Lund University
Department of Political Science

UNDK01
Tutor: Tony Ingesson

Organizational failure and intelligence:

A framework for understanding intelligence failure

Arvid Norman

Abstract

Failure often captures public attention, especially in an intelligence context were the consequences can be devastating and the successes are rarely visible. Understanding failure is important if we are to prevent it and both the field of organizational theory and the field of intelligence have been interested in the nature of failure. This study aimed to further the understanding of intelligence failure by applying a framework for organizational failure created by McMillan and Overall (2017) to the case of the Yom Kippur War. Utilizing case study methodology and process-tracing, combined with an operationalization of the McMillan and Overall framework, this paper aimed at evaluating the exploratory and explanatory value of the framework in an intelligence context. The framework consists of three strategic organizational capacities (learning, planning, and agility) and their three corresponding levels of failure (simple, complex, and catastrophic). Misalignments in each organizational capacity accumulate and cause increasingly serious states of failure. The framework showed promise for the academic study of intelligence failure as it allows for comprehensive analysis of causal and sequential events, but its current form is deemed impractical for use by intelligence personnel.

Key words: Intelligence failure, organization framework, intelligence studies, organizational theory, Yom Kippur War, confirmation bias, cognitive dissonance, failure
Words: 9624

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1 Introduction

Few phenomena so capture the intelligence community as does failure. An intelligence failure frequently has dramatic and devastating consequences: Failing to prevent terrorist attacks, not being able to identify an impending attack, the inability to predict the collapse of a state, of the iron curtain, the outbreak of a civil war. Intelligence failures are etched both in the annals of history and, presently, – especially through jihadist terrorism – in the public consciousness of the West (Gill, 2020, 43-44).

In part this preoccupation with intelligence failure must be seen as a result of availability. The information on successful intelligence operations is lackluster in comparison, which is inevitable in such a secretive community. The catastrophes are harder to keep from the public eye. However, understanding failure has long been seen as essential if intelligence agencies are to avoid repeating mistakes.

Interestingly, the fields of management, organizational theory and organizational psychology have a similar interest for understanding failure. The study of intelligence failure tends to be strongly event driven, while organizational theory has a multitude of organizational and group dynamical models for failure. As a general rule of thumb, most organizational principles still apply to an intelligence organization, since an organization can be defined as any group of people interacting in some kind of structured way with the same goal or purpose (Senior & Swailes, 2016, 4). Furthermore, Garicano and Posner (2005, 151-152) describe how intelligence organizations share the basic information and communication structure common to all formal organizations – where field data is processed by a field officer and then, depending on the importance of the data, sent further up the hierarchy.

In the wide field of study on organizational failure, there is bound to be vast amounts of untapped knowledge that can increase the intelligence professional's understanding of what causes failure in an intelligence organization. This paper will attempt to provide some insight into this potential source of untapped knowledge by testing the applicability of an organizational framework for the understanding of organizational failure on an intelligence failure. And what better case than one that has shaped modern intelligence understanding of failure – the surprise attack on Israel during Yom Kippur in 1973.

1.1 Purpose and hypotheses

The purpose of this paper is to apply a method used to understand organizational failure in a broader sense, created by McMillan and Overall (2017), to the specific context of intelligence failure. This in the hopes of establishing whether or not the framework is helpful for case studies, and/or for preventative organizational work, and if it generates increased understanding on why intelligence organizations fail. As a result, the paper is a mix of a method developing approach and a case study. Hence, the research question is as follows: Can the framework for organizational failure presented by McMillan and Overall (2017) be used to understand the Israeli intelligence failure of the Yom Kippur War of 1973?

2 Theory

As this paper aims to integrate organizational methodology with the field of intelligence, it also requires a melding of organizational theory and intelligence theory. The concept of failure is widely studied in both fields as they both pertain to groups of people dealing with complex and poorly understood processes of information gathering, organization, and its consequences. This implies an overlap in the fundamental theory of both fields. Therefore, a somewhat detailed overview of the paper written by McMillan and Overall will be provided. This includes a description of the theoretical basis specific to their framework and how it can be understood in the context of intelligence, which is needed to clearly define the methodology of this paper and allow for the case analysis and methodological evaluation.

Since the framework was mainly created with financial organizations in mind the examples used by McMillan and Overall are mostly related to business. Some of these examples do, however, lend themselves well to an intelligence context and will be used to facilitate the understanding of how these fields relate to each other.

2.1 The McMillan and Overall perspective on organizational failure

The ambition of the McMillan and Overall (2017) framework was to create a framework that takes both specific external events and internal organizational factors into account. This framework was also intended to recognize that organizations are not always rational but can aim to accommodate political and personal interests over optimizing outcomes (Ibid., 272; 273).

First, the McMillan and Overall definition of organizational failure will be presented. Second, the idea of failure as a cumulative process will be described. Third, the three strategic capacities, their accompanying forms of failure, and their six causal factors as presented by the framework will be explained.

2.1.1 Definition of organizational failure

McMillan and Overall define organizational failure as “a state with scarcity of resource slack, unstable goal preferences, and poverty of strategic options” (Ibid., 272). They contrast this with organizational decline. Organizational decline more generally represents failings in the organization’s sector of business, in the form of lower customer demand or disruptive technological developments (McMillan

& Overall, 273). Organizational failure on the other hand is largely "a function of internal dysfunctions" (Ibid., 273).

This translates well to the context of intelligence. When an intelligence organization fails the resulting surprise significantly hampers governmental, military, or law enforcement ability to direct strategic resources, provides an unstable basis for establishing both short-term and long-term goals, and limits the ability to gather sufficient resource slack to deal with both the current and future surprises. While organizational decline could conceivable take place in an intelligence organization, organizational failure is what causes the highly visible failures that are the focus of this paper.

2.1.2 Failure as a cumulative process

McMillan and Overall (2017, 275-276) conceptualize failure as a temporal and cumulative process of misalignments on three decision-making levels, which relate to different strategic organizational capacities. This means that misalignments in action and decision-making, related to organizational goals, accumulate and eventually result in *catastrophic* failures (Ibid., 276). These misalignments can be created both vertically and horizontally in an organization (Ibid., 276). The idea of failure as both a timed, accumulative process and as an episodic, event based, occurrence is essential to understanding the framework. A multitude of more or less noticeable variables define an organization's preparedness on different structural levels – a preparedness that is then tested by



Figure 1. *The McMillan and Overall framework. From McMillan and Overall (2017, 276).*

external events with the potential to act as a catalyst for organizational collapse. Thus, the flaws and failures inherent to human action in an organizational context risk building into increasingly serious states or processes of failing. These accumulating failures manifest themselves in simple, complex and catastrophic failures that build on each other (Ibid., 275-276). Eventually, in themselves or

when faced with external threats, these processes result in organizational failure (Ibid., 276).

