

# ”Engage and Destroy”

The effects of law enforcement militarization on positive  
peace in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica

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# Abstract

The purpose of this thesis was to investigate how law enforcement militarization affects positive peace in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica and why law enforcement militarization affects positive peace in a certain manner. Positive peace was defined as the absence of structural violence and constituting democracy, social justice, justice, human rights and development. This thesis was a small N-case study with Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica constituting the three cases. The method of analysis was, first, a descriptive analysis which aimed to describe the relationship between law enforcement militarization and positive peace. Second, an explanatory analysis which aimed to explain the described relationship. The results have generally shown that countries with higher degrees of law enforcement also have lower levels of positive peace and vice versa. This has been explained by law enforcement agencies with a higher degree of militarization generally conducting direct violence and/or being transformed into institutions of structural violence by governments, both of whom negatively effect the indicators of positive peace; democracy, social justice, human rights, justice and development. Law enforcement agencies with lower degrees of militarization seem to conduct themselves in more peaceful and non-violent manners.

*Keywords:* Law Enforcement Militarization, Positive Peace, Brazil, Argentina, Costa Rica, Democracy, Social Justice, Justice, Human Rights, Development, Structural Violence, Armed Forces, Paramilitary, Police

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background

“Engage and destroy” refers to military training and rules of engagement which enables and authorizes the use of lethal force (Flores-Macias 2019, 5). It arguably does not refer to how law enforcement officers are to be trained or how their rules of engagement should be outlined. However, when observing Latin American law enforcement agencies, they seem to possess a more militaristic nature and many of them are trained and operate under “engage and destroy” (Ibid, 8-10). This militaristic nature is, to an extent, a response to the high level and type of violent organized crime in the region (Azzi 2017, 591), as well as the corruption of non-militarized law enforcement (Flores-Macias & Zarkin 2019, 4). Nonetheless, the results of law enforcement militarization have been disappointing. Militarized law enforcement has been accused and found guilty of summary executions, torture, kidnappings, extrajudicial killings etcetera (Chevigny 1990; CELS 2018; Acebes 2016). Yet, they are still a very present, powerful and growing force in Latin America.

Because of this conduct and their growing presence, I ultimately asked myself: At what point will the frequently bad activities surrounding militarized law enforcement go to such an extent that we will see a degradation of democracy, human rights, justice etcetera, and ultimately, a weakening of peace in Latin American countries?

## 1.2 Purpose and Research Question

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how law enforcement militarization affects positive peace in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica and why law enforcement militarization affects positive peace in a certain manner. The broad topic I am interested in, which frames the purpose of this thesis, is why law enforcement militarization does not seem to achieve that which law enforcement arguably sets out to do; restore peace and security. The research question will therefore be formulated as:

*How and why has different degrees of law enforcement militarization affected positive peace in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica?*

This research question is primarily of an explanatory nature, but it is a two-part question. The first part will quantitatively describe the relationship between law enforcement militarisation and positive peace, while the second part will qualitatively explain the mechanisms of the quantitative relationship between the two. However, it is in essence an explanatory question, because I primarily wish to explain how militarization affects positive peace.

Moving on, I argue that the question is significant for real-world problems as well as peace and conflict academia because of three reasons. First, there has been no definitive answer as to how law enforcement militarization affects positive peace. The topic of law enforcement militarization in of itself, as well as its effects on society, has been previously and thoroughly researched (Chevigny 1990; Alvarado 2010; Kraska 2007; Flores-Macias & Zarkin 2019; Wood 2015; Lawson 2019; Meeks 2006), but no research on the effects of law enforcement militarization on society has applied, nor framed their research through, the concept of positive peace. By applying this concept, I argue that it is possible to see how important the role of law enforcement is to intrastate peace and security and, more importantly, how and to what degree law enforcement militarization affects intrastate peace and security in practice. Second, the research will show what is and is not successful law enforcement to ensure intrastate peace and security. Positive peace is not exclusively about the absence of inter/intrastate armed conflict, but also democracy, development, human rights etcetera. Hence, how law enforcement affects these will have implications for how peaceful and secure countries continue to be. Third, the question has relevance for peace and conflict academia because I argue that law enforcement are intrastate peacekeepers. They maintain security which in turn is supposed to result in a peaceful country were people are not killed, oppressed, threatened etcetera. In fact, law enforcement officers are often synonymous with peace officers (Merriam-Webster 2020; Meeks 2006, 36). It is therefore even more relevant to peace and conflict academia if the activities of peace officers result in the exact opposite of peace.

### 1.3 Chapters

The thesis has the following setup: In chapter two I define the concepts of positive peace and law enforcement militarization, as well as provide the reader with previous research and theories on law enforcement militarization.

In chapter three I outline my method. I will outline my research design, the data I will be using which, among other things, constitutes the indicators of positive peace and law enforcement militarization. I also outline how this data will enable me to establish the degree of law enforcement militarization and measure positive peace in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica. Furthermore, I list the pros and cons of my data as well as the method of analysis I will apply.

In chapter four, the results from both the quantitative descriptive and qualitative explanatory analysis will, first, be presented and, second, discussed. The quantitative descriptive results will show the different degrees of law enforcement militarization and the level of positive peace in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica. The qualitative explanatory results will show the activities of militarized law enforcement and the effects on positive peace. I will likewise summarize and discuss the results.

Chapter six is a short conclusion which reconnects to Chapter 1. It also contains suggestions for future research.

## 2 Concepts, Theory and Previous Research

In this chapter, I will define the concepts of positive peace and law enforcement militarization, as well as provide the reader with previous research and theories on the effects of law enforcement militarization on society. By defining the concepts, I will provide an understanding, as well as outline the indicators, of positive peace and the different degrees of law enforcement militarization. By providing previous research and theories, I attempt to showcase what has been previously investigated on the subject of law enforcement militarization and what my research will add to these findings by applying the concept of positive peace.

I will start by defining the concept of positive peace.

### 2.1 Positive Peace

Positive peace refers to the integration of human society (Amadei 2018; Caplan 2019, 2; Stephenson 2017, 138; Shields 2017, 9), which means to build institutions and structures that can create and sustain peaceful societies (Caplan 2019, 2; Rissler & Shields 2019, 63; Shields 2017, 9). At its core, positive peace is therefore the absence of structural violence; structures, institutions, norms, attitudes and other features of society which indirectly kills or harms individuals and inhibit them from achieving their full potential (Caplan 2019, 5; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2016, 13-14; Aggestam & Höglund 2016, 27; Galtung & Fischer 2013, 11, 35; Stephenson 2017, 138). The reason why structural violence is present has to do with a lack of freedom and democracy, since freedom and democracy help people to shape their own lives (Galtung & Fischer 2013, 11-12). What constitutes positive peace is therefore democracy, development, fair and just relations between states and individuals (social justice), justice, and human rights (Amadei 2018; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2016, 14, 27; Aggestam & Höglund 2016, 25; Öjendal & Johansson 2016, 235; Stephenson 2017, 139; Shields 2017, 8; Moita 2016, 60). In fact, the main consequences of structural violence are today framed as violations of human rights (Öjendal & Johansson 2016, 235). Simply put, the concept of positive peace is more than the absence of war, killings and direct violence (Moita 2016, 57). A country is arguably not at peace if the social order within the country is unacceptable (Caplan 2019, 5). Hence, the concept of positive peace can be applied to cases where there is no violent or armed conflict or war, but the, for example, democratic or human rights situation is horrendous.

