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The anti-state jihadist war front of al-Qaida in Pakistan

A study of the post-9/11 localization strategy of al-Qaida

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Abstract

This study explains the post-9/11 localization strategy of al-Qaida by examining its role in anti-state jihad in Pakistan. The central argument of this study is that al-Qaida harnessed the domestic problems of Pakistan to incubate an anti-state jihadist movement in the country, which came to be led by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Leveraging a systematized set of narratives of al-Qaida and TTP leaders related to Pakistan, this study details the domestic conditions which led to the launch of war by local jihadists against Pakistan. The study finds that Pakistan's post 9/11 policies engendered grievances in Islamists parties and jihadist groups, who were attracted to al-Qaida's call to jihad. This study also shows that al-Qaida devised a careful strategy to channel these grievances in addition to the political and economic problems of Pakistan to harness the anger of Pakistani jihadis and shape the anti-state jihadist movement to its benefit. In turn, the anti-state jihadist movement in Pakistan not only helped al-Qaida in punishing the Pakistani state for its partnership with the US government post 9/11 but also helped support al-Qaida's war against the US and its allies in Afghanistan and beyond.

Keywords: Terrorism, al-Qaida, Pakistan, Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP), anti-state jihad, Macro-level analysis.

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Table of Contents

ABBREVIATIONS.....	V
1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY	3
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS	3
1.3 THESIS OUTLINE	4
2 JIHAD, AL-QAIDA AND PAKISTAN	5
2.1 MODERN JIHAD AND AL-QAIDA.....	5
2.2 DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR EXPLAINING THE TRANSNATIONAL JIHAD	9
2.3 AL-QAIDA AND ANTI-STATE JIHAD IN PAKISTAN	11
3 TERRORIST MOVEMENT AND DOMESTIC CONDITIONS.....	15
3.1 COMPARING CRENSHAW’S AND DELLA PORT’S CONCEPTS EXPLAINING THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC CONDITIONS FOR A TERRORIST MOVEMENT	15
3.2 AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK BASED ON CRENSHAW’S THEORY	18
3.2.1 <i>Permissive factors</i>	19
3.2.2 <i>Precipitants factors</i>	21
4 METHODOLOGY CHAPTER.....	25
4.1 QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY.....	25
4.2 DATA SOURCES	27
4.3 DATA COLLECTION.....	30
4.4 DATA QUALITY.....	32
4.5 THEMATIC ANALYSIS.....	33
4.6 DELIMITATIONS	35
5 ANALYSIS CHAPTER.....	37
5.1 PERMISSIVE FACTORS	37
5.1.1 <i>Social facilitation</i>	37

5.1.2	<i>The inability or leniency of the state</i>	42
5.2	PRECIPITATING FACTORS.....	43
5.2.1	<i>Concrete grievances</i>	44
5.2.2	<i>Lack of political participation</i>	48
5.2.3	<i>Mass passivity of the broader community</i>	50
5.2.4	<i>Precipitating event</i>	52
5.3	DISCUSSION	56
CONCLUSION		63
BIBLIOGRAPHY		65
PRIMARY SOURCES:		70

Abbreviations

AfPak	Afghanistan and Pakistan
AQIS	Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
IeK	Ihya-e-i-Khilafat
NAJ	Nawai Afghan Jihad
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
TTP	Tehreek Taliban Pakistan
US	United States

1 Introduction

Al-Qaida's trajectory since 9/11¹ requires more explanation. Despite the ferocity of the international counterterrorism response after 9/11, al-Qaida emerged as a vanguard of the Sunni jihadist world and remained so for a decade and a half. Whereas pre-9/11, it only enjoyed a safe haven in Afghanistan, post-9/11 al-Qaida developed large franchises, expanded affiliate organizations, and forged important alliances (Holbrook, 2014, pp. 17-21; Clarke, 2019, p. 7). In turn, al-Qaida acquired global membership, sophisticated fighting cadres, and important passive supporters (Stenersen, 2017b).

Although the global counter-terrorism efforts of the last two decades have greatly minimized al-Qaida's transnational terrorism capabilities, the political and organizational resilience of al-Qaida is an undeniable reality. This raises a simple yet important question that guides this study: How did al-Qaida survive post 9/11? The losses suffered by the group after 9/11, especially in the US military operations in Afghanistan and subsequent drone strikes campaigns (Mir, 2018), should have ended the organization, but it expanded manifold.

This study examines the survival and revival of al-Qaida in Pakistan, which served as the base for al-Qaida's reconsolidation for its post 9/11 campaign against the United States (Holbrook, 2014, p. 18; Shahzad, 2011). One of the primary aims of al-Qaida behind the 9/11 attacks was dragging the US into a long battle inside Afghanistan, where today, the US is involved in the longest war of its history (Stenersen, 2017a, p. 3). For this purpose, al-Qaida incubated a substantial jihadist movement in Pakistan, which helped the group in a number of ways. Al-Qaida's senior leadership, which was then facing a survival threat after losing its sanctuaries in Afghanistan, found a new

¹ 9/11 refers here to 11th September 2001 terrorist attacks of al-Qaida in the US which simultaneously hit multiple targets in different cities, particularly New York and Washington.

home in Pakistan (Scott-Clark & Adrian, 2017). Pakistan also provided the longest safe haven for the rest of al-Qaida's organization, where it was based in the tribal areas of Waziristan for more than a decade (Gul, 2011; Shahzad, 2011). From Pakistan, al-Qaida also guided a strong insurgency inside Afghanistan. Pakistan also became a base for al-Qaida's transnational terror plots after 9/11 (Nesser, 2016). Finally, Pakistan became a major theatre of the al-Qaida allied groups' war against the Pakistani state.

This study examines al-Qaida's politics of survival by examining the local politics of its base of operations and how al-Qaida aligns its transnational aims with that politics. As Thomas Hegghammer argues that the rise of transnational jihad that birthed al-Qaida in the late eighties, is situated alone neither in the theological aspects nor international politics, but mainly in the domestic politics of the Arab world (Hegghammer, 2020, p. 1). In a similar vein, this study shows that al-Qaida's success in Pakistan is best understood through the post 9/11 local domestic conditions, rooted in the social, political, and economic problems faced by key Islamists factions and movements.

The selection of Pakistan as a case study for this research makes sense for three reasons. First, al-Qaida is mostly approached as a problem of the Arab world. The existing literature disproportionately focuses on case studies from the Arab world or Africa (Maruf, et al., 2018; Lia, 2016; Hegghammer, 2010a; Zelin, 2020). That research is important; however, Pakistan's centrality to al-Qaida remains underappreciated. For one, it is the birthplace of al-Qaida (Wright, 2006, p. 133). Since its formation, the group has remained connected to the country in diverse ways for more than three decades. Understanding the rise of transnational jihadism post 9/11 is incomplete without understanding al-Qaida's trajectory in Pakistan.

Second, studying al-Qaida in Pakistan offers an important data opportunity. The Pakistani chapter of al-Qaida has a sophisticated online operation. Al-Qaida established

its first media network in Pakistan in 2002 (Farooq, 2012). The official Pakistani media wing of al-Qaida, As-Sahab Urdu, came into being in 2005 (ibid). As-Sahab Urdu quickly became a role model for all other media wings of al-Qaida (Rafiq, 2015).

Thirdly, since al-Qaida's decision to create franchises, al-Qaida has an important franchise in Pakistan – Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) – is a product of the post-9/11 jihadist war theatre of Pakistan (Soufan Center, 2019). Al-Qaida, through AQIS, can influence the complex conflicts in the region and revitalize its ambitions of global jihad. The study of al-Qaida in Pakistan can improve an assessment of the threat al-Qaida may pose in the region and beyond.

1.1 Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study is to explain anti-state jihadist politics in Pakistan by exploring the role of al-Qaida. This study traces the post-9/11 survival strategy of al-Qaida and its impact on the anti-jihadist scene in Pakistan, as well al-Qaida's shift from transnational terrorism to a localization strategy. The study examines domestic conditions in Pakistan tapped by al-Qaida and their connection with al-Qaida's transnational aims through the publicly available narratives of al-Qaida and Pakistani jihadist groups' leadership. This thesis contributes a novel explanation on the important strategic shift of localization of al-Qaida after 9/11, which is seen as one of the main reasons behind its survival. This study challenges a common wisdom in the terrorism studies and particularly jihadism literature that for al-Qaida transnational and local war aims are irreconcilable. It shows that instead al-Qaida has the ability to seamlessly move between the two for the benefit of both political priorities.

1.2 Research Questions

I assess al-Qaida's strategy in Pakistan by breaking the inquiry around two questions:

- What were the domestic conditions that al-Qaida used to benefit from in establishing an anti-state jihadist war front in Pakistan after 9/11?
- How did the anti-state Pakistani jihadists formulate the social, political, and economic problems of Pakistan to support al-Qaida's transnational aims?

1.3 Thesis outline

The next part of this thesis covers the background and literature review chapter, which contains a comprehensive discussion about al-Qaida, modern jihad, and anti-state jihad in Pakistan. It gives a detailed insight to the readers about the rise of the modern jihad, its three variants, and then the emergence of al-Qaida as the dominant actor of the jihadist world. It also contains a summary of the main tracks in the existing literature about al-Qaida and global jihad. The last section of this chapter explains the pro-state to the anti-state journey of the Pakistani jihadists. The third chapter outlines the theoretical framework of this research. It first compares the environmental conditions of Causes of Terrorism theory of Martha Crenshaw with the macro-level analysis of Donatella Della Porta's theory for defining the importance of the domestic conditions for explaining a terrorist movement. In the next section, it operationalizes an analytical framework for the thesis based on Crenshaw's theory. The fourth chapter is of methodology, which explains the methodological choices of this paper. It also informs the reader about the data set for this research, its collection, and its pros and cons. The fifth chapter is the analysis of the empirical findings, which ends with an interesting discussion integrating the analysis of the empirical findings with the theory and other previous parts of this research. The next part is the conclusion of the thesis, which is followed by the bibliography. Bibliography contains a separate list of the primary sources at the end.

2 Jihad, al-Qaida and Pakistan

This chapter reviews the existing literature on Islamist militancy, al-Qaida, and anti-state jihadist politics in Pakistan. The first part includes a detailed overview of the evolution of modern jihad and its different variants. It discusses how, why, and when al-Qaida dominated the jihadist world across the globe. It also includes a discussion about the strategy of al-Qaida from transnational terrorist attacks to localization shift after 9/11. The second part provides a brief overview of the approaches in the existing literature for studying the different dimensions of al-Qaida and global jihad. The last part gives a comprehensive overview of the al-Qaida role in turning pro-state jihad to anti-state in Pakistan. These discussions will help the reader to understand the background of the research problem and an insight into the study. Secondly, these discussions contribute to the analysis of the empirical findings of this research.

2.1 Modern jihad and al-Qaida

Before turning to the debate on the rise and expansion of al-Qaida, let me make here a definition of jihad for the readers. Jihad is an Arabic word meaning struggle or to strive for. In religious terms, it means a struggle for Islam which can be both through violent and nonviolent means. Islamist groups define violent jihad in two ways: offensive and defensive jihad (Mendelsohn, 2009: 40). Offensive jihad is for the expansion of Islam while defensive is for the liberation of Muslim lands or helping communities of Muslims perceived as oppressed. In this research, the word jihad refers to violent jihad in modern ages, which according to Abu Musab al-Suri², started in the 1960s (Al-Suri, 2004).

² Abu Musab al-Suri is considered the leading ideologue of the global jihad, see for more about him, (Lia, 2007)

Thomas Hegghammer categorizes modern violent jihad into three main types: socio-revolutionary, transnational classical, and global jihad (Hegghammer, 2010a, p. 07). Socio-revolutionary jihad is to oust Muslim rulers through militancy, transnational classical jihad is intended to liberate occupied Muslim lands, and global jihad is envisaged to fight hegemony of the US and West for ending the “oppression” of Muslims.

Socio-revolutionary jihad is a domestic one. Conflicts encompassed in this type include from the campaign in Egypt in the 1960s, in Syria and Afghanistan in the 1970s, and Algeria in the early 1990s (Sands & Qazizada, 2019, pp. 73-78; Lia, 2007, pp. 35-37; Mendelsohn, 2009, p. 46). Sayyid Qutab and Abdul Salam Faraj are considered two leading theorists of socio-revolutionary jihad.³

While the transnational and global variants of jihad focus on fighting major great power, they are different. The transnational jihad claims that it is an individual duty of every Muslim to support oppressed fellow Muslims in any corner of the world (Hegghammer, 2020, p. 499).⁴ Abdullah Azzam is considered the founder of the transnational classical jihad, which mobilized thousands of Muslims across the world to fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.⁵ This argument gave birth to the phenomenon of foreign fighters, which later on benefited global jihadism. Kashmir, Tajikistan, Bosnia, Philippines, and Chechnya were its other fronts after Afghanistan (Hegghammer, 2010b; Roy & Zahab, 2004).

