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# A Eurocentric Study of New Terrorism

Assessing New Terrorism's validity and applicability in  
describing European terrorism 2010-2018 using quantitative  
research.

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## Abstract

New Terrorism has been a highly regarded theory in the field of terrorism since the late 1990s, but how accurate is it in regards to European terrorism in 2010-2018? Are terrorists more lethal, primarily religious, part of transnational and decentralized organizations, and are they using CBRN-weapons? This paper uses a quantitative study, with a descriptive and retroductive approach, of all terror attacks in Europe 2010-2018, to examine New Terrorisms' validity, and propose possible changes to the theory. I find that New Terrorism is partly correct. Terror groups are primarily transnational and non-hierarchical and lethality is higher than in the early 90s, although less so in Western Europe. Separatist groups are however found to be the most common type of movement, followed by ideological movements – responsible for 4 and 2 times as many terror attacks as religious groups. Likewise, the potential threat of terrorists using CBRN-weapons for mass destruction is found to be incorrect. Based on this, New Terrorism 2.0, Europe edition is proposed. Stating that separatist and ideological groups are the most common, lethality is high (but less so in Western Europe), organizations are primarily transnational and non-hierarchical, and the risk of terrorist using CBRN-weapons is low in contemporary European terrorism.

*Key words:* New Terrorism, Europe, CBRN-weapons, Religious terrorism, Lethality, Separatist terrorism.

*Words:* 10 863

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# 1 Introduction

This research paper seeks to examine the accuracy and applicability of the theory New Terrorism in regards to European terrorism 2010-2018. To begin with, background, the research question and the purposes for it, and the structure of the paper are outlined.

## 1.1 Background

Terrorism is generally defined as violence by an individual or subnational group in order to inflict fear in a population beyond the immediate target for political goals (Hoffman 2006:40). The exact form of it has changed throughout history. According to Rapoport (2001: 420), there were 4 major waves of terrorism between 1880 and 2001, "each with its own special character, purposes, and tactics".

A goal for some has been to accurately describe the ever-changing nature of terrorism. In the late '90s and early 2000s, the theory New Terrorism was outlined by Lesser (1999), Hoffman (1998), Laqueur (1999), Neumann (2009) among others to describe what was in their eyes a new form of terrorism emerging as the most common one at the time. Contemporary terrorism was argued to differ from "traditional terrorism" in terms of aims, structures, and methods. Religion, higher lethality, transnational network structures, and the potential use of CBRN-weapons (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) was seen as the new defining characteristics of terrorism according to them. After the 9/11 attacks, when jihadists linked to Al-Qaeda, a transnational group working on acquiring CBRN-weapons (Cameron 2002), killed 2 977 by hijacking commercial airplanes and flying them into heavily populated buildings (CNN 2019), many agreed with them. Following 9/11,

New Terrorism became a dominant theoretical perspective in the field of terrorism, influencing the perception of contemporary terrorism and the crafting of counter-terrorism measures (Silke 2007).

It's now been years since New Terrorism was outlined. Still, it's being taught at universities and is heavily influential in the counter-terrorism industry (Mythen & Walklate 2014: 56). While studies still support transnationalism, non-hierarchical structures (Killberg 2012) and high lethality (GTD 2018: 31) Europol's (2019) latest research states that separatist terrorists are more active than Islamic ones and terrorists using CBRN-weapons on the continent is almost unheard of. Given this, how terrorism has changed throughout history, and the rapid progress and shifts in technology, demographics, and counter-terrorism in Europe one could argue thorough testing of New Terrorism is needed. That leads the text to the research question and the purpose of it.

## 1.2 Research Question and Purpose

The aim of this thesis is to examine New Terrorism's validity and applicability in Europe in the time period 2010-2018 by testing it empirically. There are five primary purposes for this. Firstly, it can be argued to be crucial to understand if and how a central theory on terrorism such as New Terrorism holds up empirically in present time in order to efficiently combat and prevent future terrorism. Testing the theory in a modern setting will allow for this and in addition describe key characteristics of contemporary terrorism in doing so, hopefully adding important insights for academia, law enforcement and legislation to use.

Second and linked to the first purpose, as alluded to in the background, the theory is aging. Most of the influential literature was written in the late 1990s (Laqueur 1999, Hoffman 1998, Lesser 1999) or the early 2000s (Tan & Ramakrishna 2002, Simon & Benjamin 2001). Even more recent pieces (Neuman 2009), are now more than a decade old. Correct theoretical assumptions made then might not be true today considering the changing nature of terrorism.

Third, the concept New Terrorism was created to outline and explain terrorism on a global scale (Lesser 1999: 2). The possibility of regional differences is therefore prevalent. In order to reach conclusions on how accurate the theory is on European terrorism, it needs to be tested there. Fourth, Europe is chosen since much of the empirical research in the above-mentioned sources have focused on the US, the Middle East, and Asia. Given that in the period 2010-2018 2884 terror attacks occurred on the continent, killing 2 477 and injuring 5 406 (GTD 2020:a), Europe should arguably not be overlooked.

The fifth purpose is to add a more quantitative statistical perspective to the theory. When surveying the literature, it becomes apparent that most theoretical inferences are made from qualitative studies, both supportive and critical, making inferences based on a few key groups or events, such as Al-Qaeda and 9/11, or Aum Shinrikyo and the Sarin Gas attack (Crenshaw 2008: 27). Since New Terrorism is supposed to describe the general trends in terrorism it should hold up to a quantitative test.

A secondary aim of the thesis is to test for any inter-continental differences between Eastern and Western Europe. Surveying for variations between the regions can be seen as appropriate due to large differences in regards to wealth, history, political system, and geography. Doing so will hopefully bring more nuance to the study and understanding of the results.

In order to reach the aims and fulfill all five reasons the following research question has been outlined: *How does the theory of New Terrorism align with terrorism in Europe 2010-2018?* To answer the question a quantitative statistical study is performed, focusing on the key characteristics of New Terrorism.

### 1.3 Structure

To answer the research question the paper is divided into six main sections. Following the introduction, the theoretical framework on Terrorism and New

Terrorism will be presented, highlighting the 4 key characteristics of New Terrorism: type of movement, lethality, structure, and CBRN-weapons. In the third section, the methodology is outlined, including research design, data collection, and data analysis. The results are then presented and analyzed in section four. In the fifth section, the results and inferences made in section 4 are discussed in terms of possible reasons for why the results came about and how the result affects New Terrorism going forward. In the sixth section, the conclusion is presented.

## 2. Theoretical framework

In this section, the theoretical framework is presented. Starting off by defining terrorism to clarify what we are studying in the thesis. Following that, New Terrorism is described by presenting the 4 key characteristics of the theory: type of movement, lethality, structure, and CBRN-weapons. Based on the description, 4 hypotheses are outlined in the last part of the section, to be studied later on in the paper.

### 2.1 Terrorism

Terrorism is one of the hardest concepts to define in peace and conflict. As of 2019, there were at least 212 definitions (Nazala 2019: 114). However, there is a decent form of consensus in the academic world on what the key features that define terrorism are. A study concluded that the most common one is the use of violence (represented in 88% of definitions), followed by it being for political reasons (65%), and used to inflict fear (51%) (Hoffman 2006: 34). From these key features, a common pattern is to conceptualize terrorism as a deliberate form of violence performed by an individual, a sub-national or



non-state group in order to inflict fear in a population beyond the immediate target and doing so to reach a political goal (Neumann 2009: 8)(Hoffman 2006: 40)(Prunckun 2014: 178-179).

Terrorism is an asymmetrical form of warfare used by the less powerful to overcome a stronger opponent by the doctrine “kill one, frighten thousand” (Ibid). The violent act constitutes a form of propaganda by deed with hopes from the terrorist of influencing a population to behave in a way that suits their political goal. The political goal can in turn be ideological, territorial, or theological (Ramakrishna 2014: 161-162)(Neumann 2009: 95).

## 2.2 New Terrorism

New Terrorism is a theory in the field of terrorism that was outlined in the late 1990s and early 2000s to manifest, what was proposed, to be a significant on-going shift in the nature of terrorism. The “new” terrorism was argued to be different from the “old” terrorism that dominated the mid 20th century in 4 distinct aspects: type of movement, lethality, structure, and the potential use of CBRN-weapons (Hoffman 2006). Each aspect will now be elaborated on in with the purpose of conceptualizing them and setting up relevant measurements, which is done in section 3.1, and crafting 4 hypotheses to test.

### 2.2.1 Type of Movement

The first cornerstone of New Terrorism is the argument that religious terrorism has become the most common type of terrorist movement (Neumann 2009: 23-24). It’s put forward since for much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the most common terrorist movement was either left-wing extremist, far-right/nationalist or separatists. Nationalistic right-wing groups attacked immigrants, asylum-seekers, and guest workers with the goal of more ethnically homogeneous home countries (Laqueur 1999: 120). On the opposite

side Marxist, anarchist, and other left-wing groups fought with the aim of ending capitalism and neo-liberal interference. In addition, separatist groups like ETA and IRA used terror in their pursuit of national liberation (Crenshaw 2008: 29)(Hoffman 2006: 232- 233).