However, although positive peace is more concerned with the absence of structural indirect violence, rather than direct violence, the absence of direct violence is also encompassed within the concept of positive peace for several reasons (Caplan 2019, 5). First, one cannot discuss peace in a country if direct violence is not heavily reduced (Galtung & Fischer 2013, 173). Second, by addressing and resolving structural indirect violence one is also resolving direct violence, since the deeper reason for direct violence is contained within structural violence (Moita 2016, 57-58). Of course, direct violence can take on different forms and be exercised by different actors. In order to link direct violence to law enforcement, direct violence will therefore be defined as state violence. State violence is, first, political killings; “killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state, including paramilitary groups” (V-Dem 2020). Second, torture; state officials or agents of the state purposefully inflicting extreme physical or psychological pain, with the purpose of extracting information or intimidate victims who are incarcerated (V-Dem 2020). Third, excessive and/or illegal use of force by the state or its agents against individuals. Hence, when referring to direct violence and/or structural violence, it is exclusively violence performed by the state and/or agents of the state. The reason for including only state violence and not, for example, violence between criminals or criminals conducting violence on civilians, is because I will exclusively investigate militarized law enforcement agencies and their effect on positive peace. It is therefore structural and direct violence by the state and its agents which effects the indicators of positive peace; democracy, development, fair and just relations between states and individuals (social justice), justice and human rights (Amadei 2018; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2016, 14, 27; Aggestam & Höglund 2016, 25, 235; Stephenson 2017, 139; Shields 2017, 8; Moita 2016, 60).

## 2.2 Law Enforcement Militarization

The concept of law enforcement militarization will be defined as “the process through which government agencies tasked with providing public safety adopt the weapons, organizational structure, and training typical of the armed forces” (Flores-Macias & Zarkin 2019, 3). By using this definition, the concept is widened and can therefore include cases where the police as well as the armed forces conducts law enforcement, since both are government agencies. This in contrast to other definitions of law enforcement militarization, many of whom focus exclusively on police (Kraska 2007, 503; Zaverucha 2000, 8). In the following sections I will outline previous research and theories on law enforcement militarization and its effect on society, as well as the four different degrees of law enforcement militarization.

### 2.2.1 The Effects of Law Enforcement Militarization on Society

Previous research and theories on law enforcement militarization are plenty, encompasses lengthy and different time periods and include different countries, however mostly North and South American countries. There is also plenty of research on how law enforcement militarization has taken place as well as a great deal of research on how law enforcement militarization has affected society. Furthermore, previous research has investigated the effects of militarization on indicators of positive peace. However, it is difficult to find any research which applies the concept of positive peace or frames their research through the concept. By applying positive peace, I argue that democracy, human rights, social justice, justice and development are closely connected to intrastate peace, if not interconnected. Hence, by applying positive peace, one can argue that if law enforcement militarization lowers these five indicators, they lower positive peace which is ultimately a threat to intrastate peace.

Flores-Macias and Zarkin (2019) have investigated the effects of law enforcement militarization on three indicators of positive peace, namely human rights, social justice and justice. They state that depending on if law enforcement is accountable to civil or military law, what weaponry and training they have access to and if the law enforcement organisation is structured around military conducts, these will have big effects on human rights and the legal order (Flores-Macias & Zarkin 2019, 4). First, military weaponry, military training and military organizational structures are meant to maximize destructive power. With more destructive power, law enforcement will likely increase their use of excessive force (*Ibid*, 5). Second, military training and structures frame criminals as enemies and threats to law enforcement officer's survival and officers will therefore conduct warrant-less searches, illegal detentions, torture, extra-judicial killings etcetera to protect themselves, in effect increasing human rights violations. Third, militarized law enforcement moves away from civil law to military law, but military law does not accommodate domestic military policing (*Ibid*). In other words, military law is not sufficient in handling activities and situations between citizens and militarized law enforcement, which can arguably result in no fair and just relations between individuals and state (social justice), as well as inadequate justice for individuals.

Chevigny (1990, 390) states that militarized law enforcement can be an instrument of coercive social control and this social control violates human rights. Considering the statistical disproportionate use of deadly force by police in Jamaica, Argentina and Brazil, it points towards summarily executions of criminal suspects by the police, which constitutes human rights violations (*Ibid*, 424-425). These executions occur when the threat of social unrest within the countries seem high. Hence, militarized law enforcement is an extreme instrument of coercive social control. This social control is possible because of the popularity of militarized law enforcement among the public with its “tough-on-crime” policies, but also because the killings are framed to the public as acts of self-defence in the context of shootouts (*Ibid*, 425).

Meeks (2006, 33) has researched law enforcement militarization and development and discussed whether law enforcement militarization is an instrument for an economic war on the poor urban underclass or not. He states that as law enforcement becomes more militarized, officers lose their role as a protector and server of the community and it is replaced with the role of military personnel engaged in war. As a result, the lower income inner city, where crime is frequent, is viewed as a war zone and the underclass inhabitants are the enemy (*Ibid*, 36-37). This role of militarized law enforcement is a mechanism in an ongoing economic war against the underclass to keep them poor, isolated, disenfranchised, to disrupt their families, reduce employment opportunities and sustain an unfair educational system. In other words, hinder development with the purpose of preserving the suburban middle-class status-quo (*Ibid*, 38).

Apart from human rights, development, social justice and justice as indicators of positive peace, there is also democracy. Alvarado (2010, 3) argues that democratic change in Latin America has eroded because law enforcement militarization creates autonomy for police and military against democratic institutions. First, the military intervenes in internal affairs such as law enforcement, which is unusual and inappropriate in a democracy and there is no clear separation between police and military activities (*Ibid*, 8). Second, there are no constitutional/legal regulations on the military and no systems of control (checks and balances). Instead, the military has had an enormous influence over the reforms in Latin America and therefore kept its impunity from the legal system (*Ibid*, 9). Third, because of impunity, the military can disobey the legal system and, for example, conduct human rights violations (*Ibid*, 10). Lastly, armed forces participate in decisions on national policies as well as designs and implementations of public security. By conducting themselves in these four manners, the military is applying a military doctrine to national policy and security instead of a civil and democratic doctrine which erodes democratic change (*Ibid*, 11).

While on the subject of democracy, Zaverucha (2000) argues that law enforcement militarization in Brazil creates fragile institutions which jeopardizes the strengthening of the democracy. The Brazilian constitution confers on the armed forces the responsibility of keeping law and order in the country and as a result, the institutions for public or internal safety are governed or commanded by military men or generals and some branches of the police are overseen by the army (Zaverucha 2000, 9-10, 24). Hence, the army has enormous national power and this results in an undemocratic form of power based on military strength which makes Brazilian institutions fragile. These fragile institutions therefore jeopardize democracy (Zaverucha 2000, 24-25).

Evidently, the above previous research and theories focus exclusively on the negative effects of law enforcement militarization. However, Wood (2015) focuses on the potential useful possibilities of law enforcement militarization. One could even argue that law enforcement militarization is a means of increasing social justice. Wood (2015, 5) states that although there are plenty of reason why the trend of law enforcement militarization is problematic and perhaps should not be allowed to continue, it is possible to fuse this with another more collaborative,

problem-solving, and decentralized policing trend called community policing. Wood (2015, 16) illustrates this fusion with the operation of Master Sergeant Cutone in Springfield Massachusetts 2009. Master Sergeant Cutone was temporarily assigned to the police force and in order to fight gangs who had occupied areas, he assembled a hand-selected team. This team would patrol neighbourhoods, as well as woo and befriend the locals in order to gather information on criminal gangs, a form of community policing. Successful in their wooing and information gathering, the team executed raids and after the raids they walked around the neighbourhood explaining to residents what had happened. The team also held weekly meetings with residents, politicians, social services etcetera to build trust and safety. The wooing, weekly meetings and neighbourhood patrol arguably increased fair and just relations between law enforcement and residents, allowing the police to collect information. The result; A 62% drop in crime (Wood 2015, 2).

## 2.2.2 Degrees of Law Enforcement Militarization

In accordance with the previously outlined definition, I will use Flores-Macias and Zarkins (2019, 3) concept of law enforcement militarization, which incorporates four different degrees of law enforcement militarization; non-militarized, militarized, paramilitary police and constabularized military, all of whom have four indicators in order to establish the degree; accountability, weaponry, training and organizational structure.

