



# LUNDS UNIVERSITET

## **The nature of the European actorness regarding the refugee strategy in Uganda and Ethiopia - A descriptive comparative case study**

Amandine Barring  
Student Number : 970210-3046

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## Abstract

Previous conclusions in the literature established a decline of the European actorness on a global scale. This article addresses the pertinence of the actorness theory on a regional level based on a comparative descriptive study of bilateral EU-Third countries partnerships in Ethiopia and Uganda. While the European influence appears to be decreasing, the Specific Issue of the refugee crisis - as being a significant and preoccupying event for the European Union on an economic, political and social scale - could strengthen the European actorness in both countries. Considering the contrasting evolved partnerships between the EU and Uganda / Ethiopia, it will be intriguing to estimate the nature of the European actorness in both settings. The Twitter platform database will be employed through a qualitative content analysis targeting the distinct patterns of Bretherton & Vogler (2006; 2013) to measure, on a communication level, this European actorness regarding the refugee strategy in East Africa. The aim of the research is the creation of a new hypothesis involving the relevance of the European actorness for future explanatory studies. The study results revealed the importance of the European Presence. It also presented the relative significance of the European Opportunities in a particular region. Finally, it did not give new insights concerning the Coherence of the European Union in East Africa.

*Key words:* European actorness, EU refugee strategy, EU-Third Countries partnerships, Eastern African region

*Word Count:* 19881

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## Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
API	Application Programming Interfaces
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework in Uganda
EBCG	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EUTF	The European Union Trust Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HoA	Horn of Africa
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty of States
KP	Khartoum Process
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MPF	Migration Partnership Framework
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
STA	Settlement Transformative Agenda
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNESCO	United Nation Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	The United Nation Refugee Agency

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# 1. Introduction

With the 2014 migration crisis, Europe has faced one of the most critical failures in its contemporary history. The European Union (EU) implemented several internal and external strategies, targeting different regions as well as specific populations of origin to contain the migration crisis (Niemann & Zaun, 2018). My research focuses specifically on the instrument known as EU-Third countries partnerships. This instrument provides European control over the migration crisis in geo-strategical regions that preoccupy the EU external policy regarding refugees. In the East African region, the aim of the EU agreements with the Eastern African countries is to externalise the crisis through diplomatic and financial investments in development aid projects as well as in diplomatic agreements. Therefore, in both short and long term prospects, the European goal is to enable regional management of refugees. Countries in East Africa all have very different national refugee policies. Uganda and Ethiopia are the most advanced countries in terms of progressivist policies and self-reliance, allowing an optimal integration of refugees. However, the European Union has more advanced agreements with Ethiopia than with Uganda. This disparity is an interesting outlook that my research will try to understand through a description of the European actorness nature in social media, in particular, Twitter. The actorness theory stresses the importance of the power and influence of a global actor on an international scale (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; 2013).

Internally, divisions among EU member states hinder reaching a common migration strategy. According to Eurostat (2020), approximately 1.32 million refugees applied for asylum in 2015 within the European Union. A debate sparked up in the public opinion and among European leaders regarding the evolution of the migration phenomenon and which public policies to adopt. The debate caused significant diplomatic divisions between member states (BBC, 2016a). Some countries aspired to adopt a quota approach by countries, allowing for a balanced and proportional distribution that would encourage solidarity and unity among member states in facing the difficulty. Other countries, especially in Eastern Europe, favoured a closed borders strategy and strict protectionist policies limiting the flow of migration. This division is a real challenge for the European Union which questions its strength and its actorness at the global level and at the internal scale (De Angelis, 2017). The gradual takeover of the populist parties reflects the European public opinion's fears which reached its height with the withdrawal of Great Britain from the European

Union in 2020 (BBC, 2019). Despite the flagrant decrease of asylum seekers, down to 640,000 in 2018 (Eurostat, 2020), these fears continue to grow.

The adoption of common migration policies and strategies were necessary despite the apparent division between member states. The Valletta summit on migration was organised in November 2015 as a result of the migration crisis, in order to provide adequate responses to migration flows in collaboration with Africa (Council of the European Union, 2015). Africa is an essential actor for the European strategy to control migratory flows considering that 31% of the refugees at the end of 2018 originated from the African continent (UNHCR, 2018). Nevertheless, migration flows to African countries increased Africa's instability and reinforced not properly controlled political conflicts (Guéhenno, 2016). As a consequence, the European Union allocated a budget to migration policies in Africa. The EU also established the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa in a logic of development aid (EUTF), requiring around 3.4 billion euros in investment (European Commission, 2018), as well as Migration Partnership Frameworks (Castillejo, 2017) in a more targeted approach.

The most pressing challenge that Africa faces is the failed states issue that create migration flows to their neighbouring countries and thus provoke a crisis in the concerned region (Fund For Peace, 2019a). Somalia and South Sudan are both failed states and Somalian and Sudanese refugees are mostly welcome by neighbouring countries. These neighbouring countries (Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda) have very different policies on refugees. However, Ethiopia is more involved in the cooperation with the European Union, thanks to its new Migration Partnership Framework (Castillejo, 2017) and European financial investments (European Commission, 2018). Although Kenya and Uganda share a frontier, they have a very contrasting approach to refugees management (Refugees Studies Centre, 2019). In general, however, the European Union faces a lot of difficulties in developing refugees management agreements with Eastern Africa countries. This paper will describe the nature of the European actorness (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; 2013) in the Eastern Africa region regarding refugees strategies in a Hypothesis-Generating logic.

Subsequently, my research question is formulated as follows:

*What is the nature of the European actorness regarding the refugee strategy in East Africa?*



My research will provide a new vision of the European actorness through the lens of a specific issue (Grinsberg, 2001): EU-Third Countries partnerships addressing the refugee strategy in East Africa. According to Bretherton and Vogler (2013), the European actorness significantly decreased in the past decade. It will be interesting to examine whether the externalisation of the refugee crisis, as an urgent security matter and part of the founding values of the European project, succeeds in establishing a strong European actorness in East Africa. Besides, using Twitter as a database for analysing the EU actorness will, hopefully, bring interesting insights into the actorness theory by focusing on a strategic political communication tool. Therefore, I will examine the relevance of Bretherton and Vogler (2013) hypothesis through a qualitative study of their actorness theory in the refugee crisis context. Furthermore, not only will the use of this theory allow to apply a global approach on a regional scale but it will also explore the theory's nature in social medias. In a more ambitious initiative, this innovative study could be the starting point for explanatory research about the impact of the European actorness over EU-Third Countries partnership for specific issues. Thus, my research will generate a hypothesis that will allow future studies to understand why the European actorness is a relevant explanation for agreements concluded through EU-Third Countries partnerships. The comparison between Uganda and Ethiopia will lead to a deeper understanding of the various refugee strategies in the Eastern Africa region. Finally, the particular study of refugee policy from failed states is innovative and specific but above all, pressing on the European political agenda considering the 'strong security overtones' (Hout, 2010, p. 142) linked to this dilemma.

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## 2. Background

### 2.1. The Eastern African Background

According to UNHCR (2018), the Eastern region of Africa and the Horn of Africa witnessed an increase in its refugee population up to 4.3 million. It is a significant share of the total refugee population in Africa, 6.3 million at the end of 2018. This migration and refugee challenge contributes to the very fragile situation in the region and the need for special attention compared to other African areas.

The East Africa region has experienced significant migration problems for 50 years. Between 1978 and 1995, the number of refugees reached a peak because of political events. These events include:

the overthrow of the Ethiopian Imperial Government in 1974; the independence struggle of Eritrea; the war between Ethiopia and Somalia between 1977 and 1978; and, the civil conflict in Sudan and Somalia in the 1980s (Bariagaber, 1997). The refugee crisis, which has continuously increased in East Africa, is particularly complex and forms a unique geopolitically and socially sensitive region. First, many military and peacekeeping interventions by external actors, including the European Union, led to an escalation of conflicts (Loubster & Salomon, 2014). Besides, political problems in the region involve countries using refugees as a mean for political negotiations, thus intensifying the conflict. As Bariagaber (1999) explained: "The nature of the conflicts [...] and the accompanying refugee formations in the region, have become temporally more enduring, spatially more extensive, emotionally more intense, and less amenable to compromise and negotiated solutions" (p. 601). These political tensions and diverse economic situations produced substantial variations between countries of origin and destination. For instance, Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in Africa, which led many Ethiopian refugees to leave the country in the past (Bariagaber, 1997). Today, Ethiopia is still economically unstable but happens to be the most popular country of destination in the region for refugees. These inconsistencies overtime question the relevance of migration strategies such as repatriation given the complexity of the flows (Bariagaber, 1997). Besides, today the situation is aggravated by Somali and Sudanese difficulties. The two failed states are currently suffering from incredibly hard political conditions (Fund For Peace, 2019).

Zartman (1995, p. 1) defines a failed state as "a deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup, or riot. It refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), laws, and political order have fallen apart and must be constituted in some form, old or new". I chose to focus my study on failed states' refugees since there is no relevant government able to protect them. It is, therefore, up to the international community, and in particular, the EU, to take responsibility to protect these citizens' rights. The Responsibility-to-Protect (R2P) was drafted in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty of States (ICISS) to address the need to intervene in humanitarian crises that require intervention. According to Lombardo (2015), this principle suggests an "assessment by the international community of any possible action in case the state is unable or unwilling to adopt measures in order to protect and safeguard its population and everybody who is in that territory at that moment" (Lombardo, 2015, p.1190). Since the European Union promotes human rights and defends democratic principles, the EU has a responsibility to protect refugees originating from failed states. This responsibility follows a

cosmopolite logic. For my research, the principle of responsibility to protect is essential to understand, as it is an integral part of the European strategy for development aid in East Africa.

## 2.2. Background of EU-Third countries agreements with Africa

The European Union has adopted multiple strategies to externalise the migration crisis in African regions confronted to refugees. These strategies follow various levels of development and intensity and indicate a gradual commitment of the European Union in Africa's migration policies. It is precisely this bilateral variation that I will examine in my research. Accordingly, I intend to provide an accurate contextualisation on each concluded agreements.

The 2006 Rabat Process was one of the first regional migration dialogue between the EU and Africa. It proposed “a dialogue platform for national administrations of the countries of origin, transit and destination along the West African migration routes”. The ultimate goal of the initiative is a better-coordinated response from all the countries concerned with massive migratory flows. The Rabat Process is not binding but mostly a framework with an adaptive strategy. The dialogue is very flexible and integrative (Rabat Process Website, 2020). In 2007, the Joint EU-Africa Strategy was adopted at the second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon. The main objectives of the strategy are to reinforce the political dialogue between Africa and the European Union, expand Africa-EU cooperation, and promote a people-centred partnership (African Union Website, 2020). In November 2014, the EU-Horn of Africa (HoA) Migration Route Initiative – also known as the Khartoum Process (KP) – was established as a joint initiative to tackle “the challenges of human trafficking and smuggling of migrants between the Horn of Africa and Europe, in a spirit of partnership, shared responsibility and cooperation” (Khartoum Process Website, 2020). The Khartoum Process is financed by the EU Emergency Trust Funds (EUTF). According to the European Commission, €714 million of a total of €1.8 billion EUTF funds have been set aside for projects in the HoA notably to improve conditions for refugees as well as to strengthen migration management (Khartoum Process Website, 2020). Later in November 2015, the Valetta Summit took place in Malta and gathered European and African leaders to discuss and find a solution to the European migration crisis. The main result of the Valetta summit was the creation of the EUTF, financed by the European Union and its member states to support development in Africa. In return, the African countries were to collaborate with the EU to stabilise the crisis (Council of the European Union, 2015).

### 2.2.1. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)

On 9 September 2015, the EU President Jean-Claude Juncker announced the creation of a Trust Fund aiming for stability and addressing the root causes of destabilisation, displacement and irregular migration. According to the European Commission (2018), the EUTF for Africa is the result of the stable partnerships between the European Union and Africa. This initiative was resulting from the Valetta Summit on Migration that took place in November 2015 (European Commission, 2018). The EUTF budget is worth over €3.4 billion. Most of the contributions are made by the EU (88%), but member states also participate (12%). One of the primary concern of the EUTF is Migration Management which includes fighting against significant issues such as irregular migration and human trafficking. This specific fund is a major financial contributor to the Migration Partnership Framework (MPF) and the Khartoum Process (KP) (European Commission, 2018).

### 2.2.2. Migration Partnership Framework (MPF)

The MPF is considered a very elaborate agreement that brings the European Union to another level of influence over African countries. It was created in June 2016 following the migration crisis of 2015 to establish “a coherent and tailored engagement [...] with third countries to better manage migration” (European Commission, 2016, p. 6). This partnership seeks to influence the European Union and its member states to cooperate with partner countries in Africa for better management of migrant flows. The MPF differs from the Valetta Action Plan and previous EU migration initiatives and agreements. Indeed, the MPF focuses on a transactional relationship and uses both positive and negative incentives to achieve EU interests. Most of the MPF financing comes from the EUTF for Africa: €500 million were invested for the five MPF countries – Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. However, MPF priority countries still benefit from the EUTF program. According to Castillejo (2017), activities in the priority countries included, among others, high-level political dialogue by both the EU and member states; placement of dedicated European migration liaison officers within EU delegations; substantial funding and programming on migration by the EU and member states; increased security support; and, strengthened EU agency involvement in partner countries.

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### 3. Literature Review

#### 3.1. The European Actorness

I will now define the actorness theory to understand how literature perceives it. The actorness idea questions the role and power of an actor on a global level. Various dimensions are explaining the actorness of the European Union. Sjöstedt (1977) is one of the pioneers of the actorness theory and stresses the importance of capability when conceptualising European actorness. He is the first author to introduce a behavioural criterion as a distinct determinant of an actor position on the international scene. This “actor capability” is, according to him, necessary to exert sufficient influence and it is determined by structural prerequisites. Besides, Sjöstedt states that the actor must also be autonomous, which implies internal cohesion and external delimitation (1977, p. 17). Despite the fundamental influence of Sjöstedt's work, his theory does not address the interplay of internal and external factors. Thus, the next attempts at defining actorness accurately focus on the external impact of the internal element. Allen and Smith (1990) were the first to incorporate the external dimension in the elaboration of the concept of "presence" as an international interaction active in certain areas but less active in others (p. 20). There are four main forms of presence characterised by a set of qualities and implications for the actor. The four forms vary along two dimensions: the tangible/intangible dimension and the positive/negative dimension (Allen & Smith, 1990). The first form is the “initiator [that] provides a positive stimulus to certain courses of actions” (p. 21). The second is the “shaper [that] moulds the accounts of participants” (p. 22). The third is the “filter [that] operates to exclude certain possibilities and to constrain expectations” (p. 22). Finally, the fourth and last form is the “barrier [that] provides disincentives to actions and may impose costs or punishment on actors who operate in defiance of it” (p. 22).

This categorisation of actorness theory allows application to state but also non-state actors such as the European Union. However, critics of this theory supported that Allen & Smith did not make a clear connection between the concept of presence and actorness. Consequently, Hill (1993) explains that the role of the EU in international politics is characterised by its ability to fulfil external expectations towards it. According to Hill, there is a gap between the expectations of external actors and the internal capacities of the European Union to meet its expectations due to a lack of resources or the agility to implement decisions. Following these different conceptualisations, more recent contributions to the actorness theory demonstrate the importance of a constructivist vision and

especially of the interrelation of internal and external factors. Jupille & Caporaso (1998) identify four elements to the actorness theory: recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion. These criteria suggest that actorness requires a combination of internal and external factors. Finally, the approach of Bretherton & Vogler (2006), which I will use as my theory, is based on social constructivism and adopts a sophisticated design of measurements which can be summarised by opportunity, presence and capability. I will explain further this theory in the theoretical part.

The actorness theory is intimately linked to other concepts such as the legitimacy and the effectiveness of a global actor. First, regarding legitimacy, Cmakalová & Rolenc (2012) explain that the European Union must be perceived as legitimate to maintain sufficient influence on the international scene (p. 260). However, what is particularly interesting for this research is the notion of effectiveness which is, according to Bretherton & Vogler (2006), directly linked to the actorness theory. Bretherton & Niemann (2013) address this particular question in an article titled “EU external policy at the crossroads: The challenge of actorness and effectiveness”. According to them, an effective policy is categorised in terms of “goal attainment” and “problem-solving”. Effectiveness could therefore be identified as a “Special Issue”, as understood by Ginsberg (2001). According to Ginsberg, complex cases that impact Europe over a specific period would allow a stronger commitment of member states to increase the effectiveness of adopted exceptional measures. The 2015 Valetta Summit illustrates and supports this theory in the event of a specific threat to Europe’s prosperity and, above all, to its security. Indeed, this “issue-specific effectiveness” (Carbone, 2013) is mainly linked to a European Union that speaks with one voice, rather than in a divided manner, in order to allow for coherent and consistent policies. However, these measures are usually perceived as ineffective on the long term and offset with short term ambitions. Issue-specific effectiveness may therefore be understood as the alignment of preferences as a fundamental factor in a coherent policy. This alignment must be carried out horizontally and vertically (Carbone, 2013, p. 342).

