

Aid and the Domestic Politics of a Welfare State

Exploring the Effects of Domestic Politics on Danish Foreign
Aid Strategies



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Abstract

How does domestic politics affect foreign aid? A great deal of literature that seeks to answer this question has sought to test the partisan theory. This theory suggests that ideological governmental changes will affect a donor country's foreign aid – in terms of total aid, aid allocation and/or aid strategies. At the same time, there has been a scholarly tendency to understand aid from welfare states to be unaffected by partisan changes due to these countries' fundamental altruism. This thesis seeks to relate these two scholarly assertions to the case of Danish foreign aid strategies. This will be done as longitudinal research looking into the period from 2012 to 2020. The embedded case study will apply three analytical tools within the framework of qualitative mixed methods. The data consists of government data, reports, and expert interviews. The findings suggest that there are partisan tendencies in Danish foreign aid strategies across the three governmental shifts in question. However, these tendencies are not as distinctly present as some supporters of the theory would claim. The analysis finds that the reason for this might be found in the unique domestic political, structural, and institutional context of Denmark.

Key words: foreign aid, domestic politics, welfare state, partisan theory, Denmark.
Words: 9843

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1 Introduction

Understanding the forces at play behind aid has occupied scholars for decades. Rather than being concerned with the effectiveness of aid, this inquiry wishes to understand the factors that affect how development aid is allocated, framed, and/or justified. One such facet is that of domestic politics. This strand of reasoning argues that the domestic politics of the donor countries affect their aid in various ways. The partisan theory suggests that as the government of the donor country changes, so will the country's aid. The general patterns identified by previous scholarly works in support of the theory show that a right-wing government will generally grant more aid than a left-wing, as well as favour long-term strategies such as poverty reduction over short-term commercial interest (Fleck & Kilby, 2006; Tingley 2010; Milner & Tingley 2013; Brech & Potrafke, 2014). At the same time, several authors posit that due to the altruistic nature of welfare states, domestic politics do not affect their aid in the same way (Stokke, 1989, 2019; Noël & Thérien, 1995; Lancaster 2007). The Scandinavian countries are often argued to be particularly compelling examples of this.

This study seeks to test these theorisations on the relationship between domestic politics and aid in the case of Denmark. This is carried out applying qualitative mixed methodology with three analytical tools: 1) secondary data analysis, 2) document content analysis, and 3) expert interviews.

The following section will explain the specific aim and relevance of the study, also demonstrating inherent limitations.

1.1 Aim, Relevance and Limitations

To guide the study, the following research question was devised:

How has domestic politics affected the strategic interests of Danish foreign aid in the period from 2012 to 2020?

Hence, the thesis aims at exploring what ways these strategic interests have changed in a period of three different governments, and then relate this to the theoretical framework outlined in section 3 of this paper. This research is relevant to the general field of study in a number of ways: Firstly, it provides in-depth insight into the specific case of Denmark, which has yet to be studied in relation to the theoretical framework. This means that the findings that can both tell us more about

partisan theory, but also about how this theory relates to welfare states more generally. Additionally, Tingley (2010: 40) argues that understanding the domestic political drivers behind aid helps studies concerned aid effectiveness because rapid changes in aid have been linked to negative growth.

One source of information used to determine strategy changes is official government reports. This type of source was deemed useful to the study due to its direct connection to the topic but also its accessibility. However, it should be noted that looking into strategy reports does not necessarily allude to the practical application of these. Thus, an analysis of strategy documents may reveal political rhetoric more than anything else. This does limit the study in the sense that I can mostly focus on the level of formulation rather than execution. However, this thesis builds on the general assumption that these reports are not mere window-dressing, but indeed reflected in the way the country's aid cooperation is conducted. Furthermore, as I rely on two additional methodological tools, I argue that this limitation does hinder me in reaching a valid insight.

2 Background

Before diving into the deep end of the analysis, the following section will provide a brief explanation of the conceptual framework, as well as providing some relevant background information that will further the understanding of the structural foundation of the topic and scope.

2.1 Conceptual Framework

In order to ensure a proper foundational understanding of the study, I identified two concepts that need to be properly explained:

First, the concept of foreign aid is in this study understood as the voluntary transfer of capital, goods, or services from a country or international organisation to another in the form of a gift, grant or loan (Williams 2020; Kenton 2020). Herein lie several common distinctions; such as development and humanitarian aid. However, in this research, that distinction will not be very clear. When researching Danish aid, I found that the government itself does not make this distinction themselves. Indeed, while ODA is commonly understood as ‘official development aid’, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ database openaid.dk is described to “show Denmark's official assistance to developing countries (ODA)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2020b). Furthermore, in the government reports analysed (see section 5.2) humanitarian aid and development aid are portrayed as interlinked. Thus, in this particular study, foreign aid refers to a broader umbrella concept.

In the process of fine-tuning the research question of this study, I repeatedly re-phrased ‘strategic interests’. Mainly because I found that the phrase can be understood in a myriad of ways and is hence somewhat ineffective in narrowing down the question and framing the research. In this study, the phrase should be understood as an expression of what Denmark wishes to accomplish when granting aid - the *end game*, in other words. Previous scholarly works concerned with similar topics have used words such as ‘determinants’, ‘priorities’ or ‘purpose’ (Stokke, 1989; Borring Olesen, 2015; Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov, 2018; Lancaster, 2007). Thus, while expressions of motives, priorities, aims, and interests are not entirely synonymous, they are used to describe similar phenomena. As such, my question could perhaps also have been formulated as ‘what motivates Danish ODA’ or ‘what is prioritised’.

2.2 Three Eras of Danish Aid History

To understand the significance of recent changes in aid, the historical background of Danish aid cooperation and its strategic interests is highly relevant. Borring Olesen (2015) draws up three periods of Danish aid history: the establishment 1962-1991, the front runner 1991-2001, and the civil-military framework 2001-2015.

While tracing all the way back to the 1940s, Denmark's commitment to development cooperation was formalised by law in 1962. In 1971 this law was modernised and the development agency Danida¹ was founded (Borring Olesen, 2015: 26). From the outset, the agency was created as a section under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in 1986 it was re-organised into its own department with three separate divisions: a multilateral, a bilateral and a transverse secretariat (Engberg-Pedersen, 2020: 85). During this time, the international cooperation for development was strengthening greatly and when the UN declared the 60s as the development decade, they simultaneously recommended that the rich member countries strived to secure development targeted economic transfers equivalent to 1% of gross national income (GNI). In 1970 this recommendation was changed to the well-known target of 0,7% of GNI to ODA. In 1978 Denmark reached this goal as the fourth country (behind Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands) and by the end of the Cold War, it had even reached 0,9%. Generally, all development work was aimed at the outspoken goal of reducing poverty (Borring Olesen, 2015: 28). Thus, in this period, Denmark established and solidified its development cooperation.

The pattern continued into the 90s where Danish ODA would eventually hit 1,5% of the GNI. In 1991 the Foreign Ministry was reorganised into a South and the North department with Danida as its anchor. This both meant that development work became a central part of the Ministry, but also that development became further entangled in the broader foreign political scheme. The office as Minister for Development Cooperation² of Denmark was introduced in 1993 by the social-democratic government; a clear signal that development was a highly prioritised element of Danish foreign politics. Priorities and strategies mirrored the previous decade's dedication to reducing poverty (Borring Olesen, 2015: 31). Hence, this period signified a period of Denmark as a front runner in the field.

The events on 9/11 in 2001 resulted in a significant change in the way many countries conducted foreign affairs and created a new international agenda: *The War on Terror*. This resulted in a shift in the way Denmark's development cooperation was conducted (Borring Olesen, 2015). Among other things, this meant a general militarisation of Danish development cooperation as exemplified in the dramatic increase of ODA to Afghanistan where the Danish military was also operating. In developmental priority reports this shift was also highly visible, as the

¹ At its establishment, the word 'Danida' was an abbreviation for 'Danish Development Agency'. Today it has been changed to an abbreviation for 'Danish International Development Agency'.


² The official wording of the title has changed several times over the years but will be referred to as such in this paper to avoid confusion.

new main strategic interest was no longer poverty reduction but rather the stabilisation of so-called fragile states (Engberg-Pedersen, 2020: 87). This strategy became the big signifier of the Danish development work in the 2010s. In this period, the ODA % of GNI also started dropping though it never fell below the 0,7% target.

2.3 Organisational Structure

To understand the significance of scrutinising domestic politics' relation to aid in Denmark, it is highly relevant to first understand the organisational structure (figure 1) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Figure 1: The Organisational Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Source: The figure is the authors own design inspired by Lancaster (2007: 209) and based on information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2020c).

The figure illustrates how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is divided into five departments. Each of these has its own department head. However, the department of development policy is the only department that has additional political leadership besides the Minister of Foreign Affairs: The Minister for Development Cooperation. Each of the five departments have different areas of responsibility, but there are several overlaps of management as in the case of ‘Migration, Stabilization and Fragility’, which concerns the Department of Development Policy, Foreign Policy, and European Affairs and the Arctic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2020c). Organisationally, the latest period has greatly solidified Danida’s role as part of the Ministry. Danida is today more or less synonymous with the department of Development Policy and is referred to as “an area of activity under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2020a). In 2012 the Council for Developmental Policy was founded, although it has existed in other forms since 1962 (Lancaster, 2007: 209). This council, consisting of usually 11 members appointed by the Minister for Development Cooperation, is tasked with the responsibility of providing strategic dialogue and counselling to the Minister (Law Concerning International Development Cooperation, 2012, §10). Typically, the members represent interest organisations from civil society (i.e. NGOs, think-tanks, unions, and research institutions) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, n.d.).

Thus, Danida is closely associated with the Ministry and, as such, the broader political agenda. Furthermore, it is directly governed by the politician occupying the office of Minister for Development Cooperation. Lastly, the agency has a direct link to civil society via the council. With this understanding in mind, the following section will relate the theoretical framework.

3 Theoretical Framework

This thesis builds upon the bulk of literature that seeks to uncover and explain how the political landscape of the donor country affects their aid. Scholarly work concerned with this topic has generally sought to explore how domestic politics affect aid allocation.