2.2 Simple failures and the strategic capacity for organizational learning

Simple failures stem from what the authors call the *strategic capacity for learning* (McMillan & Overall, 276). These simple failures are comprised of issues on the tactical and operational levels. Examples of situations that can lead to simple failures include failure to deliver orders on time or delivering the wrong product, issues with recruitment, problems with service or difficulties with production lines (Ibid., 272). For an intelligence organization, equivalent levels of failure could be difficulty recruiting the appropriate competence, or shortcomings in the ability to collect and distribute intelligence from the frontline.

When issues such as these arise on the customer or worker level, or collection level in the case of intelligence, they lead to attempted recuperation and learning on the organization's part (Ibid., 272). If an organization fails to learn this constitutes a simple failure that is then repeated and provides a breeding ground for complex failures. These simple failures are the result of an accumulation of misalignments caused by *single-loop decision-making* and lacking *learning competencies* (Ibid., 276).

2.2.1 Single-loop decision-making

The idea of single-loop decision-making is based on the classical organizational work of Argyris (1976) and describes how organizational choice is a reflection of the concentration of power and control of resources in an organization. A single-loop decision tends to address issues on a superficial level, with a short-term bias that often is accentuated by certain managerial personalities (McMillan & Overall, 277). These managerial personalities consist of what may be deemed "weak" leaders, that due to their length of tenure, levels of self-awareness, and/or aspiration levels surround themselves with subordinates who fixate on daily routines and norms of conformity (Ibid., 277).

In other words, this single-loop process is a top-down status quo enforcement that results in patterns of managerial and organizational rigidity and fosters a culture of risk aversion, deference of routines and low levels of self-criticism (Ibid., 277). The effect of single-loop decision-making is that the organization's ability to make appropriate decisions in order to align internal needs and demands is hampered (Ibid., 277). The individuals on top tend to reach premature and unfounded conclusions that lack the feedback of more knowledgeable individuals in other parts of the organization (Ibid., 277). To further understand the phenomenon, it can be contrasted with double-loop decision-making which includes "openness to criticism, self-reflection, risk-taking, and willingness to delegate responsibility" (Ibid., 277).

2.2.2 Learning competencies

Forming a basis for organizational learning can prove challenging as it requires the establishment of a culture of learning, resting on knowledge, expertise, and experience harnessed through verbal communication and quickness of mind (McMillan & Overall, 277). Flaws in this process restricts the organization's ability to digest both positive and negative feedback and risks reinforcing cognitive biases and acceptance of poor performance, which in turn limits decision choices, generates bias towards past decisions, and fosters a culture of normalcy (Ibid., 277). To prevent this dedicated communication is essential, and a loosely coupled organization needs measures of autonomy and boundaries while a tightly knit organization must divert financial and intellectual resources to have subunits dedicated to lessening the impact of learning failures – such as audit systems (Ibid., 277-278). The latter of which is the most appropriate when dealing with intelligence organizations that have hierarchies and structures similar to that of either police or military forces.

2.3 Complex failures and the strategic capacity for organizational planning

Complex failures are a result of shortcomings in the *strategic capacity for organizational planning* (McMillan & Overall, 276). McMillan and Overall (279) differentiates between plans and planning. Plans are more of a playbook regarding operating procedures and forecasted revenues. Planning relates to the ability to anticipate future events by understanding both past performance and the complexities of the subtle environmental interaction surrounding the organization (Ibid., 279). Thus, planning is about anticipating the future while plans are a set of rules.

This second level of failure results in an absence, or minimal level, of foresight and planning regarding future events and event cycles. These complex failures are potential threats to the survival of the organization. For example, product launches that do not meet the needs of the buyer, misdiagnoses at hospitals or recurrent bugs in vital software (Ibid., 273). Or, in the intelligence context, the inability to appropriately analyze information and reach valid conclusions or a structural rigidity that prevents the questioning of held assumptions.

The strategic capacity for organizational planning relates to an organizational ability to anticipate change, from both external forces and internal weakness (Ibid., 278). McMillan and Overall defines misalignments on this level as an "inability to recognize internal processes necessary to know, understand and prepare for future event cycles" (278). These misalignments are primarily made up of *structural rigidities* and *intelligence sense-making* (Ibid., 278).

2.3.1 Structural rigidity

Routines are essential to most organizations, but they can incentivize compliance and discourage deviance regardless of unintended consequences (McMillan & Overall, 278). Routines based on compliance rather than functionality become ritualized aspects of the everyday workings of the organization, instead of a necessary process serving to direct resources toward common goals. Ritualization of routines suppresses reflection, deters deviation from the status quo, and promotes inaction – risks which are then further moderated by the personalities of managers (Ibid., 278). Structural rigidities become particularly evident when faced with new, unexpected events as the organization relies on precedent rather than situational facts when making decisions (Ibid., 278). Instances of crisis in a rigid organization can cause managers that are unwilling to deviate from the status quo to deny that a potential crisis even exists, drastically decreasing the ability to plan appropriate responses (Ibid., 279).

Furthermore, these rigidities are represented through mindsets on all levels of the organization (Ibid., 279). Selective perception through preconceived assumptions can lead to decision paralysis and reduce understanding of ambiguous threats (Ibid., 279). This risk creating a loop on an individual level, especially in times of crisis where stress and anxiety increases the propensity for compliance with routines, where frames of reference validate perceptions rather than the opposite (Ibid., 279).

Importantly, structural rigidity can be a result of organizational success, which can encourage decision rigidity, group conflict, and mixed loyalties (Ibid., 279). Without active efforts to ensure corrective feedback and adjustment of routines an organization will lower its strategic capacity for planning which minimizes opportunities for proactive measures and paves the way for denial and deception (Ibid., 279).

In the context of intelligence, structural rigidity could prove fatal. A reduced understanding of threats combined with decision paralysis, denial, and deception in a field that is dedicated to finding and stopping threats is potentially disastrous. The ability to identify and remedy structural rigidity could aid intelligence agencies in monitoring internal organizational risks before they accumulate and cause complex failures.

