



Back to the Future of a ‘Global Britain’

The Impact of Industrialisation on British Nationalism and
the Post-Brexit Discussions for Going Global

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Abstract

This thesis explores the evolution of British nationalism regarding two major historical segments - industrialisation and imperialism - considering Brexit. The essay aims to reveal the true colours of Global Britain, and it is based on two dominant sections, the origins of British nationalism, as they are described by Ernest Gellner, Liah Greenfeld and Krishan Kumar, and its development into a hard Eurosceptic, right-wing populist phenomenon. The essay overall investigates the projection and the influence of Britain's imperialist past during Brexit, how this affects British nationalism and what the role of right-wing populism is.

Discourse analysis is applied as a methodological approach in order to extract and evaluate empirical data for the analysis. Additional literature is used to justify why I chose to study British nationalism through the process of industrialisation and why this is important for today's Conservative political agenda.

Imperial nostalgia is a strong factor in the discourse and for British nationalism in general. The references to Britain's past are essential for the self-esteem of the nationalists in the country. This leads to nostalgia and the need to recapture this glorious past and make Britain great again. This can be achieved by breaking free from the EU and the Single Market and making the UK a champion of free trade worldwide. Regarding industrialisation as Gellner exposed it, the discourse is full of values and ideals deriving straight from his approaches. The importance of the English element is also revealed in British nationalism. Finally, the significance of self-determination and parliamentary sovereignty is also brought forward to analyse the 'Vote Leave' campaign's goals and how they transformed British Euroscepticism.

Keywords: British nationalism; Industrialisation; Euroscepticism; Brexit; Global Britain

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1. Introduction

British national identity came into existence once England and Scotland joined forces in 1707 with the Act of Union (Wellings 2002, p. 95), and the new British national identity affected the imperial ideals of governance. The fact that British nationalism and British imperialism emerged at the same time made the two identical, and not dissimilar. But what happened to the British national identity since the fall of the Empire? Did it adapt to reality or did it continue praising the past in order to survive now that the Empire is lost? The answers lie upon the most recent series of events that troubled Britain, and this is Brexit. Brexit has been described by politicians, media and people as an expression of nationalism, and this makes it the perfect case to study in order to find answers on what happened to British nationalism. In order to understand British national identity, the origins of the British state must be exposed.

However, Brexit is not only a nationalist phenomenon, it is also a product of hardworking Eurosceptics. Critical towards the UK's further integration in the EU, the Iron Lady, Margaret Thatcher, was one of the UK's biggest Eurosceptic politicians. Thatcher, as a defender of national sovereignty and an opponent towards further European assimilation, is a paradigm of British Euroscepticism until today. The main discussions around Brexit may have begun recently - a few years before the referendum in June 2016, with David Cameron's speech about plans for a referendum on the British membership in the EU - however, the foundations for a possible Brexit were set many years before the referendum; even before the establishment of the EU in 1993. These foundations must be traced back to the British Empire, where British nationalism started rising (Kumar 2000). This may sound absurd since the European Community did not exist back then, but this can be noticeable in the nation's history.

Since Margaret Thatcher was elected as the leader of the Conservatives, the party followed a Eurosceptic thinking by seeing further European integration more

critically. Even later, when David Cameron led both the party and the country, his position was not entirely opposite European integration. However, he believed that Great Britain should be treated differently compared to other nations in the EU (Mölder 2018, 155). In his speech in January 2013, Cameron mentioned that the UK should remain in the heart of the European single market, but he proposed five principles to change this single market and make it more effective. In contrast, he mentioned that the EU is interfering into the daily life of the British citizens with legal regulation they never agreed on and that they do not get a say about those regulations.

As a result, he asked the British citizens to question themselves what the national interest of the UK is. But which national interest did he really quote? Because as I mention in the first paragraph of this introduction and I also explain in the following pages, the British nation was perceived as a continuation of the English nation, and since the British Empire fell, Scotland and Northern Ireland started becoming more and more distanced from the British state. Only the English continued believing in the values of the British nation. These facts pushed the English into becoming the last threshold of the British nationalism. This made them look dominant over the rest of the people in the UK. This dominance can be viewed in numbers, such as the numbers of the Members in the Parliament (MPs), or the influence the nation has over the other composing nations of the country. According to Wellings, English dominance was found in every British institution. Even in institutions such as the Scottish law and the Scottish church, that have been constitutionally protected by the Union of Acts in 1707, the sense of Britishness emerged in order to promote a homogeneity that Englishness could not endorse. According to him, this British homogeneity was found everywhere in the British Empire - not only in Great Britain - and Britishness is still perceived as superiority because of its English character (Wellings 2002, 99). Since the UK consists of four constituent countries - England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland - and devolution allowed the three of them to maintain their own independent national parliaments or assemblies after decolonisation, there cannot be only one national

interest. Or at least, there is one superior national interest - in this case, the national interest of the British - but for this interest to exist harmonically, it must suppress all the other interests by suppressing the rising national identities.

Another one reason that associates Euroscepticism with British nationalism, is the fact that many of the 'Leave' supporters come from the far-right party, UK Independence Party (UKIP). This is obvious in the 2014 European elections, where UKIP and its hard-Eurosceptic agenda were the big winners with 27.49%, against 25.40% and 23.93% from the Labour Party and the Conservative Party respectively (BBC News, 2014). Since the 'Leave' campaign gained momentum in the UK, UKIP's nationalist agenda became more popular and the party's hard Eurosceptic agenda was embraced by more people; contrary to Cameron's soft Euroscepticism. In fact, the entire "Vote Leave" campaign was based on an organisation called "Global Britain" that supported absolute withdrawal of the UK from the EU. On the 23rd of June 2016, a referendum was held on whether or not the country must continue being a member of the EU. 51.9% of the entire population of the UK voted pro-Brexit and the remaining 48.1% was against leaving the EU. However, this is not the only dichotomy between the voters. In England, 53.4% of the people voted to 'Leave' the EU and 52.5% of the Welsh voters also supported this decision; 46.6% and 47.5% voted 'Remain' respectively. Whereas, 62% of the Scottish people voted 'Remain' in the EU at the referendum and 55.8% of the Northern Irish people agreed with them; 38% and 44.2% in respect voted 'Leave' (BBC News, 2016). These numbers also show that Scottish and Northern Irish voters were less internally divided than the English and Welsh voters. The percentage of Scottish and Northern Irish people, who were certain of remaining in the EU, was larger than the percentage of English and Welsh people who wanted to stop the UK's integration, but not enough to outvote them. These numbers justify the fact that Brexit has been described by many, as I introduce in the 'Previous research', as an expression of nationalism, and more precisely English nationalism. But since references to "English nationalism" are absent in the discourse that I used, I stick

on the fact that Brexit is an expression of British nationalism, and not particularly English. However, I illustrate the influences that England has on the British nation.

Later, after Cameron's resignation, the Conservative party adopted UKIP's agenda and it began demanding total withdrawal from the EU. After this, the numbers of the Conservative Party, in the UK General Election of 2019, increased to 43.6% while UKIP lost its only seat in the parliament (BBC News 2019). Something that Nigel Farage predicted almost two years before the 2019 General Election by saying that "If Theresa May delivers an EU-exit deal that suits party's supporters, it (UKIP) may have no future." (Walker 2017, on The Guardian).

Although Brexit can be studied and approached through different theoretical lenses, I try to address my thesis mainly in theories of nationalism and populism. The former is approached mainly through the process of industrialisation and theories of modernity regarding the nation. Therefore, concepts such as nation, sovereignty, autonomy, imperialism, productivity and division of labour are also presented in the theoretical framework in order to provide valid results. The questions the readers of this essay will be able to answer will mainly be focused on British nationalism regarding Brexit and the influence of the British imperialist past.

1.1. Research Questions

- How is Britain's imperialist past projected in the discourse of Brexit?
 - What is the importance of the British Empire in the discourse of modern British nationalism?
 - What is the significance of the English element in this story?
- How does British Euroscepticism try to achieve its ultimate goal according to the discourse from the 'Vote Leave' campaign?
 - Why is this manifested by right-wing populism?

1.2. Delimitations

Certainly, British nationalism means something different to the British people who identify themselves as nationalists. Some of them are pro and some are against on issues that I have addressed in the essay. But the purpose of the essay is not to find out how nationalists perceive themselves in Britain. If I wanted to come up with results on this topic, I would have conducted a quantitative research by sending out as many questionnaires as possible. Or I would have conducted interviews with key informants in order to get an in-depth point of view. However, one of the purposes of the essay is to approach British nationalism through discourses that had a great impact during the last years regarding the most debated political issue in Europe. Therefore, British nationalism, as it has been approached in this essay, is a phenomenon not to be generalised. Just because, the Conservative Party managed to pull out a success story during Brexit, it does not mean that the people who supported the party identify 100% with its values and ideas. Therefore, as a first delimitation I would say that my essay has no big sample, I did neither collected my empirics through questionnaires nor through interviews.

As a second delimitation of the study, I would set the extensive “Key Concepts” section. This is not a limitation itself, but it is a challenge that troubled me because of its length. One can argue that the concepts could easily be part of the theoretical framework of the essay, but the reason I decided to cover this part separately is the fact that the concepts’ use in the essay is to help the reader to understand the arguments of the essay. They are concepts that are specifically defined like this, in order to provide thorough and solid results. All these concepts co-exist with each other and other specific definitions in the theoretical framework, but they do not replace any of the specific definitions in the theoretical framework.

Another delimitation is when the empirical material is either incomplete or the documents are not authentic or accurate (Creswell 2009, p. 180). Thankfully, finding

authentic material was easy enough due to the fact that all websites that I visited were operated by the British Government or the ‘Global Britain’ organisation itself. Also, the speeches by Johnson and May are also transcribed in websites of news agencies, such as The Guardian, The Independent and the New York Times.

1.3. Structuring the Essay

The essay starts with the methodology. In this section the reader can find the way I worked in order to gather the theories that I used and my empirical material. I also demonstrate what kind of method I used in order to gather the material, how I gathered this material, and the coding process. The subsection of “Key Concepts” that I have mentioned in the delimitations can be found in this section.

Then, the “Previous Research” section which precedes the main theoretical framework and where the importance of theoretical concepts is shown. Here, I included essays from academic journals. Some of the essays are related to Brexit and its nationalist and populist characteristics, while other essays are focused on nationalism in Britain and its origins according to the authors. After this section, the theoretical framework comes. This is the part that involves mainly the theories of the essay and it is divided into two parts. The first part is about nations and national membership, with references to Kedourie, Greenfeld’s introduction and first chapter about England from her book “Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity” and Gellner’s introduction from his book “Nations and Nationalism”. The second part is about nationalism and industrialisation and it is explicitly focused on Gellner’s chapter “Industrial Society” from the same book; with small references to the Weberian Protestant Ethics. The reason I chose these two approaches for my essay is the fact that firstly Greenfeld locates modern nationalism’s roots in England, and then Gellner recognizes how important was industrialisation’s role in the British nationalist character, and of course industrialisation’s values that enriched modern nationalism. After the theoretical

framework, a historical account takes place right before my analysis. This section in history combines details about the British Empire from both of the authors that I mentioned already and Kumar's point of view in regard to the Empire, as well as other authors.

The analysis is separated in two halves. The first half is my attempt to understand Brexit as an expression of British nationalism, and more precisely British nationalism as it arose through the process of industrialisation. The purpose of this analysis is to discover Brexit's nationalist character in the discourse. I dig deep into the notion of British nationalism to find its roots that can be traced in Great Britain's imperialist past. I tried to understand whether this past still influences British nationalism of the 21st century and if yes, then how does this happen? This first half is also separated into two subsections under the headlines "Global Britain and Discourse" and "Nationals Ambitions: The Discourse through the Theory".