Since then a shift has occurred according to proponents of New Terrorism (Hoffman 1999: 15). The claim is based on the fact that since the 1980s religious terrorism has been on the rise at the same time as left-wing, right-wing, and separatist terror has been on the decline (Neumann 2009: 23-24)(Gurr & Cole, 2000). In 2004 around half of the active terror groups were labeled religious while 28% were considered left-wing and 24% nationalist or separatist (Hoffman 2006: 85-86).

The rise of religious terrorism has partly been attributed to the creation of the Mujahedin in Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution, spreading political Islam around the globe (Rapaport 2001: 441-442)(Neumann 2009: 106-115). But more importantly to the large societal shifts in the last decades. Increasing globalization, secularism, modernity, and migration are argued to cause feelings of anxiety and existential threat, plus economic and cultural segregation - especially for Muslim diasporas in the west (Ibid 80-101). Subsequently, many who feel left behind turn to religion because of its moral and ethical critique of power, it providing meaning and a blueprint for a new society (Noor 2002: 161). Most religious groups are peaceful, but some outliers are not. When peaceful means fail to bring about change some turn to those outliers, often attracted by the fact that religion can legitimize violence by providing a higher purpose for it (Neumann 2009: 96-101), making religion a strong motivator for terror.

Religious terrorism is recognized by Hoffman (1999: 20) as “a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative”. Islamic terrorism is regarded as the most prominent form of it (Neumann 2009: 105), but it also manifests itself in forms of cultist, Jewish, Sikhist, and Christian extremism (Jurgensmeyer 2017)(Hoffman 2006: 89-127). Religious terrorists are thought to have millenarian or even apocalyptic aims (Laqueur 1999:

83-84), perhaps best exemplified by Al-Qaeda's pursuit to destroy western society (Simon & Benjamin 2001: 5). Distinctly different from the more "traditional terrorist" who is believed to be driven by ideological or territorial aims. Goals that are perceived as more attainable (Lesser 1999: 101). Religious groups still have territorial and ideological pursuits, but they are secondary to their spiritual and theological goals (Neumann 2009: 94).

Religion's dominance has however been questioned, even among the theory's proponents. Laqueur (1999: 80 & 105) argues that far-right terrorism, separatism, and religion are equally strong types of movements. In similar fashion Neumann (2009: 24) accept the statement that radical nationalism is as common in domestic terrorism and Lesser (1999: 103-104) held it possible that ideological terror movements might increase drastically under the right circumstances. Crenshaw (2008: 36), a critique, argues that scholars overestimate the spiritual part and that the claims being made are not empirically substantiated. However, all things considered, religion is regarded as the most common type of movement in New Terrorism.

### 2.2.2 Lethality

Increasing lethality constitutes the second characteristic of New Terrorism. Contemporary terrorism is argued to be more lethal than in the past. Both in the sense that a larger percentage of terror attacks result in fatalities and more mass-casualty attacks are taking place. A mass-casualty attack is defined as an attack resulting in 100+ casualties by Falkenrath et.al (1998: 47). The sheer number of mass-casualty attacks since the '90s (Hoffman 2006: 270) – including 9/11, the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing and the 2004 Madrid Train Bombing – and the trend of more attacks resulting in fatalities in the '90s - from 14% in 1991 to 29% in 1995 and then averaging around 20-25% (Hoffman 1999: 10-12) – have made proponents put forward this claim.

Looking back, terrorists in the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century are thought to have followed the doctrine "a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead" because most groups

then had ideological or territorial goals and the violence was just a method to reach them (Ramakrishna 2014: 162). Too much violence was seen as counter-productive as a method since it came with a probable risk of losing public support and a group's place at the bargaining table (Simon & Benjamin 2001: 5-6). Harming a group's political pursuit. Instead, strategic symbolic acts or threats of violence were modus operandi for old terror groups to gain attention, often through media, in order to inflict anxiety and pressure on the enemy without losing supporters in the process (Hoffman 2006: 233). Old terror groups were therefore selective in target-choosing - often focusing on military targets - and wary about the number of victims. The mass-casualty attacks that did occur were written off as mistakes or done by rogue elements in the organization (Neumann 2009: 25-26)(Laqueur 1999: 32-33).

The argument that terrorists are more lethal now has however met criticism since highly lethal terrorism is nothing new. The Air India Bombing in 1985 killed 328 (Cameron 2002: 51) and FLN in Algeria were highly lethal in the '50s (Duyvesteyn 2004: 31) for example. It has also been argued that the assumption is based on a few outliers (Tucker 2001: 6). Neumann (2009: 26-27) states however that "there exists no data that shows stagnation or decline in mass-casualty attacks over the past decade" and that there exists a consistent and well supported scholarly consensus for an increase in overall lethality.

Considering it to be true several reasons are put forward for why that is. New terrorists are perceived to have let go of their constraints on violence. Recognizing killings to be an end itself instead of just a mean (Simon & Benjamin 2001). At worst, the end is to erase an entire enemy population (Laqueur 1999: 81) - moving towards a doctrine of a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead. A doctrine linked to religious terrorism since terrorists believing they're acting in divine duty have more apocalyptic aims and have an easier time legitimizing the killing of the "other" and disregarding public opinion (Jurgensmeyer 2017). Higher lethality is also linked to information overload and emotional desensitization - forcing larger and larger death tolls to get noticed and outbidding other terror groups in the current crammed media

landscape. New, better, and more accessible weaponry and technology also play its part. Especially in conjunction with more states taking an active role in sponsoring terror groups with funds and weapons. A final factor is new organizational structures with less constraint on the terrorist doing the attack (Hoffman 1999: 13-25)(Neumann 2009: 135-140).

### 2.2.3 Structure

Speaking of new organizational structures. It's actually the third characteristic of New Terrorism. Unlike contemporary groups, traditional groups are argued to have used top-down hierarchical structures with a clear chain of command while also having a physical center of gravity in a region or state for their operations (Arquilla et.al 1999: 45)(Neumann 2009: 17-18). An example is IRA - an Irish terrorist group operating in Ireland and Great Britain 1969-1994 using a structure similar to most militaries (Ibid: 29-32).

The hierarchical structures did however make terror groups vulnerable to counter-terrorism since a key witness, a wiretap or a mole could expose a large part of the organization (Rapoport 2001: 420)(Neumann 2009: 17). Leading to most new groups adopting network structures with a flatter, decentralized structure with greater autonomy for fractions and individuals according to New Terrorism. In these structures' terrorists operate in cells consisting of a few terrorists and a team leader, with no knowledge or cooperation with other cells or personal relations with the organization's leaders (Arquilla et.al 1999: 41)(Hoffman 2006: 271). Cells plan, prepare, and execute attacks on their own while the central command is left to focus on the bigger picture - theology/ideology, recruitment, and macro strategy. It's favored since it makes groups more flexible, responsive, and harder to fight for governments (Neumann 2009: 52).

In addition, terror groups are argued to have become increasingly transnational due to globalization, cheaper air travel, and large improvements in IT. The Internet is regarded as the most important reason since it allows for fast

encrypted communication, transferring money, and availability of information on how to conduct terrorism. Increasing transnationalism manifests itself in groups working across state borders, receiving financial support, and members from abroad (Ibid: 50-70)(Tan 2002: 234-245). Transnationalism also takes the form of central command in large organizations like Al-Qaeda or ISIS setting up their headquarters in war-torn states with little rule of law and run their organizations from there. Assisting their cells wherever they are and leaving them to do the violence (Glenn 2015). The increasing transnationalism can be seen as a new headache for counter-terrorism agencies since most of their tools are based around national institutions (Neumann 2009: 153-156).

#### 2.2.4 CBRN-Weapons

Most proponents of New Terrorism put forward a fourth characteristic, the potential threat of terrorists using CBRN-Weapons (chemical, biological, radiologic, and nuclear) in the near future - what is often referred to as weapons of mass destruction. The risk of terrorists using CBRN-weapons instead of conventional weapons such as firearms and bombs in order to cause mass destruction was stated as high in the late '90s and early 2000s (Laqueur 1999)(Simon & Benjamin 2001: 10)(Lesser 1999: 120).

Four reasons were behind this. Firstly, terrorists had started gaining the necessary technical expertise they'd lacked in the past thanks to the internet and state sponsorship, especially in Europe (Laqueur 1999: 228). Secondly, the fall of the Soviet Union unleashed large amounts of nuclear and radioactive material into the black market for wealthy terror organizations to tap into (Laqueur 1999: 74). Third, CBRN-weapons seem to be the perfect weapon for the new lethal and apocalyptic religious terrorists, seeking to annihilate the enemy (Simon & Benjamin 2001: 11). Fourth, major terror groups were actively working to acquire them and put them to use. Most notably Al-Qaeda who for years prioritized to obtain them (Ramakrishna 2014: 166), and after 9/11 were close to succeeding (Cameron 2002: 56) and Aum

Shinrikyo who in 1995 infected the Tokyo Subway with sarin gas - killing 12 and injuring 5 500 (Laqueur 1999: 54).