2.3.2 Intelligence sense-making

Essentially, inadequate intelligence sense-making is a result of an overreliance on existing precedent, filtering out information that contradicts held assumptions, and an asymmetry in the flow of communication (McMillan & Overall, 280). The asymmetric communication is reinforced by secrecy, distance, and specialized knowledge (Ibid., 280), which is particularly prevalent in intelligence organizations. In a hierarchical system, good news tends to hold primacy over bad, further strengthening existing biases. When combined with the lacking learning processes resulting in simple failures this creates a dysfunctional loop of misalignments that lessen the organizational understanding of events and hinders

planning. As a result, the organization reduces information flow and limits its capacity for decision making, thus reducing resource slack, preventing problem solving, foresight, and knowledge sharing (Ibid., 280).

Intelligence sense-making is already an important theme in intelligence studies and in the intelligence community. The understanding of, and interest in, cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias and cognitive dissonance, has sky-rocketed in the last two decades (Bar-Joseph, 2005, 3; Taillard & Giscoppa, 2012, 54; Wirtz, 2014, 6).

2.4 Catastrophic failures and the strategic capacity for organizational agility

Catastrophic failures stem from the accumulation of the two previous forms of failures and their interaction with the organization's *strategic capacity for agility*. This capacity is in turn made up of *knowledge inclusiveness* and the *organizational platform.* An accumulation of misalignments on the learning and planning levels then lead to a catastrophic failure, a "total failure of an organization that occurs at all levels and cannot be remedied without major structural corporate transformations" (McMillan & Overall, 273). In the intelligence context this could mean that an organization lacks the ability to adapt in the face of a catastrophe, such as a failure to predict an attack, or in the face of an opportunity, such as recognizing a chance to gain vital information regarding WMDs but lacking the ability to redirect the necessary resources to gain it, thus failing in its most basic function. Organizational agility is the ability to seize opportunity and adapt to defend against threats (Ibid., 280).

McMillan and Overall (280-281) uses the strategic capacity for agility as an explanation for how seemingly superior organizations fail to prevail over seemingly inferior ones, where they argue that a plenty of resources result in a higher tolerance for misalignments of resources, a larger spread of resources across multiple activities, inadequate learning systems, and lacking feedback structures. In contrast, a lack of resource slack necessitates a higher degree of self-scrutiny and adaptability (Ibid., 281). McMillan and Overall exemplify this with the many complicated, high risk organizations such as nuclear power plants and aerospace firms that are seen as reliable. They have been forced to enact both social and engineering measures to ensure knowledge inclusion and distribution. However, the strictness imbued in such an organization means that simple and complex failures that do inevitably occur can be difficult to identify and build up for years into a catastrophic failure (Ibid., 281).

To limit negative impacts on the capacity for agility organizations can prioritize knowledge inclusiveness, actively and routinely assess organizational platforms while diverting resources to ensure learning ability on all levels (Ibid., 281). These measures can be seen as establishing fail-safe systems to contrast the more traditional form of organizational agility that are based on an implicit idea of organizational and managerial rationality (Ibid., 281).

2.4.1 Knowledge inclusiveness

When faced with crisis, organizations tend to favor bureaucratic control over trust-based collaboration (McMillan & Overall, 281). Stress, on the individual level, increases the propensity for tunnel-visioning as a part of the fight-flight response and per definition increasing cognitive load of complex tasks, thus lowering the ability to handle multiple pieces of information (Goldstein, 2011, 87). Both short-term and long-term stress inhibits executive function, which includes the ability to plan actions to reach a certain goal as well as information flexibility, abstract thinking and the ability to make inferences (Banich & Compton, 2011, 337; Krabbe, Ellbin, Nilsson, Jonsdottir & Samuelsson, 2017, 333). This process results in a failure to integrate available knowledge and information which leads to a decrease in organizational agility when faced with external threat.

On an organizational level, a lack of knowledge inclusiveness results in an increased separation between subunits that risk emphasizing past routines while downplaying learning opportunities as well as the complexity and ambiguity of a situation (McMillan & Overall, 281). McMillan and Overall (282) argue that catastrophic failures often occur in a bureaucratic hierarchy that produces false judgment and display confirmation biases, refuse to challenge assumptions, and where managers believe they are in line with the overall organizational view. Instead of searching for facts and threats they attempt to validate reassuring assumptions, downplay contradicting information and create a state of heightened social hostility (Ibid., 282).

The end result of weak knowledge inclusiveness is that the members of the organization fail to obtain information that indicates the need for a change in direction, which results in the organization continuing down a track towards catastrophic failure (Ibid., 282).

2.4.2 Organizational platforms

To enable appropriate countermeasures to potential failures, the nature of the organizational platform is vital, as the capacity for agility needs to be an integrated part of the organizational architecture. How the organization is constructed in terms of production, leadership, and communication moderates the effects of simple and complex failures and can either serve to mitigate or amplify them (McMillan & Overall, 282-283). Organizational platforms aim to integrate the social, technological, and coordination processes in a flexible yet reliable way. The goal is to achieve a seamlessly integrated ecosystem where corrective feedback is constantly appraised and knowledge is dynamically distributed throughout the organization (Ibid., 282). This is achieved mainly through the existence of redundancy and other fail-safe systems (Perrow, 1984 in McMillan & Overall, 282), redundancy in this context meaning the duplication of critical system functions to act as a fail-safe system. The necessary social interaction, behavioral feedback, variability and coordination needed for a properly functional organizational platform puts a heavy demand on the organization as it requires

high levels of system-wide integration, continuous training for employees, and long-term planning horizons. Furthermore, such organizations, once created, are difficult to replicate (McMillan & Overall, 282).

In organizations that require flexibility as an integral part of their function, such as an intelligence organization, the absence of redundancy and an understanding for its own vulnerability can prove disastrous since it amplifies failures in agility (Ibid., 282-283). Failure is not the result of a single event, rather it is spiral where many simple failures remain unresolved and grow as a consequence of limitations in the strategic capacity for organizational learning, planning, and agility (Ibid., 283).

As an example of how an organizational platform can amplify the effects of simple and complex failure, the authors present the well-known case of Enron: With new senior leadership the company's culture changed and favored an immensely competitive work environment but without adjusting their fail-safe mechanisms. They rewarded based on performance and regularly terminated the bottom 10-15% performers which created a multitude of practices that lead to complex failures, like aggressive accounting and energy shortages. These failures spiraled and led to the collapse of the company (Ibid., 283).