³ Both have written two books individually which are considered influential ideological guidance for this category of jihad, see, *Milestones* (by Syed Qutb) and *The Absent Duty* (by Abdul Salam Faraj).

⁴ Two book of Abdullah Azzam played influential role in mobilizing the Muslims across the world for joining the Afghan jihad against the Soviet invasion. His struggles birthed to the phenomenon of Muslim foreign fighters which later on benefited the jihadist groups like al-Qaida and ISIS. For details on Muslim foreign fighters, see, (Hegghammer, 2010b)

⁵ For details about Azzam, see, (Hegghammer, 2020).

On the other hand, global jihad took shape after the Afghan-Soviet war, which became the trademark of al-Qaida. The global jihad of al-Qaida emphasized defeating the existing world system dominated by the US-West, which will establish the supremacy of Muslims in the world. Therefore, al-Qaida turned for transitional terrorist attacks in the West, which resulted in the September 11 attacks in the US.

The global jihad narrative of al-Qaida birthed the debate of the far and near enemy (Gerges, 2009)⁶. Al-Qaida argued that rather than fighting the near enemies (Muslim rulers), jihadists needed to defeat the far enemy (US and West) first. In this view, the far enemy is the source of miseries and oppressions of Muslims across the world, and thus fighting to defeat it is the primary solution for the problems of the Muslim world. For example, to get rid of un-Islamic and corrupt regimes in the Arab world, to liberate the occupied lands (e.g., Palestine, Kashmir, etc.) and to establish an Islamic caliphate. Therefore, the pre-9/11 emphasis of al-Qaida on all other jihadists was to join global jihad for defeating the US and West (Mendelsohn, 2011, p. 36). The September 11 attacks, causing the most severe blow to the US on its soil in its history, opened unexpected large flows of jihadists across the world into the ranks and files of al-Qaida. Most of them did not agree with its global jihad view before 9/11.

The focus of countering al-Qaida has mainly remained in eliminating its capability for more attacks in the West like 9/11. Some experts use the al-Qaida capabilities of attacks in the West as a tool for measuring its strength. This assumption does not seem to be correct when we look back at the goal behind its foundation. According to al-Qaida experts (Stenersen, 2017a, p. 8; Mendelsohn, 2011; Clarke, 2019), the group was established as the global vanguard of jihad – to back and support the jihadist movements across the world – and not merely for large-scale attacks like 9/11. Anne Stenersen, an expert on al-Qaida, argues that transnational terrorism is only one of al-

⁶ For more details of this debate, see, Fawaz Gerges book, *“Far and Near Enemy”* (Gerges, 2009).

Qaida's strategy and the group has a flexible strategy (Stenersen, 2017a, pp. 1-3). She argues that one of the purposes of al-Qaida behind 9/11 was for a massive mobilization of the Muslim masses for jihad. Al-Qaida, later on, shifted to covertly supporting the local jihadist war fronts in the world for this purpose; for example, Iraq, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Yemen, Algeria, Somalia, Pakistan (ibid; Mendelsohn, 2009, p. 46; Clarke, 2019, p. 11).

Similarly, a closer study of major transnational terrorist attacks by al-Qaida suggests that the group used such attacks as a tool for the expansion of the jihadist war fronts across the world.⁷ For example, Bin Laden and other leadership of al-Qaida many times expressed this view that the primary purpose of 9/11 was to lure the US-West for invading Muslim countries (Stenersen, 2017b, pp. 9-10). Al-Qaida aimed at 9/11 for creating an opportunity for bringing its prime enemy to the battlegrounds of its choice rather than going after them to the far-away Western countries (ibid; Andersen & Sheikh, 2017, pp. 11-19). Experts consider these local jihadist battlefields significant for the covert growth of al-Qaida in the years after 9/11. They can enable al-Qaida in the future to strike the US again on its soil whenever the circumstances become favorable (Clarke, 2019, pp. 28-29).

Barak Mendelsohn, an expert on the franchising strategy of al-Qaida, views the localization process of al-Qaida from another angle. According to Mendelsohn, the 9/11 attacks provided al-Qaida with unexpected opportunities for massive expansion for which it was not ready (Mendelsohn, 2011, p. 39). For this purpose, the group adopted the strategy of establishing regional franchises and local branches or covert local chapters by radicalizing existing jihadist groups and individuals. Similarly, many other experts of transnational jihad also consider the shift of al-Qaida from

⁷ Such as, the 1998 attacks against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, targeting USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 and the September 2001 attacks on the US soil.

transnational terrorism to localization as the cause of the massive expansion of jihadism after 9/11 (Lia, 2016; Meagan & Zeigler, 2017; Sheikh, 2017). This trend started with the opening of the al-Qaida chapter in the KSA in 2003 (Hegghammer, 2010a). Due to this massive localization process, Stenersen argues that it does not fit suitable to term al-Qaida merely a global organization (Stenersen, 2017b, p. 9). Instead, in the words of Tore Hamming (Hamming, 2019, p. 02), the term “glocal” is more fitting al-Qaida than calling it a global organization. The glocalization strategy of al-Qaida can explain its post-9/11 war fronts in the Muslim countries where it did not pose any particular security challenge to these states before 2001.⁸

The above debate shows that some of the expert scholars of Islamic militancy and al-Qaida agree that the main aim of the global jihad of al-Qaida was to trigger a massive mobilization of jihadists in the Muslim world, for which it first focused on a strategy of transnational terrorist attacks in the West. The group later replaced it with a strategy of incubating local jihadist war fronts in the Muslim world. However, some other scholars disagree on the relationship between transnational and localization strategies. This research is a contribution in this regard for exploring the localization strategy of al-Qaida in Pakistan after 9/11.

2.2 Different approaches for explaining the transnational jihad

The period after 9/11 saw massive growth in the studies of jihadist terrorism. Since then, many academic disciplines have focused on researching the evolution and expansion of transnational jihadist terrorism. In social sciences, this research concentrates mainly on the fields of political science, sociology, and many of their

⁸ Except KSA, which considered Bin Laden and his group a threat to its security because of the Bin Laden severe criticism of the KSA rulers for deploying US army in the country (Wright, 2006, p. 4). Otherwise, al-Qaida had not hostile relations with any other Muslim state before 9/11. For example, Yemen, Pakistan etc. which became hotbeds of al-Qaida war after 9/11, but evidence show that al-Qaida covertly maintained its networks in these countries.

inter-disciplinary and subfields like terrorism studies, peace and conflict studies, social movement studies, political psychology, and socio-theology. Mostly these studies revolve around the following central dimensions of transnational jihadism; the rise of global jihad, jihadist terrorism in the West and foreign fighters, internal dynamics of transnational jihadism, and its regional and local expansions.

The first body of literature discusses the rise of global jihad that how it took shape (Hegghammer, 2020; Roy & Zahab, 2004; Hamid & Farrall, 2015). It explains al-Qaida as the foundational base of transnational jihad (Atwan, 2006; Wright, 2006). This research work focuses on the study of the establishment and evolution of al-Qaida, its ideology, mergers of other jihadist groups into it, and on the leading figures of transnational jihadism (Rassler, 2017; Stenersen, 2017b; Lia, 2007; Al-Zayyat, 2004; Farrall, 2017). This work tells us who, when, how, and what played essential roles in the rise of transnational jihad.

The second body literature concentrates on transnational jihadist terrorism in the West (Nesser, 2016). It gives the detailed accounts about the jihadist terrorist acts in the West, analysis of the involved individual actors and their radicalization processes (Nesser & Stenersen, 2014; Soufan, 2015; Bergen, 2008). The migration of radicalized Muslims from the West and other countries into the battlefields of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria is also closely connected to this field (Hegghammer, 2013b; Holman, 2015). These studies indicate the unexpected high decrease of jihadist terrorism in the West in comparison to its massive expansion after 9/11.

The third category revolves around the internal dynamics of the transnational jihadist groups (Atwan, 2013). It explores the expansion of transnational jihadist terrorism from the cooperation and rivalries of the jihadist groups (Brown & Rassler, 2013; Hamming, 2017). This study shows how the internal dynamics of transnational jihadism has transformed its strategies for the survival and expansion of global jihad (Clarke, 2019;

Hamming, 2019). Different theological approaches used for explaining transnational jihadism also fit this category. The magnitude of this research increases with the so-called Islamic State split from al-Qaida in 2013.

The fourth category studies the opposite shift of transnational jihadism, from the far enemies back to the near ones, discussing changing patterns of jihadist terrorism from the West to its increase in the local Muslim countries (Gerges, 2009; Sheikh, 2017; Parvez, 2019; Lia, 2016; Meagan & Zeigler, 2017; Nesser & Gråtrud, 2019). It includes the localization and franchising strategy of al-Qaida started in 2003 from KSA, expanded to many other regions in the years later (Hegghammer, 2010a; Mendelsohn, 2011; Maruf, et al., 2018). The last category, on the other hand, lacks enough research effort. Many notable cases of these anti-state jihadists war theatres still need explorations for analyzing their roots to the global jihadism of al-Qaida.

This research is contributing to the last two categories. Its main contribution is exploring an important local war front of jihad, i.e., Pakistan, which enabled al-Qaida to develop a deep network in the country. Later on, that network evolved into one of the strongest franchises of al-Qaida in South Asia – al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) (Soufan Center, 2019). While it also narrates how the ties of al-Qaida with the conventional Pakistani jihadist groups became severe after 9/11. Many of their members revolted from these groups and came close to al-Qaida and helped it in the war against their state. The coming section explains the pro-state to the anti-state journey of these jihadists under al-Qaida.

2.3 Al-Qaida and anti-state jihad in Pakistan

The connections of al-Qaida to Pakistan predate its founding. Al-Qaida was established in 1988 in the North-Western city of Peshawar, which was then the headquarters of jihadists from across the world participating in the Afghan-Soviet war (Wright, 2006,

pp. 44-46). Al-Qaida remained in Pakistan till the early nineties before locating to Sudan in 1992 (Stenersen, 2017a, p. 2). After shifting back to Afghanistan in 1995, the group came in more close contact with the Pakistani jihadists through the Afghan Taliban. Al-Qaida fostered very close relations with the Pakistani jihadists – who were mostly from the Deobandi sect⁹ – when both were fighting together for the Taliban government in Afghanistan during 1996-2001 (Rassler, 2017). Until 2001, al-Qaida never appeared any threat to the Pakistani state because of its only focus on the far enemy. Secondly, the domestic political conditions of the country were not in favor of any violent revolt against the state. In a subsequent chapter, a detailed discussion of this issue will follow.

Since the 1990s, Pakistan has supported Islamist militant groups fighting in Afghanistan and India (Fair, 2018, p. 10; Kapur & Ganguly, 2012). Pakistani state funded dozens of jihadist groups to fight against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Rana, 2003). These groups were later on re-directed to Kashmir for its liberation from India. These remained based in Afghanistan until the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 (Rassler, 2017). During the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, these groups developed relations with al-Qaida, which provided training and economic support. In turn, these groups helped meet al-Qaida's logistic needs in Pakistan (ibid).¹⁰ It was an important period of the evolution of al-Qaida during which the group trained hundreds of recruits from Arab countries and also planned deadliest transnational terrorists attacks (Stenersen, 2017a, p. 156). Al-Qaida also established close relations with influential religious scholars and Islamist parties of Pakistan through them (Stenersen, 2017a, p. 73)

⁹Majority of the pro-state jihadist groups belong to the Deobandi sect – which is one of the main Sunni sects in Pakistan. Pakistan has a wide network of Deobandi *Madrassas* (religious schools) which are seen as the main recruiting places of these jihadist groups. Afghan Taliban also belong to Deobandi sect and most of their leadership are also graduated from these madrassas.

¹⁰ Important of these were, Harkatul Ansar, Harkatul Mujahideen, Harkatul Jihad Islami, Jaish-e-Muhammad.

Until the September 11 attacks, Pakistan maintained very cordial mutual relations with various jihadi groups. Soon after these attacks, Pakistan joined the international coalition for the Global War on Terror (GWOT) – a war against al-Qaida and its allies – which drove a wedge between jihadists and the Pakistani state. Many Pakistani jihadists turned against the Pakistani state. They started providing shelters and support to al-Qaida members inside Pakistan once the US invasion of Afghanistan got underway (Scott-Clark & Adrian, 2017). Some of them joined hands with al-Qaida and carried out sophisticated terrorist attacks against the army and government as revenge (Musharraf, 2006). They also helped al-Qaida to establish a safe haven in the Pashtun tribal regions of the country bordering with Afghanistan – which became the longest base of al-Qaida in its history (Shahzad, 2011; Gul, 2011).