If the first part of the essay answers to "why" British nationalism arose during Brexit, the second half of the essay answers to "how". This section is focused on the 'Vote Leave' campaign's goals. As expected, theories of right-wing populism and ontological (in)security are mentioned to understand why the 'Vote Leave' campaign was so successful. This is where notions of nostalgia are situated. Also, a brief explanation of existential anxiety is presented through the Lacanian approach of the subject which is introduced in the section about key concepts. This second half of the analysis is divided into another two subsections with the headlines "Sovereignty and Discourse" and "British Nationalism and Production of Imaginaries".

The essay ends with a conclusion that summarises the results from the analysis and a section called "Discussion" which includes a small passage about the difficulties with distinguishing British and English nationalism in the theoretical framework, and the relevance of the study and its contribution in academia.

2. Methodology

2.1. Planning Research

To settle on which theoretical lens I will use for my thesis, I make use of essays from academic journals to collect information for my literature review. Brexit is one of the most debated phenomena of the last decade due to the fact that it is connected to the rise of populism in the West. Since the ascent of right-wing populism in Europe and the USA gathered so much academic attention, there is much data that is relevant to my research questions and it can be used for extensive research. Brexit can be interpreted in various ways in order to be analysed by sociologists. However, one of my main tasks in this essay is to understand British nationalism and how it has been forged throughout history in order the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign to be successful. The last few years, there have been published many academic articles and research pieces focusing on Brexit and hard Euroscepticism and connecting these two to British nationalism. My purpose in this thesis is to examine British nationalism as an expression of imperial nostalgia that concluded the UK’s integration in the EU. In order to determine in one topic that makes me feel comfortable discussing and it encourages me to work on it extensively, I had to identify the topic, collect data related to it, put in order the documents that provided to me data, re-examine all above and finally create an organic form of the results to ensure that the reader of this essay can understand the logic of my essay (Eco 2015, p. 6).

2.2. Literature Search

To understand nationalism in Britain, I focus on theories of nationalism by historians and sociologists, such as Greenfeld and Gellner, who explain it through the processes of industrialisation and modernity. Industrialisation is a phenomenon that started in Britain and expanded in the rest of the world. It is one of the main

characteristics of modernity along with the nation-state, urbanisation, mass-democracy, etc. Since I focus only on nationalism as a phenomenon of modernity, I seek its origins in Great Britain and its connection to the British Empire. Therefore, the academic articles and theories that I use have nothing to do with nationalism as introduced by the French Revolutionaries or the Treaty of Westphalia, but they mainly focus on the origins of the nation in Great Britain. In case of mentioning the French Revolution and the Treaty of Westphalia is only to prove the distinction between those two and nationalism as it has been introduced in Britain through modernity and industrialism. The essay is not a research in history, I do not focus on historic events that led to the rise of nationalism in the British Empire. I rather focus on historical processes that I mentioned above, such as modernity and imperialism - mainly referring to imperialism in Britain separated from continental Europe - that led to today's interpretation of nationalism in the UK. I describe modernity as a process because it is a significant point in history that brought changes to the old agrarian system through systematic series of actions.

To decide my theoretical framework, I did an extensive literature review which not only helps to decide whether or not the topic is worth studying, but it also provides a ground plan for projecting the importance of the study in a specific field. Another purpose for the use of this method is to share the results of other articles that are related to the topic and it is an easy way to compare the findings of the thesis to other researchers' work. The access to articles is easy and this makes the collection of the data simple. The theoretical framework of the essay functions as a broader interpretation of attitudes and behaviours found in discourse in political agendas, such as the 'Vote Leave' campaign and British politicians who support the campaign. The reason I chose this specific topic is because it reflects my previous studies and experiences (Eco 2015, p. 7). I tried to combine three main features, the first feature is related to my bachelor's degree in sociology and the study of industrialism. The second and third features can be found in two courses in my master's degree related to

populism and nationalism respectively. According to Lindsay Prior, the use of documents - such as academic essays, journal articles, textbooks, etc. - can construct an image for a specific phenomenon within a science field and thus they provide useful knowledge on how the social world works (Prior 2003, p. 129). This I tried to do. I tried to use already existing knowledge about British nationalism and right-wing populism in order to analyse my empirical material.

2.3. Philosophy of Research

Overall, the used method of the essay may be discourse analysis, which means that it is a hermeneutic research, but the essay itself is a construction of theories regarding British nationalism. Discourse analysis as a qualitative method belongs to the interpretivist approach of research (Della Porta & Keating 2008, p. 32). The purpose of research is to gain in-depth insight into the phenomena through close interaction with the data, and usually meanings and concepts emerge from the work itself. Such a method sacrifices representativeness for greater validity. Discourse analysis focusses on the meanings of the context (Ibid 2008, p. 28-31). Furthermore, the discourses are illustrations of how the notions that derive from the theories are applied in British politics of the 21st century. The essay is mainly conceptual and not just empirical; keep in mind that the empirics are examples and illustrations that help me relocate the theories in present time. As Prior said using Derrida's explanation, "all texts contain ambiguities they can be read in different ways, [...] and since this is so, any ultimate interpretation of a text must forever be deferred" (Prior 2003, p. 110).

2.4. Data Collection

In the essay, I analyse the 'Vote Leave' campaign's goals that are based on the 'Global Britain' organisation's goals and agendas of British politicians, mainly Boris Johnson's speech in Greenwich on the 3rd of February 2020. All sources help me to

interpret Brexit as a result of right-wing populism and to evaluate its nationalist dimension regarding the British Empire. Therefore, for my empirical material, I do discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is the analysis of the usage of the language in a text. Discourses constitute no evidence of phenomena, but they are analysed as such; they may be seen as illustrations of nationalism, Euroscepticism, etc. but this does not mean that any final assumption will be interpreted as a generalized image of nationalism and/or Euroscepticism. Rose (2007, p. 142) says that “discourse is a particular knowledge about the world which shapes how the world is understood and how things are done in it”. Discourses are the means of knowledge in times which influence reality as we view it. By studying discourses, we are allowed to analyse assumed truths which are demonstrated as rational, sensible and undoubtable (Jäger 2001, 34). The purpose of this essay is not to analyse British nationalism and British Euroscepticism on a general level, but to analyse the discourses through the definitions and the theories of the mentioned concepts. I focus on the meaning behind the context that the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign demonstrated and the meaning behind Johnson’s speech a few weeks before the UK left the EU revealing the government’s ambitions.

Global Britain is the government’s ambition for an independent country, separated from the EU and its institutions, and ready to sail in a global journey seeking new allies in order to achieve free trade agreements. The reason I chose to analyse data from the sources I mentioned already is due to the fact that they are relevant to both of my main theoretical topics - which is British nationalism and British Euroscepticism - and they are sampled regarding the influence they had on the people of the UK. Since I am conducting a discourse analysis for my empirical material, I would call this my methodology. Therefore, I describe my research as qualitative research, because I do not measure anything, but rather I try to interpret my data. The study focuses on the representation of the meaning behind the words used in political agendas and this makes it suitable for a qualitative method since the data contain linguistic elements and

I want to interpret these data in order to understand the connection between British nationalism, British Euroscepticism and Imperial past in Britain.

2.5. Data Analysis

The raw data, such as transcriptions, reports and speeches have been read thoroughly and they have been coded on a digital form. I later divided them into themes, such as British nationalism, British Empire, industrialisation, sovereignty, free trade, Global Britain, Conservative Party, hard Euroscepticism, Vote Leave, right-wing populism and nostalgic deprivation, in order to interrelate the grounded theory with the empirics, and the accuracy of the information (Creswell 2009, p. 185).

All data, both theoretical and empirical, are collected using Google, Google Scholar, JSTOR and the library services of Lund University, and all data that fit the criteria for answering my research questions were included. Of course, my main two empirical materials are chosen regarding their influence on the British people. Additional empirical materials, such as speeches by Nigel Farage, David Cameron, Theresa May and information from the official page of 'Global Britain' are included in the essay in order to fill some gaps and voids that occurred by the main two sources; the 'Vote Leave' campaign and Boris Johnson's speech on February 3, 2020.

2.6. Key Concepts

National Identity: Along with membership in a nation comes nationality, but nationality is more than just membership in a nation. Nationality is a type of identity and it is much more different than any other kind of identity because along with nationality comes sovereignty for the people who own this particular identity. Nationality must not be confused with any other identity. Religious, class, linguistic, territorial and political identities can be parts of national identities, but they are not national identities themselves. Neither are unique identities, such as Englishness,

Frenchness, or Germanity, because a unique identity may exist long before the national identity appears (Greenfeld 1992, p. 12). The people who possess the same nationality are usually seen as a greater community than any other and they are always homogeneous. The only division between them can be class, status and locality; and in some cases, ethnicity (Ibid 1992, p. 3). According to Greenfeld (1992, p. 12), national identity is a specific identity and not generic. Generic identities are usually developed because of psychological needs. The development of national identity must not be seen as a psychological need.

Euroscepticism: It is described by EAVI - the European Association for Viewers Interests is a non-profit organisation based in Brussels and it carries out on behalf of the European Commission the main studies to define and measure media literacy - as a phenomenon that is opposed to any form of expansion of the power of the European Union. Parties that embrace Eurosceptic agenda tend to be populist and they are against any loose immigration controls by the EU (EAVI 2018).

Soft/Hard Euroscepticism: Euroscepticism is divided into two scale-like types. From soft to hard, with soft Euroscepticism being the critical thinking against further European integration and hard Euroscepticism being the absolute opposition to any kind of European integration (Gifford 2006, p. 851- 852).

Populism: Populism is not an ideology like nationalism, capitalism, Marxism, etc. Ideologies are usually associated with either left or right tendencies in politics and they are sets of socio-political beliefs. Populism is not related to only one of these tendencies. Populism can be classified as a thin-centred ideology, which means that it can appear in parties from any political spectrum (Hadiz 2014). Through populism, society is divided into two homogeneous groups that are meant to oppose each other. The first group is the elite - or the establishment - and it has the upper hand, it rules over the second group and it can force its power. The second group is the people. This

group is usually the one that must feel tricked by the elite and it is usually described as pure (Ibid 2014, p. 130-131). The last characteristic of populism is its view to the glorious past that now is lost, and it must be regained (Kinnvall 2018, p. 525). Through this view, populists create imaginaries for returning to the past in order to reclaim its lost greatness and they see the future as dystopic and uncertain. Populism is usually associated with movements who are described as “anti-establishment”, and their voters are characterized by frustration. Today in Europe, populism is a term that is often appeared around nationalism and any kind of existential anxieties produced by illiberal masses (Müller 2016, p. 7).

Ontological security: Ontological security is not a physical security; it is rather a psychological form of security. According to Giddens, ontological security is the “security of being” (Kinnvall 2018, p. 529). Contrary to human security, which is physical security and the freedom and dignity of the individual are granted, “if individuals lack ontological security, they are unable to establish relations of basic trust with other individuals and, consequently, are unlikely to be able to live in freedom and dignity, free from fear and want.” (Shani 2017, p. 277). Although human security is connected to ontological security, the latter is not necessarily coupled with the former. It is possible for an individual to find ontological security where other’s freedom and dignity are denied. For Giddens, an insecure person is someone whose identity and autonomy are not taken for granted. Trust in others through stable experiences with them is the key to develop predictability in life and social routines that are the foundations of ontological security (Kinnvall 2018, p. 530).