3 Method

In its design this paper was both a case study and a method developing study. As a result, while the primary aim was to test the method, the first step was to analyze the chosen case using the work of McMillan and Overall. Then these results were evaluated to find if and how the framework yields insight into the phenomenon of intelligence failure.

3.1 Application of the McMillan and Overall framework

The McMillan and Overall framework and theoretical background presented under the theory heading above was operationalized as follows: The selected case was subjected to an analysis of what caused the *simple*, *complex*, and *catastrophic* failures that lead to the failed outcomes. The defining outcome of organizational failure was defined as being surprised by an enemy attack – the Arab league surprising Israel on Yom Kippur. This ties into the idea presented by McMillan and Overall that a catastrophic failure results in a scarcity of resource slack, unstable goal preferences, and poverty of strategic options (McMillan & Overall, 272), which in the intelligence context is reflected by the lack of options and drastic cost in resources and lives resulting from the organizational failure.

Simple, complex and catastrophic failures were mapped, identifying issues in the strategical capacity for organizational learning, planning, and agility respectively. Thus, focus lay on recognizing the issues in the *single-loop decision-making*, *learning competencies*, *structural rigidity*, *intelligence sense-making*, *knowledge inclusiveness*, and *organizational platforms* in the Israeli intelligence community (AMAN in particular) that lead to the respective failures and how these in turn built on each other and spiraled. A section separate from the main analysis was used to evaluate the applicability of the model.

3.2 Process-tracing

Process-tracing is an analytic method used to draw causal inferences from data drawn from a temporal sequence of events regarding a given phenomenon (Collier, 2011, 824). According to Collier (824) process-tracing can contribute to four major research objectives: identifying political and social phenomena, as well as systematically describing them; discovering and evaluating hypotheses through assessment of causal claims; understand causal mechanisms; and provide an alternative method for addressing research problems of reciprocal causation,

spuriousness, and selection bias which are otherwise answered with statistics (Collier, 824). For this paper the issue of causation is relevant as a means of establishing if the intelligence failures were at all caused by internal organizational factors in the intelligence organizations. Thus, process-tracing provides the ability to identify essential causal factors that can then be coded and analyzed using the McMillan and Overall framework.

First of all, process-tracing research demands careful description of the temporal events of the chosen case. Extensive knowledge and careful description of specific points in time during events are required to analyze the events as a whole (Ibid., 824). Therefore, the events Yom Kippur need to be described, through the lens of the chosen framework, in order to identify if any of the described forms of failure actually did take place. Detailed description allows analysis. However, as the focus here lies on the framework rather than the case, this description will be drawn from one main source which clearly limits the scope of any causal inference and generalization resulting from the case analysis.

Establishing causal inference in process-tracing can be achieved through the use of four types of tests: Straw-in-the-Wind tests, Hoop tests, Smoking-Gun tests, and Doubly Decisive tests (Ibid., 825), the last of which are very rare in social sciences (Ibid., 827).

Straw-in-the-Wind tests can only increase the plausibility or raise doubts regarding a hypothesis but cannot by themselves establish any *necessary* or *sufficient* criterions for accepting or rejecting a hypothesis (Ibid., 826). It is an inference that provides a clue but not a decisive piece of evidence, the example provided by Collier (826) being an unpaid bill of a romantic gift that was unknown to the wife, thus suggesting an affair but does not conclusively prove anything as there are many possible reasons for this – perhaps it was not intended as a romantic gift, or it was meant for his wife but did not yet give it.

Hoop tests on the other hand provide a *necessary* condition for the hypothesis, allowing it to eliminate a hypothesis but is not sufficient to accept it (Ibid., 826-827). As an example, uranium is necessary to develop nuclear capability, but the availability of uranium is not in itself sufficient evidence of nuclear capability.

Smoking-Gun tests provide *sufficient* but not *necessary* criterion for accepting causal inference; hence it can confirm a hypothesis, but failure to pass such a test does not reject the hypothesis (Ibid., 827). A country performing a nuclear weapon test is sufficient to draw the conclusion that they have nuclear capability, but the absence of such a test does not exclude the possibility that they have nuclear capability. Finally, Doubly Decisive tests meet both sufficient and necessary criterions allowing the acceptance of a hypothesis and the elimination of other hypotheses. Often this entails a combination of the other tests (Ibid., 827).

3.3 Assumptions

First of all, the McMillan and Overall framework is, out of necessity, assumed to be of predictive value in its original field. No attempt is made in this paper to question the framework, but rather try it on empirical material to evaluate potential usefulness in the field of intelligence. The framework was deemed theoretically relevant, both as a direct methodological contribution and as a theoretical development of the commonalities between organizational theory and intelligence studies, regardless of previous practical use. However, this does entail that conceivable limitations of the framework in its original use for more financially oriented organizations are not discussed – rather this was left for future research if the framework showed promise for intelligence work.

Secondly, causal inference process-tracing requires diagnostic evidence, which in itself relies on prior knowledge and is thus subjected to researcher bias (Ibid., 824). Counteracting this bias requires awareness of existing conceptual frameworks that affect the way researchers view the subject (Ibid., 824). This paper relies on previous understanding of failure and organizational theory, a field that has already been largely influenced by the cases of Pearl Harbor and the Yom Kippur war. Hence, awareness of the limitations in data collection and inferences on the basis of the bias of both researcher and theoretical field is vital in qualitative methodology.

3.4 Materials

As described by Lamont (2015, 132-133), choosing a case must be done with care and deliberation. The choice of the Yom Kippur War was based on multiple factors: It holds a central position in the national historical narrative of Israel; the amount of information – pre-attack indicators and early warning – available to AMAN limit the causes of failure to either individual or organizational factors, as compared to other intelligence failures where information might simply not have been available; and, it is both well-known and has been subjected to extensive academic study, rending it easily researchable and suitable for process-tracing methodology.

Since the main focus of this paper is to evaluate methodology, while the goal of the case study is to allow this evaluation, the source material for the case was limited to one primary source: Uri Bar-Joseph's (2005) *The watchmen fell asleep: The surprise of Yom Kippur and its sources*. It can be considered a formative work on both the subject of the Yom Kippur War and on intelligence failure, especially shaping much of our modern understanding of group processes and their role in intelligence failure. Furthermore, its account of the war is detailed enough to allow process-tracing and the application of the McMillan and Overall framework.

