



LUND UNIVERSITY

Department of Sociology

ACCOMMODATION, CONTENTION, AND TRANSFORMATION

MAPPING THE FIELD OF GREEN TRANSITION POLITICS IN DENMARK FROM 2007 to 2020

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Master's thesis: SOCM04 30 credits

Autumn semester 2020

Supervisor: Charalambos Demetriou

Word count: 22.124 (from introduction to conclusion)

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## ABSTRACT

Climate change has become an all-encompassing problem as CO<sup>2</sup> accumulating in the atmosphere sets the pace of temperature increases in our rapidly warming world. In attempting to make society 'green,' environmental movements have pursued different strategies through different political constellations. Shedding light on the movement's ability to influence, I analyze the Danish environmental movement's organizational configuration. Realizing the transformation of Danish environmentalism, I argue, we must examine past developments through field theory. As such, the movement is situated in a field of green transition politics. The field is a delineated area of political organizations interacting with one another, guided by similar interests in influencing how society 'deals' with green transition.

I construct a dataset by interviewing activists, environment advocates, advisors, and state officials to gain a systematic record of change and a/the substantiated shift in the logic that has dominated the politics and organization of green transition. Drawing on archival data and secondary sources, I treat the contextual interview information as threads in weaving the social history of the field's development. Reflexively, I discuss the analytical limitations and practical advantages of applying field theory to understand the thesis conduct of inquiry.

My historical analysis shows how transition policies developed from being a matter of 'greening' through technological advances into becoming a policy area where the popular backing to facilitate green conversion and the conditions for policy implementation became the presupposition for transition. The study demonstrates three junctures of the field's development, centralized around how the movement arranged its conduct according to its surroundings. First, the field's dominating activities were those of technologically advancing Danish businesses, which were figureheads of green technology. Therefore, 'transgressive' ideas (e.g., societal conversion) of green politics were marginalized. In effect, the movement's organizations jockeying for positions had to assume the functions as climate experts to gain a foothold. Second, when climate change policy became the dominant political agenda of green transition, a new set of actors joined the struggle to shape the contours of green transition policies. Third, the movement gained momentum in 2019 due to new organizational forms and developing new intermediate narratives of climate justice that resonated with many stakeholders in the field.

In the end, I discuss what the current struggle of the field might bring in the future. To sustain recent popular support for a green transition, the analysis highlights the expansion of new organizational forms as pivotal in organizing.

Keywords: social movement studies, climate politics, field theory, green transition, strategic decision-making, climatization

## POPULAR SCIENCE SUMMARY

The future dire consequences of climate change caused by global carbon emissions appear more frightening than ever. To combat this, emissions reduction goals are utterly imperative. Nationally spearheading emissions reduction, the Danish Parliament adopted a legally binding Climate Act in 2019, specifying a 70-percent reduction of Denmark's emissions by 2030 (compared to pre-industrial levels).

In efforts to understand how the Parliament realized such an aim was of great importance, this thesis engages with the development of the Danish environmental movement's ability to impact the state. To a great degree, the movement's influence depends on which organizations raise concerns and their demands. The movement's potential to make the state co-opt green legislation has historically varied because of alternate political ways of 'dealing' with green transition issues. To shed light on this connection, I study how the dominant viewpoints of transition policy have affected different relationships between the government, market forces, and the environmental movement.

Building on that, the analysis illustrates that the movement's capacity to impact policy was made less likely when green transition policy was inferred to mean enhancing a 'green' growth agenda. In this period, the political development accepted as possible was shaped by the market and state supporting green transition as a technical adventure for Danish businesses. As such, only the movement's professional organizations had a voice, as they had adopted an organizational appearance to fit the dominant way of dealing with green transition. From 2015 onward, concerns over climate change caused a new agenda to surface in the transition debate. In influencing policy-development, as climate justice (i.e., the societal root causes of climate change) started to dominate the discussion, new movement actors began to take part in the struggle. As climate change became synonymous with green transition, a new agenda attentive to the preconditions for implementing green technologies and the popular backing of society's conversion toward carbon neutrality emerged. This forced the government to settle on a new Climate Act to resonate with the growing movement's demands.

