Populism in Turkey and Hungary

A Search for Security and Belonging

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to gain an understanding of the potential relationship between populism and a population's search for security and belonging. Furthermore, how this is expressed through the rhetoric and policies of a country's leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, and Viktor Orbán in Hungary, this is examined through conducting a qualitative content analysis. Here I use newspaper articles, academic papers, and books, based on theories of "Ontological security", and populism. The findings of the thesis suggest how intertwined the rhetoric and policies of the populists are with notions of existential anxiety and the need to secure a stabile identity, based on stories and memories of a glorious or traumatic past. In this, Turkey has adopted an identity, that highlights the ethnically Turkish, Sunni Muslim, based on stories of the Ottoman Empire and its fall. In Hungary, an identity has been constructed, based on defending Christian culture and values, stemming from the fall of "Greater Hungary", the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and its subsequent Soviet occupation. The two proposed identities are personified by respective populist leader, both of whom, by embracing and continually using exclusionary, populist narratives, have awakened society's latent populists and, in turn increased their support.

Key words: Ontological (In)Security, Populism, Turkey, Hungary, Identity, Minorities, Elites, Religion, Chosen Glories, Chosen Traumas
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1   Introduction

"Disruptions of the past two decades—economic, security, cultural . . . have generated fear and anxiety and these create fertile conditions for a public seeking comfort in simple answers like "make America great again" and longing for a simpler (if fictive) time of cultural homogeneity and happiness" (Kinnvall & Mitzen 2018, p.826). The need to find simple answers, stemming from a nostalgic longing for the times of old when things were "great", is met by populist leaders around the world. These representations of the "common man", of "the people", through their division of society into two opposing camps, create simplistic answers as to why things were good back then but bad right now. Namely through painting the opposing side and the establishment as consisting of corrupt and immoral individuals who are at fault for all of the nation's problems, while making their side, "the people", out to be a pillar of morality and truth (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013; Müller 2016). These being the people who by extension should be the ones in charge, so that they can impose their vision of the nation and its people upon the state, creating a state run by the people, for the people (Müller 2016).

During the last few years, a rise in populist, authoritarian and nationalist parties and figures can be observed throughout Europe (and the West), such as Matteo Salvini in Italy and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. This boom in right-wing populism in Europe can, at least partially, be attributed to a rise in animosity towards (Muslim) immigrants (BBC News 1 2019). However, this "boom" is not limited to the confines of the Christian Western world. Erdoğan, president of Turkey, a majority Muslim country on the edge of Europe is yet another one of these populist right-wing leaders, even being crowned as the world's most populist right-wing leader in the most recent "Global Populism Database", not too far ahead of Orbán himself (McKernan 2019).

The goal of this thesis is to conduct a comparative study of these two leaders, Erdoğan and Orbán, who are both classified as populist politicians (according to the "Global Populism Database), while at the offset seeming so immensely different, one being the leader of a majority Christian country while the other of a Muslim majority country, and one being in Europe while the other is situated in the Middle/Near East. This, in order to understand what has led to this rise in populism, and to highlight some of the differences between the two "brands" of populism, analyzed primarily using the theoretical lens of Ontological (In)Security, predominately described as the search for a stable self, and identity, as put forward by scholars such as Catarina Kinnvall, Jennifer Mitzen and others.

1.1   Purpose

The purpose of the thesis is firstly to describe the political situation, history and demographics in Turkey and Hungary. This is done in order to highlight the populist nature of both leaders and to provide useful background information for further analysis. Secondly, using this insight to reach an understanding as to why these countries have seen a rise in populism, explained through the lens of ontological (in)security. Furthermore, to see how the rhetoric and policies of the populist politicians intertwine with notions of existential anxiety and a search for a stable identity.

This is done in the hopes that the findings of the thesis, can contribute to the larger field of research, both within ontological (in)security theories and, within the field of populism. Furthermore, the aim is to fill the gap in research that exists within the fields, as no research, comparing the two cases, has been conducted prior to this. Further still, I hope, to reach an understanding in regards to the differences and/or similarities in how populism and ontological (in)security is expressed in the two countries, but also how this can be understood in relation to the different cultural contexts of the two countries. One being in the Western, Christian sphere, while the other subsides within the Middle/Near Eastern, Muslim cultural sphere.

1.1.1   Research Questions

1) What is the relationship between the rise of populism and an increased search for security and belonging in Turkey and Hungary?
2) How is populism expressed in the rhetoric and policies of Erdoğan and Orbán?

1.2   Structure of the thesis

The thesis, following the current introductory chapter, is structured as followed: Chapter two provides a condensed but extensive literature review where previous research is presented, both in regards to the two cases of the thesis (Turkey and Hungary), as well as in relation to the two main theoretical fields, populism and ontological (in)security. This is followed by Chapter three, where the theories of the thesis are discussed, starting with a definition of populism, discussing its main characteristics, and highlighting what a populist does once in power. After this, the thesis makes a case for the use of ontological security as opposed to other forms of security, while outlining the main theoretical characteristics within the field. When this has been done, the main theoretical underpinnings of the thesis are put forward and discussed, showing the ways in which, the two theoretical fields will be used and combined for the analysis. In the chapter following this,

chapter four, I discuss the method used in the thesis, namely a qualitative content analysis, based primarily on David Altheide, as put forward by Alan Bryman (2012). Furthermore, I explain why I have chosen Turkey and Hungary as cases for the study, as well as having a discussion on the delimitations of the thesis. This is followed by chapter five, where my empirical data is brought forward, describing the history, demographics and (current) political situation in Turkey and Hungary. Thereafter I turn to chapter six, where I discuss how well the themes found in my empirical data align with the characterization of populism made in chapter three. In chapter seven, the connection between ontological security and populism in Turkey and Hungary is established, analyzing both cases separately, followed by a comparison of the findings. Lastly, in chapter eight, I bring forward my concluding remarks, where I summarize the main findings of the thesis and bring to light some of its shortcomings, while also discussing possible future research.

2 Literature Review

The two cases of this thesis, Turkey and Hungary, have both been subject to extensive research from the broader academic community. Researchers, such as Natalie Martin (2015), Paul T. Levin (2011), Idris Turan et al. (2019), Basak Alpan (2019) and Ayhan Kaya (2020), focus for instance on Turkeys relations with the EU as well as its ascension process. Atilla Ágh (2018), Beáta Huszka (2017), Lee Congdon (2018) and Nanette Neuwahl & Charles Kovacs (2020), instead focus on Hungarian-EU relations, often centered around the illiberal turn in Hungary and the country's clash of values with the EU as a whole. Other texts, such as those written by Gabor Scheiring (2019) and Miklós Molnár (2001), Ayhan Kapusuzoglu et al. (2017) and Erik Jan Zürcher (2004), focus on the economy and the history of Hungary and Turkey respectively.

Much research has also, maybe not all too surprisingly, been conducted regarding the rise of populism in these two cases. Firstly, in the Turkish case, Ezgi Elci (2019), through a quantitative content analysis, has mapped out the rise of populism in Turkish politics, Burak Özcetin (2019) has looked at how the tv-show "Dirilis", "the show of the people", is used to further the ruling party's (AKP's) populist narratives. Yonca Özdemir (2020) has researched the contradictions in the AKP's "neoliberal populism" and their social policies, while Burak Bilgehan Özpek & Nebehat Tanriverdi Yasar (2018), has shined a spotlight on how Turkish populism is expressed through foreign policy. Similarly, Hungary has seen an equally large width in research conducted, with Atilla Antal (2017) looking into the character of populist-governing in Hungary, while Nicole Lugosi (2018) has written on welfare issues, through looking at populist party manifestos and speeches in Hungary. Péter Krekó & Atilla Juhász (2019), in addition, have conducted research on the "black and white" narratives and tribalism in Hungary and Poland, and lastly Daniel Hegedüs (2019), using Hungary as a case study, has questioned the incumbency effect's capacity to "mainstream" populist parties in power, instead claiming its possibility to radicalize the populist even further. Furthermore, both Turkey and Hungary were mentioned by Cas Mudde (2019) and Jan-Werner Müller (2016) as examples of countries ruled by populist leaders, both authors central to this thesis.

Papers by Brent Steele & Alexandra Homolar (2019), Chris Browning (2019), Jelena Subotic (2019), Shogo Suzuki (2019), Kinnvall (2018; 2019) as well as Zeynep Gulsah Capan and Ayse Zarakol (2019), all discuss the possible relation that exists between ontological security and populism, although, only one (Capan & Zarakol 2019) grounds this discussion in an analysis of any of the countries focused on here, namely Turkey. Other researchers have looked at ontological security in Turkey, such as Maurizio Geri (2017) and Türkay Salim Nefes (2013), both focusing on the securitizing of certain minority groups, while Özlem

Demirtas Bagdonas (2012) instead focuses on Turkey's use of "uniqueness" as an expression of its ontological insecurity. Hungary on the other hand has seen much less attention within this field, as there seems to be a lack of research conducted on the ontological security of Hungary (The exception being Mälksoo (2019), albeit, focusing on Hungary as an ontological security threat).

Given this, there seems to exist a gap in the literature. Attempts have been made in connecting the two fields of populism and ontological security, and much has been written regarding both Turkey and Hungary in general, especially within the field of populism. Although, very few have, as of yet, managed to combine both populism and ontological security, applying them to the cases of Turkey and Hungary, with none comparing the two cases to each other as of yet, something which will be done in this thesis.

3 Security, Belonging and Populism

In the following chapter, the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis will be laid out. This will be done through three separate (but connected) segments. The first segment will consist of an introduction to the concept of "populism", showcasing the immense diversity that exists within this field of research and introducing some of the different definitions commonly used. This will be followed by a discussion where the definition that will be used throughout the thesis will be brought forward, as well as an explanation as to why this was chosen. Furthermore, a showcase of what characterizes a (right-wing) populist and how populists act while in power, is forwarded as to contextualize what populism is, moving it from the purely theoretical, to the more practical level.

Section two is to be set up in a similar manner to the first one. It starts off with a more general discussion regarding different forms of "security", followed by an introduction to the field of "Ontological (In)Security", as well as a discussion of what concepts characterize the current debate within the field. Lastly, the "key theoretical underpinnings" of the thesis will be laid out and discussed, showing the ways in which, the theories will be used for the future analysis of the thesis.

3.1 Populism

What is populism? Most people have probably heard the being term thrown around before, and many of us presumably have an idea of what it means, but it is seldom a term that we have a precise definition of. To characterize what a populist is can be a hard task. The reason for this, at least partially, is because of the diversity within the field itself, as well as the diversity that exists among the cases that these theories aim at explaining. Populist leaders have sprung up all the way from South and Latin America to Northern Europe and the Middle East (just to pick some examples), with ideological outlooks spanning from the farthest left to the farthest right of the political spectrum. As a result of this diversity, finding a clear and precise definition that one can make use of that is both specific as well as inclusive enough to incorporate the diversity observed amongst populist movements, while also excluding those, such as anti-elitist movements that are not populistic in nature, becomes quite the exorbitant task. This, therefore turns the act of defining populism into a balancing act between specificity and inclusivity (as is so often the case within political science).

This struggle can be seen exemplified in Mudde's and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser's paper, where they, in order to analyze populism in Northern European and South American countries, construct a definition that can somehow

be inclusive enough to fit countries in both of these regions, while still being narrow enough to be classified as "populism" (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2015).

The definition created, stemming from commonalities often observed within the field, and as a continuation of the definition coined by Mudde (2004, p.542-543), Mudde and Kaltwasser put forward their definition of populism as a: "thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt 'elite', and holds that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people" (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2015, p.18). Something which, when boiled down to its most core components basically becomes, an "us vs them" mentality, with a belief in majority rule.

The "us" as the pure people, which in this thesis would correspond with the Turks and the Hungarians, vs "them", the filthy elites. A definition similar to this one would in all likelihood need to be used for this thesis. The reason being that, similarly to how Mudde and Kaltwasser had to find a versatile definition that could encompass both Northern Europe and South America, an equally versatile definition has to be used in order to account for potential differences between the two cases focused on in this thesis, Turkey and Hungary.

The "Muddean" approach, although being the most cited body of work within the field of populism today, is not without its critics. Some examples of where this criticism is raised comes from Jonathan Dean and Bice Maiguashca, who criticize Mudde and Kaltwasser's definition as not truly constituting an ideology (in a thin nor thick respect), and as a definition with a hard time drawing the line between accidental populist rhetoric and fully-fledged populist politics (Dean & Maiguashca 2020, p.12-14). With this being said, I still derive value from the use of the "Muddean" approach, as it is the most commonly cited current definition, placing the thesis in a significantly larger context of accumulative knowledge than what would otherwise be possible if one uses a non-ideational approach. This seemingly being seconded by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2018), as well as by Steele and Homolar (2019) as they commend the ideational approach's accumulative capabilities, through its broad and flexible definition of populism.