4 Analysis

The analysis was executed as follows: First, a short summary of the overall events of the Yom Kippur War was provided, followed by a short description of the organizational structure of AMAN and central personalities and their respective roles. Then the "intelligence conception" was described. Finally, the analysis of the case using the McMillan and Overall framework was performed and evaluated.

4.1 The Yom Kippur War

On October 6, 1973, on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, an Arab coalition led by Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel. The coalition was initially successful in overcoming Israeli defenses, inflicted heavy losses, and posed a serious threat to the existence of Israel (Bar-Joseph, 2005, 1). The Yom Kippur war left a lasting legacy in Israeli society and has had a profound impact on our understanding of intelligence failure (Bar-Joseph, 1-2). The failure of Israeli intelligence to predict the attack, despite an unprecedented amount of prior warning and available information, reshaped military and political doctrine with lasting local and global consequences (Ibid., 1-2). What separates the Yom Kippur war from other, similarly defining intelligence failures like the Soviet failure to predict the German invasion during Operation Barbarossa and the US failure to predict the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was the fact that AMAN, Israel's military intelligence agency, had an almost perfect understanding of the Arab attack plans, military capacity, deployments, and evidence of their enemies' intent to launch an assault (Bar-Joseph, 2).

4.1.1 The Israeli intelligence situation, 1973

In the national security doctrine of Israel at the time of the Yom Kippur war, the idea of strategic warning had been considered one of the pillars on which Israeli security relied (Bar-Joseph, 53). For the Israeli intelligence community, and their military intelligence in particular (known as AMAN, from "Agaf HaModi'in" – "the intelligence section"), the Egyptian threat was the priority. If war was to occur, Egypt acting alone was considered the best-case scenario while the worst-case scenario, known as "Mikreh Hakol" – "the case of all" – was a coordinated attack by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, with support from other Arab countries (Ibid., 53).

The geographical consequences of the Six-Day War in 1967 increased the difficulty in predicting Egyptian war preparations. Instead of having the entirety of the Sinai Peninsula between the Egyptian forces and the Israeli army, all that

separated them was the Suez Canal (Ibid., 53). In 1968, a committee was established to review the strategic warning capabilities of AMAN in regard to Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Their conclusion was that AMAN's ability was reasonable in view of their goal, but still acknowledged that their ability to predict Egyptian war initiation was lowered and additional resources were requested (Ibid., 54).

The main sources for intelligence on Egyptian and Syrian activity on the frontlines was signal intelligence and visual intelligence (VISINT). VISINT relied heavily on aerial reconnaissance which was made increasingly difficult after Egypt and Syria reinforced their air defenses in 1970 and 1973 respectively (Ibid., 54).

The Director of Military Intelligence from 1964 to 1972, Maj. Gen. Aaron Yariv, remained cautious as to the ability to detect Egyptian war preparations, stating in November 1968 that the Egyptians were better able than ever to surprise the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). However, in 1972, Maj. Gen. Yisrael Tal requested an AMAN assessment of its strategic warning capability, which was submitted in June 1972 (Ibid., 54). In stark contrast to Yariv, this document asserted that Egyptian logistical preparations would grant at least a twenty-four-hour warning for small-scale operations and at least 4-6 days of warning before any major action (Ibid., 54).

Yariv's replacement, DMI Eli Zeira, was far less guarded in his assertions (Ibid., 55). Although the document included a caution regarding the limits of warning capability, the optimistic assumption seems to have carried over to IDF command. Furthermore, the document focused solely on SIGINT and VISINT, omitting human intelligence (HUMINT) in its entirety, partly as a result of the division of labor between AMAN and the more HUMINT-oriented Mossad (Ibid., 55).

The existing defense plan in 1973, called "Sela" (meaning "Rock"), was put in place in 1968 and relied on high-quality early strategic warning (Ibid., 56). The plan required at least five days of warning in order to call up reserves and deploy forces to pre-prepared defensive positions, especially on the Bar-Lev line facing Egypt on the banks of the Suez Canal (Ibid., 56). As AMAN promised four to six days' warning, the risk of having less than the required five days' warning was considered and Chief of Staff David Elazar told Prime Minister Golda Meir in May 1973 that he considered short notice to be forty-eight hours and claimed that they could have sufficient forces ready for war within that time frame (Ibid., 56-57).

In summation, the Israeli high command put their faith in AMAN's ability to provide early warning and it was made an essential part of Israel's defensive planning. Elazar was sure that war could not break out without warning, based on three pillars: 1) SIGINT and a high level Mossad source in the Egyptian leadership would provide early warning that Egypt had the intention to go to war; 2) previous experience proved that Egypt and Syria were poor at maintaining long-term secrecy; and 3) AMAN and the new Director of Military Intelligence, Eli Zeira, promised, both verbally and in writing, sufficient warning to mobilize reserves (Ibid., 58).

4.1.2 The intelligence conception

A *conception* is a thinking framework that facilitates structuring and the valuing of how relevant a certain piece of information is for the perception of a concrete problem (Bar-Joseph, 46). The Agranat Commission concluded in 1974, after the Yom Kippur War, that the root for Israel's intelligence failure was the existence of something they called "the conception" to which intelligence agents fervently adhered (Ibid., 46).

In the Israeli context "The Conception" was a collection of assumptions and ideas that established Egypt as the nexus for future aggression and that they were unable, and therefore unwilling, to launch an attack (Ibid., 46-47). Syria was seen as a likely ally to Egypt in case of war, but Syrian war participation was deemed to rely fully on the Egyptians taking the lead. Which was, in essence, correct, but resulted in an over-emphasis on evaluating Egyptian war intentions while ignoring the more obvious Syrian war preparations (Ibid., 46-47, 66). This was largely based on Israel's air superiority, Egyptian inability to strike at air bases in Israel, the previous results from the Six Days' War and the War of Attrition, and that the Egyptians were considered aware that any attempt at achieving their goals through war would result in an inevitable defeat (Ibid., 45-46). These assumptions were moderated by the view of the new Egyptian president Sadat as a "ridiculous" leader prone to making empty threats (Ibid., 46).

4.2 Application of the McMillan and Overall framework

First, the Yom Kippur-case will be related to the six causal factors with their respective failures and continuously analyzed. Secondly, the results from this analysis will then be used to discuss the applicability of the McMillan and Overall framework on intelligence failure as well as implications for future research and intelligence practice.