**Table 1**  
**The four different degrees of law enforcement militarization**

	Non-Militarized Police	Militarized Police	Paramilitary Police	Constabularized Military
<b>Accountability</b>	Civilian Law	Civilian Law	Civilian Law (with some exceptions)	Military Law (with some exceptions)
<b>Weaponry</b>	No access to heavier weapons and equipment	Some access to heavier weapons and equipment	Some access to heavier weapons and equipment	Full access to heavier weapons and equipment
<b>Training</b>	Maintain public order (focus on community development and use of	Maintain public order (non-lethal use of force)	Maintain public order (non-lethal use of force)	Engage and destroy

	force as last resort)			
<b>Organizational Structure</b>	Low degree of centralization and hierarchy, bottom-up command, deployed in small groups	Medium degree of centralization and hierarchy, bottom-up command, deployed in small groups and formed units	High degree of centralization and hierarchy, top-down command, deployed in formed units	High degree of centralization and hierarchy, top-down command, deployed in formed units

Note: Table from Flores-Macias and Zarkin (2019, 3).

First, non-militarized police. The police are accountable to civilian law, they are trained to use force as a last resort, they maintain order and security by focusing on community development and they are organized in a low degree of hierarchy (Flores-Macias & Zarkin 2019, 6). Second, militarized police. They are still accountable to civilian law and tend to have a low hierarchy organisation as well. However, they have some access to military grade weapons, organizes to a certain degree in a military style of centralization and hierarchy and use of force is no longer a last resort in their training, although it is a non-lethal use of force. An example of militarized police is SWAT teams in the United States (Ibid 7). Third, paramilitary police. Not to be confused with non-government groups, warlords or off-duty military/police personnel who carry out illegal violence, the paramilitary police is indeed a legitimate agent of the state (Merriam-Webster 2020). They share similarities with both non-militarized and militarized police, but their organizational structure is more in line with armed forces. The reason being that they have a high degree of centralization and hierarchy, a top down command and they deploy in formed units. Furthermore, although they are accountable to and under the jurisdiction of civilian law, they might also answer to military law. An example would be the Policia Militar in Brazil, who answers to the Ministry of Defence, military law (Flores-Macias & Zarkin 2019, 7). Fourth and most militarized, constabularized military. In other words, instead of police forces, the armed forces take on the role of law enforcement to prevent crime (security patrolling), fight crime (drug and weapons seizures, searches and arrests, evidence gathering and interrogation) and guard prisons. Constabularized military is accountable to military law which means that they report to the Ministry of Defence. They have a complete militaristic organizational structure, full access to heavier weapons as well as equipment and are trained to engage and destroy, in other words use lethal force (Ibid).

The above outlined model is in many ways influenced by Kraskas (2007, 504) militarization model. The reason for adopting Flores-Macias and Zarkins model (2019, 3) is because, most importantly, Kraskas model does not include cases were the armed forces conduct law enforcement. This ignores a very real, relevant and extreme degree of law enforcement militarisation, constabularized military,

and the effects this degree can have on society. Furthermore, and likewise important, seeing as how Flores and Zarkin (2019), based on their data, has already equated certain degrees of militarization to certain government agencies in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica, this alleviates me from having to prove why, for example, the National Gendarmerie in Argentina is a paramilitary police (*Ibid*, 8).

Lastly, two points. First, the degrees of militarization do not exist independently in countries. For example, it may be that both militarized and paramilitary police forces are operating in one country (Flores-Macias & Zarkin 2019, 8). However, I will be focusing on a country's highest degree of law enforcement militarization, since I argue that the agency with the highest degree is the one which will affect positive peace the most. Second, the aim of this militarization model is to characterize law enforcement agencies, not the state in which these agencies operate. Furthermore, it does not matter how many agencies are militarized. If only one agency has a degree of militarization according to the model, there exists law enforcement militarization.

# 3 Method

In this chapter I outline my research design, as well as what type of data I have collected and will use, the pros and cons of this data and what method of analysis I will apply. By outlining the data, I provide the reader with an understanding of what the indicators of positive peace and degrees of law enforcement militarization are and how I will measure these two concepts. Furthermore, the reader will get an understanding of how, and with what method, the results will be analysed.

I will start by outlining my comparative small N-case study research design.

## 3.1 Research Design

I will conduct a comparative small N-case study in which Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica are the three cases and they will be compared from 2013-2019. These three have been chosen on the principle of most similar systems design, in other words they share important characteristics but differ in one crucial way (Halperin & Heath 2017, 219). The important characteristics are, first, they are Latin American countries with a certain degree of similarity in culture. They share the same catholic faith, speak either Spanish or Portuguese etcetera (UI Landguiden Argentina 2020; UI Landguiden Brasilien 2020; UI Landguiden Costa Rica 2020). Second, Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica are democratic republic states (*Ibid*). Third, during at least half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the three countries were military dictatorships (*Ibid*). Fourth, they are all fairly new democracies, especially Argentina and Brazil who became democracies during the 1980s while Costa Rica became a democracy in 1949 (*Ibid*). However, the crucial difference is their degree of law enforcement militarization. Brazil has a constabularized military as law enforcement, in the form of the Brazilian Armed Forces, Argentina has two paramilitary police forces, the National Gendarmerie and the Naval Prefecture, and lastly, Costa Rica has two militarized police forces by the name of Unidad Especial de Intervencion and Fuerza Especial Operativa (Flores-Macias & Zarkin 2019, 6-8). The point is to investigate whether this crucial difference in law enforcement militarization has any effect, and can explain the effect, on positive peace in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica. However, it is important to note that there are some other crucial differences between the countries. First, the size of the countries and the number of inhabitants varies greatly. Brazil is the largest country in Latin America and has a population of around 209 million, while Argentina is the second biggest in size with a population of around 44 million and Costa Rica is the third smallest with a population of around 5 million (UI

Landguiden Argentina 2020; UI Landguiden Brasilien 2020; UI Landguiden Costa Rica 2020). Second, the countries vary in economic achievements. Brazil is one of, if not, the biggest economy in Latin America and was a success story between 2003-2014. However, poverty and inequality has decreased and there is a highly depressed economic activity (World Bank Brazil 2019). Argentina is the second biggest economy in Latin America and has vast natural resources in energy and agriculture, but economic growth has been difficult and urban poverty is high (World Bank Argentina 2020). Costa Rica is nowhere near the economic size of Argentina and Brazil, but it has been, and still is, a success story. There is steady economic growth, environmental accomplishments and one of the lowest poverty rates in Latin America (World Bank Costa Rica 2020). Furthermore, by only investigating three cases in a specific region in a specific part of the world, generalizations of my conclusions will be limited.

Moving on, the period of 2013-2019 has been chosen because it is a relevant period to investigate if law enforcement militarization has affected positive peace in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica. When examining statistics on the three countries at face value, there has been some significant variations in their level of, for example, democracy. During the same period, some major events have occurred in the countries, many of whom involved or required the presence of militarized law enforcement agencies. For example, the FIFA World Cup 2014, Olympic Games 2016, protests and reforms to policy and law.

Furthermore, the small N-case study will be a blend of theory testing and theory generating (Halperin & Heath 2017, 212, 215, 217). I will apply previous research and theories on how law enforcement militarization affects society to investigate whether these can explain the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica. The reason for applying previous research and theories of this nature is because they investigate some indicators of positive peace, for example human rights and democracy. However, by applying the concept of positive peace, I will also generate and add upon previous research and theories, since these have not investigated the effects on, specifically, positive peace.

## 3.2 Data

The data I have collected, and shall make use of, consists of quantitative and qualitative secondary sources, in other words data which is for purposes other than academic research (Halperin & Heath 2017, 177, 180). These quantitative and qualitative secondary sources are Globalis statistics, Human Rights Watch reports, Amnesty reports, other NGO publications and articles from a wide range of news websites. However, I have also collected qualitative data from academic articles and government websites, as well as quantitative data from academic research such as Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem).