Yet, it was only a prediction for the future. At the time no data intended it was becoming a prevalent feature. Looking at previous data nuclear and radiological terrorism was in sharp decline from 1970 to 2000 while biological and chemical terrorism was slightly increasing (Karmon 2002: 194-195). During the '90s 69 CBRN-related attacks took place, 28% of them in Europe. 17 of the ones in Europe were deemed actual terror attacks and 15 of them were chemical. None was used for mass destruction (Ibid).

Despite stating the future threat as high, reasons for why the threat hadn't and possibly wouldn't materialize was put forward by the same proponents. Hoffman (2006: 272-280) argued that only a few terror groups would have the capabilities to successfully use them. Laqueur (1999: 69-71) stated that nuclear and radiological weapons require immense funding, time, and expertise while the cheap and easy alternative, biological weapons, was unreliable. Making chemical weapons the only viable option at the time. In turn, Cameron (2002: 63-64) argued that several groups had moral constraints about using them, despite better capabilities they were still hard to obtain and use successfully. For example, Aum Shinrikyo failed to launch more than one mass-casualty attack despite numerous attempts. And after 9/11 the support for terrorism declined and state sponsorship regarding CBRN-weapons with it (Ibid: 53) - making future attacks even less likely. In Cameron's words in 2002: "it appears to be a major disconnect between interest and an immediate threat."

Worth noting is that Neumann (2009) does not use the risk of CBRN-weapons as part of his conceptualization of New Terrorism, probably for the above-stated reasons. Making CBRN-weapons the part of New Terrorism with the least theoretical backing.

## 2.3 Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical framework presented above I propose four hypotheses for the study:

- 1) In accordance with New Terrorism, I expect religious terrorism to be the most common type of movement. The historic increase of it and the on-going societal shifts that are argued to have caused it indicates it should be. However, based on the mild skepticism of religions' dominance made by the theory's proponents a result showing far-right and separatist terrorism being as common as religious terrorism could be somewhat considered in line with New Terrorism.
- 2) In regards to lethality - based on improvements in weaponry and technology, less constraint on terrorists, information overload, and the apocalyptic goals of religious groups – I expect it to be higher than in the 90s, like New terrorism argues. Meaning fatalities to be present in over 14% of all terror attacks and likely at + 20%, and there to be more mass-casualty attacks in Europe than the 9 that took place in 1991-1999 (GTD 2020: c).
- 3) A majority of the studied organizations are expected to be non-hierarchical and transnational. Increasing globalism, development in IT plus the fact that these types of structures make the groups harder to combat indicates why the hypothesis should be correct.
- 4) The number of uses of CBRN-weapons should higher than the 17 that took place in Europe in the '90s and a few uses should have resulted in mass-destruction. 2010-2018 should qualify as the near future proponents of the theory talks about, and state sponsorship, better capabilities and access to material, and the more apocalyptic goals of today's terrorists support the hypothesis. However, many doubts are stated in the theoretical framework and it's the part with the least theoretical backing, arguing against it.



## 3. Methodology

In the following section, the methodology for testing the 4 hypotheses is presented by outlining the research design and how the data is collected and analyzed.

### 3.1 Research Design

Comparative research is chosen to answer the research question since it allows a researcher to empirically examine if a theory's assumptions are general by testing it in different countries and time periods (Halperin & Heath 2017: 212). In this study, it's done by comparing the theoretical assumptions of New Terrorism with empirical data on terrorism in Europe 2010-2018.

The study is a Large-N study of all recorded cases of terrorism that fits the stated operationalization of terrorism, see table 1, limited to attacks conducted on European soil during the period 2010/01/01-2018/12/31. The study has a descriptive approach, studying the existence and frequency of the four characteristics of New Terrorism, based on the conceptualizations, operationalizations, and measurements outlined in table 2. All characteristics are studied separately. In the next step, data analysis is done using descriptive statistics with the purpose of showing central tendencies in the data. More on that in section 3.3.

*Table 1 - How Terrorism is Studied (Based on Section 2.1)*

Concept	Conceptualization	Operationalization	Measurement
Terrorism	A deliberate form of violence performed by an individual or non-state group in order to inflict fear in a population beyond the immediate target to reach a political goal.	Successful use of violence carried out by a non-state actor with a political goal in mind.	Each individual actor of terrorism that fits the operationalization.

*Table 2 - How New Terrorism is Studied (Based on Section 2.2)*

Concept	Conceptualization	Operationalization	Measurement
Type of Movement	Religious groups are the most common type of terror movement.	Most groups are primarily: a) driven by theological imperatives and have, b) apocalyptic/millennial goals	The label attributed to the individual/group for each terror attack, classified into the following categories: <b>1. Religious</b> a) <i>Islamist</i> b) <i>Christian</i> c) <i>Jewish</i> <b>2. Ideological:</b> a) <i>Far-right/nationalist</i> b) <i>Far-left</i> c) <i>Ideological other</i> <b>3. Separatist</b> <b>4. Other</b>
Lethality	Terrorism is more lethal than in the early 1990s.	a) More than 14% of terror acts result in fatalities b) More than 9 incidents have resulted in 100+ casualties	a) % of incidents resulting in fatalities b) Number of mass casualty attacks

Structure	Terrorist groups are primarily non-hierarchical and transnational.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Fractions are autonomous and have no or limited chain-of-command.</li> <li>b) Groups are operating over state borders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a)               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Has the group few or no levels of middle management?</li> <li>2. Are fractions autonomous in regards to target selection, strategy, and execution?</li> </ul>               Yes or no.             </li> <li>b) Does it operate, cooperate, or receive help transnationally? Yes or no.</li> </ul>
CBRN-weapons	Terrorists are using CBRN-weapons for mass destruction	More than 17 successful uses of CBRN-weapon in terror attacks and some for the purpose of mass destruction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Uses of CBRN</li> <li>b) What type</li> <li>c) Its impact</li> </ul>

Considering the quantitative approach of the study, the results will come with high external validity, meaning that the results are good for theory testing and for drawing general inferences about European terrorism. The 9-year period is chosen with that in mind since it allows for a large sample size, limiting the impact of outliers while the cases remain contemporary. The large sample size is preferable since in comparative research large sample sizes are considered crucial for high external validity (Ibid: 174-175). The quantitative approach does however come with less detail and depth which gives my findings lower internal validity (Ibid: 178). Fortunately, that's not a problem for the thesis. The purpose of it is not to give extensive detail on an individual terror group or attack.

### 3.2 Data collection

The data is primarily gathered from large statistical databases since it's the most time-efficient way of collecting large amounts of data (Ibid: 176-177) Considering the total number of terror acts in the study is 2 884 (GTD 2020:a), collecting the data myself would not be feasible. It is however secondary data, which is considered inferior to primary data because the initial data collection might be containing elements of bias and methodological

flaws that are not transparent (Ibid: 180). Every data source has thus been picked with caution.

The primary source is one of two major databases on terrorism: Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The other one, RAND Database stopped measuring in 2009 and can thus not be used. Unfortunate since triangulation, combining several different sources (Dulic 2011: 39), is recommended to ensure valid and reliable information. GTD is, fortunately, a highly regarded source of information on terrorism, referenced by a multitude of scholars, databases, and governmental institutions (LaFree 2011: 44). It's the world's most comprehensive database on terrorism, managed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland (GTD 2020). GTD can be seen as the equivalent of the Uppsala Conflict Database, on terrorism.

The fact that GTD is American based, and thus not directly affected by the terrorism, and not a government source should be considered a strength since government statistics on sensitive topics such as terrorism have a greater risk of containing bias (Halperin and Heath 180-181). Steps have still been taken to further limit threats of bias or measuring errors. Other sources such as Europol's yearly reports on terrorism, official incident reports, and national statistics are used to control for any uncertainties in GTDs data. Adding elements of triangulation.

Despite GTDs comprehensive database it doesn't offer necessary information about organizational structures and at times the terrorists' aims and motivation. To gather data for this, intelligence reports, case studies, and official documents are primarily used. Favoring primary sources and checking for biases by evaluating the sources in regards to its audience, author's agenda, and if the author represents a biased 3rd party. In the cases where those sources can't fill the gap, newspaper articles are used with the same source criticism. Preferably from News Agencies since they are primary news sources and therefore have not gone through another layer of editing or filtering (Sollenberg & Öberg 2011: 49).

During the study, the conceptualizations and operationalizations outlined in tables 1 and 2 are strictly followed to avoid faulty inferences due to different sources using different

definitions of theoretical concepts. A common problem in social science research (Höglund 2011: 118-120). By doing this I increase my internal validity and ensures good reliability (Halperin and Heath 2017: 171). Lastly, Appendix A is transparent and detailed on how and from where data is collected to make sure findings are easy to replicate and verify.