As such, the thesis will ground itself in the "Muddean" approach, albeit with a minor addition. I would build upon this previously mentioned definition, through the inclusion of all those besides the "elites" who fall outside of the "us", and whom, like the elites, are seen as a threat towards this group. This new group could in theory be almost anyone, depending on who the "us" is, such as migrants, women, political opponents, or minority groups. Similar sentiments can be seen mirrored, in parts, by Müller in his book *What is Populism?* Where he proposes the idea that something else needs to be added, a further exclusionary element, where those who are perceived as not being with the party or the populist movement, are not seen as a part of the "in-group" and become ostracized in ways similar to the elites (Müller 2016, p.16-18).

Using this definition put forward by Müller, although modifying it somewhat, as to make it less connected to party support and rather to the act of "othering" in general, with "othering" in this case being defined as "an exclusionary labeling

practice, where one creates 'the other', a person or group of people that are seen as different to oneself, done through labeling 'the other' as deviant or non-normative" (Mountz 2009, p.328). This widening, in turn means that the othering of not only the elites, but also of other groups that are perceived as not being a part of the "in-group", would be a prerequisite for someone to be referred to as a "populist". This "other" group could, as mentioned before, be from one of many possible segments of, or outside of, society, including migrants, women, political opponents, minority groups etcetera. Thus, turning the definition from (1) "the pure people" versus "the elites", with a belief in majority rule, too (2) <u>"the pure people" versus "the elites" and "the other", with a belief in majority rule.</u>

One could in theory, change this definition even further in an even more general direction, turning it into "the people versus the other", especially since the othering of elites often also take place. Although, this new definition would in turn make it so that any movement, party or leader, that espouse the "us versus them" dichotomy, and the narrative of "the other" would be populist, something that simply is not always the case. If this were to be done, the definition would become diluted and, as such, the anti-elite aspect of the definition should remain as is, to make this distinction as clear as possible.

In using this "new" definition, a higher degree of precision is acquired, while at the same time keeping it somewhat open to existing differences between populists around the world. This keeps the door open to those populist movements that value party loyalty over everything else, while also including those who instead focus on engendering minority groups. Furthermore, it excludes cases of pure anti-elitism or forms of pure othering, such as racism, as aspects observed within populism, but not something that in and of itself would make a politician or movement "populist". In this thesis, populism is therefore defined as follows: "Populism is a thin-centered ideology that perceives society as being divided into <u>three homogeneous</u> and antagonistic groups, <u>'the pure people'</u> versus <u>'the corrupt elites' and 'the other'</u>, with a belief that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people". This being a modification of the definitions as put forward by Mudde (2004, p.543), Mudde and Kaltwasser (2015, p.18), as well as by Müller (2016, p.16-18). In doing this, the definition is distanced somewhat from the more general definition, first suggested by Mudde and Kaltwasser, towards one that is more exclusionary, such as the nativist form of right-wing populism that is often seen in Europe (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2018, p.1676-1677).

3.1.1 What Characterizes a (Right-Wing) Populist?

As has been made apparent, what defines a "populist" can be quite hard to pinpoint, similarly, what characterizes one, is an equally difficult task. Kinnvall, when looking at the connection between ontological security, attest to this diversity, although concluding that a constant, at least within far-right populism, is a "fear of strangers related to vehement nativist nationalism built on the myth of the quasi-homogenous nation-state," something which is "increasingly expressed in terms of Islamophobia and nostalgia for an imagined past" (Kinnvall 2018,

p.528). Similar arguments can (at least in parts) be found in Mudde, who identifies several overarching characteristic signifiers when it comes to far-right populist ideologies, these being: (1) Immigration, (2) Security, (3) Corruption and (4) Foreign policy (Mudde 2019, p.26).

The populist arguments against (1) immigration (as with the other 3 characteristics) often centers around the previously mentioned concept of nativism, where the "native" culture is seen as superior to the "alien" one and the influx of these aliens and their culture is seen as an existential threat to the nation. This nativist way of thinking, exemplified through the adoption of certain conspiracy theories among some politicians, such as "The Great Replacement" theory. This theory argues that "the West" is being overrun by a tidal wave of non-western immigrants, brought on, not by the needs of the immigrants but by national progressive politicians, or even by the hands of some greater (Jewish) conspiracy, as is the case with Orbán (Mudde 2019, p.26-27).

(2) Security is commonly seen ingrained in debates regarding immigration, often prioritizing issues of "Law and Order", connecting these issues of security with that of immigration. This is done, as the perceived insecurities experienced are blamed upon the aliens, as they are seen as perpetrators of the crimes committed, and as a danger to the nation. The alien perceived not only as a danger in a physical sense but also through being perceived as a threat to the economy and culture of the nation. This lack of security, brought upon by the existence of aliens within the country (or outside of it), is then blamed upon the elites who are seen as naïve and weak (Ibid, p.27-28), not dealing with this "problem" but instead being enablers of, and the lead cause behind it.

The third characteristic, (3) corruption, is often portrayed, by populists, as stemming from and being connected to "the elite". The elites are perceived as corrupting both the political system itself, as well as the minds of the people within it. Examples of this being academics or journalists, who are often accused, by the populist, of being anti-national traitors (Ibid, p.28). Lastly, populists have a certain way of looking at (4) foreign policy, showing suspicions towards supranational organizations such as the European Union (EU) or United Nations (UN). The populist instead prefers national governance over what they perceive as "hostile and remote bureaucrats", seen as "a first step towards [a] (cosmopolitan) one-world government". Furthermore, the populists often hold "irredentist claims, where they claim ownership of "lost" territory, an example being Hungary, who "lost" almost two-thirds of their territory as a result of the Treaty of Trainon, a loss that populist leaders, claiming to represent all "ethnic Hungarians", aim at reversing, reuniting all Hungarian territories (Ibid, p.29-30).

One further characteristic worth pointing out is the gendered dimension that often exists within populist rhetoric, a dimension that itself is shaped by the nativist outlook held by far-right populists (Mudde 2019, p.81). The survival of, and reproduction of the nation is often seen as one of the most important aspects for a far-right populist, favoring this over the "individual reproductive and self-determination rights" of the woman. Women are instead, removed of their agency and seen purely as mothers, the "womb of the nation", and as bearers of the

traditional heterosexual family (Mudde 2019, p.81-82). The woman, in the eyes of the populist is perceived as being under threat, firstly from feminists who (like homosexuals) are seen as undermining traditional family values and thereby also the "survival of the nation", as well as through being bringers of alien ideas, brought to the nation by foreigners, to weaken the nation. Secondly, by the invading "other" who pose a threat to the native woman as well as her rights (Mudde 2019, p.82-83), as such, needing protection from the (strong), native man.

How then, do these characteristics translate when the populist comes into power? This will be discussed below, under "The Populist in Power".

3.1.2 The Populist in Power

One aspect that might seem unclear is that of how populists govern when in power, especially since they owe a large part of their existence to being against the ruling elites. Müller brings up an interesting observation, regarding how populists, when in power, still do not see themselves as being a part of the elite. The elites still exist but have now been reformulated into being those of perceived influence who try to hinder the populist, either from inside of the country or from abroad. The populist simply continues on with his or her crusade of polarization against the elites, painting it out as this grand apocalyptic struggle between opposing forces (Müller 2016, p.27), although with a somewhat redefined idea of who are and are not part of "the elite". The logic of a populist in power is more or less the same as it was prior to getting into power, using the same type of talking points, arguing that they are the sole, morally just representatives of the people. Furthermore, that only those who are a part of the "real" people, deserve support and quality governance. This manifest itself in three ways: (1) Colonization of the state, (2) Mass clientelism & discriminatory legalism, and (3) The systematic repression of civil society (Ibid, p.28).

(1) Colonization of the state is done through replacing otherwise nonpartisan bureaucrats with party loyalists, cementing their rule and reshaping the government in the image of "the people". In doing this, the populist replaces those, put there by the old elites, while at the same time, calling out those who dare to criticize these changes as being "traitors" (Ibid, p.29). (2) The act of exchanging material goods for political support and favors among the elites or different groups in society, in a process referred to as "mass clientelism". This is done, while at the same time, conducting forms of discriminatory legalism, where they treat those who go against them, or those who are not seen as a part of the people, more harshly than other groups (Ibid, p.29-30). Lastly (3) harassing and repressing nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as a way of maintaining their claims of being the exclusive moral representatives of "the people". This is done since the NGOs provide a different and often opposing claim of moral representation for the people. As such, they often get discredited as being controlled by foreign powers and therefore as unable to represent the people (Ibid, p.30).

This is not to say that acting in ways similar to what I have just described is done exclusively by populists, as it is a behavior often seen amongst well-established, status-quo politicians as well. The big difference is that all of this, is conducted "in broad daylight". This is done in a very public, open setting, as opposed to how it is done "normally", where this is kept behind locked doors. The populists, seeing themselves as morally righteous, perceive this as but a way of ridding themselves of the elites, of giving support to "the people" and of avoiding foreign influence (Ibid, p.29-30). As such, the populist can act in a paradoxically elitist, undemocratic and immoral way under the guise of representing the people, the real people. Often done in a repressive, authoritarian manner, constantly moving the nation further towards becoming an autocratic state (Halmai 2019; Castaldo 2018). With some research suggesting that populism in fact, is only used as a guise for would-be authoritarian leaders to gain influence and power (Castaldo 2018).

3.2   Ontological (In)Security

Before setting out to identify what Ontological (In)Security is, it is important to first discuss why that type of security is to be preferred over other forms, such as the traditional state centered, "Political realism", the more critical "Human Security", or the Copenhagen and Welsh school of security studies.

The "traditional" lens in which security is viewed through tends to be that of "political realism". If one looks at security through that lens, the sovereign state becomes the main provider and focus of security and security generation. This state entity does whatever it deems necessary to increase its own power in relation to other sovereign states (Scholte 2005, p.126-127), often by gaining an increased level of security through increased military might (Runyan & V. Peterson 2013, p.144-145).

The strength of the military in countries such as the US, India and France, at 1st, 4th and 7th place globally (Global Firepower 2020), just to name a few random examples, should as a result of their extensive military capabilities and capacity to defend themselves lead to a population in relative safety. Yet the (arguable) rise of populism seen in these three countries would point to that not being the case, or at least to the fact that people in these countries do not feel safe. Because even if one doubts the connection between ontological security and populism, it still seems odd that people in militarized and (militarily) powerful states would elect anti-elitist, anti-establishment politicians, instead of respecting, and sticking to the status-quo if they in fact keep them safe. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that there needs to be something else, besides a state centered, political realist approach to security. Besides that, as this thesis aims at understanding the connection between people's sentiments and populism, a state centered view of security would not be adequate, as its focus is on the state as opposed to its citizens and their sentiments.

Similar arguments can be made when speaking of "Human Security", which expands the notion of what safety consists of, although not in a way sufficient enough to be able to connect sentiments of safety with the rise of populism in these countries. Human security was first defined in the "United Nations Development Program Human Development Report" from 1994, quoted here by Giorgio Shani as "safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression' and as 'protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in patterns of daily life – whether in jobs, in homes or in communities" (Shani 2017, p.278).

Both Turkey and Hungary are relatively well-developed countries (although at different levels), if a decent level of human security is met, what can then explain the presumed levels of anxiety and the support shown towards populist leaders and movements in these countries? To claim that the rise in populism worldwide, but more specifically in the case of Turkey and Hungary, is a result of a lack of human security would be an oversimplification that unlike what the name suggests, leaves out the human aspect by, not taking peoples sentiments into account. Furthermore, as brought forward by Shani, human security seems to presuppose a certain level of ontological security. If the inhabitants of said nation lack that ontological security, they will also be unable to reach a sufficient level of human security, you cannot have one without the other (Ibid, p.277). It therefore seems reasonable to look at ontological security as the main catalyst for the rise in populism, rather than human security or the political realist form of security.

As for other, more critical views on security, such as the Copenhagen or Welsh school, they are either too statist in nature, or lack the analytical depth that I believe I find with ontological security. The Copenhagen school centers around the concept of securitization, where otherwise mundane or "normal" issues are elevated from "the realm of 'normal politics' to the sphere of 'panic politics' (Buzan et al. 1998, p.34, quoted in Browning & McDonald 2013, p.241), therefore expressing a need for "desecuritization" (Browning & McDonald 2013, p.241). The Welsh school, criticizing the Copenhagen school as being "too statist" (Ibid, p.242), instead argues that security is something only achievable through emancipation, in this case referring to the freeing of people "from the physical and human constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on" (Floyd 2007, p.332).

