing the civil society a certain extent of freedom, the Algerian authorities comply with international norms concerning human rights and associative freedoms and ensure the maintenance of international support networks (see Bellin 2004; Jackson 2000; Buzan 2004).

A few participants spoke about different strategies that the UN and the civil society carry out through their migration practices in Algeria, such as *Communitarian Work*, *Studies* and *Awareness-raising activities*. Both Algerian NGO 2 and International NGO 1 had migrant community teams as part of their staff. Yousef, representative of Algerian NGO 2, recounted that they managed a community-based clinic, with *'community-based strategies for the improvement of access to health care for the most vulnerable populations'*. The community-based strategies allowed the organization *to 'get to know these populations well'* and '*to know their needs, to know their demands'*. Moreover, Yousef explained that migrant women worked with specific projects:

> These are women who will be intermediaries between us and certain populations. […] We give them specific tasks. For example, sometimes, to do interviews, sometimes they are more accepted by the populations. […] Sometimes, for example, we train traditional midwives among the migrant populations […] The migrant women trust traditional midwives a lot more.

By evaluating the needs of sub-Saharan migrants, Algerian NGO 1 do not only consider migrants' rights, they also reinforce migrants' agency, perspectives and potential by incorporating them into

their teams. This way, it is arguably easier for the team of Algerian NGO 1 to reach out to sub-Saharan migrant women. In the vacuum left by the Algerian state in the field of practice of migration, Algerian NGO 2 offers migrant populations work when the Algerian authorities do not, exercising agency and power (see Giddens 1979).

Both UN Agency 1 and Algerian NGO 2 executed studies on sub-Saharan migration flows in Algeria, which for the former involved a data-tracking matrix of migrants, while it for the latter implied the use of *'observation worksheets'* to identify the vulnerability of sub-Saharan migrant groups. The participants also shed light on awareness-raising activities executed through cultural activities, such as screening of films and documentaries, and campaigns in schools and universities. Through these activities, UN Agency 1 and Algerian NGO 2 exercise agency and power, as they are able to provide information of the sub-Saharan migration that the Algerian authorities cannot or do not want to (see Giddens 1979).

6.5 Conclusion

The significance of this study is twofold: 1) I manifest that state and non-state actors mainly perceive the field of practice of sub-Saharan migration in Algeria as distinguished by a notion of securitization and sovereignty principles, due to the Algerian rent-driven authoritarian apparatus. Thus, statements concerning the EU's considerable influence on migration practices appear exaggerated; 2) despite the predominant role of the Algerian authorities in the field of practice of migration in Algeria, state and non-state actors play relevant roles. Through the exercise of diplomatic and humanitarian practices, as well as exchanges and strategies, they fill part of the vacuum left by the Algerian state, as they counter the state logic of security and securitization, thus exercising agency and power. However, the oscillation between these two levels is marked by sensitivity. In the next chapter, I deepen my analysis, as I connect my findings to the literature and the theory previously discussed. Furthermore, the next chapter serves as a way of interpreting latent content in the findings, pertaining to agency and power.

CHAPTER VII

Analysis: The Interplay of Agency and Power, the Authoritarian State Apparatus and the International Society

In this chapter, I display the complexities concerning the emergent field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration in Algeria. By connecting my findings to Giddens's (1979, 1998) theorization of agency and power, Bellin's (2004, 2012) understanding of the coercive apparatus of authoritarian states and Buzan's (2004) conceptualization of the notion of the normative structure of international society with the literature, I show that in the vacuum of an official Algerian migration policy, actors construct a distinct field of practice of migration.

7.1 The Construction of Sub-Saharan Migration as a Threat to Security and Sovereignty

The primary result of this study is that state and non-state actors perceive the field of practice of sub-Saharan migration in Algeria as organized mainly according to securitization and sovereignty principles. The Algerian authorities have a dominant position on this national level of the field, exercising security-oriented practices and imposing rules and resources of securitization and sovereignty, forming a structure that is reproduced and reinforced by other actors (Bourdieu 1984; Giddens 1979). While the security aspect of Algerian migration policy is well confirmed by the literature, the sovereignty aspect stands in stark contrast to how scholars describe migration practices in the country. Rather, many scholars claim that the EU has a relative or a strong influence in the field of migration in Algeria (Fargues 2013; Collyer 2012; Baghzouz 2017; Bensaâd 2017). I call these assertions into question, as almost all participants in this study argued that the EU had minimal influence on the field of migration in Algeria. Nonetheless, my findings show that Spain, and to a lesser extent France, respond to the conditions of migration by supporting the prevailing security structure, thus exercising a certain amount of European influence.