### 3.3 Data analysis

Since the research question is descriptive the answer is as well and the analytic process set up to reach one. The data analysis is done by using descriptive statistics with the purpose of showing central tendencies in the data. Because I'm not interested in exploring any relationship between independent and dependent variables the analysis is limited to univariate statistics, as descriptive studies should be (Heath & Halperin 2017: 363 & 391).

The analysis follows the school of logical positivism taking a retroductive approach, combining deduction with induction. Logical reasoning, mathematics, and empirical observations are combined in the process (Ibid: 30-31) of making truthful claims about European terrorism. Deduction is the primary method because the most important aim of the thesis is to test New Terrorism. This part comes first. The deductive approach began with outlining New Terrorism in section 2.2 and continued by crafting the 4 hypotheses presented in section 2.3. In section 4, these assumptions are analyzed in regards to the empirical observations in the study and inferences about the theory's validity in Europe in 2010-2018 are made. After this, the inductive approach comes into play. Based on the empirical observation and the analysis, possible redefinitions of New Terrorism are made for the theory to better align with the empirical reality of present Europe terrorism.

The four characteristics of New Terrorism are measured and analyzed separately. Measurements for type of movement, structure, and CBRN-weapons are coded as nominal variables since they are categorical and therefore can't take on numerical values (Halperin & Heath 2017: 364). Numbers are assigned to each variable and the numbers of instances of each measurement are studied. Data on lethality is interval, meaning that there is no distinction between the measured value and the label (Ibid: 365-366).

Regarding type of movement, every responsible individual/group for each incident is studied and divided into one of the categories presented in table 2 that fits them the most based on their goals, aims, and motivations. Cases where the perpetrator is unknown are discarded. When GTD doesn't offer enough intel to make an informed decision other sources are used. The percentile distribution is presented in table 3 and compared to hypotheses 1.

Lethality is studied in more ways. Most importantly, the percentage of incidents that result in fatalities is calculated, and the amount of mass-casualty attacks is extracted and compared to previous time-periods of the same length. The results are then analyzed in regards to the hypotheses 2. To accompany that, the distribution of casualties per incident, the mean for casualties, fatalities, and injuries as well as the range is calculated to give more information about the overall lethality. Everything is presented in table 4 and figures 1, 2, and 3.

For structure, the top 30 groups in terms of most conducted terror attacks are taken as a sample size to represent the entire population. They're studied individually in regards to the operationalization set up in table 2 and based on that divided into hierarchical/non-hierarchical and transnational/non-transnational, or unknown. Results are compared to hypothesis 3. This is a tricky part that almost deserves an individual qualitative study due to it being hard to find detailed secondary information covering this. Terror groups are rarely transparent about how their organization operates and good second-hand information is hard to find on some groups. The results should, therefore, be taken with caution.

The measurements on CBRN-weapons are documenting the total number of uses as well as breaking down the statistics into each kind. Following that, each report file in GTD is studied in order to detail if they resulted in or were used with the purpose of mass destruction. Results are then compared to hypotheses 4.

For the purpose of acquiring deeper knowledge about terrorism in regards to regional differences most of the data is broken down into Western and Eastern Europe.

## 4. Results

The results of the study will now be presented in 4 sections, one for each characteristic of New Terrorism. All the data is presented in the form of charts, tables, and diagrams to demonstrate central tendencies in the collected data. Detailed information regarding measurements and sources can be found in Appendix A.

The presented results are analyzed using the theoretical framework, comparing the hypotheses with the results to test the accuracy and applicability of New Terrorism. Lastly in each section inferences are made about possible redefinitions of New Terrorism that could be argued should be made based on the results.

### 4.1 Type of movement

The results, seen in table 3, show a clear discrepancy between New Terrorisms' claims about religious terrorism being the most common type of movement and the empiric reality in Europe. Separatism stands out as the most prevalent type of movement - accounting for 53,6% of terror attacks. Ideologically motivated groups are a clear second at 33%, with far-left groups being a bit more common than far-right/nationalists. Religious terrorism is far back in 3rd at 12,4%.

Table 3– Distribution of Type of movement

<b>Type of Terror Group</b>	<b>Europe</b>	<b>Western Europe</b>	<b>Eastern Europe</b>
<b>1. Religious</b>	12,4% (141)	13,5% (86)	11% (55)
a) <i>Islamist</i>	11,9% (135)	12,7% (81)	10,8% (54)
b) <i>Christian extremism</i>	0,4% (4)	0,5 % (3)	0,2% (1)
c) <i>Jewish extremism</i>	0,1% (2)	0,3% (2)	0% (0)
<b>2. Ideological</b>	33,0% (375)	52,5% (334)	8% (41)
a) <i>Far-right/-Nationalist</i>	13,4% (152)	18,5% (118)	6,8% (34)
b) <i>Far-left</i>	18% (204)	31% (197)	1,4% (7)
c) <i>Ideological other</i>	1,7% (19)	3% (19)	0% (0)
<b>3. Separatist</b>	53,6% (608)	33,3% (212)	79,5% (396)
<b>4. Other</b>	0,9% (10)	0,5% (3)	1,4% (7)

(GTD 2020:a)

Even the more cautious prediction that far-right and separatist groups would be as common as religious groups are shown to be false since separatism is more than 4 times as common and ideological terrorism more than twice. Hypotheses 1 is therefore incorrect. The only thing New Terrorism is correct about is Islamic terrorism being the most common form of religious terrorism.

Comparing Western and Eastern Europe shows that religion is as prevalent as a movement in both regions, however, ideology and separatism are not. Separatists groups are responsible for 79,5% of incidents in the east compared to 33% in the west. In regards to ideology, the numbers are 8% and 52,5% respectively. Other interesting inferences that can be made is that far-left terrorism is far more common in the west and that other ideological reasons for terror such as animal rights,



environmentalism, and feminism only exist in Western Europe (GTD 2015:a, 2015:b, 2017).

Since separatism and ideology are responsible for 86,6% of all incidents I argue that a theoretical framework on contemporary European terrorism should be stating that they're the main types of terror movements, emphasizing separatism as the most common one. Due to the sizable differences between Western and Eastern Europe a nuanced theory should also emphasize separatism dominance in Eastern Europe and ideology as the most common type of movement in Western Europe.

## 4.2 Lethality

Contrary to type of movement the results for lethality can be seen as in line with New Terrorism. Hypotheses 2 states that fatalities should be present in more than 14% of the incident, preferably over 20%, and more than 9 mass-casualty attacks should have occurred. Table 4 shows that both predictions are met.


*Table 4 – Numbers on Lethality* (GTD 2020:a, 2020:b, 2020c)

<b>Type of Measure</b>	<b>Europe</b>	<b>Western Europe</b>	<b>Eastern Europe</b>
Casualties	7 883	2 768	5 115
Injuries	5 406	2 223	3 183
Fatalities	2 477	545	1932
Mean (Casualties)	2,73	2,07	3,30
Mean (Injuries)	1,87	1,67	2,05
Mean (Fatalities)	0,86	0,41	1,25
Terror acts resulting in fatalities	637 22%	92 7%	545 35%
Number of mass-casualty attacks (100+ casualties):	2010-2018: 14 2001-2009: 17 1991-1999: 9	2010-2018:7 2001-2009: 8 1991-1999: 3	2010-2018: 7 2001-2009: 9 1991-1999: 6
Range:	Casualties: 520 Injuries: 443 Fatalities: 298	Casualties: 520 Injuries: 443 Fatalities: 93	Casualties: 298 Injuries: 173 Fatalities: 298

22% of incidents resulted in fatalities indicating that European terrorists' desire to kill and their ability to do so are on par with the global average in the late '90s. The average that made proponents of New Terrorism state that contemporary terrorists are more lethal (Hoffman 1999: 10-12.) In other words, New Terrorism holds up in this respect, but a further increase has not taken place.


Interestingly, there is a large discrepancy between Eastern and Western Europe. In Eastern Europe 35% of incidents involve killings, well over the global average in the '90s, pointing towards a high lethality. Western Europe's mere 7% tells us that their terrorists are considerably less lethal and that in this aspect New Terrorism is incorrect about Western European terrorism. The east/west discrepancy is further backed up by the stats on the distribution of casualties and the mean for casualties, injuries, and fatalities. As seen in figure 1, Eastern Europe has a higher percentile distribution for all intervals except 101+ (which is almost even) and 0 casualties. Likewise, Eastern Europe has a higher mean for all measures, most notably on fatalities, see table 4.

Figure 1 - Distribution of casualties (GTD 2020:a)



Moving to mass-casualty attacks. As seen in figure 2, they are up by 5 compared to 1991-1999, to 14. Well in line with hypotheses 2. Interestingly, that's 3 fewer attacks than what occurred 2001-2009. The results from 2001-2009 further support New Terrorisms' claims that mass-casualties are more common in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. However, it makes me draw the conclusion that the number of mass-casualty attacks has stabilized or stagnated rather than continued to increase in the last decade.