As previously outlined, the indicators of positive peace are democracy, development, fair and just relations between states and individuals (social justice), justice and human rights (Amadei 2018; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2016,

14, 27; Aggestam & Höglund 2016, 25, 235; Stephenson 2017, 139; Shields 2017, 8; Moita 2016, 60). In order to measure positive peace in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica from 2013 to 2019, I have collected data on these indicators from the Electoral Democracy Index, Equality Before the Law and Individual Liberty Index from the V-Dem database (2020) and the Extreme Poverty Index from Globalis (2020), because what these indexes measure is consistent with the indicators of positive peace (see Table 2 and section 2.1). The Electoral Democracy Index measures clean elections without fraud, freedom of expression, freedom of association, suffrage and if elections affect the composition of the chief executive. The Equality Before the Law and Individual Liberty Index measures to what extent laws are transparent and rigorously enforced, public administration is impartial, citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from torture, political killings, forced labour, freedom of religion, foreign movement and domestic movement. Lastly, the Extreme Poverty Index measures the percentage of the population living under 1,9 US dollars. It is important to note that social justice, justice and human rights are three very interconnected terms which are hard to differentiate, and they will therefore be under one umbrella term named Social Justice/Human Rights. Furthermore, the reason for using extreme poverty as a measure of development, and not for example BNP per capita, is because some research suggests that law enforcement militarization is a war against the poor underclass (Meeks 2006, 33). Law enforcement militarization may therefore increase extreme poverty.

The indicators of law enforcement militarization are the four degrees of law enforcement militarization; non-militarized police, militarized police, paramilitary police and constabularized military (Flores-Macias & Zarkin 2019, 3). By using the law enforcement militarization model and data from Florec-Macias and Zarkins academic article (2019), it has already been coded that Brazil has a constabularized military, Argentina has paramilitary police forces and Costa Rica has militarized police forces. More importantly, these degrees of law enforcement militarization are constant in each country during the period 2013-2019 (Flores-Macias & Zarkin 2019, 6-8).

**Table 2**  
**The Indicators of positive peace and law enforcement militarization**

	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Source</b>
Positive peace	Democracy  Social justice/Human Rights (social justice, justice and human rights)  Development	Electoral Democracy Index (V-Dem 2020)  Equality Before the Law and Individual Liberty (V-Dem 2020)  Extreme Poverty (Globalis 2020)
Law enforcement militarization	Non-militarized police (1)  Militarized police (2)  Paramilitary Police (3)  Constabularized military (4)	Flores-Macias & Zarkin (2019)

The data from Human Rights Watch reports, Amnesty reports, academic articles, other NGO publications and news websites will be applied to illustrate the activities of these militarized law enforcements agencies in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica. Furthermore, in accordance with positive peace, illustrate if these activities can constitute forms of structural or direct violence, which could negatively affect positive peace.

### 3.2.1 Pros and Cons of Data

One of the main issues with secondary sources, whether they consist of quantitative or qualitative data, is the difficulty in knowing how high the quality is since I have not created the data myself (Halperin & Heath 2017, 177). This issue is likewise applicable to quantitative and qualitative academic research and articles. However, I argue that the sources are appropriate because Human Rights Watch, Amnesty, Globalis, other NGOs, V-Dem, the academic articles and the different news websites have stated how the data was collected, who it was collected by, who it was funded by and why it was collected. For example, Globalis collects data on extreme poverty from the UN Global Sustainable

Development Goals Indicators Database, Globalis is funded by the United Nations Association of Sweden and their purpose for collecting data is to shine light upon differences and similarities in the world as well as highlight how different events have affected development (Globalis 2020). Furthermore, I would argue that the NGOs and news websites I have collected data from, are all well-established, widely known and, to some degree, respected institutions. Of course, although news websites may state how they collected data, who it was collected by, funded by and collected for what purpose, they can be argued to be flamboyant or ideological in nature as well as have an interest in drama and sales, which can potentially lower the quality of news-sources. I will attempt to overcome this by incorporating many different news websites who report on the same topic or event. While on the topic of ideology, it is also important to keep bias in mind. Especially considering my use of NGOs, who arguably have visions and ideas about how the world looks like or how it should look like. It is therefore not a stretch to imagine shining a more favourable, or unfavourable, light on data when published by an NGO (Halperin & Heath 2017, 181).

### 3.3 Method of Analysis

My research question contains a two-part structure; first, a quantitative description of the relationship between law enforcement militarisation and positive peace. Second, a qualitative explanation of the quantitative relationship between the two. The method of analysis will therefore likewise be descriptive and explanatory (Halperin & Heath 2017, 363).

First, I will conduct a quantitative descriptive analysis which aims to describe the collected data (Halperin & Heath 2017, 364) and in effect the relationship between law enforcement militarization and positive peace in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica. I will create three line graphs, each consisting of either the Electoral Democracy Index (Democracy), the Extreme Poverty Index (Development) or the Equality Before the Law and Individual Liberty Index (Social Justice/Human Rights). The lines in each of the line graphs will be Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica. The X axis in the line graphs will display the years of 2013-2019 and the Y axis the different numerical values from the indexes. The degree of law enforcement militarization has already been established in each country, based on Flores-Macias and Zarkins data and model (2019). The degree will therefore have the label of LEM (short for law enforcement militarization) followed by a degree value of 1-4, which will be placed next to the name of each country in the line graphs. I will then summarize the collected data with the median as a measure of central tendency (Halperin & Heath 2017, 364, 366, 372-373). I will produce a table which will contain the median value for each country's score on the indexes. The reason for conducting this rather basic quantitative descriptive analysis, is to provide a starting point for research on positive peace and law enforcement militarization.


Second, I will conduct a qualitative explanatory analysis which aims to explain the relationship, outlined by the quantitative descriptive analysis, between law enforcement militarization and positive peace. I will therefore apply qualitative data which outlines the activities militarized law enforcement are involved in, possibly activities which constitute structural or direct violence and therefore explain how this affects the indicators of positive peace. In other words, the qualitative data will provide concrete examples and explain why the quantitative relationship exists between law enforcement militarization and positive peace. Hence, my research is ultimately explanatory.

# 4 Results/Analysis

In this chapter, I, first, outline the results from the quantitative descriptive analysis and, second, the results from the qualitative explanatory analysis on the effects of law enforcement militarization on positive peace. I will likewise summarize and combine the quantitative and qualitative results in order to discuss them in the last section.

## 4.1 Law Enforcement Militarization and Indicators of Positive Peace in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica


### 4.1.1 Graph 1: The Level of Democracy in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica, 2013-2019



*Note:* The scale is from low to high, 0-1, but here the lowest value is 0,4. LEM and the numbers next to each of the countries represents the degree of law enforcement militarization.

*Source:* Electoral Democracy Index, V-Dem Database 2020.


#### 4.1.2 Graph 2: The Level of Social Justice/Human Rights (Social Justice, Justice and Human Rights) in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica, 2013-2019



*Note:* The scale is from low to high, 0-1, but here the lowest value is 0,4. LEM and the numbers next to each of the countries represents the degree of law enforcement militarization.

*Source:* Equality Before the Law and Individual Liberty Index, V-Dem Database 2020.

#### 4.1.3 Graph 3: Development in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica, 2013-2017



*Note:* The percentage of the population that lives for less than what one can buy for 1,9 US dollars in the US. LEM  
And the numbers next to each of the countries represent the degree of law enforcement militarization.  
There was no data on Argentina 2015 and there is no data after 2017.

*Source:* Extreme Poverty Index, Globalis 2020.

#### 4.1.4 Summary

**Table 3**  
**Median Value of Democracy, Social Justice/Human Rights and Development 2013-2019**

	Democracy (Scale low to high, 0-1)	Social Justice/Human Rights (Scale low to high, 0-1)	Development (Percentage of population in extreme poverty)
Argentina	0,75	0,87	0,65
Brazil	0,85	0,83	3,4
Costa Rica	0,9	0,97	1,5

*Note:* The values are based on graphs 1-3.

In sum, Brazil has the highest degree of law enforcement militarization, constabularized military, and generally the lowest scores on indicators of positive peace. Argentina has the second highest degree of law enforcement militarization, paramilitary police, and generally higher scores than Brazil, but lower than Costa Rica. Costa Rica has a lower degree of law enforcement militarization, militarized police, and generally had the strongest scores when compared to Argentina and Brazil.