The argument that the Copenhagen school is too statist, I think, holds true as they, instead of looking at public perception, focus on how politicians or the state, through their use of language can make normal political subjects, into issues of existential threat (Floyd 2007, p.329). Hence it would be more suited to an analysis, based on state actors and how they affect country politics, as opposed to the relationship that exists between that of public perception and politics, as is the case for this thesis. The Welsh school on the other hand, falls somewhat closer to how I would view security, although still falling short, lacking the analytical power of ontological security. An example being in how the Welsh school speaks of freedom from political oppression as paramount to feeling secure. One could arguably suggest that supporting populist leaders, given their focus on fighting the elites, is an expression of a desire among the people, to escape the elite's political

oppression and I would agree with that sentiment. Although, that does not account for the apparent need by the majority population of a country to oppress the security of others, such as minority groups or migrants, to create a sense of security for themselves. Therefore, yet again leading me towards the use of ontological security as the main theoretical framework of the thesis.

With that being said, I do not intend to discredit neither political realism's, human security's, the Copenhagen school's, nor the Welsh school's view of security as something incorrect or unimportant, far from it. Even though I am of the belief that ontological security stands above these, and that it has a higher degree of explanatory power to that of other forms of security, especially given the aim of this thesis, it is far from impossible to presume that other aspects such as physical security or securitized issues, can play a role. In holding this discussion, the goal was simply to highlight how I, and by extension the thesis perceive security as something based primarily on feelings and perceived notions of safety as opposed to anything else. This seems to be a sentiment shared by an increasingly larger segment of International Relations scholars who, like me, perceive the world of today, as guided more by feelings and sentiments rather than by pure rationalities, opting for theories of ontological security as opposed to the more narrow approaches (Kinnvall & Mitzen 2018, p.828).

3.2.1 What is Ontological (In)Security?

Ontological security, as put forward by Mitzen and Kyle Larson, is defined as referring "to the security not of the physical body but of the self or identity, the subjective sense of who one is that enables and motivates action and choice". This "security of the self" stems from our need to experience ourselves as "being" as opposed to existing in a constant process of "becoming" (Mitzen & Larson 2017, p.1-2). In other words, that we need to perceive our identity as being stable, not as something that is in constant flux and in the process of constant change, even if that is in fact the case (Kinnvall 2004, p.747-748). Anthony Giddens described ontological security as being: "the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and the constancy of the surrounding social and material environment of action" (Giddens 1990, p.92 quoted in Mitzen & Larson 2017, p.2-3). Or put forward in even simpler terms by Kinnvall as "a security of being" something which also includes a sense of confidence and trust that the world is what it appears to be. (Kinnvall 2004, p.746).

As has been made apparent, there exists no single definition of ontological security, although, there are some obvious commonalities that can be observed, at least when looking at research conducted based on the previously mentioned "security as being", that of a stable identity that is persistent over time. Given this, I would characterize "Ontological Security" as centered around a "perceived trust in the continued stability and continued existence of oneself and one's identity". Furthermore, putting the above definition to the side somewhat, I want to highlight the divide that exists within the field of ontological security regarding

the type of actors one's analysis should center around. This being a major fault line dividing the research conducted within the field into two clear major "teams", with both sides themselves containing a significant amount of theoretical diversity. The first one of these two, being the more "state-centered" research, such as the work conducted by Steele (2005; 2008), Zarakol (2010) and Subotić (2016), with these three representing some of the diverse branches that exist within this more state-centered approach. Given this diversity, there exists no typical way in which this state-centered approach interprets ontological security. Although one great example of how this can be expressed can be seen in Steele's article, where he speaks of states as social actors, with their own identity, something which is reflected in how this state acts on the global stage, as "It is unnatural for a state to identify itself one way and to 'perform' acts in a different way" (Steele 2005, p.524-527).

The critique against this state-centered perspective can be put forward in quite different ways, coming from the opposing side of this divide, from those who instead prefer a focus on society and people, as opposed to the state. The first example being from Alanna Krolikowski (2008), who argues that seeing the state as a social actor, and granting it personhood, can result in one overlooking the effect the state can have on the ontological security of its people. While others, such as Paul Roe (2008), put into question the assumption that states are even in need of feeling ontologically secure in the first place. Albeit only examples of some of the criticism leveraged against this perspective, it paints a vivid picture of the overall field, and the divide that it houses. The perspective held in this thesis, would be that of the second, society focused one. Not because I subscribe to Roe's view, that states lack the need to feel ontologically secure, but rather because my intention is to understand the interplay between Turkish/Hungarian society and that of their populist leaders, and how the sentiments of this society are expressed through these leaders. Furthermore, as the shift towards ontological security, away from realist security, human security and other more critical schools of security, was done to get away from the trappings of a more "state-centered" point of view, this also seemed like the more logical choice.

With a clear picture of where the thesis stands within the overall ontological security field, lets try to get a deeper understanding of the theory at hand. The previously mentioned, "security of the self" that ontological security centers around, can partially be explained through the concept of the "home". The "home" in this respect does not refer to a specific place per se, but rather a perceived feeling of "home", and a place where one can construct one's sense of self and identity. The home serves as a "secure base on which identities are constructed" (Kinnvall 2004, p.747), and a "protective cocoon" formed around "particular narratives of home and secure pasts" (Kinnvall & Mitzen 2018, p.826).

When this sense of identity and "home" gets disrupted, be it through, migration, globalization, fear of terrorism (Kinnvall & Lindén 2010, p.595-596), or whatever it may be, it can affect different actors in different ways. Those with what is referred to as a "healthy sense of basic trust" are somewhat flexible, adapting to this change through reflecting over and experimenting with new

practices, holding on to a sense of home even when this home is threatened. Those with a more "rigid sense of basic trust" on the other hand, try to cling to existing routines and securitize their subjectivity (Mitzen 2006, p.274), a process that will be explained in further detail later on. For them, this disruption creates a sense of loss and existential anxiety, and creates a feeling of ontological insecurity, leading to the need to find a new home and for a new identity to be formed (Kinnvall 2004, p.747).

This search for a new stable identity leads to the previously brought up process of "Securitizing Subjectivity", where one creates and reaffirms certain identity traits within him/herself, and the juxtaposition of these traits with that of a stranger-other (Kinnvall 2004, p.749). This leads to the establishment of essentialist identities, where the boundaries between the self and the other has been made apparent. These essentialist identities possibly manifest themselves in absolutist forms of reasoning, such as "black-and-white" thinking and religious or secular fundamentalism (Kinnvall & Lindén 2010, p.599), where "(T)hose who do not (seem to) subscribe to a common belief system thus challenge the very foundation of the group", turning the other from a stranger, to "the enemy" (Kinnvall 2004, p.754-755).

Two important and often used identity signifiers, observed in the process of securitizing subjectivity, is that of both religion and nationalism, often expressed through so called "chosen glories and "chosen traumas". These chosen traumas, or glories serve as links between the past and the present, providing the group with either tales of calamity, destruction and grief, or of a glorious past. This in turn being used to either construct feelings of hatred or to bolster their self-esteem (Kinnvall 2004, p.755). These mythologized stories of either past glories or traumas are strongly connected to that of both images of the nation and of religion. These then serve to demonstrate "that the nation it wishes to create has always existed" and/or "traumas through which the nation was lost", brought up in order to either glorify the nation's past, or highlight its historical trauma(s). In this process, religion becomes a powerful tool as matters of religion are turned into matters of the nation, transforming religious revelations into national shrines, religious miracles into national feasts and holy scripters into national epics. This can, in turn transform historical traumas and/or glories into a natural part of one's identity and one's perceived image of both the self and the other (Ibid, p.756). Furthermore, religion and nationalism, through providing us with certain answers regarding "questions concerning existence itself, the external world and human life, the existence of "the other," and what self-identity actually is", also provide us with a notion of what is the "truth". Those who do not follow that "truth" in turn get excluded (Ibid, p.759).

This use of nationalism and religion as a way to securitize subjectivity can end up in both restrictive discourses about "the family", where the agency of the individual women are overlooked in favor of paternalistic notions of protection, both of the woman and by extension, of the religious virtuous family, as well as racist dialogue, often repackaged as being about issues of culture and religion as opposed to abject racism (Kinnvall 2004 761-761). As perceived threats towards

the nation, its religion and culture are seen as increasing, more ontological insecurity is felt, leading to an increase in nationalist and religious backlash, as the formerly stable "home" gets disrupted.

A significant aspect in this search for a sense of security, connected to the concepts of "chosen glories" and "chosen traumas", is that of a "common political memory". This collective memory can vary from case to case, be bound to a specific national memory, or even span the borders of several countries, creating an identity of the nation as an indivisible unit, like in Serbia (Ejdus 2014), or one where several nations are united in their opposition against certain ideas and values, as is the case for the pan-European, anti-Nazi identity (Mälksoo 2014). The memory serves as a critical aspect in securing ones sense of ontological security, as it helps in both the creation, and the sustaining of a particular "biographical narrative", using selected events, setbacks, triumphs, myths and symbols to communicate this narrative (Subotic 2018, p.298). In turn, "providing a sense of where 'we' came from and what "we" have been through" (Berenskoetter 2014, p.270), securing certain desirable memories that portray the nation in a positive, heroic light, in a process that fuses the collective emotions of shared past traumas and glories with that of ones present conditions (Subotic 2018, p.298-299; Ejdus 2014, p.49). Thus, using and revising these memories in ways that enable certain ideas and exclude others (Subotic 2019, p.246-247). This, creates a hegemonic biographical narrative, in which history is turned into stories of national victimhood and heroism, that leaves no room for alternative stories or narratives (Subotic 2018, p.299; Subotic 2019, p.249).

This notion of national narratives and common memories, is often made out to be something exercised by the state, such as Croatian attempts to distance themselves from their past as a Nazi ally (Subotic 2019), although I would argue that this can be extended to society at large. Just like how an identity can ground itself in certain stories of a glorious and/or traumatic past (Kinnvall 2004, p.755), so do these stories ground themselves in the notion of collective memories. As such, it is not the stories themselves that enable the securitizing of subjectivity, but rather the memories, held by the collective, in relation to these stories.

In Summary, ontological security is one's "perceived trust in the continued stability and continued existence/continuity of oneself and one's identity". This trust is built through an imagined "home", where one can safely construct one's identity. If this imagined home, gets disrupted and one's trust in the stability of one's identity starts to be put into question, said identity could be perceived as being under threat, which leads to the "securitizing of subjectivity". This process in turn can result in the creation of a new identity, essentializing one's own identity in juxtaposition to that of an enemy other and, by extension, end up in an absolutist, black-and-white discourse. Used throughout this process are the notions of chosen traumas and glories, collective memories of mythologized past events, used to create a link between the past and the present, and to bolster the group's identity in relation to the other. In turn, excluding those who are perceived as not being part of this mythologized story, often masking this

exclusion as "cultural differences" or as an attempt to protect the sanctity of "the family".

3.3 Key Theoretical Underpinnings

There is an implicit, underlying connection between the two theoretical fields brought up in this paper, these being ontological (in)security and populism. Right-wing populist arguments often presuppose some level of ontological insecurity and anxiety towards some perceived 'other' (may they be the elites at the top, or the migrants/minorities at the bottom of society). Furthermore, theories that speak of populism, often do so in terms that fall well in line with certain aspects of ontological (in)security. The next step would therefore be to combine the two, as to highlight the connections that so often exist between the two bodies of work, namely how ontological (in)security feeds into populism (and vice versa), this being the overarching goal of the thesis. With that being said, I do not intend to make any absolute claims regarding how ontological insecurity would be a prerequisite for populism to grow and take root. Nevertheless, I do believe that there could be some credence to that claim, as populism (especially of the right-wing variety) often, if not always, rests upon the perceived insecurities and anxieties of the "common man" and as such would be dependent on some level of ontological insecurity in order to be able to spring up. I simply suggest that looking at ontological (in)security could be one way of explaining the rise of populism throughout the world, or at least in these two cases, while being transparent to the fact that there are most likely other approaches one could take in trying to understand this.

Similar connections to the ones this thesis attempts to find have been made previously, such as by Steele & Homolar (2019), Browning (2019), Subotic (2019), Suzuki (2019), Kinnvall (2018; 2019) and others, all using different cases, approaching them from different angles, although still working within the fields of both ontological security and populism.

The main claim of the thesis is that there exists a connection between ontological (in)security and populism, as the perceived concerns and anxieties of "the people" are exploited by populist leaders, in order to gain votes. Furthermore, that this is a self-reinforcing cycle, where the election of populist politicians, through their alarmist and divisive rhetoric, causes more ontological (in)security to arise, in turn leading to a further increase in populist support.

