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Surveillance in public space: a social space perspective

Alvida Amanda Gunhild Andersson



Abstract

In 2019, a national incident operation was introduced by the Swedish police to reduce gun-shootings in public space, and to achieve public safety and security. The operation - known as Operation Rimfrost - introduced a new intelligence-based method to combat crime, which involved the use of different surveillance technologies in public space. "From a social space analysis perspective of Operation Rimfrost, the operation illustrates a state-led solution to resolve an urban crisis. Surveillance technologies were promoted as creating safe and secure public space. However, the right to the city in combination with an understanding of surveillance points out that these technologies can have the possibility to suppress a democratic development of public space. This is because surveillance technologies can inhibit public space as a place for political action, and as a place to gather and express dissent in public. In addition, the analysis of Operation Rimfrost illustrated a lack of participation in society by those most affected by the operation. People living in deprived areas, also referred to as "criminal areas" during the operation, were not aware of any ongoing national operation against violence involving firearms in public space.

Keywords: social space, public space, surveillance, the right to the city

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1. Introduction

In 2013, a whistleblower to state-led surveillance argued that “It all comes down to state power against people’s ability to meaningfully oppose that power...if policy switches are the only thing that ever restrains these states, where changed, you could not meaningfully oppose this...” (Citizenfour 2014:22:43-23:04). With this, he wanted to create a public awareness about policy regarding state-surveillance. In 2020, surveillance technologies are becoming a common feature in public space in Sweden. Closed Circuit TV systems (CCTV) and more recently Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) are surveillance technologies used by the police. They are promoted because they are cost reducing for the police, as well as because they have the potentials to increase safety and security in public space. As public spaces are important for political engagement in a democracy, increased state-led surveillance of public space may have implications for democracy in society. Surveillance could both increase some forms of security, while at the same time decrease the individual integrity and other forms of security in public space. Through a social space analysis, the state's monopoly of violence becomes evident. The important participatory aspect of democracy where at least one state-agency, The Swedish Data Protection Authority, has the power to intervene in the state's use of surveillance technologies during a neoliberal rule can also be highlighted.

1.2 Aim and research question

The aim of this thesis is to explore a contemporary urban crisis from a social space perspective. In addition, it addresses how the state uses surveillance technologies in public space to respond to an urban crisis. The concept of the right to the city will be used to analyse what implications surveillance in public space has. The following research questions address these issues in relation to a national major incident operation in Sweden:

What surveillance technologies have been used in the fight of crime in public space during operation Rimfrost in Malmö?

What does the use of surveillance technologies imply for the right to the city?

Approach of the thesis

This thesis begins with unfolding the social space perspective, and continues with a deeper understanding of surveillance and the right to the city in relation to the social space perspective. This constitutes the theoretical framework for this thesis, and is outlined in chapter two. In chapter three, the methodology and how choices of it relate to the theoretical framework is explained. Chapter four contains the analysis that is structured according to the social space perspective. Finally, chapter five presents the main conclusions of the thesis.

2. A social space perspective on surveillance of public space

The theoretical framework is an understanding of the social space perspective by Lefebvre to explore aspects of surveillance in public space. Surveillance in public space is problematized through the concept Lefebvre developed: the right to the city. This concept can be understood as highlighting a process that Lefebvre wanted to reveal with the social space perspective. The right to the city poses critique by highlighting other perspectives to a current development in society; namely increased surveillance in public space. Surveillance is conceptualised by Foucault (1997) and other scholars that discuss the use of surveillance technologies in public space.

2.1 Social space

Social space links theory and practice, according to Lefebvre (1991). He did not just develop a theory of social space, but also a methodology of how to approach social space. In *The production of space*, Lefebvre (1991) explains social space as a concept that embraces a multitude of interactions that create relations, and thereby the transformation of social space. Social space, as conceptualised by Lefebvre, emphasises relations. The outcome is oppositions, contrasts and mirror effects (Lefebvre 1991:38-39, 41). Social space is a contradictory space, as it is differential space. Lefebvre describes social space as a form of encounter, assembly, simultaneity. Social space is everything that is produced by either nature or society, by their co-operation or conflicts (Lefebvre 1991:101). That is living beings, things and objects, works, signs and symbols. Social space is a work and a product. Therefore, it has modes of production (Lefebvre 1991:101-103), and these modes of production in the urban space are concentrations of all those aspects. Cresswell (2013) explains that Lefebvre suggested that social space is produced by capital and capitalism, as a dominant social production, and that any mode of production produces its own power (Cresswell 2013:130-132).

Lefebvre argued that the urban space was the decision-making centres (Lefebvre 2003:439), and that the urban reality is concealed by an image widely promoted by a hierarchy

of levels that cover up both moral and political order. The urban space is dominated by state-bureaucracies along with capitalism, which simultaneously achieves self-actualisation and self-concealment (Lefebvre 1991:317). It is space that enables the economics to integrate with politics (Lefebvre 1991:321). With a social space perspective to public urban space, democratic spaces can be understood as reproduced in a manner where the state creates space in order to control this space in favour of economic development. Lefebvre argued that the capitalist mode of production had a tight relationship to the state. The organisation of the state and the political arrangements, he said, intervene in space on behalf of the economy (Lefebvre 1991: 378-379). By implementing policies regarding public space, the state upholds a measure of democracy. However, policies can come with contradictions that are spatial for the individual (Lefebvre 1991:318-319), where the meaning of individual freedom, liberty, privacy or possibility to express dissent are decreased in public space in favour for economic development. According to Lefebvre (1991, social reproduction of space under a neoliberal capitalism creates an urban illusion that covers up the urban reality of for example segregation in the urban space. Segregation in a democracy implies passivity and lack of participation in society as a whole. A democracy would imply equal participation, thus, segregation was a sign of absence of democracy (Lefebvre 20013:137,187).

The illusion, Lefebvre argued, would be revealed in times of a crisis in the urban space. As the urban illusion would be fading and the urban reality uncovered, political powers would have to respond to the urban reality. Further, Lefebvre (1991) proposed that this gives rise to the sequence of force-repression-oppression. This is where the aim for the state and local authorities is to reassure and establish political authority, rather than dealing with the causes of segregation in the urban space. State-political power as a response becomes omnipresent in various places at various levels; intense, diffuse or concentrated. Political power in this way reproduces space and social relationships, and thereby the political power to control the urban space (Lefebvre 1991:321). It is also worth mentioning that Lefebvre (1991) argued that it was during an urban crisis - changes to the current mode of production - a form of reproduction of social space was possible. This is because during this time, reappropriation of space could at least halt a domination of space (Lefebvre 1991:167-168). By adopting what Lefebvre named the *spatial triad*, a social space perspective has potential to reveal the process of what can be considered a dominant space by an analysis of a crisis. There are three elements, which illustrate social space. They are in a dialectical relationship,

and so they escape the philosophical thought of dualism that Lefebvre was very sceptical about. He argued that dualistic thinking and a view on object and subject as two elements became a way to master space by covering up the multitude of space (Lefebvre 1991:39-38).

A blind field is yet another concept Lefebvre introduced. This can be a phenomenon in urban space that does not appear on a diagram; it is something that has not yet been given meaning through research, and can therefore wrongfully be considered insignificant. A blind field is both mental and social. Lefebvre explained how a blind field stays a blind field through the blinding and blinded. Here, the power of ideology and language is the blinding, and the blind field is when language fails or is pushed away by the blinding (Lefebvre 2003:30-31). In other words, social space contains blind fields that are projected by politics and policy. Social space is a perspective on reality that opens up the multitude of relations and outcomes in social space that would be locked up by dualistic philosophy or by ideology. A social space perspective opens up and puts words on the mental and social aspects of a blind field in the urban space, because these elements, forms, functions and structures have spatial interrelationships (Lefebvre 1991:141). A blind field that evolves in relation to an urban crisis can be displayed with an analysis by the spatial triad. In a sense, it can challenge the metanarrative of an urban crisis, as the spatial interrelationship and reproduction of the social space is unveiled through an analysis of its production.

The spatial triad

The spatial triad consists of three elements that together constitute social space. Lefebvre proposed that the elements had a dialectical relationship with each other (Figure 1). These would display a view on social space, as perceived, conceived and lived (Lefebvre 1991:39). The three concepts are abstractions of reality, he argued, and give better potential to separate actions that form a coherent whole (Lefebvre 1991:71). The concepts, he suggested, have potential to unveil a phenomena or process - an urban crisis - in society that otherwise could remain a blind field in the urban space.

The first element of the spatial triad is spatial practice. It is the element that embraces production and reproduction; it ensures a level of continuity and cohesion by its spatial activity. From an analytical standpoint, it is the spatial practice of a society that is revealed through the deciphering of its space. Spatial practice can assure passivity to segregation, and

segregation is a conflict (Lefebvre 2003:18-187). A spatial practice has a certain cohesiveness, but is not necessarily fully coherent (Lefebvre 1991:38). This can be interpreted in an analysis with a social space perspective; it is to question what spatial practices are being applied by the state and local authorities to handle an urban crisis, put in relation to the other elements.