The situation in Pakistan became favorable to such an extent that it attracted al-Qaida to establish its branch in the country which is evident from a letter of Bin Laden¹¹, dated 2004,

"In regard to Tawfiq and Hamzah al-Rabi', it is essential to assign some Pakistani brothers who are satisfied with our work program, to establish a branch for al-Qa'ida in Pakistan, to recruit the needed elements to work inside and outside."

But al-Qaida officially announced a war against Pakistan in 2007 after the Pakistani military's controversial raid on the al-Qaida sympathetic Red Mosque in Islamabad (Shahzad, 2011). Red Mosque belonged to the Deobandi sect. Most of the jihadist groups had a very close connection to it. The founder of the mosque was one of the leading Islamist figures of the country who had established close contacts with al-Qaida

¹¹ This letter is part of the massive library of Bin Laden documents which is accessible online through the website of the US Directorate of National Intelligence. They were captured during the Abbottabad raid of May 2011 in which Bin Laden was killed.
<https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2017/english/Draft%20of%20a%20letter%20to%20subordinates.pdf>

before 2001 (Shahzad, 2011, p. 42). The mosque became important support center of al-Qaida in the center of the capital of the country (ibid, p. 43). It had also taken the shape of a radical Islamist movement demanding for strict implementation of Sharia law in the country. The movement went beyond the control of the government in 2007, and they had to ask the army for support. This resulted in military action against the Red Mosque movement in which the army destroyed the mosque and killed a central leader of the movement, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, with dozens of his supporters. The Red Mosque incident riled Islamist and jihadist communities across Pakistan. The resulting political situation shaped into an ideal opportunity for al-Qaida, who responded quickly by declaring war against the Pakistani state to seek revenge. A large number of members of Islamist parties and jihadist groups¹² responded to al-Qaida's call (Rana, 2015). Al-Qaida organized them under an umbrella organization - Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – which became its frontline anti-state ally in Pakistan (Shahzad, 2011; Sheikh, 2016).

In conclusion, the anti-state jihadis movement in Pakistan lacks any prior 9/11 solid roots to the Islamist or jihadist parties of the country because they all had close links with the state. They were struggling for the state interests through the country and importantly through militancy in the region. Therefore, the post-9/11 jihadists' war against their state emerged as an unexpected development that now had forged close ties with al-Qaida.

¹² The word Islamic faction and jihadist groups have separate meanings in this thesis. Islamist factions are the Pakistani Islamist parties active in non-violent political struggles in the country, for example, Jamaat Islami (JI), various factions of Jamiat Ulama Islam (JUI), Ahilsunnat Wal Jumaat (ASWJ, formerly known as Sipahi Sahaba Pakistan, SSP). The jihadist groups are the pro-state conventional jihadi groups, the so-called Kashmiri jihadists, mostly connected with the Islamist political parties. They have active support network in the country but have remained active in violence in abroad, mostly in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

3 Terrorist movement and domestic conditions

This chapter presents the theoretical framework to examine the role of domestic conditions in the anti-state jihadist war front of al-Qaida in Pakistan after 9/11. Two different theories from sociology and political science provide relevant analytical frameworks: the *Social Movement theory* of Donatella Della Porta and the *Causes of Terrorism theory* of Crenshaw. The “environmental conditions” of Crenshaw’s theory and the “macro-level analyses” of Della Port’s theory study the role of domestic conditions for a terrorist movement. Della Porta has studied the anti-state left-wing terrorism of Italy and Germany, which led to the foundation of her theory. Crenshaw is a pioneering expert in terrorism research. She has derived her theory researching various case studies of anti-state movements between 1780 till the 1960s.

Although this research is using Crenshaw’s theory as its analytical framework first, it compares it with macro-level analysis of Della Porta’s theory to better explore its pros and cons for the case study of this research. I proceed in two steps. First, I overview the theories. Second, I operationalize the Crenshaw’s analytical framework for its applicability to the anti-state jihadist war front of al-Qaida in Pakistan.

3.1 Comparing Crenshaw’s and Della Port’s concepts explaining the role of domestic conditions for a terrorist movement

Della Porta’s and Crenshaw’s theories employ a three-level analytical framework for explaining the political violence of non-state actors against the state. The three levels of analysis of Della Porta's theory are macro, meso, and micro levels. Macro-analysis relates to the study of the system or processes at the domestic level, which results in organized violence (Porta, 1995, p. 10). The other two examines the strategies of the terrorist group and the psychological factors of individuals for explaining terrorism (Porta, 1995, p. 10). Similarly, Crenshaw’s theory includes environmental conditions,

group strategy, and individuals motivations, which correspond to the macro, meso, and micro levels of Della Porta's theory (Crenshaw, 1981). The environmental conditions are the domestic problems that focus on the broad political, social, and economic issues on the macro-level for explaining the causes of terrorism.

Della Porta's theory is significant for the cases having high levels of domestic violence (Porta, 1995, pp. 5-6). This significance makes it relevant to study anti-state transnational jihadism, which is notable for indiscriminate violence against civilians (Crenshaw, 2011, pp. 7-8). Second, it claims to have explanatory power for those violent political movements whose goals are undemocratic (Porta, 1995, p. 6). The anti-state transnational jihadist movements are also anti-democratic, to establish Sharia systems¹³ in the Muslim countries, leading to a proto-state global system Islamic Caliphate (Andersen & Sheikh, 2017, p. 11).

However, this theory has some limitations.

First, Della Port's theory focuses alone on the political aspects of the domestic problems, mainly the grievances from the state. It ignores broader social, economic, and cultural variables (Porta, 1995, p. 14). Second, it considers an active political movement essential precursor for starting violence against the state, which Della Porta says emerges from pre-existing social movement (Porta, 1995, p. 3). However, as mentioned in the last part of the preceding chapter, the anti-state jihadist movement in the country lacks reliable connections to any particular political or social movement of the country, which could be declared bases of the anti-state jihadist movement in the country.

¹³ Sharia literally means path or way. Its common interpretation is "divine law". The Islamists view it as an inflexible set of divine laws that should only be the law of a Muslim country. (Sheikh, 2016, p. 46)

The above shortcomings make Crenshaw's *Causes of terrorism* theory (Crenshaw, 1981) a more suitable theoretical frame for the questions posed in this study for two reasons. First, the environmental conditions of this theory include economic and social conditions, in addition to the political processes (Crenshaw, 1981, pp. 380-385). It provides a more comprehensive analytical framework that takes into consideration many other domestic factors rather than just the hostile actions of states for explaining the rise of an anti-state terrorist campaign. Applying this framework to the Pakistani case study will allow a focus on not just the implications of the political actions of the state but the pre-existing conditions in Pakistani society, which enable the entrenchment of al-Qaida in Pakistan. As Pakistan had a history for cordial relations with jihadists, how those jihadis turned against the Pakistani state is a major paradox, which can't be accounted for just by Pakistani state's choices (Kapur & Ganguly, 2012). We need to look beyond the Pakistani state's actions and behaviors to understand al-Qaida in Pakistan.

Secondly, the utility of Crenshaw's theory is that it views terrorism as a rational strategy of a non-state group for its political goals (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 380). "The rational needs" push the group for using the favorable domestic conditions into a terrorist war theater against the state for its goals. Thus, for Crenshaw, terrorism is a calculated strategy of a group for its broader goals. The rationality of a terrorist group is of the assumption that they have a consistent set of values, beliefs, and images of the environment (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 385). The terrorist plays role in converting the passive grievances of a community in concrete grievances, thus pushing some of its members for a violent means for revenging them. Similarly, this research considers al-Qaida of the prime role for encouraging the Pakistani people for war against their state, which relates to its broader goals of massive jihadist expansion for achieving the global hegemony of Islam (Stenersen, 2017a, p. 08).¹⁴

¹⁴ For more details, see, 2.1 section of the Literature Review chapter of this thesis.

Let me clear it here that focusing only on the environmental aspect of Crenshaw's theory does not exclude the importance of its other two aspects in this research. They are also contributing to this research from a broader perspective. As discussed previously, the central notion of this research considers the anti-state jihadist war front in Pakistan as part of the rational strategy of al-Qaida. Secondly, as we shall meet in the coming methodology chapter, the methodological approach of this research is based on studying the conscious attitudes of the al-Qaida leadership and their Pakistani followers through their public statements and interviews. This is in line with Crenshaw's main proposition of individual-level analysis, which emphasizes studying the conscious attitudes of the terrorists to understand their actual motivations (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 390).

Before going to operationalize the role of the environmental conditions of Crenshaw's theory to explain the anti-state jihadist movement of al-Qaida in Pakistan after 9/11, let first explain how Crenshaw defines terrorism. According to Crenshaw, terrorism can be both for and against the state. This theory looks into the terrorism that non-state actors use against the state (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 379). She says that non-state terrorist groups use terrorism to communicate political messages. The terrorist campaign goes beyond, causing material losses to the enemy and aims reactions from different audiences (ibid). Similarly, this research claims that the anti-state jihadist movement of al-Qaida in Pakistan was for multiple purposes, for revenge from the state, and seeking support from the Islamist and jihadist groups of Pakistan. The discussion of the analysis chapter explains it in detail.

3.2 An analytical framework based on Crenshaw's theory

Here I will operationalize the main propositions of the domestic conditions of Crenshaw's theory for outlining a framework for the analysis of the empirical materials of this research. Crenshaw divides domestic conditions into two categories, *permissive*

and *precipitants* (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 381). Permissive are the pull factors that are the root causes and facilitate the establishment of terrorist movements in the long run. They provide opportunities that create such situations that motivate a terrorist campaign. Precipitants directly push for terrorism and results in a terrorist movement. They not only prepare the environment for terrorism but also provide motivations and direction for a terrorist campaign (ibid).

Both sets of factors are subdivided into four categories, as shown in *Table 1*. First is the operationalization of the *permissive factors*, which precedes then the *precipitant factors*.

Table 1

Crenshaw's analytical framework of the causes of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981, pp. 381-5)

Environmental conditions or Domestic issues (social, political, economic, cultural issues)	
Permissive or pull factors	Precipitant or push factors
Modernization	Concrete grievance
Urbanization	Lack of political participation
Social facilitation	Mass passivity of the broader community
The leniency of the state	Precipitating event

3.2.1 Permissive factors

According to Crenshaw, the following are the main permissive factors:

- Modernization
- Urbanization

- Social facilitation
- The leniency of the state

The first two permissive factors - modernization and urbanization - do not appear relevant to this case study. Modernization is significant for it provides such facilities, which helps the terrorist groups, for example, sophisticated networks of communications and transportation (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 381). Similarly, Crenshaw sees terrorism purely as an urban guerilla war phenomenon of cities (ibid, 383). Cities are highly significant because they provide essential opportunities for terrorism, for example, a variety of targets, mobility, communications, anonymity, and audiences. Above all, cities provide excellent recruitment grounds for terrorism. As we shall see in the next chapter that the methodological approach of this research is using thematic analysis of the public narratives of al-Qaida and its fellow Pakistani jihadist, which might not inform us well about these two factors. Although, I will keep them as two separate themes in the analysis of the empirical data and will reflect in detail on them in the analysis chapter.

Social facilitation is the next permissive factor, which can be a significant factor for the analysis of this case study. This factor can include social and cultural habits and historical traditions which provide moral and political justifications for the authorization of the use of force against the state (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 382). These can be significant in the analysis for four reasons.

First, Muslims of Pakistan as a part of British India has a long history of the violent revolts against the rulers for resisting foreign invasions or ending oppressions. Secondly, al-Qaida found strong support within the Pashtun tribal areas of the country bordering with Afghanistan after 9/11. It will be interesting to know how their tribal culture and customs have facilitated the al-Qaida war in Pakistan. Third, as mentioned in the literature review chapter, a large number of Pakistan jihadists have previously

involved in foreign jihads under state support. These jihadists have enjoyed respect and support in society where the state and people admire them for sacrificing life for the greater interests of the country (Murshed, 2003, pp. 409-413). It will be interesting to know how al-Qaida benefited from these existing sympathies for jihad in Pakistani society. Fourth, previous research on foreign jihadists shows religious justifications of prime importance for motivating them to fight against their state and fellow Muslims (Hegghammer, 2013b, pp. 7-9). It is, therefore, interesting to find what kind of religious arguments al-Qaida used for turning these foreign jihadists for war in their home country.

The last category of permissive actors is the absence of effective counter-terrorism measures, which could be either due to the inability or leniency of the state (Crenshaw, 1981, pp. 381-2). Crenshaw says that terrorists are mostly clandestine groups, which make states generally unable to counter them effectively. However, the leniency or negligence of the state can be interesting to analyze in this case study where Pakistan is alleged for covertly supporting jihadists (Fair, 2018, p. 10; Kapur & Ganguly, 2012). It will be interesting to study if this covert support indirectly channeled to al-Qaida in its anti-state war because members of the pro-state jihadist groups secretly provided massive supports to al-Qaida for its re-emerging from Pakistani after 9/11 and later in its war against the state (Hussain, 2012; Shahzad, 2011).