This previously mentioned connection will be explored in the analysis, using certain key theoretical underpinnings and concepts. "The home", or the disruption of the home, is looked upon as the main generator of anxiety for the people of Turkey and Hungary. This disruption of the home serves as a catalyst for the process of "securitizing subjectivity", where the identity is reshaped, and a renewed sense of belonging is created. In this process of identity formation,

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collective memories, and mythologized stories of "chosen glories and traumas" take center stage, serving as building blocks, onto which this new identity is constructed. This new identity, and the biographical narratives on which it is based, sets the boundaries of who is, and is not a part of "the people", be they "the elites" or "the others". An exclusion that can be based on notions of a common religion, ethnicity or commonly held traditional values. In doing so, I explore the relationship between feelings of anxiety and ontological (in)security and that of the rhetoric and policies of each country's respective populist leader. Furthermore, I make the case that these populist leaders, when in power on a mandate based on an opposition against the elites and the migrant and/or minority other, spread these sentiments of exclusion and existential anxiety even further, creating more ontological (in)security in the process. This increase in perceived insecurity is then likely to lead to an increase in the support given to the populist leaders, through mobilizing the more "latent" segments of populists in society (Mudde 2004, p.547-548). In a way that creates a self-perpetuating cycle of insecurity and populism in the nation, where both of these are mutually reinforcing.


Illustration 1: The mutually reinforcing cycle of populism and insecurity.

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4   Method

The thesis was conducted as an interpretative, comparative case study, applying existing theories to cases within a specific field, in order to gain an increased understanding of the cases at hand (Esaiasson et al. 2012, p.41). In this case, trying to understand the relationship between populism and a population's search for security and belonging, and how this has led to the increase in support shown towards populist leaders and parties in Turkey and Hungary. This was done through a qualitative content analysis, a form of content analysis that focuses on discovering the latent meanings within texts, as such requiring a certain degree of subjective understanding and interpretation, in order to come to terms with the underlying meanings of a (or several) text(s) (Kuckartz 2014, c.2 p.16-18).

How a qualitative content analysis (or an "ethnographic content analysis" more precisely) is constructed, and what it should consist of can of course differ significantly. Although in a general sense, it is about finding themes within or between the texts that are being analyzed. In doing this, the researcher often goes in with certain "codes" or themes in mind, albeit revising these as the analysis takes shape, depending on the findings of one's texts. This back-and-forth is done in order to be "systematic and analytical but not rigid", having the initial categories guide the study, while allowing for the emergence of new ones. While also emphasizing the context in which the texts themselves exist within. This makes for a more open and reflexive way of analyzing texts and documents, eventually illustrating the discovered themes through examples from the data gathered, such as through exemplifying quotes (Bryman 2012, p.557-559).

Altheide (referred to, in Bryman 2012, p.559), put forward the steps that a researcher should follow in conducting this type of method, as the following:
1. Generate a Research Question.
2. Familiarize yourself with the context of the documents.
3. Become familiar with a smaller number of documents and use this to generate the initial codes (themes) that guide the further collection of data.
4. Revise the generated codes by applying them to more data.

The content analysis of the thesis was guided by these "steps", as put forward by Altheide. Formulating research question(s), establishing the overarching framework of the thesis, looking at populism and a sense of security and belonging. Following this, I familiarized myself with the context of the documents. The documents used, consisting of secondary sources, such as newspapers, books and academic papers. This contextualization was conducted, and later put forward in chapter five of the thesis, where the history, demographics and current political situation of both cases was accounted for. After this, I went about establishing the initial themes, informed either by my

theoretical framework, contextual knowledge, my personal perceived notions or the codes generated as a part of this initial (smaller) sample of texts. These initial themes being things such as "anti-migrant", "the people" or "anti-elite". Themes that would then be continually revised and eventually brought forward through examples in chapters five (my empirical data) and six (the analysis). Such as changing "anti-migrant" into the broader theme of "anti-minority" and separating "anti-elite" into an internal and external anti-elitism.

After this, I used both the contextual information, as well as the empirical data gathered as a part of the content analysis and connected these with the theoretical framework of the thesis. Firstly, I make a case for Turkey and Hungary's "populist" classifications. This is followed by, the main analysis, using contextual data, such as the history, demographics and the political situation in both Turkey and Hungary, to gain an understanding of the ways in which populism is framed by the leaders of both countries, as representatives of "the people". Finally, I look at how these contextual clues inform the identity signifiers of the "people", analyzing the interplay between populism and the search for security and belonging.

4.1 Material

The material used throughout the thesis, besides scientific texts, books and scientific articles, consisted primarily of reporting done through newspapers and reports by Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in this case, English-speaking newspapers reporting on Turkey and Hungary. Not being able to speak nor read Turkish or Hungarian at a sufficient enough level, newspapers in their local languages had to be excluded, as such, only English-speaking news media was used. The same applies to NGO-reports and scientific research. This could in turn have had an adverse effect on the thesis and its results. The reason being that these media houses, whether from Turkey, Hungary or the Anglosphere, with their use of English, the world's "lingua franca" might be aimed at a certain, and maybe more cosmopolitan, audience. As such, they could carry with them certain biases, more critical towards Erdoğan and Orbán. This is important to keep in mind as to be transparent with the possible biases held by the sources used throughout the thesis.

The material gathered was done through what I believe to be reputable (if somewhat biased at times), sources, mostly from the United States and the UK, such as *Politico* or *The Guardian* but also from English speaking newspapers in Turkey and Hungary, such as *Ahval News* and *Daily News Hungary*, as well as other international newspapers such as *Al Jazeera*. The reason as to why second-hand sources was used as opposed to those directly from the parties or leaders themselves was a pragmatic decision, done mainly out of availability, as acquiring first-hand sources in English proved to be too difficult.

4.1.1 Delimitations

As will become apparent to the reader, the focus of the thesis is on the "Justice and Development Party" (AKP) and Erdoğan in the case of Turkey, and on the "Hungarian Civic Alliance" (Fidesz) and Orbán in Hungary. This was done even though other (right-wing populist) alternatives exist, such as the "Nationalist Movement Party" (MHP) in Turkey or "The Movement for a Better Hungary" (Jobbik) in Hungary, with both of these examples being more radical alternatives than both the AKP and Fidesz. This, partially to make the thesis more focused, but also because including them in the analysis would not have a significant impact on the results of this thesis, especially as these (extreme right) parties, although different, are merely more extreme versions of what Mudde refers to as "the radical right" (Mudde 2019, p.25-26), in other words, the AKP and Fidesz. Furthermore, as the intention of the thesis was to look at the interplay between ontological insecurity and populism, the analysis, even with its focus on the more "mainstream" populist parties, can in all likelihood be applied to that of their more extreme counterparts.

A further delimitation made in the thesis is regarding that of timespan. Focus was given to information within the timeframe of both leader's ascension to power, until current day, making my timespan stretch from 1998, when Viktor Orbán was first elected prime minister (Várdy et al. 2019), until today. Although using other, historical sources, in order to contextualize certain aspects of the two cases.

Furthermore, I should be transparent with the delimitations put on this research by my epistemological viewpoint, being that of interpretivism. A viewpoint where focus is put on "individuals as actors in the social world", and not just on how social structures and external factors affect the individual. Instead, through my own subjectivity, trying to "understand, or interpret . . . what individuals intend when they do certain things" (O'Reilly 2009, p.119-120). In other words, trying to understand the interplay between populism and a need to secure one's identity. By extension, meaning that the conclusions derived in this thesis are but my understanding and interpretation of the situation at hand, and should not be perceived as objective answers in any way, as any such answers would be impossible to find, stemming from their non-existence.

4.2   The Chosen Cases and Why they were Chosen

The method of picking cases, used in the thesis was a variant of what is often referred to as a "method of difference" approach, looking at otherwise similar cases, where one major aspect sets them apart, in these cases being mainly that of differences in religion. Although, leading to similar outcomes (the rise in populism) as opposed to different ones, as is often the case when using this approach (Teorell & Svensson p.226-229). Instead the thesis aims to reach an understanding on how this difference is expressed, and how it has shaped the rise

of populism in both cases, identifying possible commonalities and variations between the two.

The two cases chosen for this comparative case study were; The Republic of Turkey and The Republic of Hungary, both of which have experienced a rise in populism, and both currently under the rule of (arguably) populist leaders, namely Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the Turkish case, and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. Countries where both leaders started off, far less populistic than they are today. While Erdoğan came to power as a cautious reformist, he is now crowned the world's most populist right-wing leader according to the "Global Populism Database" (McKernan 2019). Orbán, who started off as an anti-Soviet, left-wing atheist and pro-democracy student-activist, now rule Hungary as an "Illiberal Democracy" (Lendvai 2018), and has, similarly to Erdoğan, become increasingly populist over time (Lewis et al. 2019).

Besides this, many other similarities are to be found, when looking at both cases through a historical lens, as both have been the rulers of, or parts of larger empires at some point in time, the Ottoman Empire for Turkey and the Austro-Hungarian Empire (and arguably during their time under Soviet influence) for Hungary. Both countries are relatively close to each other, even more so during their times as empires, when they even shared borders at times. Besides this, they have a fair amount of shared history. Respective empire was also part of the same alliance during WW1, of which, both countries "gained" their independence and lost significant amounts of territory as a consequence of losing the war (BBC News (1) 2018; BBC News (2) 2018). Furthermore, both have significant ethnic minorities living in their countries (although being the most significant in Turkey), making up 30-35 percent of the Turkish population (Yapp & Dewdney 2020; Findlay 2019), and around 16 percent of the population in Hungary (Várdy et al. 2019; Sawe 2017).

This leads us to the main difference between the cases, being that of differences in religion, with around 53 percent (with some estimates claiming a much higher, 82 percent) of the population in Hungary following Christianity in one denomination or another, with a large segment of the population being irreligious or unaffiliated (Várdy et al. 2019; Office of International Religious Freedom (1) 2018; Bilal 2017), while a majority of the Turkish population, over 97 percent, follow Islam, with the largest sect being that of Sunni Islam at about 83 percent of the total population (Yapp & Dewdney 2020).

5 Country Information

The following chapter has been split into two sections, one focusing on Turkey and one on Hungary. These segments have been divided into further subsections, focusing on (1) The history, where I touch upon what I perceive as important, historical events; (2) The demographics, highlighting the ethnic and religious makeup of the countries; and (3) The current political situation, describing the leaders of both countries, discussing current political events, policies as well as statements made by respective political leaders.

5.1 Turkey

5.1.1 The History of Turkey

The republic of Turkey might seem like a permanent fixture in our world (especially if you are born in the 90s like myself), but it is in fact quite new when looking at it from a historical point of view, although tracing its roots back to empires of old, primarily to that of the Ottoman Empire, ruling the lands of what used to be the Eastern half of the Roman Empire (the Byzantine Empire as it is often called). And as "any modern history of Turkey really is a history of the Ottoman Empire" (Zürcher 2003, p.6), if one wants to speak of the history of Turkey, one also needs to discuss the history that is the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottoman Empire can trace its roots back to groups of Islamized Turkmen from the steps of Central Asia. Whom, split off from the Seljuk empire, expanding into regions formerly held by the weakened Byzantine Empire, and their Turkmen neighbors. With the empire eventually spanning from parts of modern-day Hungary, the Balkans including Greece, parts of Romania and Ukraine, as well as large parts of the Middle East and North Africa, with territory in Iraq, Syria, Israel, and including large parts of the Arabian peninsula, Egypt all the way to Algeria (Shaw & Yapp 2019), in other words, an immensely vast empire.

The vastness of the empire was arguably seconded only by its diversity, inhabited by around 25 million people, many with both different identities and religious beliefs, from Greeks and Turks to Kurds and Arabs, with inhabitants from the three major Abrahamic faiths, Christians, Jews and Muslims. The empire, although on paper, an Islamic caliphate governed by the laws of Islam, still showed considerable tolerance towards its religious minorities, although levying these "dhimmis", as these second-class citizens were called, with extra

taxes. Often being less tolerant towards opposing Islamic sects, than to that of its Christian and Jewish population (Zürcher 2003, p.9-11).

After circa 100 years at its peak, the Ottoman Empire started its slow decline somewhere in the middle of the 1500s, a time marked by great internal as well as external conflicts, culminating in the loss of the Great War (WW1), and the occupation of Ottoman territory by European powers (Shaw & Yapp 2019). Following this, Mustafa Kemal (later adopting the name Atatürk, roughly translated into "father of the Turks") established a provisional government in Ankara, current capital of Turkey, with the aim of ridding the country off its foreign occupiers and establishing the Republic of Turkey as seen today. Three years into the conflict, after retaking Istanbul, the Turkish Republic was proclaimed, abolishing the caliphate in favor of a state, governed by secular values (Itzkowitz 2020).

The period following this has been marked by modernization, secularization, the emancipation of women, and eventually by further democratization, economic growth, clashes with minority groups, several coup d'état attempts as well as periods of political upheaval and authoritarianism, as can be seen happening in Turkey right now (Itzkowitz 2020; Yapp & Dewdney 2020).