3.1 Partisan Theory

A great deal of the literature concerning domestic politics' impact on aid seeks to uncover how government ideology affects aid allocation efforts. This is commonly referred to as the partisan theory or -hypothesis. The hypothesis states that a left-wing government would be more so inclined to grant aid than a right-wing government (Brech & Potrafke, 2014: 62). Overall, the scholarly empirical findings testing this theory differ. Tingley (2010: 47) concludes that "as governments become more conservative, the share of GDP committed to foreign aid effort declines". Similarly, in their study concerning the politicisation of aid in the US, Fleck & Kilby (2006: 220) find that not only is a Democratic government likely to grant more aid than a Republican, but they also assert that ideological shifts affect the aid strategies. Thus, they suggest that aid from a left-wing government is more focused on long-term developmental goals such as poverty alleviation whereas a right-wing government would be more concerned with commercial interests like trade relationships. Milner & Tingley (2013) mirrors this argument but also add that a conservative (i.e. right-wing) government would be more likely to have militarised aims in their aid. Additionally, they argue that left-wing governments favour multilateral aid more so than right-wing ones. Brech & Potrafke (2014: 73) discovered isolated partisan tendencies. They conclude that the thesis holds true in the case of bilateral grant aid and aid to less developed countries as they reason that a right-wing government would be more likely to pursue the first, while a left-wing government would favour the latter.

Conversely, Round & Odedokun (2004) does not find any significant correlation between the left-right partisan divide and aid efforts. However, they note that their conclusion and the conclusion of alternative studies who argue the opposite are highly conditioned by the way they handle and utilise the empirical data. Thus, their study underlines an interesting and highly relevant methodological concern.

In summary, the literature on the subject varies on a scale from confirming the partisan theory (Tingley, 2010; Fleck & Kilby, 2006; Milner & Tingley, 2013),

finding localised evidence in support of the theory (Brech & Potrafke, 2014), to lastly repudiating the theory (Round & Odedokun, 2004).

3.2 The Theoretical Altruism of Welfare States

When discussing domestic political landscapes and aid, welfare states are repeatedly referred to as unique cases (Noël & Thérien, 1995; Brech & Potrafke, 2014). These states are often argued to be outside the partisan divide owing to the fact that being a welfare state means that the state is fundamentally driven by altruism and a ‘wish to help’. As Noël & Thérien (1995) states: “A state generous with its own citizens would tend naturally to be generous as well with people in developing countries” (Noël & Thérien, 1995: 524). Lumsdaine’s (1993: 29) seminal work also claims that humanitarian egalitarian convictions are the main drivers behind welfare state’s aid granting. Denmark is one such state often cited in works mirroring this narrative. Indeed, Scandinavian states are frequently presented as structurally in favour of long-term development aid, partly due to their historical commitment to UN set ODA-targets (Odén & Wohlgemuth, 2013; Sachs, 2015). Some authors even argue that a generous aid profile has become a matter of identity for these countries (Stokke, 1989, 2019: 105; Lancaster, 2007: 221). This strand of arguments, stemming from the theoretical school of constructivism, has meant that countries such as Denmark often are understood to almost be above the effects of domestic politics on aid. Thus, several scholars maintain that ideological governmental shifts do not affect the welfare states’ aid policies (Noël & Thérien, 1995: 552; Lancaster, 2007: 221).

4 Methodology

At the basis of well-written and relevant research is a critically designed methodology. However, this crucial task of navigating the terminological jungle of social science research can pose a challenge in itself. In the following section, the methodological framework of this study will be assiduously explained and rationalised. In designing the methodology for any research, it is crucial to understand the study's relationship with the existing theory. This study adopts a highly deductive rationale by moving from theory to data. In doing so, the aim of the thesis is to test, verify and falsify theories outlined in chapter 3.

Traditionally, much scholarly work concerning domestic politics and its effect on aid has employed quantitative research methodologies. Tingley (2010) investigates the causal relationship between domestic ideological governmental shifts and aid by running regressions using a time-section cross-sectional dataset including all but four OECD-DAC countries in the years from 1971 to 2002. Similarly, Round & Odedokun (2004) and Brech & Potrafke (2014) both employ panel data-based surveys across 22 and 23 donor countries, respectively. While Fleck & Kilby's (2006) study is concerned with the politicisation of aid in a context of the US, it utilises a sizable quantitative dataset consisting of data from about 119 recipient countries in the years from 1960 to 1997.

For the purpose of measuring the economic and geographical shifts in aid allocation over time, the quantitative research method seems highly fitting. However, as this study wishes to explore a somewhat different aspect of the causal relationship, namely domestic politics' effect on aid strategies, and due to the potential methodological pitfalls put forward by Round & Odedokun (2004), I argue that exploring a different empirical methodology is contributory to the theoretical field. Additionally, replacing the conventional large number of subjects being studied, this study opts for a single country case. Hence, the following section will outline and justify the employment of a qualitative mixed-methods case study methodology.

4.1 Research design: The Case Study

To answer the research question, it was found that the in-depth inquiry made possible by a case study was highly fitting. The case study was chosen for its ability to delve into complex issues necessary to comprehend the topic, and for its suppleness in terms of allowing for emerging ideas and realisations (Saunders et al., 2016). Among scholarly standard norms for selecting a single case study, a

specific case should be chosen for its significant relevance to the topic (Saunders et al., 2016; Yin, 2014). Furthermore, according to Yin (2014: 84), a study of a single case may be appropriate when it applies to one or more of five factors, here amongst being unusual or an opportunity for unique research access. For this study, I identified that these two apply. Firstly, in relation to the partisan theory, welfare states are argued to be unusual cases. Thus, testing the theory in this setting was deemed particularly interesting. Lastly, while I do not have sole access to the data being studied, my personal connection to the Danish case and actors involved did justify the selection of this country over other welfare states. Altogether, the case of the Danish aid was an equally well-suited and accessible means to explore the theory. While the study is primarily concerned with detecting strategic changes over time, I do so by utilising several units of analysis in an ‘embedded’ case study system. This strategy was favoured over a ‘holistic’ (Yin, 2014).

In formulating the methodology as a single rather than multiple case study, I deliberately prioritised the heightened level of in-depth insight albeit the trade-off might be less evidence and hence a more tenuous foundation for generalisation gained from multiple case studies (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). A comparative case study of the Scandinavian countries was considered, as it could have been highly interesting to investigate the divergent patterns of aid and here, too, I identified a lack in the literature. However, factors of time, capability, and manageability were considered in opting for a single case study over the comparative case study. While comparative analysis of several cases would have added analytical clout to the research, it was just not a realistic endeavour within the practical frame of this project. Furthermore, my deep insight and ties to the Danish case could not have been replicated as easily in Sweden and Norway which would have compromised the reliability of the study. However, the intrinsic weakness of findings that are possibly distinctive to a single case, are addressed in the following section (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).

4.2 Methodology: The Qualitative Mixed Methods Study

This study employs a qualitative mixed method. While utilising both qualitative and quantitative methods, the predominant part of the analysis is based on the former (QUAL+quan in accordance with Bryman, 2012: 632). Practically, this study applies three methodological tools: secondary data analysis based on official numbers provided by the Ministry’s database openaid.dk³ (quan), document content analysis of official government reports (qual), and expert interviews (qual). Together these were deemed the most appropriate and fitting methods for answering the research question within the practical framework of the study. In qualitative

³ Openaid.dk is sourced as Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2020b) in the bibliography but will be referred to as ‘openaid.dk’ throughout the thesis.

research, the aim is to gain a more in-depth insight into a phenomenon. Thus, in this case study, it was deemed highly suitable. However, I also found that quantitative data could offer a complimenting dimension to the study. There is a myriad of ways in which the various methodologies can supplement each other. In this study, the mixed method is argued to offer some degree of triangulation and completeness (Bryman, 2012: 633). The triangulation takes place to compare findings from the different sources and thus strengthen the study's validity. Another concern for this type of research is the issue of generalisability. When conducting research based on findings from a smaller sample and in a highly specific context, critics of the method argue that the conclusions reached cannot be replicated in different settings. As this affects the reliability of the study, this should be acknowledged as a highly relevant critique (Bryman 2012: 406). In this case, as the study is focussed entirely on Danish domestic politics and aid, I recognise that the findings from the study lack universal generalisability. On the other hand, it allows me to engage with the theory in a different manner as I, by focusing on a single case study, can explore the patterns of aid and the changes both in terms of the total amount granted but also the type of strategy pursued more in detail. As such, it is the intent of this inquiry to contribute to the existing pool of literature by being focused on one case.

Lastly, qualitative research has been faulted for being highly subjective due to the selective role of the researcher (Bryman, 2012:405). In this study, I recognise that my own impression of the topic and theory might have affected both the way I designed and conducted the research and the conclusions I have drawn from this. It is arguable that keeping oneself completely out of any type of study is an impossible task as subjectivity often happens subconsciously. Thus, the best tool to counteract this was to maintain a high level of transparency through the research process, its methodology and the writing of the thesis.

In the following, I will provide a more detailed explanation of the process behind the qualitative methodological tools utilised in this study.

4.2.1 Content Analysis

To analyse the contextual framework of aid strategies and targets, a content analysis of official government reports was utilised. Within the scope and possibilities of this study, this was determined to be the most fitting method of analysis. The purpose of the content analysis is to systematically categorise qualitative textual data in order to determine patterns and relationships (Julien, 2008: 120). Hence, this method provides a way of identifying inter-data relationships and enables the researcher with the possibility of analysing qualitative data quantitatively (Saunders et al., 2016). This indicates that coherency and explicit ground rules are needed in order to conduct a proper content analysis. Strict observance is called for during the coding process to secure a coherent and reliable output. Saunders et al., (2016) identify the steps in qualitative content analysis as follows: "sampling, devising analytical categories, defining the unit of analysis, conducting coding, and

undertaking quantitative analysis” (Saunders et al., 2016: 611). In the following, each of these procedural steps are elucidated in relation to this study.

Finding a fitting sample for the analysis was in this case fairly straightforward. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes variations of developmental priority and strategy reports yearly. As the research question determined the temporal limitations, sampling was a matter of determining the most crucial and relevant reports. The choice fell on three reports published under one of the three governments in power during the eight years being studied. This allowed me to trace strategic shifts during the period.

Devising analytical categories is crucial to the accuracy and consistency of the analysis and thus the internal validity and reliability of the entire study. Prior to analysing the reports, I composed categories in which the content could be placed. The formulation of these categories was guided by the research question and the theoretical framework. Hence, since the aim of the analysis was to understand shifts in aid strategies, the initial analytical categories reflected the theoretical framework outlined in section 3 of this paper.

Likewise, the unit of analysis was guided based on the research question. The question allowed for a relatively broad unit of analysis, but it also called for the need of a fair amount of contextualisation. Thus, in order to comprehend the context, the unit of analysis was determined as phrases, sentences and even paragraphs.