### 3.2. The European refugee strategies

The refugee crisis pushed the European Union to adopt emergency measures and manage the issue at both internal and external levels (Niemann & Zaun, 2018). According to Niemann & Zaun (2018), bordering countries are the main concerns of the EU member states migration strategies, most notably Italy and Greece. Internally, the “hotspot strategy” developed in the Dublin regulation

was too controversial since it put all the responsibility on these countries despite their limited capacities (Menéndez, 2016, p. 397). At the opposite end of the spectrum, the relocation and resettlement strategy was also considered in order to relieve border countries from a “disproportionate” responsibility (Niemann & Zaun, 2018). Externally, some agreements and partnerships have been concluded to externalise the crisis and thus decrease EU internal conflicts. EU-Third countries partnerships, for example, were usually the outcome of informal negotiations and had non-binding conclusions (Collyer 2016, p. 610). According to this strategy, migrants that attain EU borders can be subjected to the principle of *refoulement*, meaning that they can be redirected to a third country that is not part of the European Union. The goal is to reduce the burden on border countries like Italy or Greece that are the first stop for many illegal migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea (Klepp 2010, p. 5). Furthermore, the intensification of border controls, including the implementation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) in December 2015, is one of the main initiative of the European Union to relieve border countries. Finally, the EU Trust Funds are qualified by Niemann & Zaun (2018) as being one of the main European strategies to control migration flows to the European Union.

External strategies, the focus of this research, identify a very specific setting of “insiders” and “outsiders” (Collyer, 2016). The European enlargement of 2004-2007 provoked the formation of new interests in EU territoriality, mostly concerning migration in the Mediterranean bordering countries. The geo-strategic concerns of the European Union (insiders) in terms of migration are matching the core “freedoms” desirability of the Third Countries (outsiders), through the exposure to freedom of movement of goods, capital, services, and people. Therefore, according to Collyer (2016), “engagement beyond ‘EU’ rope creates a further distinction since this region will remain ‘outside’ the EU, but at least some of those living there will gradually acquire some of the characteristics of ‘insiders’” (p. 609).

However, this common European external strategy with third countries is not always manageable considering divisions among member states. Indeed, the European Commission is determined to find common solutions with the aim of harmonising migration policies and making them as coherent and effective as possible. However, faced with the urgency of the situation and the lack of consensus within the European Union, the policies that were eventually adopted were particularly chaotic (Niemann & Zaun, 2018). Many extreme-right parties have gained power since the migration crisis of 2014, creating a European internal division between pro-migrant and anti-

migrant advocates (Greenhill 2016, p. 322). Greenhill (2016) describes internal divisions within the European Union as splitting societies “into (at least) two mutually exclusive and often highly mobilized groups: the pro-refugee/migrant camp and anti- refugee/migrant camp” (Greenhill 2016, p.322). The pro-migrant camp may promote a certain financial commitment in order to promote solidarity in an emergency situation. Meanwhile, in the anti-migrant camp, this financial aid would be rejected in order to favour investments in the interest of the state and its locals. Slominski & Trauner (2018) demonstrated that the member states actually “use” the European Union for stronger pooling of operational and financial resources and joint negotiations of return deals. However, they keep their own strategy when it comes to migration integration and social management. Divisions on migration create a collective action problem as some member states adopt a non-cooperative and free-riding behaviour (Slominski & Trauner, 2018, p. 103). Non-cooperative and free-riding behaviours aim at releasing the migratory pressure and include closing border policies or immediate migrants return to the country of origin. Several reasons – cultural, economic, social and political – can explain these divisions but Perkowski (2016) suggests that the coexistence of security and humanitarian discourses in the European Union could be the main reasons for the inconsistency of its migration policies.

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## 4. Theoretical Framework

### 4.1. Theory

As a reminder, the research question is : *What is the nature of the European actorness regarding the refugee strategy in East Africa?*

Bretherton and Vogler argued in 2013 that the actorness of the European Union is no longer as relevant as it was in the past. An evolution of the international context contributed to a decrease in European influence as a global player. My research will, therefore, consist in demonstrating the nature of the European actorness on the Special Issue (Grinsberg, 2001) of the refugee crisis and in the Eastern Africa region. My paper supports that the migration crisis in Europe creates, by its urgent nature, an opportunity for the European Union to empower and reinforce its actorness in Eastern Africa.



The actorness theory has mostly been understood as being “the capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” (Sjöstedt, 1977, p. 16). The theory, based on socio-constructivism, understands the European Union as an actor undergoing an interactive construction process. The theory includes three concepts that construct the actorness: Presence, Opportunity and Capacities. The actorness theory of Bretherton & Vogler (2006) will be particularly useful since it conceptualises global politics as processes of social interaction in which actors engage. These formal and informal processes “shape the evolution of actors identities and provide contexts within which action is constrained or enabled” (p. 19). Hence, the ability to act is not only linked to external opportunities and internal capacities.

Social constructivism underlines the importance of norms and values for an actor. Social structures influence the interests and identities of actors in an interactive process. Institutions creates an international system as they represent the values and norms that are shared by all states. Institutions make it possible for states to find a compromise even if they have different interests (Risse, 2004). In the European Union case, democratic values build a European identity, recognised and legitimised by the perception of external actors. Indeed, as Risse (2004) explained, social constructivism “is a truism that social reality does not fall from heaven, but that human agents construct and reproduce it through their daily practices” (p.160). This theory emphasises the importance of the autonomy and the coherence criteria as a cornerstone for actorness. The autonomy criterion refers to the EU being an independent actor from national interests and recognised as a unit on the international level. The coherence criterion applies to the EU’s ability to formulate coherent policies (Bretherton and Vogler, 2013). The link between actorness and effectiveness is evident in the sense that “a ‘minimal level of coherence’ must be present to enable the EU to act. Hence, actorness logically precedes effectiveness” (Niemann & Bretherton, 2013). I will now explain the three main criteria of the theory of actorness from Bretherton and Vogler (2013).

First of all, the *Presence* aspect “conceptualises the ability of an actor, by virtue of its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders” (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013, p. 376). As I explained previously in the literature review, Allen and Smith (1990) are the first authors who focused on the importance of the factor of presence. They affirm that the analysis of European foreign policy is clear and feasible for measurement. At the same time, EU status and impact in a more normative and constructivist way are “inherently ambiguous” (p. 19). Therefore, the European Union is

characterised, according to Allen and Smith (1990), as having a “variable and multi-dimensional presence, which plays an active role in some areas of international interaction and less active one in others” (p. 20). According to Niemann & Bretherton (2013), Presence is a passive concept manifested “both directly, through the unintended external consequences of internal policies, and indirectly, through the subtle processes of structural power associated with perceptions of the EU’s reputation” (p. 266).

Second, the *Opportunity* aspect “refers to the external context of ideas and events that enable or constrain action” (p. 378). Therefore, the changing external environment that surrounds the European Union would strongly affect, positively or negatively, its influence on the international scene. Bretherton & Vogler (2013) describe two main events as being fundamental to the EU actorness opportunity: the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the mid-1970s and the end of the Cold War. The loss of these two sources of international stability deeply disturbed the EU actorness stability as well. The structure of the international system, therefore, is vital in defining the European actor on a global scale. For instance, the EU was typically enjoying close relations with Africa due to their shared past and structural bond, notably through development aid, trade and partnership agreements. However, China is increasingly claiming a more significant economic role over African countries which automatically leads to a weakening of the European Union’s influence in the region. The Opportunity aspect demands a precise balance of power in favour of the European Union to promote a better actorness on a global scale.

Third and last, the *Capability* concept “refers to the internal context of EU external action (or inaction)” (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013, p. 381) which notes that internal factors are affecting the EU’s ability to capitalise on its Presence and to respond to Opportunity at the external level. This category was introduced by Sjöstedt (1977), who focuses his theory on internal characteristics applied to general external actions. However, this theory is too abstract to operationalise. Therefore, I decided to focus on the Bretherton and Vogler’s (2013) version of the Capability criteria including the Coherence aspect as being a fundamental part of their theory, notably in the formulation of policies as being a key parameter. Coherence can be vertical, horizontal and institutional. Vertical coherence highlights the consistency of bilateral external policies of member states with the European overall global strategy. In my case, this implies that member states must agree on a joint approach regarding European actorness in failed states neighbouring countries. Horizontal coherence refers to “tensions between policy sectors that impede effective policy formulation and

implementation” (p. 383), tensions that underly the importance of the refugee management issue in the European strategy towards failed states neighbouring countries. Institutional coherence is the “Union’s internal policy coordination procedure” (p. 383) that could contribute to effectiveness. However, institutional coherence will not be measured in the analysis conducted in this study considering the limitations of the database. As such, it is essential to specify that the study will consider only a part of the capability criteria and will not, therefore, represent the category in its broader dimension.

## 4.2. Conceptualisation

### 4.2.1. Distinction between political refugees and migrants

To clarify the framework of this study, it is essential to understand what I mean by political refugees. First of all, a migrant designates any person travelling in space who does not intend to return to his country. Indeed, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defines the migrant as follows as any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country in which he was not born and who has acquired significant social ties with this country (2020). According to the UNHCR (2016), it is also important to clarify that migrants choose to leave their country not necessarily because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but to improve their lives by finding work, and in some cases, for reasons of education, family reunification or other. Refugees are a particular category of migrant. It is also a legal category as defined by the 1951 Conventions on the status of refugees. UNHCR explains that “refugees are people who are fleeing armed conflict or persecution” (2016). More specifically, the Geneva Convention stipulates that an individual is considered to have a refugee status if the person fears persecution because of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a certain social group or its political opinions (UNHCR on Geneva Convention, 1951). The European Union has a responsibility to apply the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as other legal texts such as the 1969 OAU Convention on refugees (UNHCR, 2016). These include the assurance of not being sent home in the face of the dangers refugees have fled; access to fair and efficient asylum procedures; and, measures to ensure that refugees’ fundamental rights are respected so that they can live in dignity and security while helping them find a long-term solution.

#### 4.2.2. Distinction between host countries and transit countries

From a purely theoretical point of view, it is easy to distinguish a host or destination country from a country of transit. According to the International Organization for Migration, a country of destination means “a country that is the destination for a person or a group of persons, irrespective of whether they migrate regularly or irregularly” (IOM, 2020). In other works, this definition means that the country of destination is the purpose of the refugee or the migrant coming from another state. In the meantime, a country of transit is treated as “the country through which a person or a group of persons pass on any journey to the country of destination or from the country of destination to the country of origin or of habitual residence” (IOM, 2020). However, the IOM emphasises the ambiguity of this term when applying the theoretical definition to a practical situation. Indeed, the term *transit* implies a temporary process and thus leads to many different interpretations of the duration a refugee can spend in a country of transit before this country would be considered a country of destination. Refugee camps are a particularly relevant example to illustrate this problem. If a Somali refugee flees Somalia and finds himself trapped in a Kenyan camp awaiting a court decision allowing him to continue his journey towards his destination country which can be an EU Member State, then Kenya becomes his country of destination depending on how long the Somali Refugee will stay. For my study, I assume that Europe negotiates with the neighbouring countries of failed states so that they can welcome refugees in a logic of time and integration. The aim of the EU is not to make Ethiopia or Uganda transit countries towards Europe but to find lasting solutions to the European migration crisis. Ethiopia and Uganda are therefore considered to be host or destination countries.

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## 5. Research Design

### 5.1. Epistemology and Ontology

My study is focusing on a descriptive qualitative framework. According to Creswell and Creswell (2018), it is essential to clarify the philosophical worldview proposed in this research. Epistemology can be understood as being the assumptions one make about the kind or the nature of knowledge (Richards, 2003, pp. 33-35). In this study, I will have interpretivism assumptions because it seeks to understand the nature of the actorness of the European Union in EU-third country refugee

partnerships. Therefore, the social world is approached through the understanding of human behaviour as well as subjectivity. The result of the study will produce knowledge by exploring and understanding the social world even if an external reality exists independently of our beliefs and our understanding. Furthermore, ontology is the assumptions one make about the kind and nature of reality and what exists (Richards, 2003, p. 33-35). In this study, ontology is based on a constructionist approach of the world that follows a subjective interpretivist view. Thus, reality is a series of different individual constructions and in the case of this research, construction of European influence.

## 5.2. Qualitative Comparative Case study

To carry out my research, I had to select neighbouring countries of failed states allowing feasible and relevant research on an academic and scientific level. First of all, it is essential to clarify that these neighbouring countries are host or destination countries, and not transit countries as developed in the conceptualisation.

I decided to study the cases of Ethiopia and Uganda being the countries hosting most of the refugees in East Africa (UNHCR, 2018). Furthermore, Uganda and Ethiopia have very similar national logic regarding refugees and tend to adopt progressivists policies. Note that Sudan and Kenya were also considered during the process of selection, but they were eventually excluded because of their strict and protectionist policies towards refugees (Refugees Studies Centre, 2019; Centre for Human Rights Law – SOAS, 2016).

### *Situation in Ethiopia*

Ethiopia is an African country hosting over 109 million inhabitants, according to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2019), which makes it the second-most populous nation on the African continent. Despite its economic and diplomatic influence in Africa, Ethiopia is one of the poorest country in the world (World Bank, 2018). Ethiopia is a relevant case study considering it hosts South Sudanese refugees and a large part of the Somali refugee population (UNHCR, 2018). Ethiopia is the ninth-largest refugee host country in the world, reaching 903'200 refugees in 2018. At the end of 2018, approximately 422'100 South Sudanese refugees remained on the Ethiopian territory, as well as 257'200 Somali refugees. Ethiopia hosts the second highest

number of international migrants in the Africa at mid-year 2019 with 1.3 million according to UN DESA (2019), just behind Uganda.

### *Situation in Uganda*

Uganda is an African country hosting a large refugee population numbering, according to UNHCR (2018), approximately 1.16 millions of refugees at the end of 2018. Most of the refugees in Uganda come from South Sudan with 788,800 South Sudanese refugees at the end of 2018. Uganda hosts the highest number of international migrants in Africa at mid-year 2019 according to UN DESA (2019) with 1.7 million.

#### 5.2.1. Similar National Refugee logic

### *Ethiopia*

According to UNHCR, Ethiopia “maintains an open door policy for refugee inflows and allows humanitarian access and protection to those seeking asylum on its territory” (p.5). Therefore, Ethiopia is one of the most progressive refugee policymaker in Africa, mostly since the Ethiopian parliament adopted revisions to its existing national refugee law on 17 January 2019 (UNHCR, 2020a). The law provides refugees with the right to work and reside out of camps, access social and financial services, and register life events such as births and marriages. Furthermore, the government of Ethiopia has “advocated for stable humanitarian financing, while promoting wider investments in refugees’ self-reliance through an improved and sustainable approach that goes beyond mere care and maintenance and combines wider support to host communities; furthering peaceful coexistence and the greater inclusion of refugees as part of national development plans” (UNHCR, 2020a).

### *Uganda*

Despite the heavy migration burden hanging over the country, Uganda possesses a progressive and inclusive policy towards refugees. The Self-Reliance Model it adopted defines Uganda as an example for the countries of the East Africa region. This unique model is integrative and allows an optimistic projection of the refugees’ conditions in the long run. The BBC (2016b) calls Uganda

“the best place to be a refugee” since it represents, along with Ethiopia, an example to follow for the other countries of destination in East Africa. Uganda adopted in 2017 a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) to proportionally and effectively address the needs of refugees in the country. Also, the 2006 Refugee Act and the 2010 Refugee Regulations “allow refugees freedom of movement, the right to work, establish a business, own property and access national services, including primary and secondary education and health care” (UNHCR, 2020b).

Furthermore, Uganda is planning to adopt a Settlement Transformative Agenda (STA) encouraging a non-encampment policy to refugee protection and assistance. According to the Refugee Studies Centre (2019), the Uganda model has three main elements that distinguish it from other host countries: “First, its regulatory framework: it lets refugees work and choose their place of residence. Second, its assistance model: it allocates plots of land for refugees to cultivate within its rural settlements. Third, its model of refugee-host interaction: it encourages integrated social service provision and market access” (Refugee Studies Centre, 2019, p.2).

#### 5.2.2. Different EU - Third country strategies for refugee management

##### *EU-Ethiopian agreements*


Ethiopia’s cooperation with the European Union is ruled by the Cotonou Agreement signed between the European Union and the ACP countries (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States) in 2000. The EU opened a delegation in Ethiopia in 1975. The EU has been allocating a budget of 2.7 billion to Ethiopia, without taking emergency aid into account. In 2007, the European Commission (EC) and the Government of Ethiopia signed the EC-Ethiopia Country Strategy Paper for 2008-2013 with a total budget of €644 million (European Community, 2009). Ethiopia is one of the largest recipients of aid among Africa, Pacific, and Caribbean countries. In 2019, the EU humanitarian funding for Ethiopia reached €51 million to support people in Ethiopia. This budget includes live-saving assistance to internally displaced people uprooted by violence or natural disasters as well as protection, food aid, safe water, shelter, necessary items, nutritional aid and healthcare, disease prevention, and education (European Commission, 2020a). In addition, the EC established the EUTF fund with a budget of €251 million euros allocated over twelve projects to further help Ethiopia. The EUTF intensified the collaboration between the EU and Ethiopia

(European Commission, 2018). Furthermore, the European Union made a crucial deal with Ethiopia: the MPFs’.