The second element of the spatial triad is representations of space. In an analysis, this perspective to an urban crisis is to analyse how the state and local authorities identify what is lived and perceived, and thereby classify and present the urban crisis. Conceptions of space from this perspective is communicated with a system of verbal signs, symbols in urban space or policy implementations in relation to an urban crisis (Lefebvre 1991:38-39). Official documents, press releases, public interviews or strategies are according to Lefebvre the representations from the dominant space in society. Don Mitchell argues that representations of space can therefore be understood as “tied to the relations of production and to the “order” which these relations impose...” (Mitchell 2003:131). Mitchell explains that representations of space can be understood as the “planned, controlled, and ordered space” (Mitchell 2003:129).

The third element of the spatial triad is representational space. It is the space that is directly lived through images and symbols of a society; it is the individual’s space (Lefebvre 1991:39). Representational spaces can overlay the physical space, with systems of non-verbal symbols and signs. Representations of space can be abstract, but they play a role in social and political practice through establishing relations between objects and people in represented space (Lefebvre 1991:39-41). Representational spaces may be blinded by an illusionary ideological projection from representations of space. The representational space perspective seeks the lived space, lived through the spatial practice that are outcomes from representations of space. Mitchell argued that representations of space could be understood as appropriated, lived space and space-in-use (Mitchell 2003:129).

Lefebvre said: “for conflicts to be voiced, they must first be perceived, and this without subscribing to representations of space as generally conceived” (Lefebvre 1991: 365). He argued for a theory that could transcend representational space on the one hand and representations of space on the other. A theory would be able to properly articulate contradictions, in particular contradictions between these two aspects of the elements of social space. Lefebvre argued that socio-political contradictions are realized spatially. Thus,

spatial contradictions express conflicts and it is in space that conflicts effectively become contradictions of space (Lefebvre 1991:365).




Figure 1, The spatial triad. Own elaboration based on Lefebvre (1991).

2.2 Public space and the right to the city

Mitchell (2003) argued that public space is a social space, and it is socially produced “through its use as a public space” (Mitchell 2003:129). Public urban space can be understood as a democratic space that is collectively owned by its citizens and governed by the state and the local authorities (Collins and Shantz 2009:517). The purpose of public space is to serve the public, and all citizen should have access to it. In that sense, they are public places for everyone. Public space is the social locations offered by street, parks, public buildings, and the public internet. Public space is place specific and has historically been places for political action, where voices that question politics and policy in society have been seen and heard (Collins and Shantz 2009:518). Public space is thus important for public democratic participation in society as a place for the public to question and challenge the state. It is a space which could be considered a counter space (Lefebvre 1991:383).

Democracy can be regarded as a form of an oligarchy, where a small number of people has the power to rule over the collective (Held 2006:23, 28). A democratic society is an illusion;

governance is always carried through by a minority over a majority (Rancière 2007: 49-50). With the shift from the Keynesian welfare-state model of governance to a neoliberal model of governance, Mark Purcell (2008) argues that strategies to enhance economic development in cities have led to governments actively intervening on behalf of capital. Purcell argued that this has led to a mix of an *aidez-faire* and *laissez-fair* approach to urban policy. This means that *aidez-faire* policies seek to lower the barrier for capital to accumulate and the *laissez-fair* approach seeks to minimize state regulation of economic activity (Purcell 2008:15-16). Neoliberal policies as such have created cities, as David Harvey (1989) puts it, with a “geographical shape of dual cities with inner city regeneration and a surrounding sea of increasing impoverishment” (Harvey 1989:16). Neoliberalism can be seen as a political project to ensure economic development, and it can be argued that neoliberal policies aiming for economic development have led to policies that aim to create attractive public spaces for capital investments that ideally would create trickle down effects in society where all citizens would benefit from these investments. The absence of trickle down effects in cities has increased segregation (Purcell 2013:9). This has in turn led to urban decay, where a low socio-economic quality of life is reality for a growing population. Urban decay can take many forms in public space. For example, homelessness and the increasing impoverishment of citizens can generate more dissent in society, and this dissent is expressed in public space.

Mitchell (2003) argued that public space is an arena for the relationship between the public, the state and local state. He described how in public space there is an ongoing process between public dissent and the authority’s response to the public dissent. Governments create different strategies to respond and reduce dissent in public spaces by creating policies regarding public space (Mitchell 2003:51-54, 58). Thus, public space is not peaceful spaces. As they are spaces to express opinions, they are differential spaces, as a democratic public space ideally would be. Lefebvre (1991, 2003) expressed similar thoughts: that policies and strategies were led by state, local authorities along with capitalism such as business firms, companies or public-private companies. In addition, they simultaneously achieve self-actualisation and self-concealment (Lefebvre 1991:317). It is through space - say public space - that capitalism is enabled to integrate with politics (Lefebvre 1991:321), because policies shape the urban space and create an illusion of reality that mask the condition of the segregated city (Lefebvre 2003:146).

Policies aiming to secure public space have historically come along with law making. For example: regulating freedom of speech, assembly and other behaviour in public space, where the motives for policies were the so-called good for the public. This includes strategies for creating safety and security in public space. This securitization at the same time undermines the democratic space that public space should constitute, as public space becomes a place that is regulated to exclude public dissent or counter the possibility of a counter space. Thus, Mitchell (2003) argues in line with Lefebvre, that public space is a socially produced space, a product of competing ideologies about what constitutes that space. They are a space that make political activities possible. Public space can therefore be considered essential to a democracy. Here, societal movements seek places to be seen and heard – and by claiming public space, societal movements become public and political, when otherwise they might not be (Mitchell 2003:128-130).

The right to the city

Lefebvre (2003) argued that the urban is the centre of power and the decision-making processes, and that capitalism had become highly intertwined with policy that decreases citizens' right to participate in the decision-making of the city. The concept Lefebvre introduced, the right to the city, can be understood as strive for a collective right to democracy and a right to be part of the decision-making processes by participation, which Lefebvre, argued was concentrated in the urban space. Capitalism is for Lefebvre a driving force of the increasing inequalities he saw in cities as well as many scholars after him points out the political notion of the right to the city to challenge this development. Lefebvre argued that there was an absence of urban democracy because of the lack of representations of the totality. Passivity was for him a sign of a fading democracy. He argued that urban democracy should imply equality of places in urban space (Lefebvre 2003:137,142,125,181). Peter Marcuse (2012) argued that neoliberalism emphasises privatisation and is opposed to a collective city (Marcuse 2012: 97). For urban space to become more just towards its citizens, alternatives to current democracy, politics and policy should be evolved (Marcuse 2012:38).

Mitchell (2003) argued that public space are socially produced through its use as a public space. Public space he suggested are the space that make political activities possible. Public space is where an analysis through a social space perspective social space would

address questions to policy regarding public space (Mitchell 2003:128-130). Purcell (2008) suggests that the right to the city is a political project to restore democracy from neoliberal policies. He addresses the concept of democracy and highlights that neoliberalism has reconfigured democracy and thereby the governance of cities (Purcell 2008:311-313), and he argues that this development contributes to an undemocratic society (Purcell 2008: 96). Purcell (2013) also point out that the struggle for democracy, is democracy and that democracy is the movement itself. He argued that struggle against the state emerges from democracy (Purcell 2013: 316-317). Which is a contrast to Lefebvre, as he opposed any system as a solution to segregation (Lefebvre 1991:429), however the strive for a democracy with equal participation would be the pathway to an urban reality.

The collective notion of the right to the city is an important aspect of the concept, as this right exceeds the individuals. Marcuse (2012) argued that the ideology of democracy, when intertwined with neoliberal logic, does not act for the collective. Therefore, he links the right to the city to social justice, and that the possibility to make sure of that lies in the right to be able to participate in the decision-making process (Marcuse 2012:31, 34). The collectively notion of the right to the city can also be used by neoliberal policies to secure public space. Barry Buzan (2016) explains that the security of individuals is inseparably entangled with that of the state (Buzan 2016:51). Buzan concluded that the disharmony between individual security and the state is a permanent contradiction (Buzan: 2016:62), because the state act for the collective. That conclusion could be questioned, if a neoliberal mode of democracy politically acts for the collective when impoverishment of the right to the city in predominantly segregated spaces in the urban or public space is increasing in today's society with surveillance technologies. Stephen Graham (2011) argued that cities where becoming contemporary war zones, where operational differences between different state agencies, such as the police or intelligence service where becoming less visible. At the same time politics of security where not bound on civil rights or human rights but rather on profiling on individuals, places, behaviour, groups and connection. In this way, he argued, that different subjects end up in different categories – according to what is perceived to the geographical ordering that uphold global neoliberal capitalism (Graham 2011:14-15).