3.2.2 Precipitants factors

Following are the main precipitant factors:

- Concrete grievances
- Lack of opportunity for political participation
- Context
- Precipitating event

The first important precipitant factor is the existence of concrete grievance in a smaller group of a community, who believe the state responsible for the ill-treatment or discrimination against their larger community (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 383). Crenshaw says that the terrorist movement emerges as a smaller part of the political movement of this broader community struggling for their rights or justice against the state discriminations, for example, a nationalist movement demanding state. The role of an external agent is considered responsible for imparting perception for violent revolt to the enraged smaller part of this large community for the perceived injustices, deprivations, and oppressions against them. Similarly, in this case study, the role of al-Qaida will be studied in imparting perceptions to the passive grievances of the different communities of Pakistan, which can be particularly, the Islamist parties and jihadist groups.

The second important precipitating factor is the lack of opportunity for political participation (Crenshaw, 1981, pp. 383-4). It might be due to direct or indirect state restrictions on political struggle. It might be due to the hopelessness of goal achievements through the existing political system controlled by the state, for example, pseudo or controlled democratic system in the country. It can have two important implications in the analysis of this case study. First, it can explain the frustrations of the members of the state-supported jihadist groups who, after 9/11, were banned from taking part in militancy in Afghanistan or Kashmir (Hussain, 2007, p. 51). Most of them became the early recruits of al-Qaida in Pakistan (Shahzad, 2011). Secondly, it can explain the trajectory of the youth from Islamist parties into the anti-state jihadist movement in the country who are disillusioned with the political system of the country (ibid). They are the people frustrated with the non-violent political struggle for their goals in the country.

The third important factor for direct causes of terrorism is the context in which the broader community remains silent or passive on the hostile actions against its smaller

group who struggle through violent means for the rights of its larger community (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 384). They remain discontent with mass passivity of their community in reaction to the transgressions of the state. Desperately, they resolve to use the violence for the rights or defense of their community, without any consultation with them. This smaller part of the larger community can also be from its elites, who became the target of the hostile actions of the state in struggling for community members. Similar is the case of jihadists in general and al-Qaida in particular. They consider themselves as the elite of Muslim Ummah¹⁵ fighting on behalf of them, where in reality, the majority of Muslims disown them (Holbrook, 2014, pp. 110-115).

It will be interesting to know such actions of the Pakistani state, which jihadists consider hostile against Islam, their country, ethnicity, or tribe, etc. For example, the jihadists mostly connect the state actions against them as oppressions against Islam. Some of these could be, for example, counter-terrorism actions in the country resulting in the killing or arrests of jihadists, military operations in the tribal regions, US drone strikes, and many similar others.

The final factor of the direct causes of terrorism is the precipitating event, which precedes immediately before the outbreak of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981, pp. 384-5). These events involve unexpected actions of the government with excessive use of violence, which then results in a reaction from the targeted population against the state. The action-reaction series results in a conflict between the state and its challenges.

There could be many examples of it; for example, the state rejection of the election results in Algeria in 1991 for the fears that the radical Islamists would make their government (Mendelsohn, 2009, p. 46). As a reaction, it resulted in a brutal jihadist war against the state. In the case of Pakistan, Pakistan's support in the US invasion of

¹⁵ The worldwide Muslim community (Gerges, 2009, p. 25)

Afghanistan after 9/11 can be one of the main precipitating events. It will be interesting to know all the similar incidents which have contributed to the establishment of a jihadist war front in Pakistan.

4 Methodology Chapter

4.1 Qualitative Case study

This research aims to study the post-9/11 localization strategy of al-Qaida, which is difficult to quantify but suits better a qualitative approach. Therefore, this research is a qualitative case study. In research designs, a case study is a common approach to qualitative research (Bryman, 2012, p. 66). Case studies provide a significant part of the knowledge about the social and political world (Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 223). A case can be a phenomenon, or an event, chosen, conceptualized, and analyzed empirically as a manifestation of a broader class of phenomena or events. (Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 226) Researchers use case studies for detailed and intensive analysis of a single case (Bryman, 2012, p. 66). As evident from the previous discussions, the anti-state jihadist war front of al-Qaida in Pakistan after 9/11 is a case study for this research. The case study is significant both for inductive and deductive research processes but this research is an abductive one (Bryman, 2012, p. 71).

Qualitative research is “an approach for understanding the meaning of individual or groups ascribes to social or human problems.” (Creswell & Creswell, 2017, p. 41). Similarly, this research is studying the role of al-Qaida in turning the domestic conditions in Pakistan for an anti-state jihadist war front in the country after 9/11. For this purpose, it is looking into the primary narratives of al-Qaida leadership and its Pakistani jihadist followers for identifying those social, political, cultural, and economic conditions which facilitated the jihadist war front of al-Qaida in Pakistan. Using primary materials for identifying these conditions is a significant method because the best way to understand what motivates actors to engage in a particular behavior is a critical reading of their own words (Hamming, 2017).

For this purpose, it is using the public statements of the al-Qaida leadership and interviews of its allied and affiliated Pakistan jihadists for studying their narratives. These statements are the detailed public messages of the al-Qaida leadership to the Pakistani people for calling upon them to wage war against their state, which contains different types of justifications. The aim will be to look at those arguments which are rooted in the domestic problems of the country. Similarly, the interviews of the indigenous Pakistani people – who became part of the al-Qaida war against their state – provide a detailed account of their journey for fighting against their state. Their interviews can further give a more detailed insight into the domestic problems of the country to which they connect their war against the state.

The best scenario for this research could be of detailed interviews with al-Qaida leadership and these anti-state Pakistani jihadists, which practically is not possible. These people are either killed, and those alive remain underground due to security reasons. Thanks to modern technology, which makes the virtual medium of the internet as the jihadists' main source of communications to their supporters and adversaries through releasing various types of materials. These materials also help the academics eager to study these groups from sitting behind their computers. This opportunity makes possible the main empirical foundation of this research, a qualitative reading of primary sources of al-Qaida leadership and their allied and affiliated Pakistani jihadists. This data can give a novel insight into the al-Qaida strategy of shaping post-9/11 anti-state jihadist war in Pakistan, which otherwise is highly opaque. This research is also using the secondary sources for deep analysis of the domestic conditions identified through the empirical findings of the primary materials. The secondary sources include scientific articles and books written on Pakistani militant groups and al-Qaida in the AfPak region.

These statements and interviews can be part of the propaganda materials, but this concern does not affect this study. The objective of this research is not to identify the

actual domestic conditions that resulted in the jihadist war against the state in al-Qaida. It is beyond the scope of this study. The main objective of this study is how al-Qaida rationalizes its war against the state to the domestic conditions of the country for getting the support of the Pakistani people. However, inaccuracies of these claims can be of concern, which can be addressed by using accumulative sources (Hegghammer, 2010a, p. 12). Therefore, this research is additionally using secondary sources from the existing literature to elaborate precisely on the analysis of the empirical findings of the primary materials.

4.2 Data sources

The qualitative study involves studying texts and images rather than numbers (Creswell & Creswell, 2017, p. 254). It provides a possibility for an in-depth data collection and analysis through using a wide range of materials, for example, interviews, documents, observations, and audio-visual data (Creswell & Creswell, 2017, p. 257). The empirical data of this research contain statements and interviews which are in audio, video, and text formats. This study is text-centric, which is in line with the analysis method of this research. The coming sections of this chapter explain it in detail.

The statements are the main detailed messages of al-Qaida leadership to the Pakistani nation which are urging them to wage war against their state. These are ten statements in total, which are released between 2007 and 2014. Their audiences are different groups of the country – ordinary Muslims, Pashtun, and Baluch tribesmen, Islamist parties, jihadist groups, army, and Islamic scholars. They are of Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, Mustafa Abu Yazid, Abu Yahya al-Libi, and Azzam al-Amriki. All these individuals are the central leaders of al-Qaida who have played important roles in shaping the jihadist war front in Pakistan after 9/11.¹⁶ These statements are released

¹⁶ Laden was the central head of al-Qaida who was replaced by Zawahiri in 2011 after his killing. Yazid was al-Qaida chief for AfPak region who has played main role in the establishment of al-Qaida in

in the video format by the official media wings of al-Qaida – As-Sahab Central, As-Sahab Urdu, and As-Sahab AQIS. Their transcriptions are published in the different issues of *Nawai Afghan Jihad* – the Urdu language flagship magazine of al-Qaida in Pakistan.

Table 2 *Statement of al-Qaida leadership*

#	Title of the statement	Leader	Source & Date
01	Knight of the martyrdom caravan: Ghazi Abdul Rasheed	Abu Yahya al-Libi	As-Sahab Urdu Jul 2007
02	Transgressions against the Red Mosque	Ayman Zawahiri	As-Sahab Central Jul 2007
03	Shariat or martyrdom	Osama Bin Laden	As-Sahab Urdu Sep 2007
04	Message to the Pakistani army and the people of Pakistan	Ayman Zawahiri	As-Sahab Urdu Aug 2008
05	Message to the people of Pakistan	Mustafa Abu Yazid	As-Sahab Central Jan 2009
06	Message to the Muslim sisters and brothers in Pakistan	Ayman Zawahiri	As-Sahab Central May 2009
07	A message to the Muslims in Pakistan	Osama Bin Laden	As-Sahab Urdu Jun 2009
08	Swat: Shariat or martyrdom	Abu Yahya al-Libi	As-Sahab Urdu Jun 2009
09	The American attack on Pakistani army at Salala Check post	Ayman Zawahiri	As-Sahab Urdu Feb 2012
10	Pakistan regime: An agent of the devil.	Azzam al-Amriki	As-Sahab Central 2014

Similarly, interviews of the indigenous Pakistani jihadists tell us about their narratives of fighting against the state and their support for al-Qaida. Their narratives can inform us about the role of domestic conditions to which they connect their war against the state. The media outlets of al-Qaida and TTP have conducted and published these interviews. It includes thirteen interviews, which are of eleven important leaders of the

Pakistan. Al-libi was the central ideologue of al-Qaida who has extensively written on the theological aspects of fighting against the Pakistani state and army. He became deputy head of al-Qaida in 2011. Al-Amriki was the central spokesman of al-Qaida. All they have lived in the Pashtun tribal regions of Pakistan after 9/11 and have played important roles in the establishment of al-Qaida in Pakistan.

anti-state jihadist movement in Pakistan belonging to the al-Qaida affiliated and allied Pakistani groups.¹⁷ They include the founding leadership of TTP. All these interviews are published in the different issues of “Nawai Afghan Jihad” (NAJ) and “Ihyai-e-Khilafat” (IeK)¹⁸. Nine of these interviews are initially produced in video format by As-Sahab Urdu, As-Sahab AQIS, and Umer Media¹⁹. I also searched two other magazines of al-Qaida – Resurgence, and Hitteen – but could not find any similar interview there.²⁰ Similarly, I checked all issues of the TTP Magazine and could not find any relevant interview there.

Table 3 *Interviews of anti-state Pakistani jihadists*

	Title / Interviewee	Designation	Source & Date
01	As-Sahab interview with <i>Mullah Ahmad Nazir</i>	Head of an allied group of al-Qaida in Waziristan	Mar 2009
02	As-Sahab interview with <i>Ustad Fatih</i>	A military commander of TTP Swat	Aug 2009
03	Why jihad in Pakistan? <i>Ustad Ahmad Farooq</i>	Spokesman of al-Qaida for Pakistan	As-Sahab, Aug 2009.
04	As-Sahab interview with <i>Wali ur Rehman Mehsud</i>	Deputy head of TTP	Nov 2009
05	As-Sahab interview with TTP leadership – <i>Hakim Ullah Mehsud</i> and <i>Wali ur Rehman Mehsud</i>	Central and deputy heads of TTP	NAJ, Nov 2009.
06	Nawai Afghan Jihad interview with <i>Wali ur Rehman Mehsud</i>	Deputy head of TTP	NAJ, Feb & Mar – 2012.
07	Ihyai-e-Khilafat interview with <i>Hakeem Ullah Mehsud</i>	Central head of TTP	IeK, Jul 2012
08	Umar Media interview with <i>Hakim Ullah Mehsud</i> and <i>Wali ur Rehman Mehsud</i>	Central and deputy head of TTP	NAJ Feb 2013
09	Nawai Afghan Jihad interview with <i>Adnan Rashid</i>	An important military commander of TTP	NAJ, Mar April May Jun Aug Sep – 2013.

¹⁸ Taliban Magazine and Ihyia-e-Khilafat are the official magazines of TTP. First one is released by the TTP Central while the second one was published by Mohmand Chapter of TTP:

¹⁹ Umer Media is the official media wing of TTP.

²⁰Resurgence is English and Hitteen is Urdu magazines of al-Qaida published from Pakistan.