Sara, representative of the EU, perceived Algeria's refusal to engage in the EUTF as a consequence of their reluctance to share information about policy processes with external actors. Algeria's construction of sovereignty is inspired by Westphalian sovereignty, thus 'the autonomy of domestic authority structures' and 'the absence of authoritative external influences' (Krasner 2001). In this light, the assertions in the literature of heavy European influence in the field of practice of migration

in Algeria seem exaggerated. Indeed, sovereignty is a defining social element of the structure in Arab politics (Barnett 1988). It is also raised as an important aspect in the literature of Algeria's foreign policy (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami 2014; Baghzouz 2014; Daguzan 2015). Clearly, scholars on migration have not been conversing with those on foreign policy.

José, representative of the Spanish Ministry of Interior, constructed sub-Saharan migration as an absolute threat to Algerian sovereignty and security. Through José's linkage of migration flows with organized crime and terrorism, migration is illustrated as an extreme threat to domestic and interdependence sovereignty – the ability of a government to regulate the movement of goods, capital, people and ideas across borders, and to exert effective state control (Wæver 1995; Krasner 2001). Due to the weak, authoritarian character of the Algerian state, migration is transformed into an extreme security problem, linked to developments undermining the political order, and consequently, large numbers of soldiers are mobilized (Wæver 1995; Huysmans 1995; Buzan et al 1998). As José relates migration to organized crime and terrorism, he reinforces the impression that migration is a *special* kind of problem, which the state can counter by claiming a 'special right' (Waever 1995). Consequently, the field of practice of migration in Algeria is securitized by the Algerian authorities as well as Spain.

Securitization of migration in Algeria resonates with Salim's study (2016), emphasizing how connections are made between migrants and security domains, with the aim of presenting an image of sub-Saharan migrants as criminals. Furthermore, the Spanish cooperation with the General Directorate of National Security, the gendarmerie and the coast guard bear resemblances with the forms of cooperation that Spain has with Morocco and Italy has with Tunisia and Libya (Baldwin-Edwards 2006; Boubakri 2004; Hamood 2006). However, it does not seem like Spain and Algeria exercise joint naval patrols, as Spain and Morocco. José pointed out that *'Algeria is not Morocco'*, indicating that resemblances between the Maghreb states should not be exaggerated.

The emphasis on security in Algeria is linked to the roles and views of the security institutions. Occupying a central role within authoritarian state apparatus, the military perceives itself as defender of the nation (Bellin 2012). Hence, the military must have a target, something they can defend the nation *against*. All flows across borders, including migrants, have therefore been constructed as targets. Consequently, the military fights migration in the name of maintenance of security and order, with the aim of fulfilling their mission and acquiring prestige and national legitimacy (Bellin 2012). As a result, actors such as International NGO 1 become witnesses to interruptions of their programs, as sub-Saharan migrants fear going out in public. These findings

support the idea that the coercive apparatus in Algeria possesses an extraordinary capacity and will to repress. This is explained by the fiscal health of the coercive apparatus, based on rentier economy; the maintenance of international support networks, preserved even in the post-Cold War era; the low level of institutionalization of the coercive apparatus, manifested by the blurred lines between the state and the private; and the low level of political mobilization (see Bellin 2004).

Notions of securitization and sovereignty in the field of practice in Algeria cannot only be considered from a national perspective, as the states-system and the non-states-system co-exist (Scholte 2000; Woods 2000; Held et al 1999). Both security and sovereignty constitute essential norms and rules for expected behavior in international society. As such, they are critical components in the institutionalization of shared interest among states (Buzan 2004; Jackson 2000). Adherence to the notion of securitization was also demonstrated by UN Agency 1, exercising numerous security-oriented practices. The construction of sub-Saharan migration as a threat to security and sovereignty comprise social and political constraints to migrants as well as external actors, of rules of expected behavior. Yet, this structure also enables Spain, France, the EU and UN Agency 1 to act within the field of practice of migration. By doing so, they simultaneously reinforce the structure of securitization and sovereignty through an adaption of their practices to the Algerian logic of the field, molding them into an institution (Giddens 1979; Bourdieu 1984).