In a last remark, I discuss the focus of the movement in the years to come. Essential for the movement's future organization (as highlighted by advocates and activists) is enhancing people's ability to take action where they live on those green transition problems close to home.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

92-Group – The danish 92 Group: forum for sustainable development

BttF – Bridge to the Future

DCCC – Danish Council on Climate Change

DCM – Danish Climate Movement

DGSB – The Green Student Movement

DI – The Confederation of Danish Industry

DSNC – Danish Society of Nature Conservation

EMO – Environmental Movement Organization

ENGO – Environmental nongovernmental organization

FH – Confederation of Danish Trade Unions

GTD – Green Transition Denmark

IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

KOR – Council on Climate and Green Transition

SMO – Social Movement Organization

UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

WWF – World Wildlife Fund

## First part: The object of inquiry



## 1 INTRODUCTION

The changing welfare of Earth's ecosystem and the societal ramifications of shifting weather patterns have been a generative force, producing various modes of environmentalism. In efforts to publicize and promote awareness on the conditions of Earth's habitability (e.g., climate change, biodiversity, pollution, resource depletion), environmental movement organizations (EMOs) have embodied such concerns in multiple organizing constellations (Caniglia et al. 2015; Dalton et al. 2003; Rootes 2003; Thörn et al. 2017) using different tactics and framing strategies (Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004; Newell 2006; Nisbet 2009). Emerging from an industrial awareness concerning the unintended consequences of modernity for preserving wilderness (Brulle 2000; Diani 1996; Rootes 1999), the movement transformed into a current dominating focus on carbon emissions and their root causes (Hadden 2015; Dietz et al. 2013; Rüdiger 1995)<sup>1</sup>. Accordingly, EMOs have organized in and across different spheres of society with significant impact on green transition governance and regulation (Nulman 2015).

When confronted by new institutional bodies (scientists, government administration, and business markets) that took over the environmental agenda, scholars have shown (Dryzek et al. 2003, 20-55) that EMOs incrementally moved from constituting an oppositional civic culture toward becoming professionalized environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOS). This form became the frontstage of the movement to assume a legitimate actor's role in influencing the administration and politicians (Brulle 2000; Rootes and Nulman 2015; Læssøe 2007; Jamison et al. 1990; Wettergren and Soneryd 2017). Despite professionalization, over the last three years the reinvigoration of widespread climate activism and continued scientific worries about our rapidly warming world coincide.

Inasmuch as green politics vary according to different modes of existence (i.e., grassroots versus public interest group), EMOs constitute opposite endpoints in an organizational spectrum. The case of the Danish environmental movement displays the heterogeneity of such an organizational continuum between "youthfulness and radicalism, and the more staid, established, forms of nature protection and conservation" (Jamison 2001, 72) motivated by a range of issues. Demonstrating the movement's heterogeneity, noticeably, interorganizational coalition work has gained a more permanent foothold in the movement's repertoire. To illustrate, The Danish Society of Nature Conservation (DSNC), a member-based organization

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<sup>1</sup> Dryzek (2013) emulsify these features of a larger bundle of issues in mapping the *Politics of Earth*.

engaging in activities with local government and corporations to enhance nature protection, modified its paragraphs of purpose in the late-2010s to include climate change as within their interest (Redder 2018; DSNC 2019; DSNC Interview 2020). Accordingly, DSNC started to sponsor campaigns during the national election in 2019 in coalition with the Danish Climate Movement and other ENGOs. Moreover, in this period, a new coalition-building effort to secure a comprehensive Climate Act was instigated (Christensen et al. 2019). How can a field of heterogeneous organizations motivated by a range of issues related to green transition politics synchronize actions around a shared issue of climate policy? How can we explain such processes of realignment?

### 1.1 GREEN TRANSITION AND ITS POLITICAL MODES OF ACTION

When analyzing the configuration of the political mobilization for green transition in Denmark, it is not enough to know the scale of protest and citizen participation to detect a change in the organizational politics and milieu (Wahlström et al. 2013). We ought to know how certain constellations emerge and why it matters (Hadden 2015). The alignment is best understood as the “interaction between international and national processes” (Jamison et al. 1990, 185). Overall, EMOs’ changing strategies on green transition are primarily investigated through intergovernmental processes. Since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, during which the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established, climate mitigation and adaptation strategies have been deliberated transnationally. Along this avenue, the introduction of sustainable development, Agenda 21, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris-agreement became the predominant focus of EMOs’ mobilization (Hadden 2015).