5.1.2 Demographics of Turkey

Turkey, with its estimated 82,6 million population, is a fairly diverse state, although far more homogenous than its Ottoman predecessor, with most sources claiming that the amount of people identifying as "ethnic Turks" numbering around 65-70 percent, with a sizeable minority of Kurds at approximately 15-19 percent (Yapp & Dewdney 2020; Findlay 2019). The Kurds being the fourth largest ethnic group in the entire region (BBC News (2) 2019). Although, keeping in mind that the word "Turk" technically does not refer to an ethnicity per se but to all citizens of Turkey, making all citizens of The Republic of Turkey, "Turks", regardless of their ethnic identification (Yapp & Dewdney 2020). As such, who is and is not in fact a "Turk" is quite hard to discern, as an ethnic Kurd in some sense is a Turk, at least in the eyes of the state. Although this thesis will adopt the prior mentioned 65-70 percent, as the amount of people who ethnically identify as Turks, as to make room for differences in ethnic identification. Turkey also has an increasingly large number of Arabs living in the country, mostly as a result of the neighboring Syrian civil war, which led to a large influx of migrants to Turkey, partially because of the migration agreement made between the EU and Turkey (Deutsche Welle 2018), a deal that has recently been put under pressure by Turkish authorities who see the deal as unfair, therefore wanting to let Syrian refugees pass through the Turkish borders into Greece and the EU (Ahval News (1) 2020). The estimated Arab population in Turkey is currently situated at around five to five and a half percent of the population (Koru & Kadkoy 2017), an increase from the around one percent of the population, presented prior to the civil war (Yapp & Dewdney 2020; Findlay 2019).

Religiously speaking, Turkey is a majority Muslim country, by quite a significant margin, with estimates varying between 97-99 percent Muslim, with a small minority of Christians, Jews and religiously unaffiliated (Yapp & Dewdney 2020; EURYDICE 2019; Office of International Religious Freedom (2) 2018). The Muslim segment of the population can be further divided into its Sunni majority and it's Shia and Alevi population, where the Sunnis make up 77-82 percent while ten to 15 percent follow either the Shia or Alevi branch of Islam (Office of international Religious Freedom (2) 2018). With this being said, recent polls suggest that "only" about 61 percent identify as religious (51 percent) or pious (ten percent), a slight drop in the ten years since the last polling was conducted, although still being a considerable majority of the population (Kenyon 2019).

5.1.3 Erdoğan and The Political Situation in Turkey

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan grew up in a tough, lower class part of Istanbul, called Kasımpaşa, a neighborhood inhabited by conservative, working-to-middle class citizens, and a place where he is today looked upon as a great inspiration (They even have a football stadium built by, and named after him) (Ahval News (1) 2019; Keddie 2018). Erdoğan, being an early advocate of religion's increased role in Turkish society, this was made even more clear in 2011 after the AKP's biggest election win up until that point. In his victory speech, Erdoğan espoused that "The tyranny of the elites is over" and that Turkey was now turning a new page, as to avoid rule by "criminals whose direction has split from God's will and the will of the people", fusing the will of God, with that of the people (McKernan 2019). Furthermore, restoring Ottoman era architecture in the Balkans, and building new, government backed, Ottoman-inspired mosques in places such as Istanbul (Ahval News (2) 2019).

Erdoğan has also gone out of his way to promote not only traditional Islam, but also a more traditional view of the family, exemplified in a speech held by him on International Women's day in 2016, where he gave praise to "family and traditional values". In this speech, making the claim that motherhood was more liberating than economic liberation (for women). Furthermore, blaming the "weakening of the family institution", together with the availability of birth controls, as leading causes for both the observed population decline, as well as a "collapse in values" seen in Europe. Further still, calling for women in Turkey to each have at least three kids (Hürriyet Daily News 2016).

Erdoğan and the AKP, although weakened somewhat from their mayoral losses last year, losing both Istanbul (Turkey's biggest city) and the capital Ankara, plus seven more out of Turkey's ten largest urban areas, still hold a tight grip on the political power in Turkey, especially on a national level (Freedom House (1) 2020; (2) 2020). This was made even more prominent after instituting the new presidential system in 2018, giving Erdoğan control over all executive functions of the state, including the appointment of judges and other oversight personnel. This, enabling the continuation of Erdoğan's crusade against

opposition politicians and civil society in the aftermath of the Gezi park protests and the 2016 coup d'état attempt (Freedom House (1) 2020; Mckernan 2019). Erdoğan, framing those who dare to oppose him, through the use of the post-coup state of emergency, with claims of terrorist connections. This state of emergency has been used by Erdoğan, to jail people from civil society organizations, news media, journalists and political parties, including both opposition parties such as the Kurdish HDP as well as within the top echelons of his own party, namely within the Gülenist organization, whom he blames for orchestrating the coup (Freedom House (1) 2020; Al Jazeera 2017; Al Jazeera (2) 2019). Furthermore, seeing Erdoğan make use of the current Corona crisis to show favor towards AKP led municipalities, as donations made towards helping those affected by the virus in opposition-controlled areas of Turkey has been blocked by the government (Hürriyet Daily News 2020).

As a result of the prior mentioned mayoral losses, who were believed to have stemmed from dissatisfaction regarding not only the economic situation in Turkey, but also from the way the refugee situation was dealt with, Turkey has seen a large shift in its refugee policy. Turkey, now home to 3,5 million Syrian refugees, around five to five and a half percent of the population, has shown refugees a generosity that has not been appreciated by Turkish society at large (as 75 percent of all Turks disapprove of the country's refugee policy), including criticism from both the opposition and within his own party. The refugee perceived as "a security threat, and a danger to Turkey's ethnic makeup" (Tol 2019). This has led to a shift from the "open-border", "compassionate Islam" that Erdoğan himself promoted prior to this, where he called for Sunni solidarity against the tyrannical Alawite Shiite Assad regime, to a "Turkey first" approach. Even going as far as working on resettlement plans in the "safe zone" they aim at establishing in Northeastern Syria. A plan that entails sending the refugees back as opposed to integrating them into Turkish society (of which, prior attempts at integration have sparked major social media backlash) (Ahval News (3) 2019; Tol 2019).

The establishment of this "safe zone" in parts, is also seen as an extension of the long running conflict between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Worker's party (PKK), that has seen the death of almost 50,000, mostly Kurds, since war broke out in 1984. A conflict that itself is a result of decades of mistreatment and attempts at forced assimilation by the Turkish government, where traditionally Kurdish names, customs and even their language was banned, referring to them as "Mountain Turks" as opposed to "Kurds" (BBC News (2) 2019. The PKK, growing out of these decades of maltreatment by the Turkish government, established itself as an organization that advocated for Kurdish rights in Turkey, with connection to the Kurdish government in Northern Syria, the area in which Turkey plans to establish this refugee "safe zone" (Ozcan 2019). Furthermore, the Turkish government promotes a hegemonic Sunni Turkishness, through the mistreatment of not only their Kurdish minority, but also through years of mistreatment towards the country's Alevi population, whom are not recognized as being a separate branch of Islam and therefore not given the same

rights as their Sunni counterparts. With the Alevi community expressing concerns over anonymous threats of violence, the jailing of Alevi preachers on terrorist claims, and the promotion of Sunni Islam through the religious education in schools (Office of International Religious Freedom (2) 2018).

Recent attempts have also been made by the Turkish government to increase their influence not only over certain minority groups in Turkey, but also within the larger region. One example of course being the prior mentioned "safe zone" in Syria, but also through improving their relations in other nearby countries such as in the Balkans and Libya, where they have sent troops to support the Tripoli based "Government of National Accord" against assaults by the opposing General Khalifa Haftar, in an explicit attempt to protect their "kin in Libya", people with believed Ottoman heritage (Ahval News (2) 2020).

5.2   Hungary

5.2.1   The History of Hungary

The territory of what is today referred to as "Hungary" has not always been home to the Hungarians (or Magyars as they call themselves). Many different groups have previously inhabited what is today Hungarian land, from the Celts to the Romans, and from the Huns to the Avars (who are believed to have been a Turkic group interestingly enough), culminating in the arrival of the Uralian speaking Magyars, leaving their homes thousands of kilometers Northwest of Hungary and conquering the territory around the middle, to late ninth century. With the Magyars converting to Christendom circa 50-100 years after the conquest (Molnár 2001, p.1-4;17-20).

After this, following a time of expansion and increased regional prominence, we see "the rise of the Ottoman threat", culminating in the fall of Buda (as the two cities of Buda and Pest had not been combined into one at that time) and the Ottoman occupation of large parts of Hungary, marking the start of "the century of Magyar decay", and the turning of Hungary into "Europe's last bastion against the Ottoman invasion" (Molnár 2001, p.60, 91-92, 102, 122). Following years of conflict and several failed attempts to recapture Hungarian lands, ground was made as significant portions of territory (Including Buda) was recaptured as a result of the Ottomans failed siege of Vienna, a moment greatly celebrated throughout the Christian world (Ibid, p.131-133).

With the recapturing of previously lost Hungarian territory, and now firmly under Habsburg (Austrian) influence, the ground was set for what would eventually lead to the establishment of the dual monarchy, the Austro-Hungarian empire. This period in time, marked by relative stability, as well as economic well-being, where the identity of the empire's (minority) population of ethnic Hungarians was seen as respected (Ibid p.208-209, 216). Only half a century after

its establishment, after losing the great war (WW1), came the fall of the multiethnic dual monarchy and the independence of Hungary, leaving some Hungarians lamenting this loss of historical grandeur, while others took to celebrating the occasion (Ibid, p.244). Although this optimism would be short-lived as what came after arguably left a scar on the Hungarian nation, a scar that persists to this day. Namely the Treaty of Trianon and the Soviet occupation. The treaty of Trianon, saw Hungary losing more than a third of their territory, and about 60 percent of their population, dropping from 18.2, to 7.6 million people, of which, around 3.4 million were ethnic Hungarians, now living within the confines of neighboring states (Ibid, p.262).

As the second world war broke out, Hungary saw itself occupied by Nazi Germany, during which, large segments of the Jewish population in Hungary (Europe's biggest at the time) were rounded up and deported, around 435,000-437,000 people. This followed years of rising anti-Semitism in Hungary between the two wars (Ibid, 274-276, 288-292). With the loss of Germany, came the liberation of Hungary and the occupation by the Soviet Union, seeing Hungary firmly placed under Soviet influence during the coming 45 years, a period market by political repression and economic paralysis (Ibid, p.323-324). 1990 saw the end of this influence, as Hungary broke free from Soviet and established itself as the "democracy" we can see today (Ibid, p.338-340), of which, a prominent voice in this democratizing and liberalizing process was the current prime minister, and former student activist, Viktor Orbán (Lendvai 2018).

5.2.2 Demographics of Hungary

Just as in the Turkish case, the demographic situation in Hungary today, is a far cry from the prior diversity seen in the country (or empire). In the grand scheme of things, Hungary is quite ethnically homogenous, having a significant majority of people identifying as ethnic Hungarians, at almost 84 percent. The largest observable ethnic minority being the Roma, at just above three percent, with a larger, almost twelve percent of people defined as "other" or "undeclared", (Várdy et al. 2019; Sawe 2017), what the exact ethnic makeup of this group would be is quite unclear though.

Religiously speaking, Hungary is a majority Christian country, with 53 percent of the population following some denomination of Christianity, mainly split between that of Catholicism (circa 37 percent) and Protestant churches (circa 14 percent) (Várdy et al. 2019; Bilal 2017), with only around twelve to 22 percent of the population attending church regularly (Buyon 2016). Although, some estimates put the total Christian population much higher, at around 82 percent (Office of International Religious Freedom (1) 2018). The country also has a sizeable irreligious and/or unaffiliated population, comprising of around 45 percent of the total Hungarian population, possibly as a result of Hungary's time as an official atheist state during the country's communist era (Várdy et al. 2019).

Lastly, when speaking of the demographic situation in Hungary it is of importance that one mentions the country's current population decline. Not only

did the country lose a sizable chunk of its population after the first World War (Molnár 2001), but following this, as a result of emigration and increased urbanization, the country's population has seen a continued decrease, having the population in modern day Hungary peak during the end of the 70s to early 80s (Várdy et al. 2019).

5.2.3 Orbán and The Political Situation in Hungary

Viktor Orbán grew up in relative poverty, claiming that he was 15 years of age before he was even able to turn on the tap and enjoy warm water for the first time. He started his political career, advocating for the further democratization of Hungary, interestingly enough, with support from George Soros, the Jewish-Hungarian philanthrope, much distained by Orbán today (Lendvai 2018; Encyclopaedia Britannica 2019; Freedom House (3) 2019). Soros, being blamed, in one of Orbán's recent regularly occurring Friday interviews, for supporting migration into Europe, and for bankrolling pro-migration politicians (Daily News Hungary (1) 2020). Wherein the laws put in place to heavily restrict immigration into the country have been named the "Stop Soros" laws, in attempts to amplify this supposed connection (Freedom House (3) 2020).