Figure 2 – Number of Mass-casualty attacks



(GTD 2020:a,b,c)

In regards to mass-casualty attacks, no inter-continental difference can be seen since both regions experienced 7 attacks each. The same goes for the severity of the mass-casualty attacks. Looking at the range in table 4, Western Europe had the attack with most casualties and injuries, 520 and 443 in the Nice Truck attack (GTD: 2016) and Eastern Europe, the incident with most fatalities when 298 died in the Malaysian


Airline Flight 17 shoot down (GTD: 2014). Thus, when it comes to mass-casualty attacks, no European region is spared.

Concludingly, New Terrorism appears to be correct in regard to lethality when reviewing Europe as a whole. The results indicate that European terrorists are more prone and able to hurt people than in the early 1990s. Yet an updated theory should state that Western European terrorists are on average not so lethal since 93% of attacks result in 0 fatalities, but they are as prone to execute mass-casualty attacks.

### 4.3 Structure

Results for structure, shown in figure 3, signals that New Terrorism is correct about transnationalism and flat organizational structures.

*Figure 3 – Transnationalism and hierarchy in the 30 most active terror organizations*



However, as discussed in the methodology chapter, labeling and finding appropriate information for this part was hard. Results should be imprinted with that in mind. Due to lack of information, it wasn't possible to state if 3 groups were transnational or not and the same goes for 5 groups in regards to hierarchy. Those are labeled unknown.

24 of the 30 groups were primarily active in Western Europe and due to the low amount of Eastern European groups no regional comparison will be made.

15 groups showed distinct tendencies of being transnational. Having fractions in different states, working across borders, getting support from abroad, or engaging in transnational partnerships. On the contrary, 12 groups had a physical center of gravity, working entirely from one country. The advantage of transnationalism follows hypotheses 3, which states that transnationalism should be more common. Despite this, the gap could be seen as too small to confirm New Terrorism, especially since measuring and labeling was hard. Even so, the results do not disprove New Terrorism at least.


Continuing, the results for hierarchical structure also follows hypothesis 3. I consider 16 groups to be non-hierarchical due to them using network structures that are flat and decentralized and their members are operating in autonomous cells. That can be compared to 9 groups using the more traditional top-down hierarchical structure with a clear chain of command when looking at the organization as a whole. The large majority for a non-hierarchical structure I as grounds for confirming this part of New Terrorism.

Accordingly, I argue that an updated form of New Terrorism focusing on Europe still should put forward the claim that terror groups are predominantly non-hierarchical. It should also be positive to transnationalism being more common based on these results, yet await further research to confirm it.

#### 4.4 CBRN-Weapons

The results for the use of CBRN-Weapons show a strong discrepancy to hypotheses 4. As shown in figure 5 the total number of uses was 8, distinctly lower than the 17 in the '90s (Karmon 2002: 194-195). 1 biological weapon was used while 0 incidents involving radiological and nuclear weapons were recorded. Making chemical weapons the dominant CBRN-weapon of choice, just like in the '90s (Ibid).

Figure 4 - Uses of CBRN-Weapons



(GTD 2020:d)

What contradicts hypothesis 4, even more, is the lack of mass-destruction in the incidents. The attacks lead to a total of 6 injuries and 1 fatality. In addition, nothing about the weaponry indicated that the purpose of using them was mass destruction. Teargas was used once, pepper spray 3 times, antiseptic dye once and acid was thrown twice. The biological weapon consisted of one person throwing feces (GTD 2020:d). What can be seen as mellow types of weapons compared to conventional weapons such as bombs and firearms. Because of this, it's of low importance that 7 uses took place in Eastern Europe and 1 in Western Europe (GTD 2020:d)

The results rejecting hypothesis 4 are perhaps not so surprising considering that CBRN-weapons is the part of New Terrorism with the weakest theoretical backing. Nevertheless, given the results a modern European interpretation of New Terrorism should in my opinion state that there is low usage of CBRN-weapons in European terrorism and not at all for mass-destruction.

## 5. Discussion

In the result section I establish that New Terrorism partly aligns with the empirical reality of European terrorism 2010-2018. The hypotheses for lethality and structure are correct, but the ones for type of movement and CBRN-weapons are not. The results and inferences will now be discussed. First in terms of what may have caused the results, broken down into each characteristic. After that in regards to what the results tell us about contemporary European Terrorism and how I propose an updated European version of New Terrorism should be set up to account for it.

### 5.1 Type of movement

The most surprising result to me is the low amount of religious terrorism compared to ideological and separatist terror. Several theoretically related phenomenon's point towards that religion, in particular Islamism, should have been the most common type of movement, just like New Terrorism states.

For starters. Europe has experienced large waves of Muslim migration from the Middle East during the 21st century, most notably in 2015 (Van Mol & Valk 2016: 37-42). 3 things indicate why a part of this group could be ready to engage in terror. One, European states have a colonial history in the Middle East marked by brutality, repression, and extraction (Fichter 2019). Two, more recently European states have been active in the wars that stripped some Muslim migrants of their jobs, home, and family members - forcing them to flee (Augustyn 2020)(Sabbagh 2019). Possibly creating motivators for revenge or to use terror to pressure European states to withdraw from the Middle East. Three, their new home is a very different society - shaped by Christianity, secularism, and modernity (Casanova 2006: 23-25). That

combined with a collective European failure to economically and culturally integrate migrants has left many Muslims feeling alienated, distressed, and living in poor conditions (McKinsey 2018: 5-7). Not helped by an increasing anti-Muslim sentiment sweeping over Europe (Kallis 2015: 27-29). Breeding grounds for religious extremism according to Neumann (2009: 90-100) and I agree.

I see the results as even more surprising since these motives aligned with the creation of ISIS. A powerful transnational Muslim terror group with supporters all over Europe, that has called their followers to engage in an “all-out war” with the west (Dearden 2017). Over 5 000 Europeans are believed to have been recruited to ISIS in 2014-2016 to fight for a caliphate in Syria and Iraq (Barrett 2017), many of which later returned to Europe prior to 2019 - radicalized, desensitized, and trained in combat (Europol 2019: 41). Arguably posing a huge threat of mass-scale religious terrorism.

Yet, while terrorists linked to ISIS have indeed engaged in terrorism in Europe and all these motives exist, religious terrorism only amounted to 12,4% of all attacks (GTD 2020:a). Explaining a part of this, is according to me the strong focus on Islamic terror in the west (Boot 2019), possibly leading to counter-terrorist agencies devoting a lot of time and resources to stop just them. A Europol study concluded that more than half of terror-related arrests in 2015-2018 were made on Islamic terrorists (Europol 2019: 15), indicating that this was a factor. Another limiting factor could be that distressed Muslims got an outlet for their radicalized ideas through fighting for ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and Europe, therefore, got spared.

To further explain the results, I think it's important to assess what can be seen to have caused the large amount of separatist and ideological terror. Separatism for starters, especially in Eastern Europe, can be seen to stand due to the Ukraine War. Over 80% of terror attacks worldwide take place in conflict settings (GTD 2018: 2) and this was the only war in Europe. In this war, The People's Republic of Luhansk, and Donbas fought for the secession of eastern Ukraine and were very active in doing so, most likely due to Russia helping them out (Oldberg 2020). Together they account



for more than half the separatist terror in Europe 2010-2018 (GTD 2020:a), driving up the numbers a lot.

In turn the nation-state's strong presence in Western Europe probably accounts for the high number of separatist terror attacks there. The nation-state is a common construction in Western Europe, merging governmental institutions and the culture of the majority ethnicity in state-building (Paleri 2014: 88-89). A construction that results in minority groups in some states feeling they're having it worse in regards to laws, language, religion, and customs, and they therefore dream of autonomy. For example, Irish Republicans in Northern Ireland and Corsican Separatists in France (Bötticher, & Mares 2013). But since they are minorities they have a low chance of obtaining it through democracy and they would probably not win a war versus a Western European army. Making terrorism, an asymmetrical form of violence for attention and pressure, very appealing for some groups as I see it.

Ideology's strong presence can in turn be explained by the European context. Neumann (2009: 90-94) may regard anxiety from the current fast economic and cultural transformation, the backsides of globalism, and financial hardship as factors leading to Islamic terrorism. But I disagree when it comes to Europe, as the average European is Christian or atheist. Instead, it's more reasonable that right-wing/nationalist movements blaming the EU and immigrants, and left-wing extremists blaming capitalism should attract them. Their explanations and solutions to the various problems in Europe should be more in line with most Europeans worldviews and easier to grasp. Particularly considering these movements' strong historical presence in Europe (Lesser 1999: 104). Increasing right-wing terror is for example a common trend in Europe after large migration waves (Laqueur 1999: 248) and Lesser (1999: 103) even predicted the resurgence of left-wing terrorism in the 21st century in Europe if the welfare state eroded and youth unemployment took off. Exactly what happened after the financial crisis in 2008. Most notably in Greece (Economist 2020), a country with many anarchist attacks in 2010-2018 (GTD 2020:a).