However, the re-domestication of climate policy following the adjudication of the Paris-agreement in December 2015 proffered EMOs new opportunities to influence climate change policy (Bäckstrand et al. 2017; de Moor and Wahlström 2019; Hale 2016). In tandem with these political progressions, since 2018 mobilizing efforts have ignited an upsurge in street protest and global days of action, new EMOs have emerged (e.g., Extinction Rebellion and Fridays For Future), and increased public attentiveness to the salience of climate politics has stimulated new discussion on the subject (Wahlström et al. 2013, 2019, 2020). In Denmark’s case, during a meeting in the spring of 2018, students of the capital region formed the Green Student Movement (DGSB). This signified a new flow in the Danish environmental movement’s

sentiments, as a whole kaleidoscope of protest organizations afterwards accompanied the ENGOs. Indeed, we have witnessed the flowering of new climate change-related mobilization, but consequences of such proliferation have only been slightly illustrated in media and research<sup>2</sup>. If the current transformation is solemnly a product of new organizations emerging, we leave their organizing processes unstudied (Dietz 2014). While the assemblage of young people was a preamble to prepare the legislators and government to take action (O'Brien et al. 2018), changes in Danish green transition policies stem from interorganizational dynamics, historically motivating new coalitional work to occur and new partnerships to form between the state, EMOs, and business institutions.

## 1.2 FIELD DYNAMICS AND STRUGGLE

As the Danish environmental movement's concerns became state institutionalized early on (Wettergren and Soneryd 2017), a variety of extra parliamentary and intra-institutional actors appeared. Rendering deficient distinctions between institutional and contentious politics (a distinction generally emphasized by movement scholars [Snow et al. 2018, 2]), the movement's transformation amalgamates from its situatedness among institutionalized actors and businesses external to the movement, and likewise from shaping these actors' conduct and climate political stands (Pettinicchio 2012; Minkoff and McCarthy 2005; Bereni 2019). As part of a field formation, as Armstrong (2002, 195–6) terms these developmental aspects, movement expansion and the political outcome are inseparable. Hence field-building (i.e., movement development) is empirically detectable in the intersection of policy consequences and organizational realignment (Rojas and King 2018).

In this thesis, I build on recent work in organizationally inclined social movement theory and lend substance to the process of organizational transformation in the Danish EMO sector. The transformation, I argue, is incomprehensible if not taking into account “[t]he coevolution of institutional context and social movement [and how it] reveals a great deal about how activists and groups recognize and respond to political opportunities to effect change (Pettinicchio 2019, xv). In this zone, “between open rebellion (agitators) and slavish conformity

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<sup>2</sup> See: O'Brien, Selboe, and Hayward (2018), Doherty et al. (2018) and discussions from the Copenhagen Centre for Political Mobilisation and Social Movement Studies' 2020 panel debates.

(institutional reproduction), there lies a zone of strategic action that is rarely acknowledged” (Fligstein & McAdam 2012, 103). I analyze interorganizational changes by arguing that the Danish environmental movement is embedded in a field of green transition politics. The field of green transition politics refers to a relational assembly of collectives and organizations, encompassing both intra and extra-institutional actors devoted to converting transition politics and/or challenging the dominant system of meaning in the climate governance and intermingling the institutional lines between civil society, political institutions, and the market. Coopting different intersecting policy issues, the term “green transition” is used interchangeably for climate issues and energy system conversion to signify the “diversity of contemporary change efforts” (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008, 75). The environmental movement is only one pole of the field, albeit the most consistent organizational manifestation of transitional action. Field actors are structurally integrated by orienting their activities toward altering the same institutional framework through debate, protest, recommendation, coalition-building, and interorganizational action.

### 1.3 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS, OVERVIEW, AIM, DELIMITATIONS, AND FINDINGS.

How has the composition of the field of green transition politics in Denmark remained stagnant and changed between 2007–2020 with the more recent introduction of highly visible demonstrations AND proliferating forms of organization?

- I. By what research methods can we identify how the connection of civil society, market, and state actors’ strategic action is impacting the political outcome of climate politics and transition policy?
- II. Which developmental characteristics are detectable in and between the early stages of the green transition field and after the Danish general election in 2019?
- III. How do factors such as social justice, equity, and cost-effectiveness play into actors’ accounts of their work and professional practice on green transition?