George Kateb (2001) argues that every citizen in a democracy should be sensitive to actual, threatening or arguable violations to legal rights, as it is at the heart of democratic citizenship (Kateb 2001:207). Kateb further states that camera surveillance and the

accumulation of personal data in databases had become the ultimate source of formal violations of the rights of privacy, as a few strategically placed people know the most about the rest of the population. Because detailed information on people is accumulating and permanently available to the state (Kateb 2001:272-274), individuals hardly can know if they are under surveillance, and this creates a panoptical gaze in society (Kateb 2001:276-277; see, also, Section 2.3). Kateb (2001) asserts that being observed means that an “unauthorised autobiography” of the individual is created and that this is hard to avoid for a person. Kateb argues that it is an assault to the personhood of individuals in a democratic society (Kateb 2001:275). For people in public space it entails that by surveillance technologies losing anonymity, as a person can be placed presumptuously in a category by their appearance or behaviour in a database. He put words on what Foucault described as the faceless gaze that surveillance project into society (see also section 2.3), as well as the thoughts from a representational space perspective to surveillance.

“..one is insulted, and
insulted deeply, because one loses all possibility of innocence.
Nothing I do under surveillance is innocent when I know that I
am under surveillance. Is it worse to know or not to know that I
am? Is it worse to be afflicted by inappropriate self-consciousness
or to be duped without being aware of it? Then, too, there is no
innocent detail in one's life when the anonymously curious can
know it. Instead, one is crudely treated as interesting and even as
presumptively or potentially guilty, no matter how law-abiding
one is”
(Kateb 2001:274)

Benjamin J Goold (2004) argues that the individual unable to see the watcher behind a camera creates the feeling of being watch, he therefor argues that one should consider how much privacy one is willing to surrender “for the sake of crime preventing or public safety” (Goold 2004:24,26). A public acceptance of surveillance can come along with trust to the government. The trust to surveillance cameras can be that it is hard to legally point out how they abuse individual's privacy. This can be because of the, so far, absence of abuse and

violation of information collected through video surveillance (Kateb 2001:289) or by a general trust to the government, what Lefebvre would argue came from the domination of space, what he labelled as the blinded and the blinding. It can also derive from the fact that there so far is an absence of grave injuries of for example CCTV or there might not be possible to seek legal redress on constitutional grounds. Kateb also lifts an aspect of surveillance that Foucault described as a disciplinary gaze, which has the power to control movement that is people in space.

The right to the city as a concept can highlight implications for democracy when surveillance cameras are in use in public space, and how such technologies potentially can to suppress democracy. For example, demonstrating in public spaces can be reduced by the fact that individuals by claiming space with their bodies in public space will do so at the cost of exposing their faces. Under surveillance technologies, this means that an individual can be categorized by the state according to their political action. This development can reduce individuals' attempts to claim the right to the city in public spaces. In that sense, surveillance of public urban spaces can be a powerful way to reduce and minimize what the concept the right to the city stands for: a political project that seeks to challenge reconfigure or claim democracy in with public space.

2.3 Surveillance

The promotion of surveillance in public space can be understood with a social space perspective as creating an urban illusion of reality, as public spaces becomes blind fields through surveillance. This is because the policies do not attempt to treat and resolve a societal problem, such as segregation and inequality in the urban space, but rather policies are created to exclude or change behaviour of people in public space. This can be interpreted as what Lefebvre called an illusion of transparent politics and policy; in times of crises a blind field in society would be reviled by a struggle in public space. In addition, that in a time of crisis the state would come to use the legal monopoly of violence towards its citizens (surveillance technologies could be considered as such) to secure the institutionalized order, the urban centrality - or say the neoliberal political economy.

The Panopticon

The architect Samuel Bentham designed a prison as a surveillance “machine” called the Panopticon: the all-seeing. It was designed to maintain surveillance with the minimum cost of guards. Conceived as a circular building with one watchtower in the centre facing all the cells of the prison, the Panopticon was efficient for the watcher, as the prisoner could never know if they were watched or not. Therefore, the prisoners could be expected to correct their behaviour at all times (Foucault 1975: 195, 19, 249). Foucault (1975) described the idea of the Panopticon as a disciplinary power meant for the body and mind, a social control that had the effect: a social control whose effect was self-discipline (Foucault 1975:166, 170-72).

The theme for the Panopticon included surveillance, observation, security and knowledge. Knowledge with a system of individualizing and permanently documenting individuals (Foucault 1975:249-250). Surveillance is power, which can be used, as an analytical arrangement of space (Foucault 1975:203). The power of surveillance can for the state be a powerful tool to establish control of public space (Foucault 1975:219). For example, restrain dissent in public space, and decreasing the opportunity for representational space to take place in public space. This in turn could decrease participation.

With an emphasis on power relationships between the state and the public, Foucault (1975) argued that regulations for society had developed with the idea to reduce its economic and political cost by increasing the effectivities of the institutional order and by multiplying its circuits. He highlighted that this created a new economy and a new technology for punishment in society for those who did not follow the rules. Reducing the political cost was partly to gain the acceptance in society to give punishment, as punishing illegality became the general defence for society as a whole (Foucault 1975:89). Reducing the cost of punishment came not only with strategies of physical disciplinary acts; more so, disciplinary acts were directed at the mind of individuals in society. Foucault (1975) argued that surveillance had become a decisive economic operator, and that the work of directing, superintending and adjusting had become a function within the capitalistic system (Foucault 1975:175). This was in line with the process of the humanization of bodily cruel penalties, as surveillance of the body and mind can be said to be one of the processes to humanize penalties. Moreover, the organisation of the eighteen-century surveillance techniques and strategies brought an automatic anonymous power. State-led organisation of surveillance can be explained as a network of

relations from top to bottom. Moreover, to some extent the reverse, a network poses social control by the individuals themselves to behave with discipline. In this way, state-led surveillance successfully achieves self-discipline through the people themselves. Surveillance and the organisation of surveillance supervises itself and becomes a faceless gaze into society (Foucault 1975:176-177).

In public space, the disciplinary power by surveillance technologies (an ideological gaze as promoted and implemented by policies from the state) could be understood as imposing the same power act on the public. Cameras are symbols of power and they can “correct” the behaviour of individuals in public space by their disciplinary gaze. Surveillance by technologies are there for cost reducing for the society by acting disciplinary to individuals in public space. The disciplinary power that comes from state created policies is carried out in everyday life by the police, who have the ordering power (Foucault 1975:216) to achieve social control (Foucault 1975:214).

Surveillance technologies

Since the 1990s, new surveillance technologies such as CCTV have become a common feature in public space. It is said that there are two main reasons for the popularity of CCTV use amongst authorities. The presumed effectiveness as crime a reducer and the cost-reducing effect for authorities, as cameras reduce the cost of labour (Koskela 2000:334). Surveillance technologies have been designed to maintain continuous surveillance with the aim to reduce cost and improve efficiency of surveillance (Dobson and Fisher 2007:311). In line with this, Koskela argues that CCTV has become a tool to manage public space, as disobedience, the expression of dissent, or law-breaking activities easily can be located in space (Koskela 2000:246). Mackay (2006) argued that CCTV had become a “...management tool for the police and a source of archive evidence, despite the concerns for civil liberties of potential misuse of this information” (Mackay 2006:131).

UAV is a newer surveillance technology that is implemented to monitor public space, UAV for example drones - can be a component of a UAV. The significant difference between UAV and CCTV is that UAVs are not fixed in space. They can move across public spaces, to what can be considered private spaces where they are not prohibited to monitor. Alongside technology advances of UAV, a gap between information communication technologies (ICT)

and surveillance technologies is closing up (Hempel and Töpfer 2004:13). An example of this is new software developments that enables facial recognition. A face recorded in space will be identified from a previous picture, from for example a passport picture. Software sorting, such as facial recognition, can allow authorities to access private information of individuals based on biometric information captured by CCTV or UAV (Graham 2005:572).

Individual and collective life are becoming shaped by treatment within computer controlled, customized service domains where software sorting is made based on some criteria (Graham 2005:564-565). A criterion may come from authorities, and therefore CCTV or UAV become a political act when connected to software. For example, in the case of face-recognition, the facial biometric imagery targets a whole population, where computer algorithms that are built on code categorize any deviation from what is to be normal. Software sorting “automatically stipulates the subjects, locations or behaviours that are deemed by the operators to be ‘abnormal’, ‘threatening’ and worthy of further scrutiny or tracking” (Graham 2005:572-573). The accumulation of data through images increases the possibility of abuse even if without software like facial recognition. As Burkhard Schafer (2013) argued that police officers could “in principle query the data held cumulatively in the CCTV centres of a city so that the software first identifies the faces of participants at a lawful demonstration, and then traces back the journey they took to reach the demonstration, identifying in the process their home addresses, or where they dropped off their children for school” (Schafer 2013:436).