Nostalgia: It is one’s desire to return to a time or place that boosts the subject’s wellbeing and happiness. In the majority of white Christian countries, nostalgic deprivation is connected with the white status that comes along with privileges and benefits that white people are pledged to protect in order to continue their prosperity (Gest et al. 2018). These expectations of the white people for prosperity are inherited

from the old generations to the new ones and, since demographic changes are viewed as a threat against this superiority, the privileges and the benefits must be understood as the natural order of the things (Ibid 2018). Thereby, because of multiculturalism, white people in white societies had to change a system where they had the upper hand in most of the governing institutions, to a system that guarantees equal rights. According to Gest et al. (2018), nostalgic deprivation is more likely to strike dominant ethnic groups and such a phenomenon is closely related to partisan identities linked nearer to the Conservatives, than the Labourite partisans.

Production of imaginaries: If nostalgic deprivation is a product of lack of ontological security, then the production of imaginaries is the means to avoid existential anxiety. The sense of safety in everyday life that ontological security provides is necessary for people to not get anxious; precisely, to prevent the feeling of existential anxiety (Kinnvall 2004, p. 746). Kinnvall argues that to understand the production of imaginaries of the populists, we must see ontological security as a “security of becoming”. This helps understand why imagining a secure future is fundamental for populist movements.

Existential anxiety: Existential anxiety among members of populist movements is something usual since the world around them is constantly changing and new threats appear in their way towards their glorious past. Their ontological lack can be described as never-ending. To reduce this feeling of ontological lack, the subjects must produce fantasies about their future that help them feel secure. This happens due to the fact that without the production of such fantasies, the subjects will live a life full of existential anxiety. So, the imaginaries and fantasies help them overcome their anxiety (Eberle 2018, p. 246 and Kinnvall 2018, p. 531). Lacan’s theory on existential anxiety was based on his ego psychoanalysis that said that the ego is a defensive construction that tries to escape constantly to misleading formations of fantasy. The ego is able to protect the subject and prevent it from realising its psychic situation.

3. Previous Research

Having seen the results of the Brexit referendum in the introduction of this essay, it has been made clear that Britain did not vote for Brexit. It was rather England that voted for Brexit. Craig Calhoun begins his chapter 'Populism, Nationalism and Brexit' in the book about Brexit (2017) by saying:

“In a sense, Brexit is misnamed: England voted to leave the EU. Technically, of course, the state that held the referendum and will now negotiate withdrawal was the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. But Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain in Europe. It was England that decisively chose Brexit.” (Calhoun 2017, p. 57)

Meadwell agreed with Calhoun and he expressed his opinion in one of his articles at the LSE Blog (2019) that Brexit is a phenomenon focusing on the English needs and wants, rather than the Scottish and Northern Irish needs. He continues by mentioning how David Cameron and Theresa May, both coming from the Conservative Party, are referring to national self-determination, while Scotland and Northern Ireland never supported the 'Vote Leave' campaign and he questions whether this national self-determination is only for the English people or not. But referring to national self-determination, a nation must exist first.

One thing that I need to mention here is Ben Wellings' essay (2010), where English nationalism appears almost non-existent in the political context due to the fact that it is expressed not within the UK's political context, but outside of the UK. The author mentions that English nationalism is expressed through the defence of the UK's sovereignty - specifically the parliamentary sovereignty - which is generated against European integration. According to the author, usually, English nationalism is hiding behind British nationalism and it can rarely be understood, almost enigmatic

due to the fact that it emerges as protection of Britain and not of England specifically. This is something that Kumar has pointed out, as well, in one of his essays. He mentions how different books are being published every year about the Scottish and Irish identity, but very few books about English identity, making English identity almost extinct. He also notes that books about Britain and British identity have been increased (Kumar 2000, p. 576). This does not mean that people in England are all feeling British and not English.

Here, I want to mention what Kumar explained in his essay “Nation and Empire : English and British National Identity in Comparative Perspective” that now that the empire is gone and industrial supremacy vanished, with the Scots using their North Sea oil, the Welsh claiming their own assembly and the Northern Irish being divided into Catholics and Protestants, it seems that the English are left with the memory of a lost global power (Kumar 2000, p. 593). The reason I want to mention this, is because of its significance in the pages to come in this essay. The English people turned into their last stronghold, which is the Conservative Party, formerly known as the Crown Party and currently being the strongest Eurosceptic party in the UK. Since 1975 and until 2016, the Conservative Party was not entirely against Britain’s European assimilation, but they were critical towards any further integration. Since the 1975 referendum for Britain’s European integration, and because of the country’s decline after decolonisation, Euroscepticism has become the protector of the British national identity; especially in the realm of international and foreign affairs. Because of this long tradition, British Euroscepticism has become the backbone of the British state (Gifford 2006, p. 857).

However, UKIP ascended in order to give a different image to British Euroscepticism. The far-right party compromised with a group of the Conservative MPs in order to reform the relations between the UK and the EU, and soon David Cameron announced a referendum on the country’s EU membership (Gifford 2014, p.

513). Since UKIP joined forces with the conservatives and other right-wing supporters in the 'Leave Campaign', the British Eurosceptic agenda stepped on another level. This entrance of UKIP into Britain's political life made some serious distinctions between the people of the UK and the "others" - meaning Brussels - which developed even a bigger gap between the UK and the EU; thus, the dialogues for an agreement between the two became unapproachable. Eurosceptics demand was clear, in order for the UK to remain in the EU, the latter must give more freedom to the states that constitute the Union, resulting in the achievement of Britain's desirable autonomy. For such an ideology to be proved successful in an election rally, the idea that the people's interest must be the only priority of the executive authority should be legitimized as the only conception of democracy; and not to be constrained by popular democracy (Ibid 2014, p. 518).

Populism seems very tempting, especially in the UK's situation where the European political elites had 'fooled' the masses that European integration was the only way. Through this frustration against Europeanism, populism managed to gain momentum because it simply paid attention to the people who have been pushed away by the previous governments (Calhoun 2017, p. 63).

Here, it is crucial to mention Whittaker's essay in geopolitics and his connection between the Conservative point of view in the later years and the importance of the British Empire. Whittaker mentions the following statement from David Cameron's speech in London, in 2013, promising the British people an 'in or out' referendum on EU membership:

"Our geography has shaped our psychology; we have the character of an island nation: independent, forthright, passionate in defence of our sovereignty. We can no more change this than we can drain the English Channel."

The author continues by mentioning how important Britain's geographical position is in the country's foreign affairs. Great Britain as an island, independent from the European in-land powers, was still a significant player in world affairs even before it joined the EU. As an Empire, Great Britain was presented as the “guardian of a system of maritime Lines of Communication” and this is not easily forgotten by the people (Whittaker 2018, p. 955). The article combines geopolitics and ontological security, and it explains how Britain's position as an imperial power provided a sense of security to the British. Indeed, the island identity that is attached to Britain's geopolitics helped to build the British Empire, and away from the European mainland, it lacked the sense of Europeanism. Throughout the years, there have been many opinions and views around the notions of English identity, Englishness and English nationalism in the fields of social and political sciences; many researchers have expressed different ideas about the issue. Basically, one opinion is that the majority of young people in England view English identity as a bad thing. Another opinion is that English nationalism exists, but it is not brave enough to appear as it is, therefore it is expressed through British Euroscepticism (Wellings 2010, p. 489).

4. Theoretical Framework

The main theories of the study are situated in the following pages. The first part of the theoretical framework is a combination of approaches in nationalism of the British historian Elie Kedourie and the American scholar Liah Greenfeld. The importance of Kedourie's approach through Immanuel Kant's theory on autonomy and individual self-determination. It is important to understand the significance of Kedourie's approach because it strictly relates national self-determination to modernity in an individual level. Of course, references to other theorists are mentioned in this subsection in order to get a greater view of the topic. The reason such individualistic approach is significant to the essay is due to the fact that the second subsection of the theoretical framework is dedicated to Gellner's chapter "Industrial Society" from his book "Nations and Nationalism", where Gellner emphasises on the transmission from the organic agrarian society to the individualistic industrial society. Since the industrial revolution took place in England, acknowledging Greenfeld's introduction from her book "Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity" is important; as well as, the first chapter of the book which is a big deal in the 'Historical Account' section.

4.1. Nation and national membership

To understand national self-determination and nationalism, I must first go in-depth into the concepts of nation and sovereignty and explore why these concepts are presented as fundamental criteria of the modern state. According to Weber, any community that has the tendency to form its own state can be considered a nation (Weber 1948, p. 179). Anderson proposed that a nation is an imagined political community (1991). Seton-Watson wrote that a nation consists of people who share a sense of solidarity and common culture (1977, p. 1). All of these definitions focus on the sense of community and collectivity and they, more or less, refer to the nation-state as a result of the Treaty of Westphalia which signalled the establishment of States by

national sovereignty. This does not mean that states did not exist before the Treaty of Westphalia; the Habsburg Empire was a state, as well as the Roman Empire (Easthope 1999, p. 42). Back then, a state could be multinational, even though the term 'nation' had not yet been used. In addition, nowadays, a state can be formed among people of two or more nations and it is called a federal state; not to be confused with situations where a nation can create a state that includes other national minorities like Spain. In this manner, a nation can form a state, but a state is not always made up by one nation. For Max Weber (1948), a state is an agency that possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence, a nation, however, can never monopolize legitimate violence. Gellner (1983) specified the state starting from its first characteristic, which is the division of labour and then he adds that the state is the institution or the set of institutions which deals with the enforcement of the order; these institutions are usually the police, the legal system etc.

According to Kedourie, self-determination has changed politics all around the world and now it is seen as the highest moral for autonomy. Autonomy is the condition that needs to be attained over and over again, it is not something that happens to a person or a group of people once and for all (Kedourie 1993, p. 24). For the French revolutionaries, autonomy had the face of the national self-determination that had to be seized by the rulers. For Immanuel Kant and his continuators, national self-determination lies upon the importance of individual self-determination. This idea promotes an individual's authority over their own action. It was these ideas of Immanuel Kant that influenced the French revolution. (Ibid 1993, p. 24-43). "National self-determination is, in the final analysis, a determination of the will; and nationalism is, in the first place, a method of teaching the right determination of the will" (Ibid 1993, p. 76). However, Gellner claims that "not all societies are state-endowed" (1983, p. 4). I assume that throughout history, there were many stateless societies; nomads, hunters, gatherers etc. In a stateless society, nationalism does not exist. Where there is no state, there are no rulers, and therefore there is no sense of a violation of the

individual's autonomy. Since the individual's autonomy is obtained, there is no need for the individual to achieve his or her national autonomy. Consequently, nationalism is not a problem in a stateless society (Ibid 1983, p. 4). The lust for self-determination and transforming a country into a state that respects its people is the first stone set for modern nationalism (Kedourie 1993). For the modernists, nationalism, as well as the nation, is a contemporary product, it is closely connected to 'modernity' and it imposes homogeneity, but as I explain in the next section of the theoretical framework, it is rather the opposite. This kind of homogeneity is inescapably imposed in the form of nationalism (Gellner 1983, p. 38). Thus, processes like industrialisation, urbanisation, capitalism, mass democracy and bureaucracy are also connected to nationalism because they are embedded in modernity and they monopolize in western societies because they are parts of the nation (Smith 2004, p. 54).

Nationalism can be seen as an "umbrella term" which includes any phenomena related to nationality - as well as the sense of consciousness that comes with nationality - and it is fundamental to the world as we know it (Greenfeld 1992, p. 3). Someone can easily think that the term of national consciousness began emerging right after the French Revolution, however, the English people had developed national consciousness a long time before the French (Colley 1986, p. 100). There are two branches of nationalism. Often, nationalism is addressed to a xenophobic and patriotic political ideology; and to avoid misunderstanding between the two, when I will refer to the latter one, I will make clear that I do not refer to nationalism as the fundamental piece of the sovereign state. Democracy and nationalism are interconnected because democracy, as we know it today, appeared in the form of nationalism and vice versa. "The location of sovereignty within the people and the recognition of the fundamental equality among its various strata, which constitute the essence of the modern national idea, are at the same time the basic tenets of democracy", Greenfeld writes in her book (1992, p. 10). Nationalism in England justified the tendency towards equality among the different social strata, also known as "democracy". Yet, in England of the 16th century,

nationalism was focused on the Crown since the image of the monarch spoke the country's distinctive sovereignty (Ibid 1992, p.50).