Lastly, the actual analysis was conducted via the process of coding. When coding, the forethought set of ‘rules’ predetermined in the previous steps were continuously consulted. I also opted to remain open to changes, as the analysis unfolded by conducting in vivo coding. Thus, by carefully organising each report into the thematic schemes, I aimed to establish an intertextual chain which elucidates to the governmental aid strategies. Practically, the coding was conducted with the help of the analysis software NVivo 12 Plus. While the relatively small sample size could have allowed for in-hand coding, I preferred the systematic and orderly nature of the software. Refer to section 5.2 for a more detailed description of the coding process.

4.2.2 Semi-Structured Expert Interviews

Concurrently with the content analysis, I conducted two qualitative expert interviews. Whereas the document content analysis enabled analysis of the textual elements of governmental aid strategies and policies, I anticipated that interviews potentially would deepen the overall research design with comprehensions from people with close and rich experience in the field. Thus, the interview-based data adds a complementary dimension to the overall analysis. To ensure the adequate fundamental components for a successful and useful interview, Miles and Huberman’s (1994:33) four-phased framework was applied in planning the interview. The four phases are as follows: a) The setting, b) the actor, c) the event, and, d) the process. The four phases were employed as outlined in the following table 1:

Table 1: Miles and Huberman’s (1994) four-phased framework for planning an interview

a. The setting
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, conducting the interviews face-to-face was not possible. As an alternative, online interviews were deemed the most fitting setting for the interview. Per agreements with the interviewees the respective interviews took place over Skype and via phone.
b. The actor
There was a myriad of people it could have been interesting and relevant to interview in order to gain expert insight on the topic. To complement the document content analysis, I sought to interview someone with hands-on experience with both the political and the practical aspects of development policies. Christian Friis Bach, a social liberal politician, is one of the four people who have had the title of Minister of Development Cooperation in the time frame being studied. He held the position from 2011 to 2013 under a social democratic government. Furthermore, his experience as Secretary-General for the Danish Refugee Council and International Director for the DanChurchAid made him an obvious candidate. Thus, he was deemed a highly relevant actor and was contacted via a personal connection. He was kind to offer an interview of 30 minutes’ duration. Due to Mr Bach's position as a politician, I deemed that an interview with a person with an apolitical role in the Ministry could enrich the accuracy of the study. Therefore, I contacted Danida and was offered a 30-minute interview with Jens Ole Bach Hansen who holds the title of Team Leader and Chief Advisor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the department for Africa, Policy & Development. It could be argued that more interviews could have provided a deeper insight into the topic. However, as this method component did not stand alone but was rather an addition to the content analysis, I found that the knowledge generated from the two added a sufficiently informational dimension to the study on their own.
c. The event
The event was predetermined by the research question. In this instance, the ‘event’ should be understood as the domestic politics' effect on Danish aid. I had a well-developed idea of said event based on my preliminary studies. Thus, my notion was that the interviews would serve as a useful addition to the content analysis as well as bringing hitherto unconsidered aspects into attention. This dictated the practical pace of the interview so that it allowed for answers to explicit questions while encouraging the emergence of the unforeseen.
d. The process
To accommodate the wish to gain insight into predetermined themes while also allowing for the unforeseen, I selected a semi-structured interview. This type of interview is characterised by a main event needed to be addressed while providing the researcher with sufficient leeway to improvise. The questions are designed as open-ended, to encourage a broader development of answers (Denscombe, 2010: 175). A total of four questions were prepared beforehand based on the preliminary findings from the content analysis. These were sent to Mr Bach and Mr Hansen prior to their respective interviews to allow them ample time to prepare and to ensure that I would not ask questions they would not wish to answer. A tone-setting question was deliberately designed to get the ball rolling

on a topic highly familiar to the interviewees. Subsequently, two questions were devised with regards to the more detailed aspects of what was mentioned in the first question. The final question was an opportunity to tie up the previous questions in a broader perspective. At both interviews, several of the answers given sparked further unplanned follow-up questions. With consent from the interviewees, the interviews were recorded and thereafter transcribed by the researcher. The full Danish transcripts of the interviews can be found in appendix A and B.

4.3 Time

The time frame for this longitudinal study was determined based on what I deemed plausible and the hole in the existing pool of literature. While there are articles such as Borring Olesen (2015) that investigates strategic changes in aid, I found a lack of research that explores the more recent development. Furthermore, to ensure that I could detect changes across governments, I reasoned that the period should cover three governmental shifts. Hence, the period from 2011 to 2020. However, as the first report used in the content analysis was published in 2012, this was selected as the start of the period.

4.4 Language and Translations

Most of the process of conducting this research was affected by the task of translating. The researcher's fluency in Danish and English made this a relatively seamless process. However, it should be noted that translations always involve a degree of agency, and thus, the risk of misinterpretation. As such, the meaning an author put into a phrase from a source may not be the meaning intended and indeed not the meaning the reader takes away from it. Arguably, this is always the case no matter the linguistic framework, but translations do intensify this potential pitfall (Temple, 2008: 890). In this study, I have strived to provide translations that properly balance the most direct translation and the crucial task of maintaining meaning and contextual integrity. In working with the sources this was highly salient. Two of the reports analysed for the content analysis were published in both Danish and English while the last only in Danish. Hence, to ensure a more transferable coding process, it was decided to analyse the Danish version of all documents - although the analytical codes applied in NVivo were English. The interviews conducted with Mr Bach and Mr Hansen were likewise conducted in Danish and both were made aware that their answers would be translated when cited in the text. Thus, in the following analysis, direct citations from these sources are likely to be translated from Danish to English by the researcher.

5 Analysis


In accordance with the methodology, the following analysis is structured in three parts. Firstly, I will present three selected graphs that provide a brief overview of the monetary size and development of Danish aid for the period. Following, the results from the content analysis will be presented, discussed, and compared to the aforementioned graphs. Lastly, I will tie up the analysis with some of the main findings from the qualitative interviews with Mr Bach and Mr Hansen.

The electoral shifts in the period were as followed: In the first period from 2011 to 2015, the government was held by the Social Democrats, the Danish Social Liberal Party and the Socialist People's Party (although SPP left government in 2014). In the 2015 election, the liberal party Venstre was elected into office and was in 2016 joined by Liberal Alliance and the Danish People's Party. Lastly, in 2019 the Social Democrats regained their seat by forming a minority government (Folketinget, 2020).

5.1 The Numbers of Danish Aid

To start off the analysis I wish to present three graphs that gives a general summary of the financial aspect of Danish aid. This knowledge is relevant to the analysis in two ways: firstly, it can show whether the partisan theory holds true in terms of the amount of aid given (as argued by Tingley, 2010) and secondly, it allows me to triangulate some of the findings presented later in the content analysis. Thus, knowing the monetary size and development of the aid is highly relevant. For this purpose, three graphs were put together based on data from openaid.dk, each highlighting different aspects of the financial development of Danish foreign aid. One could have included a plethora of alternative graphs, but these three were chosen based on their overall significance and relevance to the findings from the content analysis. This first figure 2 shows the Danish net ODA and how much this represents of the GNI.

Figure 2: Net ODA and ODA % of GNI




Source: Authors own design based on data from openaid.dk

While the net ODA has decreased, the arguably most crucial development in the graph is the decrease in ODA % of GNI. Although the percentage remains comparably high and above the 0,7% UN recommended line, it has decreased significantly from 0,85% to 0,72% in the period from 2013 to 2018⁴. The most drastic change can be seen from 2015 to 2016. Based solely on this and considering the governmental shift from left-wing to right-wing that took place in 2015, one could be compelled to conclude that there seems to be a negative correlation between the election of a right-wing government and the amount of total aid granted. However, this snapshot in time does not provide a full picture. Indeed, the left-wing government elected in 2019 has stated that it intends to earmark 0,7% of the country's GNI to aid in 2020 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2019: 2). The shift illustrated in the graph can then not be argued to fully support the partisan theory but rather it indicates a foundational shift across the political spectrum in support of lowering the amount of aid granted.

Figure 3 shows how the aid is distributed between three main categories: multilateral ODA, bilateral ODA, and the expenses for the reception of refugees.

⁴ The graph is limited to these years as this is the only data available on openaid.dk.

Figure 3: Danish ODA categorised




Source: Authors own design based on data from openaid.dk

While multilateral ODA has remained more or less the same at around 30%, bilateral aid was in 2018 at its all-time highest at over 65%. The category of expenses for the reception of refugees is included because it illustrates how it, with over 15% in 2015, was a substantial part of the aid budget in 2015 and 2016 but decreased significantly from 2016 to 2017. This development will be further explored in section 5.2.2. Hence, the graph shows an increased focus on bilateral aid cooperation and shift in the way the government financially tackled the reception of refugees. There are not significant shifts detectable in the election year of 2015.

Lastly, figure 4 shows the regional distribution of Denmark's bilateral aid.

Figure 4: Regionally divided bilateral aid



Source: Authors own design based on data from openaid.dk

The graph was chosen because it highlights a steady increase in bilateral aid to the MENA-region⁵. The region has gone from around 10% in 2013 to around 20% in 2019. This development seems to have happened gradually and there are no visibly significant shifts in the year of an election. Thus, this steady increase may point to the fact that there, like with the percentage of GNI to ODA, has been a trans-ideological political focus on the MENA-region.

5.2 Content Analysis

To uncover the shifts in the strategic aims of Danish development aid over the last eight years, three periods were identified based on electoral changes in government and analysed via official reports.

Table 2 provides an overview of the reports and the government they were published under:

Table 2: Sources analysed in the content analysis

No.	Report name	Published	Author/Publisher	Government (partisan term)	Minister for Development Cooperation	Pages
1	The Right to a Better Life: Strategy for Denmark's Development Cooperation	June 2012	Danida/The Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Left-wing (with centre party presence)	Christian Friis Bach (Danish Social Liberal Party)	44
2	The World 2030	January 2017	Danida/The Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Right-wing (with far-right party-presence)	Ulla Tørnæs (Venstre)	44
3	The Government's Development Political Priorities 2020	October 2019	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Left-wing	Rasmus Prehn (Social Democrats)	20

These reports were selected based on their significance at the time of their publication. Each year, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes a report concerning the following couple of years' governmental development spending, strategies, and priorities. However, I found that the first report published after the

⁵ In accordance with the World Bank, the MENA-region entails the following countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza (Palestine) and Yemen.

election of a new government tends to be more comprehensive and formulated in a manner that is aimed at setting the tone for the way this government intends to conduct development cooperation. Thus, report no. 1 and 3 were chosen for the analysis because they both are examples of this type of report. Report no. 2 was published in 2017 - 2 years after the 2015 election. However, it was chosen because it was a highly influential report, published due to the ubiquitous shift in the field of development in the transition from the Millennium Development Goals to the Sustainable Development Goals. This shift is also exemplified in 'Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change: A Review of Denmark's Foreign and Security Policy' (commonly known as the Taksøe report). This significant 130-page report was written by Peter Taksøe-Jensen, the ambassador for Denmark in India, on behalf of the Ministry. It was published in 2016 and in it, Taksøe-Jensen offers his take on and recommendations for Denmark's strategic foreign interests as a whole. Initially, this report was also included in the sample and coded equally to the other sources but was ultimately left out of the final analysis to ensure a higher level of comparability. However, its detrimental contents are not lost as source no. 2 was written based on the recommendations from the report. While the purpose of the three sources analysed is practically the same, it should be noted that report no. 3 is significantly less exhaustive than no. 1 and 2. These are 44 pages each while no. 3 is 20 pages long (12 excluding the appendix). Thus, the amount of times a certain code is repeated is not altogether comparable across the sample size. Therefore, their coverage percentage will be presented as well.