Moving on, the political situation is probably the reason why ideological movements are more present in Western Europe. Eastern European states are on average less open to immigrants and globalism, have a communist legacy, and fewer are part of the EU (Debeuf 2018). Much of the above-listed problems put forward by left-wing or right-wing movements have therefore already been taken care of, or their solutions are present in large political parties (Ibid). Resulting in fewer incentives for ideological terrorism. Another probable reason for the low amount of left-wing terrorism is lower income-standards since most left-wing terrorists are well-educated college-students from middle-class families (Strentz 1988: 15), something Western Europe has more of (Debeuf 2018).

Considering all this the results of the study appear more logical to me, even though it's surprising that Islamic terrorism wasn't more common.

## 5.2 Lethality

The high lethality in accordance with hypotheses 2 was more expected. The results follow the current global trend of more deaths from terrorism (GTD 2018: 34) and I've found the 5 reasons put forward in the theoretical framework for why lethality increased in the '90s to be present or evolving in present-day Europe.

Firstly, access to new and better weapons and technology have continued. A report made on the EU commission's behalf states that new connections between terrorists and criminals have made it easier for terrorists to obtain military-grade assault rifles and important barriers in Europe stopping it has eroded in the last few years. Resulting in them being used in European terrorism during the last decade (Duquet & Goris: 2018). Terrorists are now also using AI and drones to gather information and execute better attacks, and portable air defense systems made to shoot down aircrafts have made it into the hands of several terrorists (Cronin 2019). Linked to this, is in my eyes the internet's continued growth while remaining badly regulated (Barrinha & Renard 2017: 360). Online retailers and easy-to-access and

hard-to-trace black market-sites on darknet allow most terrorists to buy components for highly lethal explosives and firearms, with low risk of detection (Davis 2020).

Secondly, information overload and emotional desensitization from it have undoubtedly increased since the introduction of social media, smartphones, and digital news outlets. The competition for attention must be fiercer than ever and since Hoffman (1999: 13) and others argue that the competition locks terrorists into spirals of more and more casualties to topple each other to get their much-needed attention, it's likely an explanation for Europe's high lethality.

Thirdly, state sponsorship - in combination with war - in Ukraine. Given that Russia supplied separatist with military equipment (Oldberg 2020), how bloody wars usually are, and that fatalities have a tactical advantage during a war it should have contributed to the high lethality. An indication of this is that 5 of 14 mass-casualty attacks in 2010-2018 took place in Ukraine during the war (GTD:f)

Fourthly, the apocalyptic goals of religious terror groups (Laqueur 1999: 83), could be argued to have caused the high amount of mass-casualty attacks. Besides, mass-casualty attacks fitting their aims (Jurgensmeyer 2017) is the fact that Islamists were responsible for 8 of the 14 mass-casualty attacks, indicating this (GTD:f).

Fifthly, given that the study concluded that a majority of terror groups in Europe 2010-2018 were non-hierarchical and those are argued to be more lethal due to fewer constraints on the individual terrorists (Hoffman 1999:21), it could be a factor as well.

With these 5 reasons in mind I find it surprising that lethality is just in line with hypotheses 2 and haven't continued to increase when weapons, technology, and information overload has done so since the '90s. However, I've found 2 factors to explain why that is.

One, the large percentage of ideological and separatist movements. As previously discussed, non-religious groups tend to be more wary about carrying out attacks with many casualties as it comes with probable risk of losing public support, making it harder to reach their goals (Simon & Benjamin 2001: 5-6). Two, the

increasing counter-terrorism measures in Europe. EU has been adopting new legal framework, and new counter-terrorism strategies, and directives to enforce better prevention, protection, coordination in the last 15 years to stop terrorists (EC 2020:a). The same has been done by many states in Europe following 9/11 (UNODC 2020). Probably leading to better prevention against highly lethal attacks and organizations.

Lastly, it's worth discussing why Eastern Europe was so more lethal than Western Europe. One obvious reason is that Eastern European states are trailing far behind their western neighbors in counter-terrorism measures (Rekawek 2017: 194-195). Adding to this is that more Western than Eastern European states are a part of the EU and therefore receive additional tools for counter-terrorism. The war and state sponsorship in Ukraine are probably also linked to the discrepancy given what was discussed above. Finally, related to the battle for attention, is the media's collective tendency to give more attention to terror in the west than in the rest of the world (Hoffman et.al 2010). Logically resulting in a higher demand for fatalities in Eastern Europe for the same attention, therefore playing a part in why Eastern Europe had a 5x higher rate of incidents with fatalities.

### 5.3 Structure

The results indicating a narrow advantage for transnationalism and a considerable advantage for flat decentralized structures are logical in my opinion. For starters, proponents of New Terrorism put forward globalization, cheap air travel, and IT-developments as facilitators for the new structures (Tan 2002: 234-245)(Neumann 2009: 50-70). Looking at the development of these factors in Europe in the last two decades I conclude that running a transnational and non-hierarchical organization should be easier than ever before. Already in the early 2000s developments in IT made it possible to recruit, train, and equip members without meeting leadership face-to-face (Tan 2002: 235). Today, when social media offer channels for radicalization and mass-recruitment, and new technologies allow terrorists to communicate and,

spread propaganda (Kavanagh et.al 2017: 3-8) it must be even easier. Increasing globalism has also made traveling and exchanging money, goods, and knowledge across borders easier and cheaper than ever before (Altman & Bastian 2019), and the EU stands out as the most interdependent supranational organization in the world, adding to this.

To go along, motivations for transnationalism and decentralized structures should be high. Left-wing and religious groups tend to have a message and a cause that transcends state borders (Neumann 2009: 120)(Noor 2002: 161). Expanding transnationally should, therefore, not be too hard for them, and by doing it the base from which they can recruit members and receive support from would increase, making it easier to reach their goals. Separatists and far-right/nationalists are more locked to a single state in regards to message and cause but could however benefit from transnationalism by taking advantage of training with other groups and receiving support from diasporas, which they do (McCreanor 2017)(Kaldor 2012: 115). Outside of the EU transnationalism also comes with the advantage of groups being harder to fight since it forces national counter-terror agencies to cooperate to stop them. Decentralized network structures are also harder to fight since they leave little physical trace and even if a fraction or individual is stopped the rest of the organizations live on (Rappaport 2001: 9). Making the structure more preferable than hierarchical-structures. ISIS further proves why motivations should be high since much of ISIS's success can be attributed to its decentralism and transnationalism. Many supporters, often radicalized through social media, have carried out terror attacks in the name of ISIS, even without prior relations to the organization (Simcox 2016). Giving ISIS leadership the attention and the results they want without any efforts or increased risk of getting caught.

Given all this the only surprising part of the results is that transnationalism only had a narrow advantage. I have however identified a few reasons that could account for it. One is possible measuring errors. Terrorists aren't transparent about their operations and since extensive research on each group wasn't possible, it's

possible that a few groups hid their transnational operations and the results didn't account for it. Another possible reason is separatism being the most common type of movement. Some smaller ethnic groups like Corsican separatists do not have large diasporas helping them from abroad (Lambroschini 2014), confining them to a physical center of gravity. Linked to this is that many of the top 30 organizations were small groups like "Crypteia" or "Comite d'Action Viticole" who worked frequently but for a short period of time, with few members and little attention (Strickland 2018)(Smith 2016). Possibly never giving them the opportunity or attraction to go transnational. Lastly, extensive transnational counter-terror cooperation through Europol (EC 2020:a) can have had an impact on the results since Neumann (2009: 155-156) argues that transnational cooperation is a good way to stop transnational organizations.

## 5.4 CBRN-Weapons

Lastly, the results tell us that hypotheses 4 is wrong. Given the circumstances I'm not surprised. Not only are terrorists using CBRN-weapons in Europe almost unheard of, the assumption that they would was merely a prediction made 15-20 years ago. Unlike the 3 other characteristics of New Terrorism, this wasn't already an established part of terrorism when creating the theory.

More importantly, reservations about the prediction were even made back then. CBRN-weapons being unreliable, expensive, hard to obtain material for, and demanding of extensive expertise was put forward (Cameron 2002: 63-64)(Laqueur 1999: 69-71). State sponsorship, more readily available knowledge on the internet, and nuclear and radiological material flooding the black markets after the Soviet Union's collapse was argued to overcome the obstacles (Ibid: 74 & 228), but in hindsight, I'd argue the impact was limited. Following 9/11 support and sponsorship for terrorism declined rapidly, prominently for CBRN-weapons (Cameron 2002: 53). Potential sponsor Iraq turned out to never have had the capabilities (SC 2003) and

Iran has entered a non-proliferation deal since then (SC 2015). Whilst comprehensive information on how to produce and operate CBRN-weapons exist on the internet, it is often riddled with technical flaws and leaves out important factors on usage (Cole 2011). Russia and USA have in turn cooperated to secure all loose nuclear material from the former Soviet Union (Allison 2008: 70). No wonder the prediction was wrong.