*EU-Ugandan agreements*

Uganda’s agreements with the European Union include humanitarian assistance for refugees in Uganda, up to 33 million euros in 2019 (European Commission, 2020b). This budget addresses the needs of more than one million refugees in Uganda. The rapidly evolving situation in Uganda since 2017 requires effective and rapid emergency assistance. According to the European Commission, the funds “help humanitarian organisations to provide protection, shelter, food assistance, healthcare, access to safe water and sanitation services, and education assistance to refugees and their host communities” (2020). In addition, the European Union encourages the use of the funds to increase “the resilience and self-sufficiency of the most vulnerable people to reduce their dependency on aid in the long-term”, in the logic of the Self-Reliance Model. However, the discussions between Uganda and the European Union are not as advanced as the Ethiopian discussions. The budget allocated to Uganda is not sufficient, considering the very modest capacity that Uganda has in facing this very serious situation. Last but not least, the EU has not concluded agreements as strong as the MPFs’ it established with Ethiopia.

Scheme 1 : Development level of EU-Third countries strategies for refugee management





Scheme 1 intends to project an illustrative explanation of the problematic of my research. It highlights the main differences between Uganda and Ethiopia in EU-Third countries strategies for refugee management. Ethiopia and Uganda have more progressivists policies compared to other countries, as can be seen from their self reliance model. Their model is compatible with European values and tends to welcome the influence and assistance of the European Union and/or the United Nations for their migratory policies. The major difference between the Ugandan and Ethiopian models of refugee policies is that Ethiopia is in a more advanced process of collaboration with the European Union, as shown by the European investments allocated to the two states. The EUTF and Migration Partnership Framework are self-explanatory examples of the European ‘enthusiasm’ for Ethiopia. My research will examine the nature of the European actorness within this context.

### 5.2.3. The Comparative Cases Methodology

I decided to use a comparative case analysis as my methodology in order to describe the European actorness in the bilateral agreements and strategies between the EU and Uganda or Ethiopia. My research is descriptive and, in a larger measure, Hypothesis-generating (Gerring, 2007). The aim of Hypothesis-Generating case studies is to generate an hypothesis linked to the importance of the European Actorness over the developed EU-Third countries agreements over refugees. The cases of Uganda and Ethiopia are apparently quite similar. However, they also show a surprisingly contrasting intensity in the development of EU-Third countries agreements for refugee strategies in East Africa. In order to be transparent in the economical and political choice of cases to be compared, the Table 1 below will summarise the matching patterns between Ethiopia and Uganda.

Table 1 : Matching comparative cases of Uganda and Ethiopia

	<b>Uganda</b>	<b>Ethiopia</b>
Population in million (IMF, 2020ab)	39,8	95,6
Territory in km	241038	1104300
Economical stability		
Nominal GDP (IMF, 2020ab)	30,765	103,607
Real GDP growth (IMF, 2020ab)	6,2	7,2

	<b>Uganda</b>	<b>Ethiopia</b>
Economic Decline in 2019 (Fund For Peace, 2019b)	6.4	6.5
Savings as percent of GDP in 2018 (World Bank, 2018)	18,3	33,17
Uneven Development 0 (high) - 10 (low) in 2019 (Fund For Peace, 2019b)	7	6.5
External interventions index, 0 (low) - 10 (high) in 2019 (Fund For Peace, 2019b)	8.3	8,5
Political stability		
Human Development Index (0-1) in 2019 (United Nations Development Programme, 2019)	0,528	0,470
Factionalised Elites 0 (high) - 10 (low) in 2019 (Fund For Peace, 2019b)	8.9	7.9
Corruption (0=Strong; 100=Weak) (Transparency International)	28	37
Refugees and displaced persons index, 0 (low) - 10 (high) in 2019 (Fund For Peace, 2019b)	9,1	8.7
Human rights and rule of law index, 0 (high) - 10 (low) in 2019 (Fund For Peace, 2019b)	8	8.2
Security apparatus, 0 (low) - 10 (high) in 2019 (Fund For Peace, 2019b)	7,5	8,2
Fragile State Index (low) - 120 (high) in 2019 (Fund For Peace, 2019b)	95,3	99,6
State legitimacy index, 0 (high) - 10 (low) in 2019 (Fund For Peace, 2019b)	8,6	8

Table 1 highlights interesting differences in trends. First of all, in terms of political stability, Ethiopia and Uganda are very similar cases and, therefore, suitable for a comparative approach. However, the economical stability and other general features of the two countries are not necessarily fitting and could biased the research. In fact, the population and the territory area are very different between Uganda and Ethiopia. These two criteria could possibly be indicators of the importance of the country on the global scale. Furthermore, the economical situation, symbolised by the nominal GDP, differs widely between the two chosen cases. Ethiopia is, again, having a more important nominal GDP compare to Uganda.

### 5.3. Operationalisation

I will now carry out the operationalisation of the theory by identifying categories and factors that will constitute an appropriate coding of the data. As I mentioned earlier, I will use the actorness theory of Bretherton & Vogler (2006). In 2013, Bretherton & Vogler developed the importance of the coherence factor in European capability, in the article “A global actor past its peak?”. Vertical, institutional and horizontal coherence are perceived as encompassing the capability criterion. I will keep this simplified variant for my research, incorporating the criterion of coherence as fundamental. The Presence and Opportunity criteria will keep following with the 2006 and 2013 theory. However, it is important to acknowledge the difficulty of analysing the Presence and Opportunity factors, as they overlap. As Bretherton and Vogler (2013) explain, these two categories are closely related since Opportunity could also refer to perceptions. I will, therefore, use the three categories Presence (= C1), Opportunity (= C2) and Coherence (= C3) to measure the European actorness on the strategies adopted in East Africa. I will myself code the different subcategories according to criteria selected in Bretherton and Vogler’s theory (2006; 2013).

#### 5.3.1. Presence

The Presence category is, as explained by Bretherton and Vogler (2013), characterised by the perception of the European Union by the region of East Africa, as well as the expectations they have towards the EU as a global player. Indeed, in the updated version of Bretherton and Vogler ’s theory of actorness, the “presence does not denote purposive external action, rather it is the ability to shape the perceptions, expectations and behaviour of others” (p. 377). The Presence is understood and measured by the external context in the EU-Third Countries partnerships on refugees. I brought

together several essential characteristics of the Presence Category in Table 2, following Bretherton & Vogler’s theory (2006; 2013). The different factors are adapting the actorness theory by Bretherton & Vogler to a national scale in order to measure the theory in the specific countries chosen for the comparative case study.

Table 2 : Categorisation of Presence

Factor 1.1. = Common Values
Factor 1.2. = EU as Economical and Political Power / Leader
Factor 1.3. = Prosperity and Success of the European Partnerships
Factor 1.4. = EU as a major and exclusive regional partner
Factor 1.5. = Internal harmony and unity of the EU

Factor 1.1. refers to the “common values” emphasis on the ability of the European Union to shape shared values between Uganda or Ethiopia and the EU. For example, common values could be democratic principles, the importance of human rights or transparency among others. Factor 1.2. is explicitly referring to the EU adopting a leadership role in some fields that Bretherton & Vogler (2013) would measure through trade or environmental policy leadership. However, in my analysis, it will specifically designate the the leadership of the European Union in the refugee policy area. Factor 1.3. is the perception of "Prosperity and Success of the European Partnerships”, notably concerning refugee policies. Indeed, according to Bretherton & Vogler (2013), success is essential for the Presence Category since “considerable evidence of success would be necessary to change external perceptions of the Union as an essentially civilian power”. Factor 1.4. corresponds to the non-competitive aspect of the partnership. This factor involves that the Ugandan and Ethiopian representatives consider the European Union as a major influence in their region compared to other actors. Finally, Factor 1.5. is very important to Bretherton & Vogler since perceptions of unity and effectiveness also enhance presence (p. 377). In fact, the authors develop an argument on how “perceptions of significant internal divisions can have a deleterious effect” (p. 378), including on the actorness of the European Union.

### 5.3.2. Opportunity

The Opportunity category, in the theory of Bretherton and Vogler (2006; 2013), is linked to the external contextual factor. Opportunity (C2) is closely linked to Presence (C1), as explained earlier, but add the aspect of objective regional stability. While Presence is closely linked to personal perception from representatives of third countries, Opportunity closely relates to the objective setting of events that enables the European Union actorness (2013, p.378). The coding will, therefore, mostly include contextual aspects of the region that correspond to a European Opportunity. Furthermore, I will directly look for European Opportunities in both Ethiopia and Uganda, including European political, economic, non-competitive and interest opportunities. This categorisation is only linked to the European Union Opportunity scheme. In order to cover a sufficiently relevant conjuncture, we will identify the European Opportunity in the East African context as summarised in Table 3 below. The various factors are deduced from Bretherton & Vogler's examples that they use to define a setting of opportunities (pp. 378-381). I will use a simple coding that encompasses different circumstances in order to better understand European Opportunities in Ethiopia and Uganda.

Table 3 : Categorisation of Opportunity

Factor 2.1. = EU's Political Opportunity
Factor 2.2. = EU's Economical Opportunity
Factor 2.3. = EU's Non-Competitive Opportunity
Factor 2.4. = EU's Opportunity of Interests

Factor 2.1. refers to the political stability of the national and regional context. This means that an optimal environment that allows for European opportunities would ideally be a collaborative state that encourages the European influence in the region. Certain aspects such as corruption can be taken into account as well. Factor 2.2. corresponds to encouraging financial investments and projects fitting the globalisation scheme and, most importantly, the "EU external economic relations" (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013, p. 378). Factor 2.3. can be associated with Factor 1.4.. However, a major difference between Factor 2.3. and 1.4. is the subjectivity aspect. Indeed, Factor 2.3. includes a contextual non-competitive opportunity for the EU while Factor 1.4. corresponds to

the perception of the EU as an exclusive partner. Bretherton & Vogler (2013) highlight the possibility that “there has been increased interest in Africa from many quarters, with China engaging particularly proactively” (p. 380), which could reduce the European actorness. Finally, Factor 2.4. corresponds to the shared strategy between the EU and Uganda or Ethiopia on refugee management.

### 5.3.3. Coherence

The Coherence category is included in the capability criteria to incorporate the internal context of the European external action and the way in which policies are formulated. In this research, what matters will be the European partnerships regarding refugee strategies in Eastern Africa. The categorisation of the coherence is consistent with Bretherton & Vogler’s model (2013), i.e. composed of vertical and horizontal coherence. Vertical coherence “denotes the extent to which the bilateral external policies of the member states are consistent with each other and complementary to those of the EU” (p. 382) and will, therefore, include the member states’ agreement with the EU strategy regarding refugees. Horizontal coherence concerns the “tensions between policy sectors that impede effective policy formulation and implementation” which will be measured on Twitter through prioritisation of issues. The prioritisation of the third country policy is important since it gives information about the EU partnerships but also issue-prioritisation on refugees. The categorisation will not take into account the institutional coherence since it concerns the “Union’s internal policy coordination procedures” (p. 383) and, therefore, cannot be measure through a Twitter content analysis. Indeed, the institutional coherence is related to the various European institutions which are not significantly represented with official statements about Eastern Africa on Twitter. The Commission is the only European actor communicating on this matter. Finally, the research will incorporate the availability of policy instruments (EU-Third Countries partnerships) in the Twitter content analysis. Table 4 below summarised the categorisation including the criteria of the actorness theory of Bretherton & Vogler (2013).

Table 4 : Categorisation of Coherence

Factor 3.1. Member States shared strategy with EU on Third Countries partnerships
Factor 3.2. Availability and capability of the partnership
Factor 3.3. Prioritisation of the Third Country as a strategic partner
Factor 3.4. Importance of migration and refugee policies

Factor 3.1. tells about member states' shared strategy with the EU on third countries partnerships' notably concerning the refugee management in the region as well as the predominant European role in this strategy. The agreements between member states on a European strategy and investments would inform us about vertical coherence in the European Union's action. Factor 3.2. involves the availability and capability of the partnership in terms of financial and political possibilities. Factor 3.3. and 3.4. inform us about what the priority of the European Union is in its East Africa strategy and, therefore, add a horizontal aspect to the Coherence category.

This article acknowledges the limitations of the measurement of the Coherence category notably linked to the social media framework that does not permit an elaborate and complete research on the vertical and horizontal coherence. Certain indicators such as silences are not going to be included in the analysis or interpreted as being a sign of agreement or disagreement which restrain the analysis I will conduct. However, I decided to adapt this category according to the operationalisation performed earlier in the study. Nevertheless, this category should be taken very particularly with precautions by the reader and will not generate any hypothesis at the end of the research considering the important limitations restricting the conclusions. I decided to include this category to the analysis to have a comprehensive approach of the Bretherton & Vogler (2006; 2013) theory of actorness even if it contains meaningful limitations.

#### 5.3.4. Standardisation of the Categories

The standards of the categories and factors will be like the following depending on the coding scheme (see Table 5): HIGH; RELATIVELY HIGH; NEUTRAL; RELATIVELY LOW; and, LOW. Each factor is going to be discussed individually in the first place in terms of content and "tone" of the tweets. It will then open a broader discussion on the main categories (C1, C2 and C3). I decided

to include the tone of the tweets for the Presence and Coherence categories given that both categories are subjective in their nature. Indeed, Presence incorporates perceptions and expectations from third parties of the European Union (Bretherton & Volger, 2013). Coherence refers to shared commitment and prioritisation, which both relate to subjectivity. Consequently, the tone of the tweets matters to comprehend sarcasm, enthusiasm, skepticism, indifference or negativity. The tone will give the research an additional necessary outlook, thus allowing a complete analysis of the Presence and Coherence categories (C1 and C3). Strauß & al (2015) supports that the tone used in social medias define a sentiment in online communication that could be categorised as being positive, neutral or negative (p. 371). I will analyse the tone according to the general tendency of the tweet but also according to the linguistics used by the authors of the tweets. The categorisation of the tone are going to be based on Strauß & al (2015) identifying positive, neutral and negative tones.

Table 5: Analysis standards criteria

Standards	Frame
HIGH	(C) is highly represented and there is positive ton
RELATIVELY HIGH	(C) is highly represented but there is no signs of positive ton
RELATIVELY LOW	(C) is low represented but there is no signs of negative ton.
LOW	(C) is low represented and there is negative ton
NEUTRAL	There is no (C)

#### 5.4. Qualitative content analysis

In order to conduct my research, I will mainly use textual data for a qualitative content analysis. Each aspect of the actorness theory (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013) will be taken into account according to the operationalisation in the two countries chosen for the comparative study. Content



analysis is defined by Krippendorff (2004a) as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (p. 18).

As previously explained in the Epistemology and Ontology section, I will use an interpretative approach. In the content analysis, I will report the statements and views of the people I study and draw conclusions about the influence of aspects to the EU actorness in our specific context. The goal of the research is to find out the nature of the actorness in the development of EU-Third countries agreements in East Africa. Therefore, I am using a deductive approach as the methodology with a coding process will systematically transform and aggregate the data into units. It will lead to a precise description of the relevant characteristics of the content of interest for this research. The analysis will therefore be thematic: regularities in the corpus will allow to identify typical patterns similar to the coding I introduced in the operationalisation section. According to Krippendorff (2004), techniques used during content analysis must be reliable and above all, they should be replicable. In addition, results must be scientifically valid “in the sense that the research effort is open for careful scrutiny and the resulting claims can be upheld in the face of independently available evidence” (Krippendorff, 2004b, p. 18). The following section will develop the various aspects introduced by Krippendorff (2004).

#### 5.4.1. Reliability, Validity and Generalisability

Ritchie and Lewis (2014) emphasised the importance of reliability and validity in qualitative studies. Reliability is linked to the replicability of a study and validity refers to the correctness or precision of the research aim (Ritchie & Lewis, 2014, pp. 272-273). Thus, when considering the reliability value of my research, the issue of the possible replicability of my study arises. However, qualitative studies are usually unique in their nature. Therefore, I will use during the qualitative content analysis a systematic and transparent data selection process, as well as a comprehensive analysis referring to Appendixes permitting the reader to verify my analysis. This will enable interpretation and include multiple perspectives. The validity criteria identified by Ritchie and Lewis (2014) means that all the different parts to a research design are suitable and connected. Advantages and limitations to the qualitative content analysis research will be discussed later in the Qualitative Content Analysis subchapter.

Punch (2013, pp. 122-125) highlights the issue of generalisability especially in the context of case studies. As written before, comparative case study analysis are creating a degree of freedom that

depends on the large number of variables and the limited number of cases (Lijphart, 1971, p. 685). In my research, generalisability is essential to understand as my study follows a Hypothesis-Generating logic. However, considering the specific region of East Africa, it is difficult to generalise the findings from this research to another context. Furthermore, the use of social medias as a tool for measuring the EU actorness has its limitations in terms of generalisability.