At a national level in the field of practice of migration in Algeria, power is mainly characterized by conflict, used as an instrument by the Algerian authorities as they protect their interests against other actors (Alsop et al, 2006). As a structure, security and sovereignty principles are executed by coercion, through the coercive state apparatus. These principles are also products of calculation, as sub-Saharan migration flows mixing with potentially illegal flows across Algerian borders are perceived as a *real* threat to Algeria's sovereignty and security. Finally, security and sovereignty are probably also beliefs of the Algerian authorities, of what it means to be an independent, non-aligned state. Security and sovereignty constitute essential norms for the authorities, providing the state with elements to their identity and inform them how to act (Buzan 2004). Algeria's violent colonial past has marked the country deeply, and accordingly, sovereignty has become a sacred principle. Scholars on migration in Algeria seem to have neglected this aspect, as they sweepingly compare Algeria to their neighbors in the Maghreb.

7.2 Robust Authoritarianism

The national level of the field of practice of migration in Algeria is marked by a 'robust authoritarianism'. The Algerian authorities form the predominant actor on this level of the field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration, diffusing rules and resources of authoritarianism through the state's obscure migration policy and strictly regulated space for the UN and the civil society, reinforcing the sensitivity surrounding migration in Algeria (Bourdieu 1984; Giddens 1979; Bellin 2004). These aspects resonate well with the literature, as Baghzouz (2017) questions whether Algeria has a real migration policy, while Liverani (2008) views civil society in Algeria as an 'element of conservation', exploited by a weakened state to regain legitimacy and reinforce its capacity to obtain voluntary acceptance of its rule.

François, representative of UN Agency 1, highlighted the obscurity concerning the return operations of non-Nigerien migrants to Niger. This kind of obscure migration policy is an illegitimate form of politics, due to the lack of respect for international law, human rights and principles of transparency. Monitored by an effective rent-driven coercive apparatus with a low level of institutionalization, the Algerian regime can implement policies with a certain level of independence and survive substantial illegitimacy, as is not guided by a sense of responsiveness towards society (see Bellin 2004; Luciani 2013; Norton 2013). Obscurity also took the form of the law requiring associations to be 'authorized', contributing to a strict regulation of civil society as well as the UN. The law embodies the structure of robust authoritarianism in the field of practice of migration, forming strict rules for partnerships between organizations. Accordingly, the authorities employ the strategy of 'divide and conquer' in the field of practice of migration, with the aim of preventing strong coalitions and common platforms that could put substantial pressure on the regime (Cavatorta and Elananza 2008). Through an application of this strategy, the Algerian authorities exercise substantial influence on Algerian associations, as exemplified by the two Algerian NGOs in this study, partially arguing as they were representatives for the regime. Clearly, a 'virtual order' of practical knowledge of what rules and resources are necessary and appropriate for conduct in the Algerian field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration exist. Thus, by complying with the Algerian 'rules of the game' these associations are able to exercise migration practices, yet not without also reproducing and reinforcing the structure of robust authoritarianism, forming an institution in the field of practice (Giddens 1979).

This structure principally contains power marked by conflict, as the Algerian authorities use power to protect their interests against other actors (Alsop et al 2006). Robust authoritarianism is strongly

characterized by coercion, employed through the repressive security apparatus (Buzan 2004; Bellin 2004). An element of calculation is also present, as this structure is reinforced to ensure the survival of the regime. Nonetheless, non-state actors still perform agency in interaction with this structure, through practices that make a difference for sub-Saharan migrants (see Giddens 1979). As the Algerian authorities tolerate their work, power is also distinguished by consent (Alsop et al 2006).

7.3 Diplomatic and Humanitarian Practices in the International Society

The second major finding of this study is that despite the authoritarian character of the Algerian regime, states, the UN and civil society respond to the conditions of migration through diplomatic and humanitarian practices. The international level of the field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration is characterized by a relative opening of the field, allowing for a strife of influence between state and non-state actors (Bourdieu 1984). On this level, a certain willingness of the Algerian authorities to adapt their activities in the field of practice of migration to rules such as international norms of human rights, cooperation among states, and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law is prevalent (Giddens 1979; Jackson 2000). The authorities also partially tolerate such practices by other actors. These aspects have been ignored by scholars, as literature on migration has mostly focused on securitization and the EU's influence, whereas literature on foreign policy has aimed its attention to the major trends in Algeria, such as security-oriented partnerships (Baghzouz 2014, Daguzan 2015; Addi 2017).