The three reports were imported into Nvivo 12 Plus and were subjected to an initial round of coding. As outlined in chapter 4.2.1, I had formulated overall thematic categories prior to coding. These included strategic focus eras and actors. The actual codes were formulated in vivo as the initial coding took place. Doing so, I let the sources guide the analysis. Following, a second round of open coding took place to ensure that the content was analysed on similar premises and to start identifying patterns. Lastly, the identified codes were sorted into the predetermined categories as well as categories I had not yet identified such as 'framework'. A more detailed account of the process of coding qualitative data, organising the data and keeping track of emerging coding can be found in Creswell (2014: ch. 9.5). In the following analysis, the central takeaways from the three aforementioned reports will be presented via a table containing the primary coding scheme divided into the thematic categories. In each table, the six most common codes will be presented and followed by a discussion about how they relate to partisan theory.

5.2.1 2012-2015: The Era of Rights

The first period identified within the time frame was from 2011 to 2015. During this period, government was held by the Social Democrats in a coalition with the centre-party the Danish Social Liberal Party. The overall aid strategy during this time was presented in the report 'The Right to a Better Life: Strategy for Denmark's Development Cooperation' published in June 2012. The following table 3 presents the report's coding scheme:

Table 3: 2011-2015 coding scheme

Coding	Description	Example	Instances	Coverage %
<i>Framework</i>				
Rights	This content is concerned with working to secure rights.	“Human rights are both a means and an end in our development cooperation. They must be part and parcel of everything we do from start to finish” (p. 11)	47	5,42%
<i>Strategic focus areas</i>				
Poverty reduction	This content concerns the focus on poverty reduction.	“The will to implement an effective poverty reduction strategy will remain among the key criteria for the provision of budget support” (p. 37)	36	2,94%
Economic growth	This content centres around the central role of economic growth.	“Denmark will work for sustainable and inclusive economic growth and employment creation, which will continue to be a core element in Denmark’s development cooperation” (p. 2)	39	2,03%
Stability	This content centres around the focus on stabilising fragile state.	“Denmark will contribute to preventing conflict and crises by strengthening the capacity of countries and of regional organisations to prevent conflicts through dialogue and mediation” (p. 28)	30	1,54%
Multi-lateral cooperation	This content concerns multilateral development cooperation.	“Simultaneously, we will strengthen our involvement in the multilateral organisations that play a key role in championing human rights” (p. 9)	23	1,18%
<i>Actors</i>				
Private sector	This content is concerned with the role of the private sector in the development work.	“Denmark will maintain its efforts to promote private sector led economic growth and job creation” (p.17)	17	0,87%

Generally, the main framework of the report was that of human rights. This element is visible throughout the entire report. Furthermore, the role of poverty reduction is a highly significant component. Both are argued to be signs of an altruistic aid strategy and are according to partisan theory more likely to be pursued by a left-wing government (Fleck & Kilby, 2006). However, the militarised interest of stability and the more commercial interests such as economic growth and the private sector also play a substantial role in the report. The report puts great emphasis on the importance of multilateral cooperation and asserts that the Ministry wishes to strengthen its involvement in these while maintaining a ‘limited number’

of bilateral agreements. Milner & Tingley (2013) argues that this strategy is more likely to be pursued by a left-wing government. However, while figure 3 does not include the two first years of the period, this statement does not seem to have held true in terms of economic commitment since multilateral ODA did not increase but rather decreased (albeit slightly) from 2013 to 2015.

In summary, the reports contain components that are argued to be typical of left-wing ideology such as a focus on poverty, human rights, and multilateral cooperation, while also having tendencies towards the commercial and militarised strategies. The presence of a centre-party in government could perhaps account for these tendencies. Indeed, the office of Minister for Development Cooperation was held by a representative from said centre-party (the Danish Social Liberal Party). Thus, generally, this report seems to reflect a great deal of the partisan theory in terms of strategy.

5.2.2 2015-2019: The Era of ‘Migratisation’

The following period stretched from 2015 to 2019 and was analysed via the strategy report ‘The World 2030’. In this period, government was held by the right-wing party Venstre in coalition with the far-right party the Danish People’s Party. Published in 2017, The World 2030 was the result of a broad political settlement which became the basis upon which the Ministry would conduct its development and humanitarian work in the following years. The following table 4 presents the report’s coding scheme:

Table 4: 2015-2019 coding scheme

Coding	Description	Example	Instances	Coverage %
<i>Framework</i>				
Danish interests	This content mentions the central role of Danish interests in development work.	“Within our four strategic aims, we will focus and prioritise our effort on the activities and areas 1) where we have the most at stake – interests and values” (p. 6)	21	2,4%
SDGs	This content is concerned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).	“The Danish development cooperation will contribute to realising the global ambition of the Sustainable Development Goals for the world’s development towards 2030” (p. 1)	30	2,36%
<i>Strategic focus areas</i>				
Migration and refugees	This content centres around the goal of stopping flows of refugees and irregular immigration.	“Irregular migration is a global challenge and as the refugee and migration crisis has demonstrated, the development in Europe’s	19	5,28%

		neighbourhood increasingly affect our part of the world” (p. 22)		
Economic growth	This content centres around the central role of economic growth.	“Denmark will prioritise the promotion of market-based economic growth” (p. 26)	23	4,28%
Poverty reduction	This content concerns the focus on poverty reduction.	“We react to a demand from the countries themselves and support their ambitions and plans for fighting poverty” (p. 4)	9	1,58%

Actors

Private sector	This content is concerned with growing focus on the private sector in development work.	“Danish private actors, including businesses, investors and financial institutions, foundations, collective and business organisations, will in the future be increasingly relevant partners” (p. 12)	12	2,74%
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The overall framework for the report is provided by SDGs. This was arguable to be anticipated considering its time of publication. However, another detrimental aspect mentioned in the report is that of Danish interests. This component could have been placed under the thematic heading ‘strategic focus areas’ but was placed under ‘framework’ due to it being a repeatedly mentioned feature throughout the entire report. One strategic interest that was highly emphasized in the report was migration and refugees. This is a shift from the report no. 1 which discussed this matter in terms of stability rather than migration. In this report, the government is especially concerned with the importance of stopping flows of irregular migration and targeting the root causes behind it. Thus, considering figure 4, it could seem as though the government shifted funds from the reception of refugees towards the root causes of the migration. At the same time, the communicative role of poverty reduction is significantly decreased compared to the previous report. Thus, based on this, one could reason that this government was focused more on short-term development rather than long-term. Furthermore, the role of multilateral cooperation is considerably less significant while the role of the private sector is emphasized to a higher degree. In terms of the partisan theory, all these tendencies are symptomatic of a right-wing government and thus confirms the hypothesis (Fleck & Kilby, 2006).

5.2.3 2019-: The Era of Solidarity

Lastly, to uncover any strategic shift following the election of a Social Democratic government in 2019, I analysed the new government’s first strategy report

published in the fall of 2019 titled “The Government’s Development Political Priorities 2020”. The following table 5 presents the report’s coding scheme:

Table 5: 2019- coding scheme

Coding	Description	Example	Instances	Coverage %
<i>Framework</i>				
SDGs	This content is concerned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).	“The Government emphasizes that the EU is working purposefully to lift all the UN's global goals in the African countries and regions that need it most” (p. 7)	7	1,06%
<i>Strategic focus areas</i>				
Migration and refugees	This content centres around the goal of stopping flows of refugees and irregular immigration.	“With the 2020 Budget Bill, the government is taking a first step in development assistance to support a more equitable and humane asylum system, which also means fewer spontaneous asylum seekers coming to Europe” (p. 5)	17	7,65%
Climate change	This content centres around the focus on climate change.	“Denmark must take leadership for the green transition in the world - and raise the ambitions for climate, environment and nature” (p. 3)	14	6,66%
Gender equality	This content concerns focus on reducing gender inequality.	“The government will pursue a development policy that promotes the rights and opportunities of girls and women in developing countries” (p. 10)	15	4,76%
Poverty reduction	This content concerns the focus on poverty reduction.	“If you fight climate change, you can also fight hunger, poverty and displacement” (p.3)	10	2,24%
Multi-lateral cooperation	This content concerns multilateral development cooperation.	“This should among other mark the beginning of a new dialogue on enhanced multilateral cooperation” (p. 6)	6	1,76%

Like the previous report, the overall framework of this report is provided by the SDGs. The role of migration and refugees has likewise kept its stance as a highly salient feature and while poverty reduction is present it is not nearly as significant as in report no. 1. However, climate change is highly present throughout the report. Since no scholarly work has yet theorised on the effect of partisan theory and climate change in aid this element cannot as easily be connected to theory. Nevertheless, compared to the two previous sources, it is debatably striking the degree to which this government emphasize this facet in its aid strategy. Like report no. 1, multilateral cooperation is once again emphasized to a higher degree. Additionally, the typically left-wing government goal of gender equality is highly present (Brech & Potrafke 2014). I have dubbed this period the era of solidarity due

to the word's repeated presence in the report as exemplified here: "The government will pursue a development policy of solidarity, fairness and justice" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2019: 2). In summary, this report confirms parts of the partisan theory while also bringing to light the hitherto non-theorised component of climate change.