The field of green transition politics is my conceptualization of the Strategic Action Fields (SAFs) offered by Fligstein and McAdam (2012). The theory is a comprehensive framework for detecting how an ensemble of actors accomplish transformations of, settle on and

accommodate specific logics within a circumscribed social area (i.e., climate politics). The review chapter discuss previous research findings on the danish environmental movement and situate my investigation in social movement research debates on how social movement organizations (SMOs) have been conceptualized and analyzed as embedded in fields. Inductively, I found the movement dynamics exceeded common frontiers between interest organizations, SMOs, and unions, the state, and governance units. While the authors remain more or less agnostic as to how knowledge of SAF stability and change are acquired, part of the research aim is to develop an integrated theoretical orientation combined with a methodological stance. The method section yields transparency to my understanding of knowledge production, data generation, and data analysis to render the design of the iterative analysis consistent. Using a combination of interviews and archival research techniques, the analysis explains field transformation processes leading up to the field's configuration in 2020. I develop a profound understanding of how different political logics have dominated the field constituency at different junctures of its development. Political logics, in this case, are sets of presumptions about the goals and legitimacy of organizational repertoires used for impacting the political outcome of climate politics. Identifying the processes changing the field rests on apprehending the dominating political logic at play in state departmental action and policy development. The interplay between political organizations' role in embracing and adjusting how the government did/should "arrange" green transition policy is the crucial empirical vector around which transformation occurs

The purpose of the study is twofold. Empirically the thesis investigation is fueled by a sociological interest in making sense of how the Danish environmental movement's current state emerged from historical processes, and how political creativity fertilized its new organization. Conceptually, testing the theory of fields in an empirical context provide substance to the relationships between institutions, organizations, and social movements, showing "how such organizations are themselves embedded in complex fields of culture, politics, and action, the more we know about the dynamics of movement development and change" (Minkoff and Clemens 2007, 166f). The process of social movement changes (or the means by which social change is acquired) encounters theoretical responses from across the spectrum of social movement scholarship (E.g., Amenta and Polletta 2019; Bosi et al. 2016; McAdam et al. 2001), but effects of embeddedness on movement outcome and development are still not well known (Walker 2012).

For the sake of delimitation, the thesis scope condition identifies the field's political organization in the effects of social transformation sought through the state (Amenta and Caren 2007). This includes a circumscribed sector of organizations focusing on state-oriented efforts, such as professionals and business actors, EMOs and ENGOs, and governance units. I exclude environmentally motivated initiatives that chiefly focus their action on lifestyle politics – that is, those focusing activism or advocacy on embodying the change that we ought to bring about (Leach 2013). Such delimitation can be ambiguous (See: de Moor et al. 2017; Willis and Schor 2012) but the restraint helps to focus on the object of investigation. Moreover, lifestyle politics in Denmark have been examined considerably over the last few years (Målgand et al. 2014; Hoff et al. 2019).

The analysis shows that the diversification and mainstreaming of climate politics opened the field to a much broader ensemble of organizations, and that different ways of dealing with green transition affected what goals were made pursuable. My findings suggest three different junctures of the field's development between 2007–2020. In the beginning, jockeying for position and influence was restricted, as the expertise position of the ENGOs was entrenched by market forces and new governance structures. Adjudicating the creation of a cross-sectional policy on climate change, a Climate Commission instigated a new agenda in green transition politics. This meant the field expanded, composed of various new actors and interlinked policy areas seeking incorporation into the policy cycle in the following years. A parallel move was instigated as the governmental feasibility of dealing with green transition progressed. Over time, this gravitation was periodically affected by events (e.g., the Paris-agreement and national Climate Acts), which endogenously altered the legitimacy of civic associations disruptive potential. Co-occurring with the instigation of new civic organizations and networks, the venue of field-building crystallized around a new logic in 2019 as Danish ENGOs and grassroots developed a policy recommendation which serve as the foundation of the new Climate Act enacted in the spring of 2019. Overall, the dominating logic in the beginning of this period was still governing after 2019, but the struggle of green transition changed, since the stakes of the field altered from being a matter of the realness and feasibility of green transition technologies to becoming a struggle of the means and haste by which the greening of society was facilitated.