The notion of *'states are on the same level'* is critical for the Algerian authorities. Sharing a common identity (system of governance) and a common set of rules (conduct of diplomacy) are crucial factors for Algeria when they choose their partners (Buzan 2004). Hence, Spain, Italy and France are rather privileged partners, whereas the EU lacks cooperation with the Algerian authorities. This is an example of how the structure of securitization and sovereignty intervenes on the international level of the field of practice of migration, connecting it to the national level and turning the entire field into a politics of sensitivity. While the Algerian-Spanish relations on migration lie in the field of securitization, the logic of close bilateral collaboration opposes Algeria's traditional understanding of sovereignty. It appears as the Algerian authorities consider globalization as a catalyst for the increasing disparity between state capacity and state autonomy as measures of state effectiveness, and consequently, they have increased their cooperation with other states (Adamson 2006). By doing this, they draw on the structure of international norms of cooperation among states, and are able to uphold their sovereignty as well their external relations

(Ibid., Jackson 2000; Giddens 1979). However, due to shared principles of sovereignty, the migration practices of states in the Algerian field of practice do not go beyond that of information-sharing.

The Algerian authorities exercise migration practices in the humanitarian area. Nonetheless, these practices are highly limited, since they are exercised in the context of securitization. The UN and the civil society carried out more far-reaching humanitarian practices, through their assistance to migrants, establishment of distinct spaces for migrant women, and referencing of migrants to health and education institutions. Humanitarian practices represent flows of agency and power, as these actors employ their practical knowledge of rules and resources to counter the structures of securitization and sovereignty in this field of practice (Giddens 1979). Yet, the reproduction of humanitarian practices is rooted in the normative structure of human rights and international law in the international society, forming an institution in the field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration (Ibid.; Jackson 2000). As such, these practices are calculated by the Algerian authorities, with the aim of spreading a good image of Algeria (see Buzan 2004). The Algerian invitations to UN Agency 1 & 2 to observe a return operation support this idea. As sub-Saharan migrants are forced on the return operations, there is also a distinct element of coercion in this structure. Moreover, an element of belief is present here, as these humanitarian activities likely are motivated by ideas of good morals.

On this level of the field of practice, especially non-state actors strongly manifest the 'capability to have done otherwise' through their execution of agency and power (Giddens 1989). Power is a force produced primarily by consent, as the Algerian authorities accept these practices, however power is simultaneously distinguished by conflict, as activities in the humanitarian area are constrained by the authoritarian state (Alsop et al 2006).

7.4 Exchanges and Strategies in the International Society

On the international level, state and non-state actors respond to the conditions of migration through their exercise of exchanges and strategies, consisting of coordination, dialogue and capacity-building as well as communitarian work, studies and awareness-raising activities. This level of the field of practice of sub-Saharan migration is distinguished by a relative opening of the field, permitting increased interactions between state and non-state actors (Bourdieu 1984). These aspects have largely been neglected by literature on migration and foreign policy. Yet, the literature on civil society gives an account of secular and religious movements in Algeria and Jordan

informally cooperating on issues that are quite self-contained and not too sensitive in the eyes of the regime (Cavatorta & Elananza 2008). In the field of practice pertaining to migration in Algeria, the UN has a key role. Due to their practices concerning dialogue, capacity-building and coordination with the Algerian authorities, both UN Agency 1 and UN Agency 2 have important roles in the promotion of Algeria's engagement in migration issues.

The magnitude of coordination within the civil society appears as quite relevant, as the coordination project of International NGO 1 implies. Perceiving itself as a leading actor in the field of practice of migration, International NGO 1 shares its knowledge of migration and protection of vulnerable people and furnishes civil society with the tools needed to reinforce their capacities. By tolerating these forms of coordination, the Algerian authorities acquiesce to international normative structure of human rights, cooperation and international law (see Jackson 2000; Barnett 1998). Another important aspect of migration practice was the strategy of having migrant community teams, as International NGO 1 and Algerian NGO 2 have. This strategy clearly demonstrates how some actors in the field of migration in Algeria adapt their practices to the needs of sub-Saharan migrants, building on their practical knowledge of the field. Furthermore, the strategy offers an alternative to the dominating security and sovereignty structure in the Algerian field of practice of migration, aiming attention at sub-Saharan migrants as individuals, and their right to human dignity. In addition, Algerian NGO 2 acts as a substitute for the state as they employ sub-Saharan migrants.