She continues by saying that nationalism was expanded into different directions than democracy; thus, from an expression of sovereignty, nationalism became an expression of uniqueness and it lost its democratic character. Since then, the "people", as the "nation", has been transformed into a political elite. One of her biggest contributions to theories in this field is her introduction of two different types of nationalism. The first one is related mostly to what Greeks were calling 'ta ethne' and it is named collectivistic-authoritarian nationalism which can only be ethnic. This means that nationality can only be inherent from generation to generation. Meanwhile, the second type of nationalism is called individualistic-libertarian nationalism which can be ethnic, but it can as well be civic (as in the form of citizenship). When individualistic-libertarian nationalism is classified as civic, then nationality can be gained (Greenfeld 1992, p. 11).

So, what is a nation? According to Greenfeld, linguistically and historically, the origins of the word "nation" can be traced back to the Latin language. The word "natio" means "birth" and it was initially used for people who had moved to Rome from another region; because of this, they were lesser than the Romans. Having the same meaning, the word was used in later years to describe the students who come from different geographical regions in the University of Paris (Ibid 1992, p .4). By the 16th century, the word nation was transformed again. During that period in England, the nation was synonymous to the word "people", but in a way that these people were recognised as an elite. At this exact period of time, the world's first nation had risen; England. Before that semantic transformation of the "nation", the word was still used to refer to the people populating a specific region, but it was explicitly applied to the lower classes; the rabble (Ibid 1992, p. 6).

In the late modern epoch, from the industrial revolution until today, the “nation” means “sovereign people”. According to Gellner (1983), a modern man can easily see a society where states are absent - even though he takes the centralized state for granted - however, he cannot see a world without nations. “A man without a nation defies the recognised categories and provokes revulsion” (Gellner 1983, p. 6). The world tends to see nations as an inherent attribute of humanity, even though they are not. Nations, just like states, did not exist all the time throughout the history of humankind, and this rejects an idea that nations are a universal necessity. Gellner continues by referring to a discussion of two individuals to explain how a nation can be formed. In the first example, these two individuals can agree that they belong to the same nation if only they share the same culture, and by culture, he means a set of ideas, signs, associations and ways of behaving. In the second discussion of this example, the individuals belong to the same nation only if they recognise each other as individuals that belong to the same nation. Consequently, solidarity, loyalty and other cultural values that can make up a nation are all agreed by the individuals. It is this recognition among them that turns them into a nation, and it is also this recognition that excludes others from that nation (Ibid 1983, p. 6-7).

4.2. Nationalism in the Time of Industrialisation

In Smith’s chapter “Dating the nation” in the book “Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the study of nationalism”, the nation is presented as a self-aware ethnic group. According to this statement, a nation comes into being when the members have consciousness of themselves as the belongings of a nation. Focusing on Walker Connor’s approach to the nation, Smith explains that the nation bears a psychological bond and kinship among its members and he explains that members of the same nation often believe that they are ancestrally related (Smith 2004, p. 63). Although this happened many times in the past with other self-aware ethnic groups in the Roman Empire and during the Hellenistic period, the nation was formed

for the first time in the modern era (Smith 2004, p. 58-59). But why did different groups of people start feeling the need to construct a nation later in history? If we had self-aware ethnic groups already in the Roman Empire, what does make nationalism a product of modernity? The answer lies among one of the various notions of modernity, which is industrialisation.

Gellner refers to the Weberian approach of rationality through the means of bureaucracy. According to Gellner, two elements exist in the notion of rationality for Weber. The first one is coherence, or consistency, and the second one is efficiency. The former is about the soul and honour of a good bureaucrat, the latter is about the spirit of the ideal entrepreneur (Gellner 1983, p. 20). Gellner himself believes that these two elements are not so independent from each other. In an industrial society, the community lives and relies on perpetual growth and continuous improvement. It was the very first form of society that invented the concept of progress. This exact fact dooms the industrial society to be unable to survive temporary reductions. In a world that grows endlessly, there is one precondition. This precondition derives from Hume's philosophy of causation. Here is Hume's account of causation summarised by Gellner:

“The actual connections of this world can only be established by first separating in thought everything that can be thought separately - so that we can isolate the pure elements, so to speak - and then seeing what, as a matter of experience, happens to be actually conjoined to what.” (Gellner 1983, p. 23).

A society like the industrial society is dependent not only on economic growth but on cognitive growth as well. Cognitive growth presumes that nothing is permanently linked to anything else. Based on this belief, productive growth is dependent on the constant distribution of human roles. This may sound too unstable for a society to have permanently changing human roles, but the model of a society based

on stability is not compatible with the model of industrial society, consequently, no production or innovation will come if the society remains stable. Gellner adds that progress does not come by a single change in the society and he argues about a society based on constant and continuous changes, to an extent that they become a feature of the social order. The reason he is focusing on these constant changes in industrial society is because nationalism is situated exactly on those changes. Nationalism's roots are found in the division of labour, which is persistently changing, in the same way as human roles change in industrial society (Ibid 1983). For an industrial society to be successful and to have high productivity, the absence of hierarchies is crucial. This fact brought an enormous change and turbulence in the late agrarian societies. Essentially, hierarchies had to vanish. This hierarchical absence is central in the economy and the means of production in a nation. In fact, if society needs to be productive and properly industrial, the transition to a nation is unavoidable. Therefore, to be called a nation, the nation must obey the division of labour imposed by industrialism.

Consequently, because of the division of labour, a society must be mobile and not still. The transformation to industrial society had to bring the will of mobility. This will of mobility came when the number of populations in the industrial societies started increasing, therefore the number of jobs increased as well. While the number of specialisms increases, the gap between them decreases. Through this, mobility can be achieved only if the training in society is in the majority generic. Industrial society seems to be the most highly specialised society ever existed, but the educational system in such a society is the least specialised. Specialisation in an educational system like this comes only in late age. (Ibid 1983, p. 26). The society itself works the same way as its educational system. "It provides a very prolonged and fairly thorough training for all its recruits, insisting on certain shared qualifications: literacy, numeracy, basic work habits and social skills, familiarity with basic technical and social skills." (Ibid 1983, p. 27). As a consequence, since the majority of the population has already gained some basic skills after completing the generic training, mobility is achieved through this

basic training system; it is easier and almost effortless for someone to be re-trained for other jobs. And through mobility, high productivity is granted.

In these notions of industrialism is situated the modern nation. Nation-states can be traced in various periods of history; from the Hellenic city-states to the Roman Empire. Nations in different societies can develop the sense of national pride or nationalism, but nationalism, as we know it in the late modern epoch, is developed through the process of industrialisation to serve its purposes for high productivity, because without nations, nationalism and the division of labour high productivity could not be achieved as successful as it has already been achieved.

5. Historical Account: The British National Empire

In this section, as I have mentioned already, Greenfeld's chapter about England (1992) is valuable because of the mentions to the Crown and the Protestant Church that had a big impact in the formation of nationalism in the country. The British sociologist Krishan Kumar is a main figure in this section of the essay because of his approach to imperial nationalism of Britain and its relations to England. Overall, this part of the essay is focused on historical events that shifted and shaped imperialism from the dawn of empires until the modern era, and it also explains something very crucial about the British Empire, which is its double dimensioned role; the external and internal dimensions.

In Kumar's essay, it is made clear that English nationalism is to some extent absent. Yet, he specifies that this absence of English nationalism and the need to point it out in order to feel different from any other nation reveals that this exact need is part of the English nationalists' self-perception and therefore part of English nationalism (Kumar 2000, 576). What is peculiar about English nationalism is its consistency of royalism and the worshipping of the monarchy that has been transmitted into British nationalism as well. In a world where monarchism is left behind and republicanism has taken its place, it is absurd for the monarchy to be worshipped through a nation. However, the British monarchy is strictly connected to the British Empire, and Kumar declares that British nationalism is the nationalism of the imperial state. Even though in other cases - such as the empires of Habsburgs and the Ottomans - nationalism was the reason modern empires ended, in Britain the nation was a synonym to the empire (Ibid 2000, p. 579). Kumar refers to the contradictory term of "imperial nationalism" and he explains that every empire had a national identity, even though the nation had not yet been invented as a term in that specific period of time; for example, the Roman Empire started from the Romans and this gave to the empire-state a sense of national identity, but in a different manner than the modern national identity that is provided by

the republic-states. Contrary, the British Empire did not share the same notion of national identity as the Roman Empire. What was different from the classic empires to the modern empires was their missionary purpose. The core ethnic group of a modern empire was seeing itself as the power that had a goal to “civilize” politically and culturally other ethnic groups that were described as uncivilized. This civilisation was succeeded through missions operated by the empire (Ibid 2000, p. 580). He also mentions in his essay “Empire and English nationalism” that in the late Western European empires, the ideals of nation and empire are not against each other, but they “appear as twin expressions of the same phenomenon of power” (Kumar 2006, p. 2). In a sense, there is a connection between imperialism and nationalism regarding their power, but an empire is not a nation, and Gellner who mentions the fundamental differences between the two is absolutely right (Ibid 2006, p.3). Theoretically, if I want to follow Gellner’s approach by heart, empires belong to the past agrarian societies, while nations belong to the modern industrial societies. Even their cultural characteristics are very much opposing each other; for example, literacy in the agrarian society is not as common as it is in the industrial one (Gellner 1983, p. 11).

According to Gellner (1983, p. 41), there is a link between colonialism and nationalism. The very early industrial societies were the first to colonise big parts of the rest of the world. Three out of five continents on Earth - Africa, America and Oceania - were entirely colonised by Europeans. This new, modern empires were nothing like the Romans or the Ottomans. Empires like the latter ones were built after their military superiority. These warfare activities were usually energy-consuming for the conquerors. The modern European Empires, which the British Empire belongs to and it was their pioneer, were relying mostly on their industry and trade. The English historian John Robert Seeley (1883) said “We seem to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind.” and he was correct. Due to industrialism, the British Empire was built as a result of its economic and technological growth (Gellner 1983, p. 42). What is distinct about the British Empire in the 21st century is

the British people's denial neither to face nor to forget the Empire and its loss. Easthope claims that if the subject is in denial to work through an experience, it is destined to encounter the same experience again (1999, p. 31). However, since Scottish and Northern Irish people started developing their own national identities since then, this denial is mainly associated with the English.

The English achieved an empire state in two dimensions. The first dimension was the "internal" empire, which is more or less the expansion of England towards the North and North-West. This expansion led to the creation of Great Britain. The second dimension was the "external" empire, which was the overseas expansion both to the West - North America and the Caribbean islands - and to the East - India, South-East Asia and Oceania (Kumar 2000, p. 588). In the first case, the expansion of the English national identity was set aside. The development of the British national identity was the government's and the scholars' priority instead, in order to create a new large political entity. Therefore, the "British" overtook the "English". This new identity had something great in common in order to keep the masses united. This great common thing was Protestantism (Ibid 2000, p. 589). Even before the creation of the British Empire, the Church of England had declared that "God is English". Once, English nationality and religious faith were one (Greenfeld 1992, p. 60). According to Weber, mobility, urbanisation and individualism are few of the links between industrialism and Protestantism. Gellner says that in a Protestant nation, like England, it is inevitable to not connect nationalism with the values of Protestantism and industrialism. But this is not applied in other parts of the world; there are still countries who struggle to explore the connections between nationalism and industrialism because of their lack of relationship with Protestant attitudes (Gellner 1983, 39-40). After the unification of Britain, the sense of British nationhood passed to the church, and since the English became British and people of the Commonwealth, if I may say, their God changed nationality; God became British.