Research on CCTV surveillance in publicly accessible spaces concludes that CCTV is a multifunctional risk management technology that is mainly deployed for social control (Hempel and Töpfer 2004:7). In the study by Hempel and Töpfer, the use of CCTV was contextualised to the city, and they argued that the management of urban space through CCTV became a tool for social exclusion. This is because operators in control based on their appearance or behaviour (Hempel and Töpfer 2004:20) could sort people into categories. The practice and attitude of the personnel working in the operating rooms observing individuals in public space shapes the operational procedures, for example by the tendency of operators to target whole categories of the public as likely criminals (Hempel and Töpfer 2004:38,39).

Their research findings indicated that people did not know much about CCTV per se, but that there was a growing consciousness about it (Hempel and Töpfer 2004:8). Further, the research indicated that individuals' attitudes to CCTV would vary significantly depending on whether questions were put in a context of the CCTV's potential (Hempel and Töpfer 2004:9,

18). Scepticism towards CCTV in public space was based on grounds of civil liberties and privacy. As 53 percent of their informants said, that footage from CCTV could easily be misused, and only 25 percent of the informants would welcome CCTV in their own street (Hempel and Töpfer 2004:46). As much as 75 percent of the informants believed that where they were under surveillance, but only 36 percent of them could point out the nearest surveillance camera (Hempel and Töpfer 2004:46-47).

CCTV can be considered a generation of the Panopticon (Fisher and Dobson 2007:308), as they are newer technology that's promoted to reduce crime by controlling the behaviour of people through a faceless gaze (Fyfe and Bannister 1996:42), where individuals do not know whether they are being watched or not. In this way, surveillance by the state can regulate movements of public resistance in public space.

The use surveillance technologies can be considered a force-repression-oppression sequence, as Lefebvre (1991) described surveillance is predominantly justified by enhanced safety and security for the public, by so gaining a public acceptance of surveillance. However, surveillance also have to potentials to monitor the public sphere, and assures the ability to track individuals across space and access information about them. When these measures are justified by policies to secure public spaces from threats, predominantly from "outside" (such as international terrorism) rather than from the "inside" (from the segregated city), these policies mask the urban reality while also reducing a political cost, say segregation. Surveillance can thus work two folded when legitimized by the public. Reduce the democratic right to express dissent to for example an uneven development or to be present in public space, as that possibility might be infringed upon by surveillance.

Surveillance technologies in a Swedish context

The use of CCTV and UAV are relatively new technologies that the Swedish police use. As of now, 2020, the use of UAV is allowed in public spaces, but the Swedish police have to announce to the public beforehand where and when they are going to monitor. The Swedish law, Kamerabevakningslagen, where under discussion during year 2019. It was suggested that the law was to be changed so that the police, the security service, coastguard and the custom service should have the mandate to use video surveillance without asking for permit from the Swedish Data Protection Authority (Regeringskansliet 2019). Video surveillance where

promoted as effective crime preventer and as means to increase safety in public space. By increasing safety in public space, it was argued that more people would be present in public space. To keep the privacy of people, it was suggested that the authorities who would benefit from the new law would have to make a documented decision where it is clear that the aim for video surveillance has to outweigh privacy concerns. Further it was suggested that Swedish Data Protection Authority should act as a supervisors and be able to give fines if rules were not followed (Regeringskansliet 2020). These changes in the law, were accepted, and in use from January 1, year 2020 (Sveriges Riksdag 2019). Thus, CCTV has become an efficient resource for the Police, as CCTV can either be fixed or mobile by for example be adapted to a movable container (Figure 2).



Figure 2, CCTV in a public space. Source: Authors own 2020.

UAV have a completely different potential to perform surveillance compared CCTV, as they are quiet, can move across space (public space and private space), and individuals cannot know exactly where they are. The Swedish police have argued that the use of UAV will increase, as UAV can help them to for example observe demonstrations (Polisen 2019), something that the Swedish Data Protection Authorities warns the police not to do, since it can be considered a crime to the integrity of the individual (Sveriges Television 2019). According to Kateb (2001), surveillance technologies are easily misused; that there is a risk that the police will use surveillance that does outweigh privacy interests in the fight against crime. An example of this that it has been reported that Swedish police had used the American controversial application Clearview AI. Which is a software that enables facial recognition through their database with pictures from social media, such as Facebook and Instagram (Svt Nyheter 2020). This turns mobile devices into a form of advanced surveillance camera (Sveriges Radio 2020).

In Sweden, there is an ongoing process with in the governmental to change the law on the Passport register. Through the principle of parliamentary transparency, it is possible to take part of arguments with in the government about what different agencies with in the state want to use the Passport register. For example, the security service wants to access the Passport register, because it holds biometric information. With this register, they want to have random access to be able to run software facial recognition with it because it will help them to identify individuals (Säkerhetspolisen 2019). The Swedish Data Protection Authority had a more critical reflection to the possibility for the Security Service to use the Passport register with its biometric information in their crime preventing work, because they see it as an infringement to the personal integrity. Mainly because of the situations where biometric information is handed to other countries. Where then it is not clear how the biometric information of individuals are handled and what that can imply for the individual (The Swedish Data Protection Authority 2019).

A law came into force in year 2020, allows for secret data interception (Regeringskansliet 2020). The Swedish government argued that criminals often communicate through encrypted apps, and that criminals avoids places where they know they can be tapped or monitored. For law enforcement authorities it meant that they had a gap on important information (Regeringskansliet 2020). The new law, Hemlig dataavläsning, means that it's allowed the police to gain access to data in mobile devices and the like without the owner's consent or

knowledge in cases where the crime they are suspected of carries a penalty of two or more years of prison (Svensk författningssamling 2020). The implementation of the law was criticized by the Swedish Data Protection Authority, which argues that secret data interception should only be allowed for example when national security is in danger. The authority was critical to the fact that the police when using this method, the police will be able to monitor and “map private people’s lives completely”. They argued that it is a surveillance technology that can intrude private people’s lives (Sveriges television 2019). Because with the new law, it is possible to access all personal data in a mobile device, individuals will not know if their data is collected and read, it is a new facet of the Panopticon, as it can change individual’s behaviour on these devices.

Surveillance by new technologies in the public space have been criticised for violating privacy in a democratic society, because everyone has to accept surveillance in order to prove innocence (Agrell and Petterson 2016:105-106). A risk with mass surveillance of the public has been identified as self-censorship and passivation in the civil society. For Lefebvre, passivation is a sign of an undemocratic development. Because self-censorship and passivation in turn could reduce freedom of expression, and so undermine democracy, because it can make people hesitant to express their political opinions in public (Agrell and Petterson 2016:214). This could for example be controlling public space from demonstrations against oppression, which undermines differential spaces and thus democracy. Meanwhile surveillance cameras are described as essential for the governments to achieve goals of safety in society, and to prevent and disrupt criminal activities. In order to achieve a public acceptance of CCTV, governments have to work proactively to achieve social acceptance of surveillance cameras. By for example using the concept safety instead of surveillance in promoting them. It is argued that individuals will then be more willing to give up some of their integrity in exchange for collective security (Agrell and Petterson 2016:139). These arguments go in hand with what Foucault described, that the state work proactively to reduce the political cost of surveillance.

Opinions of the use of surveillance technologies

A survey on public opinion and perception of surveillance cameras and privacy among the public for the years 2017-2019 was carried out in Sweden through telephone interviews where it is not clear if any of the respondents actually had the experience to live with CCTV in their

neighbourhood. The study concludes that there is a strong support for video surveillance of Sweden's public space (Lahtinen 2017-2020), as there is a strong belief, that CCTV reduces crime, either by preventing or solving them. Of the concerns raised in the survey, breach of privacy ranked the highest with 55 percent. Only 6 percent of the respondents knew where to turn direct complaints concerning CCTV privacy breaches. On the question whether they believed automatic facial recognition was being used in Sweden, 55 percent of respondents answered "no, not much" (Lahtinen 2019:2).

The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) has conducted research on the police's active use of CCTV in public space in the cities Stockholm and Malmö. In Stockholm, the police's use of CCTV had been on a three-year trial. CCTV was installed in two central, commercial public spaces in Stockholm: Medborgarplatsen and Stureplan. They had installed cameras that were active on specific times on weekend evenings, and they had special personnel monitoring the cameras (Brå 2015:14). The operators complemented the police by giving an overview of the space they were monitoring. By locating people with suspicious behavior that the police could attend to (Brå 2015:16, 18). Brå determined that there had been a problem with the personnel in the control room, that the quality of the cameras and their positions in public space had not been satisfying. CCTV at best had given an overview for the police on duty (Brå 2015:18, 25). Brå concluded that while reading the protocols from the personnel working the weekends, it was evident that the documentations varied, and that this indicated that the operators seemed to have had different motivations and varying degree of competence for the work (Brå 2015:16). Further, Brå suggested that there had not been any change to how safe the two places felt for the public (Brå 2015:8). The police presumed the fact that a large amount of respondents to their survey did not know that there was any video surveillance in Medborgarplatsen and Stureplan (Brå 2015:9) played a role in that the perceived feeling of safety in these areas had not changed.