## 2 NOVUM – REVIEWING THE LITERATURE

A great many scholars have analyzed the means by which protest organizations and political organizations are shaping the contours of national and transnational climate politics (Nulman 2015; Agnone 2007; Allan and Hadden 2017; Brulle 2000; Betsill and Corell 2001; 2008; Olzak and Soule 2009), but previous research has scarcely examined the constellational impact of changing fields on such politics (Walker 2012). Some sought to address the state institutional context of policy change in terms of transforming knowledge interest (Jamison et al. 1990); organization discourses (Brulle 2000; Caniglia et al. 2015); energy system transformations (Andersen and Nielsen 2016; Dyrhaug 2020); appropriation of state responsibilities by SMOs (Thorn and Svenberg 2016); or network diffusion and co-option (Hadden 2015). While most analysts have come to focus on movement dynamics that “takes place in constructed mesolevel social orders,” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 9) their conceptualization and analytical purpose vary significantly (See: Walker [2012] for an overview). The review first discusses the main finding of contemporary environmental movement studies, before showing how field theory has been used broadly in assessing social movement development.

### 2.1 CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT STUDIES

Comparative studies on the environmental movement from the anthology “Climate Action in a Globalizing World,” (Thörn et al. 2017) analyze how state institutions in advanced liberal governments form new governmental relations with businesses and civil society to take on different functions and responsibilities. This process, they argue, “shape new relationships between social movements and political institutions in a way previous theories of movement institutionalization cannot fully grasp” (Thörn et al. 2017, 12). Apart from processes of movement institutionalization (understood as professionalization and bureaucratizing organization structure formed by regularized access to policymakers), when movements orient their mandate toward influencing policy and become part of the policymaking process, they participate in “policy networks” with government institutions and businesses. Læssøe (2007) shows, that in the case of Denmark, while the issue of sustainable development was deliberated as a field-building process, the business industries quickly gained an advantage in determining the limits of sustainable awareness. Similarly, Jamison and Baark (1999) find that as the Danish environmental movement was mainly formed by local organizing of wind energy experiences

and counter-knowledge expertise, the movement organizations translated into various kinds of professional interest as a function of the corporatist model of governance, illustrated by alliances between grassroots expertise, local government, and business; in other words “a transition from movement to institution, as ideas and activities that were previously considered radical or alternative are now being translated into more acceptable forms” (Jamison 2001, 45). Wettergren and Soneryd’s (2017) investigation of the Danish environmental movement reveals similar patterns of ecological modernization, but also shows evidence pointing toward a revitalization of local grassroots initiatives, reemphasizing local action and contention over institutions “dealing” with climate transition. They argue that “[t]he doctrines of ecological modernisation can be seen as a result of this transformation of environmentalism from a loosely organised, activist movement in the 1970s to an ever more integrated program of industrial and technological policy in the 1990s” (Wettergren and Soneryd 2017, 211). As this entanglement is an ongoing process, “it is no longer possible to overlook the intersections between protest and institutional politics” (Bereni 2019, 13). The inadequacy of the inside-outside institutional channels (Pettinicchio 2012) renders redundant the separation of protests and institutional politics (Snow et al. 2018).

## 2.2 APPROACHES TO ORGANIZATIONALLY INCLINED FIELD THEORY

Neglected in the abovementioned investigations is a theoretical attention to the interorganizational realignment and configurations of jockeying for positions between the SMOs, ENGO, business sectors, and government institutions which transpire from such processes of movement institutionalization. I argue we need to acknowledge the double-sidedness of movement interaction. The progress of movements’ outcome of influence on policy, when situated in a broader social milieu, becomes part of an intertwined process of a field-bundling endeavor, where social movements are simultaneously adapting to the context and shaping the shared meaning of interest (Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Dryzek et al. 2003). Treating social movements as organic entities, we neglect how different SMOs interact with each other, the state, and external field actors (Pettinicchio 2012, 2013; Rao et al. 2000; Armstrong 2005).