The results are even more reasonable given that the EU has been crafting extensive legislation on the matter (EUROJUST 2017) and Europol have been coordinating training activities and information on best practices for deterring attacks involving CBRN-weapons last couple of years (EC 2020:b). I also find it highly unlikely that the many small and decentralized groups that operated in Europe in the time period (see Appendix A) had the funds, expertise, and time to successfully use CBRN-weapons.

In addition, the motivation for using CBRN-weapons is likely low. Simon and Benjamin (2001: 11) argued that CBRN-weapons would be on the rise due to them fitting the apocalyptic aims of religious terrorists. We now know most terror movements in Europe weren't religious. Even so, religious groups still rely on supporters and too bloody attacks turn them off, e.g. 9/11 lead to shrinking support for Al-Qaida (Neumann 2009: 164). Given how disruptive and uncontrollable CBRN-weapons are, this can be a factor. Even more so for ideological and separatist group who to a higher degree follows the doctrine "a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead" (Ramakrishna 2014: 162). Considering that, all the obstacles in the process of obtaining them, and the fact that conventional weaponry can cause mass-casualty attacks I can't imagine many groups being motivated to use CBRN-weapons in Europe right now.

## 5.5 European terrorism and New Terrorism 2.0, Europe edition

The results and the discussion above indicate that New Terrorism's accuracy to describe contemporary European terrorism is flawed. It's understandable since the theory is aging, the characteristics of terrorism are constantly evolving and the theory tries to explain terrorism globally (Lesser 1999: 2). Nonetheless, it's 50% correct. I, therefore, argue that the best way moving forward is to create a Euro-specific update of New Terrorism - a New Terrorism 2.0, Europe edition - so that academics, legislators, and people working in counter-terrorism get a more accurate picture of European terrorism.

For starters, type of movement should be re-evaluated for the new theory. Separatist and ideological movements are responsible for way more attacks and their dominance should be reflected in the new theory. To further reflect the empirical reality separatism's dominance in Eastern Europe and ideological terrorisms advantage in Western Europe should be noted. Their future dominance is however not guaranteed. It's possible that circumstances and motivators for terrorism will change, just like they've done in the past. For instance, another separatist war like the one in Ukraine is unlikely in the near future. But given the strong grievances that caused separatist terror and the political and cultural context that sparked ideological terror discussed in section 5.1, their dominance will likely persist for a while. By emphasizing their dominance more resources would perhaps be set aside to combat them and more research could be attributed to study the grievances that motivate those groups to conduct terror. Focusing on combatting Islamic terrorism has stopped many jihadist groups in Europe (Europol 2019: 15) so by doing this, the result will hopefully be less European terrorism in the future.

Regarding lethality, higher lethality should be a part of the new theory given the results. The only tweak I propose is to outline that Western European terrorists are less lethal on average since 93% of attacks there result in 0 fatalities (GTD 2020: a). By pointing out this difference in the new theory, it could hopefully push Eastern



European states to catch up to their western neighbors in adopting appropriate counter-terrorism measures and engaging in transnational cooperation. The two most important factors for Western Europe's lower lethality in my opinion.

Looking ahead it's hard to tell if lethality will stay high in Europe as a whole. The Global Terrorism Index (GTD 2018: 31) shows that lethality increased massively in 2011-2014 and then fell by 52% to 2018. The fall of ISIS, the ceasefire in Ukraine, and developments in counter-terrorism indicate the decreasing trend could continue. Further research on lethality in the coming years is therefore recommended to see if the assumptions made in this paper are still correct.

Continuing, results indicate that transnationalism and non-hierarchical structures should be part of the new theory, even though more qualitative research is recommended. Seeing that transnationalism and network structures are more attractive for terrorists and that neither globalism, IT-developments nor the internet will disappear anytime soon the structures will likely persist. Moving forward more international cooperation should be a focus to combat the new transnational character. It's what Neumann (2009: 155) recommends. Europol is a good start but many European states are not part of the EU and terror networks can transcend EU-borders. One advice is to utilize the international equivalent, Interpol, more. Counter-terror agencies must perhaps also find new structures themselves to fight the new dominant organizational structure in terrorism as Arquilla et.al (1999: 55) argues that it takes networks, not hierarchies like most governmental institutions are, to fight a network.

Lastly, I'd argue that the potential of terrorists using CBRN-weapons should be downplayed based on the results. There is no indication that European terrorists are using them for mass-destruction. It would however be a dangerous move stating that they never will. Just one successful use of the right type could cause enormous damage, perhaps more so than all previous attacks using conventional weapons combined. Many would probably also argue that the extensive focus on limiting terrorists' potential to acquire CBRN-weapons by counter-terrorism agencies (EC 2020:b) is the reason why they haven't been used for mass-destruction to this day. To

make sure the possibilities of a future attack isn't neglected, I, therefore, propose that the new theory should state the risk of terrorist using CBRN-weapons as present, but low. Given that this study only covered the actual uses, a good area for future research is the capabilities and aspirations of European terrorists using CBRN-weapons in the future.

## 6. Conclusion

In conclusion, in this I paper find that New Terrorism is partly correct in describing contemporary European terrorism. Results indicate that European terrorists are more lethal. New and better weaponry and technology, information overload, the apocalyptic aims of religious terrorists, and the war in Ukraine can be seen to have caused it. Most organizations are also found to be transnational and non-hierarchical, even though the advantage for transnationalism was small. Continued globalization, developments in IT, and the fact that transnationalism and non-hierarchical structures make terrorist groups harder to combat likely account for the advantage. On the contrary, the potential risk of terrorists using CBRN-weapons for mass-destruction has not materialized. Obstacles persist and the phenomenon's thought to increase the threat has not developed as predicted. In addition, counter-terrorism has improved and the motivations to try aren't there. Lastly, and most surprisingly, the study finds separatist terror to be 4 times and ideological terror 2 times as common as religious terrorism, even though several factors pointed toward a result containing a high amount of Islamic terrorism. However, when accounting for counter-terrorisms strong focus on Islamic groups, the Ukraine war, and the present circumstances driving ideological and separatist groups the results became less surprising.

Based on the result and the discussion an updated version of New Terrorism - New Terrorism 2.0, Europe edition - is proposed. Stating that separatist and ideological groups are the most common types of movements – separatism in Eastern and ideological in Western Europe - lethality is high (but less so in Western Europe), groups are primarily transnational and non-hierarchical, and the risk of terrorist using CBRN-weapons is present but low in contemporary European terrorism. Given the evolving nature of terrorism, the characteristics might change in a few years and continued research on them is recommended.

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## Appendix A

### Measurements for *Terrorism*:

Type of Measure	Europe	Western Europe	Eastern Europe
Total amount of terror acts:	2884	1333	1551

Steps taken using GTD (2020:a):

1. Time period 2010-01-01 - 2018-12-31.
2. Region: Western Europe + Eastern Europe. Then Western and Eastern Europe on their own.
3. Criteria: Require Criterion I and II to be met, excluding ambiguous cases and unsuccessful Attacks.

### Measurements for *Type of Movement*

Type of Measure	Europe	Western Europe	Eastern Europe
<b>Religious</b>	141 amount of incidents 12,4% - of incidents	86 13,5%	55 11%
<i>Islamist</i>	135 11,9%	81 12,7%	54 10,8%
<i>Christian extremism</i>	4 0,4%	3 0,5%	1 0,2%
<i>Jewish extremism</i>	2 0,1%	2 0,3%	0 0
<b>2. Ideological</b>	375 33,0%	334 52,5%	41 8%
<i>Far-right/Nationalist</i>	152 13,4%	118 18,5%	34 6,8%
<i>Far-left</i>	204 18%	197 31%	7 1,4%
<i>Other</i>	19 1,7%	19 3%	0 0
<b>3. Separatist</b>	608	212	396



	53,6%	33,3%	79,5%
<b>4. Other</b>	10 0,9%	3 0,5%	7 1,4%
<b>Unknown</b>	1749 60,6%	697 52,3%	1 052 67,8%

Steps taken using GTD (2020:a):

1. Time period 2010-01-01 - 2018-12-31.
2. Region: Western Europe + Eastern Europe. Then Western and Eastern Europe on their own.
3. Criteria: Require Criterion I and II to be met, excluding ambiguous cases and unsuccessful Attacks.