When examining graph 1-3, it seems as though Brazil begins to decrease in social justice/human rights and development after 2014 and in democracy after 2016. As it happens, 2014 and 2016 were the years in which Brazil hosted the FIFA World Cup and Olympic Games, where the armed forces had a heavy presence throughout both events (Azzi 2017, 598, 601; Livingstone 2014, 19-20, 22). In contrast to Brazil, Argentina had insignificant decreases or no changes at all in 2014 and 2016. However, both Argentina and Brazil had rather significant decreases in democracy 2018. This was the year in which the Brazilian armed forces were granted control over law enforcement in the entire state of Rio de Janeiro (Phillips 2018). It was also the year where former Argentinian president Mauricio Macri reformed the security doctrine to allow the Argentinian armed forces to involve themselves in internal affairs (Rey 2018), which resulted in the paramilitary Gendarmerie getting logistical and strategical assistance from the armed forces (Salomon 2018; Insight Crime 2018). When compared to Brazil and Argentina, Costa Rica has no significant decreases or increases throughout 2013-2019 and there are no major reforms or events during this period. In fact, law enforcement in Costa Rica seems to be continually credited as non-violent and peaceful (OSAC 2019; Gingerich & Oliveros 2017, 83; Grace 2018). In the next section, I will attempt to explain the above described quantitative relationship of higher degree of law enforcement militarization/lower scores on indicators of

positive peace and lower degree of law enforcement militarization/higher scores on indicators of positive peace by qualitatively analysing the activities of militarized law enforcement and the effects on indicators of positive peace.

## 4.2 Explaining the Effects of Militarized Law Enforcement on Indicators of Positive Peace in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica

### 4.2.1 Democracy

#### **Costa Rica**

In the case of Costa Rica, no data implies activities from Costa Rica's militarized police, Unidad Especial de Intervencion (UEI) and Fuerza Especial Operativa (FEO), which could negatively affect democracy. Quite the contrary, Costa Rica is known as a stable and democratic country, with non-violent law enforcement (OSAC 2019). In other words, when compared to Argentina and Brazil, the UEI and FEO are not involved in activities which undermines democracy. For example, the Argentinian paramilitary Gendarmerie have been deployed to conduct direct violence in order to repress democratic protests, in other words violate freedom of assembly, which undermines democracy (Jenkinson 2015). Furthermore, the Brazilian armed forces, constabularized military, are granted by the Brazilian constitution the responsibility of law enforcement (Zaverucha 2000, 9-10, 24), as well their own judicial institutions in the form of military courts. These military courts are institutions of structural violence because they undermine democracy by imprisoning citizens for insulting armed forces officers, which is a violation of freedom of expression (HRW World Report 2018, 91-92). In contrast, the UEI and FEO have not repressed protests and the constitution of Costa Rica only grants the UEI and FEO authority to preserve public order (Costa Rica's Constitution 2011: Title I. Article 12; Title IX. Article 109). One could therefore argue, in accordance with Zaverucha (2000, 9-10, 24-25) that there is a clear distinction between military, police and judicial institutions in Costa Rica, which results in these institutions relying on a form of power based on democracy. Hence, these are not institutions of structural violence who jeopardize democracy.

#### **Brazil**

In Brazil, the armed forces have been transformed by the government into, or already exists as, institutions of structural violence and are used to undermine and decrease democracy. First, the armed forces have military courts and these have the potential to negatively affect democracy in accordance with Zaverucha (2000). He states that the armed forces govern judicial institutions, the military courts, to

keep law and order and this results in judicial institutions having an undemocratic power based on military strength (Zaverucha 2000, 9-10, 24-25). With this undemocratic power, the military courts are institutions of structural violence because they jeopardize democracy by, for example, applying the law of desacato. Desacato violates freedom of expression because it states that individuals can receive a prison sentence for disrespecting armed forces officers (HRW World Report 2018, 91-92). Second, the Olympic games 2016 were held in the city of Rio de Janeiro, in the state with the same name. The government deployed the armed forces in order to uphold public security and they remained in Rio de Janeiro until October 2016 (Azzi 2017, 598, 601). By deploying the armed forces throughout the whole city of Rio, one can argue in accordance with Alvarado (2010, 11) that the government used the armed forces to design and implement an undemocratic military doctrine to the city's public security, in effect turning the armed forces into an institution of structural violence because their military doctrine undermined democracy. The military doctrine to public security was evident when examining the activity of the armed forces; warships patrolling the Copacabana beach, infantry units with armoured personnel carriers guarding Olympic centres, beaches and the streets of Rio, armed forces guarding airports, 88 000 police and armed forces deployed and 900 million dollars spent on defence (Bhatia 2016).

However, one might argue that because the armed forces are not always deployed, they are not a constant constabularized military in Brazil. This is not the case because the armed forces are authorized by the constitution, as well as the government, to act as law enforcement, hence a constant constabularized military (Zaverucha 2000, 9-10, 24; Constitution of the federative republic of Brazil 2010: Chapter III. Section I. Article 92; Section VII. Article 122). While it is true that the armed forces are not always deployed, it is the different ways in which the armed forces are deployed that can affect democracy. This is illustrated by the fact that the armed forces were deployed in 2018, but this time the armed forces were granted authority to control law enforcement in the whole state of Rio, not only the city as in 2016, and the deployment was for a different purpose (Phillips 2018; Londono & Darlington 2016; HRW World Report 2019, 92). Former president Michel Temer deployed the armed forces and this was a federal intervention which coincided with Temer having to push through a democratic vote on an unpopular pension reform. This reform was a constitutional change and constitutional changes are not allowed during federal interventions (France 24 2018; Woody 2018; Londono & Darlington 2018). Hence, the armed forces were deployed in Rio, which implemented a military doctrine to public security (Alvarado 2010, 11) and this turned the armed forces into an institution of structural violence because their military doctrine undermined democracy by hindering the democratic vote on a constitutional reform.

## **Argentina**

In Argentina, the National Gendarmerie, one of the paramilitary police forces, have been accused of applying excessive force, direct violence, on protesters to undermine democracy. In Argentina 2015, the National Gendarmerie were deployed to disperse a protest of bus drivers and they allegedly started beating protesters and shooting them with tear gas and rubber bullets, which resulted in 18-30 wounded bus drivers, two of whom ended up in intensive care (Jenkinson 2015). According to the Center for Legal and Social Studies, this direct violence by the Gendarmerie constituted an attempt to repress a democratic protest, in other words repress freedom of assembly, and in effect undermine democracy (Jenkinson 2015). A similar protest occurred in December 2017, where citizens protested a pension reform. The Gendarmerie used tear gas without precaution, pepper spray in an abusive manner and aimed for the face when firing rubber bullets (CELS 2017; Fox 2018). This direct violence by the Gendarmerie during both protests is in accordance with Flores-Macias and Zarkin (2019, 3, 5, 8), who state that law enforcement militarization increases destructive power, and therefore the use of excessive force, because militarized law enforcement has access to military equipment and weapons. With this access, the Gendarmerie are likely to use more excessive force, which can explain why they fired rubber bullets at the faces of the protesters and utilized tear gas and pepper spray in an abusive way, in effect undermining democracy. Furthermore, this excessive force by the Gendarmerie is in accordance with Chevigny (1990, 390) who states that militarized law enforcement can be an instrument of coercive social control. In fact, many advocates for human rights have argued that the state deployed the Gendarmerie to use this type of excessive force as a means of social control because the state was expecting grievances on the pension reform (Fox 2018).

## **Concluding Remarks**

In sum, when comparing Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica, the Argentinian Gendarmerie have been accused of direct violence against protesters in order to quell freedom of assembly, or to perform social control over citizens, while the Brazilian armed forces have instead been transformed into institutions of structural violence by being granted their own judicial institutions, military courts, who infringe on freedom of expression. Furthermore, the armed forces have been deployed to act as law enforcement in entire cities or states, in effect transforming the armed forces into an institution of structural violence because they deploy a military doctrine which can hinder democratic votes. However, the Costa Rican UEI and FEO seem to not take part in activities of direct violence, in contrast to the Gendarmerie, nor are they transformed into institutions of violence like the armed forces. Rather, the UEI and FEO are, compared to Brazil's armed forces, constitutionally separated from judicial institutions and not granted control over entire city's or state's law enforcement.