Orbán himself even going as far as subscribing to the conspiratorial "great replacement" theory, where hidden forces, inside and outside of Europe want to replace the "native" Europeans with "non-natives". Attempts at solving Hungary's depopulation problems, centering around policies that create more "Hungarian children", instead of increasing migrations, as is done by other western countries in the EU, since "migration for us is surrender", as Orbán himself puts it (Walker 2020). Instead urging voters to defend "Christian" nations against immigration, the increase in crime that this supposedly brings with it as well as against the "virus of terrorism" and the "Muslim invader". The most recent European election campaign, being framed as a battle between "The 'new internationalism' of pro-migration Brussels bureaucrats" funded by people such as George Soros, and "sovereign nation-states defending tradition and Christianity" (Al Jazeera (1) 2019; Schultheis 2018). In this conflict between Hungary and the EU-elites, Orbán has even gone as far as to compare the EU with that of the Soviet dictatorship, claiming that "We [Hungarians] do not want a Europe any longer where the Greater abuses his power, where national sovereignty is violated and where the Smaller has to respect the Greater. We have had enough of dictatorship after 40 years behind the iron curtain." (Halmai 2019, p.299). The previously mentioned anti-migrant view held by Orbán, can also be seen reflected within the greater Hungarian public, as a majority, at 59 percent of those surveyed, held the view, that pro-migration NGOs should be banned in Hungary (Daily News Hungary (2) 2020).

These negative sentiments can be seen extended to that of the Roma minority in Hungary who has been increasingly put under pressure as the far-right has grown

in the country (Freedom House (3) 2020; Dunai 2019). The Roma seen, even by Orbán himself, as a threat to the life of everyday Non-Roma Hungarians (Daily News Hungary (1) 2020). Concurrently one could observe the increased importance given to Hungarians abroad, as the government has shown increasing interest in Hungarian minorities in what was once "Greater Hungary" and parts of the "Austro-Hungarian Empire" (Pogonyi 2015). The Hungarian government granting citizenship and voting rights to ethnic Hungarians abroad, and instating the "Day of National Unity", as a day of mourning the Treaty of Trianon that separated those groups from their "motherland" (Inotai 2019).

Although losing political control over Budapest in the most recent local election, Fidesz and Orbán are still very much in control over Hungary. Their power over the country's (previously) independent institutions has been further cemented, policies that hinder the work done by opposition groups, journalists, universities, and NGOs have been enacted, making it harder for them to express unfavorable opinions towards the government. Moreover, blocking journalists' access to the National Assembly, consolidating national news media, enacting strict regulations for NGOs, and attempting to increase their control over Hungarian schools and universities and the Constitutional Court, now, fully in Fidesz's control (Freedom House (3) 2020).

Furthermore, showing great distain towards those working against or questioning what is perceived as "traditional values" in Hungary. Women's rights NGOs targeted through new tax regulations, arrests against their members, as well as through the targeting and banning of certain gender studies programs, as was done in 2018. The Hungarian government, going as far as enshrining the protection of these traditional values and of "Christian Culture", in the new Hungarian constitution, claiming that Hungary "shall protect the institution of marriage as the union of a man and a woman", as the "the family is 'the basis of the nation's survival" (Mudde 2019, p.85-86; Freedom House (3) 2020). This shows a clear prioritizing of family-values over the agency and further emancipation of women. Even more worryingly, increasing Orbán's executive power in the midst of the Covid-19 Crisis, giving him the power to rule by decree, suspend the enforcement of certain laws, and jail those who spread what is perceived as "untrue or distorted facts", this without a set time limit (Bayer 2020), moving Hungary even further towards becoming an authoritarian state.

6 Are they Populist? Populism in Turkey and Hungary

In order to be able to understand the connections between populism and identity in Turkey and Hungary, one first has to clarify whether or not these countries are in fact led by populist leaders, something which will be done in this chapter. That is not to say that all policies implemented, nor that everything said, by Erdoğan and Orbán are based purely on populism, although, the existence and prevalence of populist politics, policy and rhetoric, at least points to the populist nature of respective politicians.

Summarizing the previous theory segment on populism, a (right-wing) populist divides the world into two opposing sides, the "pure" people, who are in opposition to "the elites" and "the other", the other usually being migrants or minorities. The migrants/minorities are portrayed as risks not only to the bodily security, but to the culture of the nation. Furthermore, blaming internal or external elites for being inept at or enablers of this threat (Mudde 2019, p.26-18). All of this is often wrapped in divisive, gendered and nativist rhetoric, often expressed through authoritarian measures (Ibid, p.81-83; Halmai 2019; Castaldo 2018). Once in power, the populist treats those who are on "their side" with great favor, while mistreating those who oppose them. Moreover, trying to cement their rule partly through replacing critical voices within the state with loyalists, while subjugating the voice of civil society in order to maintain their claim of being the moral representative of "the people" (Müller 2016, p.27-30).

In both Turkey and Hungary, a clear divide has been made between that of the "pure" people and of the elite as well as between the migrant/minority "other". Erdoğan, firmly presenting himself, not as a part of the establishment, but as the tough guy from Kasımpaşa "bravely confronting the old Kemalist establishment of the Turkish republic" (Müller 2016, p.27). Even going as far as ousting parts of his own party (the Gülenists), on claims of orchestrating the 2016 coup (Al Jazeera (2) 2019), in an attempt to avoid comparisons with the entrenched elites of old. Erdoğan, seeing himself as the righteous representative of the people, not the elites who have led the nation astray, away from the will of God and the will of the people (McKernan 2019). Orbán similarly, through highlighting his poor, humble upbringing (Lendvai 2018), while continually using divisive rhetoric towards migrants and the elites, especially those in Brussels, and even national minorities to some degree, such as the Roma people (Al Jazeera (1) 2019; Daily News Hungary (1) 2020), makes a clear distinction between "the people" he represents and those whom he perceives as being opposed to him. "The people",

in this case also includes the ethnically Hungarian diaspora in neighboring countries, located in former Hungarian territories.

"Erdoğan had long stood out from his populist peers on the issue of immigration" (Ahval News (4) 2019), although, now having shifted significantly, from portraying the refugees as fellow Sunni brothers, in need of protection, into a substantial security risk. They are perceived as a risk, not only to the continued power of the AKP, but also to Turkish society as a whole. As the increase in Syrian refugees is seen as correlating with increasing crime levels in Turkey, and furthermore, as something with a possible negative impact on the ethnic makeup of the country (Ahval News (3) 2019; Tol 2019). This ethnic threat being an extension to that of Turkey's Kurdish minority and the PKK, whom the Turkish government has been in an on-and-off conflict with, since the 80s (Ozcan 2019). Further still, mistreating not only ethnic minorities in the country, such as the Kurds, but also religious minorities like the Alevi (Office of International Religious Freedom (2) 2018), in attempts to promote, a hegemonic Sunni Islam Turkishness. Orbán, although never being pro-refugee to start with, has a similar outlook to that of Erdoğan, as the migrant is seen not only as a bringer of terrorism but also as ethnically unwanted. Instead, opting to "make new Hungarians" as opposed to "importing" them and replacing its ethnic Hungarian population with foreigners, as is done in other EU countries (Walker 2020). Similarly, putting pressure on the Roma minority as being a nuisance for Non-Roma Hungarians (Daily News Hungary (1) 2020). Making it so that being a part of "the people" is more than just being a Hungarian citizen, but also ethnically Hungarian. Furthermore, framing the whole issue of migration as a battle between Christian Europe and the pro-migration elites in Brussels, showing a clear divide between the will of the people, and the will of the (in this case) EU elites (Al Jazeera (1) 2019).

Both political leaders have also shown a great willingness to implement increasingly autocratic practices, silencing the voices of those critical towards them, or those with possible opposing claims to political power and influence in their respective countries. Erdoğan and Orbán, both go out of their way to limit civil society, the opposition and national news media. Furthermore, ousting their opponents and putting their own loyalist in places of power, be it in the party, the government or the judicial system. With Erdoğan showing explicit favoritism towards those whom he claims to represent, while showing disfavor to those he is not, through gestures such as the building of a stadium in his home neighborhood, Kasımpaşa, and by blocking Corona-related donations in opposition-held municipalities (Keddie 2018; Hürriyet Daily News 2020). Thus, making use of the current covid-19 crisis to, just like Orbán (Bayer 2020), further his grasp on power in the country. Furthermore, both leaders have been very transparent with their opposition towards those who stray away from what they perceive as "traditional" family values, with Orbán going as far as to enshrine these values into the new Hungarian constitution (Mudde 2019, p.85-86; Freedom House (3) 2020).

All of the above points, although not in definite terms, to both Erdoğan and Orbán as being political leaders with populist characteristics, as defined and characterized in the thesis by Mudde and Kaltwasser, as well as Müller. They make clear distinctions between that of the "pure" people and the elite/'other'. They also show great distrust towards the elites and distain towards migrants and minorities as they are perceived as having a negative impact on the nation's security and the hegemonic culture of the nation. Neither of them shy away from showing favors toward certain groups in society and disfavors to others, while cementing their political power through silencing their critics and those with competing sets of values. As such, I believe that one could definitely make the case, that Erdoğan and Orbán are populist leaders.

7 Ontological (In)Security and Populism – Connecting the Dots

One thing that must be made excessively clear before this analysis begins, is twofold. This is but my analysis of the situation, given the background information, theories, as well as underlying personal biases and worldviews held by the author. They are therefore not to be seen as absolute conclusions, but rather as my interpretations. Secondly, no group, be they Turkish or Hungarian, is a monolith, as such, the conclusions drawn and connections made are generalized to a degree as they do not apply to all Turks or Hungarians, something for the reader to keep in mind.

7.1 The Disrupted "home"

In the theory chapter of this thesis, the "home" as a concept, was established as a "secure base on which identities are constructed" (Kinnvall 2004, p.747), and as a "protective cocoon" for one's identity (Kinnvall & Mitzen 2018, p.826). When this "home" experiences a disruption of sorts, this creates a feeling of loss and existential anxiety, in turn leading to a need to "securitize subjectivity". In doing this, one creates an (often) essentialized identity, through reaffirming certain identity traits within him/herself, and the juxtaposition of these traits with that of a stranger-other (Kinnvall 2004, p.749). This, I would argue is what has taken place in these two cases.

In the case of Turkey, the "home" has in some sense, long been in a disrupted state, at least at times. One could go back as far as to after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, when the Turks went from being Ottoman, to simply being "Turk". But what I would argue has long been the greatest cause for this disruption and the anxiety that fosters, has been the conflicts with its minority populations, both religiously, such as with the Alevi (Office of International Religious Freedom (2) 2018), but mainly ethnically, in the case of the Kurds. This ethnic, culturally and linguistically distinct people group has long been a point of contention for the Turkish state and the idea of a united "Turkish" identity. Numerous attempts have been made by the Turkish government to assimilate this group into Turkish society at large, regardless of the will of these people. Going as far as banning certain things seen as particularly "Kurdish", such as their language or certain traditions. Furthermore, not even referring to them as Kurds, instead calling them "Mountain Turks" (BBC News (2) 2019). Despite these attempts, the Kurds have remained steadfast in their "non-Turkishness", going as far as armed conflict and

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acts of terrorism, as a means of protecting themselves and their rights (Ozcan 2019). As such, this internal enemy, in the form of the Kurdish threat makes it so that the "home" as a secure base, is unable to be upheld, through generating a constant feeling of fear and anxiety for the Turks. This being a feeling that is similarly felt regarding the country's religious minorities, such as the Alevi, whom unlike other Turks, do not follow Sunni Islam, and therefore break away from what is hegemonically seen as "Turkishness". Unlike the Kurds who mainly follow the same branch of Islam, although with a different, and clashing, ethnic identity.

The recent influx of migrants (mainly Syrian Arabs) has exacerbated this feeling of anxiety even further, as they, similar to the Kurds, are seen as quite steadfast in upholding an identity, separate to that of the "Turkish" one. The refugee perceived as both a threat to the bodily security as well as yet another ethnic and cultural threat (Tol 2019), with some Turks expressing that they "feel like a stranger in [their] own country" as a result of this recent influx of refugees (Hoffman et al. 2018). As such, although not being the main source of anxiety, furthering the previously held feelings of insecurity even more, resulting in the need to "securitize subjectivity".

The disruption of the home in the Hungarian case, is seemingly more recent and more straight-forward, although with roots in Hungarian history to some degree (something which I will go into greater detail with, in 7.3). Post-Soviet Hungary, with its ascension into the EU, has experienced a time of relative prosperity, although it has carried with it certain causes of anxiety for the Hungarian public. As it has led to a further decrease in the country's already declining population figures through increased emigration (and urbanization) (Várdy et al. 2019). As such, when the "refugee crisis" of 2015 took place, and increasing numbers of refugees tried to make their way into Europe, Hungary, being at the frontline of this crisis, raised doubts regarding the effect that this (Muslim) immigration would have for Hungary and Europe at large. The immigrants bringing with them foreign cultures, traditions and customs, not perceived as compatible with Hungarian, nor "Christian European" values, instead seeing them as a threat and as "Muslim invaders" (Al Jazeera (1) 2019; Schultheis 2018; Freedom House (3) 2020).