Through the reproduction of exchanges and strategies, these practices form a structure, providing rules and resources in the field of practice of migration in Algeria (Giddens 1979). It is characterized by belief in international norms such as human rights, cooperation and international law, which actors have recourse as they exercise their activities (Giddens 1979; Buzan 2004; Jackson 2000). The structure is also influenced by calculation, as the Algerian authorities profit from capacity-building as well as a favorable image (Buzan 2004). Expressions of agency are highly visible in this context, as coordination, capacity-building, dialogue and various strategies are employed to counter the structures of security and sovereignty, as well as robust authoritarianism. Once again, power is generated by consent, as the Algerian authorities tolerate these practices. At the same time, power is characterized by conflict, as agency intersects structures.

7.5 Conclusion

In this analysis, I have showed that my study fills a gap left by the literature, on questions concerning the EU's influence on migration politics and Algeria's interpretation of sovereignty, as

well as the roles of state and non-state actors in the vacuum left by a missing formulated Algerian migration policy. I have argued that in this vacuum, state and non-state actors form a distinct sub-Saharan field of practice of migration, consisting of two levels, the national level and the international one. These levels are intersected by a constant interplay of flows of agency in contact with the predominant structures of securitization and sovereignty and robust authoritarianism, as well as the less prevalent, yet important, structures of diplomatic and humanitarian practices and exchanges and strategies. State and non-state actors counter these structures, and reproduce them, by exercising agency and power. On the national level, power is mainly marked by conflict, as the Algerian authorities employ power to protect its interests against other actors, while the international level is mainly marked by consent, as state and non-state actors achieve outcomes, tolerated by the state. Due to the interplay of flows of agency and structures connecting the national level to the international one, the Algerian field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration constitutes a politics of sensitivity.

CHAPTER VIII

Conclusion

This study sheds light on a topic that has been left in obscurity by scholars as well as politicians to a large extent. By placing the spotlight on state and non-state actors' perceptions and practices in the field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration in Algeria, I argue that this field is primarily characterized by a notion of securitization and sovereignty, in which the Algerian state is the dominating actor. While securitization of migration in Algeria is well-confirmed by the literature, scholars have missed the ways in which this aspect is closely intertwined with sovereignty, due to the lack of dialogue between research on migration and research on foreign policy. In this light, I question assertions of the EU's extensive influence on migration politics in Algeria. There has been a tendency of assuming that Algeria works the same way as its neighbors in the Maghreb, without paying enough attention to Algeria's colonial past and its consequences for the values that motivate the Algerian authorities and its well-oiled security apparatus. Algeria's strict emphasis on security and sovereignty on migration matters places the country in the same group as states such as the U.S., Hungary and Poland.

Moreover, I shed light on the complexity of migration, by showing that even in states where robust authoritarianism reign in the field of practice, non-state actors exercise power and agency by countering the structure of security and sovereignty. This tendency is less prevalent than that of the security and sovereignty practices of the Algerian state, and do not mean that neither Algerian civil society nor multilateral institutions are 'free' to act as they wish. Yet, although the field of practice pertaining to migration is heavily imbued by sensitivity, state and non-state actors exercise influence on the Algerian authorities, provide assistance to sub-Saharan migrants, coordinate among themselves to strengthen their impact, and develop distinct strategies. By doing so, they make the lives of sub-Saharan migrants easier. As a result of the interplay of flows of agency and structures connecting the national level to the international one, the Algerian field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration forms a politics of sensitivity.

Ultimately, this study touches upon the question of how we can save migrants from danger. At this point, the deaths and sufferings of sub-Saharan migrants in the Sahara remain largely unknown and ignored. There is an urgent need of the behalf of Europe and the world community to respond to migration *before* it becomes a so-called 'problem', winding up at Europe's shores. Also, there is a

need of politicians as well as scholars to recognize that there is not only a connection between Europe and the Middle East, there is also one between these two regions and sub-Saharan Africa.