#### 4.2.2 Social Justice/Human Rights

##### **Costa Rica**

The Costa Rican UEI or FEO appears to not be involved in activities which negatively affects social justice/human rights. In fact, it is possible that the UEI and FEO has had positive effects on social justice/human rights in accordance with community policing outlined by Wood (2015). Wood (2015, 2, 15-17) states that community policing strengthens fair and just relations between law enforcement and citizens (social justice), in order to collect information from citizens on criminals. This is similar to the strategies of Costa Rican law enforcement, who have focused on long-term dedication through citizen-engagement (Grace 2018). As a result, police brutality is low in Costa Rica and the police are viewed as conducting themselves in a peaceful manner (Gingerich & Oliveros 2017, 83; Grace 2018).

##### **Brazil**

In the case of Brazil, the armed forces failed in establishing fair and just relations with citizens (no social justice) and therefore conducted human rights violations, a form of direct violence, which decreased social justice/human rights. Before and during the FIFA World Cup in the city of Rio de Janeiro in 2014, the armed forces were sent in to assist the Pacifying Police Unit (PPU) to restore security in the poverty- and crime-stricken favelas (Portuguese for shantytowns) as well as improve social justice (Livingstone 2014, 19-20, 22). The PPU resembles the mix of community policing and law enforcement militarization outlined by Wood (2015). Wood (2015, 2, 15-17) states that community policing comes first to strengthen fair and just relations between law enforcement and residents in order to collect information on criminals. Only after will militarized law enforcement have success in their operations. However, the PPU did the opposite, they would first send in the armed forces who would occupy favelas, clear them from criminals with force and then deploy officers trained in community policing to keep a permanent presence in the favelas (Azzi 2017, 595; Livingstone 2014, 19-20, 22; Taylor 2014). One could therefore argue, in accordance with Flores-Macias and Zarkin (2019), that because community policing came second, no fair and just relations were initially established between the armed forces and the favela residents which ultimately resulted in human rights violations, a form of direct violence, and negative effects on social justice/human rights. The reason being that lacking fair and just relations, the armed forces failed in collecting information from residents to catch criminals. Because of this, residents were perceived by the armed forces to be on the same side as criminals, who are, in the eyes of the armed forces, enemies. As enemies, they are a threat to the armed forces survival and soldiers will therefore conduct human rights violations to protect themselves (Flores-Macias & Zarkin 2019, 5). In fact, the favela residents did loose trust in the PPU and therefore decided not to communicate with them (Campoy 2016). Although older residents appreciated the presence of the PPU, younger residents believed the unit displayed an authoritarian posture and tried to

enforce moral standards (Leeds 2016). Furthermore, the armed forces were accused of human rights violations during their operations, for example excessive physical violence (Azzi 2017, 596). However, it is also important to note that social justice failed because officers were not trained enough in community policing, not paid enough and felt that they were not conducting real police work. In other words, no incentives to better the relations with the residents (Leeds 2016).

Moving on, in October 2017 a new law was introduced in Brazil, which moved trials on unlawful killings and torture of civilians by the armed forces from civil to military courts (HRW World Report 2018, 89). This expanded the power of the armed forces' military courts and hindered investigations on human rights violations, which makes these military courts institutions of structural violence because they reduce justice for individuals. This law is not in accordance with international law, which state that extrajudicial killings and human rights violations by armed forces are to be tried in civil courts (HRW World Report 2019, 92; HRW World Report 2018, 89). The reason being that military courts do not guarantee judicial independence (Amnesty International 2017), something which Flores-Macias and Zarkin (2019) concurs with. They state that the armed forces are accountable to military law, but military law does not accommodate domestic military policing (*Ibid*, 5). In other words, the Brazilian armed forces' military courts are not sufficient in handling situations between citizens and the armed forces. Furthermore, a month after the law was passed, seven to eight civilians were killed in a joint operation by the armed forces and police (Amnesty International 2017; HRW World Report 2019, 92; HRW World Report 2018, 89). The homicide division in the civil police force could not investigate because they had, as a result of the new law, been prohibited to investigate actions by military personnel. Instead the investigation was transferred to military court (Amnesty International 2017). This is in accordance with Alvarado (2010, 10), who states that there are no checks and balances on the armed forces in Latin America. Instead, they have an enormous influence on institutions which results in impunity and the possibility to get away with human rights violations (*Ibid*).

### **Argentina**

In Argentina, the Naval Prefecture has been accused and found guilty of torture and excessive use of force, in other words direct violence, which has negatively affected social justice/human rights. The Naval Prefecture allegedly operates without any external control from the ministry of security (CELS 2018). This is in accordance with Alvarado's research (2010, 9-10) on how there are no checks and balances on military conduct in Latin America which results in them getting away with human rights violations. Although Alvarado's (2010) focus is on the armed forces, this can be applied to the paramilitary Naval Prefecture as well, seeing as there are allegedly dozens of ignored reports on the Naval Prefecture conducting arbitrary detentions, beatings and humiliations (CELS 2018). For example, in September of 2016, two young men were tortured by six Naval Prefecture officers (*Ibid*), a Prefecture officer shot a 26-year-old in the head for not stopping at a

vehicular checkpoint and Prefecture violence is allegedly a daily routine which has resulted in bad relations between Prefecture officers and young people (*Ibid*).

The second paramilitary police force in Argentina, the National Gendarmerie, have likewise been accused and found guilty of excessive use of force, but more importantly an alleged political killing, as illustrated by the case of Santiago Maldonado. Maldonado attended a protest for native rights in August of 2017 (Fox 2018; CELS 2017; Delgado 2018) where the Gendarmerie were deployed and started firing both 9mm- and rubber bullets (Smink 2017). Although, some state that the protesters drew first blood by wielding hatchets and throwing rocks which severely wounded Gendarmerie officers (Andrade 2017). Furthermore, the Gendarmerie allegedly raided the native's homes, burned their property, confiscated phones, work tools and books (CELS 2017) as well as purposefully detaining journalists and people who were filming (Fox 2018). However, the most important event in this protest was Maldonado being beaten by the Gendarmerie, thrown in a van and later found dead, allegedly killed by the Gendarmerie (Smink 2017; CELS 2017). The Gendarmerie operation was later confirmed by the minister of security to be violent and riddled with irregularities (CELS 2017), but it was ruled that the Gendarmerie were not involved in the death of Maldonado. This ruling is controversial and not agreed upon (Dapelo 2019).

However, despite the case of Maldonado, the Gendarmerie have been credited as being less lethal when deployed to operations compared to non-militarized police (CELS 2016). This conflicts Flores-Macias and Zarkins (2019, 5) who state that law enforcement militarization results in more use of excessive force. At the same time, the presence of the Gendarmerie can worsen social justice because they do not coexist well with the inhabitants of urban conflict zones. This is especially evident with young people, who the Gendarmerie sees as subjects to discipline (CELS 2016). Nonetheless, the Gendarmerie also have the potential to improve social justice, because Gendarmerie officers often have a closeness with the communities in which they operate. The reason being that many Gendarmerie officers live close to these communities and they are therefore acquainted with them (Dudley 2018). Hence, one could argue, in accordance with Wood (2015, 2, 16-17), that this closeness allows the Gendarmerie to establish fair and just relations with inhabitants, collect information and then effectively execute attacks on criminals.