4.2.1 Strategic capacity for learning

Israel's strategic capacity for learning, made up by its ability to handle tactical and operational misalignments, relate to both managerial and organizational factors – defined as *single-loop decision-making* and *learning competencies* in the McMillan and Overall framework. This includes the managerial style of Zeira with its effects on communication and knowledge diffusion in and from AMAN, as well as the organization's ability to check bias and use existing knowledge and experience.

4.2.1.1 Single-loop decision-making

When Zeira became director of military intelligence, it resulted in a significant shift in management style. His personal convictions resulted in a top-down leadership style that fostered low levels of self-criticism and served to isolate the top echelons from knowledge in other parts of the organization. As both Zeira and Bandman held strong beliefs, which were confidently stated both internally and externally, they minimized potential corrective feedback and served to enforce a top-heavy single-loop decision-making process.

The effects of Zeira's leadership style becomes evident by the treatment of those within AMAN that considered imminent war a likely proposition. The in-group of top-level analysts, consisting of many senior analysts like Arie Shalev (head of the Research Branch), the chiefs of Branch 6 (Yona Bandman), Branch 3 (Chaim Yavetz), and Zeira as well as others, that adhered to "the conception" nicknamed the analysts expecting war as "the alarmists" (Bar-Joseph, 243). This speaks loudly to the strong ingroup dynamics that were allowed or shaped by Zeira's leadership. Furthermore, on multiple occasions the head of the Egyptian political section, Mr. Albert Sudai, demanded to attend discussions with Zeira and voice his concerns about imminent war he later found out that the meetings had been held without him (Ibid., 243).

This one-way communication from the AMAN leadership was also clearly seen in their avoidance of raising essential questions that could disturb the non-war view. Instead, vital questions were asked by Prime Minister Meir on April 18 and October 3, while Zeira resisted the topic (Ibid., 245). The attempt to silence dissent is further amplified by a statement by Bandman on October 1 that the only benefit of that day's discussion was that there would be no more debate about the possibility of war (Ibid., 245).

Clearly, in line with the single-loop decision-making category of McMillan and Overall, Zeira's managerial personality created a status quo enforcing culture that effectively silenced self-criticism by shaming dissidents and overtly avoiding topics deemed to go against the approved line. Furthermore, this lead Zeira and those in his proximity to accept the premature and unfounded conclusions predicted by McMillan and Overall's framework. The causal value of confirmation bias and groupthink from Zeira and those around him seems to be close to a Smoking Gun-test. Their refusal to acknowledge and distribute relevant information pointing to war is a clear indicator of a direct link to the intelligence failure of the Yom Kippur War. However, to fully understand how this could occur, a more complex picture of structural factors enabling bias emerges.

4.2.1.2 Learning Competencies

On a broader, tactical and organizational level, previous experience had a significant impact on Israel's view of potential threats. Despite a heavy emphasis on the importance of early warning, the success of the Six Days' War led to an organizational overconfidence, in part within AMAN but especially from the outside trust put in their ability to predict war. This overconfidence was further strengthened by the "cry-wolf" syndrome where Israel reacted three times to perceived Egyptian war preparation at the end of 1971, the end of 1972, and in the spring of 1973 (Bar-Joseph, 237). When overconfidence interacted with a DMI with strong personal convictions, the well-respected Research Department

presenting simplified facts, and they all lacked a sufficient check and balance, like some form of audit system, this resulted in a reinforcement of cognitive bias in nearly all involved individuals. The organization lacked the ability to embrace and learn from lower levels in the organization and thus could not properly harness competence and receive corrective feedback to question the assumptions of the top leadership.

4.2.1.3 Simple failures

As a result of single-loop decision-making and shortcomings in learning competencies an accumulation of simple failures could occur. These simple failures were primarily comprised of the maintained and strengthened biases of Zeira, Bandman, and other top-level decision-makers in the AMAN and IDF organizations. Furthermore, the organization lacked a sufficient ability to integrate learning throughout the organization to counteract this bias through corrective feedback. The organization failed to identify the developing organizational rigidity that resulted from Zeira's, Bandman's, and the organization's, biases that paved the way for premature and unfounded conclusions on the leadership level.

4.2.2 Strategic capacity for planning

The Israeli strategic capacity for organizational planning refers to their ability to anticipate change, both external and internal, by understanding past performance and the complexity of environmental interaction (McMillan and Overall, 279). The simple failures described above are underlying issues that have accumulated and not been properly dealt with by the organization, allowing more complex issues in the strategic capacity for planning to grow. Complex issues that consist of misalignments in the categories of *structural rigidities* and *intelligence sense-making* (Ibid., 278).

4.2.2.1 Structural rigidities

In 1973, AMAN showed several signs of structural rigidity. The strongly held beliefs of Zeira and Bandman deterred deviation from the status quo within the organization (Bar-Joseph, 243-245) which in turn promoted general inaction (). Routines that were supposed to garner knowledge became more ritualized and preconceived notions were strengthened rather than the opposite. Selective perception created a breeding ground for decision paralysis and a reduced understanding of the threat signals from Egypt (Ibid., 243).

When faced with information regarding Egyptian and Syrian war preparations, rather than changing approach, the organization, headed by Zeira and Bandman, relied more heavily on existing routines and frames of reference to validate perception and thus denied the existence of a threat (McMillan & Overall, 279; Bar-Joseph, 251).

The structural rigidity was, at least in part, a result of previous success on both AMAN's and the IDF's end. As Egypt and its allies had so clearly failed during the Six Days' War, and no sufficient alterations to their military capacity had been made, the situation encouraged decision rigidity and group conflict. The confidence in Israeli leadership that war could be predicted, and handedly dealt

with if it came to that, created the perception of resource slack that was based more on rigidly held ideas than an actual estimation of facts. This fits well with the idea presented by McMillan and Overall that rigidity can be the result of organizational success. Furthermore, as described by Bar-Joseph (239-240) the initiator-victim relation inherently means the intended victim of a ruse intends to maintain the status quo. This clearly affected the view of the entire Israeli system which had a strongly held wish for things to remain as they were, reinforcing the structural rigidity and confirmation bias.