In Malmö, Brå carried out a crime-preventing project with the use of CCTV in a residential area described as a "deprived area", in the district Seved. The evaluation of the project is partly presented with information gained from interviews. The information is based on answers from eight people, where two were local traders, two were police officers working in the area, two were property owners, and two were tenants (Brå 2019:62). The residents were the most skeptical towards the use of CCTV in their residential area, and expressed concerns about integrity and privacy. One of the concerns was that to be observed by CCTV

was generating the feeling of becoming a potential criminal. Residents also conveyed worries that the police would use the material from CCTV for other purposes. Further, they questioned how the police had informed the public about the surveillance, indicating that the information of the implementation of CCTV in Seved had not been communicated well. One of the residents expressed a concern that society is moving in a direction where surveillance had to be accepted to feel safe, a society he/she was not happy with (Brå 2019:63-64). CCTV therefore created an uncomfortable feeling for the residents. The local traders on the other hand, had a more positive attitude towards the use of CCTV in Seved, as one of them thought that living in a democratic society means that if you don't have anything to hide, then there is no need to feel unsafe when being observed by the police (Brå 2019:63-64). The police argued that CCTV was an important tool for them, providing an extra eye and creating a safer environment for them to work in. For example, the use of CCTV had allowed the police to drive into Seved with just one car instead of two (Brå 2019:49). The police also problematized the use of CCTV, but as an organisational issue. For instance, there was no clear routine for the documentation of the use of CCTV. Moreover, the cameras themselves needed to be of better quality to avoid situations where they were affected negatively by power failure (Brå 2019:75). The police also highlighted that there has to be personnel actively watching the cameras for them to be a complement to the patrolling police (Brå 2019:76). Finally, the police expressed that they wanted to develop the use of CCTV and spread the knowledge of CCTV among the police organisation, so that it could become a more active tool for the daily routine (Brå 2019:75-76). The rapport on implementing CCTV in Seved concluded that although Seved had become a less open criminal environment, the drug dealing activities did not vanish, they had instead moved to unwatched places. An implication of measuring the effect of CCTV in Seved was the Seved had been targeted by many different projects to make it a safer neighbourhood, and thus the fact that the area had less problems after the installation of CCTV could not only be linked to the use of CCTV (Brå 2019:75).

Seved has been subject for a study besides Brå and Lund University. In a thesis where interviews were the main method to gain knowledge about opinions of CCTV, residents expressed scepticism about the police use of CCTV than people only working in the area, whereas one finding was that CCTV cameras did not have efficient signage about them being active in the area, which among the resident gave a negative feeling. In addition to that, the residents did feel that CCTV intruded their integrity. The study concluded that the research

finding is contrasting from the one done by Lund University. The suggested reason is sample criteria. Whereas the study from Lund University, a random sample of the population does not guarantee that any respondents are residents living in a neighbourhood where the police use CCTV – there for the questions in the interviews are imaginary. The sample of interviews in the thesis, are among residents being subject for CCTV, different from the research by Lund University who uses another type of random sample where it is not known if the respondents live in a neighbourhood where CCTV is implemented – which can play an important role about the opinions of surveillance (Nordquist 2018:22-26). Thus, representational space might not be presented fairly. As the aforementioned study by Hempel and Töpfer (2004) individual's attitude to the use of CCTV would vary significantly if CCTV's potential was put in a context. The public opinion in the aforementioned study by Lund University can thus be used as a produced knowledge about the public opinion but if it really reflects public opinion is another question.

3. Methodology

Epistemology can be understood, as a theory of knowledge that is concerned about what is scientific knowledge (Bryman 2016:690). Ontology is theory of the nature of social entities (Bryman 2016:693). Methodology can be considered as toolboxes for methods and they reflect considerations of epistemology and ontology (Moses and Knutsen 2012:2-3). Niels Bohr had the argument that epistemology and ontology were not separable considerations (Barad 1996:173). Bohr argued that that "...measurement is a potent moment in the construction of scientific knowledge..." where meaning and matter meet (Barad 1996:166). He therefore situated practice within theory and he referred this to the principle of complementarity (Barad 1996:173).

Agential realism is an approach to science and the production of such and Karen Barad (1996) argued that agential realism includes practice within theory. That implies that theory is epistemologically and ontologically reflexive of context. Agential realism entails that boundaries between subject and objects are necessary in research, for to make meaning of concepts. Nevertheless, they are not innocent because when boundaries are made, they have real consequences in everyday life. Agential realism argues that constructed knowledge has to be accountable and responsible. That can be done by accounting for the research design. None the less, agential realism is an approach to science that, among many things, seeks to challenge existing boundaries made in the process of producing knowledge (1996:182-183).

Lefebvre's social space perspective, to the production of social space as a produced by social relations and described as a form that is everything produced by nature or society, can be considered as having a component of Bohr's principle of the complementarity. It can be argued that he has an approach to science that corresponds to agential realism, as his perspective of social space holds epistemological and ontologically reflections interwoven. He was in his time critical to the production of knowledge in the name of science, as he argued it was biased in the first place by ideology.

3.1 Research design

It can be argued that the researcher is biased in the choice of research as being part of the universe; the research design is what bridges over that inherent bias to the production of scientific knowledge. The research design applied in this thesis is a case-study approach; the arguments that the strength of case studies is that they can shed light on context, process and like causes and outcomes, which the goal of Lefebvre's spatial triad is. Case studies have according to Flyvbjerg (2011) the prosperity of providing knowledge and therefore be theory generating. Case studies have been criticized over being biased but Flyvbjerg argues that instead a case study "...contains a greater bias toward the falsification of preconceived notions than toward verification" (Flyvbjerg 2011:311). For this thesis, the extreme/deviant case have been decided upon because this case-study approach typically would address unusual cases and theories that are able to account for a deviant case (Flyvbjerg 2011:306-307). Case studies can also be considered as an approach to bridge the use of quantitative and qualitative methods. The argument is that both quantitative and qualitative methods are valuable for a research as they together can strengthen an argument about a phenomenon in reality that the case study is investigating. Flyvbjerg calls this the complimentary between case studies and statistical methods beautiful (Flyvbjerg 2011:314).

3.2 Methods

Content analysis

Content analysis is a flexible method that can be applied to different media (Bryman 2016:285). The purpose of performing the content analysis is to grasp the meaning of the different media (Bryman 2016:302-303). A weakness with content analysis can be selection bias that can either overstate or understate relationships. To avoid such bias, the selection criteria and coding process can be transparent (Flyvbjerg 2011:314). This means that the research becomes replicable (Bryman 2016:284).

For this content analyse, the selection criteria are set to secondary data, such as official documents, newspapers and official social media online concerning operation Rimfrost. Since this selection criterion is set to a unit of analysis that is a publicly available

source of information in Sweden, this selection of sample contributes to transparency as well as to avoid bias of the analysis (Bryman 2016:552-553). For the unit of analysis, the selection criterion has been done through a database provided by Lund University, Retriever Research, and online search on Google. Retriever Research collects and stores newspapers, and in the online database, it is possible to set several search parameters. The selection for a unit of analysis begun with a sample of what can be described as pre-operation Rimfrost, where the purpose was to gain knowledge about what was considered as the cause of the urban crisis. The parameters for that search were the phrase "Shootings in Malmö", a search limitation to the year 2019 and the limitation to the number of newspapers set to six in the Retriever Research database. For the sample of operation Rimfrost the number of newspapers were the same, but the sample parameters for the period was set to the months of November 2019 until June 2020. This period was selected because operation Rimfrost started in November 2019 and was set to end in June 2020. For this sample, the following search words were applied: "operation Rimfrost, Malmö"; "operation Hagelstorm"; operation Norrsken"; operation Rimfrost, permafrost". The change of search parameters is an example of what can be described as "the messiness of qualitative research", i.e. going back and forth with the research design during the research. Here, it is considered as a strength, as it means engaging with critical reflexivity in the research process. In order to find material from social media these search words have been used in Google search, which led to Facebook, YouTube, official webpages of authorities and news reports online that contained live-interviews with official authorities.

To be transparent with the content analysis, a communication of how it has been conducted can be done (Bryman 2016:293). Thus, a schedule of the content analysis is applied to communicate the method of content analysis to this analysis (

Table 1). The theoretical framework guides the codes. The unit of analysis is the selection criteria. The theme relates to the research question, while the emerging themes are how the theme is evolved from the coding process. The emerging themes concerning surveillance are analysed in relation to the theoretical framework applied in the thesis; this process is illustrated with a figure (Figure 3).

Table 1, Coding Schedule. Table layout: Alvida Andersson 2020.