Apart from the activities of the Gendarmerie and Naval Prefecture, there were two major events in 2018 which were arguably steps towards a constabularized military in Argentina and possible negative effects on social justice/human rights. First, the Gendarmerie began to get logistical and strategic assistance from the Argentinian armed forces. The Gendarmerie were deployed at the Argentinian borders to Bolivia and Paraguay to fight drug-trafficking and former president Mauricio Macri deployed 500 soldiers to the borders which were followed by another 3500 in the months after (Salomon 2018; Insight Crime 2018). Second, and shortly after, Macri reformed the defence doctrine by removing the legal ban on the armed forces involving themselves in internal affairs. In other words, the armed forces can now assist in crime-fighting and terroristic threats (Rey 2018) as long as the criminal or terroristic threat has originated outside of Argentina

(Milani 2019). Importantly, this is not a constabularized military in Argentina, because the armed forces are as of now only assisting the paramilitary. Furthermore, no data indicate that these two events have resulted in activities which negatively affect social justice/human rights. However, one could argue that Argentina has taken a step towards a constabularized military, which, when taking the activities of Brazil's constabularized military into account, might negatively affect social justice/human rights in the future.

### **Concluding Remarks**

Both the Brazilian armed forces and the Argentinian Gendarmerie and Naval Prefecture have conducted direct violence, such as torture, excessive use of force, and allegedly political killings, which are human rights violations. However, the armed forces have failed to establish fair and just relations with citizens (social justice). This has resulted in citizens being viewed as enemies by the armed forces and the armed forces therefore conducting human rights violations to protect themselves. In contrast to this, the Argentinian Gendarmerie have actually on occasions improved social justice because Gendarmerie officers often live near the areas in which they operate and they are credited as being less lethal than other law enforcement agencies. In fact, the Costa Rican UEI and FEO have likewise affected social justice in a positive way, but by applying community policing focused on long-term dedication through citizen-engagement. Furthermore, the Brazilian armed forces are granted military courts and these courts are institutions of structural violence because they hinder human rights violations investigations, in effect reducing justice for individuals. In contrast, the Argentinian Gendarmerie and Naval Prefecture are not institutions of structural violence nor do they control judicial institutions. However, one could argue that they have taken a step towards constabularization by allowing the Argentinian armed forces to involve themselves in internal affairs as of 2018. In contrast to both Argentina and Brazil, the Costa Rican UEI and FEO have not resorted to direct violence nor do they appear to be institutions of structural violence.

#### **4.2.3 Development**

##### **Costa Rica**

In the case of Costa Rica, it is difficult to attribute activities by the UEI or FEO to negative or positive effects on development. This could be because militarized law enforcement needs to be used as an instrument by the government to decrease development, which has not occurred the case in Costa Rica. In other words, law enforcement cannot in of itself affect development. This is evident in the case of Brazil, were the government has used the armed forces to gentrify poverty-stricken favelas which keeps inhabitants in poverty (decreasing development) (Livingstone 2014, 19-20; Wilson 2014). However, one could argue that the Costa Rican government has had no grievances to quell because Costa Rica is in many ways a success story; it is a stable country with one of the lowest poverty rates in Latin America (World Bank Costa Rica 2020).

## **Brazil**

In Brazil, the armed forces were used by the government during the FIFA World Cup 2014 to gentrify the poverty-stricken favelas, in effect evicting locals and banning them from businesses. This turned the armed forces into an institution of structural violence because they in effect decreased development (increased poverty). According to Meeks (2006, 36-37), law enforcement militarization results in the officers perceiving that crime- and poverty-stricken areas are war zones and the inhabitants are enemies. This is useful for the government, because law enforcement is therefore used to keep the inhabitants in poverty in order to preserve the suburban middle-class status-quo (*Ibid*, 38). To illustrate this: Before and during the FIFA World Cup in Rio, the state deployed the armed forces as part of the Pacifying Police Unit (PPU) in crime- and poverty-stricken favelas to forcefully rid them of criminal inhabitants (Azzi 2017, 595; Livingstone 2014, 19-20, 22; Taylor 2014). However, seeing as how officers trained in community policing were deployed in the favelas after the armed forces were done (*Ibid*), this would indicate that the PPU and armed forces did not view the inhabitants as enemies, nor was it aimed at keeping the inhabitants in poverty. In fact, these community policing officers were to give social assistance and create social programs, which would assist the poor favela population as well as rid people of the view that police are corrupt, violent or militaristic (Leeds 2016; Woody 2018; Livingstone 2014, 19). However, community policing was not followed by the state's promise of social investments for development in the favelas. Instead, the PPU and the armed forces were used to evict residents and gentrify the favelas (change the character of the favelas through the influx of more affluent residents and business) in order to reconfigure the city for the FIFA World Cup 2014 (Livingstone 2014, 19-20). Residents were placed in huts and banned from selling food, drinks and trinkets, making it easier for the new affluent business to thrive and taking revenue away from the residents (Wilson 2014). In other words, in accordance with Meeks (2006, 38), make Rio more suitable for the wealthy middle-class and tourists. However, it seems as though the armed forces do not wish to operate in this way nor as a constabularized military. Eduardo Vilas Boas, former commander of the Brazilian army, has stated that the armed forces cannot be expected to solve, by military intervention, a security crisis rooted in longstanding economic and social problems that other government agencies have failed to solve (Albaladejo 2018; Woody 2018; Londono & Darlington 2018).

## **Argentina**

Moving on to Argentina, it seems to resemble Costa Rica and their militarized UEI and FEO because neither the Gendarmerie nor the Naval Prefecture seem to have been involved in activities which positively or negatively affects development. However, as stated earlier, it can be argued that militarized law enforcement needs to be instrumentally used by the government to hinder development. Nonetheless, no such activities seem to be evident in Argentina nor Costa Rica.

### **Concluding Remarks**

In conclusion, the Brazilian armed forces have been used by the government as institutions of structural violence to hinder development. The armed forces were used to ban favela residents from conducting business and evict residents in order to gentrify the poverty-stricken favelas for the FIFA World Cup 2014 and Olympic Games 2016, in effect keeping residents in poverty. When compared to Brazil, the Costa Rican UEI and FEO and the Argentinian Gendarmerie and Naval Prefecture have not been used by the government as institutions of structural violence to undermine development. In Costa Rica, because the government has had no grievances on development to quell, but in the case of Argentina there is no data to indicate any activities with positive or negative effects.

## **4.3 Discussion**

In sum, the descriptive analysis has shown that Brazil has the highest degree of law enforcement militarization, constabularized military, and generally the lowest scores on indicators of positive peace, while Argentina has the second highest degree of law enforcement militarization, paramilitary police, and generally higher scores than Brazil, but lower than Costa Rica. The years in which one can observe significant decreases in indicators of positive peace in both Argentina and Brazil, seem to be years where there was involvement by the armed forces in major events, assistance to paramilitary police, and/or reforms or decisions which granted the armed forces more involvement in internal affairs. However, when compared to both Brazil and Argentina, Costa Rica has no significant decreases or increases and their law enforcement is continually credited as non-violent and peaceful. The explanatory analysis has attempted to explain this general relationship of higher degree of militarization/lower scores on indicators of positive peace and lower degrees of law enforcement militarization/higher scores on indicators of positive peace by showing that Argentina's paramilitary police, the Gendarmerie and Naval Prefecture, as well as Brazil's constabularized military, the armed forces, have been involved in direct violence and used as institutions of structural violence by the government. This direct and structural violence has generally negatively affected indicators of positive peace; democracy, social justice/human rights and development. One can therefore argue that the citizens of Brazil and Argentina are unable to reach their full potential or shape their own lives (Caplan 2019, 5; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2016, 13-14; Aggestam & Höglund 2016, 27; Galtung & Fischer 2013, 11-12, 35; Stephenson 2017, 138). In the words of Meeks (2006, 36-37), the militarized law enforcement agencies are no longer protectors and servers of the community which they should be. However, the results have also shown, in contrast to Brazil's armed forces, that Argentina's Gendarmerie and Costa Rica's militarized police, UEI and FEO, can affect social justice/human rights in a positive manner. Furthermore, when compared to both Argentina and Brazil, the result show that Costa Rica's UEI and FEO have not been involved in activities of direct violence,

nor have they been transformed into institutions of structural violence. Lastly, the results have shown that Argentina has arguably taken steps towards a constabularized military by allowing the Argentinian armed forces to involve themselves in internal affairs as of 2018.