#### 5.4.2. Twitter as a Database for Content Analysis Research

To answer my research question, I decided to use an innovative and non-traditional database in academic research: Twitter. Founded by Jack Dorsey and associates in San Francisco in 2006, Twitter was a friend-following medium that became a news medium as well as an anticipatory one (Rogers, 2014). As Rogers (2014) explains, the Twitter microblogging platform increasingly became an emergency communication channel in time of major events. Considering the limited amount of characters (140) allowed by the social platform, “Twitter’s strength lies in the ability to gain interesting insights from short and often highly context-bound messages” (Gaffney & Puschmann, 2014), which allow people to target their statement. In this research, the content analysis method will use the advanced research tool of Twitter that will allow to target the EU refugee policies in Ethiopia and Uganda and the nature of their partnerships.

The formation of a complex follower network with “unidirectional as well as bidirectional connections between individuals” (Weller & al, 2014) leads to a certain visibility and freedom for organisations as well as politicians targeting “personal publics” (Schmidt, 2014). The concept of “personal public” according to Schmidt (2014) is a new type of publicness specific to Twitter as a communicative space. What characterised this type of public is its personal relevance, audience which consists of network tied made explicit and the possibility of conversational mode (p. 4). This is a very useful way for politicians, diplomats to target their electoral audience but more specifically to directly communicate with the public without the interference of newspapers and media interpretations. But it can also be a way for media outlets and newspapers to capture the attention of a broader public. Ahmadian & al (2016) highlight the informal method of communicating through social medias that Donald Trump uses for its statements. Unlike Facebook, Twitter is topic-oriented instead of being socially-oriented. Therefore, Twitter has become a prominent medium for political communication (Ahmadian & al, 2016; Weller & al, 2014). Rogers (2014) supports that Twitter is a credible database for researchers considering the relative ease of the collection and gathering of data and the limited amount of characters lends itself well to textual

analysis (p. 21). Twitter has widely been use by diplomats as well as by politicians and news channels. The qualitative content analysis conducted in this study will consider the Twitter account of politicians (Presence), of news channels (Opportunity) and of diplomats (Presence and Coherence). Therefore, it is essential to contextualise the practices of those specific actors in the context of communication on social medias.

#### 5.4.3. Twitter as a communicative space for various actors

##### *Political communication on Twitter*

Content analysis on social medias is an innovative approach to Political Science in terms of political communication strategy. Recent years have witnessed an increasingly relevant use of social media in a political context. Indeed, Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan (2013) explain that “given the tremendous growth of social media, in particular Twitter and Facebook, social media are increasingly used in political context recently—both by citizens and political institutions" (p. 1278). Tumasjan & al (2011) identify in their study the use of social media like Twitter for the dissemination of politically relevant information. They suggest that microblogging like tweets seems to reflect the political landscape off-line and can be used to predict elections for instance (pp. 407-413). This growing change in communication channels completely shifts the physics of information diffusion (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2013, p. 1277). Consequently, scholars “from a variety of scholarly fields, including humanities, computer science, and health science” are taking this evolution very seriously (Mahrt & al, 2014, p. 407).

##### *News channels communication on Twitter*

My research will analyse the Tweets of News channels such as the Economist, CNN and BBC. Indeed, the Tweets released by the medias usually include a very short description of their main findings or questions followed by a link to the complete article. As Schmidt (2014) explained, Twitter allows to target a different audience that could have not been targeted thought usual conditions of newspaper or traditional medias. It also allows a broader public using social medias as their main source of information. Through the spread of direct and live informations, Twitter is a very important tool for identifying live news events. Jackoway & al (2011) also supports that Twitter presents an interesting source of information if one is able to identify the relevant news to the fake or non relevant news. Indeed, “Twitter presents a massive source of information on current

events, it is an incredibly noisy medium, so automatically selecting which posts (i.e., Tweets) are reliable and interesting for a general audience can be very difficult.” (Jackoway & al, 2011, p. 25), however, the Tweets of news channels have very high chances of being accurate informations verified by journalists investigations. In fact, Moon & Hadley (2014), support the argument of Jackoway & al (2011) by explaining that news organisation can employe Twitter as a news source of information. Their study demonstrated that TV and newspaper rely on Twitter accounts of official sources to gather information.

#### *Diplomatic communication on Twitter*

Strauß & al (2015) develop about different types of communication strategies adopted by the embassies on social medias such as Twitter notably based on interactive, personalised, positive, relevant and transparent communication. According to them, social medias give a lot of opportunities for public diplomacy considering the specific audience, or ‘personal publics’ described by Schmidt (2014). Su & Xu (2015) introduced a new form of public diplomacy called the “twitplomacy” where actors such as government, state, NGO’s or individuals can engage in digital diplomacy through social medias to release diplomatic news. Su & Xu (2015), indeed, distinguished three types of twitplomacy dealing with diplomatic organisation of state, international government organisation and individuals involve in the diplomatic sector (p. 19). What makes Twitter as being a very interesting information spreading channel for diplomates is the instant live communication, the more convenient and open activities of Twitter and the nuclear diffusion effect including “continuous commenting and forwarding by the connected fans” (Su & Xu, 2015, p. 19). However, as Strauß & al (2015) concluded from their research, embassies are not using this interactive communication style allowed by social medias such as Twitter.

#### 5.4.4. The relevance of Twitter as an analysing tool for the Actorness theory

The actorness theory supported by Bretherton & Vogler (2006; 2013) has not been measured with social media tools. No research has attempted to link actorness to Twitter. However, as Sjöstedt explains, the European actorness is an active process linked to the capacity of an actor in relation to other actors (1977, p. 16). Furthermore, it is an interactive process (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p. 19) that questions the political engagement of both parties. Twitter could be a questionable tool for this research considering its narrowed context. Yet, it allows for political statements on an

interactive platform. My research using Twitter as a tool for conducting a qualitative content analysis is relevant given that social medias “affects the beliefs, values, and attitudes of people, as well as their intentions and behaviors” (Lai, 2015). Twitter enables politicians to engage people in their actions.

The actorness theory includes the Presence, Opportunity and Capacity categories (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; 2013). Twitter is a relevant tool for measuring the Presence of the European Union in East Africa since it will consider the accounts of officials from Uganda and Ethiopia. As Ahmadian & al (2016) explain, Twitter has recently began to be a good tool for politicians to communicate with the world by avoiding journalists’ interventions. Twitter has raw data that is a suitable way of understanding the Ugandan and Ethiopian perceptions and expectations of the European Union as a global actor. The Opportunity aspect is a category contextualising the region in order to deduce the actual opportunity of the European Union within this specific context as a global actor (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; 2013). The use of an external viewpoint is, therefore, necessary to have a broader perspective on the regional context. The research will use newspapers and tweets about the regional context in order to understand the dispositions of the European Union. The use of Twitter for analysing the last category, Coherence, is less evident. Indeed, the Capability/Coherence refers to the internal context of the European external action (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013, p. 381). This internal context is mostly concerning the European actors such as the European institutions and member states’ cooperation and instrument capacity. However, I decided to include this category acknowledging this limitation by adapting the coding to the social media usage. The European Commission tweets as well as the member states’ accounts are going to be analysed to understand if the European Commission and member states have a shared strategy in Uganda and Ethiopia, in light of their prioritisation, cooperation and instruments capacity.

#### 5.4.5. Advantage and Limitations of the Content Analysis on Twitter

According to Krippendorff (2004), there are several advantages for qualitative content analysis research. First of all, it is an unobtrusive technique which guarantee a certain validity. Second, it can handle unstructured data as the researcher is doing a deep analysis of the data. Third, content analysis is context sensitive and, therefore, allows the researcher to process significant texts. Furthermore, despite the novelty of this research, content analysis can still cover different types of documents. My sample is composed of tweets which are a non traditional type of data, so content

analysis is the most appropriate option since it gives more freedom than a discourse analysis for instance. As Bengtsson (2016) points out, “content analysis can be used on all types of written texts no matter where the material comes from” (p. 10). Finally, Mayring (2004) supports the argument that the systematic nature of this method renders the procedure “transparent, intelligible, easy to learn and readily transferable to new research questions” (p. 269).

My research on Twitter, in particular, will allow an innovative type of content analysis based on the importance of new technologies. Advantages in light of my research question are diverse. First of all, Twitter communication scheme allows for gathering raw data and to manually analyse representing officials’ viewpoints on a non-official topic-oriented platform. Considering the lack of officials statements from Ugandan and Ethiopian representatives but the huge quantity of information on Twitter, this database seems quite suitable. Therefore, social networks seem to be the best alternative since they “show alternate ways to make sense of user practices, social norms, and power relations as they play out on Twitter, and throughout the digital world” (Marwick, 2013, p. 8). Second of all, the information is available, actualised and targeted. This will lead us to gathering time-specific and topic-oriented statements on the European Union.

However, there are limitations to a qualitative content analysis. For example, there is the evident limit of textual data. Content analysis is assuming that the data collected for the research will be sufficient proof for establishing a causal relationship. Nevertheless, other data could lead to conclusions that differ from the research I am conducting. Indeed, the Twitter database is limited in terms of quantity which could bias the conclusions. However, because I am performing a descriptive study, there is no need for establishing a causal relationship but rather a need to understand a concept within a specific type of study and a particular context. Also, certain language bias such as sarcasm or irony could corrupt the result. This limitation can be solved by performing a deep qualitative content analysis that will take into consideration suspected irony and sarcasm that could compromise the results. Again, this is the advantage to a limited amounts of tweets: it privileges quality over quantity. Another meaningful limitation I should take into account is the precision of the analysis. According to Krippendorff (2004b), precision has to do with the “ability of a researcher to handle an usually clumsy search engine with its considerable limitations” (p. 333). In other words, the error of using search terms is irrelevant here but constitute a possible limit action to the results. Indeed, this can especially be a problem in computer analysis based on a quantitative approach, but again this research involves a qualitative gathering of data. However, the

selection of “keywords” and “hashtags” could deepen this limitation since it is not covering a wide range of data. In addition, this study only considers Twitter as a representation of social reality. This can be criticised since it does not include informal aspects or more in-depth information that could be gathered in another type of data such as interviews. Nevertheless, this study is a description of the nature of actorness in social medias and, therefore, have the only purpose of describing the social reality in social media. Since my research is of the Hypothesis Generating type, I will later in this paper suggest future research prospects using another type of data for an explanatory study.

To carry out this research in a feasible way, taking into consideration the time limit, the practical capacities made available to Master students as well as the structure of the thesis, I will select an appropriate sample size. I will therefore establish a structured and relevant procedure for my analysis by following the advice of Bengtsson (2016) on the different steps to follow. These steps are going to be performed several times during the research in order to “maintain the quality and trustworthiness of the analysis” (Bengtsson, 2016, p. 11). The first step is the “Planning process” and considers that “it is essential to begin by clarifying what the researcher wants to find out, from whom and how”. The second step consists of the Data Collection. Finally, the last step is the Data Analysis (Bengtsson, 2016, p. 9).

#### 5.4.6. The planning process

First, the “aim” of my analysis is to identify the nature of the coding units for the European actorness, using the Presence (C1), Opportunity (C2) and Coherence (C3) on Twitter regarding EU-third countries agreements on refugees in Eastern Africa, specifically in Uganda and Ethiopia. Thus, the subject treated in the text matters (Mayring, 2004). Regarding the “sample and units of analysis”, the sample will consist of tweets from the Twitter platform through the coding scheme established in the Operationalisation section. In addition, “the choice of data collection method” is one of the main reasons that led me to choose a comparative content analysis because this method is very flexible and allows the study to understand the human condition in different contexts as well as in a specific situation. I chose a qualitative method as the “analysis method” for my content analysis. However, the techniques of content analysis are mainly understood as being quantitative, meaning that facts stated in a text are presented in the form of frequency and expressed by figures (percentage for example). A quantitative content analysis summarise a result instead of reporting a deep and detailed analysis that could lead to elaborate interpretations as in a qualitative content

analysis. This is why I decided to use a manifest qualitative content analysis which will lead to more interesting results given my constructivist approach. The reasoning is deductive since I start from the theory of Bretherton and Vogler (2013) and therefore has a predetermined framework which will be tested during the analysis.

## 5.5. Data Collection and Selection

In terms of content, according to Gaffney & Puschmann (2014), the Data Collection can be performed in many ways “from Web-based analytics services that combine collection, analysis, and visualisation, to directly mining the Twitter API and interpreting the data using a dedicated statistics package” (p. 55). In my study, the content of the tweets will be analysed by the classic advanced research tool of Twitter combining different factors such as “Hashtags”, “Keywords”, “Accounts”, “Engagement” or “Dates”. This tool will not allow me to analyse an important number of data. However, considering the complex framework of the actorness theory, I will need to use this manual tool. Indeed, the study will take into account the content of the tweets as well as the tone used and the illustrations that accompany the statements. Such a qualitative approach will only be possible through a manual selection of tweets allowing freedom and room for manoeuvre. The limitations of this study will undoubtedly be linked to the number of tweets included in the analysis and the representativeness of the database but, as argued previously, this choice was made for a better quality of the study.

Concerning the experimental material, I have selected multiple tweets originating from different contexts and users to review each categories of actorness individually. Indeed, each category (C1, C2, C3) are exclusive and, therefore, require a specific examination. Furthermore, six databases are selected, each containing from 25 tweets to 30 tweets and thus totalling 160 tweets for the comparative case study. Content analysis is a flexible approach (Bengtsson, 2016). The “corpus” will be selected based on several criteria. To determine the material, I am going to consider the following points, that Mayring (2004) emphasises. In brief, the volume of corpus material as defined in its entirety; the selected samples established according to consideration of economy and representativeness; the samples selected according to a particular model. The design that was chosen for gathering the sample is “quota sampling” where information is filtered from the population through the criteria determined by the needs of C1, C2 or C3 and the availability of data. The samples are selected according to three main criteria:



- **Time period:** 2015 - 2020
- **Scope and Purpose:** EU-third countries agreements on refugee for C1, C2 and C3
- **Twitter accounts:** Targeted Relevant Users depending on C1, C2 and C3

I decided to frame the time period from 2015 to 2020 since the first main EU-Ethiopia/Uganda agreement over refugee management, the EUTF, was concluded that year at the Valetta Summit. The study will be conducted until 2020 to have a broader perspective on the three categories. Therefore, the study will observe the nature of the actorness during this specific timeframe. As explained earlier, the goal of this study is to generate an hypothesis which emphasises the need for actual data to measure over time. The criteria for the selection of the tweets also force the study to include a larger timeframe to include a larger number of tweets in the analysis.

The data collection is going to be manual and purely based on a qualitative initiative. Hence, there will be no use of a quantitative computer analysis but only a qualitative study based on the researcher standards. Qualitative research will avoid major bias that is often encountered in quantitative analysis such as language subtleties, sarcasm/irony or citation from other actors. The discussions will refer to Table Appendixes and occasionally quote direct tweets to avoid a useless use of space. As mentioned previously, a total of 160 tweets are going to be analysed. The study acknowledges that the selected data is not a representative sample of all probabilities and can, therefore, be biased. Furthermore, several quotes gathered in the Appendixes can overlap between the different factors.

#### 5.5.1. Data Selection of the EU Presence

In order to understand the nature of the Presence category (C1), I will distribute the tweets between Ugandan and Ethiopian representatives with 30 tweets for each one of these two countries. The tweets will originate from various accounts and will be 60 tweets in total. The strategic selection of the accounts follows this pattern:

- **For Uganda:** President (@KagutaMuseveni), Prime Minister (@RuhakanaR), Foreign Affairs Ministry (@UgandaMFA), Official Government Communication (@UgandaMediaCent)
- **For Ethiopia:** Prime Minister (@AbiyAhmedAli), Foreign Affairs Ministry (@mfaethiopia)

The Twitter accounts are selected from government representatives. Ethiopia does not include the Twitter account of its President or government communication office, considering there were no

relevant signs of EU actorness in this specific issue on these accounts. Several hashtags and keywords will narrow down the database: EUTF; Refugees; EU; Partnerships; and, Migration. Indeed, the choice of the keywords and hashtags are fundamental to narrow down the database. The keywords “EUTF” or “Partnerships” allow to collect data specifically related to an EU-third country partnerships for development aid. The keywords “Refugees” and “Migration” are topic-oriented to the issue of migration. These four keywords are ONLY relevant IF the European Union is represented in the Tweets considering it is the main criteria to measure the European Presence in the region.

### 5.5.2. Data Selection of the EU Opportunity

To understand the nature of the Opportunity category (C2), the Twitter accounts of a few major newspapers enable a contextual approach to the European opportunities required to measure the actorness of the European Union. Newspapers and journalists’ viewpoints allow for an external observation of the regional context based on journalists’ investigations. UNHCR official Twitter account will also be included to include the perspective of an international organisation specialised in refugees. The following Twitter accounts are strategically targeted and selected:

- UNHCR : @UNHCRUganda / @UNHCREthiopia
- The Economist (@TheEconomist)
- CNN International (@cnni)
- BBC (@BBCWorld)


The news Twitter accounts are from Great-Britain and the United States to conduct an analysis in English. However, the selected hashtags and keywords are more flexible than for the Presence category (C1) and mainly directed to a broader collection considering the importance of a broader context. Therefore, countries’ names are the first key words used to build the database (Ethiopia; Uganda). The database is then narrowed down by the following keywords: Refugees; Migration; Economy. Yet, these three keywords are not necessarily used in every case, to narrow the database.