The church was not the only institution in Britain that gained the people's loyalty through the empire. The Crown and the Parliament had also been benefited. All three of them have been praised for developing the most prosperous and wealthiest nation worldwide. By the middle of the 18th century, Britain's mission was to defend Protestantism from the external danger, Catholicism. However, in the late 18th century, this mission changed. The industrial revolution had well started in Britain and the main constituent kingdoms of the country could identify with a new aspect of the empire. Since Britain was the world's first industrial country, the British saw this aspect of theirs as a national achievement, but not as a national belonging. Industrialism helped the "overseas" empire to expand even more and also made the British see themselves as the bearers of modernity (Kumar 2000, p. 590). Kumar argues with Gellner and he says that "Industrialism might [...] give rise to nationalism; but as an economy, a culture, and a way of life it always transcends it." and he mentions how the British Empire, contrary to other European Empires, embraced their Anglo-Saxon heritage and it enabled them to construct a different type of imperial rule. This factor gave to the entire empire once again an English essence. Even though the profits from running the "overseas" empire were distributed to all the regions constituting Britain, with the rise of nationalism in continental Europe in the late 19th century and the fall of the other European Empires, the Scots and the Irish started abandoning the idea of the British nation and generally the values of the nation as it emerged through industrialisation (Ibid 2000, p. 591). It is interesting how since the fall of the British Empire, the Scots and the Northern Irish have become more critical towards the UK, the Parliament and the British Government.

Other researchers share the same views on the topic. British national identity flourished and Englishness had a big portion in the sense of British nationality throughout the imperial-national establishment. British nationalism appeared with the rise of the British empire, but it was only during that era that Great Britain was viewed as one nation. Once the empire lessened and finally died, there was no more one nation

(Calhoun 2017, p. 58). Since the English identity was the most powerful among the constituent identities of the Union, Englishness and Britishness had more or less the same integrity (Wellings 2002, p. 95). The two terms - 'English' and 'British' - have many times been interpreted as one, and this is coherent because the British politicians of the past who were always in the forefront to defend the British national interests were always English. Hence, in Scotland, Ireland and the rest of the world except England, the British national interest was perceived as the English national interest. Consequently, the English national identity overshadowed all the others. It would be logical if the English identity had overshadowed the British identity as well, but since the British national identity was still emerging, it absorbed the English one. One can argue with this statement and ask, "since Brexit was an expression of English nationalism" (Calhoun 2017), "how is it possible for the English identity to have been absorbed by the British one?" The answer is that just because the 'British' swallowed the 'English', it does not mean that the 'English' is now absent or missing. This is the reason why a lot of times the 'British' is confused as the 'English' and vice versa (Wellings 2002, p. 99-100).

6. Empirics and Analyses

The following pages are the presentation of the empirical material and its connections to the previous sections of the essay. It is the longest of all sections and here basically lie the answers for the research questions that I posed at the end of the introduction. This eighth part of the essay is divided into four smaller chapters in order for the reader to be able to locate which question is answered where. The first out of the four parts is called ‘Global Britain and Discourse’, and it is essentially where the majority of the empirics considering Britain’s imperialist past are answered. The second part has the headline ‘National Ambitions: The Discourse through the Theory’ and the reader can find the connections between British Empire and British nationalism of the 21st century, as well as the English influences in today’s British nationalism. The third part with the headline ‘Sovereignty and Discourse’ is where the rest of the exemplary empirics are located in the analysis and it sheds light on how British hard Euroscepticism tries to recapture the British glorious past and do a 180-degree turn toward the nation’s imperialist roots. The fourth part is called ‘British Nationalism and Production of Imaginaries’. It is in this last part that I illustrate why the British hard Eurosceptic agenda is manifested specifically by right-wing populism. This is the structure of the next section which aims to firstly present the findings and then try to interpret and evaluate the results through a discussion. It is mainly directed by the order of the research questions.

6.1. Global Britain and Discourse

In 1997, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, Lord Stoddart of Swindon and Lord Harris of High Cross created ‘Global Britain’. This organisation had a vision of a sovereign Britain independent from the EU in order to ensure the country’s prosperity. To do so, Britain had to seek its prosperity on a global level. This global vision of Britain would be attained only through trade. The central activity of the organisation ‘Global Britain’

between 1997 and 2013 was advising MPs and MEPs and publishing issues related to Britain's exit from the Single Market (Global Britain 2019). The whole Brexit campaign, when announced in 2013, had focused on Global Britain's research and activities. In this following section, I demonstrate a short summary from Boris Johnson's speech on 3rd of February 2020 and associations with it from Theresa May's speech on 17th of January 2017 (Government Digital Service 2017) and with reports from the official website of the 'Global Britain' organisation. In 2017, Theresa May announced the government's approach to a Global Britain. It was seen as a vision of a country that reaches beyond the borders of the EU provided by the Conservative Party (The Lancet 2017). In that speech, the concept of a Global Britain was stated more explicitly than ever before.

“I want this United Kingdom to emerge from this period of change stronger, fairer, more united and more outward-looking than ever before. I want us to be a secure, prosperous, tolerant country - a magnet for international talent and a home to the pioneers and innovators who will shape the world ahead. I want us to be a truly Global Britain - the best friend and neighbour to our European partners, but a country that reaches beyond the borders of Europe too.” (May 2017).

May made clear that the government's goals are - by order of reference in the speech - to regain control over the country's borders and legislative system, to strengthen the Union and to expand the trade agreements of the country with old and new allies; these three goals are also this essay's main factors that influence the Brexit campaign and the post-Brexit UK. The Commonwealth was intended to be approached in order for the UK to conduct new agreements. The attempts to approach the Commonwealth again was almost included in every public discourse made by the Conservative governments after the Brexit referendum. In 2018, the former Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson referred to Global Britain as the outward-facing champion of

the family of nations called Commonwealth. In the following pages, I indicate PM Boris Johnson's speech at Greenwich in regard to the government's Global Britain vision and a few reports from the organisation 'Global Britain' which I will in a later stage analyse in order to connect them to the theoretical framework of this essay.

The true colours of a Global Britain became more apparent during the speech of Johnson, as PM of the UK, in February 2020 at Greenwich. Johnson's speech started with an introduction on the Old Royal Naval College in Greenwich which was painted by James Thornhill. In a room full of anchors, sails, powder barrels and compasses that capture "the spirit of the United Kingdom in the early 18th century."; all of these elements that speak of supreme national confidence, according to Johnson. And then he mentions that this is the time where a newly forged UK will take off. All it takes is to follow the instincts and the instructions of the British people in order to have another such a moment. And he concludes his introduction on Britain's past by saying that a debate about the country's sovereign authority of 47 years has come to an end and this is the moment that the UK will re-emerge after decades of hibernation as a global free trade champion.

Johnson continues his speech on free trade and how countries who learn to specialise and exchange increase productivity and wealth. He refers to the notion of free trade as a British born notion that managed to do more than any other economic idea because "free trade is God's diplomacy"; it has the ability to unite people. However, according to Johnson, nowadays free trade suffers, and this is not the fault of the consumers and overall people, but it is the fault of politicians who fail to lead. Since global growth is being choked, humanity needs a champion who will save the world and lead a free trade campaign that will help the world to regain the levels of economic growth of the past. Such a champion must be a government that is willing, powerful and with nerves, muscles and instincts on such an issue. The UK, even though it did not use these instincts for half a century, is ready to take this role of the champion

for the world. He also refers to the Scottish economist Adam Smith whose ideas on free trade had influenced Britain's economic growth and he also uses other notions that Smith introduced in his work "The Wealth of Nations" such as the term "mercantilism".

As Johnson had already mentioned in the past, as a Foreign Secretary, the UK will reach out to the Commonwealth and build allies because these countries have "some of the fastest-growing economies in the world." Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the US, Japan and countries in the Pacific will be among the friends that the government will seek agreements with. The UK will remain to be the country with the highest standards in social protection, subsidies and environment regardless of any EU regulations and the compulsion of a treaty.

The PM also mentioned that the UK will restore its sovereignty in relation to its borders, but it will always be in cooperation with the EU whenever Britain's national interest and the EU's interest converge without the need of any treaty. He emphasizes that the UK is not a European country by treaty, but by historical and geographical facts. The UK has been next to Europe to support each other for centuries, but the country will continue being independent, autonomous and not muted in order to be able to help not only Europe but the whole world as well. It is this independent voice that Britain's friends all around the world are looking forward to hearing and start again negotiations on free trade. Not just because it is right for the world, but also because it is right for the UK and its peoples who want the country united again as one, as a whole. He makes clear that the UK will prosper one way or another, and it will always be by the side of Europe to help it, as it has been for the last centuries; and the UK will as well be by the side of any other country who asks for it, as it has done in the past.

"Because it will help our national programme to unite and level up and bring together our whole United Kingdom. And by expanding our trading relationships to improve the productivity of the entire nation by expanding

infrastructure, education and technology you know that our programme is to bring this country together, combine that with greater free trade.” (Johnson 2020).

Johnson concludes his speech by calling the people of the UK to remember their past and go up a gear again in order to recapture the lost moments of their ancestors. Embracing an outward-looking global champion is the government’s and the people’s ambition. This can be achieved through global free trade, now more than ever that the world needs it; “for Britain, for our European friends, and for the world”.

Regarding Global Britain’s - the organisation - activities, many reports have been published since the Conservative government embraced its visions in relation to the country’s policies. In a 2017 publication, the authors referred to Brexit as the only opportunity that has been given to the people to return back to their ancestral free trade routes (Steward & Monteith 2017, p. 3), and they were calling Her Majesty’s Government (HMG), specifically, to leave the EU with or without a deal because even a no-deal scenario was better than a bad deal scenario. Big parts of Johnson’s speech as a PM at Greenwich have derived from this report. How the UK has always been a trading nation and that for centuries the country was relying on its unique global trading program is made clear in this report as well, signalling that indeed the Conservative Government is using the organisation’s guidelines to navigate through the post-Brexit era. In the same report, the differences between Europe and the UK are mentioned. Specifically, the Anglosphere was mentioned in order to emphasize the similarities between the UK and the countries in the Anglosphere regarding trading policies. The Anglosphere’s common law focuses on how the individual can act freely unless his action is forbidden, while according to the Continental tradition, which is based on the Napoleonic code, the individual has no rights to act unless the rights are specifically given (Ibid 2017, p. 6). This gives the UK and the Anglosphere a different element from Europe, it makes these countries more forward-looking and accepting to new

ideas regarding free trade, while Europe seems less mercantilist. The EU's Single Market is being held responsible for having the world's least prosperous Gross Domestic Product (GDP). If the UK keeps being a member of the EU's Single Market, the country will be unable to reach out to other partners in the world and make its own trading deals (Ibid 2017, p. 7). So, it is time for the UK to rediscover its ancestral trading roots, practices and ideas.

In the same report by the organisation 'Global Britain', four options for the UK's future regarding its EU membership as mentioned. The first option is the European Economic Area (EEA) membership, the same as the one Norway has signed with the EU. This design is for governments who want to join the EU, but the population of the country does not agree with it. Such an option will benefit the UK with zero tariffs, but it will be excluded from any further decision-making, while the borders of the UK will still be not controlled by the British state (Ibid 2017, p. 10-12). The second option is the European Free Trade Association Option, also known as the Swiss option. By following this option, the UK will have a higher degree of independence compared to the first option and it gives the probability to the country to adopt any of the EU policies, but with fewer chances of changing directions in the future. However, the UK will have no influence in future decision-making, and this is still against the organisation's goals (Ibid 2017, p. 12-13). The third option, also known as the Canadian Option, is even more liberating. UK will be excluded from any EU policies; it will have full control over its borders, and it will not be part of the European Court of Justice. In this model, over 99% of the tariffs between the country and the EU have been removed. However, the process in order to achieve an agreement like this is very time-consuming. The organisation 'Global Britain' suggests that if such an agreement is not settled within 24 months since the UK leaves the EU, then the UK will trade under WTO rules (Ibid 2017, p. 14-15). The final option is the Global Free Trade Option in which the UK will be fully independent of all the EU regulations and it offers to remove most of the trade tariffs from other nations (Ibid 2017, p. 15-17).