Codes	Unit of analysis	Theme	Emerging themes
Representations of space	Official documents, social media, daily press.	Surveillance	Reclaim public space, safety, security. By surveillance methods, open and covert.
Spatial practice	Official documents, social media, daily press.	Surveillance	Open and covert surveillance. Targeting criminals and criminal activity in criminal/deprived urban areas.
Representational space	Official documents, social media, daily press.	Surveillance	Lack of representation in representations of space and spatial practice. Represented from the perspective of representations of space.




Figure 3, Figure of thought. Authors own elaboration 2020.

Statistics and a geographical web-based tool

In the process of sampling and coding the unit of analysis, other methods are applied to communicate their relevance to the research question. This involves the use of a quantitative method, creating tables of statistical findings. The second method is the use of a geographical web-based tool, google maps, to visualise research findings.

Reflection

The element of representational space is in this analysis analysed from the representations of space perspective. It is thus a limitation to the thesis that the element representational space is not analysed directly from its perspective. From a right to the city perspective, this perspective would favourable be analysed through a primary data collection. This could increase a knowledge about the public knowledge's, attitudes, or feelings about surveillance in public space. In addition to that, it could generate an awareness in representational space about what surveillance in public space can imply.

4. A social space perspective to operation

Rimfrost

This chapter begins with situating a contemporary urban crisis, as Lefebvre argued that an urban crisis had the potential to reveal a blind field in society. Thereafter follows the analysis that explores surveillance in public space through operation Rimfrost. The analysis is structured in three sections that is guided by the spatial triad (Figure 1).

The urban crisis

Lefebvre (1991) argued that blind fields in society are concealed by the state and local states through policy decisions that conceals the urban reality as hole. The argument here is that the city Malmö in Sweden was going through an urban crisis that became exposed to the public sphere. Malmö had experienced years of increased criminal activities, shootings and explosions in public space. According to statistics, shootings in public space is not a phenomenon specific to Malmö alone, but nationally overall (Table 2). A comparative study of the years 2006 and 2015 concludes that shootings had doubled up between the years of that study. Another finding of the study was that shootings in disadvantaged urban areas in what the state designates as URBAN15- and LUA-areas, names for “deprived areas” (Brå 2015:10-11), in year 2014 was five times more common than in an urban area that is not in a disadvantage condition (Brå 2014:10). Between the years, 2017-2019, shootings in public space of Malmö had decreased but not on a national scale (Table 2).

The two shootings that had happen in Malmö, year 2019, did not happened in a so-called deprived urban area which might be a reason of the public national attention. For example, a young mother holding her infant was shoot dead in a central public space of Malmö (Svenska dagbladet 2019). This launched headings in newspapers such as “We have to act to save the country ... because the state is losing its monopoly on violence...” (Svenska dagbladet 2019) in Swedish press. Later that year in November two young boys where shoot at in public space where as one of them, a 15-year-old boy was shoot dead. The incident was described by the police as an execution in the public space of Malmö (Polisen 2019). Just hours later, the state and local authorities would respond to the shootings in Malmö. The following day the

police held a press conference and announced that they had declared a “national major incident operation” because of to the escalating violence in Malmö (Polisen 2019).

Table 2, Shootings and explosions in Sweden and Malmö (2017-2019). Sources: The Swedish Police and Brå 2017-2020. Table layout: Alvida Andersson 2020.

Shootings in Sweden			
Year	2017	2018	2019
Total	324	306	334
Injured	139	135	120
Dead	43	45	42
Shootings and explosions in Malmö			
Year	2017	2018	(until November) 2019
Total	65	49	26
Injured	35	14	13
Dead	7	12	6
Without physical injury	23	23	7
Explosions	58	45	28

A national major incident operation

A national major incident operation had previously been declared in 2017, when a terrorist attack happened in Stockholm, in 2018 as a response to summer wildfires in Sweden (Kvällsposten 2019). The National Operations Department (NOA) is part of the Swedish police,

and responsible for directing, managing or supporting police operations, nationally as well as internationally. It is NOA who are responsible for major incident operation and they named the new major incident operation, operation Rimfrost. In effect, the police changed its organisation, and centralised itself to one commanding manager within NOA, who has a team of specialists to council, but can make the decisions of the operation and, therefore, “owns the police resources” (Polisen 2019). The centralization of the police organisation allows the commanding officer to geographically relocate police resources. Such as investigators, analysts and police officers on patrol duty. NOA is thus responsible for coordination, prioritization and harmonization of efforts (Polisen 2019). Accordingly, Lefebvre had argued that the state and local authorities would respond to an urban crisis with a sequence of force-repression-oppression. At various levels, with the goal of establishing the political power by mastering for example public space.

At the press conference, where operation Rimfrost was presented to the public, the police said that they wanted to “lock away the criminals” and “we will see a security service that is more active in this field” and “this is costly but necessary”. They also argued that the police can “influence phenomena in society, we do not control them” (Polisen 2019). The police argued that they had nationally considered 200-300 individuals to be the main threat to society, and would therefore target them one by one. By doing so, the head of NOA predicted, there would no more open criminal activity. The police would be visible, “and it should be nice and tidy” in public space. Moreover, for operation Rimfrost to be successful, the public had to feel a diffidence from before (Aftonbladet 2020). To achieve the goal of the operation, the police relied on existing surveillance methods and by introducing more surveillance methods to enhance public safety and security (Aftonbladet 2020). The police also argued during the time of operation Rimfrost, that they in peacetime should be able to use the military’s resources. As they today they only have that possibility in case of a terrorist attack (TV4 2020).

The surveillance technologies that the police use as methods to fight crime and create nice and tidy public spaces, can be understood as technologies used to achieve social control of the population as well as control dissent in society in favour for political rule, according to Lefebvre (1991). Operation Rimfrost ended at the 14th of June and the police in Malmö said that after operation Rimfrost comes “operation Permafrost”. Because the police argued that, the knowledge that the Malmö police had gained during operation Rimfrost was knowledge

that they could practice without an ongoing national major incident operation in the nation (Sydsvenskan 2020). Mitchell (2003) had argued that public space was an arena for the relationship between the public and the state. In addition, that the state would respond to dissent by policies concerning public space, thus potentially the new surveillance technologies came to be legal for the police to use during operation Rimfrost, that are the new knowledge and methods that the state profited on through the urban crisis.

In June as it was announced that the national incident operation Rimfrost was closing down and the head of the national operations department, NOA, as well as the commanding manager of Rimfrost argued that their purpose is not to solve a societal problem, but to interrupt them. They concluded that they saw a trend in Malmö that was increasing the perceived feeling of safety in public space and they connected it operation Rimfrost. Where they have had not only all of the resources and technologies that the police have in use to fight crime, but as well from other state agencies such as the security service and Swedish Armed Forces. The intelligence based method operation Rimfrost was a method that they could continue to use within the police as the police argued in a press conference that collaboration between authorities where key to fight crime and increase safety and security (Polisen 2020).

4.1 Representations of space

Representations of space is the element of the spatial triad that focuses on the conceptualized reality by the state and local authorities. As how do they identify what is lived and perceived in social space. In relation to representations of space the urban crisis are shootings and explosions in public space. Representations of space can be found in strategies, policy documents and interviews as well as symbols and signs (Lefebvre 1991:38-39). With a representation of space perspective, the aim is to address how the state and local authorities present operation Rimfrost and what the objectives the operation is. As in how surveillance technologies are justified to be used in public space. The analysis begins with operation Rimfrost and continues with analysis of the two sub-operations that took place under operation Rimfrost in Malmö: operation Hagelstorm and operation Norrsken.

Operation Rimfrost in a representations of space perspective

Operation Rimfrost (operation Hoarfrost) is in relation to representations of space the major national incident operation against violence involving use of firearms and explosions by criminals in public space. Operation Rimfrost implied a state-led operation with the objective to reduce the number of shootings and explosions in what's called criminal environments by the state and local authorities. By reducing the number of individuals in criminal networks through prosecution and gang-related initiatives. The aims of the operation are to counter criminal activities where weapons and explosives are used in crime-related conflicts. To increase the number of weapons and explosives seized and by so the police will achieve the goals of safety and security in public space (Polisen 2019). Operation Rimfrost was to be in play for a six-month long period that could be extended. However, the head of NOA argued that a six-month period would be enough to make a difference. He also highlighted that it is a very costly operation (Dagens nyheter 2019).

In relation to the representations of space perspective operation Rimfrost is not just about reinforcements with police officers and other authorities geographically concentrated to a decided hotspot to put their efforts to, but about extended efforts with the use of different surveillance technologies such as helicopters, CCTV and UAV to counter criminal activities in public space.