### 5.5.3. Data Selection of the EU Coherence

To cover the nature of the Coherence category (C3), I will not use pre-selected Twitter accounts. This particular category is demanding a broader selection of representatives than the other two. The Coherence category is at the level of member states, their shared commitment, and policy

coordination: the Twitter accounts selection needs to be flexible. Consequently, the database selection is mainly going to be targeting specific hashtags and keywords in Ethiopia and in Uganda at the first level, like: EU; Partnership; Refuges; Migration. At a secondary level, I am selecting the database depending on the Twitter accounts according to the following criteria: Official Twitter accounts of European political representatives (EU, member states and/or delegations in Ethiopia and Uganda).

Scheme 2 : The Data Selection logic



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## 6. Analysis

The following sections will attempt to estimate the nature of the European Presence, Opportunity and Coherence in Ethiopia and Uganda. Each factors will be regarded according to the operationalisation conducted previously in the study. The data collection is selected according to scheme 1. Each country will be discussed considering the Factors and the overview of the analysis, leading to a more comprehensive discussion of the comparative case study at the end of the section.

### 6.1. The Presence Category (C1)

#### 6.1.1. The European Presence in Ethiopia

I will now analyse the Presence category (C1) in Ethiopia on 30 Tweets from the Ethiopian foreign ministry (@mfaethiopia) and the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali (@AbiyAhmedAli).

Regarding Factor 1.1. 'Common Values', the EU and Ethiopia agreed on shared values concerning the protection and control of migration flows as well as poverty reduction and peace in the Eastern African region. Besides, there are some references to the topic of security and climate change. Overall, the tweets mainly relate to agreements between EU-Third countries reflecting Ethiopia's enthusiasm for European values. The Factor 1.2. 'EU as Economical and Political Power / Leader' is less present than Factor 1.1. however, there are some significant signs such as "the responsiveness of the @EUCouncil and @EU\_Commission to the emerging support needs of the continent" (see Appendix 1 : 3 April 2020 at 10:26 AM; @AbiyAhmedAli). Factor 1.2. being less significant than Factor 1.1. could be explained by the fact that Ethiopia does not consider the European Union as a dominant power but as an equal partner (see Factor 1.2. in the Appendix 1). However, the European Union is definitely perceived by the Ethiopians as a credible global and regional player and taken very seriously by the Ethiopian representatives. The Factor 1.3. representing the 'Prosperity and success of the European Partnerships' is present. However, it particularly stresses the importance of the strength and progress of the partnerships but not of the European Union itself. This is an interesting feature considering that the Factor 1.4. of the 'EU as a major and exclusive regional partner' is very significant in the tweets analysed (see Factor 1.4. in Appendix 1). The cooperation with the European Union is fundamental to Ethiopian officials in a logic of partnership based on mutual and egalitarian respect. The European Union is, therefore,

perceived as a responsible actor and a credible actor. Finally, Factor 1.5. is the least significant of the elements in the Tweets analysed with approximately five references (see Factor 1.5. in Appendix 1). The Factor 1.4. represents the ‘internal harmony and unity of the EU’. This factor is hardly noticeable probably considering the bilateral character of partnerships which assumes an internal unity of the European actor as indisputable.

### *The tone of the Tweets*

Overall, the EU Presence by Ethiopian officials is HIGH. Only 6 Tweets out of 30 were qualified as neutral considering the ton, there are no negative ton Tweets and therefore 24 positive ones. In a more linguistic matter, various language indicators demonstrate a HIGH Presence of the EU in Ethiopia: “Strong & Successful Partnership” (See Appendix 1 : 8 October 2015 at 10:33 AM; @mfaethiopia), “W’re grateful that #EU expressed its interest” (See Appendix 1 : 31 May 2016 at 6:20 PM; @mfaethiopia), “#Ethiopia is desirous of enhancing partnership with all #EU organs” (See Appendix : 14 January 2016 at 8:05 AM; @mfaethiopia). These examples are referring to three Tweets but others also include words such as ‘welcomes’, ‘committed’, ‘ready to work’, ‘meaningful’, ‘warmly received’, ‘appreciating’ among others.

### *Concluding comments*

The analysis demonstrate a strong partnership between Ethiopia and the EU. The area of migration has the highest priority compared to other areas of partnership. The partnerships between Ethiopia and the European Union are valuable from the Ethiopian side and based on mutual respect. Ethiopia is supporting the European priorities and implement EU values in their strategies. Consequently, the European Presence (C1) in Ethiopia is qualified as HIGH based on the content analysis realised on Twitter.

#### 6.1.2. The European Presence in Uganda

I will now analyse the European Presence (C1) in Uganda among 30 Tweets from the Ugandan Foreign Ministry (@UgandaMFA), The Government of Uganda's Official centre for Public Communications (@UgandaMediaCent), the Prime minister of Uganda (@RuhakanaR) and the President of Uganda (@KagutaMuseveni).

The European Union possesses 'Common Values' with Uganda (Factor 1.1.), however, they are mostly based on economical issues and not on migration issues. The EU is perceived as an economical power and as a potential investor for Ugandan projects for development rather than a normative power. There are 3 quotes referring to the refugee issue in the 30 Tweets analysed (See Appendix 2). The other topics are mostly covering economy. For instance, the Ugandan Prime Minister emphasizes on the importance of “promoting trade and investments and expanding the EU market for our products, to create jobs and improve livelihoods” (see Appendix 2 : 9 March 2020 at 10:49 AM; @RuhakanaR). Furthermore, the Factor 1.2. ‘EU as Economical and Political Power / Leader’ is present in the Tweets but again, the European Union is perceived as being an economical power rather than a values implementer. The ‘support’ of the European Union is appreciated by the Ugandan officials (see Appendix 2), however, this support is not exclusive. Indeed, the partnership between the European Union and Uganda is often compared to other economical powers such as China and India in the Tweets. The President of Uganda enjoys the “strong links with partner countries like China, the EU among others” (See Appendix 2 : 5 December 2019 at 8:36 PM; @KagutaMuseveni). The Factor 1.3. ‘Prosperity and Success of the European Partnerships’ and the Factor 1.5. ‘Internal harmony and unity of the EU’ are not referred in the Tweets. But the EU as being a major and responsible player is important (see Factor 1.2.2. in Appendix 2). However, the EU is mostly an economic major and responsible player rather than a normative one. This factor is mostly referred from the partnership between the EU and Uganda at the financial level and does not reflect a real cooperation. The tweets are referring to a ‘one way’ partnership based on a unilateral decision making process dominated by the Ugandan side. The European Union is expected to furnish financial capacities and investments to Uganda.

### *The tone of the Tweets*

Globally the Tweets are mixed between negative (13 Tweets), neutral (6 Tweets) and positive (11 Tweets) tones. Considering there are mostly negative tweets, the Presence is categorised as LOW. The Government of Uganda's Official Centre for Public Communications is very negative towards the EU and notably qualifies the EU as being an undisciplined actor with no real political influence over the Ugandan decision making process. The hashtag #UgandaDecides in particular emphasizes on this tendency. The President of Uganda is using sarcasm when qualifying the EU as prioritising the ‘wrong interest’ instead of promoting the economy. The President of Uganda shows his in-

satisfaction regarding the European prioritisation “I thank the EU for their support to our roads sector but they do more in supporting Uganda’s general economic development” (See Appendix 2 : 10 May 2017 at 4:16 PM; @KagutaMuseveni). The linguistic indicators are showing negative characteristics notably emphasising on the Ugandan power in their country and commending the European Union in their strategy rather than the opposite: ‘takes objection’, ‘emphasis the need’, ‘we told’, ‘I appeal’, ‘we don’t agree’, ‘we ask’. Therefore, the partnerships are based on a one-way strategy in the advantage of Uganda rather than in the advantage of the EU according to the Tweets analysed of the Ugandan representatives.

### *Concluding comments*

The partnership between the European Union and Uganda is mostly based on non exclusive, non equal and non binding agreements that allow a certain freedom to Uganda. The President does not hesitate to manifest his in-satisfaction with the European attitudes and demands for more financial investments in the region. Globally, we can observe a concrete rejection of the European power in the country based on different priority interests and resentment from the Ugandan part. The European Presence (C1) in Uganda is qualified as LOW based on the content analysis realised on Twitter.

### 6.1.3. Discussion

Considering the analysis conducted for the European Presence (C1) in Ethiopia and Uganda, there is very contrasting features comparing EU Presence in both countries. A significant difference is the interest of the Third countries for EU. Uganda is enjoying EU economic power while Ethiopia is benefiting from EU as an economical and political power. A second significant different is the nature of the partnerships. In Uganda, the partnerships are non balanced, non exclusive and unilateral profiting for Uganda mostly rather than for both parties. In Ethiopia, the partnerships are balanced, exclusive and bilateral for both parties based on respectful and mutual cooperation. Generally, Uganda is not completely satisfied with EU-Uganda partnerships while Ethiopia is satisfied and promoting deeper diplomatic relationships. Uganda tends to use more sarcasm and negative vocabulary compare to Ethiopia having an enthusiastic and positive attitude towards the EU. The Table 6 below summarise the significant differences regarding the coding scheme of the research :

Table 6 : Summary of European Presence in Ethiopia and Uganda

	<b>EU Presence in Ethiopia</b>	<b>EU Presence in Uganda</b>
Factor 1.1.1. Common values	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Common values on every mentioned domains (migration, development, climate change, peace, security)</li> <li>- Agree with EU strategies</li> <li>- EU has a normative influence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Common economical interest</li> <li>- No European normative power</li> <li>- No interest in EU refugee strategies</li> </ul>
Factor 1.1.2. Economical and Political Power / Leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU as a political power</li> <li>- EU as an economical power</li> <li>- Necessity of European support</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU economical power</li> <li>- Financial investor</li> <li>- Financial competitiveness with China / India</li> <li>- No major Political Influence on Ugandan decision making</li> </ul>
Factor 1.1.3. Global and Regional Credibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Political credible actor</li> <li>- Use of respectful and enthusiastic language</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No significant Political credibility observed</li> <li>- Economically credible actor</li> <li>- Use of sarcasm</li> </ul>
Factor 1.2.1. Prosperity and Success of the European Partnerships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strong, successful and excellent partnership</li> <li>- Demand for deeper engagement in the partnership</li> </ul>	No signs of Factor 1.2.1.
Factor 1.2.2. Major Regional Partner	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Importance of the partnership as exclusive, bilateral and equal</li> <li>- High demand for cooperation from both sides</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Non balanced, non exclusive and unilateral partnerships</li> <li>- High demand from the Ugandan side for EU's investments</li> </ul>
Factor 1.2.3. EU Internal Harmony and Unity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Including the EU Commission, EU Council and EU Member States</li> <li>- Assuming internal harmony</li> </ul>	No signes of Factor 1.2.3.

The Table 6 highlight the contrasting tendencies of Ethiopia and Uganda regarding the European Presence. EU has a HIGH Presence in Ethiopia while EU has a LOW Presence in Uganda.



## 6.2. The Opportunity Category (C2)

### 6.2.1. The European Opportunity in Ethiopia

I will now analyse the European Opportunity (C2) in Ethiopia among 25 Tweets collected from Twitter accounts of popular news channels as well as the UNHCR : @cnni, @BBCWorld, @UNHCREthiopia, @TheEconomist.

The Factor 2.1. 'EU's Political Opportunity' is mainly highlighted by signs of progress to a democratic political system with the respect of female inclusion in high political positions (president, supreme court chief, ministerial posts). The end of the war with Eritrea is also a sign of political peace. The positive attitude towards refugees encourage as well European political opportunity in the country as well as the progressive initiatives towards medias. Concerning the Factor 2.2. 'EU's Economical Opportunity', transportation innovations like the "first metro system in sub-Saharan Africa" (see Appendix 3 : 14 October 2015 at 7:30 PM; @cnni) creates better opportunities for Europe since the country is economically developing encouraging European investments. Furthermore, the phone network is also progressing towards broader communication opportunities. Common projects between the European Union and Ethiopia investments based on better conditions for refugees are supporting the democratic model and therefore, the European opportunity. The third Factor 1.3. 'EU Non competitive opportunity' questions the European exclusivity access to Ethiopia through trade deals as well as political, humanitarian and diplomatic ones. In this case, the result are controversial considering the high investment of EU in humanitarian deals (refugees) but not necessarily in the trade sector. Indeed, China seems to have a bigger influence on that matter. Finally, the last Factor 1.4. 'EU's Opportunity of Interests' is very high. The result of our previous category analysis (C1) already gave probabilities of this outcome, however, it is further confirmed in this contextual analysis with the importance of Gender Equality notably as well as the promotion of refugees rights.

#### *The content of the Tweets*

The linguistic used by the newspaper is less relevant considering the journalists are suppose to have a neutral and objective approach to the situation. However, some content are more incline to correspond to positive or negative news in the country. For example, there is 7 Tweets with negative

content in the text corpus. They are mostly concerning protests against the government and accusation of low transparency in the treatment of protesters. For example, in 2017, “Ethiopia rejects UN investigation over protest deaths” (see Appendix 3 : 18 April 2017 at 11:58 AM; @BBCWorld). Furthermore, there is, according to certain Tweets, high risk of conflict in the country notably based on ethnical reasons. Nevertheless, most of the Tweets analysed demonstrate positive news linked to the promotion of gender equality, innovation, peacetime, or positive refugees initiatives. For instance, the Prime minister Abiy Ahmed Ali got the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 “for his work in ending a 20-year-war with Eritrea” (See Appendix 3 : 11 October 2019 at 11:53 AM; @cnni).

### *Concluding comments*

The newspaper approach to Ethiopia’s context brings a very interesting overview of the stability of the country. Indeed, the analysis highlighted the contrasting popularity of the Ethiopian leaders internationally praised but internally contested. The European Opportunity (C2) in Ethiopia is qualified as RELATIVELY HIGH based on the content analysis realised on Twitter. There is mostly signs of HIGH European opportunities in the country (18 positive Tweets), however, 7 negative Tweets doesn’t allow a HIGH level of C2. Therefore, we categorise C2 as being RELATIVELY HIGH.

#### 6.2.2. The European Opportunity in Uganda

I will now analyse the European Opportunity (C2) in Uganda among 25 Tweets collected from Twitter accounts of popular news channels as well as the UNHCR : @cnni, @BBCWorld, @UNHCRUganda, @TheEconomist.

Considering the Factor 2.1. ‘EU’s Political Opportunity’, it mainly concerns the positive attitude of the Ugandan government towards the refugees crisis considering the economical circumstances of the country. The President is personally attending events in favour of refugees and improving the refugee’s life in the country through several health care and educational initiatives (see Appendix 4). The second Factor 2.2. ‘EU’s Economical Opportunity’ is also present in the analysis and generally include technology progress in transport and energy, for example “Uganda has unveiled Africa’s first solar-powered bus” (see Appendix 4 : 15 February 2016 at 3:22 PM; @cnni).

Furthermore, as I mentioned before, the investments in the Health care system for refugees and the education is also a good economical progress considering the inclusion of the refugees in the society. There is no sign of Factor 2.3. 'EU's non-competitive Opportunity'. This could be explained by the restricted amount of Tweets selected that does not allow a complete analysis of the different factors but the study will assume that it signify that there is more competition in this country which lower the EU's opportunity framework. The last Factor 1.4. 'EU's Opportunity of Interests' is also mainly covering the refugee area. There is no other common interest observed between the EU and Uganda. However, there is a lot a diverging interests observed in the analysis like LGBTQ's rights. It seems that Uganda's government is very repressive towards the LGBTQ community and, in that sense, have different interest that the European Union.

### *The content of the Tweets*

The European Opportunity in Uganda is quite negative considering 13 Tweets out of 25 are negatives. Therefore, more than 50% of the content of the Tweets are negative tending the conclusions of the analysis to relatively low opportunity. The majority of negative Tweets concerns the lack of transparency from the Ugandan government promoting non democratic values. The discrimination towards the LGBT community is notably denounced by several parties : “@WorldBank president Jim Young Kim blocked loans to Uganda to take a stand against LGBT discrimination #econpride” (see Appendix 4 : 3 March 2016 at 3:09 PM; @TheEconomist). Furthermore, violent protests against corruption and authoritarian initiatives like taxes imposed on social media use or limiting freedom of press can be observed. Finally, a significant number of Tweets denounce an authoritarian model of political government based on Museveni more than 30 years of power and initiative to suppress the opposition. Indeed, The Economist states that “Uganda's 73-year-old president has a plan to rule forever” (See Appendix 4 : 30 September 2017 at 4:51 PM; @TheEconomist). The positive content are mostly concerning Uganda's progressivist national policies towards refugees represented by UNHCR : “Several mobile companies have since built masts across the region, allowing refugees and locals to get online” (Appendix 4 : 5 July 2019 at 12:35 PM; @UNHCRuganda).

### *Concluding comments*

The newspaper viewpoint gave us interesting aspects of the Ugandan political and economical stability. Concretely, the President of Uganda is controversially perceived by the international as well as the internal level. The European Opportunity (C2) in Uganda is qualified as RELATIVELY LOW based on the content analysis realised on Twitter. There is mostly signs of LOW European opportunities in the country (13 negative Tweets), however, 12 positive Tweets doesn't allow a LOW level of C2. Therefore, we categorise C2 as being RELATIVELY LOW.