10	Nawai Afghan Jihad interview with <i>Khalid Sajna</i>	Deputy head of TTP	NAJ – Jul 2013
11	Ihyai-e-Khilafat interview with <i>Umar Khalid Khurasani</i>	Head of TTP executive council	IeK, Sep 2013
12	Interview with <i>Shahidullah Shahid</i>	Spokesman of TTP	NAJ, Dec 2013, and Jan 2014.
13	Ihyai-e-Khilafat interview with <i>Qari Shakil</i>	Head of TTP political council	IeK, Nov 2014

All these interviews are released between 2009 and 2014, which were the peak years of jihadist terrorism in Pakistan. The statements of al-Qaida leadership are from 2007, which is the year of the official launching of the jihadist war against the state. The two-year gap between them indicates to the central role of al-Qaida in founding anti-state war front in Pakistan and then preparing indigenous Pakistani jihadist leadership for leading this front.

4.3 Data collection

The data set for this paper comes from an extensive data corpus of the online available materials of al-Qaida media outlets released from the AfPak region. This author has collected, examined, and coded all these materials recently for another research project aimed to create a database for academic researchers. The database covers the online data of As-Sahab Central, As-Sahab Urdu, As-Sahab AQIS, Nawai Afghan Jihad, and Hitteen from the period of 2000 till Dec 2019. It contains 1018 text and audio-visual outputs, which include books, magazines, eulogies, communique, attack videos, jihadist poems/anthems, interviews, biographies.

The data set of this research is not a random sample from the above mentioned vast amount of materials but selected after a close analysis for its significance to the topic of this paper. The statements of al-Qaida leadership are the main detailed messages of

the group which are addressing different Pakistani audiences. They are of the period 2007-2014. These statements focus on the anti-state jihadist war in the country and discuss its various aspects. Secondly, the interviews are of those Pakistani individuals who became members of the allied and affiliated groups of al-Qaida in Pakistan and then played central roles in the anti-state jihadist war. They talk in detail about their backgrounds, political affiliation, geographical location, and their trajectory into allied and affiliated groups of al-Qaida in Pakistan. They rationalize their fighting against the state to the domestic conditions of the country who also connects it with the general rhetoric of al-Qaida. All these materials are collected from four open-source websites, which are, nawaiafghan.com, emaad.net, jihadology.com, and archive.org.

The first two are the official websites of al-Qaida. "Nawaiafghan.com" is the AQIS website which contains almost all issues of NAJ magazine. "Emaad.net" is a gigantic website of al-Qaida, which includes media materials of al-Qaida Central and its franchises and groups active in different parts of the world. It has a special section for the productions of AQIS and other sub-media outlets of al-Qaida in Pakistan.

The third one, jihadology.com, is an academic website run by Aaron Zelin, a leading expert of transnational jihadist groups and research fellow at Washington Institute. It provides data to the researchers released from the official media sources of al-Qaida and related jihadist groups from all over the world.

The fourth one is the "archives.org" website, which is a non-profit online platform for digital archiving. Al-Qaida and its Pakistani allied groups widely use it for online distribution of their propaganda, and recruitment materials for their communication to the external world. Several accounts are existing there, which possess hundreds of audio-visual and text materials of al-Qaida Pakistani media outlets.

4.4 Data quality

There are few essential scientific measures that a researcher should fulfil while collecting data for the research, which are authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning (Scott, 1990, pp. 1-2). I have tried to take care of all these in the data collection process for this research. First, these are open-source materials, which makes it natural for the readers to question its authenticity. The authenticity of these materials is beyond doubt because the official media outlets of al-Qaida and TTP have released these materials. Secondly, they are available from various sources and in different formats, which excludes further any attempt of forgery.

The second concern is the credibility of the materials (Scott, 1990, p. 03). The data of this research is originally in Urdu or translated to Urdu, which is the official language and medium of communication of the public in Pakistan who are the targeted audiences of this data. All interviews are originally in Urdu, while the statements are translated from Arabic. The official media outlets of al-Qaida and TTP have translated them into Urdu. Similarly, these media outlets have also released the text version of the audio-video outputs. I have multiple times watched and listened to the audio-video versions of these materials to get a better understanding. Their comparisons to the text versions show that the transcription contains the entire contents of these outputs without any manoeuvring. These three points were important to mention to exclude any scepticism of the readers about the credibility of these materials. I have analyzed and coded all these materials in the Urdu format. I translated the selected codes into English, which I have explained in the coming section of this chapter.

Representativeness is the third concern. It means that whether the data covers the people relevant to the study. It is also fulfilled here. First, the statements of al-Qaida leadership include its central leadership, which has played the leading roles in the strategy making of the group and thus in the al-Qaida decision of establishment of an

anti-state war front in Pakistan. For example, the Bin Laden documents show that it was Bin Laden's decision ordering for establishing a local chapter of al-Qaida in Pakistan in 2004.²¹ Secondly, interviews are of the Pakistani jihadists who all have remained the founding and influential figures of jihadist terrorism in the country.

The fourth important factor is the meaning of the data, which is important for addressing the research questions. Data can have two meanings, literal and interpretative (Scott, 1990, pp. 28-29). I have not relied only on the literal meaning of the messages of al-Qaida leadership and interviews of its allied and affiliated Pakistani jihadists but have interpreted its meaning from its context perspective. The coding section of this chapter further explains it.

4.5 Thematic Analysis

This paper is using qualitative thematic content analysis (or only thematic analysis) for the data analysis. Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analyzing, and reporting themes within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This method of analysis not only arranges and explores the data but further provides in-depth interpretations of its various aspects. A theme collects the relevant information from the data in relevance to the research question for exploring the research topic. Themes can be established both inductively and deductively (Braun & Clarke, 2006). As this is theory-driven research, the themes collection is a deductive process based on the *permissive and precipitant conditions* which are main concepts of Crenshaw's theory.

As mentioned at the start of this chapter, data can have both semantic or explicit meaning and latent or interpretative meaning (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In this research,

²¹ Osama Bin Laden letter, <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2017/english/Draft%20of%20a%20letter%20to%20subordinates.pdf>

I extracted the data not only for its semantic meaning but of the underlying ideas, assumptions, conceptualizations, and ideologies that the semantic content is hiding inside. This is significant to go beyond the propaganda aspects of these materials and to investigate deeply how their claims can have precise meanings by connecting these arguments to the context of the historical, cultural, political, and economic factors emerging from them.

Although thematic analysis is a vague concept, this research is following the six steps strategy for qualitative thematic analysis designed by Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke (Braun & Clarke, 2006). They are; familiarization with the data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, refining and renaming themes, and producing the report.

The first step of this strategy emphasizes that the researcher should immerse into the data through repeated readings of all the materials (Braun & Clarke, 2006). I have multiple times, read all of the materials before the coding process. Secondly, the strategy of Braun and Clarke emphasizes that all kind of audio-visual data should be transcribed in this stage (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Fortunately, the official media sources of al-Qaida have released the transcript versions of these materials, which I have collected along with their audio-video formats.

After an in-depth understanding of the content of these materials, the coding process step starts. Codes are the features of the data emerging from its semantic and latent meaning that relates to the analytical concepts of the research (Braun & Clarke, 2006). I coded only that content of the materials which were relevant to the permissive or precipitant factors since the aim was to search the content of the statements and interviews relating to social, political, cultural, and economic conditions. The coding is done according to the two over-arching themes and is not limited only to their eight sub-themes. This way, the primary materials are analyzed for finding all possible

permissive and precipitant factors which could have contributed to the establishment of the anti-state jihadist movement in Pakistan.

I manually coded all the materials on the pdf versions of their transcriptions, which was a lengthy and time-consuming process. I read multiple times the highlighted content and compared them repeatedly with the analytical concepts. After the final selection, I translated the selected relevant content and copied them to a word document. I repeated the same process first for the statements and then for the interviews.

The third and fourth steps involve searching for themes and reviewing them (Braun & Clarke, 2006). First, I analyzed all the codes for their positioning in the eight outlined themes. Many codes were fitting in more than one theme. With any new arising ideas about the positioning of code, I consulted the original Urdu transcriptions many times for each code. The aim was to make new themes for those codes in case if any code does not fit any of the eight themes of Crenshaw's theory.

In the fifth step, all the themes were intensively defined and refined for the analysis. I analyzed the themes from the perspectives of their codes and of the entire data set. I then wrote a separate detailed analysis report for each theme, supplemented with quotations as evidence of the claims of these themes from the extracted data. The last step was the write-up process of the final analysis report (Braun & Clarke, 2006). It contains a concise and comprehensive discussion of all the themes from the research questions and other previous debates of the thesis.

4.6 Delimitations

As it will be evident in the coming chapters, the focus of this thesis is on al-Qaida and its Pakistani allied group – Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP). There were also other jihadist groups in Pakistan – both foreign and indigenous – who were involved in fighting against the Pakistani state. For example, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

(IMU) and many other Central Asian jihadist groups had a base in Pakistan like al-Qaida. The foreign jihadist groups supported both al-Qaida and TTP in fighting against the Pakistani state; however, they had no significant role in the founding of the TTP, like al-Qaida.

Besides, the study focuses on TTP and doesn't examine prominent indigenous Pakistani groups like Lashkar Islam, Gul Bahadar group, and other similar. This is because the TTP was 1) a purely anti-state Pakistani group 2) it was under the direct influence of al-Qaida, whose main objective was to fight against the Pakistani state.

The study also doesn't consider or distinguish data coming from the leadership of the splinter groups of TTP. This makes sense because interviews of the TTP leadership used in the study were from a period when those leaders were still in the TTP. For purposes of analytical clarity, therefore, they are considered as part of the TTP leadership.

5 Analysis Chapter

This chapter is presenting the analysis part of this thesis, which is in two sections. The first part is a detailed analysis report of empirical findings in guidance with the permissive and precipitant themes of the analytical framework of this research. The second part consists of a discussion integrating the analytical findings with the theory and previous discussions of this paper. It includes the pros and cons of the analytical applicability of Crenshaw's theory from the case study perspective. Finally, both parts provide answers to the research questions for explaining the post-9/11 survival of al-Qaida in Pakistan. It identifies the contribution of the domestic political, social, cultural, and economic conditions in Pakistan to the al-Qaida efforts of shaping a brutal terrorist front in the country after 9/11. Simultaneously, it also answers why indigenous Pakistani citizens got attracted to the al-Qaida plans and how they shape the al-Qaida war in Pakistan as a fight of their own.

5.1 Permissive factors

As mentioned in theory chapter, the permissive factors contain four themes; modernization, urbanization, social facilitation and state inability in countering terrorism. I could not find evidence for the first two themes; thus, this part does not include them, but the next section of this chapter has explained their inapplicability to this case study. The social facilitation has a deep role in the rise of anti-state jihadist war front of al-Qaida in Pakistan. I have presented first a detail report of it which is then followed by the state inability.

5.1.1 Social facilitation

The social facilitation proposition of Crenshaw's theory means here the existing social structures, problems, and religious-cultural traditions which indirectly facilitate the

anti-state jihadist violent revolt in Pakistan. The empirical findings provide many interesting revelations in this regard, which benefited al-Qaida and its Pakistani allied groups in waging war against the state in the country. These include historical issues surrounding the ideological foundations of the country, ethnic and tribal dimensions of the society, and theological justifications.

First is the conflictual views about the ideological basis of the country – the two-nations theory – which led to the creation of Pakistan. The basic idea of this theory was that Muslims of India are a separate nation from Hindus, who should have their homeland where they can live according to their religious values (Fair, 2018, pp. 25-27; Kapur & Ganguly, 2012, p. 116). After the creation of Pakistan, it produced ideological divisions in the mainstream political parties from left and right wings. The Islamist parties, like Jamaat Islami, Jamiat Ulama Islam, and Jamiat Ulama Pakistan and their splinter groups, all claim that the ideology of the two-nations theory will only be complete when Islamic laws practically rule the country (Sheikh, 2016, p. 46). For this reason, they are struggling since the early years of Pakistan to Islamise the state and society to make the country a pure Islamic state according to their interpretation of this theory (Haqqani, 2005, pp. 17, 235).

The statements of the al-Qaida leadership and anti-state Pakistani jihadists addresses this old unfulfilled dream of the Islamist community of Pakistan. They declare Islamization of the state through implementing a Sharia law system in the country, one of the main aims of their violent struggle (Khurasani, 2013; Farooq, 2009).²² Evidence shows that al-Qaida and its allied anti-state groups in Pakistan attracted a significant number of young educated youth into their ranks from the mainstream Islamist political parties of the country (Ahmad, 2014; Shahzad, 2011). This indicates that the rhetoric

²² All of the thirteen interviews of the Pakistani leadership of anti-state jihad and statements of al-Qaida declare implementation of Sharia in the country as one of the main goals of their war against the state.

of Islamization of the country in the narratives of al-Qaida is to gain the support of the Pakistani people who were struggling for it for decades.