In conclusion, this content analysis seems to suggest validation of the partisan theory in the sense that domestic governmental changes visibly alter the aid strategy as formulated in strategy reports. However, these differences in strategies do not fully line up with those found by scholars such as Fleck & Kilby (2006), Tingley (2010), Milner & Tingley (2013), and Brech & Potrafke (2014). Thus, while not confirming it, the claim proposed by Noël & Theriën (1995), namely that welfare state's domestic politics affect aid in a different manner than hypothesised in the partisan theory, may hold at least partially true.

5.3 Semi-Structured Expert Interviews

Following the research methodology outlined in section 4.2, I conducted an interview with former Minister for Development Cooperation Christian Friis Bach on April 24, 2020, and later I conducted an interview with current Ministry employee Jens Ole Bach Hansen on May 15, 2020. The interviews served the purpose of gaining insight into the topic from an alternative perspective. The interview with Mr Bach represented a critical concern in terms of sound interview methodology (see section 4.2.2). On the one side, asserting Mr Bach's credentials as an expert was obvious, but at the same time, the possibility that he would have a personal agenda as a politician should be considered. Throughout the process of the interview and the following analysis, I was critically aware of this concern. To cover more ground and potentially offset this concern, I later interviewed Mr Hansen. Qua his position as an apolitical employee in the Ministry, he was able to offer a complimenting, yet more so detached, perspective.

In the previous section, I was able to map how the aims of Danish ODA has changed in the last eight years. The demarcation of three eras elucidates how three governments chose to focus on different strategies - albeit not necessarily radically different. To gain deeper insight into the role of domestic politics in development strategies, I asked both interviewees to develop on the relationship between Danida, the Ministry and the government. The following is an extract of Mr Bach's answer:

"There was a lot of debate about this back when it was decided upon and the recommendations from a commission was the opposite. Namely that they should make a directorate-like construction like they had in Sweden. [...] He [note: Uffe Ellemann the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time] said very clearly that it was a matter of power. He did not want to give up power. [...] Today I would think that it in some ways has made sense because it was easier

to have an integrated foreign service. But it has also created a slightly unhealthy dependency between the financing mechanism and the foreign service. And it has also meant that it all becomes very focussed on Danish interests and bilateral agreement [...] because that is where you have the most influence and not least visibility. And visibility is something a Minister needs. So Danish interests and needs sometimes weigh more than what perhaps would be the most optimal and effective way to distribute aid seen from the recipient's perspective."

In this quote, Mr Bach brings to attention the detrimental role of the Minister. Because the Minister is elected to government by voters, they are accountable to their constituents. This means that development strategies cannot be formulated based solely on a professional assessment of what would benefit the recipient countries the most, but also needs to consider the government parties' broader political agenda. Ergo, this confirms the hypothesis that a partisan change in government consequently affects the development strategies. When asked the same question, Mr Hansen concurred this point but also added the following perspective:

"The World 2030 and other strategy reports are political documents and a politically negotiated document. [...] What lies behind these strategies, is that for the sake of development policy, there is a great interest in having gained support in the parliament. And, of course, there is also a desire that those strategies they are adopted by as wide a majority as possible because it gives peace to development cooperation. So, in that way, there is a developmental reason in making the strategies that way."

What Mr Hansen brings to light here is the long-standing tradition of broad political settlements in Danish politics. By formulating a strategy paper in a way so that most parliamentary parties can get behind it, the government secures a higher degree of accountability. In order to gain broad political support, the government must strike a balance between the professionally assessed best development strategy, the political interests of their government, as well as the interests of parliamentary parties outside of government. This could account for why the significance of migration does not alter from report no. 2 to 3 despite a partisan government change. This topic has been highly present in political debates since the refugee crisis in 2015 and a majority of the parties in parliament are interested in partly or completely stopping the irregular flow of migrants (Klint, 2019). Thus, to secure broad parliamentary support the government might have to include this in their formulated aid strategy.

6 Conclusion

“I think there are signs that we are doing something right. But it is not an exact science, after all. And by god, it is not easy to make development policy.”

- Jens Ole Bach Hansen, interview conducted May 15, 2020

This study has sought to explore in what ways Danish domestic politics has affected the strategies guiding the country’s aid in the period from 2012 to 2020. The aim behind this has been to apply and test the theoretical framework of the partisan theory and the scholarly argued ‘exceptionality’ of aid from welfare states. In relation to these two theoretical branches, it was argued that Denmark posed a highly interesting case. In order to answer the research question, I applied three analytical tools under the framework of a qualitative mixed methodology: Secondary data analysis, document content analysis, and expert interviews.

The secondary data analysis did not show that partisan government changes directly affect the total amount of aid granted as argued by Tingley (2010). Au contraire, the numbers showed a steady decrease in the period unaffected by the changes from left to right to left-wing governments. Similarly, the numbers showed a steady increase in the amount of bilateral aid to countries in the MENA-region as well as a drop in the capital spent on the reception of refugees from 2016 to 2017.

The content analysis showed a much higher degree of partisan theory. The three reports analysed confirmed that each of the three governments sought divergent, though not radically different, strategies in their aid. The first report showed an aid regime highly focused on long-term goals such as poverty reduction but also with some commercial elements such as economic growth. The second report was highly focused on underlining the importance of serving Danish interests. This entailed a continuous focus on stopping flows of irregular migration. In combination with the drastically decreased emphasis on poverty reduction, this report showed several tendencies typical of a right-wing government according to Milner & Tingley (2013) and Brech & Potrafke (2014). Likewise, the last report also contained several aspects synonymous of a left-wing government such as poverty and multilateral cooperation. However, the report also maintained a heightened focus on migration.

Through the expert interviews, I identified two significant points. Firstly, Mr Bach brought to light the fact that as Danida has political leadership in the form of the Minister for Development Cooperation, politics will always play a role in the formulation of aid strategies. This confirmed my findings from the content analysis.

Secondly, Mr Hansen argued that while the political ideology of the government affects the strategy, the Ministry is also interested in gaining support from parties not in government. This could account for the maintained focus on migration.

In summary, I have found that the changes in Danish aid strategies in the period from 2012 to 2020 to some extent support the partisan theory and suggest its partial validation. This contradicts the theory that domestic politics do not affect aid in a welfare state as asserted by Noël & Thérien (1995) and Lancaster (2007). Nevertheless, there is a definitive duality in partisan theory that does not fully apply to the case of Denmark. There are other factors within the domestic political landscape besides governmental changes that shape the way the country conducts aid cooperation. Thus, the specific structural and institutional circumstances within which a given government must act, are of great importance to understand how domestic politics affect aid strategies. This conclusion is highly relevant to the theoretical framework and our understanding of the relationship between aid, domestic politics, and welfare states.

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8 Appendix

8.1 Appendix A: Transcript of interview with Christian Friis Bach

File name: CFB skype interview 24.04.2020.M4A

Duration: 00:17:30

Date: 24/04-2020

Interviewer – Q1

Det først spørgsmål, som jeg jo rigtig gerne vil høre noget om, det er den der forbindelse mellem Danida og Christiansborg og ministeriet. Altså fordi i sammenligning med Sverige, så er Danida jo i rigtig høj grad en del af ministeriet. Christian:

Interviewee (Mr Bach)

Ja, og jeg ved ikke om du har læst det, der hedder dansk udviklingspolitisk historie? Der har jeg jo skrevet det sidste kapitel der, hvor jeg også prøver at beskrive hvorfor det endte sådan. Og det var der jo rigtig meget debat om dengang og anbefaling fra, hvad var det nu han hed, en kommission, der var nedsat, kom jo med den modsatte anbefaling. Nemlig at man skulle lave en styrelsesagtig konstruktion ligesom man havde i Sverige. Hvad var de nu han hed? Det var ham, der blev formand for kræftens bekæmpelse senere. Nå men der var sådan en kommission, og der var sådan en anbefaling. Og jeg interviewede så Uffe Ellemann om det spørgsmål, fordi der var ham der var udenrigsminister og ligesom skulle anbefale det her. Og han sagde jo meget klart, at det var et spørgsmål om magt. Han ville ikke afgive magten. Han frygtede jo, at hvis han ligesom lagde det ud i en styrelse, så ville udenrigsudvalget, og der var Jørgen Estrup formand, så vidt jeg husker, og de var ikke verdens bedste venner, så ville de ligesom ville kunne komme til at få alt for meget direkte indflydelse, og han ville ligesom miste kontrollen. Så han ville have det hele. Og det sagde Uffe jo meget sådan, han er utrolig dejligt bramfri. Så det var sådan set sådan det endte dengang, ikke. Og så kan man sige, var det den rigtig beslutning? Måske ikke dengang. Der var nok ikke en rigtig beslutning dengang. Der kan man sige, der var den faglige faglighed måske nok vigtigere end det man kan kalde den udenrigspolitiske faglighed. Og det var ligesom det valg man havde. Enten så kunne man blive en meget faglig faglig styrelse, eller så kunne man blive sådan en udenrigs faglig enhed, og der valgte man jo så det sidste. Og der dengang ville jeg nok sige, at der var fagligheden og faglig fagligheden nok vigtigere. I dag

ville jeg tro, at det altså på nogle måder har givet mening at have det som en integreret enhed, fordi man jo bedre kunne få en helstøbt udenrigstjeneste, og at man ligesom bedre kunne integrere det ind. Men det har jo også skabt en lidt usund afhængighed mellem finansieringsmekanismen og så selve, kan man sige, udenrigstjenesten, som er jo dybt afhængig også af, simpelthen, det økonomiske bidrag de modtager - altså fra udviklingsbistand. Det finansierer jo en hel del af vores ambassader og vores administration i udenrigstjenesten og den administrationsprocent, der ligger. Og også at man måske ligesom bliver meget fokuseret på danske og egne interesser, fordi man ligger integreret inde i udenrigstjenesten, og så bliver det meget de danske og egen interesser, der kommer til at vægt højt. Og det giver udslag, i blandt andet det du er inde på i et af dine andre spørgsmål, at man jo meget gerne vil have de der bilaterale aftaler i stedet for multilaterale, fordi man jo der kan fastholde en større indflydelse bilateralt i de lande man samarbejder med, ved at man ligesom bruger udviklingsbistanden som et element. Og der må man sige, hvis du ser på fremtidens udviklingsbistand, og nu ved jeg ikke om du har set, men jeg har skrevet lidt om sociale sikkerhedsnet og jeg har skrevet et afsnit i den nye økonomi og politik, der lige er kommet. Omkring de folkeorganisationer og hvis du ser sådan hvad der ville være vejen frem på sigt, så er det jo ligesom at få en international finansieringsmekanisme, der i højere grad er med til at finansiere landenes egne sociale sikkerhedsnet og sociale programmer gennem nogle effektive internationale finansieringsmekanismer, som fokuserer på statsopbygning af uddannelse, af sundhed, af sociale sikkerhedsnet. Og det er jo ligesom den måde man kan sige, man nok på den lange bane burde kigge, når man skal se på hvordan Danmarks, eller den internationale finansiering skulle være. Og der stritter det jo lidt det der med at man jo har sådan en stærk afhængighed mellem en udenrigstjeneste og en udviklingsbistand. Fordi det ikke er så attraktivt at gå igennem multilaterale institutioner, fordi man ligesom der mister indflydelse og synlighed ikke mindst, ikke. Og den synlighed er noget som en minister har meget brug for og som udenrigstjenesten også har meget brug for sådan ligesom til at skabe opbakning til udviklingssamarbejdet, ikke. Så der er nogle fornuftige ting i det, fordi det kan skabe den der synergi, at man kan tænke sikkerhed og handel og udviklingsbistand meget tæt sammen, og ligesom bruge instrumenterne til at støtte op om en samlet vision for dansk udenrigspolitik. Men der er også et usundt element i det, fordi man jo netop som sagt kommer til at, eller så kommer danske interesser og ønsker, til at vægte tungere, måske nogle gange end det som ville være den mest optimale og effektive måde at distribuere bistand på, hvis man så det fra modtagerlandenes perspektiv.