The report ends with the author's opinion that the UK will benefit by adopting the third option - the Canadian model of trading with the EU - but in case this agreement is not settled down within two years, then the UK must trade under WTO rules.

“The UK should be an international beacon, promoting free trade across the world under the Global Free Trade Option. The EU has a two-year window of opportunity after we serve Article 50 to reach a mutually acceptable arrangement with the UK that will be in everyone’s best interests. What is clear however is that no deal is better than a bad deal for the UK” (Ibid 2017, p. 19).

In a second report by the organisation, the rejection of a bad deal is promoted in order to prevent further EU negotiations and ten reasons are set forward to justify such an opinion. One of these reasons is the risk of tearing apart the Union. In a case where Northern Ireland (NI) remained in the Single Market and with links to the Republic of Ireland, the voters in NI will start seeking representation from politicians in the Republic of Ireland instead of the politicians in the UK (Steward & Monteith 2019, p. 4). Like this, the prosperity of NI and the integrity of the UK will be threatened. The writers even describe such a scenario as the EU’s plan for NI to be treated as a colony. Unless the whole UK is staying in the Single Market, NI must follow HMG instructions and leave the Single Market too. Another reason that the writers suggest avoiding different treatment of NI is to keep away demands from the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) for even more independence between the constituent territories of the UK. “The SNP often manufactures grievances to further the belief that Scotland would be better off outside the United Kingdom - in this instance, the nationalists are being handed an example of double standards on a very large salver” (Ibid 2019, p. 4).

6.2. National Ambitions: The Discourse through the Theory

It is safe to say that notions that influenced the British Empire are present in the discourse throughout Brexit. Starting with Johnson's speech in February 2020 when the transition period for the UK started, his references to anchors, cables, sails, powder barrels and compasses make clear the fact that the government of the UK and the Conservative Party are still viewing the British Empire as something very important for the entire nation and that the British past is something people must look at if they want their country to prosper again. This happens due to the fact that British national identity can still be connected to the Empire and the domination of the sea. The memory of the British Empire still influences the British nationalist self-confidence. It is the memory of an era where Britain was seen as the greatest power of the world; by colonising almost a quarter of the whole world, the Empire has created a huge impact in modern politics. The PM's speech continues by likening the past with that exact moment when the UK was set free from the EU and its institutions. This is definitely a prologue full of imperial nostalgia and national pride.

“[...]this is the moment when it all took off. And - you know where this is going - today if we get it right, if we have the courage to follow the instincts and the instructions of the British people, this can be another such moment on the launching pad.” (Johnson 2020)

The UK, according to Johnson, is re-emerging after decades of hibernation. But this cannot be true, he cannot talk about waking the British Empire from a hibernation, neither can he talk about building a new Empire, right when such a notion has long been vanished and it has been replaced by nation-states and republicanism. Of course, the PM does not talk about building a new Empire. He is clarifying that the UK is re-emerging as a campaigner for global free trade, not as a new imperial power. But 'free trade' is a concept that has been developed through imperialism, right? This is correct, Johnson as well mentions free trade's origins in his home country's past. It is Britain

that managed to do through free trade more than any other country in the world. The PM adds that “[...] if countries learn to specialise and exchange then overall wealth will increase, and productivity will increase”. If all the other references to the British Empire did not lead us directly to the UK’s imperialist past and to this past’s traditions and practices, then this line does. And as Gellner explained (1983), an industrial society is dependent on perpetual growth and productivity, and to achieve such a growth specialisation is required. This is what Johnson asks by his country and by other countries too. In order for the UK to be a campaigner of free trade, everyone must learn to specialise. This specialisation can be earned only through a society that follows the values of industrialism; industrialism is the economic organisation of the society constructed mainly on industry. These values are mobility and division of labour. One value leads to another. Mobility is attained through the division of labour and division of labour is attained through high specialisation; the more specialised a society is the more mobile it becomes and wealth and productivity increase. This division of labour that led to the creation of the British nation.

The speech continues by mentioning that free trade is being choked and this is the fault of politicians who cannot lead properly. The reason Johnson and the Conservative Party seem to worry so much about free trade is because the British introduced the notions of “growth” and “productivity” to the world. As Kumar explained (2000) and I mentioned in the section “The British National Empire”, the British viewed industrialisation as a national achievement, but not as a national belonging. To spread industrialism, free trade and modernity was the Empire’s mission. Almost identical to how the post-Brexit British government interprets the UK; as a champion of free trade who will rescue the world from poverty and politicians who are failing their people.

The Commonwealth has been brought up many times in the Brexit Discourse - not only in the PM’s speech but it can also be found in the reports from the ‘Global

Britain' organisation and in the 'Vote Leave' campaign - and it was mostly called as "the old allies". The countries that belong to the Commonwealth are described as some of the fastest-growing economies and this is due to Britain's imperial influence. This is made clear in her speech at the opening of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting on 19th of April 2018, when she pointed out how the Head of the Commonwealth and the Crown of Britain has carefully nurtured this family of nations (Government Digital Service 2018). This clears up that, for the Conservatives, the Commonwealth still works with values that the Crown has provided them with by colonising them. These countries have been under the authority of the Crown up until the previous century and some of them still have as head of their states the British Monarch, such as New Zealand and Canada. In fact, by referring to the Commonwealth as old friends is proof that the British keep believing that these countries view the UK as the bearer of modernity to their agrarian societies. The faith in the Empire's mission to civilize its colonies is transmitted into Global Britain's mission to bring economic growth to its friends.

The UK is once again present to save the world from famine and poverty, as it did in the past, not just because it is the nation's mission, but because as the PM said that "free trade is God's diplomacy" (Johnson 2020). As it happened in the past, it is happening now too. God is once again mentioned and related to the country's national goals and ambitions. Basically, "God is English", this is why the English nation is viewed as God's peculiar people (Greenfeld 1992), but it is not only England who believes in the God of the protestants. The whole of Britain are protestants, and Protestantism is likened to the values of industrial society as well. This happens not just because Protestantism is a key element for the British nation, but because according to the Weberian theory, Protestantism is a key element to the values I mentioned early - the division of labour, mobility and productivity - along with individualism. In other words, God gave industry, high productivity and free trade to the British in order to spread all three of them, as well as all the other notions that accompany industrialism,

to the rest of the world and help the people to escape poverty. This can happen the same way as it occurred the first time; by referring to God - the God of the protestants precisely - and by seeing themselves as champions of free trade and bearers of modernity. Since this cannot happen again through the Empire, the idea of a Global Britain has emerged to re-enact the Empire's missionary purpose.

It is inevitable for a nation that has been built upon those values that are connected to the British Empire's missionary purpose and industrialism to escape from them. In fact, according to Gellner, any industrial society is sentenced to experience a certain amount of anxiety when its productivity and growth are in a recession. Specifically, in Britain's case where the British do not accept the fact that the Empire is no more (Easthope 1999), this fact punishes them to seek and re-encounter the same experiences in order to escape this recession. As long as the British do not accept the loss of the Empire, they are doomed to continue believing and hoping in the same fantasies that not only it is them who taught the world how to trade, but it is also their responsibility to remind them again how to repeat this successful story.

But why do specifically the Conservatives care so much about the values of free trade? As I mentioned in the 'Previous Research' section, Kumar (2000) mentioned that the Conservative Party was formerly known as the Crown Party, and royalism has been a big part of British politics. The people of England, the first to believe in a modern nation worldwide, identified with Protestantism, the Parliament and the Crown, and since the Conservative Party was the main supporter of royalism throughout the history, it was more likely for the party to continue believing in the same values that originally formed firstly the English nation and later the entire British nation. This peculiarity of royalism in an era where royalism has been replaced by republicanism is present in both English and British nationalism. Through this worship of the English monarchy, the British national identity was developed too. While the rest of the world had abandoned royalism and adopted nationalism, the English people connected the

nation with the Crown. In fact, these two, royalism and nationalism, assemble what seems bizarre in the entire theory of Nationalism, “imperial nationalism” (Kumar 2000). In fact, the Conservative Party’s idea that through the same processes the UK will prosper again is seen as a recipe that since it was successful once, it will be successful again, and this is obvious in Johnson’s words “And I have no doubt that in either case, the UK will prosper” regarding the deal that the government will have with the EU.

Johnson ends his speech once again by referring again to the past of the British people, and he calls everyone to think of this past in order to “recapture the spirit of those seafaring ancestors”. The whole speech is full of imperial nostalgia and remembrances of notions that influenced the Empire, the Commonwealth and the Anglosphere. It seems that British nationalism of the 21st century is built on notions that influenced the British Empire, such as industrialisation, free trade, growth of productivity, royalism and Protestantism.

Another goal that May mentioned in her speech in 2017 is the strengthening of the Union. The same goal is mentioned in Johnson’s speech in 2020 when he said “[...] it will help our national programme to unite and level up and bring together our whole United Kingdom” and it is also acknowledged in the ‘Global Britain’ organisation’s report in 2019 by Steward and Monteith. As the organisation mentions, unless the government wants to remain in the Single Market, NI must depart from the Single Market as well. In a scenario where NI is treated in a different way than the other regions of the UK, other national movements such as the SNP will demand to be treated in a special way as well. It is obvious that since the Empire lessened, Scotland and NI started developing their own national identities. This is also mentioned by Kumar who said that the UK was seen as a whole only when the Empire was still roaming the seas. This means that with the loss of the “external” empire, the “internal” empire lost its strong national identity too and Scotland and NI stopped believing in the sense of

Britishness. This is also noticeable in recent elections which the main supporters of the Conservative Party are coming from England, while the numbers of Northern Irish who are supporting the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) have decreased and Scottish people who are supporting SNP have increased (BBC 2019). This fact simply shows how the British national identity is in recession.

The Conservative Government's attempts to reunite the people of the UK can also be seen by returning to everything Johnson declared during his speech. If I try to apply Gellner's approach to the nation, the central elements of the British nation will be revealed. Gellner analysed the nation through a discussion of two men if only they agree that they share the same culture, ideas, associations and ways of behaving. Going back to Johnson's speech, it is obvious that the British nation is made up of anchors, cables, compasses and other nautical symbols, free trade, industrialisation, imperialism, royalism and Protestantism. But since imperialism is out of the plan in the 21st century, the Government must stick onto anything else that is left and can reunite the nation. These cultural and behavioural associations are what turn the British into a nation and they are the exact same things that exclude others from their nation. Or at least those are the associations that turned the British into a nation the first time and the Government hopes that those same associations will help in reconstructing it again.