Already faced with a declining population, these new arrivals were perceived as an even larger threat in Hungary than elsewhere in Europe, as they exacerbated existing worries regarding the survival of the Hungarians and their culture. A sentiment made clear through both looking at statements made by Orbán where he, speaking of Hungary's declining population, said that he would not solve this through immigration but rather through creating more "Hungarian children", as well as when looking at the Hungarian people's sentiments towards pro-immigration NGOs, of which a majority seemed to hold negative opinions (Walker 2020, Schultheis 2018; Daily News Hungary (1) 2019). This feeling of anxiety brought forwards as a result of the perceived "refugee threat" is made worse, as the elites in (some) western EU countries promoted a more united EU-line, where all countries had to cooperate and share the burden of accepting

refugees (Dettmer 2019). This threat of EU-sanctioned refugees coming into Hungary, spurring their feelings of anxiety even further, leading to a need, in Hungary, to "securitize subjectivity", securing the home and in that process, reformulating an identity that can mitigate some of this perceived anxiety.

7.2   Turkey: The Glory of The Ottoman Empire and The Establishment of The Turkish Republic

Before setting out to explain the ways in which subjectivity is securitized in Turkey (and Hungary for that matter), one must preface this with something brought up in prior theory chapter. That securitizing subjectivity is often done through the use of so called "chosen glories" and "chosen traumas", using collective memories in order to create links between the past and the present through mythologized stories of glorious greatness and/or traumatic downfall(s). These stories becoming linked to oneself, turning them into natural parts of one's identity and one's perceived image of the self and the other (Kinnvall 2004, p.755-756; Subotic 2018, p.298). This, in turn helps one in identifying who is and is not a part of the "in-group", excluding those who dare to put this newly found identity into question, or those who do not fit as a part of these stories (Subotic 2019, p.249).

The ways in which subjectivity is securitized, and the identity that has sprung up in Turkey as a result of this, can in many ways be divided into four separate identity signifiers, that by extension are grounded in two separate stories from Turkey's past. One of piousness and religious (intra-Islamic) intolerance, with its basis in the glory that was the Ottoman Empire. The second, distrust towards elites, and a distinct, more homogenous Turkish identity, grounded in the memories from the fall of the empire and the establishment of the republic.

The first of these two "stories", the "chosen glory" of the Ottoman Empire, with its grandeur and rich history can be a fruitful source for identity construction. Not only because of how long it withstood the test of time, but also for what it symbolized, not only as the successor state of the Romans and Byzantines, but as the foremost Muslim nation, the Caliphate, the spiritual leader and the spiritual center of the Muslim world for hundreds of years. The grandeur and magnificence of the Ottoman Empire is looked back upon as a time of greatness and as a time when the "Turks" were at their peak in some respects, when their territory stretched from the Balkans to the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa (Shaw & Yapp 2019). Furthermore, as the Ottoman Empire was officially a "caliphate", this time of greatness is also associated with memories of a time of piousness and religious purity. This desire, to return to the times of old, can in many ways be seen exemplified in Turkish society today. In parts, this has been done through attempts to increase Turkey's influence in neighboring countries, in territory that

was once under the Ottoman empire. Such as their show of solidarity with their Muslim brothers in Syria through the acceptance of large numbers of refugees into the country (a policy that, after the fact, seems to have been quite clearly disliked by the Turkish public). It can also be seen through the restoration of Ottoman era buildings in the Balkans, the establishment of the "safe zone" in Syria, and through going into Libya with the explicit aim of protecting Libyans with Ottoman heritage (Ahval News (2) 2020), in an attempt to move countries whose territory used to subside within or be parts of the empire, into this new "Turkish Sphere". Not to mention through the countless Ottoman-inspired mosques, such as the ones built or under construction in Istanbul, showing a clear effort by the government to re-connect with its Ottoman roots (Ahval News (2) 2019). This desire to return to the grandeur and piousness of the Ottoman Empire, can be seen further exemplified in the emphasis granted to religiously based traditional values, where the family is put ahead of the autonomy and emancipation of women, as the traditional family is held in a higher regard and prioritized over the woman's right to self-determination and economic freedom. The woman is instead perceived as "the womb of the nation", and as the mother of the religious Turkish family (Hürriyet Daily News 2016).

This glorification has brought with it more than misogyny and ideas of the Turk as a follower of Islam, as the specific branch of Islam that one follows also becomes a point of importance. The Ottoman Empire, although relatively tolerant towards the other Abrahamic religions, were much less accepting of other forms of Islam (Zürcher 2003, p.9-11). This has led to the exclusion of other Muslims seen in Turkey today, such as the Alevi who (together with the Shiite) make up around 10-15 percent of the population, and whom have long been mistreated by the Turkish government in their attempts to promote Sunni Islam within Turkey (Office of International Religious Freedom (2) 2018). As such, perpetuating the idea that it is not only about being Muslim, but about being the right kind of Muslim. The memories of the legacy of the empire, used as an identity signifier, construct an identity inclusive to those who follow Sunni Islam and the values that entail, while excluding those who are not pious enough, or those who follow other branches of Islam.

The second "story", with its roots in the fall of the empire, and the establishment of the republic, can in many ways be seen as both a "chosen trauma" and a "chosen glory". This because, the collapse of the Empire signified Turkey's fall from greatness, as the empire fell, and was replaced by a more homogenous, secular republic, led by Mustafa Kemal "Atatürk". While this was a triumph of sorts, seeing Turkey defy the odds and breaking free from foreign occupation, it also carried with it the trauma of stanchly secularist and anti-religious policies. Atatürk himself was in many ways a very pro-western leader, even going as far as claiming that there is but one civilization in the world, referring to the European one (Versan 1984, p.256). As such, he tried to model this newly formed republic after the secular, "European model", abolishing the caliphate, dismantling religious schools and courts, abolishing Islamic law, and banning certain religious headdresses (Itzkowitz 2020). The legacy of this somewhat radical, top-down

secularism imposed upon Turkish society, and the discontent created by these policies, can be seen expressed through the very anti-elitist rhetoric seen in Turkey today. As the Kemalist elites and establishment, is turned into the embodiment of the injustice that was wrongfully brought upon the religious Turk against his will, in attempts to "westernize" the country. This can be seen expressed by Erdoğan, as he seeks to yet again turn Turkey into a country of piousness, blaming the secular elites, previously in power, for taking the country in the wrong direction, away from the people, and away from God. Explicitly stating after his 2011 electoral win, that "The tyranny of the elites is over" and that Turkey would no longer be ruled by "criminals whose direction has split from God's will and the will of the people" (McKernan 2019). These claims explicitly conflating the will of God with that of the (pious) people whom he represents, juxtaposed with that of the secular elite.

The fall of the empire, and establishment of the republic, also brought with it an increased ethnic homogenization, as was the case around many parts of Europe (including Hungary) at that time. This also coincided with the end of the Ottoman Caliphs (Itzkowitz 2020), thus, losing a unifying figure amongst the Muslim population in the former empire, that all citizens, regardless of ethnicity could unite around. Furthermore, all citizens of the newly founded republic would now be referred to as "Turks", regardless of prior ethnic affiliation (Yapp & Dewdney 2020). This seemingly being an inclusive change, as anyone could be a Turk, not just "ethnic Turks". Although this change in ethnic classification, left little room for divergent ethnic identities, leading to attempts to forcefully assimilate the country's minority populations (BBC News (2) 2019), primarily the Kurds, who make up a not so insignificant 15-19 percent of the population in Turkey today (Yapp & Dewdney 2020; Findlay 2019).

The goals of which were put forward in a clear manner by Atatürk's successor İsmet İnönü, who stated that "Our duty is to Turkify non-Turks in the Turkish homeland no matter what happens. We will destroy those elements that oppose Turks or Turkism" (Zeydanlıoğlu 2009 p.78-79). These attempts at forceful assimilation in turn, led to the decade's long conflicts between the Kurds and the Turkish state seen today. A conflict that has cemented the view of the Kurd as the "enemy-other", a trespasser in the "Turkish homeland", with an identity separate from that of the general public, of "the people", and as a group unwilling to assimilate, seen as a threat to the country's Turkish identity.

This has been exacerbated through their sheer size compared to that of other minority groups in the country. Support for the Kurds, or opposition towards the government, has been equated with treachery and terrorism (Onursal 2019), with Erdoğan himself threatening to "Crush the heads" of the Kurdish fighters who remain in the newly invaded parts of Northern Syria, whom are thought, by the Turkish government, to have connections to Kurdish militia groups in Turkey (The Guardian 2019). This, has exposed the almost dehumanized nature of Turkish policies towards the Kurds, seeing them as nothing but a threat, and a problem to be disposed of for the greater good of the "Turkish people". This fear of the other is then extended to that of the newly arrived Syrian migrants, whom, although also following Sunni Islam, like the Kurds, are seen as unwilling to

assimilate into Turkish society and culture (Ahval News (3) 2019; Tol 2019), and, like the Kurds, are turned into another threat and possible source of anxiety.

Together, these two stories and the memories they hold, create the basis on which subjectivity is securitized in Turkey, creating an identity based on narratives of religious piousness and purity, as well as anti-elitism with an emphasis on "Turkishness". This identity is expressed through lending support to the AKP and to Erdoğan, who is perceived as this strong, religious Sunni Turk, who stands up for the "little guy", against the oppressing elites. Erdoğan, is thus seen as a representation of the "pure" people and their need for a secure identity. Those with identities that do not align with the hegemonic identity, as represented by Erdoğan, are seen as not being a part of this "in-group", be they, Kurds, Alevi, secularists and internal elites, who get excluded, instead symbolizing what the Turk is not. This leads to narratives of "the other" as unwanted, and as a threat to Turkish security and the Turkish identity (and even to the country's ethnic makeup). Blame is being put on the country's minority groups as causes for anxiety, while the old Kemalist elites of Turkey are blamed as working against the will of the Turkish people and the will of God primarily through their secularist policies.

7.3   Hungary: The Greatness and Traumas of Times Past

The disruption of the home and the identity signifiers that sprung up following the need to securitize subjectivity in Hungary is, not unlike Turkey, based on stories and memories of the country's past. One is that of religion, stemming from the glory experienced during the time when Hungary was seen as the bulwark against the further encroachment of the Ottoman Empire and Islam into Europe. The other, is that of a fetichizing of the Hungarian ethnicity and culture, resulting from the trauma experienced as territory, and ethnic Hungarians were "lost" after the fall of Greater Hungary and The Austro-Hungarian Empire. Lastly, is that of anti-elitism, based on anti-migrant sentiments and the trauma of Soviet occupation in Hungary.

One aspect, in need of prefacing, is how "religion" in this case is not an expression of a religious population per se. Although a (slight) majority of Hungary's population follow Christianity in some of its denominations, very few are practicing Christians, with only twelve to 22 percent attending church regularly (Várdy et al. 2019; Bilal 2017; Buyon 2016). Religion in this case instead signifies Christendom in a more cultural sense. The "glorious bulwark against Islam", although stemming from a time of turmoil, conflict, and

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Hungarian decline (Molnár 2001, p.122), I would argue still should be considered a chosen glory. It can serve as a story of the Hungarian as the glorious protector of the Christian realm, sentiments seen as paralleled today. This story serves as an exclusionary element and as a justification to reject the needs of the incoming refugees, as they, just as the Ottomans, are seen as threats to both Hungary and Christian Europe. This can be seen reflected not only in the sentiments of the Hungarian people, of which a majority wants to see pro-refugee NGOs banned (Daily News Hungary (2) 2020), but also in the rhetoric and policies of Orbán himself. Immigration being made out to be this grand clash of civilizations, a conflict in which Hungary has taken the side of defending Christianity and Europe as opposed to embracing the foreign Muslim "conquerors" (Walker 2020; Al Jazeera (1) 2019). Orbán himself has made the claim that the refugees arriving in Europe should be considered "Muslim invaders", not refugees (Schultheis 2018). Furthermore, showing clear attempts by the Hungarian government, at defining Hungary as a distinctly Christian nation opposed to Muslim influence, through enshrining the protection of traditional Christian values and culture into the Hungarian constitution (Mudde 2019, p.85; Freedom House (3) 2020).