Groups studied with sources outside of GTD	
Iconoclastic sect (Georgiopoulos 2019) Popular Fighters Group Greece (TRAC:p 2014) South East Antrim Brigade (Gordon 2018) PKK (TRAC:j 2020) Rubicon (Georgiades 2019) (Economist 2018) Revolution Chemnitz (Europol 2019: 61) New Irish Republican Army (NIRA): (IMC 2004: 15) Vulkangruppe NetzHerrschaft zerreißen (Nibbrig 2018) Krypteia (Strickland 2018) Golden Dawn (Europol 2014: 39) Ulster Volunteer Force (IMC 2004: 17) Apella (AMNA 2018) Irrintzi: (TRAC:i 2020) Fire and Flame for the Police (DW 2017) Residents and regulars of Exarchia (Crabapple 2020) Wild Individualists (Garcia 2019)(Cash 2019) Comite d'Action Viticole (Smith 2016) Bahoz (Niewerth 2016) Alde (Garcia 2017) Cells of Fire (Kassimeris 2012) Continuity Irish Republican Army: (IMC 2004) Freital Group (Cwienk 2018) Third Way (Der III. Weg) (Beckes 2018: 458), Earth liberation front (Global Security:e 2017). The Nihilistic Patrol and Neighborhood Arsonists (Sideris 2015) Militant Minority + Circle of Violators/Nucleus Lovers of Anomy (Alderman 2013) Mateo Morral Insurrectionist Commandos (TRAC:l 2020) The Militant People's Revolutionary Force (Tagaris 2013)	Hekla Reception Committee-Initiative for More Social Eruptions (Chambers 2011) Sect of Revolutionaries: (US Department of State 2011) The Revolutionary Liberation Action (TRAC:p 2020) Sover and Evil Youth (Interfax-Ukraine 2018). Natsionalnyi Druzhyny and S14 (Scott 2018) Nazhdak organisation (UAWire 2017) Rugovasit Group (European Federation of Journalists 2016) Odessa Underground (Korewa 2015) Right Sector (TRAC:r 2020) Kharkiv Partisans (Stern 2015) Revenge Movement (RFERL 2014) <a href="#">1</a> Makhachkala Gang (Solovyov 2016) Ingushetia (TRAC:g 2020) Caucasus Emirate (TRAC:c 2020) Black Hawks-Anti-Wahhabist (TRAC:b 2020) NVF Fighter (TRAC:m 2020) The Friends of Freedom (TRAC:f 2020) Shariat Jamaat of the Caucasian Front (TRAC:e 2020) Vetevendosje (Morina 2016) Zero Tolerance (TRAC:t 2020) Free Network South (Freies Netz Sued) (TME 2016). Resistencia Galega (Europol 2013) The German Resistance Movement (The Local 2015). Ulster Defence Association (TRAC:s 2020)

### Measurements for *Lethality*:

Type of Measure	Europe	Western Europe	Eastern Europe
Total amount of casualties:	Casualties: 7 883 Injuries: 5 406 Fatalities: 2 477	Casualties: 2 768 Injuries: 2 223 Fatalities: 545	Casualties: 5 115 Injuries: 3 183 Fatalities: 1 932
Mean:	Casualties: 2,73 Injuries: 1,87 Fatalities: 0,86	Casualties: 2,07 Injuries: 1,67 Fatalities: 0,41	Casualties: 3,30 Injuries: 2,05 Fatalities: 1,25
Total amount of terror acts resulting in fatalities	637	92	545
Percentage of terror acts resulting in fatalities	22%	7%	35%
Distribution of casualties (Only 2076 incidents classified):	Unknown: 54 0: 1682 1-10: 1012 11-50: 79 51-100: 15 101+: 14	Unknown: 0 0: 1015 1-10: 280 11-50: 20 51-100: 4 101+: 7	Unknown: 54 0: 667 1-10: 732 11-50: 59 51-100: 11 101+: 7
Procentual distribution of casualties (Only 2076 incidents classified):	Unknown: 1,9% 0: 58,3% 1-10: 35,1% 11-50: 2,7% 51-100: 0,5% 101+: 0,5%	0: 76,1% 1-10: 21% 11-50: 1,5% 51-100: 0,3% 101+: 0,5%	Unknown: 3,5% 0: 43% 1-10: 47,2% 11-50: 3,8% 51-100: 0,7% 101+: 0,5%
Number of mass-casualty attacks (at least 100 casualties):	2010-2018: 14 2001-2009: 17 1991-1999: 9	2010-2018: 7 2001-2009: 8 1991-1999: 3	2010-2018: 7 2001-2009: 9 1991-1999: 6
Range:	Casualties: 520 Injuries: 443 Fatalities: 298	Casualties: 520 Injuries: 443 Fatalities: 93	Casualties: 298 Injuries: 173 Fatalities: 298

Steps taken using GTD (2020:a)(2020:b)(2020c):

1. Time period 2010-01-01 - 2018-12-31. When calculating Number of mass-casualty attacks the time period 2001-01-01 - 2009-12-31 (2020:b) and 1991-01-01 - 1999-12-31 (2020:c) were also used.
2. Region: Western Europe + Eastern Europe. Then Western and Eastern Europe on their own.
3. Criteria: Require Criterion I and II to be met, excluding ambiguous cases and unsuccessful attacks.
- 4: Selecting casualties. Then dividing it up into fatalities and injuries

### Measurements for *Structure*

<b>Group (Top 30 in incidents)</b>	<b>Incidents</b>	<b>Transnational?</b>	<b>Flat?</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>West/East split</b>
Donetsk People's Republic	231	Yes	No	(TRAC:n 2020)(Global Security:D 2018)	0/231
Luhansk People's Republic	102	Yes	No	(Global Security:l 2018)	0/102
Corsical National Liberation Front	62	No	Unknown	(Britannica 2016) (Lambroschini 2014)	62/0
Conspiracy of Cells of Fire	39	Yes	Unknown	(TRAC:d 2020) (Kassimeris 2012)(Global Security:C 2019)	39/0
Informal Anarchist Federation	23	Yes	Yes	(TRAC:h 2020)	23/0
Caucasus Emirate	23	Yes	Yes	(TRAC:c 2020)	0/23
Oglaigh na hEireann/IRA	22	Yes	Yes	(Sullivan 2016) (IMC 2004: 11)	22/0
Caucasus Province of the Islamic State	19	yes	Yes, (have some form of hierarchy)	(TRAC:c 2020)	0/19
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	19	Yes	Yes, (have some form of hierarchy)	(TRAC:i 2020)	15/4
The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)	12	Yes	No	(TRAC:j 2020)(Roth & Sever 2007: 906)	12/0
Group of Popular Fighters	10	No	Yes	(Mamakouka 2014)	10/0
Shut Down G20: Take Hamburg Offline	10	Yes	Yes	(Farand & Stone 2017)	10/0
Militant Minority	7	No	Yes	(Alderman 2013)	7/0

Right Sector	7	No	No, (was at first)	(TRAC:r 2020)(BBC 2014)	0/7
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)	6	No	No	(IMC 2004: 17)	6/0
Individualists Tending to the Wild (ITS)	6	Yes	Yes	(Garcia 2019)(Cash 2019)	6/0
Rubicon	6	No	No	(Georgiades 2019) (Economist 2018)	6/0
Animal Liberation Front (ALF)	6	Yes	Yes	(TRAC:a 2020)(FBI 2004)	6/0
Comite d'Action Viticole	6	No	Yes	(Smith 2016)	6/0
Zero Tolerance	5	Unknown	Unknown		5/0
Circle of Violators Nucleus Lovers of Anomy Militant Minority	5	No	Yes	(Alderman 2013)	5/0
Crypteia	4	No	Yes	(Strickland 2018)	4/0
Real Irish Republican Army	4	No	Yes	(IMC 2004: 15)	4/0
Proletariat Self-defense Groups	4	Unknown	Unknown		4/0
Golden Dawn	4	No	No	(Europol 2014: 39)	4/0
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)	3	No	Yes	(IMC 2004: 12)	3/0
Revolutionary Cells Network	3	Yes	Yes	(Revolutionary Cells. 2018)	0/3
Breton Liberation Front (FLB)	3	Yes	No	(McCreanor 2017: 6-17)	3/0
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)	3	Yes	No	(TRAC:k 2020)	0/3

Overall Deniers of Joining the Existing	3	Unknown	Unknown		3/0
<b>Summary</b>		Yes: 15 No: 12 Unknown: 3	Yes: 16 No: 9 Unknown: 5		

Steps taking using GTD (2020:a) to identify the top 30 organisations:

1. Time period 2010-01-01 - 2018-12-31.
2. Region: Western Europe + Eastern Europe. Then Western and Eastern Europe on their own.
3. Criteria: Require Criterion I and II to be met, excluding ambiguous cases and unsuccessful Attacks.

### Measurements for CBRN-Weapons:

Type of Measure	Europe	Western Europe	Eastern Europe
Total use of CBRN-Weapons	7	1	6
Chemical weapons	7	0	6
Biological weapons	1	0	1
Radiological weapons	0	0	0
Nuclear weapons	0	0	0
Total fatalities during these attacks:	1	0	1
Total injuries during these attacks:	6	2	4

Steps taken using GTD (2020:d):

1. Time period 2010-01-01 - 2018-12-31.
2. Region: Western Europe + Eastern Europe. Then Western and Eastern Europe on their own.

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FKVK02  
VT20  
Handledare: Isabel Bramsen

3. Criteria: Require Criterion I and II to be met, excluding ambiguous cases and unsuccessful Attacks.

4. Weapon Type: Biological + Chemical + Radiological + Nuclear. Then each separate.

5. Each incident report were analyzed

Type of attack:

Chemical weapons: Teargas, Acid x2, Pepper spray x3, Zelyonka antiseptic dye,

Biological weapons: Thrown faeces