#### 6.2.3. Discussion

Considering the analysis conducted for the European Opportunity (C2) in Ethiopia and Uganda, there is contrasting features comparing EU Opportunity in both countries. However, compare to the Presence Category (C1), the difference is not as important. Indeed, the results of the analysis conducted are 'Relative' meaning that the results are not significant to have certified conclusions about the nature of the European Opportunity in both countries. Concretely, at the political level the Ethiopian model is more incline of progress towards democratic model compare to Uganda. For instance, Ethiopia is more progressivist concerning gender equality and peace with neighbourhood countries. But both countries have a positive attitude towards refugees. The EU's Economical opportunities are 'similar' in both countries according to the Tweets analysed. Both countries are investing in innovations in the transport and communication area. Furthermore, there is investments from both sides to promote refugee integration and access to health, education etc. The EU's Non-Competitive Opportunity was difficult to measure considering there was no significant indicators. However, based on our database, Ethiopia is allowing better EU Non-Competitive opportunity in the political, humanitarian and diplomatic sector. The Opportunity of Interests are closely linked to Political opportunities but also include social aspect and values such as LGBTQ rights that are not defended in Uganda which goes against EU values. This could represent a limitation of opportunity. Furthermore, it seems that the freedom of medias are also more restricted in Uganda compare to Ethiopia.

The Table 7 below summarise the significant differences regarding the coding scheme of the research :

Table 7 : Summary of European Opportunity in Ethiopia and Uganda

	EU's Opportunity in Ethiopia	EU's Opportunity in Uganda
Factor 2.1.1. EU's Political Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Female inclusion in high political positions</li> <li>- Signs of peace (end of war with Eritrea)</li> <li>- Promotion of refugee's rights</li> <li>- Progress towards more democratic model (better freedom of press)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ugandan government promoting refugee's rights and access to citizens privileges (Health care, Education, work, voting...)</li> <li>- Ugandan government perceived by international community as authoritarian</li> <li>- Instability of the country (social movement, violent protests, no freedom of press)</li> </ul>
Factor 2.1.2. EU's Economical Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Innovations in Transportation sector</li> <li>- Good communication network</li> <li>- Common EU-Ethiopia investments for refugees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Promotion of new technologies and communication means</li> <li>- Promotion of eco-friendly transportations means</li> <li>- Promotion of equal privileges access to health care and education between Ugandan citizens and refugees</li> </ul>
Factor 2.1.3. EU's Non-Competitive Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU opportunities in political, humanitarian and diplomatic deals</li> <li>- China as a trade actor</li> </ul>	No signs of Factor 2.1.3.
Factor 2.1.4. EU's Opportunity of Interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Gender equality</li> <li>- Promotion of refugees rights</li> <li>- Less limitations to freedom</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Positive and progressivist attitudes towards refugees considering the circumstances of the country</li> <li>- Discrimination against other minorities (LGBT community)</li> <li>- Limited freedom to external informations (tax on social medias, no freedom of press)</li> </ul>

The Table 7 highlight the relatively contrasting tendencies of Ethiopia and Uganda regarding the European Opportunity. EU has a RELATIVELY HIGH Opportunity in Ethiopia while it has a RELATIVELY LOW Opportunity in Uganda.

### 6.3. The Coherence Category (C3)

As explained earlier in the operationalisation section, this analysis will measure a very narrowed part of the Capability theory of Bretherton & Vogler (2006; 2013), ie. the coherence part. Furthermore, the Twitter platform includes very important limitations to take into consideration by the reader when going through the analysis. Indeed, the interpretations of silences will not be examined in this study since there would be too much factors to take into account. This constitute an uncertainty that will be considered when elaborating the discussion as well as the conclusion of the research.

#### 6.3.1. The European Coherence in Ethiopia

I will now analyse the European Coherence (C3) in Ethiopia among 25 Tweets from the European Commission (@EU\_Commission), the president of the European Commission (@vonderleyen), the European Delegation in Ethiopia (@EUinEhiopia), the Former EU Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development (@MimicaEU), The Socialists and Democrats Group in the European Parliament (@TheProgressives), the Danish Ambassador to Ethiopia (@DKamblnAddis), the Italian Directorate-General Development & Cooperation (@cooperazione\_it), the German Embassy Addis Ababa (@GerEmbAddis), the Ambassador of Belgium to Ethiopia & Djibouti (@dumontfrancois3), the Swedish Embassy in Ethiopia (@SweinEthiopia) and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia (@MZZRS).

The Factor 3.1. ‘Member States shared strategy with EU on Third Countries partnerships’ is meaningful in the analysis conducted. Indeed, the European Member States seems to have a common agreement with the European strategy in Ethiopia concerning the partnerships in migration and aid. The Twitter accounts of the Danish, Swedish, Belgium, Italian, German and Slovenia officials accounts demonstrate the tendency of supporting the European Commission in their initiatives for a better management of development aid policy as well as refugee and migration. Several enthusiastic indicators such as “we welcome her historic decision to choose an African

country as her first destination outside EU” (about Ursula Von Der Leyen) (see Appendix 5 : 9 December 2019 at 7:03 AM; @SweinEthiopia) illustrate the Member States support for the EU. Furthermore, several joint EU-Member States programmes and investments are made to support Ethiopia showing mutual trust as well as political and financial commitment from the Member States (see Appendix 5). Finally, there seems to be a shared commitment between the Member States concerning the role of the European Union in migration policies as Karin Poulsen states “My good Nordic colleague @AUAmbAasland speaks on migration at #TanaFroum2019” (see Appendix 5 : 4 May 2019 at 5:27 PM; @DKambinAddis). The Factor 3.2. ‘Availability and capability of the partnership’ is manifested in the Twitter data selected, mostly concerning financial availability and capacity from the European Union to implement project in Ethiopia : “@EU\_Commission adopted yesterday new programmes, with 100 M, to support ongoing efforts to help the most vulnerable people in the Horn of Africa” (See Appendix 5: 29 May 2019 at 12:36 PM; @MimicaEU). There is also indicators of procedure coordination between the EU and the Third Country institution. Several indicators are present concerning EU-AU partnership, EU-Ethiopia partnership and Member States-Ethiopia partnerships : “The shared values and strong partnership between EU and AU/Africa was in focus as president of the @EU\_Commission @vonderleyen visited #Ethiopia and @AfricanUnion this past weekend” (see Appendix 5: 9 December 2019 at 7:03 AM; @SweinEthiopia). In fact, Ethiopia is a very much appreciated strategic partner for the European Union. The Factor 3.3. ‘Prioritisation of Ethiopia as a strategic partner’ is very much present in the analysis. In fact, the European Commission is emphasising a lot on the strength of the EU-Ethiopia partnership: “There could be no better country than Ethiopia for my 1st visit outside the EU. Ethiopia has given hope to an entire continent” (see Appendix 5: 7 December 2019 at 2:48 PM; @vonderleyen). Furthermore, the Factor 3.4. ‘Importance of migration and refugee policies’ is present as well but there is also underlying interests than can be mentioned, notably trade. Despite this, the refugees and migration policies are mostly being the priority for the partnerships in place : “Today EU and Ethiopia signed Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility” (See Appendix 5: 11 November 2015 at 7:46 PM; @MimicaEU).

### *The tone of the Tweets*

Concerning the tone, there is 24 Tweets qualified as being ‘positive’ and one ‘neutral’ which follow the content analysed previously. Indeed, there is a very apparent enthusiasm from the European Union representatives as well as the Member States regarding the partnership with Ethiopia. This

can be explained by a communication strategy from the EU in order to strengthen their influence in the country. For instance, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen qualify herself as being “deeply impressed” by her visit in Ethiopia in two different Tweets and specifying in another Tweet that “there could be no better country than Ethiopia for my 1st visit outside the EU” (See Appendix 5). Finally, several Tweets are referring to linguistic characteristics of the European development aid to Ethiopia as ‘support’, ‘welcome’, ‘partner’, ‘close relationship’ or ‘help’.

### *Concluding Comments*

The ‘Prioritisation of Ethiopia as a strategic partner’ (Factor 3.3.) is more present than the other. This can be explain by the targeted research conducted on Ethiopia partnership with the EU. However, the indicators of this specific factor are highly positive on the tone which gives the study a better understanding of the European horizontal coherence in this specific country. Furthermore, it seems like the European Commission prioritise the refugee policy more than the other one concerning their partnerships with Ethiopia which is positive for the purpose of the research. The Member States seems to be following the European strategy. For the concrete and practical application of the partnership, the EU is financially committed to Ethiopia through aid projects and refugee agreements. The European Coherence (C3) in Ethiopia is qualified as HIGH based on the content analysis realised on Twitter.

#### 6.3.2. The European Coherence in Uganda

I will now analyse the European Coherence (C3) in Uganda among 25 Tweets from the European Commission (@EU\_Commission), the European Delegation in Uganda (@EUinUG), the Former EU Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development (@MimicaEU), the EU Humanitarian Aid account (@eu\_echo), the Head of EU Delegation in Uganda (@APacificiEU), a representative of the Embassy of Belgium in Uganda & South Sudan (@AlexBrecx), the former European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid & Crisis (@StylianidesEU), a representative of Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade in Ireland (@DonalCroninIRL), European Deputy from Italy (@ckyege), a Member of Parliament for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (@HackneyAbbott), the Embassy of Belgium to Uganda & South Sudan (@BelgiumInUganda), the ex-EU ambassador to Uganda (@EUAmbSchmidt).



The Factor 3.1. ‘Member States shared strategy with EU on Third Countries partnerships’ is present in the analysis. Indeed, several accounts from Member States representatives is showing a shared strategy with the European Union concerning their partnerships in Uganda. For instance, Alexandre Brex is a diplomat working at the Embassy of Belgium in Uganda and South Sudan qualifying the European Union role with positive statements : “#Belgium is proud to be part of this timely forum to discuss sustainable partnerships between Uganda and the European Union” (see Appendix 6 : 9 March 2020 at 8:28 AM; @AlexBrex). Furthermore, a representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade in Ireland, Dónal Cronin have the tendency of qualifying the European action as complementary with the Irish one : “bringing our message of solidarity” (see Appendix 6 : 14 April 2015 at 5:17 PM; @DonalCroninIRL). A general observation made is that the representatives of Member States are encouraging the European strategy in Uganda and supporting the Commission. The Factor 3.2. ‘Availability and capability of the partnership’ is present as well since the European Union guarantee a strong support to Uganda concerning the refugee management with financial capacity and program availability : “In agreement with @MimicaEU announced EU’s generous support for the refugee response in #Uganda” (23 June 2017 at 1:08 PM; @StylianidesEU). Uganda seems to be a priority country for the European Union humanitarian projects. Furthermore, the refugees management is the main policy where the partnership is demanded : “We stand together with all countries that offer refuge and protection to #SouthSudanese refugees #Uganda” (See Appendix 6 : 19 June 2018 at 4:24 PM; @StylianidesEU). The Partnership between Uganda and the European Union is also broadly mentioned : “Look forward to work together to continue promoting and strengthening the Uganda-EU partnership” (See Appendix 6 : 19 June 2019 at 2:08 PM; @APacificiEU). The Factor 3.3. ‘Prioritisation of Uganda as a strategic partner’ is important in the analysis. Indeed, as being one of the top country hosting refugees in the region, the EU is concern about the partnership with Uganda : “#Uganda is now #Africa’s leading refugee-hosting country” (See Appendix 6 : 22 June 2017 at 6:28 PM; @MimicaEU). Consequently, the Factor 3.4. ‘Importance of migration and refugee policies’ is very high as well since it is the primary issue discussed between the EU and Uganda in the framework of their partnership.

### *The tone of the Tweets*

The tone of the Tweets are generally positive considering there is 24 Tweets qualified as being positive and one negative which follow the content analysed previously. Most of the Tweets are encouraging Uganda in their positive initiatives for their national refugee management. There is a

lot of highlights concerning the difficult situation of the country qualified as ‘overwhelming’ and the impressive management of the situation by the government in place. Alike Ethiopia, the EU is promoting their ‘support’, ‘protection’, ‘help’, ‘assistance’ among others for the refugee response in the country. Furthermore, several positive linguistic characteristics concerning the EU-Uganda relation can also be observed such as ‘strong partnership’, ‘sustainable partnership’, ‘look forward to work together’, ‘message of solidarity’ for instance.

### *Concluding Comments*

The analyse showed a very important enthusiasm from the European Union in the country. The Member States representatives seems to share a common strategy with the EU and approve the prioritisation of the refugee concerns. Furthermore, the cooperation procedure between the EU and Uganda in term of institutions is encouraging. The financial investments from the European Union in humanitarian projects for the country demonstrate optimistic initiatives. It seems like the EU is trying very hard to invest for this partnership. The European Coherence (C3) in Uganda is qualified as HIGH based on the content analysis realised on Twitter.

### 6.3.3. Discussion

The analysis conducted for the Category Coherence does not show concluding differences between the Uganda and Ethiopia. Indeed, the European Union seemed to have similar strategies in terms of communication. The Member States shared strategy with the EU is absolutely similar in the Tweets studied in the frame of this analysis. Indeed, the Member States representatives are all supporting EU in their strategy with the Third Country partner in particular concerning the refugee policy. However, the Commission is communicating more about Ethiopian and EU partnership compare to Uganda where the Commission is less involve. Most importantly, the EU communication is mainly targeting specific leaders and representatives in Ethiopia such as the President or the Vice-President as being examples for the region. While in Uganda, the EU is generally referring to Uganda’s policies but not to political representatives. This can be explain by the Ugandan representatives perception of the European Union leaders as analyse on the Category (C1) on Presence as negative. Therefore, the diplomatic and political communication is less apparent from the EU as well. Finally, the prioritisation of the Third Country and the refugee strategy is similar in both countries since the EU encourage the EU-Third Countries partnerships for Ethiopia and Uganda. Beside, the refugees

policy are being a major part of their partnerships on the EU side at least. Few Tweets in Ethiopia referred to trade as being an important topic with Ethiopia as well which is interesting considering we observed that the Ugandan representatives are actually the one pushing for an intensification of trade discussion with EU (see analysis on Category Presence (C1)).

Table 8 : Summary of European Coherence in Ethiopia and Uganda

	EU's Coherence in Ethiopia	EU's Coherence in Uganda
Factor 3.1.1. Member States shared strategy with EU on Third Countries partnerships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Member States support for the European Strategy in the Ethiopia</li> <li>- Member States and EU as one actor</li> <li>- Similar Priority on Refugee policies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Member States support for the European Strategy in the Uganda</li> <li>- Member States and EU as one actor</li> <li>- Similar Priority on Refugee policies</li> </ul>
Factor 3.2.1. Partnership coordination procedure with Third Country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Coordination between the Commission and the Member States</li> <li>- Coordination of the various actors involved in humanitarian aid or development aid</li> <li>- Enthusiasm to work with Ethiopian leaders</li> <li>- Commission very involved in Ethiopia</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Coordination between the Commission and the Member States</li> <li>- Coordination of the various actors involved in humanitarian aid or development aid</li> <li>- No specific enthusiasm for Ugandan leaders</li> <li>- Commission less involved in Uganda</li> </ul>
Factor 3.2.2. Availability and Capability of the Partnership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Important financial investments from the EU for the refugees in Ethiopia</li> <li>- Availability of Trust Fund</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Important financial investments from the EU for the refugees in Uganda</li> <li>- Availability of Trust Fund</li> </ul>
Factor 3.3.1. Prioritisation of the Third Country as a strategic partner	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ethiopia as being a very important strategic actor in the region</li> <li>- Ethiopia and EU partnership as necessary and strong</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Uganda as being a very important strategic actor in the region</li> <li>- Uganda and EU partnership as necessary and strong</li> </ul>
Factor 3.3.2. Importance of Migration and Refugee Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Refugees as being the top priority of the EU in Ethiopia</li> <li>- Trade as an interest is also mentioned</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Refugees as being the top priority of the EU in Ethiopia</li> </ul>

The Table 8 highlight the relatively similar tendencies of Ethiopia and Uganda regarding the European Coherence. EU has a HIGH Coherence in both Ethiopia and Uganda.

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## 7. Hypothesis Generating and Future Research Prospects

For further research, the European actorness impact over refugee strategies between Third Eastern African countries and the EU could be an interesting option. In a general matter, the *independent variable* would be the European actorness and the *dependent variable* would be the refugees strategies and management in Eastern Africa.

The cases of Uganda and Ethiopia are apparently quite similar but demonstrate the surprising contrasting outcome of intensity development on EU-Third countries agreements for refugee strategies in the East African region as demonstrated in the descriptive study conducted. Therefore, future studies could considered the actorness variable as an explanatory factor for this contrasting outcome. The European actorness between the two states would be compared in order to understand if such a difference can be explained by a lack of Presence, Opportunity and Coherence.