One reason that the Conservative Party is still attached to the British Empire is the Anglo-Saxon heritage that the Empire was provided with. Since the English national identity enriched the British national identity with all its cultural and behavioural associations, this heritage is undeniably related to the Conservative identity too. This heritage helped the nature of Englishness to be developed throughout the entire nation and the empire; in both dimensions, "internally" and "externally". In fact, where Englishness could not be introduced, Britishness did. But the sense of Britishness was mostly present within the "internal" empire, while at the "external" empire was more accessible and it was easier for Englishness to be embraced. The

overseas lands of the British Empire, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand could easily be injected with the sense of Englishness to create the Anglosphere. The importance of Englishness is also, indirectly, mentioned in the reports from the ‘Global Britain’ organisation and specifically in the 2017 report by mentioning how unique the Anglosphere is compared to continental Europe and the way these two take their decisions and make their laws. This probably explains why the majority of the supporters of the Conservative Party that is still fond of the UK’s imperialist past are coming from England and not the rest of the regions of the UK because by maintaining a whole Britain under Her Majesty’s rule this heritage can continue existing through the British nation. In a way, this agrees to what I have mentioned in the essay, said by Kumar, that English nationalism is absent from the UK’s politics, but it is manifested through Euroscepticism. Therefore, as Wellings said, since English nationalism and English identity do not dare to reveal their true colours, they are mainly overshadowed by British nationalism and British identity respectively, but they still have impact on the British politics of the 21st century. Undoubtedly, English people do not identify unanimously as supporters of the Conservative Party, but as the most recent general elections of 2019 have shown, 47.2% of the English voters supported Johnson’s agenda and his vision on a Global Britain (BBC 2019); nearly half of England, the biggest victory of the Conservatives in Britain the last 40 years.

6.3. Sovereignty and Discourse

The following section is the presentation of the empirics regarding the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign, as well as the discussion of these findings considering the theoretical framework around self-determination that concerns the third research question.

The ‘Global Britain’ organisation’s vision to create a country that will act as the champion of free trade is not just a national ambition, it is an expression of British national pride and national self-confidence. Here, the line between national ambitions

and nationalist ambitions is blurred. The difference between British nationalism as it aroused through the Empire and British nationalism of the 21st century is that the former one did not seek for sovereignty. Actually, in the past, sovereignty in Britain had always been expressed through the Queen's or the King's image, and this is another one reason why royalism and nationalism in Britain are identical (Greenfeld 1992, p. 50). Contrary to other countries' nationalist movements from the late 18th century until the dawn of hard Euroscepticism, the British had never sought sovereignty. The British people had realised their existence as a national group through the state that they already had had; by state, I mean any aspect of the British State, and this is the British monarchy, the church and the Parliament. Meanwhile, other national identities had to first acquire autonomy from their rulers or conquerors in order to seek sovereignty, and this sovereignty was in the form of a parliament, and not another monarch. There are cases where the rulers had to provide the people with sovereignty; some of these cases are the countries that used to belong to the Soviet Union.

Since the British had never sought for autonomy before, the Brexit supporters had to come up with references to sovereignty in order to be able to justify the cause of the 'Vote Leave' campaign; specifically, parliamentary sovereignty. However, they were not the first to seek parliamentary sovereignty in the UK. The Scottish had many times expressed their need for autonomy, but the Brexiteers were the first to win a referendum for such a cause. The 'Vote Leave' campaign is a perfect example of how the British nationalists injected parliamentary sovereignty into British nationalism, and it is the point that turned British Euroscepticism from soft to hard. As I have already said, the British Eurosceptics of the past were critical toward the EU, but not toward the UK's integration in the EU; this made their agenda an object of soft Euroscepticism. What changed the last years in Britain was the introduction of the term "parliamentary sovereignty" into British nationalism. The 'Vote Leave' campaign and speeches by the politicians who supported it are rich in references to sovereignty; as well as other elements that legitimize Euroscepticism as an act of populism. I will focus firstly on

the matter of sovereignty because the essay is written in order to demonstrate Brexit's nationalist features and in the next section on its populist characteristics.

In the 'Vote Leave' campaign's official website, the reasons why a British citizen should vote Leave on the 23rd of June 2016 are presented (see Appendix 1-4). The campaign was focused on three pillars. The first one was expressed through the concerns on immigration and border control (see Appendix 2). The open border policy of the EU lets a quarter of a million EU migrants entering the UK yearly. This affects in a negative way the public services and it also lets criminals getting in the country uncontrollably. The second demand of the campaign derives from the concern on the legislative system (see Appendix 3). Almost half of the laws of the UK have been made by the EU's bureaucrats for whom the British people never voted for. Since the UK was one of the few members of the EU that did not enter the Eurozone, its MEPs were always outvoted by the countries in the Eurozone. This means that the UK was forced to adopt policies and laws that benefitted others but not themselves, and its voice was always silenced. The third pillar was focused on the economy and trade (see Appendix 4). The regulations by the EU were affecting small businesses in the UK and they were damaging the country's economy. The same regulations delay the building of schools and hospitals and add millions of additional costs on the citizens and the government. By leaving the EU, the UK gets the power to conduct free trade agreements with other countries outside the EU that have some of the fastest-growing economies. These three demands constitute the main principles of the 'Vote Leave' campaign.

The same principles appeared in both of the speeches that I demonstrated in the section "Global Britain and Discourse" of this essay. In Johnson's speech, Brexit is presented as a long-running debate of sovereign authority that lasted for almost four years- "some would say 47 years". He mentions that the UK was muffled many times, but from that moment on it will be an independent state and it will be able to control its own waters and economy in order to protect the citizens and their right on an

autonomous legal system that by that day they were denied to have. The British will restore their sovereignty over their borders, immigration and their rules. This sovereignty will also benefit the vision of a Global Britain; “[...] I want this country to be an independent actor and catalyst for free trade across the world”.

In May’s speech in January 2017, the need to take control of the country’s own legislative system is mentioned. By leaving the EU, the UK’s laws will be taken in Westminster, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast, instead of Brussels and Luxembourg. Once the legal authorities of the country will be restored, migration will be easier to control as well. The UK will get control of who enters and who leaves its territory, it will not only control the number of the migrants, but it will also control the quality of them. The brightest, the highest-skilled and the best will be able to enter the country in order to study and work there. Meanwhile, this control will stop violent convicted criminals from coming for the EU and it will allow the British Court to deport dangerous terror suspects. What is interesting is the fact that in May’s speech, references to sovereignty or autonomy are absent, but at the same time, she mentioned every principle that has been promoted by the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign.

It is obvious that, for a referendum like this to be successful, the mentioning of sovereignty as a fundamental characteristic of the campaign was necessary. Altogether, the introduction of the terms “sovereignty” and “autonomy” had a huge impact on the referendum. Not only these terms changed the face of British Euroscepticism, but it changed the face of British nationalism as well. From praising the country’s imperialist past through everything that industrialisation has brought to the nation, nationalism in the UK was transformed into another replica of nationalism as it aroused from the Treaty of Westphalia and the French Revolution; nationalism that seeks sovereignty against the unelected elites.

6.4. British Nationalism and Production of Imaginaries

Same as the French Revolutionaries, the British had to seize their sovereignty by the rulers. The difference is that the rulers that deprived sovereignty of the British were not the monarchy, but the bureaucrats in Brussels. Since Cameron announced the Brexit referendum, the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign and its supporters introduced sovereignty and it projected it as the highest moral for self-determination. The reason national self-determination is so important, according to Kantian deontology and ethics, is because it lies upon individual self-determination. Without sovereignty, self-determination does not exist. According to Kedourie, national self-determination is the determination of the will, and nationalism is the method to teach this determination. Autonomy is the condition that needs to be attained over and over again. What triggers me by reading these approaches is that since autonomy is not something that is granted to someone once and for all, nationalism is destined to be the method of teaching it over and over again. It is as if nationalism must always exist in order for autonomy to not be lost.

Additionally, since the world around us is constantly changing, nationalism has to face new threats. For some nationalists, multiculturalism and globalisation are threats, while for others, new laws that do not promote heteronormativity can be a threat against their nationalist prudence and views. And as long as the world changes, new threats will keep coming up. What these threats do is to limit the sense of ontological security among the nationalists. Their security of being is always under strain. In the UK’s situation, what provokes the country’s nationalist movements are the EU and its institutions in Brussels that prevent the nation from having control over its borders, legislative system and economy. I want to focus mainly on the prevention of the country’s control over economics, and the reason is because the British nation was built on these economic notions of Adam Smith on free trade, productivity and economic growth; also obvious in Johnson’s speech. Britain’s sovereignty is connected to

economic growth and productivity. According to Johnson, the EU prevents these two factors from flourishing. By preventing Britain from having full control over its economy, the EU also prevents the country from conducting trade agreements. Since sovereignty is connected to the UK's determination for making free trade agreements, the EU's Single Market is a threat to the UK's sovereignty. Therefore, remaining in the Single Market means that ontological insecurity in the UK will keep increasing because their sovereignty will be neglected.

The reason references to Britain's imperialist past are so important in the discourse is because of nostalgia. If the world around us is constantly changing and new threats are emerging the ontological security is becoming more and more difficult to be attained. Therefore, the nationalists are doomed to live in a state of eternal existential anxiety. However, what prevents this eternal existential anxiety of the nationalists is nostalgia and the production of imaginaries. By referring to the country's imperialist past, British nationalists produce fantasies that, once the UK exits the EU's Single Market, the country will return to the days of its glorious past. This does not mean that the UK will try to achieve a new British Empire, but it will try to earn back its glory through more or less the same means that it used in the past, and one of these means is free trade. This nostalgia in the 'Vote Leave' campaign is obvious in quotes like "We want our country back" and "Take back control", that also reveal the frustration of the people against the unelected bureaucrats in Brussels. Meanwhile, in Johnson's speech the British people's frustration and imperialist nostalgia is even more obvious. The former noticeable in his words "Free trade is being choked and that is no fault of the people, that's no fault of individual consumers, I am afraid it is the politicians who are failing to lead." and by describing the Conservative Government as the people's government (Government Digital Service 2020). In the PM's speech, the elite is presented, in Adam Smith's words once again, as mercantilists. Consequently, these principles are some of the reasons that make British Euroscepticism and the Conservative doctrine matters of right-wing populism.

These fantasies of the British Conservatives do not enclose only economic sovereignty and free trade agreements, they also acknowledge how important a stronger Union among the four constituent regions of the UK is. Since the British decolonisation started, the UK came face to face with realities that it did not expect. Devolution was one of these realities. As I mentioned twice in the essay, with the establishment of Scottish Parliament, the creation of the National Assembly of Wales and the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland (Government Digital Service 2013), England was left with a decentralized British state and the memory of a lost empire. If decolonisation was the loss of the “overseas” empire, then devolution was the loss of the “internal” empire. The central British state lost power over issues like forestry, fisheries, agriculture, education, health care, taxation, etc. All of these factors, combined with the increasing numbers of the nationalist party in Scotland, have also contributed to increasing the ontological lack of the British nationalists, and led them to production of imaginaries for strengthening the Union. Possibly one of the reasons that the Scottish and the Northern Irish supported, in majority, ‘Remain’ was devolution. In both Scotland and Northern Ireland, nine out of fifteen policy areas have been devolved since 1997, while in Wales only seven out of fifteen of these policy are devolved; “Justice and Policing” and “Social Security Elements” in Wales are still reserved by the central British state (see Appendix 5). Perhaps, the fact that Scotland and Northern Ireland have more policy areas devolved influenced in a different way the voters of these two regions. However, this essay explores the aspects of British nationalism combining the used discourse and the theoretical framework, and not how the devolution influenced the Brexit referendum.

7. Conclusions

Reaching the last pages of this essay, a summary of the results is necessary in order to summarise the research questions that I posed at the end of the introduction. It seems that on the road to Global Britain, the references to Britain's history are essential. By analysing discourses, the researcher is able to understand how knowledge and cognition on a certain issue are shaped, and it helps define how what is presented as truth and rational is influenced by speeches, statements, texts, etc. This is exactly the reason I decided to analyse two speeches by two of the most influential British politicians of the last decade, and texts and statements by two organisations that changed entirely the face of Euroscepticism in the UK.