However, it is important to note that Zeira blatantly ignored established standard operation procedures (SOPs) and refused to activate the special collection measures (Bar-Joseph, 236). Furthermore, he actively excluded parts of the organization that disagreed with his assessment (Ibid., 243), showing that the organization did have elements that questioned him and therefore were not necessarily fully rigid. A subtle difference, but rather than being too rigid, perhaps it would be fairer to argue that AMAN was not agile enough. Regardless, structural rigidity is not a sufficient explanation for failure, but was a necessary condition for allowing the bias of Zeira to dominate.

4.2.2.2 Intelligence sense-making

Closely related to the structural rigidity was the intelligence sense-making prevalent throughout the AMAN and IDF leadership. In other parts of the AMAN organization, awareness of the risk of war was higher (Bar-Joseph, 243), but due to single-loop decision-making and structural rigidity in particular this knowledge was not properly diffused to Zeira and Bandman in a way that forced them to reevaluate their assumptions. Had Zeira more rigorously strived to create a double-loop decision-making process this information could have more easily reached him, but to counter his bias the organization would have had to have a stronger feedback structure to force him to consider contradicting information. As it now stood the asymmetric information flow on all organizational levels served to filter out information that contradicted the held assumptions, “The conception”, further creating an overreliance on precedent and thus limiting AMAN’s ability to anticipate change.

The entire process surrounding Zeira’s leadership serves as a prime example of confirmation bias, cognitive dissonance, heuristic judgement, and groupthink (Bar Joseph, 246-248). Consistently, what Zeira wanted to be true was held to be true, while opposing views where actively silenced. Clear indications of an inability to realize the existence of confirmation bias in-group. Furthermore, Zeira considered himself and Bandman to be experts on the Egyptian mindset, leading to a multitude of assumptions more based on wishful thinking than on actual evidence.

4.2.2.3 Complex failures

Reinforced by single-loop decision-making and lacking learning competencies, the result of the structural rigidities and the intelligence sense-making, of Zeira and Bandman in particular, in AMAN was that the organization could not provide foresight nor planning for future events. The organizational ability to anticipate any change in Egyptian intention was severely hampered by an overreliance on precedent and the extreme confidence displayed by Zeira and those around him.

The unwillingness to accept the very existence of a threat meant that AMAN's ability to plan for the worst was more or less non-existent.

Surely, some of the structural issues predated Zeira's appointment, in particular the focus on status quo and an idea that AMAN understood the Egyptian mindset. But the axis of cognitive bias, single-loop decision-making, and intelligence sense-making were largely the result of repeated managerial short-comings.

4.2.3 Strategic capacity for agility

The strategic capacity for organizational agility, if it had been sufficiently developed in AMAN, could have appropriately dealt with individual cognitive bias and managerial difficulties before simple and complex failures accumulated and spiraled. Agility in an organization is intended to counteract the inherent tendency of individuals and organizations alike to revert to routine and rigid bureaucracy in times of crisis. This tendency more often than not results in a strengthened separation of subunits and the simplification of threatening situations. In the Yom Kippur-case this is evident in both the *knowledge inclusiveness* and *organizational platform* section of the McMillan and Overall framework.

4.2.3.1 Knowledge inclusiveness

One result of specialization in subunits is a separation of communication, which can easily intensify the asymmetric communication patterns described under *single-loop decision-making*. When an organization is pressured, this separation tends to strengthen rather than the opposite. The bureaucratic and hierarchical organization allow the display of confirmation bias and creates social hostility rather than search for facts or threats. The dominant, formal positions of Zeira and Bandman allowed their bias to fester, while their military rank and personal confidence lowered the ability of others to challenge assumptions. At the same time the lacking feedback mechanisms let Zeira and Bandman believe that they were in line with the overall view in AMAN, or at least to themselves deny and avoid opposing opinions.

One blatant example of the failure to include knowledge is how Mr. Albert Sudai is denied participation in discussions specifically in order to prevent him from voicing his concern (Bar-Joseph, 243).

As a result of lacking knowledge inclusiveness structure, the organization failed to obtain essential external and internal information that would have allowed a redirection of misalignments in the learning and planning levels.

However, it was not only a lack of organizational ability that prevented relevant knowledge from being included, but blatant lying on the part of Zeira. He told his superior that the special means of collection, built to ensure that potential war preparations were discovered, had been activated when they had not (Ibid., 116-117, 249).

4.2.3.2 Organizational platforms

The overall construction of AMAN lacked the required redundancies and other fail-safe systems to prevent a destructive spiral. The impact of Zeira's and Bandman's cognitive bias was amplified by the lack of fail safes in the organizational architecture. As with the case of Enron presented by McMillan and Overall, the change in leadership created a shift in the organizational culture which the organization's feedback structure was unable to handle. Instead of realizing that the path was destructive, the organization upheld it through social pressure and leadership characterized by single-loop decision-making, lacking communication, non-existent self-scrutiny, and, perhaps most notably, intelligence sense-making.

When Yariv was replaced by Zeira it resulted in a culture change that the organization failed to adequately adapt to, much like the case of Enron presented earlier. An aggressively confident leader alienated himself from the existing knowledge and expertise in the organization, surrounded himself solely by people who agreed with him, and the organizational tools – the redundancies – to handle such a drastic shift in less than a year simply was not there.

Furthermore, inter-agency rivalry seems to have further strengthened the failures, as AMAN tended to down-play intelligence from the more HUMINT-oriented Mossad who provided some of the strongest evidence for the Egyptian intent to go to war (Bar-Joseph, 241). This rivalry also led to Mossad being excluded from meeting with the Prime Minister and other crucial meetings in the days leading up to the war (Ibid., 241). Additionally, the Research department was ripe with intra-departmental rivalry, where the dominant group that accepted "the Conception" – which was both the majority and the leadership – felt threatened by having their assumptions questioned by "alarmists" (Ibid., 241). Evidently, the organizational platform was unable to handle the combination of inter- and intra-departmental rivalry while at the same time countering bias within the top-level leadership.

4.2.3.3 Catastrophic failures

The combination of managerial and organizational shortcomings, with top-down leadership, lacking feedback structure, poor communication, and insufficient organizational platforms to provide redundancy, resulted in an accumulation of simple and complex failures.

Simple failures included maintaining and strengthening Zeira's and Bandman's bias, their inability to integrate knowledge from the organization to question their own assumptions, an organizational overreliance on precedent, and overconfidence.

This paved the way for complex failures. For example, structural rigidities that maintained the status quo, allowed the leadership to deny the existence of a threat, and prevented inter-departmental cooperation, while giving an illusion of consensus. Combined with intelligence sense-making, based on faulty communication, confirmation bias and lacking knowledge-integration, "the Conception" was continuously reinforced rather than questioned.