Similarly, these narratives present the counter-terrorism actions against the jihadists inside Pakistan violations of the two-nations theory and, thus, against the ideological foundations of Pakistan (Farooq, 2009; Zawahiri, 2008; 2009). The narratives of al-Qaida leadership claim the arrests and killings of jihadists in Pakistan after 9/11, making Pakistan an insecure place for the Muslims as it was during the British rule in a Hindu dominated country (Zawahiri, 2008). Similarly, the anti-state jihadists make an analogy of their war against the state with the freedom fight of the Muslims against the British colonization of the Indian subcontinent (ibid). They accuse the Pakistani state of being puppets of the US-West, while they term the latter as the actual rulers of Pakistan (Mehsud, 2009). For example, they resemble the Guantanamo prison with Cellular Jail or Black Water Prison, where the British rulers had imprisoned the prominent Muslims of the Indian subcontinent fighting against the British empire (Zawahiri, 2008).

Another related issue is the “Islamised” war doctrine of Pakistan, which helped individual revolts from the army against the state after 9/11 (Zawahiri, 2008). Pakistan has faced a stronger enemy in the shape of India in its neighboring, who Pakistan blame that never accepted the partition of its vast part, which emerged as Pakistan in 1947 (Fair, 2018, p. 47). The Pakistani state narratives to counter India present the Indian hostilities to Pakistan as a continual of the centuries-old Hindu-Muslim conflicts of the Indian subcontinent (Fair, 2018, pp. 20-22). Therefore, the Pakistani army terms its preparations of war as a jihad, which they consider as a continuity of the religious wars of those times. "Jihad" is the official motto of the Pakistani army, and the soldiers call themselves “Mujahids.” The threats from India have this way shaped the war doctrine of Pakistan, which is characterized by a religious ideology for enabling the army to combat significantly with the security challenges from the larger enemy (Fair, 2018,

pp. 32-37; Zawahiri, 2008). The al-Qaida narratives present the state support in the GWOT against jihadists as a betrayal with the ideological foundations of the army (Zawahiri, 2008). This has resulted in the individual revolt of the army officers who joined hands with al-Qaida after 9/11. They, later on, played massive roles in the anti-state jihadist terrorism in the country (Musharraf, 2006, pp. 246-250; Shahzad, 2011, pp. 92-100; Muhammad, 2020).²³

The al-Qaida leadership in their statements also makes use of the ethnic cleavages within Pakistani society and the sense of relative deprivations of the Pashtun and Baluch people for gaining their support (Laden, 2009). The Pashtun tribal areas became the bases of al-Qaida and its fellow jihadists after 9/11, where they escaped into from Afghanistan – especially into the North and South Waziristans (Gul, 2011). Subsequently, these areas became the focus of the state counter-terrorism operations against the jihadists. Al-Qaida term these military operations as a war against the Pashtun and Baluch tribal people for inciting them to retaliate back against the state (Laden, 2009).

Another interesting aspect is the Pashtun tribal cultural system, which facilitated al-Qaida and other jihadists in creating a safe haven in the tribal areas, from where they managed the anti-state war front in Pakistan. First, an important custom of their tribal culture is *melmastya* (hospitality), sheltering any people seeking refuge with them and then fighting to the death for protecting them. If their guests are killed or harmed, then they collectively fight until not revenge them, which is called *badal* (revenge) (Siddique, 2014).²⁴ Therefore, the Pashtun tribesmen consider the military operations

²³ Significant number of high-ranking Pakistani army officials became sympathizers and members of al-Qaida in Pakistan after 9/11 which even include a former Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Shahid Aziz (Muhammad, 2020).

²⁴ For more details on the Pashtun culture and the rise of violent Islamist extremism in Pakistan and Afghanistan, see, (Siddique, 2014).

of the Pakistan army against al-Qaida and its allied groups as an attack on the tribal values (Khurasani, 2013). Secondly, these tribal people claim to have a proud history of fighting against the invaders and oppressing powers, where they take huge pride in the tales of "heroism" and "glorious past of their fathers" (Khurasani, 2013; Mehsud, 2009). The propaganda materials of the anti-state jihadists portray the counter-terrorism actions in the tribal areas as oppressions of the state on the behest of the US (Laden, 2009; Farooq, 2009; Mehsud & Mehsud, 2009). This way, al-Qaida attracted a large number of tribal supporters for the war against the Pakistani state (Shahzad, 2011, pp. 11-14). They not only helped in securing Waziristan as the longest hub of al-Qaida in its history, where it was based for more than a decade – 2003 till 2014 – but also provided a large number of suicide bombers for the lethal terrorist attacks in Pakistan (Shahzad, 2011, p. 7).

The last important aspect of the socialization factors is the use of theological arguments for preparing moral grounds for the anti-state jihad in Pakistan. Some of these arguments are emanating from the past policies and politics of the state. First, the al-Qaida leadership and their Pakistani followers portray their war against the state a defensive jihad, which is generally considered a legitimate cause of jihad (Hegghammer, 2013b, p. 7). They make an analogy of the fight against the Pakistani government to the jihadist war against the Afghan government of the eighties who were backed by the Soviet forces (1979-1991). For example, Osama Bin Laden, in his statement to Pakistani people, says, "*Fighting against the Pakistani army is similar to the jihad against the Afghan army in the eighties when the latter was supporting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan*" (Laden, 2009) (My translation). The majority of the Muslims across the world, including Pakistan, supported the Afghan-Soviet jihad.²⁵

²⁵ For details of Pakistan support for Afghan jihad check; Dr. Fazal Rahim Marwat, *From Muhajir to Mujahid*, 2004. (Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar: Peshawar), (Sands & Qazizada, 2019), (Hegghammer, 2020)

This comparison aims to gain popular support for the anti-state war in Pakistan, as the jihadists enjoyed support during the Afghan-Soviet war.

The second main theological argument that anti-state jihadists use is the excommunication of the Pakistani army and rulers, declaring them apostates. Thomas Hegghammer says that fighting at home or killing fellow Muslims does not have the same acceptance and legitimacy as fighting the non-Muslims abroad (Hegghammer, 2013b, pp. 7-9). It is highly vital in the case of Pakistan, which has a large number of jihadists remained active for decades in waging jihad abroad. It was, therefore, significant for al-Qaida to prove the apostasy of the rulers and army of Pakistan to motivate these trained jihadists to wage war against their state. Al-Qaida leadership is using two theological arguments in their narratives for this purpose, which say that if anyone supports non-Muslims in fighting against Muslims and if the state rule is other than Sharia law, then these both prove their apostasy. Their narratives connect them respectively to the state support in the GWOT and lack of Sharia law system in the country (Farooq, 2009; Laden, 2009; Zawahiri, 2008, 2009).

5.1.2 The inability or leniency of the state

The narratives of the anti-state Pakistani jihadists tell about a few arguments which they use to prove the weakness and inability of the state. They boost the existence of their strongholds in the tribal regions of Waziristan as the weakness of the state, not able to enter these tough terrains (Mehsud, 2012). The secondary sources contradict this argument (Brown & Ressler, 2013), claiming it more about the state leniency, which the next paragraph explains in detail. Similarly, the anti-state jihadists also talk about the issues of corruption of the government and bad judiciary system of the country for showing the inability of the state (Mehsud & Mehsud, 2013; Fatih, 2009).

Their narratives do not refer extensively to the state leniency because it is opposite to their claims. On the other hand, the secondary sources provide quite interesting results in this regard. For example, the covert role or to the negligence of the state in the indirect facilitation of the rise of a brutal anti-state jihadist movement in the country can explain the evidence of the state support for the jihadist groups. First, as mentioned in the literature review part, the anti-state jihadists birthed out from the pro-state jihadists groups (Brown & Ressler, 2013). Secondly, al-Qaida and its allied anti-state jihadist groups were based in the areas dominated by the state-sponsored jihadi groups where evidence shows a close working relationship between them (Sayed, 2020). These direct and indirect supports of the pro-state jihadist groups for al-Qaida and its anti-state jihadist allies in Pakistan did not change the cordial relations of the state with them.

The above discussion of the permissive factors shows that the anti-state narratives of al-Qaida and its allied Pakistani jihadists refer extensively to several social and cultural factors for justifying the war against the state. The two-nation theory, Islamisation of the country and the army doctrine, appears a few important topics in these narratives. They also make use of the ethnic cleavages, Pashtun tribal customs, and religious arguments stemming from the past state policies and political system as justifications for war against the state. Their narratives also inform us somewhat of the role of state inabilities, but they are silent on state leniency, which is an essential aspect of this case study. Now we will move to the precipitating factors.

5.2 Precipitating factors

The following section of this part of the chapter discusses the role of precipitating factors in the anti-state jihadist war front of al-Qaida in Pakistan after 9/11. They are respectively of; concrete grievances, lack of political participation, mass passivity of the broader community and precipitating event.

5.2.1 Concrete grievances

The empirical findings show that the anti-state Pakistani jihadists have certain grievances that stem out from their belongings and concerns to three types of different communities, which are; being “a patriotic Pakistani,” “an Islamist” and “a jihadist.” These grievances are against the army, politicians, government, and state systems of Pakistan, which are of two categories. Some are birthed after the Pakistani state entrance into the GWOT, while others have deep historical roots in the politics of the country.

The prime grievance among them is the Pakistani state support in the US invasion of Afghanistan, which resulted in ousting the Taliban regime and eliminating there the bases of Pakistani jihadist. As Ustad Ahmad Farooq, the recruitment and media head of al-Qaida for Pakistan, says,

“Pakistan played the main role in the US invasion of Afghanistan by providing air, ground, logistic, and intelligence supports to the US. The US invasion of Afghanistan was not possible without the Pakistani support”. (Farooq, 2009) (My translation)

If seen more specifically, the Pakistani Islamists have had close ideological relations with the Afghan Taliban. First, the Afghan Taliban share the same religious sect with the majority of the Pakistani jihadist groups, known as the Deobandi Harakas (Rassler, 2017). Both belonged to the Deobandi sect of Sunni Islam and enjoyed mutual support during the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (1995-2001). Afghan Taliban hosted Pakistani jihadist groups who, in turn, fought for defending the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Rana, 2015; Stenersen, 2017; Brown & Rassler, 2013). Therefore, they consider the state support in ousting the Taliban from Afghanistan as a direct attack on them. Moreover, the Pakistani Islamists viewed the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan

as an ideal Sharia law that which they wished to implement in Pakistan as well. As one of the founding leaders of TTP, Umar Khalid Khurasani says,

"We started jihad in Afghanistan in the hope that we will implement similar Sharia systems in Pakistan one day." (Khurasani, 2013)

(My translation)

The above points make it evident that the support of Pakistan in the US invasion of Afghanistan is one of the main grievances of the Pakistani Islamists, which is an essential factor in their mobilization for a war against their state.

The second set of grievances are related to the state counter-terrorism actions against the jihadists in the country after 9/11. They seem enraged by the arrests and killings of foreign jihadists in Pakistan who escaped there from Afghanistan due to the US invasion (Shakil, 2014; Nazir, 2009; Farooq, 2009; Khurasani, 2013). The handing over of the arrested jihadists to the US authorities, which then ended in Guantanamo, is highly criticized by them. Particularly, the individual case of a Pakistani lady, Afia Siddiqi, who was allegedly arrested from Pakistan and then handed over to the US authorities due to her alleged connections to the top al-Qaida leadership, are some of their main justifications for fighting against the state (al-Amriki, 2014; Shakil, 2014) (Sheikh, 2016, p. 27). Al-Qaida leadership has particularly used the case of Siddiqi as an important topic in their messages to the Pakistani people for inciting them to fight against their government as a revenge of her (al-Libi, 2009). This category of grievances also includes the anger at the military operations, which the Pakistan army conducted after 9/11 against the al-Qaida, its allies, and local supporters in the Pashtun tribal belt and Swat.²⁶

²⁶ They are mentioned in all of the interviews and statements.

The third grievance is also related to state support in ending the Taliban control of Afghanistan which counts as a great betrayal with Pakistan (Zawahiri, 2008; Farooq, 2009). According to the anti-state jihadists, Afghanistan under the Taliban control was of a significant strategic asset for Pakistan. Pakistan has post-colonial tensions with Afghanistan, primarily a dispute over boundary line issues (Sands & Qazizada, 2019, pp. 28-29). These tensions produced a space for the Indian influence in Afghanistan, which they see as a considerable threat to the interests of Pakistan. The Indian influence in Afghanistan increased again with the establishment of the new broad-based democratic government in the country after 9/11. Therefore, the state support in the ousting of the Taliban regime is termed as a great betrayal with Pakistan for the fears of threats to the internal security of Pakistan due to the alleged Indian presence there (Zawahiri, 2008; Farooq, 2009).