References to the British Empire and generally to Britain's past are spread throughout the entire discourse that I used in the essay. The British seafarers of the past are exposed in Johnson's speech, and naval related objects are exposed not only in the room where the conference took place but also in his speech. This shows how the memory of the British Empire and the country's glorious history are still connected to the British national identity. All these images and stories about the seafaring ancestors still influence the self-esteem of the British nationalists. Johnson invites the British people recapture the glory of the past. Free trade is a practice that is seen as necessities to the country's national consciousness and integrity. By re-emerging after decades of hibernation, the country will be able to increase their productivity and wealth. The UK will be a campaigner of free trade because it is God's gift to the entire nation, and the nation must spread God's word all around the world.

By approaching nationalism in Britain as a product of industrialisation, the reader is able to understand that productivity is a big part of the British nation. Values that are connected with productivity are present in Johnson's speech and in reports from the 'Global Britain', and they are still great principles to the British right-wing

supporters. These values transformed the British Empire and its missionary character. The British Empire simply saw industrialisation as a national achievement, and they perceived themselves as bearers of modernity, saviours from poverty and the old agrarian system. Britain is supposed to be once again the nation that will liberate free trade from being choked by mercantilists. In this entire story, the Conservative Party is the loyal ally of this vision, and this happens because the Conservatives are still faithful to the Crown and its power in keeping the nation united.

The second major goal of Global Britain is strengthening the Union. Since the decolonisation, the British nation has lessened. Devolution proved that there is not trust among the people and the politicians of the country. England was left with the memory of a lost empire, and a devolved state. By conducting trade agreements with old and new allies, the Conservative Party believes that the Union will come together again. The UK must be the champion in this free trade policy. For such a result, all four of the constituent countries must leave behind the EU and follow the central British government's vision of Global Britain; a government run by the Conservatives, who still seem attached to royalism.

British nationalism of the 21st century appears as a denial of the country's imperial loss and that the country is destined to regain what is lost. Since colonialism is out of the question, new ways must emerge, or old ideas must come back forward in order for a Global Britain to come into existence. So, approaching the Commonwealth and the Anglosphere is a good start. The Government seems to rely on the same path as the British Empire. The Anglo-Saxon heritage of the Empire seems to work as a weapon that will help Britain in its Global journey. This will happen of course with the blessings of Her Majesty. The power that royalism has is also apparent in May's praise to the Queen in her speech at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in 2018. Since the sense of Englishness was difficult to be injected to the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish people, Britishness arose in order to unite the four people. However,

in the 'overseas' empire, Englishness was easier to be embraced directly through the Anglo-Saxon heritage of the Empire. This fact is one of the reasons why, outside the UK, the 'British' is usually mistaken for the 'English', and vice versa. Therefore, the English element in the discourse for Brexit is still present, regardless the fact that it is not directly addressed.

Since nationalism in Britain had never sought autonomy from any ruler, this notion was not familiar to British nationalists. The 'Vote Leave' campaign introduced sovereignty into the nationalists' agenda. It was this exact fact that turned British Euroscepticism from soft to hard. This transformation of British Euroscepticism changed the face of British nationalism as well. During the 'Vote Leave' campaign, sovereignty was separated in three ways; migration, legislative system and economy. These three principles had first been introduced by the 'Global Britain' organisation, they were promoted by the 'Vote Leave' campaign and they were embraced by the Conservative Party in Johnson's and May's speeches. By leaving the EU, the laws in the country will be taken in in the country. Once parliamentary sovereignty is restored, it is a matter of time to find a solution about the uncontrollable migration. Productivity and economic growth are big parts of the British nationalists' pride, and since, according to the used discourse, the EU's Single Market prevents economic growth, it also increases ontological insecurity. This is where nostalgia comes to save the day.

Memory is the key to unlock nostalgia. British hard Euroscepticism is filled with nostalgia. This happens mostly because British hard Euroscepticism is a right-wing populist phenomenon. One of the biggest elements of populism is the production of imaginaries to return to a glorious past and leave behind the dystopian present. As long as the country was part of the EU, it did not have the freedom to control its economy, its borders and its laws. This is exactly why the sense of sovereignty was introduced in British nationalism; because it mainly had a sense of nostalgia in it. The reason why nostalgia is so important is to prevent constant existential anxiety among

the nationalists. Since new threats are always appearing, ontological security becomes more uncertain, and its obtaining becomes more problematic. Without nostalgia and production of imaginaries, the nationalists would be doomed to live in eternal existential anxiety. However, by references to the past, the production of imaginaries prevents this kind of anxiety. In this case, the British nationalists stick onto the British Empire to avoid facing the fact that the world has changed since then. By introducing new ways to recapture the past, such as Global Britain and free trade world campaigner, they keep their hopes up for not only returning to their seafaring roots, but also to strengthen the Union that has been diminishing since decolonisation.

In conclusion, British nationalism as it arose after the Act of Union is a mixture of imperialism and industrial values, while British nationalism as it arose through Euroscepticism is a mixture of that former and notions of sovereignty, and it is affected by populist ideals, like the production of imaginaries that developed. Although these imaginaries are not expressed through practices such as colonisation, it is certainly expressed through other ideals of industrialisation, e.g. free trade. One thing has been clarified, that British nationalism is much more than just an expression of xenophobic ideals as they have been projected in the 'Vote Leave' campaign. However, returning to Gellner's approach that is used for this essay, the British nation is the concoction of values which derive from the conversation of two or more people who recognise each other as of the same nation. Therefore, British nationalism - as it is analysed and approached in the previous pages regarding the vision of a Global Britain - is the will to embrace and promote the values that have been exposed in the essay.

8. Discussion

8.1. Difficulties with distinguishing British and English Nationalism

On a daily basis, the “British” is usually misunderstood as the “English” by many people. However, the main obstacle is the fact that in academia, British nationalism is never confused with English nationalism or vice versa. One may contain traces of the other or one may have been developed through the other, but a researcher never mistaken the “English” for the “British”. The researchers and authors are very precise on whether they refer to English or to British nationalism. The use of academic material that I did is either mentioning Brexit as an exclusively English nationalist phenomenon or as a British nationalist phenomenon that has been influenced by the sense of Englishness. This essay is not an answer to any of this academic material that I used. But since I did use these specific research pieces, and since the references to the “English” are absent in the used discourse but not in the theoretical framework, I had to take the decision to approach the entire topic as an expression of British nationalism that has been influenced and shifted immensely by the sense of Englishness and its Anglo-Saxon heritage.

This assumption of the previous paragraph was made after studying thoroughly the material that I gathered. By just accepting the fact that Brexit is an expression of English nationalism would have led to false results, because I have no empirical evidence showing that this is true. None of my empirical material prove that ‘Leave’ voters in England feel exclusively English or more English than British. Therefore, my approach on the topic had to justify the references to the sense of Britishness with influences by the Anglo-Saxon characteristics. This, apparently, is not a general definition neither on British nationalism nor on English nationalism, it is simply how I perceived them through the analysis of my theoretical and empirical material.

8.2. Significance of the Study

This study hopes to contribute to the understanding of British nationalism in two main ways: its imperialist nostalgia - the memory of the glorious past of Britain and the denial of letting it go - and nationalism's evolution in the UK. Additionally, it contributes to the study of Eurosceptic discourses, in spite of the fact that it does not study Euroscepticism as a whole; but it illustrates only the right-wing aspect of this populist phenomenon in the UK.

This study can be an addition to the greatest research on the British national identity and the values that hold together the British nation. As Eco wrote in his book "How to Write a Thesis", a thesis of the present can become the first step of a broader research project of the future (2015, p. 5). From this point forward, a further research focusing on minor social groups can be conducted in order to obtain a view on how they perceived Brexit or on how they perceive British nationalism. Since Brexit is related to nationalism and the Conservative Party have contributed so much into supporting a vision for a Global Britain, then how do supporters of the Labour Party correspond to the topic? And of course, what are the responses of the supporters of other nationalist parties in the country? And by other nationalist parties, I mean the movements that demand the autonomy of the people with national identity other than English, such as Scottish nationalists and Ulster nationalists. Afterall, national consciousness comes by interacting with other people; it is not only the self-perception of one's self, but also the idea of other people about one's self.

Another expansion of this study could be the research on what role has devolution played for the results of the 23rd of June 2016. It is an issue that I mentioned in this essay, how Scotland and Northern Ireland, which are more devolved regions, voted against Brexit, while Wales, which is less devolved by two policy areas, voted to leave the EU and follow the central British state. Certainly, this is not an issue that

derives from the findings of my study, but this does not make it less of an interesting topic in academia.

Furthermore, the results of this essay could be used to involve industrialism back into the study of nationalism, not only in the UK, but also regarding other cases, such as the Anglosphere. The Anglosphere is mentioned many times in the discourse and extending the research in order to see their point of view in this story, but also to examine industrialisation's influence upon their nationalist values, would definitely contribute into the general image of their Anglo-Saxon identity. As well as the debate between industrialisation and nationalism in countries with less or absent protestant population, unlike the example of this essay. Such countries can be the countries of the Middle East, East and South-East Asia, and North Africa.

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10. Appendices

Appendix 1

Why should we Vote Leave on 23 June?

- David Cameron's deal leaves the EU in charge of the same things after as before his negotiation
- It is **not** legally binding – the European Court can tear it up the day after the referendum
- This is dangerous. We will keep sending at least £350 million a week to the EU
- Immigration will continue to be out of control putting public services like the NHS under strain
- The European Court will be in charge of our borders, immigration, asylum and even our intelligence services
- If we Vote Leave, we will take back control and can spend our money on our priorities



www.voteleavetakecontrol.org

 Vote Leave

Appendix 2

Let's take back control of our borders

- A quarter of a million EU migrants come here every year – a city the size of Newcastle
- This puts a big strain on public services like the NHS and schools
- The EU Court means we can't stop violent convicted criminals coming here from Europe
- The EU Court also stops us from deporting dangerous terror suspects



We need to take back control of our borders so we decide who can come here – and who can't

www.voteleavetakecontrol.org

 Vote Leave

Appendix 3

We need to be able to hold our lawmakers to account

- Over half our laws are made by unelected EU bureaucrats in Brussels for whom we never voted
- The Eurozone has a permanent majority in the EU voting system – this means **we're always outvoted**
- The UK has been outvoted **every single time** it has voted against EU laws
- These laws have cost **British taxpayers £2.4 billion**



We should take back the power to kick out the people who make our laws

www.voteleavetakecontrol.org

 Vote Leave

Appendix 4

Let's take back control over our economy and trade

- Only 5% of British businesses export to the EU but 100% suffer the burden of EU red tape
- EU regulations are highly damaging to our economy, costing small businesses millions every week
- EU energy regulations cost families and small businesses millions
- EU rules delay building schools and hospitals – and add millions to the cost
- We have no power to make free trade deals with fast growing economies like India and China – or even key allies like Australia and New Zealand



UK trade and jobs will thrive after we Vote Leave

www.voteleavetakecontrol.org

 Vote Leave

Source: http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/why_vote_leave.html

Appendix 5

Policy Area	Scotland	Wales	Northern Ireland
Health and social care	D	D	D
Education and training	D	D	D
Local Government	D	D	D
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries	D	D	D
Transport	D	D	D
Some taxation	D	D	D
Justice and Policing	D	R	D
Some social security elements	D	R	D
Sports and the arts	D	D	D
Defence			
Foreign Affairs			
Immigration		R	
Trade Policy			
Constitution			
Broadcasting (NI may legislate with SoS consent)			

This table is a broad summary of which powers are reserved (R) and devolved (D). The terms are a little different in Northern Ireland: ‘transferred’, ‘reserved’ and ‘excepted’ rather than ‘reserved’ and ‘devolved’. You can find out more about the Northern Ireland settlement as well as the Scotland and Wales settlements at

<https://www.gov.uk/topic/government/devolution>

Source: <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/devolution-of-powers-to-scotland-wales-and-northern-ireland>