Interviewer

Ja. Ja og det er, altså når jeg læser den der strategiplan, prioritering, der hedder 'Verden 2030' så er det jo, der er enormt centreret omkring danske interesser og jeg tror jeg tænkte sådan okay, bliver det så ikke en lille smule symbolpolitisk også, altså?

Interviewee (Mr Bach)

Det kan godt blive lidt mere symbolpolitisk. Det er fuldstændig rigtigt. At man ligesom altså "se hvor vi gumre"-agtig [griner] prøver at løfte de der udenrigspolitiske hensyn meget højt op, og dermed kommer det til at dominere hensyn. Og nu kunne du sige et af de sådan konkrete eksempler er jo også den man kalder 'migratiseringen' [griner] af udviklingsbistanden, ikke. Nu har migration og flygtninge spillet en så massiv rolle i udenrigspolitikken og så ser man at udviklingsbistanden så i sigende grad drejet hen mod programmer, som så også skal forsøge at ændre migration. Og modvirke, at der kommer flygtning til Danmark. Og det er sådan en... kan du sige netop, en reel men også en symbolpolitisk prioritering, ikke. Altså at man ligesom har behov for at vise, at vi bruger det her til at stoppe mennesker fra at komme til Danmark. Og det er jo givet udslag i, at man har støttet nogle af de programmer i nordlige Afrika og, der kan man sige hvor høj grad er det så i tråd med landendes egen interesser derude, og der må man nok sige, at det er lidt mere tvivlsomt om landende selv ville have prioriteret sådan, hvis de skulle have valgt, det ikke... Altså i Mali er migration jo ikke et problem. For dem er det en realitet, men altså de ville jo nok hellere have fokuseret på nogle mere umiddelbare behov end at styrke grænsekontrol. Og styrke der mekanismer, der kan sikre, at folk ikke kommer igennem Mali. Så der er jo nogle ting der, som godt kan støde mod hinanden og det, at man har prioriteret der med udviklingsbistanden er jo netop fordi, at det er tæt bundet ind i vores udenrigspolitik. Hvis det havde været en uafhængig styrelse, som det jo er i Sverige, ikke. Og i Norge til dels, hvor de dog har begge dele, ikke. Så ville man jo nok sådan rent fagligt og upolitisk have gået til allokeringen af udviklingsbistanden.

Interviewer – Q3

Okay, ja. Ja du svarede lidt på 2'eren der. Det gjorde du allerede. Så er der det der med, hvor høj grad man ligesom bliver konsulteret fra danske NGO'er altså nu har du selv i nogle af dem, men altså hvor stort er sammenspillet der og hvor stor er synergien imellem de ting, som Mellempoliti Samvirke og Dansk Flygtningehjælp ligesom kæmpe for og det som regeringen, eller ministeriet og Danida vil.

Interviewee (Mr Bach)

Jamen, man kan sige, jeg tror godt man kan konkludere, at organisationers indflydelse på strategien er blevet mindre over tid. Hvis du går tilbage til 70'erne og 80'erne og til dels 90'erne så var der et utrolig tæt sammenspil. Det så vi jo også i dansk udviklingspolitisk, mellem NGO'erne og ministeriet også på strategisiden. Og det er jo nok blevet mindre udtalt. Og det er der jo flere grunde til. Det ene er, at der er jo langt flere aktører end NGO'erne i dag. Private virksomheder og den måde de agerer på, spiller en større rolle. At den måde man sådan udformer strategierne på, kører måske på en lidt anden måde og altså verden er blevet meget mere kompleks end den var dengang. Dansk udviklingspolitik blev [dengang] fastlagt i tæt sammenspil med især Mellempoliti Samvirke og ministeriet og sendte danske udviklingsarbejdere ud i hele verden for at agere som tømrer og sygeplejersker. Det var jo et eller andet sted en meget [griner] enkel model, og

rammen var et tæt sammenspil. Og dengang der gik Mellemløst Samvirkes generalsekretær jo rundt på gangen inde i udenrigsministeriet og fastlagde danske udviklingspolitik. Ja altså, så det jo også et spørgsmål netop om den der sådan 'politisering' af udviklingsbistanden, som man har set, ikke. At der er andre hensyn, der er mere drivende. Netop storpolitiske hensyn, sikkerhedspolitik, måske, til dels, spørgsmål om danske virksomheder og partnerskaber - meget mere sådan komplekse ting der spiller ind. Men når det er sagt, så er der stadigvæk selvfølgelig et meget tæt sammenspil og du har jo det råd, som vi fik etableret med loven, som jeg jo gennemførte der i min tid. En ny lov om udviklingsbistand, hvor du har udviklingspolitisk råd, ikke. Hvor der jo sidder repræsentanter for organisationerne og er med til at udforme strategierne. Så der er da stadigvæk et tæt sammenspil, men det er ikke helt så simpelt. Det bare en meget mere kompleks proces og det her med at udenrigspolitikken og udviklingspolitikken er sammenvævet, det gør, at der er andre hensyn, der spiller mere ind end det hensyn, som de her organisationer de har og havde i gamle dage, ikke.

Interviewer – Q4

Ja. Så har man ofte snakket om, i hvert fald for sådan 20 år siden, er der flere artikler, som handler om sådan 'Scandinavian exceptionalism' og det der med, at Skandinavien fører en eller anden sådan exceptionel god udviklingspolitik og at meget af det handlede selvfølgelig om, at vi var nogle af de første til at nå de 0,7%. Men, er det din oplevelse, at man dag kan snakke om en skandinavisk eller dansk exceptionelitet i forhold til vores udviklingspolitik?

Interviewee (Mr Bach)

Altså jeg tror da sådan set, at man har en god og stærk udviklingspolitik. Det har man. Og i sammenligning med så mange af landene, der er der, syntes jeg, da også især effektiv og målrettet og det er sådan ikke dét. Men altså jeg syntes, at nogle gange er vi faldet til bag af dansen, når det gælder nogen af de sådan lidt mere helt centrale måder at tænke bistanden på. Jeg har jo været meget kritisk over for ens måde til at tænke sådan rettighedsbaseret udvikling ind. Jeg ved ikke om du har set, men jeg har skrevet en lille bog, der hedder "Then I Would Like a Dishwasher, Please", som handler om rettighedsbaseret tilgange, som jeg mener et helt fundamentalt for udviklingsbistanden. Og det... der mener jeg ikke, at vi har tænkt stærkt nok ind i den danske udviklingsbistand. Og især i hele sådan statsopbygningsselementerne i det, og der syntes jeg, at vi er lidt for traditionelle stadigvæk. Og netop også altså tænke udviklingsbistand mere fundamentalt som sådan nogle overførselsmekanismer til at styrke landenes egen kapacitet til at løse sociale problemer, i stedet for at tænke det som projekter og programmer, som Danmark udfører i de her lande. Der syntes jeg, stadigvæk vi er lidt for traditionelle og gammeldags. Men når det så er sagt, så er vi jo i forhold til så mange lande, og faktisk også i forhold Sverige, som jeg vil næsten sige måske er endnu mere gammeldags nogle gange i deres tilgange [griner], altså så har vi da dynamisk udenrigstjeneste og udviklingspolitik, men der er bestemt områder hvor vi, syntes jeg, halter bagud nu. Og der er andre lande, der er gået længere. Altså briterne og hollænderne er typisk meget langt fremme. For eksempel også på et de spørgsmål,

jeg har noget med at gøre nu: sammentænkningen af udviklingsbistand og investeringer - hvor vi ganske vidst fik lavet klimainvesteringsfonden i Danmark og det førte SDG-fonden men hvor andre lande er langt længere fremme i at tænke mere dynamiske måder at se på investinger og udviklingsbistand sammen. Så der er der noget at gøre også, syntes jeg.

Interviewer

Tror du der er grund til at tro på, at der vil ske store ændringer på området under den nuværende regering?

Interviewee (Mr Bach)

Nej. Altså det tror jeg faktisk ikke. Og man kan sige, altså, Rasmus Prehn han udråbte sig selv til solidaritetsminister. Og alt respekt for det og nu med Corona-krisen har det fået en helt ny betydning, solidaritet. Og en helt ny dimension internationalt, og det er der virkelig brug for. Men det er jo lidt en klassisk måde at tænke udviklingsbistanden på. Som noget der har at gøre med solidaritet, hvor vi altså ligesom ser på andre lande som nogle, der er svage og har brug for hjælp. Og andre mennesker som nogle, der er svage og har brug for hjælp, og så giver vi dem derfor en solidaritet. Men hvis du tænker rettighedsbaseret, så tænker du udviklingsbistand langt mere fundamentalt og strukturelt, som nogle overførselsmekanismer i en verden, hvor vi har underskrevet nogle menneskerettigheder og derfor skal arbejde sammen om at nå dem. Og det er der en forskel i, at man siger, at man er solidaritetsminister eller, hvad jeg prøvede lidt at sige, rettighedsminister, ikke. Og derfor tænker jeg, at han tænker da nok lidt mere klassisk og jeg tror også, at regeringen er meget optaget af at bruge det til at skabe en synlig dansk udenrigs- og udviklingspolitik, ikke. Og det vil så føre tilbage til mere bilateral, en mere projektorienteret, programorienteret tilgang. Og det er der særlige kræfter der gerne vil, fordi der ligger noget omsætning, nogle stillinger i dansk udenrigstjeneste. Og det har man jo helt fysisk brug for inde i udenrigsministeriet, mens hvis du tænker for eksempel at man brugte globale mekanismer som 'Global Partnership for Education' og Global Fond på sundhedsområdet, og sådan, så sender man jo nogle penge til de her mekanismer og så bygger staternes kapacitet op til selv at løse problemerne. Og det syntes jeg er en rettighedsbaseret måde at gøre det på, men det er ikke noget der er incitament til. Og især ikke lige nu her. Og det føler jeg heller ikke, at det den nuværende regering har stået for. Så derfor tror jeg ikke, at vi kommer til at se sådan et fundamentalt skift her.