The fourth main grievance articulated in the anti-state jihadist narratives of al-Qaida is about the changing stance of Pakistani state over the Kashmir issue after 9/11 when the state joined the GWOT. Kashmir is a boiling issue for the Pakistani people, which they consider an integral part of their country (Fair, 2018, p. 24). It has roots back to the partition of British India and the independence of Pakistan. Pakistani state initiated a peace dialogue with India for declaring Kashmir as an independent state (Musharraf, 2006, pp. 295-306). The jihadis declare this proposal of the state as a great betrayal not only with Pakistan and the cause of Kashmir but also with their fellow jihadists who got killed fighting in Kashmir (Fatih, 2009). For example, Ayman Zawahiri in his statement to Pakistani jihadists use it for attracting them into the al-Qaida war against the Pakistani state, who says

"Pervez [Musharraf] is ready to compromise on Kashmir at any cost, who suggested an independent territory Kashmir in Mar 2004, he stabbed back in the jihadist resistance against India while India is determined on its claim over Kashmir."

(Zawahiri, 2008) (My translations)

The grievance of this betrayal can be the reason that most of the so-called Kashmiri jihadists became the early founders of the anti-state jihadist war front of al-Qaida in Pakistan.

The last category of grievances is of the Islamist community of the country, which is decades older than the Pakistani state involvement in the GWOT. As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, the failure to implement a pure Islamic law system in the country is the longest frustration of Pakistani Islamists, which is also one of the main grievances which they claim a reason for their war in Pakistan. They consider the existing state system anti-Islamic, which, according to them, is democratic and secular. As TTP head, Hakim Ullah Mehsud says,

"We want to end the democratic and secular system in the country and will replace it with the Sharia law system." (Mehsud & Mehsud, 2009) (My translation)

Similarly, his deputy, Wali ur Rehman Mehsud says,

"The state system of Pakistan is apostate, which is against the goals based on which Pakistan was established. We want to make Pakistan a pure Islamic state as it was dreamed to be created."
(Mehsud, 2009) (My translation)

The above accounts of concrete grievances show that the anti-state grievances articulated in the narratives of al-Qaida and its allied Pakistani jihadists are mainly rooted in the post-9/11 state policies of the state, which resulted due to the state role in the GWOT against the jihadists. They are angered at the ousting of the Taliban from

power in Afghanistan because of their ideological relations with them, plus they considered Afghanistan under the Taliban regime as a surety for the security of Pakistan. Similarly, they are also upset with the state policy of restrictions for jihad in Kashmir in the early years after 9/11 when al-Qaida was struggling to re-establish itself from Pakistan. The lack of Sharia implementation in the country is also a central grievance of them.

5.2.2 Lack of political participation

The narratives of the al-Qaida leadership and its fellow anti-state Pakistani jihadists inform about two accounts that relate to the lack of political participation aspect of precipitating factors. They have roots with the political system and policies of the state, which are the frustrations of Islamists with the struggle for Sharia law implementation and the jihadists' anger on restrictions in participating jihad outside Pakistan.

As mentioned in the previous parts of this chapter, Sharia implementation is one of the oldest struggles of Pakistani Islamists, which roots back to its birth in 1947. They seem frustrated with the non-violent efforts under the democratic system for the enforcement of Sharia in Pakistan. These frustrations appear as one of the main reasons which have disillusioned them with the non-violent Islamist parties of the country; for example, one of the founding leaders of the Pakistani Taliban says,

"Our struggle is for implementing the Sharia system in the country which we will only achieve through force, not through any non-violent means." (Nazir, 2009) (My translation)

Second is the restrictions on jihadists in Pakistan after 9/11. Due to the changing geopolitical situations, evidence shows that the Pakistani state rolled up the Kashmir jihad and ended its covert support for the jihadists in the early years (Shahzad, 2011,

p. 42). The conventional pro-state jihadist groups did not show any strict reaction on this change in state policy, and most of them remained loyal to the state as were they earlier. On the other hand, the state restrictions on jihadists' participation in militancy in Kashmir pushed members of these groups for a revolt against the state, and they went under the control of al-Qaida (Hussain, 2007, p. 51). Ustad Faith, a jihadist commander active in Kashmir but later emerged as a brutal military leader of TTP, claims that the Pakistani military establishment jailed him with hundreds of other jihadists demanding to end militancy in Kashmir (Fatih, 2009). Therefore, he calls on the so-called Kashmiri jihadists to join the war against the state instead,

"Kashmiri jihadi groups are under the agencies, and they do whatever they order them, only leadership are aware of it, and foot soldiers do not know about it, so ask them to leave them and join us in the TTP." (My translation)

The anti-state narratives of al-Qaida employs the state control on jihad in Kashmir as a tool for urging members of the pro-state jihadist groups to leave these groups and instead join al-Qaida. They emphasize first to fight the state and then to liberate the Kashmir. For example, al-Qaida chief Ayman Zawahiri calls on them,

"The jihad for Kashmir should first be liberated from ISI²⁷ because the involvement of corrupt governments can deprive of the fruitful outcomes of jihad." (Zawahiri, 2008) (My translation)

Similarly, Mustafa Abu Yazid, al-Qaida chief for AfPak region says,

"Pakistan is enslaved by India and the US, who banned the jihadist for fighting in Kashmir." (Yazid, 2009) (My translation)

²⁷ Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is the master spy agency of Pakistan. It is the most powerful state agency which controls the state militancy projects in Kashmir and Afghanistan (Fair, 2018, p. 24).

5.2.3 Mass passivity of the broader community

The narratives of al-Qaida and its fellow Pakistani jihadists criticize the silence of a few larger groups on the hostile actions of the state against them. They mention four overlapping communities to which they claim their connection, which are as follows.

First is the general Muslim community in Pakistan. Both the al-Qaida leadership and their anti-state Pakistani jihadist fellows' terms the war in Pakistan as a part of the global crusaders attack against Muslim Ummah. For example, Ustad Fatih says,

"It is the same war which Bush declared a few years back as the war between Crescent and Crusade. ... It is a war between Islam and Crusades." (Fatih, 2009) (My translation)

Similarly, Osama Bin Laden addresses to the Pakistani Muslims,

"The war in Pakistan is part of the so-called Zionist-crusaders war on Islam which the Pakistani government is fighting on the behest of USA." (Laden, 2010) (My translation)

They criticize the silence and passivity of the larger Muslim Ummah, including the Pakistani Muslim community in responding to this "massive attack on Islam" for which they claim to be fighting on their behalf.

Secondly, they present themselves as a patriotic Pakistani citizen who seems upset with the Pakistani folk reaction to their state alliance with the US in the GWOT, whom they consider having negative consequences for their country. They portray it as the occupation or subjugation of the state to the US (Mehsud & Mehsud, 2009, 2013; Shakil, 2014). The joint intelligence operations of the US security agencies with Pakistani counterparts in the country, the US drone strikes in the tribal regions, and the

efforts of the US state officials for political stability in Pakistan, are all seen as undermining the sovereignty of Pakistan and indirect US occupation of the country. Listing all these Ahmad Farooq says,

"So, everyone should be aware that Pakistan has become America's 53rd state; that Pakistan is now an 'American occupied Pakistan,' and setting it free is now what we ought to worry about." (Farooq, 2009) (My translation)

The third one is the Islamist community of Pakistan, which the anti-state jihadists condemn for their silence over hostile actions of the state against the Islamists in the country after 9/11. Their criticism is against both violent and non-violent Islamist groups. The armed Islamist groups in Pakistan include the conventional jihadist groups – the so-called Kashmiri jihadis groups – who are known for their cordial relations with the state (Rashid, 2013; Mehsud, 2012). The Pakistani state is alleged to covertly supporting them (Kapur & Ganguly, 2012; Rana, 2015; Zahab, 2007). Most of the founding leadership of the anti-state jihadist war front has originated from these groups who are sharply critical of these groups' silence over the state actions against the jihadist community in Pakistan (Shahzad, 2011). As Ustad Fatih, who was also an important commander of one of such jihadist group but separated from it after 9/11 advises other members of these groups that

"Our sincere message to the members of jihadist groups, who are under the control of Pakistani agencies, is to come and join us in TTP. Jihad should be for the sake of Allah and not for these agencies." (Fatih, 2009) (My translation)

The al-Qaida leadership has also used these arguments for attracting the members of the Pakistani Islamists and jihadist groups to their war front in Pakistan. They condemn

these groups for their silence over the state actions against the Islamist community of Pakistan, for example, military operations in the tribal regions, Red Mosque incident, drone strikes, arrest and killing of jihadists and Islamic scholars, support in the invasion of Afghanistan and similar others. They even accuse these groups of providing support to the state in the "oppressions against the Islamists" (Yazid, 2009). Although the political and militant Islamist groups of Pakistan publicly criticize the role of the state in the GWOT, it seems that al-Qaida and the anti-state jihadist expectations show that they should have taken part with them in the violent uprising against the state.

5.2.4 Precipitating event

The narratives of the anti-state Pakistani jihadists and al-Qaida leadership indicate several events that appear as the final pushing factors resulting in the outbreak of the terrorist movement of jihadists in Pakistan. First among them is the state decision for joining the US-led GWOT campaign. The sudden change in the state policies against jihadists after 9/11 deeply hurt violent and non-violent Islamists communities of the country. It resulted in the start of clandestine sophisticated terrorist attacks in Pakistan (Gul, 2011; Hussain, 2012). For example, the deputy head of TTP, Wali ur Rehman says that they started a war in Pakistan after President Musharraf surrendering to the US pressures for offering them support in the GWOT (Mehsud, 2009). Therefore, the early targets of jihadist terrorism included the high officials of the Pakistani army and Westerners in the country. They targeted multiple times the then Army Chief and President, General Musharraf, whom they blamed responsible for this decision (Musharraf, 2006; Shahzad, 2011).

The jihadist terrorism in Pakistan precipitated further with the more involvement of the Pakistani state in the GWOT. For example, the Pakistani state started military operations in the Pashtun tribal regions of Waziristan, bordering with Afghanistan, against al-Qaida and its local and foreign allies there, which resulted in regular militant

attacks against the Pakistan army in the tribal region (Gul, 2011; Shahzad, 2011). As the central head of TTP, Hakim Ullah Mehsud says,

"We started fighting in Afghanistan after 9/11 but soon were forced to wage jihad in Pakistan after the Pakistani military operations in Waziristan on the behest of US".

(Mehsud, 2012) *(My translation)*

The state support in the US invasion of Afghanistan and then the counter-terrorism actions in Pakistan as a part of the GWOT pushed the Pakistani jihadists for a war against their state. They first started terrorist attacks in the country and then targeted Pakistani military forces in the tribal regions. But as mentioned in the literature review chapter, jihadist terrorism in Pakistan took the formal shape of a war front after the July 2007 Red Mosque incident which occurred in the capital of the country.

Al-Qaida leadership issued detailed public statements to the Pakistani people condemning the state oppressions of the Red Mosque incident (al-Libi, 2007; Laden, 2010; Zawahiri, 2007). They used it an excellent opportunity to encourage the Pakistani people to start a war front throughout the country against the state. For example, Ayman Zawahiri in his message to the Pakistani people and army for urging them to fight against the state, says that

"the ideological foundations of Pakistan were destroyed long ago, first with the US invasion of Afghanistan and then with the Red Mosque incident" (Zawahiri, 2008) *(My translation)*

The Red Mosque incident resonates in all interviews of the indigenous Pakistani citizens. They claim that their patience for the state oppressions against the Islamists ended after the Red Mosque incident, which they were facing since 2001. It shows that their grievances against the state due to support in the GWOT and then the Red Mosque

the incident provided them moral grounds for a successful campaign of war against the state.

The summary of the above accounts of the precipitating factors is that most of these factors have resulted from the state policies after 9/11, which primarily includes the state support in the ousting Taliban from power and the counter-terrorism operations against the jihadists in the country. The military operation against the Red Mosque incident seems to have played a decisive role in kicking off an anti-state jihadist movement in the country. Al-Qaida and its anti-state Pakistani jihadists lament the silence of four larger communities over the hostile actions of the state against Islamists and jihadists. They also mention issues of the mainstream Islamists parties, top of which are political failures in the implementation of Sharia in the country and state restrictions on jihadists after 9/11.