8.1. Future Research

This study forms a first stepping stone in the study of how state and non-state actors form a distinct field of practice of sub-Saharan migration in Algeria. To fully grasp the dynamics of this field, more research is needed. I suggest the following: first, future studies need to include perspectives from the Algerian authorities as well as other state and non-state actors, such as representatives of the sub-Saharan countries of origin, in order to investigate how their perspectives may differ from the ones raised in this study. Second, future studies should explore the role of racism within the field of practice pertaining to sub-Saharan migration. Studies should also examine the potential differentiation of treatment between sub-Saharan migrants, Western Saharans and Syrians. Third, a comparative study of migration practices in the Maghreb is needed, with the purpose of understanding the similarities and differences between Algeria and the rest of the region.

References

AbuKhalil, As'ad. 2014. "The Longevity of Arab Regimes: Causes of Oppression". In *Modern Middle East Authoritarianism: Roots, Ramifications and Crisis* edited by Noureddine Jebnoun, Mehrdad Kia and Mimi Kirk, 40-56. Abingdon: Routledge.

Adamson, Fiona B. 2006. "Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security". *International Security,* 31 (1): 165-199. https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.165

Addi, Lahouari. 2017. "Algeria". In *The Middle East*, edited by Ellen Lust, 403-423. Thousand Oaks: CQ Press. 14th Edition.

Alsop, Ruth, Mette Bertelsen and Jeremy Holland. 2006. "Empowerment in Practice: From Analysis to Implementation". *World Bank Institute*, January 5, 2018. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/EmpowermentLearning Modulebody.pdf

Amnesty. 2018. "Forced to Leave: Stories of Injustice Against Migrants in Algeria". *Amnesty*, 2018. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ MDE28951 22018ENGLISH.PDF

Babbie, Earl. 2013. *The Basics of Social Research.* Belmont: Wadsworth/Cengage Learning. 6th Edition.

Baghzouz, Aomar. 2014. "La politique Méditerranéenne de l'Algérie à l'épreuve des mutations géopolitiques régionales : changement ou continuité ? ". *Maghreb-Machrek* 3 (221): 23-34.

–. 2017. "L'Algérie face aux questions migratoires et de mobilité". *Outre-Terre* 4 (53): 30-49.10.3917/oute1.053.0030

Barnett, Michael N. 1998. *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order*. New York: Columbia University Press.

BBC. 2019. "Abdelaziz Bouteflika: Algerian leader resigns amid protests". *BBC*, April 3, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47795108

Bellin, Eva. 2004. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative". *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (January): 139-157. DOI: 10.2307/4150140

–. 2012. "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring". *Comparative Politics*, 44, no. 2 (January): 127-149. https://doi.org/10.5129/001041512798838021

Bensaâd, Ali. 2017. "Les migrations entre Sahel et Maghreb, un enjeu de stabilité, de développement et de démocratisation". *Outre-Terre* 4 (53): 17-29.

Ben Yahia, Jihane. 2018. "Algeria's migration policy conundrum". *Institute for Security Studies*, July 4, 2018. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/algerias-migration-policy-conundrum

Boubakri, Hassen. 2004. Transit migration between Tunisia, Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa: study based on Greater Tunis. Paper presented at the Regional Conference on "Migrants in transit countries: sharing responsibility for management and protection, Istanbul, 30 September – 1 October 2004. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bryman, Alan. 2016. *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5th Edition.

Buzan, Barry. 1983. *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. London: Wheatsheaf.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

–. 2004. *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, Barry, and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez. 2009. *International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Callinicos, Alex. 1985. "Anthony Giddens: A Contemporary Critique". *Theory and Society*, 14, no. 2 (March): 133-166. https://www.jstor.org/stable/657087

Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller. 2009. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. New York: Guilford Press. 4th Edition.

Cavatorta, Francesco, and Azzam Elananza. 2008. "Political Opposition in Civil Society: An Analysis of the Interactions of Secular and Religious Associations in Algeria and Jordan". *Government and Opposition,* 43(4): 561-578. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2008.00263.x

Chatty, Dawn. 2010. *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chaudry, Kiren Aziz. 2010. *The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1997.

Clancy-Smith, Julia A. 2012. *Mediterranean: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Collyer, Michael. 2012. "Moving Targets: Algerian State Responses to the Challenge of International Migration". *Revue Tiers Monde*, (210): 107-122. https://www.cairn.info/revue-tiers-monde-2012-2-page-107.htm

Creswell, John W, and Cheryl Poth. 2018. *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches.* Thousand Oaks: Sage. 3rd Edition.