[00:17:30] Interview ended.

8.2 Appendix B: Transcript of interview with Jens Ole Bach Hansen

File name: JOBH phone interview 15.05.2020.M4A

Duration: 00:29:51

Date: 15/05-2020

Spørgsmål 1

Interviewer – Q1

Jamen altså lad os lægge ud med spørgsmål 1.

Interviewee (Mr Hansen)

Men altså I forhold til dit spørgsmål 1 så er det jo sådan at Danida også i forhold til Sida er integreret fuldstændig i den danske udenrigstjeneste hvorimod Sida stadigvæk er en separat styrelse ligesom Danida også var det engang. Så derfor altså sådan helt bare i det praktiske set-up er vores systemer lagt mere integreret end de er i Sverige. Og det er en beslutning man har taget helt tilbage i starten af 90'erne fordi man mente det ville være mere effektivt at arbejde på den måde. Så det første skidt hen mod integrationen af det udviklingspolitiske startede der. Så tror jeg du har ret hvis man kigger i de forskellige dokumenter og strategier for udviklingspolitikken, at det er italesat mere nu end det har været gjort tidligere – at udviklingspolitikken og udenrigspolitikken de understøtter hinanden. Og det er klart at når man så laver udviklingsarbejde så kigger man på hvad er vores udenrigspolitiske interesser også. Altså jeg tror hvis man sådan helt bare objektivt kigger på hvor har vi samarbejder henne, altså hvilke lande er vi til stede i. Tidligere har vi haft rigtig meget samarbejde med lande i det sydlige Afrika – så vi har været i Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, som alle sammen er lande hvor vi ikke er til stede længere. Og så tror jeg måske at hvis man kigger på de lande hvor vi har stort engagement nu, så er det i højere grad lande på hornet, altså Afrikas horn, og i Sahal. Som naturligvis på en eller anden måde ligger lidt tættere på Danmark og hvor der også er en anden forbindelse til Danmark. Og det er klart, der handler om migration. Det handler selvfølgelig også om terrorisme. Så jeg tror at et eksempel på at udviklingspolitikken og udenrigspolitikken understøtter hinanden der er at vi selvfølgelig har en udenrigspolitisk interesse i at håndtere migrationen på en måde så... ja så den er håndteret. Og altså hvis vi kan skabe udvikling og adresserer nogle af de grundlæggende årsager til at der er migration fra nogle lande, så gør vi både noget godt i de lande, som er udviklingspolitikken hovedformål, men det gør også noget for Danmarks udenrigspolitiske interesser. Og Danmarks udenrigspolitiske interesser det er jo selvfølgelig altid essensen: at sikre Danmarks sikkerhed og danskernes sikkerhed. Og så bare lige jeg tror måske også, uden jeg kender det i detaljer, men der sådan en forskel på hvordan administrationerne fungerer i Danmark og i Sverige. Det tror jeg også man har set lidt her med Corona-krisen, faktisk, at deres styrelser er langt mere uafhængige og stærkere på en eller anden måde som uafhængige organisationer end danske styrelser har tradition for at være.

Selvom Danida ikke er en styrelse, så kan det måske forklare lidt om hvordan Sida kan optræde så uafhængigt af det svenske udenrigsministerium.

Interviewer

Ja, det tror jeg du har ret i. Men ja der fik du også svaret lidt på det andet spørgsmål, det der med sådan at når man kigger på de sidste 8 år og især i skiftet i 15 med Verden 2030, så kom der rigtig meget sådan noget, at det skal være danske interesser. Og det er jo ikke på sin vis overraskende hvor tydeligt det skulle frem hele tiden og så kunne det godt virke sådan en lille smule symbolpolitisk. Altså det er meget vigtigt at det kommer frem – det er også det første, der står under prioriteter og strategier på Danidas hjemmeside. Og det undrer jeg mig over.

Interviewee (Mr Hansen)

Ja. Der tror jeg også at man skal være opmærksom på, at Verden 2030 er et politisk dokument og et politisk forhandlet dokument. Så det er ikke udarbejdet af udenrigsministeriet som en, hvad skal man sig... ”hvis vi skal gøre alt på den bedste mulige måde, så skal vi lave udviklingspolitik sådan her”. Det er klart at det der ligger bag den strategi og også de tidligere strategier, det er at for udviklingspolitikens skyld, så er der en stor interesse i at den har fået opbakning i folketinget. Og derfor er der selvfølgelig også et ønske om, at de der strategier de bliver vedtaget med så bredt et flertal som muligt, fordi det giver ro om udviklingssamarbejdet. Så på den måde er der en udviklingspolitisk ræson i at lave strategierne på den måde. Og det er klart, at når der står i strategien at niveauet skal være på 0,7 [% af BNI] og at 8 ud af 9 partier i folketinget er enige i det, og det sidste parti formentligt gerne vil have, at bistandsportionen skal være højere, så giver det ro til at lave udviklingssamarbejde for de penge. Og det giver jo også ro til at implementere det, som står i aftalen, fordi der er så bred opbakning til det. Og det er klart, at når man så skal indgå sådan en aftale, så er det vigtigt at alle partierne kan se sig selv i den og at de kan gå til deres vælgere også og stå på mål for den. Og der, og altså det kan man jo så læse sig til, at der har man fundet at en del af den argumentation, der skulle til for at man kunne sælge varen, eller at de politiske partier kunne stå på mål for aftalen, det har været at man gør det helt klart at de mange, mange penge, for det er mange penge vi bruger – 17 milliarder kroner om året, de, og altså jeg syntes det står meget fint på side 1 og side 2 af strategien, altså det handler om at Danmark tager ansvar ude i verden som den udviklingsnyttige del af det, men det står ikke i kontrast til, at det også skal have en positiv betydning for Danmark. Og jeg syntes sådan ikke der er noget, hvad hedder det... Altså objektivt set så kan man sige altså når vi håndtere klimaudfordringerne, som så ikke fylder særlig meget i Verden 2030 godt nok, men det fylder ret meget i den nye regerings prioriteter, så når man håndtere fattigdom eller investerer i at skabe sikkerhed og ro i lande, som er ramt af konflikt og krig så altså udviklingspolitisk så er det helt sådan pure, vil jeg sige, rent, altså det er godt i sig selv. Men det er klart, det er også grænseoverskridende problemer. Så det er lidt sådan et... altså hvis man ikke håndterer det, så er det klart så bliver der et spill-over på et tidspunkt så bliver det også spill-over til Europa. Og det vil vi selvfølgelig gerne undgå. Og igen med klima. Hvis man håndterer klimaudfordringerne i udviklingslandene, så har det jo

helt klart også en automatisk effekt på hvad, der sker i Danmark. Så jeg tror tidligere har det måske været sådan lidt... har man ikke villet italesætte det så meget, som man har gjort i Verden 2030, men jeg tror sådan set at i hvert fald en del af udviklingspolitikken tidligere har spillet den samme rolle som i dag. Men tror du skal læse sådan som en del af det politiske forlig. Det tror jeg er det, der ligger bag. Det er jeg sikker på at Christian Friis Bach måske også har sagt til dig.

Interviewer – Q2

Jajaja, jo. Det gjorde han. Og han sagde også, i forbindelse med spørgsmål 3, som handler om det der bilaterale og multilaterale, at det handlede i sidste ende mest om indflydelse, hvor man kan få mest indflydelse, og hvor man er mest synlig i sit arbejde. For det har en minister brug for, som han sagde. Er det også din oplevelse?

Interviewee (Mr Hansen)

Ja altså jeg vil sige, altså CFB han var jo sådan meget... han gik sådan meget sagligt til det multilaterale samarbejde så vidt jeg husker. Og det er klart at som politikker, der er det svært ligesom at stille sig hen foran et FN-flag og sige at 5% af det her det er vores penge, det har vi gjort. Og de multilaterale organisationer de er heller ikke altid lige gode til at fremhæve de meget, meget store donorer, som giver de der kernebidrag, som finansierer deres arbejde. Det tror jeg nemlig, der har været lidt frustration over. Altså vi giver jo stadigvæk... jeg ved ikke om du har et tal på det der? Men vi giver jo stadigvæk rigtig, rigtig mange penge til de multilaterale organisationer. Hvis der er OECD-tal du kigger på, så giver den bistand, der bliver givet til de multilaterale organisationer gennem vores ambassader altså ude på lande-niveau, altså udmærkede bidrag til en særlig indsats, den bliver regnet som bilateral bistand, selvom den egentlig går til en multilateral organisation. Og vi har flyttet nogle penge fra kernebidrag, altså penge der gik til New York og så brugte organisationen dem sådan som de ville i forhold til deres strategiske planer, til at give dem mere målrettede til nogle særlige indsatsorganisationerne står foruden. Så det er ikke sådan en beslutning om at de multilaterale organisationer ikke kan levere eller vi ikke vil bruge dem, men det er måske lidt mere sådan en målretning af bistanden gennem de multilaterale organisationer.

Interviewer

Ja. Så det handler måske også om den måde det bliver regner på?

Interviewee (Mr Hansen)

Ja, det er i hvert fald en del af forklaringen også. Altså vi giver jo 1,8 milliarder kr., så vidt jeg husker, bare til EU's samarbejde, som jo også er et multilateralt samarbejde. Og det er helt kernebidrag. Altså den indflydelse vi får på det altså det er indflydelse vi får ved at sidde i Bruxelles og være med til at forhandle om, hvordan pengene bliver fordelt. Men ellers så er der ingen bindinger på det. Og så giver vi vel sådan en 5-6 milliarder kr. til FN-systemet, både humanitært og til de udviklingspolitiske organisationer. Så der er også en del. Og vi giver også beløb til Verdensbanken og til fonde under Verdensbanken. Så vi ligger stadigvæk rigtig,

rigtig højt ved de multilaterale. Og så spørgsmål 4, hvis jeg må hoppe videre til den?