UAV is an optimal surveillance technology and can be considered a development of the Panopticon principle as they impose a disciplinary gaze on society while being almost invisible, and they reduce to cost of police officers in the field. For the public they are promoted as a better tool for the society to fight crime, as UAVs are not making as much noise as a helicopter would; they are thus legitimized by being invisible and non-disturbing for the public. However, UAV are not allowed to monitor private spaces such as homes (Polisen 2020). Surveillance technologies are legitimized by the state because of their possibility to prevent or detect crime. By for example capturing and collecting material that can be used as evidence in a trial. The police also argued that UAV could be used for observation of demonstrations (Polisen 2019). However, this is an arena in which the Swedish Data Protection Authorities warns the police to proceed with caution, as it can be considered a crime to the integrity of the individual (Sveriges Television 2019).

During operation Rimfrost, in year 2020, two new policies was implemented by the state, the first one that enables the police to judge by themselves if they are allowed to use camera surveillance and the second one that gives the state the right to gain access to data in mobile devices and the like without the owner's consent or knowledge. The first sub-operation in Malmö took place after the first mentioned law was implemented and the second sub-operation after the second law was implemented.

Operation Hagelstorm

The first sub-operation under operation Rimfrost was operation Hagelstorm (Operation Hailstorm), was initiated in January 2020 when the new law on camera surveillance was implemented (Kameraövervakningslagen 2020). This enabled the police to use camera surveillance without asking for permission from any other authority. Operation Hagelstorm was a joint operation of several state agencies, such as customs officials, enforcement authority and the security service. In Lefebvre's wording, it can be considered a force-repression- sequence where the state aimed to be omnipresent at multiply levels of society. Operation Hagelstorm where preannounced by flyers in a number of languages besides Swedish but it did not indicate where or when in Malmö it would take place. The police explained that their presence might become more visual than usual, with the purpose to enhance safety and security for the individual (Polisen 2020).

The strategy of Operation Hagelstorm was two folded. To disturb the criminal networks by announcing the operation in advance, hoping that criminals would expose themselves. Operation Hagelstorm also implied that a major police operation was carried through in a suburb under UAV surveillance, where a large amount of weapons was sized. Operation Hagelstorm implied that 729 properties and staircases was searched, approximately 2000 vehicles where checked and 39 weapons, 1 kg explosives and a large amount of ammunition had been seized. The police also confiscated 67,200 SEK, detained 14 people, and prepared 41 police reports (Sveriges television 2020).

Operation Norrsken

In April 2020, operation Rimfrost organised and carried out a second operation in Malmö under the name operation Norrsken (Operation Northern lights). The same month that the

new law that on secret data interception was implemented. The law makes it legal for the police and Security Service to secretly technically access electronic devices used for communication and thereby gain information (SFS 2020:62 2020). This can be considered as a facet of how state respond to an urban crisis. A surveillance method can penetrate what can be considered as a private sphere as part of a personhoods integrity, the mobile telephone, with the goal of maintaining safe and secure public space.

The goal of operation Norrsken was to shake the criminals and make them do mistakes. The police seized less narcotics and just one firearm in operation Norrsken. The police however argued that they had secured public spaces such as buildings, staircases and cellarways. In addition, the police argued that the intelligence they had received during the operation would lead to more efforts and that the open drug scene in the city districts Möllevången and Seved would vanish (Sydsvenskan 2020). The police argued that even if they did not seize large amounts of illegalities through operation Norrsken, they believe that their operation had been successful by achieving the important aspect of enhancing public safety, which they said is one of the main goals of operation Rimfrost (Polisen 2020).

Therefor it can be highlighted that the operation successfully used the new covert surveillance technologies, with was the main purpose, but used traditionally methods to show the public (criminal or not) that they were active on the field and argued that they now had made Malmö safe again by reclaiming the streets.

Permafrost

In May 2020, it where announced that the operation would end in June (Sydsvenskan 2020). The police in Malmö argued that the biggest gain for the police them with operation Rimfrost was that they had learned a new method of how to fight crime. That they had seized approximately 700 weapons and 100 kilogram of explosives whereas half of that came from the south region of Sweden (Sydsvenskan 2020). In June, the police argued that on a national scale they had not met their goal to reduce shootings (Table 3).The most positive effect of operation Rimfrost, the police argued, had been in Malmö where they there claim that shootings had decreased half as much compared to the past two years. A decreasing trend in the statistics that had already started before operation Rimfrost (Table 2).

Table 3, Shootings in Sweden 2020. Source: Polisen 2020. Table layout: Alvida Andersson 2020.

Shootings in Sweden	
Year	(until June) 2020
Total	163
Injured	56
Dead	20

The police concluded in an interview about operation Rimfrost that that violence resulting in death, happened 8 times as often in areas as they call deprived compare to ones who are not, they claim that by reducing the criminal actors, security and safety will be perceived in these urban spaces. They also argued in the end of operation Rimfrost that by interrupting a development of shootings in these areas where not solving a complex societal problem (Dagens nyheter 2020). The head of NOA none the less argued that it had been a successful operation by reducing criminal actors in public space (Svt Nyheter 2020). The Malmö police argued that after operation Rimfrost the “permafrost” would come as they had gained new knowledge of how to fight crime (Sydsvenskan 2020). It can be argued that laws that enables use of surveillance technologies unlike before operation Rimfrost that is what “permafrost” entails. From a right to the city perspective the perceived urban crisis enabled the implementation of new laws regarding surveillance of public space, used predominantly in segregated areas.

4.2 Spatial practise

The spatial practice in relation to operation Rimfrost is a spatial practice of the state to resolve the urban crisis. A spatial practice stands in relation to representations of space as they are here legitimized. As in how do the state and local government perceived the urban crisis, the escalating shootings in public space, and how they would respond to reduce shootings in public space. It is the spatial practice by the state in public space, how they intervene as a

response to the urban crisis. The spatial practice produces and reproduces social space and there is a level of cohesion and continue of the spatial practice. Surveillance in public space is a spatial practice that is not new, that new surveillance technologies are introduced to public space indicates the cohesions and continue of surveillance in public space and that surveillance is significant in the reproduction of public space.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

The police announced five times that they were going to use, UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems) a name for UAV, during the time of Operation Rimfrost. The first announcement was in December 2019, 16 districts in Malmö were under surveillance by UAS (Figure 4).



Figure 4, Swedish police drone. Source: Polisen (2019).

The areas that the police where going to surveillance with UAV between the 10th of December 2020 to 9th of Mars were presented in ten pictures on the police's webpage (Polisen 2020). In these ten pictures, 18 areas in 16 city districts are marked on small maps in the police webpage (Figure 5).



Figure 5, UA Announcement. Source: Polisen 2019.

The criminal environments identified with the representations of space perspective where Hermodsdal, Söderkulla, Holma, Krocksbäck, Bellevue, Lorensborg, Innerstaden, Värnhem, Kirseberg, Segevång, Lindängen, Möllevången, Oxie, Rosengård, Sofielund, and Västra innerstaden (Figure 6). These are then urban areas where the police have made the decision that the interest for the police to use camera surveillance outweighs the individual's interest

of not being under camera surveillance.



Figure 6, UAV flights in Malmö. Source: Polisen 2019. Layout in Google: Alvida Andersson 2020.

The second time the police announced on their homepage was the 19th of April at 4.45 am that they were going to use UAV in an area between the roads, Amiralsgatan, Nobelvägen and Yttringvägen. From the evening as well as throughout the night. The interpretation of that area is mapped, the red lines represents the streets and the grey area between an interpretation of the area that was under UAV surveillance (Figure 7).

The third announcement from the police came at the 4th of May through Facebook. It where announced that they were going to use UAV to over the city districts Nydala, Hermodsdal and Lindängen 24/7 hours a day between the 4th of May until the 21th of June (Figure 8).




Figure 7, Amiralsgatan, Nobelvägen and Yttringvägen Source: Polisen 2020. Layout in Google: Alvida Andersson 2020.




Figure 8, Nydala, Hermodsdal and Lindängen. Source: Polisen 2020. Layout in Google: Alvida Andersson 2020.

The fourth, and last, announcement to use UAV during operation Rimfrost was announced 20th of May. Between the 20th of May and 20th of June four urban areas Holma, Krocksbäck and Bellevue were under surveillance 24/7 hours a day (Figure 9).



Figure 9, Holma, Krocksbäck, Lorensborg and Bellevue. Source: Polisen 2020. Layout in Google: Alvida Andersson 2020.

The use of UAV are said to be very efficient for the police, as they do not create sound or vibrations, and they are permitted 24 hours a day. The material that is recorded by the cameras can be used as evidence (Polisen 2020). The only limitation for the police to use them is that the police have to announce when they are in use, which they do either in their webpage or on social media such as Facebook (Polisen 2019). This can be considered an inconsistent way of communicating to the public as well as excluding people from that information because for example not everyone has a Facebook account. In turn, it leads to that, representational space's opportunity to know that they are under surveillance decrease.