Hence, it is overall possible to state that Argentina's paramilitary police and Brazil's constabularized military have been involved in direct violence and used as institutions of structural violence by the government, which negatively affects indicators of positive peace. However, these acts of violence do not always coincide with the quantitative results because the violence do not decrease the indicators of positive peace. For example, in Argentina 2016, two Naval Prefecture officers were accused and found guilty of torture (CELS 2018), but social justice/human rights did not decrease 2016-2017 (see 4.1.2). In Brazil, the military courts have infringed upon freedom of expression (HRW World Report 2018, 91-92), but it is difficult to attribute these activities to a decrease in democracy to a specific year. This could be because isolated violent activities are not capable of affecting quantitative results because these activities are rather circumstantial. However, this does not constitute a no-relationship between law enforcement militarization and positive peace. The above-outlined activities are still evidence that the Naval Prefecture and armed forces are involved in direct and/or structural violence which undermines social justice/human rights and democracy in Argentina and Brazil. Furthermore, the lack of a decrease in positive peace may be the result of the applied indexes not measuring the type of activities which militarized law enforcements are involved in. For example, the Gendarmerie have attempted to repress democratic protests, in other words repress freedom of assembly (Jenkinson 2015), but the Electoral Democracy Index (V-Dem 2020) used to measure democracy does not include freedom of assembly (see 3.2). Hence, that type of activity by the Gendarmerie is not displayed as a decrease in democracy.

However, although Argentina's paramilitary police and Brazil's constabularized military have negatively affected indicators of positive peace, it is not possible to state that negative effect are the only effects of militarized law enforcement. The reason being that Argentina and Costa Rica generally score higher on indicators of positive peace than Brazil (see 4.1), which could indicate that the Costa Rican militarized police and Argentinian paramilitary police have positive effects on indicators of positive peace. This could be because both countries, unlike Brazil, lack a constitution which authorizes their militarized law enforcement to control entire cities/states or establish military courts (Costa Rica's Constitution 2011: Title I. Article 12; Title IX. Article 109). By lacking this constitutional arrangement, it is possible that the Costa Rican UEI and FEO and Argentinian Gendarmerie are not as frequently, or never, transformed into institutions of structural violence. In fact, the results have showed that the Gendarmerie, UEI and FEO have occasional positive effects on social justice/human rights, either through close contact with communities or citizen-engaging policing (Dudley 2018; Grace 2018).

Furthermore, it is possible to state that certain degrees of law enforcement militarization do not seem to affect certain indicators of positive. For example,

Costa Rica's militarized police and Argentina's paramilitary police have not been used by the government to hinder development, nor has development decreased (see 4.1.3). Brazil's constabularized military have, however, been used to keep inhabitants in poverty (decrease development) (Livingstone 2014, 19-20) and as it happens, development has decreased in Brazil (see 4.1.3). This could indicate that militarized and paramilitary police do not affect development, while constabularized military does. At the same time, it could also indicate that none of the militarized law enforcements in themselves positively or negatively affect development or other indicators of positive peace. Rather, it is how they are used and by whom which affects the indicators. For example, there are arguably no reasons for the Costa Rican government to use the UEI and FEO to quell democratic protests or perform social control, seeing as how Costa Rica is a stable democracy with one of the lowest poverty rates in Latin America (World Bank Costa Rica 2020). In contrast, the Brazilian government have used the armed forces to not only gentrify poverty-stricken areas which keeps residents in poverty (Livingstone 2014, 19-20), but also to hinder democratic votes (HRW World Report 2018, 91-92).

Lastly, the results have shown that Argentina has arguably taken a step towards a constabularized military like in Brazil. This is important because, first, the armed forces have not been allowed to assist law enforcement in Argentina before 2018 (Rey 2018). Second, one can observe that Argentina had a rather sudden decrease in both social justice/human rights and democracy after 2018 (see 4.1.1 and 4.1.2). Although Brazil already has a constabularized military, in contrast to Argentina, Brazil has likewise had a significant decrease in democracy and social justice/human rights (see 4.1). Hence, one could argue that it is when the armed forces are authorized to involve themselves in internal affairs, or become a full out constabularized military, that one can observe the biggest decrease in indicators of positive peace. However, these results are circumstantial because decreases in indicators of positive peace in Brazil are almost always connected to major events such as the FIFA World Cup 2014 and the Olympic Games 2016. It is possible that these events in themselves decreased indicators of positive peace, seeing as how, for example, the Olympic Games costed 20 billion dollars to host (McBride 2018) and drained social provisions which increased poverty (decreased development) (Wilson 2014). At the same time, the results have shown that the activities of the armed forces during these events did result in negative effects on democracy, social justice/human rights and development. For example, human rights violations by the armed forces (Azzi 2017, 596). Regardless of all this, in the case of Argentina, it is too early to state the effects on indicators of positive peace because the reform which authorized the armed forces to involve themselves in internal affairs occurred merely two years ago.

## 5 Conclusion

“Engage and destroy” refers to military training and rules of engagement which enables and authorizes the use of lethal force (Flores-Macias 2019, 5). When observing Latin American law enforcement agencies, they seem to possess a more militaristic nature and many of them are trained and operate under “engage and destroy” (*Ibid*, 8-10). Hence, the purpose of this thesis was to research how and why different degrees of law enforcement militarization affects positive peace in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica. The research question was: How and why has different degrees of law enforcement militarization affected positive peace in Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica? The broad topic that framed the purpose of this thesis, was why law enforcement militarization does not seem to achieve that which law enforcement arguably sets out to do; restore peace and security. I applied the concepts of positive peace and law enforcement militarization as well as previous research on the effects of law enforcement militarization on society. My research design was on of a small N-case study, where Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica constituted the three cases and where chosen because of their respective different degree of law enforcement militarization. The method of analysis was, first, a quantitative descriptive analysis aimed at describing the relationship between law enforcement militarization and positive peace. Second, a qualitative explanatory analysis which aimed to explain the relationship.

In conclusion, this thesis has provided findings which generally suggests that Argentina and Brazil have higher degrees of law enforcement militarization and lower levels of positive peace, while Costa Rica has a lower degree of law enforcement militarization and higher levels of positive peace. This thesis has provided a limited explanation which states that Argentina’s paramilitary police and Brazil’s constabularized military are involved in activities of direct violence and used as institutions of structural violence by the government. This direct and structural violence negatively effects the indicators of positive peace; democracy, social justice/human rights and development. Ultimately the citizens of Brazil and Argentina are therefore unable to reach their full potential or shape their own lives. In contrast, Costa Rica’s militarized police are not involved in direct or structural violence and may even have positively affected certain indicators of positive peace. This positive effect is likewise occasionally true for Argentina’s paramilitary police

Hence, seeing the general effects on positive peace by law enforcement militarization, and adding the fact that law enforcement officers are supposed to be intrastate peacekeepers, this thesis has shown that law enforcement militarization have implications for how peaceful and secure Latin American countries continue to be. By applying the concept of positive peace, this thesis has shown, first, that law enforcement militarization can have significant negative, but

likewise positive, effects on intrastate peace and security. Second, this thesis has therefore shown how important the role of law enforcement is to intrastate peace and security. Furthermore, this thesis has shown that the armed forces are limited as a successful law enforcement agency, in effect limited as successful peace officers, to ensure intrastate peace and security because they generally negatively affect democracy, social justice/human rights and development. Hence, and lastly, with the limited findings this thesis has provided, I call on the academic community to conduct further and future research on law enforcement militarization and positive peace. Examples of interesting and important research could be: To further investigate why democratic governments would use the armed forces as law enforcement, considering that the results in this thesis and previous research indicates that they generally have negative effects on positive peace. Furthermore, to investigate if these general negative effects on positive peace are a conscious and ill-intended aim of governments when militarizing law enforcement, or if they are unfortunate consequences of governments' attempt to fight crime? The findings in this thesis, as well as future research, on law enforcement militarization and positive peace, could potentially be of use to NGO's or international organizations, for example Human Rights Watch or the UN in order for them to continue their work in working for peace, democracy, justice, human rights etcetera.

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