Following this, the chosen trauma that is the fall of Greater Hungary and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, post treaty of Trianon. Memories of this trauma, although being significant in and of itself, have to be seen in their current context, as the emotions connected to these memories have clear connections to the Hungary seen today (Ejdus 2014, p.49). This "incomplete" Hungarian nation, with a Hungary, almost one third of its "original" size, with a large diaspora "lost" to neighboring countries, and a population in decline, is perceived as a shadow of its former self. Orbán himself referred to the Treaty as a "death sentence" (Daily News Hungary (3) 2020). The losses, both territorial and of ethnic Hungarians, I would argue is central to the Hungarian identity. Not only leading to irredentist claims of a reunited Hungary (Mudde 2019, p.29), but also creating a feeling that what is ours has to be kept safe, and that the "few" Hungarians that we have left have to be prioritized. This has led to Hungary's focus on Hungarians abroad, that together with the already protective nature shown towards ethnic Hungarians in Hungary, almost fetishizes the Hungarian ethnicity and culture. This in turn, makes Hungarian citizenship far less important than that of actually "being Hungarian" in an ethnic and cultural sense. The weight given to "Hungarianness" has an adverse effect on the potential immigrant, as well as on minority groups within Hungary, such as the Roma, whom, albeit Christians, uphold traditions, a culture and an identity separate to that of the Hungarians. Both, although the Muslim migrant more so, are seen as threats towards the Hungarian identity (religiously and/or culturally), and therefore not as part of the "in-group". This is exemplified in the government's attempts at tackling the population decline, not with immigration, but rather with family planning policies, aimed at increasing the birthrates among the native Hungarians (Walker 2020). Orbán claiming that "We do not want to be a diverse country, we want to be how we [were] 1,100 years ago." (Karáth 2018), harkening back to memories of a mythologized past, and a time of perceived homogeneity.

Lastly, stemming from the chosen trauma of Soviet occupation, this has led to the creation of a Hungarian identity that values sovereignty and self-determination above intergovernmental cooperation. This, in turn, has led to sentiments of anti-elitism. The EU, although in many ways a democratizing force in the region, is perceived as a threat towards the sovereignty and self-rule of the Hungarian people. The EU being compared to that of Hungary's former Soviet occupiers, as "We [Hungarians] have had enough of dictatorship after 40 years behind the iron curtain." (Halmai 2019, p.299). Furthermore, the so called "great replacement" occurring in Europe, as native Europeans are replaced with refugees, has been blamed on George Soros funded elites in Brussels (Al Jazeera (1) 2019). As such, anti-elite sentiments in Hungary stem both from parallels drawn between that of the EU and memories of the Soviet Union, and from the blame put on these elites as enabling the influx of refugees that is threatening both the Hungarian as well as the European identity that they feel sworn to protect.

The identity created in Hungary as a result of subjectivity in need of securitizing, and the story this securitizing ground itself in, seems to be clearly based on narratives of a perceived need to protect Christendom in Europe, the Hungarian identity and a distain for the interference of the elites. Orbán, embodying these traits, with his pro-Christian, anti-Muslim rhetoric, emphasis on the Hungarian identity, and disapproval of both EU and other external elites, becomes a representation of the securitizing needs of "the people" and the model figure in which "the others" are juxtaposed. Thus, a clear distinction between the "pure" people as represented by Orbán, and the "enemy-other", perceived as a threat to "the people", has been made.

7.4   The Populist and Ontological (In)Security

The securitizing of subjectivity, needed because of anxiety brought forward from the "home" being disrupted, is used by and expressed through the support given to populist leaders and politicians in both Turkey and Hungary. As such, the populist becomes as much a result of the process as he (in these cases) is a part of it himself. This effect, exemplified in what I referred to before as the "self-perpetuation cycle of populism", involves an increase in ontological insecurity as expressed through these excluding narratives and stories of the country's past, dividing the country into those who align with these stories (the pure people) and those who do not (the others, namely elites and minorities). Support is then given to movements and politicians who identify and outwardly uphold these claims, and in doing so, become a representative of "the people". As these leaders gain increased influence, the ideas that they stand for become more wide-spread and reach larger segments of society. This allows the populist, through his divisive and anxious ridden rhetoric, about the threats facing the Turkish/Hungarian people and their identities, to spread even more insecurity and anxiety. This in

turn, has "awakened" the latent populists (Mudde 2004, p.547-548), whom prior to this, did not support the populist nor his claim of morally representing the people, but who now turn to him as a means of securitizing themselves at a time of disruption. As he, the populist leader, using certain identity signifiers, is seen as representing the securitizing needs of "the people". Thus, furthering the influence of the populist, his claim as a representative of "the people", has given him a larger megaphone to spew his rhetoric of division even further, awakening even more dormant populists. An amplifying effect, that combined with the often-authoritarian conduct by the ruling populist, such as through Erdoğan's post-coup power-grab and the ability to indefinitely rule by decree, given to Orbán in the midst of the corona crisis, cements their rule over the country (Freedom House (1) 2020; Bayer 2020).

Although this paints quite a bleak picture, this process of continual growth, will come to a point in which there are no more unknowing populists out there to awaken, leading to a stagnation in support and possibly even to a loss of support, as can be seen with Erdoğan and even Orbán to some degree. This loss of support, stemming not only from the lack of "new recruits" but also from the arrival of new, more convincing claims of representing the people. Furthermore, losing support as a result of the policies and beliefs of the populist, straying from that of "the people" as could be argued is the case in Turkey, in regards to the refugee situation.

7.5   Comparison

Both, Turkey and Hungary, as ruled by their populist leaders, have undergone a process of securitizing subjectivity, resulting from a home, perceived as disrupted. Although the overarching themes observed in both cases are similar, these being, of religion, anti-elitism and anti-minority sentiments, both based on stories and memories of a glorious and/or traumatic past, the details of each case expose significant differences.

Firstly, both leaders draw heavily upon religious symbolism and rhetoric, as well as the traditional values that stem from these beliefs. In Hungary, this is done to differentiate themselves from that of the incoming Muslim migrant, "threatening" Christian Europe. Hungary, although not overtly religious (Buyon 2016), sees itself as the protector, not only of Hungary, but of the culture and values of Christian Europe. While in Turkey, religion is instead used to harken back to memories of Turkey's past as the pious, glorious, Ottoman empire, in turn making religion central to the identity of the Turk. This has, furthermore, led to the promotion of a certain version of Islam, where Sunni Islam is given preferential treatment over other denominations such as the Alevi (Office of International Religious Freedom (2) 2018). Further still, religion has been used to ostracize the secular elites of the country who have long restricted the religious freedoms of "the people", making them out to be "criminals whose direction has split from

God's will and the will of the people" (McKernan 2019). As such, even though religion is prevalent in both cases, it is directed towards different "enemy-others". The the Muslim refugee in the case of Hungary, while being focused on separate, competing interpretations of Islam, and the secular elites, in Turkey.

Both countries have also made attempts at defining their respective nations more in line with their respective religious beliefs. Be it through changes in the school curriculum, the preferential treatment shown towards Sunni Islam, and the religiously traditional rhetoric used by Erdoğan in Turkey (Office of International Religious Freedom (2) 2018; Hürriyet Daily News 2016), or through enshrining certain traditional, or religious values in the Hungarian constitution, as done by Orbán (Mudde 2019, p.85; Freedom House (3) 2020). The focus shown, both in Turkey and Hungary, towards the protection of family values further point to the importance given to the protection of "Turkishness" and "Hungarianness". On one end, to connect the values of the family with that of conservative and religious notions of the ideal, pious family, in Turkey. While in the case of Hungary, to also avoid further population decline and the possible need to increase migration.

Although anti-elitism is prevalent in both Turkey and Hungary, each country directs their anti-elitism towards different elite groups, one being internal, and the other external. The anti-elitism observed in Turkey, as mentioned previously, stems from memories of the religious repression of "the people" by secular elites. This has led to sentiments, negative towards the internal elites of the Kemalist establishment. With the election of Erdoğan signifying that "The tyranny of the elites is over" (McKernan 2019), at least according to Erdoğan himself. Orbán, in his crusade to protect Christian civilization, instead look outwards. This has been done through blaming the external elites, globally (such as George Soros) or within the EU, as enablers of the ongoing refugee crisis, thus threatening Europe and Hungary (Al Jazeera (1) 2019). By comparing EU's attempts to rule in Hungary, with its time under Soviet occupation (Halmai 2019, p.299), two distinct forms of anti-elitism can be observed, with one looking inwards and the other outwards when finding their "enemy-elites".

When looking at anti-minority sentiments, it yet again becomes a question of external or internal enemies. In Turkey, the enemy-other is mainly internal, consisting of religious minorities (such as Alevi Muslims) and most importantly, Kurds. Although, recent political shifts regarding the intake of Syrian refugees into Turkey, towards a more anti-refugee stance (Ahval News (3) 2019; Tol 2019), could suggest a convergence of sorts between the two countries. Turkey, although moving closer to Hungary in the "othering" of the external minority, as opposed to focusing purely on the internal enemy-minorities, still perceives the internal minorities as their main source of anxiety. The Kurds, perceived as a threat towards the Turkish identity as they oppose being assimilated into the majority Turkish population, instead remain an ethnically and culturally distinct group (BBC News (2) 2019). They are perceived as a threat against "Turkishness", to a larger extent than other minority groups in Turkey, as they are not only holders of their own, separate, non-Turkish identity, but also for their willingness to take up arms to defend this identity. Here, the Turkish government

has gone as far as invading its neighbor, Syria, to combat Kurdish militia groups with perceived connections to the Kurdish militias in Turkey. This is a conflict in which the Turkish government has threatened to "crush the heads" of Kurdish forces who remain in the area (The Guardian 2019), showing that the Turkish government has no difficulties dehumanizing their non-Turk enemies.

The Hungarian case on the other hand, instead find its main opponent in an external enemy, the migrant. This enemy-other, instilling a sense of dread, as it is seen as a further threat to Christian values and the already declining Hungarian ethnicity and identity. This stems from the traumatic memory of the Hungarians' lost post-treaty of Trianon, and the general low-birth rate in the country. In a manner, not unlike the one seen in the Turkey, a dehumanization of the minority-other has also taken place, with Orbán himself arguing that the refugees arriving in Europe should be considered "Muslim invaders", as opposed to refugees (Schultheis 2018). The act of dehumanizing the refugee, in Hungary, actively downplays the humanitarian needs of the refugee, instead portraying them as a threat, and implementing harsh restrictions on migration through their "Stop Soros" laws. Albeit, not going as far as warfare and foreign invasion, in their dehumanizing efforts, as has been done in Turkey.

As such, the process of securitizing subjectivity, and the redefining of "Turkishness" and "Hungarianness" have taken place in both cases, centered around memories of chosen glories and traumas, with a focus on religion, elites and minority-groups, personified and protected by their populist leaders, there still exist observable differences. With the stories told being based on different glories and traumas, recognizing different "enemy-others", and the contrasting use of religion, aspects first thought to be similarities quickly make way for small, yet tangible differences, when looking at both cases in more detail.

8   Concluding Remarks

In the thesis I set out to answer two questions: 1) What is the relationship between the rise of populism and an increased search for security and belonging in Turkey and Hungary? And 2) How is populism expressed in the rhetoric and policies of Erdoğan and Orbán?

In conclusion, one can, through looking at the data gathered in this thesis, conclude that both the country of Turkey and Hungary, are ruled by leaders who, use methods and a rhetoric usually associated with that of populist politicians. Both leaders have replaced the establishment with party loyalists, favoring certain groups in society above others, silencing civil society, as well as dividing society into two distinct and well-defined groups, the "pure" people, as represented by Erdoğan and Orbán, and the enemy-other, represented by minorities and the elites. Such processes firmly place both Erdoğan and Orbán in the ever-growing camp of populist leaders.

Their methods of gaining support, based on demagoguery, grounded in the anxieties felt by their country's (majority) population, as the "home" is increasingly perceived as disrupted. This anxiety has been mitigated through the use of stories of historical grandeur and trauma, used to define a new identity for "the people", as well as outline who is excluded from this new identity, "the other". In Turkey we see how Erdoğan has recalled the time of the pious Ottoman Empire and the trauma of its fall. Here the "Turk" is being defined as a religious, ethnic Turk who follows Sunni Islam, and as protected by Erdoğan in their right to do so, against the corrupt Kemalist establishment. While Orbán, seeing Hungary as the protectors of Europe against the encroachment of Islam, harkens back to memories of a glorious time before the "treaty of Trianon", and the trauma of the Soviet occupation, when Hungary was seen as "the bulwark against Islam" in Europe. The Hungarian, defined as someone who is not only culturally Christian, but also ethnically Hungarian. Moreover, Orbán is seen as a leader who stands up for Christian values, the Hungarian identity and culture, against foreign interference, be it from the global elites, the "Soviet-like", EU-establishment, or the refugee, coming to replace the natives of Europe.

Furthermore, in the thesis I have made the claim, that populism is a self-perpetuating cycle. This was done as more of a thought experiment, and not discussed in detail. Nevertheless, concluding that such an effect could in fact exist, although being limited to the number of latent populists in the population, as well as to shifts in public opinion. Given this, I believe that further research could be directed towards the studying of this potential effect. Similarly, as a result of the limited space, a more gendered analysis on these two cases could have been conducted, as the gendered dimension of populism was only brought up in quite short detail. This could also be the subject of future research. Furthermore,

applying the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis to other cases could be something to which future research could be directed, or the same two cases could be studied, although applying other theories.

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