In a more specific matter, the descriptive study conducted in this research gave very interesting insights about which category of the European Actorness could be more significant in the elaborated EU-Third countries agreement regarding refugees. Indeed, the analysis showed that the Presence (C1) is HIGH in Ethiopia and LOW in Uganda. This contrasting conclusion demonstrate that the European Presence is less important in Uganda compare to Ethiopia. The EU-Third countries agreements are also less important in Uganda compare to Ethiopia. Consequently, the hypothesis generated by the descriptive research I performed is the following :

*The European Union Presence impact the refugee strategy in East Africa for significantly than the European Opportunity and the European Coherence.*

Indeed, concerning the Opportunity category (C2), the analysis performed did not gave us significant but only relative results. The Opportunity is RELATIVELY HIGH in Ethiopia and RELATIVELY LOW in Uganda. However, this precaution in the term of 'relative' is mostly link to the impersonal and external viewpoint of the newspaper analysing the contextual environment. It is

also linked to the very similar political context of both countries. Ethiopia have some advantage compare to Uganda in term of political openness and collaboration with the European Union but some informations gathered can also contradict this conclusion taking into account the citizens protests in the streets. Consequently, the hypothesis generated by the descriptive research I performed is the following :

*The European Union Opportunity relatively impact the the refugee strategy in East Africa.*

The Coherence category (C3) did not gave any interesting insights in the analysis for future explanatory research. Indeed, the Coherence is qualified as being HIGH in both Ethiopia and Uganda. Therefore, the study will not formulate any hypothesis regarding this category on the impact of the Coherence over EU-Third countries agreements in East Africa. The analysis of the Coherence has broad limitations regarding the conclusions to formulate. Considering that it does only include a narrowed aspect of the Capability introduced by Bretherton & Vogler (2006; 2013), the analysis is not complete. Furthermore, measuring the Coherence in social medias has very important limitations that the research cannot ignore notably if one take into account the silence. The absence of a member states shared commitment with the EU does not necessarily mean they agree or don't agree. Therefore, the interpretation of this category has fundamental limitations that this study acknowledge. However, a deeper research mostly including semi-structured interviews could be interesting to conduct since it will give informations coming from non-official documents about the vertical and horizontal coherence.

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## 8. Conclusion

This descriptive research illustrated the various aspects covering the nature of the European Actorness regarding EU-Third countries agreements concerning the refugee strategy in East Africa. Based on the qualitative analysis on the social media platform of Twitter, it can be concluded that the Presence category is a determinant aspect of the nature of the European Actorness in the European external strategy with potential Third Countries partner. The results indicate that the European Union have a more substantial Presence in Ethiopia compare to Uganda. Considering that Ethiopia has more advanced partnerships with the EU, the central hypothesis generated is the following: *The European Union Presence impact the refugee strategy in East Africa for*

*significantly than the European Opportunity and the European Coherence.* By analysing the European actorness in the past five years, this thesis has shown how Twitter, and social media in a general matter, can contribute to a new type of knowledge based on the communication strategy of distinct actors.

I took the descriptive approach of the European actorness to generate a hypothesis on the theory of Bretherton & Vogler (2006; 2013) in the specific context of the European refugee strategy in East Africa. The goal was, accordingly, to be the first step for further explicative research about the European actorness in Specific Issue settings (Grinsberg, 2001) as well as in a specific environment. The refugee issue in Africa is, undoubtedly, a pressing challenge considering the failed states situation which creates a crisis in the neighbouring countries. Consequently, the Twitter microblogging platform was used as a tool for gathering a database as it became an emergency communication channel in time of significant events (Rogers, 2014). The methodology I used to analyse the Twitter database involved a qualitative content analysis of a manually reduced number of Tweets privileging quality over quantity. An analysis of every Tweets, including the linguistics and tone gave a complete overview of the tendencies both in Ethiopia and in Uganda.

The expectations correlated with the study was to observe significant differences in the nature of the European Actorness in Ethiopia compared to Uganda. The research demonstrated the contrasting trends of Ethiopia and Uganda regarding the European Presence. EU has a high Presence in Ethiopia, while the EU has a low Presence in Uganda. It also showed the relatively different tendencies of Ethiopia and Uganda regarding the European Opportunity. EU has a relatively high Opportunity in Ethiopia while it has a relatively low Opportunity in Uganda. Finally, it highlights the relatively similar tendencies of Ethiopia and Uganda regarding the European Coherence since the EU has a high Coherence in both Ethiopia and Uganda. However, the analysis of the Coherence category was precariously made taking into considerations the important limitations linked to the database framework. As a result, my analysis matched my expectations since there was a significant difference in the nature of the European actorness in the comparative case study: The European Presence.

Based on these conclusions, I am formulating several recommendations for future European external strategies regarding refugee management in East Africa. The European policy could focus on a more solid media approach to improve the European Coherence in partners Third countries.

The study relatively determined that the EU should adopt a more coherent approach to social media targeting specific communication strategy depending on the Opportunities on the field. In Uganda, there is a different external, and internal setting compare to Ethiopia as well as a different European Presence. This should be taken into account when the EU develop their strategy, not necessarily on a regional level, but rather on a national one targeting specific opportunities framework. Since the European Presence is different in the comparative cases, Ethiopia and Uganda have different types of perceptions and expectations from the European Union. For instance, the research confirmed the importance of the EU as an economic power in Uganda, while the EU has more diplomatic and political power in Ethiopia. Therefore, the refugee strategy should be based on different approaches. Better financial investments for Uganda permitting coherent financial support could strengthen the European Presence in the country and, ultimately, provide a *marge de manoeuvre* for better opportunities in the country concerning refugee management. The exclusivity aspect should also be acknowledged in the European strategy. Uganda demonstrated, in the analysis, the tendency of promoting non-exclusive and non-binding partnership with the EU. This can also be rectified by high-level EU financial investment in Ugandan interests (infrastructure, transportation, innovative technologies among others) which could, in a long term prospect, be recompensed through a stronger commitment from Uganda to the European strategy regarding refugee management in the region. However, further research is needed to determine the effect of the European actorness over EU-Third countries agreements regarding refugee management.

This research contributed to an understanding of the nature of the European actorness but, most importantly, addressed a gap in the knowledge of the theory through this innovative type of study using social media data in refugee management strategy. This study permitted to answer the question raised by Bretherton & Vogler (2013) in their recent paper concerning the decrease of the European actorness in the past decades. Indeed, it illustrated the importance of the actorness theory as being possibly applied to EU foreign policy on a regional scale but, more specifically, on bilateral agreements. In a practical matter, the European actorness might be decreasing on a global perspective (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013). However, this research demonstrated that the theory can still be applied to a regional or a national scale strategy.

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## 10. Appendixes

### 10.1. Appendix 1 - EU Presence in Ethiopia

<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Factor 1.1. = Common Values</u></p> <p>«peace and security of region » (20 Octobre 2015 at 11:59 AM; @mfaethiopia) « joint declaration on #migration » (20 Octobre 2015 at 6:59 PM; @mfaethiopia) « maintain fast-growth and poverty reduction » (14 January at 8:05 AM; @mfaethiopia) « migration » (27 June 2016 at 10:22 PM; @mfaethiopia) « migration and mobility » (3 February 2016 at 12:38 PM; @mfaethiopia) « discussed regional peace and security, migration and on local issues » (7 April 2016 at 10:15 AM; @mfaethiopia) « covering regional peace and security good governance, migration and climate change » (26 March 2019 at 3:57 PM; @mfaethiopia) « ‘open door policy’ and ‘out of camp policy ‘ » (31 May 2016 at 6:07 PM; @mfaethiopia) « strategic engagement » (15 June 2016 at 10:04; @mfaethiopia) « regional peace and security »; « job creation, and tackling illegal migration » (13 November 2018 at 4:06 PM; @mfaethiopia) « prosperity and developments in the region » (28 February 2020 at 9:04 AM; @AbiyAhmedAli) « democratic transitions and economic reforms » (7 December 2019 at 12:31 PM; @AbiyAhmedAli)</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Factor 1.2. EU as Economical and Political Power / Leader</u></p> <p>« commended » (20 October at 11:59 AM; @mfaethiopia) « #EU mobilizes 170 million euros (above 3.8 billion Birr) in support for Ethiopia» (3 February 2016 at 1:51 PM; @mfaethiopia) « leadership of the #EU Council and Commission as well as to #French President Emmanuel Macron » (14 March 2020 at 8:48 PM; @mfaethiopia) « #EU’s support » (13 November 2018 at 4:06 PM; @mfaethiopia) « the responsiveness of the @EUCouncil and @EU_Commission to the emerging support needs of the continent » (3 April 2020 at 10:26 AM; @AbiyAhmedAli) « signing of Euro 170mil agreements » (7 December 2019 at 12:31 PM; @AbiyAhmedAli)</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Factor 1.3. Prosperity and Success of the European Partnership</u></p> <p>« strong and successful partnership » (8 October 2015 at 10:33 AM; @mfaethiopia) « the development partnership between Ethiopia and EU is increasing and widening by the day » (15 January 2016 at 4:14 PM; @mfaethiopia) « #Ethiopia is desirous of enhancing partnership with all #EU organs » (14 January 2016 at 8:05 AM; @mfaethiopia) « The EU Agenda on Migration and its progresses » (21 October 2016 at 2:39 PM; @mfaethiopia) « appreciating the strong relations » (9 February 2019 12:19; @mfaethiopia) « Great meeting » (28 February 2020 at 9:04 AM; @AbiyAhmedAli) « appreciated » (7 December 2019 at 12:31 PM; @AbiyAhmedAli)</p>

#### Factor 1.4. EU as a major and exclusive regional partner

« partnership » (8 October 2015 at 10:33 AM; @mfaethiopia)  
« excellent partnership » (20 Octobre 2015 at 11:59 AM; @mfaethiopia)  
« development partnership » (15 January 2016 at 4:14 PM; @mfaethiopia)  
« #Migration cooperation to be signed » (20 Octobre 2015 at 6:59 PM; @mfaethiopia)  
« in tandem with #EU » (27 January 2016 at 11:11 AM; @mfaethiopia)  
« desirous of enhancing partnership with all #EU organs » (14 January 2016 at 8:05 AM; @mfaethiopia)  
« #Ethiopia is ready to work with #EU and member countries on migration based on the Valetta framework » (27 June 2016 at 10:22 PM; @mfaethiopia)  
« #EU-#Ethiopia Multilateral Diplomacy Nexus » (25 January 2019 at 12:23 PM; @mfaethiopia)  
« #Ethiopia #EU partnership celebration » (21 October 2015 at 1:53 PM; @mfaethiopia)  
« European Union Partnership Frameworks » (21 October 2016 at 2:39 PM; @mfaethiopia)  
« bilateral and regional partnership » (12 January 2016 at 7:31 PM; @mfaethiopia)  
« warmly received President of the @EU\_Commission » (7 December 2019 at 1:57 PM; @mfaethiopia)  
« aspects of cooperation » (26 March 2019 at 3:57 PM; @mfaethiopia)  
« work together » (31 May 2016 at 6:07 PM; @mfaethiopia)  
« their cooperation » (9 February 2019 12:19; @mfaethiopia)  
« broad spectrum of cooperation » (14 December at 2:22 PM; @mfaethiopia)  
« agreed to expedite cooperation » (13 November 2018 at 4:06 PM; @mfaethiopia)  
« cooperation with the #EU » (3 April 2020 at 10:26 AM; @AbiyAhmedAli)  
« I shared with him our commitment » (28 February 2020 at 9:04 AM; @AbiyAhmedAli)  
« I welcome to Ethiopia @vonderleyen and congratulate her for the recent election as President of @EU\_Commission » (7 December 2019 at 12:31 PM; @AbiyAhmedAli)

#### Factor 1.5. Internal harmony and unity of the EU

« with all #EU organs » (14 January at 8:05 AM; @mfaethiopia)  
« with #EU and member countries » (27 June 2016 at 10:22 PM; @mfaethiopia)  
« #EU Parliament in #Brussels » (15 January 2016 at 4:10 PM; @mfaethiopia)  
« other delegates from the #EU » (3 February 2016 at 11:51 AM; @mfaethiopia)  
« #EU Council and Commission as well as to #French President Emmanuel Macron » (14 March 2020 at 8:48 PM; @mfaethiopia)

## 10.2. Appendix 2 - EU Presence in Uganda

### Factor 1.1. = Common Values

« affordable and clean energy » (12 December 2016 at 7:01 PM; @UgandaMFA)  
« Regional and International areas of mutual interests » (18 February 2019 at 5:27 PM; @UgandaMFA)  
« support for Refugees » (17 February 2017 at 1:17 PM; @UgandaMFA)  
« Article 8 of Cotonou Agreement » (28 June 2016 at 10:13 AM; @UgandaMFA)  
« promoting trade and investment and expanding the EU market for our products, to create jobs and improve livelihoods » (9 March 2020 at 10:49 AM; @RuhakanaR)  
« Trade » (16 November 2019 at 5:21 PM; @KagutaMuseveni)  
« economy grows, costs go down, private investors are attracted » (10 May 2017 at 4:19 PM; @KagutaMuseveni)  
« emphasising trade rather than aid » (@KagutaMuseveni)  
« market integration » (5 December 2019 at 8:36 PM; @KagutaMuseveni)  
« third party market » (19 September 2016 at 11:16 AM; @KagutaMuseveni)  
« Kampala Northern bypass upgrade » (24 February 2015 at 7:04 AM; @KagutaMuseveni)  
« builds schools in refugee camps across the country and provide free education » (10 November 2016 at 5:11 PM; @KagutaMuseveni)

### Factor 1.2. EU as Economical and Political Power / Leader

« need for #EU countries to support and fund their private sector so as to be able to invest in Uganda » (25 October 2018 at 11:44 AM; @UgandaMFA)  
« The Uganda-Europe Business Forum » (9 March 2020 at 10:49 AM; @RuhakanaR)  
« I appeal to the EU envoys to attract more European companies to invest in Uganda and take advantage of the market here » (16 November 2019 at 5:21 PM; @KagutaMuseveni)  
« The EU can help on the front » (10 May 2017 at 4:19 PM; @KagutaMuseveni)  
« I thank the EU for their support to our roads sector » (10 May 2017 at 4:16 PM; @KagutaMuseveni)  
« strong links with partner countries like China, the EU among others » (5 December 2019 at 8:36 PM; @KagutaMuseveni)  
« I thank the USA, EU and UN for the support » (30 January 2017 at 7:51 AM; @KagutaMuseveni)  
« On the kind of support from the EU » (10 November 2016 at 5:11 PM; @KagutaMuseveni)

### Factor 1.3. Prosperity and Success of the European Partnership

No Signs

### Factor 1.4. EU as a major and exclusive regional partner

« Partnering with the EU to promote #SDG7 affordable and clean energy » (12 December 2016 at 7:01 PM; @UgandaMFA)  
« EU-Uganda Bilateral Relations » (18 February 2019 at 5:27 PM; @UgandaMFA)  
« engage in dialogue » (28 June 2016 at 10:13 AM; @UgandaMFA)  
« The Uganda-Europe Business Forum » (9 March 2020 at 10:49 AM; @RuhakanaR)  
« We held fruitful discussions on question of EPAs with EAC. I thank him for hosting us. » (28 September 2017 at 2:17 PM; @KagutaMuseveni)  
« I thank the EU for the great work done » (24 February 2015 at 7:04 AM; @KagutaMuseveni)  
« continuous engagements » (16 November 2019 at 5:13 PM; @KagutaMuseveni)

### Factor 1.5. Internal harmony and unity of the EU

No Signs

### 10.3. Appendix 3 - EU Opportunity in Ethiopia

#### Factor 2.1. EU's Political Opportunity

- « aftermath of a bloody border war » (10 July 2018 at 11:11 PM; @cnni)
- « The Nobel Peace Prize for 2019 has been awarded to Ethiopia's Prime Minister for his work in ending a 20-years-war with Eritrea » (11 October 2019 at 11:52 AM; @cnni)
- « first female Supreme Court Chief » (1 November 2018 at 2:12 PM; @cnni)
- « first female president » (25 October 2018 at 1:14 PM; @cnni)
- « Ethiopia unblocks 264 websites and TV channels » (22 June 2018 at 5:22; @BBCWorld)
- « half of ministerial posts to women » (16 October 2018 at 5:29 PM; @BBCWorld)
- « significant achievement for a country that has had to recently manage internal displacement within its borders » (14 February 2020 at 6:26 PM; @UNHCREthiopia)
- « The ongoing 64th Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights » (29 April 2019 at 4:51 PM; @UNHCREthiopia)
- « first major voluntary repatriation program for Ethiopian refugees in the country » (20 February 2020 at 1:21 PM; @UNHCREthiopia)
- « hold local government consultations in #Jijiga on #CRRF, capacity development and coordination » (18 February 2019 at 2:28 PM; @UNHCREthiopia)
- « there are no journalists in Ethiopia's prisons » (15 March 2019 at 1:57AM; @TheEconomist)

#### Factor 2.2. EU's Economical Opportunity

- « phone lines are opened after 20 years of being cut off from the neighbouring country » (10 July 2018 at 11:11 PM; @cnni)
- « first metro system in sub-Saharan Africa » (14 October 2015 at 7:30 PM; @cnni)
- « will make up more than half the projected growth of the global populations between now and 2050 » (12 July 2019 at 2:51 PM; @cnni)
- « make clothes for some of the world's largest clothing brands » (11 May 2019 at 5:42 PM; @cnni)
- « Ethiopia unblocks 264 websites and TV channels » (22 June 2018 at 5:22; @BBCWorld)
- « Government of Ethiopia and EU launch a 20 million Euros programme in Jighiga » (27 November 2019 at 7:14 AM; @UNHCREthiopia)
- « Ethiopia expands registration and documentation services for refugees » (30 October 2019 at 5:17 AM; @UNHCREthiopia)
- « Syria received more than twice as much aid as Ethiopia, the next country on this list » (30 December 2019 at 6:57 PM; @TheEconomist)