Surveillance cameras and software that enables facial recognition

At the end of operation Rimfrost, the 12th of June, it was reported that the Police had secretly carried out a number of pilot tests of a software that enables facial recognition. The aim had been to sift through footage they had and see if surveillance videos that had captured individuals that they had in their databases. During the tests, there had been no requirement that those who have their images processed had any particular degree of suspicion against them. In addition to that, they had not informed The Swedish Data Protection Authority about the test's with software surveillance that enables facial recognition. The police explained that they talked to their legal department who's assessment was that they could do the tests (Sydsvenskan 2020). Which is an example of how the police makes an interpretation of the law, Kameraövervakningslagen, and judged it different from The Swedish Data Protection Authority.

Operation Hagelstorm

In relation to spatial practice, operation Hagelstorm used both open and covert surveillance methods to reclaim public space from criminals. The state and local authorities were represented by approximately 180 officials working for three days, from the 28th until the 30th of January. The operation took place in city districts that had been under UAV surveillance: the suburbs Rosengård, Nydala/Hermodsdal and Krocksbäck (Dagens nyheter 2020). One of the spatial covert methods that they used at the time of the operation it that they with the help of VA Syd, who is purifying wastewater from Malmö, monitored the level of narcotics in the wastewater from toilets and sinks from five city districts that are labelled as URBAN15-areas in Malmö (Brå 2018). They did so both before and after operation Hagelstorm. The wastewater had a significant high level of narcotics after the operation comparing to before (Sydsvenskan 2020).

The local operation leader of operation Hagelstorm said in an interview that the operation was aiming to create security for the public through a significantly amount of visible police officers. They had chosen three areas to focus on based on a model analysis done by the security service. The police had given the security service access to the police system, where the security service had gathered an amount of information for an analysis that resulted in three geographical urban areas in Malmö chosen. These three geographical places

in Malmö had, according to the leader of operation Hagelstorm, highly significant indicators that the police would find explosives, weapons, narcotics, and “the individuals that we have focus on” (Expressen 2020). In these areas, the police argued that they would reclaim the territory from criminal networks (Dagens nyheter 2020). This cooperation of state-agencies with the methodology that they use in public space is aiming for what Lefebvre described to become omnipresent in society. That is that the state and local authorities will use all the possibly force and methods that they can afford surveillance and say discipliner to achieve control social in public space, predominantly apparently in the segregated areas of the city. A development in urban space that Graham (2011) argued led to that the operational differences between state agencies became less visible and the politics of security became bound on place and individuals.

Operation Norrsken

The operation Norrsken in relation to spatial practice was a similar to operation to Hagelstorm, in the sense that it was preannounced, and that the police gathered a high amount of visible police officers in public space. The operation started at the 21th of April in the city district Herrgården, but this time around, the police officers did not search through the same area as in operation Hagelstorm. The high visible police officers, over 100ones, instead sat in their cars and drove in convoy instead driving towards central Malmö. This can be understood as a power manifestation. The tactic with this power demonstration in public space was later described. The police hoped that the massive police presence in public space by driving in convoy would make the criminals to expose themselves through their technical devices, for example by using their mobile telephones to communicate to each other due to the sudden police presence in public space. Thus, a high number of police officers was used not for enhance security and safety per se but to lure out criminals. Since the police had new covert methods in use - such as secret data interception in mobile devices. The surveillance method helped the police to decide their actions in real time during operation Norrsken. With their covert surveillance methods in use, they gained intelligence that a person believed by the police to be a criminal person was located in a certain street in Malmö: Norra Grängesbergsgatan. Based on this newly gained information, the police drove in convoy to that street. Here all the policemen got out of their cars, stood in the street for some moments,

and then headed off to the location that was one of the targets for the operation, the city district Seved. In the city district Seved, people from the police and other authorities numbering altogether 250 people, searched through all public spaces. They had helicopters in the air, dogs on the ground, and their covert methods all in use. In the afternoon, the same procedures were carried out in the city district Möllevången (Sydsvenskan 2020) the city district where the death of the boy that was the trigger for the state to respond to the urban crisis in November 2019 had happened.

Operation Norrskén can be considered as a power manifestation to reclaim public space from the criminals, and at the same time, under this pretext create new laws to allow the use of new surveillance technologies, for example to observe public space. The urban crisis so far has led to laws making it legal for the state and local authorities to surveillance individuals in public space, as well as suspected criminals in their private space, for example by monitoring mobile telephones. This development puts the ideal democratic public space at risk, even though it does so for the safety and security of individuals. This can be considered an act of what Lefebvre (1991) described as "achieving self-actualisation and self-concealment". Because the predominant aim with the state-led operation, Rimfrost was to enhance public safety by targeting criminals. Since they are pictured as the threat to security and safety in the segregated city, and at the same time, new surveillance technologies are promoted and put in use in society by the government that can be used for entirely other purposes such as demonstrations (Polisen 2019).

4.3 Representational space

Operation Rimfrost from a representational perspective is analysed through how presentations of space perceive representational space. That is as in how the state and local authorities present the perspective of representational space, how people in targeted urban areas perceive operation Rimfrost with its spatial practice in Malmö.

Operation Rimfrost and the two sub-operations Hagelstorm, Norrskén

The leader for operation Hagelstorm said that the operation was aiming for creating safety and security with a "very visible police resource" in public space (Kvällsposten 2020). The head of operation Hagelstorm lifted the positive reactions from the public and residents, arguing

that the residents are asking us to come back (Kvällsposten 2020). The police claimed that "the residents are welcoming our presence" (Sydsvenskan 2020) and that "most of the people are happy that we are here". They argued that by compelling our "show of force" where we show who is in charge (Dagens nyheter 2020). In sum, police argued that they had met a helpful public who have welcomed their presence (Polisen 2020). However, a resident expressed other thoughts of operation Hagelstorm than the police "I was scared, I did not know they were coming" was one residential voice (Sveriges television 2020). An another resident thought the prime minister was coming because of the invasion of the police in public space and one resident thought there was a war coming (Dagens nyheter 2020). A local trader in one of the areas that operation Hagelstorm target expressed positive feelings of the operation, saying, "Finally the police are taking the cities problems serious" (Dagens nyheter 2020). Most of the individuals represented in media during operation Hagelstorm where positive to the operation per se but not to the procedure of it. Because first they were apparently not aware of the upcoming operation and second that and second the way the operations were carried though was frightening (Sveriges television 2020).

Operation Norrsken was an operation that had the main goal of creating safety and security in public space. The response from the public was again very positive from the presentations of space perspective, witch the police was very happy about (Polisen 2020). The police claimed once again that the public had been positive to their presence and that it should not be "underestimated that now thousands of Malmö residents now knew that their homes and public spaces was free from guns and drugs" because of the police search through stairways and basements (Polisen 2020). During operation Norrsken a resident expressed that the area was much calmer comparing to a couple of years ago and an another resident thought that it was good that the police showed strength (Sydsvenskan 22 April).

In May, the police announced that by their extra safety measurements had results. Because the results of a poll that was sent out between the 27th of February and 15th of May to randomly 16 800 people in five cities located in Scania. The poll had a response rate to 57, 7 percent. They concluded that respondents in Malmö felt safer than before operation Rimfrost and that the trust in to the Police was higher than the year before. Since in year 2019, 54 percent of the respondents in a similar poll by the police thought the police cared about the local problems in the city while in year 2020, the number raised to 57 percent (Polisen 2020). There are different opinions between how the residents and how the police perceive

operation Rimfrost in a representational perspective. One aspect that becomes clear is that residents were not aware of that there was an ongoing National incident operation. This created feelings of unease because of the visible police and other state agencies during operation Rimfrost, however some residents did express positive feelings of that the police were putting efforts to resolve shootings in public space.

5. Conclusions

The surveillance technologies that have been used in public space during operation Rimfrost in Malmö are helicopters, CCTV, UAS and secret data interception. From a right to the city perspective and insights from Foucault on surveillance, these technologies imply more than just securing public space from crime. They are surveillance technologies with legal possibility to monitor activities in public space, as well as symbols that pose a disciplinary gaze into public space. This implies that the use of public space as the arena for political action, creating counter space to achieve a public awareness, can be effectively reduced by the state. From a social space understanding of operation Rimfrost, the operation was a response to the urban crisis. This resulted in that the police found a new method to fight crime in public space. They created an Omni present force including a panoptical gaze, an “intelligence method” involving not just the police, but also a collaboration between different state agencies the police, the secret police, and the Swedish armed forces. As implementing surveillance technologies can come with a political cost, a way to reduce that cost is to gain acceptance of surveillance in society. Operation Rimfrost legitimized the use of surveillance technologies in public space by claiming security and safety effects in public space, quite the opposite of what previous studies conclude on what surveillance technologies infringe in public space. Finally, the people living in urban areas that was targeted by the spatial activities of operation Rimfrost where not aware of that there was any National incident operation going on in Sweden. From a right to the city perspective, this highlights a lack of democratic participation in society as a whole.

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