Crouch, Mira and McKenzie, Heather. 2006. "The Logic of Small Samples in Interview-Based Qualitative Research". *Social Science Information*, 45, no. 4 (December): 483-99. https://doi.org/10.1177/0539018406069584

Crystal, Jill. 1990. *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. C*ambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Daguzan, Jean-François. 2015. "La politique étrangère de l'Algérie : le temps de l'aventure ? ", *Politique étrangère* (3) : 31-42.

De Haas, Hein. 2007. "North African migration systems: evolution, transformations and development linkages". IMI working paper 6. Oxford: International Migration Institute, University of Oxford.

–. 2008. "The Myth of Invasion: the inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe". *Third World Quarterly*, 29 (7): 1305-1322. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20455111

Del Pistoia, Debora. 2018. "Why Algeria Is Emptying Itself of African Migrant Workers". *News Deeply,* July 10, 2018. https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/07/10/why-algeria-is-emptying-itself-of-african-migrant-workers

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, and Raymond Hinnebusch. 2013. "Foreign Policymaking in the Middle East: Complex Realism". In *International Relations of the Middle East*, edited by Louise Fawcett, 225-231. Oxford: Oxford Univrsity Press. 3rd Edition.

Entelis, John. 1999. "Sonatrach: The Political Economy of an Algerian State Institution". *Middle East Journal* 53, no. 1 (Winter): 9-27. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4329281

EuroMed Rights. 2012. "Memorandum: Assessment of Law 12-06 of 12 January 2012 on Associations". Last modified February 12, 2012. https://euromedrights.org/publication/memorandum-assessment-of-law-12-06-of-12-january-2012-on-associations/

European Council. Council of the European Union. 2017. "The European Union and Algeria adopt their Partnership Priorities". Last modified March 13, 2017. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/13/

eu-algeria/

European Parliament. n.d. "Loi n °12-06 du 18 Safar 1433 correspondant au 12 janvier 2012 relative aux associations". Accessed November 14, 2019. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/ dmag/dv/ dmag20120125_09_/dmag20120125_09_fr.pdf

Fargues, Philippe. 2013. "International Migration and the Nation State in Arab Countries". *Middle East Law and Governance,* (5): 5-35. 10.1163/18763375-00501001

Gaventa, Jonathan. 2003. *Power after Lukes: a review of the literature*. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Accessed January 5, 2018.

Geographic Guide. n.d. Map of Algeria. Accessed November 15, 2019. http://www.geographicguide.com/africa-maps/algeria.htm

Giddens, Anthony. 1979. *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis.* London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press LTD.

Giddens, Anthony, and Christopher Pierson. 1998. *Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Guba, Egon G, and Lincoln, Yvonna, S. 2005. "Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research". In *Handbook of qualitative research*, edited by Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln, 105-117. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Halliday, Fred. 2005. *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

–. 2009. "The Middle East and Conceptions of 'International Society'". In *International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level*, edited by Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, 1-23. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hamood, Sara. 2006. "African transit migration through Libya to Europe: the human cost". *The American University in Cairo: Forced Migration and Refugee Studies*. Accessed August 8, 2019. http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/ hamood-libya.pdf

Hawthorne, Amy. 2004. "Is Civil Society the Answer?". Carnegie Working Paper 44, Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1–24.

Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. 1999. *Global Transformation: Politics, Economics and Culture.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Henry, Clement M. 2014. "The Vanishing Intermediary Bodies of "Authoritarian" Regimes: Legacies of Algerian Student Revolutionaries. In *Modern Middle East*

Authoritarianism: Roots, Ramifications and Crisis, edited by Noureddine Jebnoun, Mehrdad Kia and Mimi Kirk, 81-101. Abingdon: Routledge.

Hinnebusch, Raymond. 2006. "Authoritarian Persistence, democratization theory and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique". *Democratization*, 13, no. 3 (July): 373-395. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340600579243

Hinnebusch, Raymond, and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. 2014. *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

–. 2015. *The International Politics of the Middle East*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Huffpost Maghreb. 2017. « Un fichier national recensant les ressortissants africains en Algérie en cours de préparation ». *Huffpost Maghreb*, June 19, 2017. https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/ressortissants- africains_mg_ 17216582

Huysmans, Jef. 1995. "Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of "Securitizing" Societal Issues". In: *Migration and European integration: the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion*, edited by Robert Miles and Dietrich Thränhardt, 53-72. London: Fairleigh University Press.