#### Factor 2.3. = EU's Non-Competitive Opportunity

- « Ethiopia's capital is becoming the city that China built » (3 September 2018 at 5:50 AM; @cnni)
- « Government of Ethiopia and EU launch a 20 million Euros programme » (27 November 2019 at 7:14 AM; @UNHCREthiopia)
- « The movement was supported by @Refugees, IOM and the Governments of Ethiopia and Kenya » (20 February 2020 at 1:21 PM; @UNHCREthiopia)
- « supported by the EU, Netherlands and Denmark » (30 October 2019 at 5:17 AM; @UNHCREthiopia)
- « The EU has made available EUR 4.6m to support the CRRF roll-out in #Ethiopia » (18 February 2019 at 2:28 PM; @UNHCREthiopia)

#### Factor 2.4. = EU's Opportunity of Interests

- « first female Supreme Court chief » (11 November 2018 at 2:12 PM; @cnni)
- « first female president » (25 October 2018 at 1:14 PM; @cnni)
- « half of ministerial posts to women » (16 October 2018 at 5:29 PM; @BBCWorld)
- « Ethiopia's ratification of #KampalaConvention for Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced People » (14 February 2020 at 6:26 PM; @UNHCREthiopia)
- « efforts to shift the refugee assistance model from a camp-based approach to one focusing on self-reliance and inclusion in local development plans » (27 November 2019 at 7:14 AM; @UNHCREthiopia)
- « #Ethiopia for its generous #refugee policy and programs » (29 April 2019 at 4:51 PM; UNHCREthiopia)
- « furthering inclusion of refugees in Ethiopia » (30 October 2019 at 5:17 AM; UNHCREthiopia)

## 10.4. Appendix 4 - EU Opportunity in Uganda

<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Factor 2.1. EU's Political Opportunity</u></p> <p>« Uganda's welcome to South Sudan refugees is an example for European countries » (23 June 2017 at 11:38 AM; @cnni) « largest number of refugees in any country in Africa, and the third largest in the world » (28 September 2019 at 3:39 PM; @BBCWorld) « welcoming the President of Uganda to Moyo created great excitement » (9 July 2019 at 5:00 PM; @UNHCRUganda) « improve equitable access to and quality of health services for over 1 million refugees and 7 million host communities through its Health Sector Integrated Refugee Response Plan 2019-2024 » (4 December 2019 at 4:00 PM; @UNHCRUganda) « refugee policy is one of the most generous anywhere in the world » (27 October 2016 at 2:35 AM; @TheEconomist) « Uganda's population of some 500'000 refugees can work, vote and start business » (29 October 2016 at 12:16 AM; @TheEconomist)</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Factor 2.2. EU's Economical Opportunity</u></p> <p>« Uganda has unveiled Africa's first solar-powered bus » (15 February 2016 at 3:22 PM; @cnni) « @EU_ECHO has provided critical contributions towards the health of refugees in Uganda » (24 May 2020 at 7:50 PM; @UNHCRUganda) « Private investment has brought connectivity to north western Uganda »; « Several mobile companies have since built masts across the region, allowing refugees and locals to get online » (5 July 2019 at 12:35 PM; @UNHCRUganda) « improve equitable access to and quality of health services for over 1 million refugees and 7 million host communities through its Health Sector Integrated Refugee Response Plan 2019-2024 » (4 December 2019 at 4:00 PM; @UNHCRUganda) « unique Education Response Plan and needs support to include refugees in its national education systems » (16 December 2019 at 3:53 PM; @UNHCRUganda)</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Factor 2.3. = EU's Non-Competitive Opportunity</u></p> <p>No Signs</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Factor 2.4. = EU's Opportunity of Interests</u></p> <p>« Gay Pride in Uganda » (8 April 2015 at 8:00 AM; @cnni) « Uganda's welcome to South Sudan refugees is an example for European countries » (23 June 2017 at 11:38 AM; @cnni) « Uganda is home to around 1.3m refugees » (28 September 2019 at 3:39 PM; @BBCWorld) « supporting refugees » (24 May 2020 at 7:50 PM; @UNHCRUganda) « invite refugees from Palorinya Settlement to participate in welcoming the President of Uganda » (9 July 2019 at 5:00 PM; @UNHCRUganda) « Education is a fundamental human right »; « include refugees in its national education system » (16 December 2019 at 3:53 PM; @UNHCRUganda) « refugee policy is one of the most generous anywhere in the world » (27 October 2016 at 2:35 AM; @TheEconomist) « Uganda's population of some 500'000 refugees can work, vote and start business » (29 October 2016 at 12:16 AM; @TheEconomist)</p>

## 10.5. Appendix 5 - EU Capacity / Coherence in Ethiopia

### Factor 3.1. Member States shared strategy with EU on Third Countries partnerships

« Need for joint EU/Africa action on migration, terror and climate » (30 March 2016 at 5:15 PM; @TheProgressives)  
« New opportunities ? » (15 June 2016 at 1:27 PM; @DKambinAddis)  
« My good Nordic colleague @AUAmbAasland speaks on migration at #TanaFroum2019 » (4 May 2019 at 5:27 PM; @DKambinAddis)  
« an #EU and #CooperazioneItaliana initiative » (11 February 2019 at 11:40 AM; @cooperazione\_it)  
« funded by @EU\_Commission #TrustFund for #Africa » (4 December 2017 at 10:36 AM; @cooperazione\_it)  
« Big boost also for our work as European Ambassadors in #AddisAbaba » (7 December 2019 at 7:43 PM; @GerEmbAddis)  
« Strong political message of a true partnership of equals #AU-#EU » (7 December at 7:55 PM; @dumontfrancois3)  
« We welcome her historic decision to choose an African country as her first destination outside EU » (9 December 2019 at 7:03 AM; @SweinEthiopia)  
« Flagship event #AfricaDay »; « @EU\_Commission » (13 May 2019 at 3:59 PM; @MZZRS)

### Factor 3.2. Availability and capability of the partnership

« For people in #Somalia, #Ethiopia and #Kenya affected by severe drought, we will help with 60 million in aid » (7 July 2017 at 12:26 PM; @EU\_Commission)  
« we support with 15 million to enable humanitarian organisations to step up emergency food assistance and treatment fo malnutrition » (8 December 2017 at 4:57 PM; @EU\_Commission)  
« confirmed joint commitment to Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility #CAMP and implementation of Trust Fund for Africa #EUTF projects » (19 November 2018 at 12:44 PM; @EUinEthiopia)  
« @EU\_Commission adopted yesterday new programmes, with 100 M, to support ongoing efforts to help the most vulnerable people in the Horn of Africa » (29 May 2019 at 12:36 PM; @MimicaEU)  
« Signing of EU #Ethiopia Strategic Engagement » (15 July 2016 at 1:27 PM; @DKambinAddis)  
« Italy singed 14mln grant agreement with CSOs to stem irregular #migration in Northern and Central #Ethiopia » (4 December 2017 at 10:36 AM; @cooperazione\_it)  
« @EUinEthiopia hosted Horn of Africa meeting of the EU Trust Fund or Africa #EUTF » (22 February 2018 at 8:07 PM; @EUinEthiopia)  
« Signal that partnership w/Africa will be top priority of this EU Commission » (7 December 2019 at 7:43 PM; @GerEmbAddis)

### Factor 3.3. Prioritisation of the Third Country as a strategic partner

« We congratulate the winner of the #NobelPeacePrize Ethiopian Prime Minister @AbiyAhmedAli » (11 October 2019 at 12:19 PM; @EU\_Commission)  
« We express our condolences to the government and the people of Ethiopia » (11 March 2019 at 3:14 PM; @EU\_Commission)  
« « For people in #Somalia, #Ethiopia and #Kenya affected by severe drought, we will help with 60 million in aid » (7 July 2017 at 12:26 PM; @EU\_Commission)  
« EU and #Ethiopia sign Common Agenda on #Migration and Mobility » (11 November 2015 at 4:54 PM; @EU\_Commission)  
« Deeply impressed by my visit to #Ethiopia. Not only is it the oldest independent country in the continent and home to the African Union, Ethiopia also is an economic powerhouse » (8 December 2019 at 7:03 PM; @vonderleyen)  
« I am deeply impressed by Ethiopia's President Sahle-Work Zewde who is the only female Head of State in Africa » (7 December 2019 at 8:44 PM; @vonderleyen)  
« There could be no better country than Ethiopia for my 1st visit outside the EU. Ethiopia has given hope to an entire continent » (7 December 2019 at 2:48 PM; @vonderleyen)  
« Happy to see Ethiopian PM Desalegn @ #ValettaSummit. Today EU and Ethiopia signed Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility » (11 November 2015 at 7:46 PM; @MimicaEU)  
« Need for joint EU/Africa action on migration, terror and climate » (30 March 2016 at 5:15 PM; @TheProgressives)  
« Signing of EU #Ethiopia Strategic Engagement » (15 July 2016 at 1:27 PM; @DKambinAddis)  
« Ethiopia is a pioneering with roll out of #CRRF » (@DKambinAddis)  
« EU support for ongoing reform process in Ethiopia » (13 November 2018 at 3:12 PM; @EUinEthiopia)  
« EU amb @JBorgstam congratulating Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedu Andargachew on his appointment » (22 May 2019 at 2:04 PM; @EUinEthiopia)  
« To #ETHIOPIA support to pol and eco reforms » (7 December 2019 at 7:55 PM; @dumontfrancois3)  
« the role of European and African Partnership, eminent guests, #Ghana and #Ethiopia in focus » (13 May 2019 at 3:59 PM; @MZZRS)

#### Factor 3.4. Importance of migration and refugee policies

« Strategic Engagement on #migration in #Ethiopia took place in Addis and confirmed joint commitment to Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility #CAMM and implementation of Trust Fund for Africa #EUTF projects » (19 November 2018 at 12:44 PM; @EUinEthiopia)

« to review projects on #migration #resilience and #refugees in the region » (22 February 2018 at 8:07 PM; @EUinEthiopia)

« Today EU and Ethiopia signed Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility » (11 November 2015 at 7:46 PM; @MimicaEU)

« #MIGRATION #REFUGEES #AUEU #AfricaTrustFund » (29 May 2019 at 12:36 PM; @MimicaEU)

« Signing of EU #Ethiopia Strategic Engagement inc provisions on ia investments, trade, migration » (15 July 2016 at 1:27 PM; @DKambinAddis)

« Migration is a scar on humanity » (4 May 2019 at 5:27 PM; @DKambinAddis)

« reduce irregular migration by improving living conditions of vulnerable population, youth and women » (11 February 2019 at 11:40 AM; @cooperazione\_it)

« to stem irregular #migration in Northern and Central Ethiopia » ((4 December 2017 at 10:36 AM; @cooperazione\_it)



## 10.6. Appendix 6 - EU Capacity/Coherence in Uganda

### Factor 3.1. Member States shared strategy with EU on Third Countries partnerships

« Very inspiring seminar organised today by Team Belgium and the EU in Uganda » (26 June 2018 at 6:22 PM; @AlexBrecx)  
« Together with our German counterparts » (18 July 2019 at 2:51 PM; @EUinUG)  
« EU stands #WithRefugees » (23 June 2017 at 12:17 PM; @DonalCroninIRL)  
« bringing our message of solidarity » (14 April 2015 at 5:17 PM; @DonalCroninIRL)  
« Count on #Belgian support for #refugees via the #EUTF » (20 June 2017 at 7:04 AM; @BelgiumInUganda)  
« @FrenchEmbassyUg I was delighted to meet you this morning to warmly welcome you to the group of EU Heads of Mission to Uganda » (19 July 2019 at 2:08 PM; @APacificiEU)  
« #Belgium is proud to be part of this timely forum to discuss sustainable partnerships between Uganda and the European Union » (9 March 2020 at 8:28 AM; @AlexBrecx)

### Factor 3.2. Availability and capability of the partnership

« providing assistance to refugees and host populations who are showing such incredible solidarity to refugees » (20 June 2019 at 11:30 AM; @EUinUG)  
« Very inspiring seminar organised today by Team Belgium and the EU in Uganda on early preparedness and response to potential influent of #refugees from #DRC » (26 June 2018 at 6:22 PM; @AlexBrecx)  
« bringing together a wide group of Uganda's partners as part of the preparations for this important event » (29 October 2019 at 10:46 AM; @EUinUG)  
« @europeaid just adopted 11 new programmes for Horn of Africa under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa » (9 January 2019 at 12:50 PM; @APacificiEU)  
« Education, access to land, trade, security, freedom were some keywords of the day » (26 June 2018 at 6:22 PM; @AlexBrecx)  
« we launched a project to support refugee hosting areas to respond to increased demand on gov't service & creation of economic opportunities » (18 July 2019 at 2:51 PM; @EUinUG)  
« In agreement with @MimicaEU announced EU's generous support for the refugee response in #Uganda » (23 June 2017 at 1:08 PM; @StylianidesEU)  
« @StylianidesEU pledges 85m for #Uganda refugee response at #UGSolidarity Summit » (23 June 2017 at 12:17 PM; @DonalCroninIRL)  
« Important funding from #EU to #Uganda facing the world's fastest growing refugee crisis : 85 man in humanitarian aid/development assistance » (23 June 2017 at 11:59 AM; @ckyenge)  
« EU to support Uganda's efforts with 85M » (22 June 2017 at 6:28 PM; @MimicaEU)  
« On my way to #Uganda to assess how EU can best support in handling dramatic increase of South Soudan » (9 November 2016 at 7:39 PM; @StylianidesEU)  
« We are releasing 3.5 million of emergency funding for Uganda and South Sudan »; « This funding comes on top of the 17 million in EU funding for Ebola response since 2018 » (13 June 2019 at 12:50 PM; @EU\_Commission)  
« El programa de suport als assentaments de refugiats a Uganda i a les comunitats d'acollida financatc per la #UE ha generat 13.500 llocs de treball i 32.000 persones s'han beneficia d'un programa d'assistencia economics » (22 October 2019 at 7:30 PM; @ComissioEuropea)  
« @FedericaMog assured Hon Kutesa Uganda can count on the EU's political and financial support for hosting refugees » (13 February 2017 at 12:53 PM; @EUAmbSchmidt)  
« Data shows EU can learn from Uganda to treat refugees as assets rather than as costs » (2 March 2016 at 6:05 PM; @HackneyAbbott)  
« to strengthen rapid detection and reaction to Ebola cases » (13 June 2019 at 12:50 PM; @EU\_Commission)

### Factor 3.3. Prioritisation of the Third Country as a strategic partner

« The #EU is leading the support to Uganda's response » (20 June 2019 at 11:30 AM; @EUinUG)  
« The top 5 refugee-hosting countries are Turkey, Pakistan, Uganda, Lebanon and Iran » (1 September 2018 at 1:17 PM; @eu\_echo)  
« Uganda will get the lion share with a total of 26.2m projects » (9 January 2019 at 12:50 PM; @APacificiEU)  
« bringing together a wide group of Uganda's partners » (29 October 2019 at 10:46 AM; @EUinUG)  
« as part of the EU's continued support to Uganda's refugee response » (18 July 2019 at 2:51 PM; @EUinUG)  
« Important funding from #EU to #Uganda » (23 June 2017 at 11:59 AM; @ckyenge)  
« #Uganda is now #Africa's leading refugee-hosting country » (22 June 2017 at 6:28 PM; @MimicaEU)  
« EU/Uganda partnership is strong » (6 January 2017 at 12:24 PM; @EUAmbSchmidt)  
« discuss sustainable partnerships between Uganda and the European Union » (9 March 2020 at 8:28 AM; @AlexBrecx)  
« #EUandUganda: Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are essential elements of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement which binds the EU and partner countries, including Uganda » (7 Max 2019 at 4:13 PM; @EUinUG)

#### Factor 3.4. Importance of migration and refugee policies

« Did you know that [Uganda] hosts over 1.2m refugees » (20 June 2019 at 11:30 AM; @EUinUG)  
« The overwhelming majority of #refugees find safety in countries nearby » (1 September 2018 at 1:17 PM; @eu\_echo)  
« #WorldRefugeeDay2018 » (26 June 2018 at 6:22 PM; @AlexBrecx)  
« National High-Level Consultation Meeting on the Global Refugee Forum (GRF) » (29 October 2019 at 10:46 AM; @EUinUG)  
« EU's generous support for the refugee response in #Uganda » (23 June 2017 at 1:08 PM; @StylianidesEU)  
« #Uganda refugee response at #UGSolidarity Summit » (23 June 2017 at 12:17 PM; @DonalCroninIRL)  
« #Uganda is now #Africa's leading refugee-hosting country » (22 June 2017 at 6:28 PM; @MimicaEU)  
« #refugees fleeing conflict & violence » (9 November 2016 at 7:39 PM; @StylianidesEU)  
« @FedericaMog assured Hon Kutesa Uganda can count on the EU's political and financial support for hosting refugees » (13 February 2017 at 12:53 PM; @EUAmbSchmidt)