Interviewer – Q3

Den kan du tro.

Interviewee (Mr Hansen)

Jamen det gør det. Nu laver vi jo ikke sådan nye strategier hele tiden. Altså vi skal lave en ny her inden den nuværende udløber i januar 22. Og så laver vi jo selvfølgelig også sådanne lande-papirer og landestrategier. Og altså der er jo sådan en helt formel proces hvor de der udkast og papirer bliver diskuteret i blandt andet udviklingspolitisk råd. Som er nedsat af ministeren og hvor der også er deltagelse af civilsamfundet. Og der kører også nogle offentlige høringsrunder, hvor man har mulighed for at kommentere og komme med forslag. Og mange af organisationerne er jo også partnere for Danida, når vi laver udviklingssamarbejde, så den måde, så er det jo selvfølgelig også involveret. Det er klart at ligesom det grundlæggende sådan... altså det er Danida, der ligger strategien og der er os, det laver det analytiske forarbejde og sådan noget, men der er klart en interesse i at der et bredt ejerskab og også input til det også fra civilsamfundet. Det står også meget klart i strategien, at civilsamfundet er jo ekstremt vigtige partnere for dansk udviklingssamarbejde. Altså både sådan som nogle, der kan råde op og råbe ad os og sige når det er forkert og nogle der kan sige når der sker noget ude, som er forkert. Fordi de jo på mange måder ligesom har fingeren på pulsen gennem deres netværk. Og så er det jo også, altså udviklingsorganisationer i sig selv, altså ikke bare civilsamfundsorganisationer på den måde de sådan holder øje og kæmper for civilsamfundet råderum, men som nogle, der selv udfører udviklingssamarbejdet. Så på den måde syntes jeg, at vi har et meget tæt og konstruktivt samarbejde normalt med civilsamfundet.

Interviewer – Q4

Det sidste spørgsmål jeg havde, og det er lidt sådan et sjovt et, fordi der har været en tendens til, i de sidste 20 år måske, og der har været mange lærde som har udgivet artikler, der handlede om 'Nordic Exceptionalism' i forhold til vores udviklingsbistand. Og meget af det handler selvfølgelig om, at vi var nogle af det første til at nå det der 0,7 mål. Men jeg syntes det kunne være lidt sjovt at få sådan en... hvad er det der gør, at den er exceptionel, hvis den er exceptionel, den kan jo godt være godt uden af være exceptionel, nu.

Interviewee (Mr Hansen)

Altså det er svært at måle [griner] hvor god man er. Jeg syntes da klart, at det er exceptionelt, at Danmark har givet de der 0,7% i 42 år. Altså det er ligesom en... altså der har vi ligesom forpligtiget os og vi har påtaget os den forpligtigelse og levet op til den gennem alle de år. Altså både gennem kriser og opturstider og nedgangstider i Danmark er man blevet ved med at sige, at det her det var vigtigt. Så det syntes jeg sådan set er... altså nu er det så måske mere mig selv, der taler... Men det er, også objektivt set også i forhold til andre lande, så har vi bare ligget der

i alle de år og gjort det som FN anbefalede. Og vi er kun 5 lande, der gør det, så på den måde kan man godt sige, at det er exceptionelt. Men det er så pengesiden af det. Altså mere sådan på det kvalitative altså... som sagt, det er svært at måle, og der kun nogle få forsøg på det. Men altså vi er selvfølgelig glade når for eksempel Center for Global Development, som er en amerikansk tænketank, når de laver deres Commitment to Development Index, som er et forsøg på at vurdere på tværs om lande laver god udviklingspolitik og sådan set faktisk understøtter også mere bredt end bare igennem udviklingspolitikken, og der ligger vi meget, meget godt – eller der ligger enten som nr. 1 eller nr. 2, så vidt jeg husker.

Interviewer

Ja, det gør vi.

Interviewee (Mr Hansen)

Så det syntes jeg er et tegn på, at vi gør et eller andet rigtigt. Men altså det er jo ikke en eksakt videnskab. Og det er ved gud ikke nemt at lave udviklingspolitik. Og alle de problemer som alle andre har, har vi selvfølgelig også – balancen mellem, hvad skal man sige, teknisk bistand, fremme af værdier og menneskerettigheder og altså man kan gå ind i 10.000 dilemmaer hele tiden, som man skal forholde sig til. Og der syntes jeg sådan set også, at vi ikke har taget den, fra den sidste, nemme løsning. Man har sådan set villet også tage de der svære diskussioner når det kommer til demokrati og menneskerettigheder i nogle af de lande vi er. Og vi har også jo opgivet, kan man sige, eller valgt at sige at i lande som Zimbabwe, der syntes vi simpelthen ikke, at der var et grundlag for at være til stede, fordi det politisk var så svært og gik i den modsatte retning. Men igen, det er selvfølgelig også altid et valg hvor man skal tage stilling til, er det bedre at blive og tage kampen indefra eller er det bedre at smække med døren og så være udenfor. Fordi det er klart, at det hjælper ikke så meget det fattige at smække med døren, men så skal man også true med at blive og så blive ved med at råde op. Men det er klart, vi skal også kunne samarbejde med regeringerne og de skal også ligesom acceptere at vi laver udviklingssamarbejde i deres land. Jeg syntes også, at vi påtager os et exceptionelt ansvar ved at være til stede i nogle af de lande hvor det er aller, aller sværest at lave udviklingssamarbejde. Altså vi har jo ikke bare valgt den nemme løsning der heller ved at være til stede i Afghanistan, og i Somalia, og i Mali, og Niger og Burkina Faso. Altså lande hvor det bare virkelige virkelig er op ad bakke og hvor at grundlaget for at opbygget noget er rigtig, rigtig svagt og lande som er utroligt følsomme overfor konflikter og terror og pandemier, for den sags skyld. Så den måde... tja, syntes jeg at det er lidt exceptionelt. Men altså hvis exceptionel skal forstås på den der positive måde, så er der i hvert fald nogle ting, som vi gør, som jeg syntes er positive. Men det er klart... tilbage til spørgsmål 1. Det er klart, der er også politik i det. Det er klart, at al den kritik, der bliver rejst mod dansk udviklingsbistand – som tidligere har været egen interessen, pengene, der går til asyludgifter, at der bliver lagt så meget vægt på migration og sådan noget – det er klart, det bliver også fremhævet. Ja går ud fra, at hvis man igen så helt objektivt på det og skulle udviklingspolitikken være helt sådan idealistisk drevet, eller drevet

kun af sagen, men som jeg tror jeg sagde i starten så, både det der er egen interesse og det der er general interesse kan godt understøtte hinanden.

Interviewer

Kan man som embedsmand savne sådan lidt mere uafhængighed eller... er det bare sådan det er?

Interviewee (Mr Hansen)

Altså du bliver nok nødt til at sige, at det er sådan det er. Altså det er klart, at det er en politiske organisation vi er i og den er politisk drevet, men jeg tror... eller som jeg sagde, at når grundlaget er så bredt som der er med strategierne, som er bredt funderet politisk. Altså det er jo ikke sådan at vi danser efter de politiske vinde fra måned til måned, altså man er jo sådan set i folketinget ved at lave sådan en bred aftale besluttet: okay det er vi enige om det her er den måde vi gør det på. Og så arbejder man ud fra det – fagligt – men det er sådan det politiske grundlag. Altså jeg tror da, at hvis du kom fra Sida og kom ind i Danida så ville du formentlig syntes det var svært. Ja og så tror jeg også da også at da Danida blev lagt ind inder udenrigsministeriet der i starten af 90'erne, at der tror jeg også at der var nogle der på deres faglighed skulle sluge nogle kameler fordi det var en helt anden måde at arbejde på end de havde været vant til. Men altså det er klart, at i og med at det er politisk, så er der jo også et ansvar... altså så er det nogle, der står til ansvar for de mange penge, der bliver brugt politisk på den måde. Og det kan jeg jo også godt være en fordel, altså fordi det er klart, at der er mange der ikke syntes, at der skal bruges så mange penge på udviklingsbistand for der er massere behov i Danmark også. Og kunne være svært at lave argumenterne, hvis det hele ligesom var drevet helt sådan afkoblet fra det politiske liv, måske.

Interviewer

Men tror du så sådan grundlæggende set, at der er forskel på danskerne og svenskerne på den måde, altså at danskerne er mere tilbøjelige til at sige det skal vi gøre mindre? Altså er det sådan en dansk ting? For jeg tror ikke, at det er noget Sida oplever.

Interviewee (Mr Hansen)

Det er klart altså hvis man taler meget om det, så bliver det selvfølgelig også en del af den politiske dagsorden og diskuteret. Altså i Danmark... der er lavet sådan nogle, der ligger også, det ved jeg ikke om du har set på Danidas hjemmeside, der ligger sådanne nogle undersøgelser af hvad danskerne syntes om udviklingsbistanden, som du måske har fundet? Og der tror jeg man kan læse, at det er det sådan rimelig delte meninger om, og stadigvæk nogle, der syntes, at det er for lidt i Danmark. Altså jeg kan ikke helt sammenligne det med Sverige, men jeg tror at det kan være en fordel, at der er nogle der ligesom tager politisk arbejde, når det er sådan et stort pengebeløb, syntes jeg.

Interviewer

Ja det kan jeg godt forstå.

Interviewee (Mr Hansen)

Jeg tænker lige om der er andet jeg lige skal tilføje. Ja der var ikke noget sådan lige, der springer frem. Altså jeg tror også... Jo jeg har måske én kommentar, at det er selvfølgelig vigtigt, at man giver meget udviklingsbistand, fordi behovet er kæmpestort. Men den politiske diskussion om udviklingsbistanden kommer tit til at handle om 0,7% eller 0,8%. Og det er måske ikke altid... altså det er lidet det politiske argument at sige jamen vi skal bare give noget mere. Men sådan i det store billede, så er der også mange andre tiltag, der kunne spille en rigtig stor rolle for at skabe bedre udvikling i udviklingslandene. Altså tiltag i forhold til handel og migration for den sags skyld eller sådan noget. Nogle gange så bliver diskussionen om udviklingsbistand meget pengefokuseret, men den burde måske være meget bredere. Altså hvad er det generelle forhold mellem udviklingslandene og de vestlige lande og så videre. Så det syntes jeg også man skal have i baghovedet. [griner] ja altså man skal ikke bilde sig selv ind, at man reder verden med 0,1% ekstra, i hvert fald. Men man skal heller ikke tro, at man reder verdenen ved ikke at giver udviklingsbistand.

[00:29:51] Interview ended