Once faced with the increasingly clear war preparations of Egypt and Syria, the limits of AMAN's agility became clear with the failure of knowledge inclusiveness and the structural limitations of its feedback and redundancy

systems. Instead of increasing communication once threatened, the leadership doubled down and the bureaucratic and hierarchical separation became stronger. Golda Meir and David Elazar, the IDF Chief of Staff, accepted the warning of imminent war in the last ten hours, while the Minister of Defense, intelligence and military leaders were unwilling to do so until the last hours before the first shots were fired (Bar-Joseph, 188-189). The existing feedback structure was insufficient to check cognitive bias on the top echelons of AMAN leadership. Combined, these agility factors elevated the simple and complex failures to catastrophic levels, rending Israel largely unprepared for war.

4.3 Evaluation of framework

First and foremost, the framework seems to work as a means of structuring and analyzing intelligence failure. The accumulative and temporal nature of the framework grants a comprehensive picture of the entire causal sequence, rather than glimpses of singular causes such as cognitive bias. Within the limitations of this paper, it seems the size of the framework limits the potential depth of a case analysis. In more comprehensive academic case studies, or in a future where the framework is more established and requires less description, the McMillan and Overall framework could prove even more useful. As it now stands the lack of systematic, sequential breakdown of the entire war means that there are holes in the analysis of the Yom Kippur War which means that the explanatory value of any conclusions is questionable. In order for the framework to come to its right, the case would have had to be described even more in depth.

Furthermore, it is important to note the risk, as when working with any pre-established framework, of oneself falling victim to confirmation bias. Therefore, a framework such as this can never be considered sufficient to fully explain the complexities of an event but has to be accompanied by alternative methods and requires constant vigilance on the part of the researcher.

The complexity of the framework also means that it is rather cumbersome to gain an effective overview. As such, its usefulness in a preventive capacity by intelligence organizations is doubtful – at least in the current state. Rather, the simpler picture presented by the figure (figure 1) could be used as a diagnostic support to identify important areas to shore up in an organization. It is possible that future developments of the framework could be more easily accessible.

Many of the causal factors are, in themselves, not new as means of explaining intelligence failure. Rather, they are closely related to established concepts such as confirmation bias, cognitive dissonance, and groupthink. However, the framework does include organizational theory ideas of structural rigidity and organizational communication that might not be fully explored in the intelligence context. Breaking down the causal factors and more clearly defining what is to be included in which factor might make the framework clearer. Still, the primary contribution of the framework is the inclusion of a multitude of causal factors and the idea of accumulative failures. Shifting focus from dramatic single events or individuals to the impact of repeated lower-level failure and lacking feedback mechanisms has great potential both for academic and practical application. Here there is much to be learnt from organizational theory.

While useful for academic study, the overall structure of the framework describing failure as a spiraling process that occurs on multiple organizational levels, is an important inclusion in any diagnostic organizational work in the field of intelligence. It removes much of the risk of blaming a particular individual or event and focuses on the larger picture. This holds the potential to facilitate organizational self-scrutiny by shifting blame from individuals to the organizational level. Generally speaking, predicting the effect of every single event or individual on an organization is impossible. Instead, focus on the organizational structure is consistently possible. Ensuring sufficient corrective feedback mechanisms, fail safe-systems, and strong communication channels will in the long run prove more effective than simply trying to recruit the right person for the right job.

In conclusion, the framework shows promise in the study of intelligence failure. It contributes important knowledge from the field of organization that could deepen our understanding of intelligence organizations and intelligence failure. In its current form, the application of the framework is not fully tested. Conceivably, minor alterations and adjustments could streamline the model to facilitate its use. Also, continued use could further clarify how the content of the causal factors should be defined in the field of intelligence.

5 Discussion

As a whole, the McMillan and Overall framework fits well to break down the organizational structure behind intelligence failures. Rather than simply focusing on individuals it provides insight into organizational issues that can provide more constructive future ways of preventing the same failures. The temporal and accumulative aspects lower the risk of over-focusing on individuals or specific events, and thus creates a more comprehensive view of what constitutes failure. Without taking these factors into account the complexities of intelligence organization and intelligence failure risks being lost.

However, it remains unclear how well it would lend itself to analyzing existing organizations and aid in prevention rather than academic analysis after-the-fact. As a tool to structure a well-documented case it provides a comprehensive view of the situational complexities, but without applying it to an ongoing organization and case, with limited information availability, it is difficult to see what could be gained from it outside of academia.

Furthermore, the framework seems to struggle with individual factors, such as evaluating the importance of confirmation bias and personality, that are considered a part of many categories, but that in cases such as the Yom Kippur War are highly prominent. Largely due to the broadness of each category, a clearer definition of what is to be included or excluded from each causal factor could aid in applying the framework. As it now stands, many events fall into multiple causal categories, confusing the analysis. This could be a direct result of the broad overall perspective of the framework combined with the detail of each causal factor. A framework that tries to explain the process of failure accumulation cannot simultaneously describe the intricacies of inter- and intrapersonal workings, nor should it. Still, it remains important to note that the framework in itself does provide a broad analysis of a wide array of causal factors, but in its broadness, one risks eliminating details that could prove beneficial to the understanding of events. While not essentially an argument against the framework, it remains an important point to consider when employing it to the field of intelligence. Rather than replacing groupthink and confirmation bias as explanatory factors, it includes them in wider categories. Therefore, more detailed analysis of individual and event-based causes for failure is still essential but these can then be placed in the framework as a part of a larger organizational view. Besides, no single model will ever fully explain how or why intelligence failed, rather a combination of methods must be used to come as close as possible to a reliable conclusion. The McMillan and Overall framework could, if further utilized and adapted, be one of these methods by providing a deep, multi-layered systematic view of failure as an organizational and temporal occurrence.

As it now stands the McMillan and Overall framework serves well as a means to organize existing knowledge, but its ability to generate new knowledge related to the workings of an organization remains to be seen. Field-testing the framework as a diagnostic tool in organizational work could serve to garner these insights, as would more comprehensive case studies. While the framework holds

potential for future research and potentially for practical use, the main contribution is, as of yet, theoretical. The view of failure as temporal and accumulative processes on multiple organizational levels can be applied to most analyses of intelligence failure.

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