Table 4 *An overview of the findings from the lenses of Crenshaw's theory*

Permissive factors	Modernization	<i>Not supported by the data</i>
	Urbanization	<i>Not supported by the data</i>
	Social facilitation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two nation theory • Islamized war doctrine • Ethnic cleavages • Tribal customs • Theological arguments
	State leniency/weakness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State support for “Good Taliban”
Precipitant factors	Concrete grievances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State support in ousting the Taliban • Rulers betrayal with the nation after 9/11 • Change in Kashmir policy • State support in the GWOT
	Lack of political participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Illusions with the non-violent struggle for political goals • Restrictions on foreign fighting
	Mass of passivity of the broader communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Muslim Ummah • Pakistani nation • Islamist parties • Jihadist groups
	Precipitating event	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State entry into GWOT • Red Mosque incident

5.3 Discussion

The analysis contains some interesting and relevant revelations when we look back to the theory chapter. First, the narratives of al-Qaida and its fellow Pakistani jihadists fighting against the state are primarily emanating from the political actions of the state. Still, they are deeply rooted in the social, cultural, and economic issues of the country. The anti-state jihadists count the support of their state in the GWOT, its role in the US invasion of Afghanistan, counter-terrorism actions in the country, military operations and drone strikes in the tribal regions as few central pushing factors behind their decisions for turning against their state. Similarly, the long-standing unfulfilled dreams of the Islamisation of the country rooted to the two-nations theory, deprivations of the Pashtun and Baloch people, glorious past of the tribal people of fighting against the oppressions and foreign invasions, freedom struggle of the Deobandi scholars against the British colonization of united India, are also repeatedly employed in the messages aimed to raise the sentiments of the Pakistani people for fighting against the state. Similarly, some of the permissive factors have resulted from the past politics and policies of the state, for example, the state dependency on the jihadist groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Al-Qaida and anti-state jihadists make use of similar arguments which the pro-state Pakistani jihadists used as justifications of their fighting in these both places.

The empirical findings of the primary materials talk very little about the role of economic factors in the violent uprising against the state because they are the propaganda materials that glorify the jihadist war as a spiritual duty. Still, certain arguments inform us that the anti-state jihadists tried to benefit from the existing economic issues of the country seeking justifications for their war in the country. For example, the al-Qaida leadership talks about the deprivations of the Pashtun and Baloch tribal people, which are some of the most underdeveloped areas of Pakistan. Secondly, the Pakistani jihadists use different types of corruption allegations against the rulers,

promising the people that the Sharia system for which they are fighting will end all such corruption.

Moreover, the narratives of al-Qaida leadership and its allied and affiliated Pakistani jihadists try to portray the Pakistani army and state incapable of protecting the country from the external threats and instead claim themselves as the real protectors of Pakistan. They keep on counting the “crimes” of the Pakistani army and rulers against the country. They blame them of being more loyal to the US and West than to their country. They term the (apparent) changes in the state policies about the Kashmir and Afghanistan as a great betrayal with the country. Although these claims seem inaccurate for various reasons, the aim behind these appears that they want to connect the anti-state jihad purposed actually for the greater interest of the country.

A close analysis of the anti-state narratives of al-Qaida leadership and their fellow Pakistani jihadists tell that in the early stage, they were concentrated primarily on the post-9/11 hostile actions of the state against the jihadists. Later on, they remain more focused on the implementation of Sharia and the liberation of Kashmir, which are particularly the oldest issues of the Islamist-jihadist segments of Pakistan. This indicates that their main objective is to exploit all possible domestic conditions of the country for mobilizing the people for a war against their state. It supports a proposition of Crenshaw theory, which says that a terrorist movement keeps on finding new goals for ensuring its survival once it embark on terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981, pp. 389-396).

The comparison of the anti-state narratives of the central leadership of al-Qaida to the indigenous Pakistani jihadists, from tables 2 and 3 of the methodology chapter, provides some interesting revelations supporting the founding role of al-Qaida in shaping the war against the state. Their sequence shows that actually, it was al-Qaida

who first publicly called for an organized war against the state and army of Pakistan.²⁸ The data of indigenous anti-state Pakistani jihadists are a couple of years later of al-Qaida central leadership statements. It is evident from their arguments that they are echoing the al-Qaida rhetoric against the Pakistani state. All they claim to have turned against the state after the Red Mosque incident, which is corresponding to the public call of al-Qaida war against the Pakistani state.

The above discussions support the research questions that it was al-Qaida who planned the anti-state jihadist war in Pakistan motivated by the significant opportunities in the country rooted in its social, cultural, and political problems. The indigenous Pakistani citizens who became part of the al-Qaida war front later on further took ahead of the anti-state jihadist war front of al-Qaida by deeply integrating their conflict with the state into the al-Qaida narratives.

Another important concept of Crenshaw's theory is that it considers terrorism as a calculated rational strategy of a terrorist group (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 385); the same was assumed in the theory chapter for the anti-state war front of al-Qaida in Pakistan. These findings support it that the anti-state jihadist movement in Pakistan after 9/11 can be seen as an apparent rational strategy of al-Qaida for two reasons. First, the group was enraged by the Pakistani state actions after 9/11, which badly hit al-Qaida after Pakistan provided large supports to the US in the fight against the jihadists. It deprived al-Qaida of its sanctuaries in Afghanistan while Pakistan also killed and arrested hundreds of its members. The group was in the burning desire to take revenge for all these hostile actions from the Pakistani state. Secondly, al-Qaida needed massive manpower and logistic support for its coming long war in Afghanistan against the US and its allies, for which Pakistan was a good source of recruitment and support. Thus, the post-9/11

²⁸ The data corpus from which the data set of this paper is extracted, shows these interviews as the earliest message of the anti-state jihadist against their state. For more details, see, 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 sections of the Methodology Chapter of this paper.

political actions of Pakistani state offered good opportunities for al-Qaida to raise the anti-state sentiments among the potential segments of Pakistani nation to attract popular support for staging a deadliest war front in the country. Al-Qaida identified these significant opportunities shortly after 9/11 to fulfilling its needs from Pakistan which is evident from a letter of Bin Laden dated 2004.²⁹ Finally, the Red Mosque incident of 2007 provided an excellent opportunity to al-Qaida to put its plans in action against the Pakistani state.

Secondly, one of the central significances of Crenshaw's theory over Della Porta was mentioned in the theory chapter that the terrorist group fills the gap of a social/political movement in imparting perceptions of the passive grievances of the broader community to its fellow members for pushing them to adopt the violent means. Similarly, the Pakistani case study shows that the rise of the violent movement against the state was unexpected before 9/11 because the Islamist parties and jihadist groups of the country have had very old cordial relations with the powerful institutions of the state. In other words, an apparent political or social movement with plans for a war against the state was lacking, which can be declared as the precursor of the brutal jihadist war front in Pakistan that took shape in the years after 9/11. Here, al-Qaida played a significant role in imparting perceptions to the passive grievances of different social communities and turned them successfully against the state. For example, their narratives show that they did best to exploit the existing cleavages between the jihadists-Islamist communities and the state after 9/11. Similarly, they also try to perceive the "patriotic Pakistanis" and "general Muslims" of the country that the state actions have damaged their broader communities; their country, and Muslim Ummah, respectively. They also incite the Pashtun and Baluch tribesmen against the state for telling them that the state policies are responsible for all of their deprivations.

²⁹ Osama Bin Laden letter, <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2017/english/Draft%20of%20a%20letter%20to%20subordinates.pdf>

The glocalization ambitions of al-Qaida in Pakistan show that how they modified some of their principles for integrating their global jihad with their new local war fronts. For example, the transnational jihadism of al-Qaida is very against the ethnic divisions and nationalism. The al-Qaida leadership has somehow violated this principle in this case study for the mass mobilizations for the war against the state.³⁰ The al-Qaida leaders are repeatedly trying to urge the Pashtun tribal people by presenting them with the glorious past of their elders. They accuse the state of injustices against the Pashtun and Baluch ethnicities. The al-Qaida allied Pashtun jihadist leaders are also taking considerable pride in connecting their fight against the state to the glorious past of the Pashtun tribes. It is because the Pashtun tribal areas of Pakistan bordering with Afghanistan, especially the Waziristans, were of the great strategic interests for al-Qaida. The group established such strong ties there with the local Pashtun tribes that the area became global headquarter of al-Qaida for more than a decade.

Finally, two steps are important for understanding the turning of the pro-state Pakistani jihadists for war against their state after 9/11. First, they seem deeply hurt by the post-9/11 decisions of the state, which directly hit them. The state's role in removing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and rolling up of the Kashmir jihad project had left them with no other option of getting under al-Qaida. This brought them close to al-Qaida, where both were considering themselves victims of the Pakistani state oppressions. They became the first recruits of the al-Qaida war front in Pakistan. They saw promising opportunities in al-Qaida for a mega jihad not only in Afghanistan but also a hope of returning to the Kashmir front in the future after winning the war against the state. It is also interesting to mention here that al-Qaida never involved in Kashmir jihad before 9/11 and was critical of jihad there. But due to the attractive opportunities in Pakistan, they added Kashmir jihad as a topic in their statements for the Pakistani

³⁰ al-Qaida leader, Ayman Zawahiri has a detailed speech on nationalism, calling it "Idol of the era".

nation for attracting them into its ranks. This way, al-Qaida drew the trained and well experienced Pakistani jihadist cadres and then turned them for a more important jihad – a war against their state. After coming under the influence of al-Qaida, they took the war against their state to further heights by involving many longstanding social, cultural, and political issues of the country.

In the theory chapter, it was assumed based on already existing evidence about al-Qaida and modern jihadist groups, that the modernization and urbanization themes of permissive factors could have implications in the Pakistani study. The thematic analysis and the selected primary materials do not tell us anything specific about the role of these two in their contribution to the jihadist war theater in Pakistan, which can be due to two reasons. First, modernization could have some level contribution, but the combination of empirical data and methodological approach does not help in explaining them. Crenshaw's theory is studying the actual conditions, and the focus of this research to study the narratives of al-Qaida and its fellow Pakistani jihadists that how they inform us about the conditions that have helped them in rising an anti-state jihadist movement in Pakistan. Another reason can be that the Crenshaw theory was put forward in the early eighties, which results from the studies of different terrorist movements from the 1780s till the 1960s. So, the modernization could have a clear impact on terrorism then. The anti-state jihadist movement in Pakistan is a post-9/11 phenomenon, so the role of modernization cannot be much evident in supporting al-Qaida in its establishment.

For urbanization, Crenshaw considers terrorism an urban phenomenon for cities to provide good opportunities for the shelter of terrorists, the rise of terrorist networks, and carrying out terrorist attacks. These findings show that the anti-state jihadists sheltered in the tribal areas, but their narratives contain main threats for terrorist attacks in the major cities of Pakistan. It is also evident from the secondary sources that the most sophisticated terrorist attacks of jihadists occurred in the central urban parts of

the country.³¹ It could be the reason that their main targets, government and army infrastructures, are based in the cities. On the other hand, the sheltering of al-Qaida and anti-state jihadists in the tribal regions instead of urban cities can be seen from the massive role of the social and cultural conditions in the anti-state war front of al-Qaida in Pakistan. This again points to the limitations of Crenshaw's theory to this case study as Crenshaw focuses on actual conditions while this research is studying the narratives for identifying the role of favorable domestic conditions in the anti-state jihadist movement of al-Qaida in Pakistan after 9/11.

³¹ For complete list of terrorist attack in Pakistan from 2001 till now, see, <https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm>

Conclusion

This research has studied the anti-state jihadist war front in Pakistan. It explains the rise of the war front as a byproduct of al-Qaida's post-9/11 localization strategy in Pakistan using the narratives of 1) the central leadership of al-Qaida and 2) al-Qaida allied and affiliated anti-state Pakistani jihadist leaders, such as those of the TTP.

The narratives of al-Qaida indicate that their arguments for fighting against the state are mainly stemming from the political policies of the state. Still, they are also deeply rooted in the social and cultural issues and, to a lesser extent, in the economic problems of Pakistan. Al-Qaida rallied these issues and problems domestic to Pakistan for its transnational aims. Al-Qaida and many Pakistani jihadis were severely hit by the post-9/11 policies of the Pakistani state. These deeply angered Islamist and jihadist communities in Pakistan, which allowed al-Qaida to recruit these communities for a jihad against the Pakistani state while fueling its massive war against the US and its allies. This study shows that al-Qaida even modified some of its firm principles to tap the domestic problems of Pakistan for its interests. For example, al-Qaida tried to fuel ethnic grievances of the Pashtun and Baluch tribes to enlist their support in the war against the Pakistani state.

The anti-state narratives of Pakistani jihadists have sharp echoes of al-Qaida's standard rhetoric of fighting against a state. Many of the anti-state Pakistani jihadists were previously part of the pro-state conventional jihadist groups fighting in Kashmir. They were attracted to al-Qaida's plans to avenge the post-9/11 policies of Pakistan. They turned against Pakistan as a reaction to Pakistan's change in policy regarding the Afghan Taliban, jihad in Kashmir, and crackdown against Islamists-jihadists in the country on US pressures. Their narratives, later on, expand to the various issues of the country, connected to the politics of the Islamist parties partaking in democracy,

corruption of political elites, ethnic cleavages, and the disputed region of Kashmir. The anti-state jihadis considered the war against Pakistan as a solution to all these issues. Besides, they show a remarkable willingness to take the war beyond Pakistan once they realize their goals in Pakistan. In doing so, their narratives become identical to those of transnational jihadis of al-Qaida, who focus on supporting oppressed Muslims, liberating Muslim lands, and finally establishing a global Islamic caliphate.

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