Ibrahim, Maggie. 2005. "The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse". *International Migration* 43, no. 5 (December): 163-187. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1468-2435.2005.00345.x

IOM. 2019. "Close to 20,000 Migrants Rescued in Sahara Desert Since Beginning of Operations". *IOM*, June 25, 2019. https://www.iom.int/news/close-20000- migrants-rescued-sahara-desert-beginning-operations

Jackson, Robert. 2000. *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kaya, Ayhan. 2009. *Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

King, Stephen J. 2009. *The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Krasner, Stephen D. 2001. *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Le Quotidien d'Oran. n.d. "Tebboune : La présence des migrants subsahariens en Algérie sera réglementée". *Le Quotidien d'Oran*, Accessed November 1, 2019. http://www.lequotidien-oran.com/index.php?news=5246277

Liverani, Andrea. 2008. "Civil Society in a Weak State: The Political Functionings of Associational Life in Algeria, 1987-2005". PhD Diss., London School of

Economics and Political Science, University of London.

L'Obs. 2017. « Les migrants « amènent le crime, la drogue et plusieurs autres fléaux » : un ministre crée un tollé en Algérie ». *L'Obs*, July 10, 2017. https://www. .nouvelobs.com/monde/20170709.OBS1847/les-migrants-amenent-le-crime la-drogue-et-plusieurs-autres-fleaux-un-ministre-cree-un-tolle-en- algerie.html

Luciani, Giacomo. 2013. "Oil and Political Economy in the International Relations of the Middle East". In *International Relations of the Middle East*, edited by Louise Fawcett, 103-121. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3rd Edition.

Lust, Ellen. 2017. "Institutions and Governance". In *The Middle East*, edited by Ellen Lust, 160-204. Thousand Oaks: CQ Press. 14th Edition.

Martinez, Luis. 2000. *The Algerian Civil War.* London: Hurst.

May, Tim, and Beth Perry. 2014. "Reflexivity and the Practice of Qualitative Research". In *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*, edited by Uwe Flick, 109-122. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

Migdal, Joel S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Migration Policy Institute. 2019. "A Growing Destination for Sub-Saharan Africans, Morocco Wrestles with Immigrant Integration". *Migration Policy Institute,* July 2, 2019. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/growing-destination- -sub-saharan-africans-morocco

Miles, Matthew B, Huberman, A. Michael and Saldaña, Johnny. 2014. *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook.* Thousand Oaks: Sage. 3rd Edition.

Moghadam, Valentine M. 2003. "Engendering Citizenship, Feminizing Civil Society". *Women & Politics* 25 (1-2): 63-87. https://doi.org/10.1300/J014v25n01_03

Nicholson, Michael. 1998. 'Failing States, Failing Systems' paper presented at the conference on "Failed States and International Security: Causes, Prospects, and Consequences" Purdue University, West Lafayette February 1998.

Norton, Augustus Richard. 1993. "The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East". *Middle East Journal* 47, no. 2: 2015-216. https://www.jstor.org/stable/ 4328567

–. 2013. "The Puzzle of Political Reform in the Middle East". In *International Relations of the Middle East*, edited by Louise Fawcett, 127-148. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3rd Edition.

Roberts, Hugh. 2003. *The Battlefield Algeria 1988-2002: Studies in a Broken Polity*. London: Verso.

Salim, Chena. 2016. *Les traversées migratoires dans l'Algérie contemporaine - Africains subsahariens et Algériens vers l'exile.* Paris: Karthala.

Scholte, Jan Aart. 2000. *Globalisation: A Critical Introduction.* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Seidman, Steven. 2016. *Contested Knowledge: Social Theory Today.* Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated. 6th Edition.

Strauss, Anselm, and Corbin, Juilet M. 1990. *Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques.* Newbury Park: Sage.

Volpi, Frédéric. 2013. "Algeria Versus the Arab Spring". *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 3 (July): 104-115. Project MUSE. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2013.0040

Wæver, Ole. 1995. "Securitization and Desecuritization". In *On Security*, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz. New York: Columbia University Press.

Wheeler, Nicholas J. 2003. *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine. 2010. "Dynamiques migratoires sub-sahariennes vers l'Afrique du Nord", *Confluences Méditerranée.* 3(74): 133-142. 10.3917/come.074.0133

Woods, Ngaire. 2000. *The Political Economy of Globalisation.* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Zartman, William. 1995. *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.