Moving beyond a movement-centric approach has, in recent years, gained traction in the sociology of social movement, mainly by the agenda-setting anthology by Davis et al. (2005) and a body of other scholarship (Armstrong 2002; Walker 2013; Diani and Pilati 2011; Krinsky



2019; Levitsky 2007; Bereni 2019; Curtis and Zurcher 1973; Mey and Disendorf 2019; Evans 1997). Theorists have observed that organizations recombine collective forms of action (Rao et al. 2000 Armstrong 2002) by way of analyzing “repertoire of organization” (Clemens 1993, 1996) to understand the trajectory of organizational forms, linking particular organizational attributes with different cultural identities, providing SMOs with social opportunities and constraints (Davis et al. 2008; Polleta and Jasper 2001).

Movements’ mobilization of public opinion operates within somewhat pre-existing organizational or institutional infrastructure (Morris 1981; Armstrong 2002; Hadden 2015). Indeed, organized relationships provide internal and external factors explaining movement development (Clemens and Minkoff 2007) and the potential impact of state-oriented movements. Accounting for these constraints and empowerment of social movement’s space of opportunity (Zald and McCarthy 1987) profoundly rests on conceptualizing movement organizations as part of a somewhat structured order (Scott and McAdam 2005; Armstrong 2005; Diani and Pilati 2011), by virtue of their formal interaction with other organizations, partners, regulating agencies, governmental bodies in power, and other components of the state (Minkoff and McCarthy 2005). Such conceptions of structured order are labeled as social movement sectors (McCarthy and Zald 1977) or organizational fields (Dimaggio and Powell 1984; Scott 2004), emphasizing the processes by which organizations emulate or become isomorphic to the prevailing mode of action in order to survive. Culturally inclined sociologists call them arenas (Jasper 2015, 2019), multi-institutional systems (Bernstein and Armstrong 2007), or fields (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). In social movement studies, the Bourdieusian school of thought on assessing the struggle within a field dominates empirical investigations of collective action (Ibrahim 2013, Mayrl 2013, Landy 2015, Ancelovici 2019; Crossley 2002; Mathieu 2019). By uncovering SMOs in their operating contexts (Crossley 2002), the notion of fields demonstrates the analytical power of considering the extensive differences of determinants and consequences for organizational change and reproduction, aligning with the issues of agency and structure (Crossley 2002; **Matin** 2003).

The entanglement of intersecting forms of political organization are broadly defined within two different analytical purposes in social movement studies. The first strand of research focuses on how interorganizational identities are assembled and field boundaries constructed (Diani 1995; Diani and Pilati 2011), resembling that of network studies (Hadden 2015). The second area of scholarship focuses on the extant political commitments and logics governing

the interaction between movement organizations, and the avenues within which they operate. That is, either the focus of inquiry is to show organizational diversity and consequences among SMOs (Landy 2015; Armstrong 2002; Matieu 2019) or the object of interest is showing how organizational embeddedness produces internal conversion of movement efforts to transform existing fields, and which organizational modes of action have consequences for cooperation and contention when movements are nested in a larger organizational area of politics (Minkoff and Agnone 2010; Walker 2015; Jasper and Duyvendak 2015; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Rao et al. 2000). Underscoring modes of organizing as a heuristic capturing the diversity of organizations associated with a field, the latter use the term to situate SMOs in relation to companies, businesses, labor unions, and state entities (government and agencies) to understand the impact on organizational innovation and development (Rao et al. 2000). Both analytical purposes empirically designate the concept of field to the inquiry of organizational heterogeneity, but the model of explaining factors as part of a field analysis varies greatly.

The first position considers organizational fields as a classifying arrangement, viewing movement positions as a function of habitual embeddedness. By conceptualizing movements as a field, Levitsky (2007) demonstrates how the Chicago gay movement consolidated a heterogeneous collective identity. The structural underpinnings of the shared meaning of an enterprise navigating the ambitions of the movement was formed by a division of labor and organizational specialization; the political affiliation of the movement was intelligible to various strategical activists. Utilizing the cultural-institutional field approach in an analysis of the lesbian and gay organizations in San Francisco, Elisabeth Armstrong (2002, 2005) argues that organizational change of a movement is also acquired through the cultural context (interorganizational upheaval), that facilitates organizational creativity as a key mechanism in making alternative organizational constellations thinkable, hence constituting what forms a part of the field. To bring about change within fields, Rao et al. (2000, 238) analyze the phenomenon as a process where organizations “de-institutionalize existing beliefs, norms, and values embodied in extant forms, and establish new forms that instantiate new beliefs, norms and values.” Movement mobilization instigated by entrepreneurs, as in Pettinicchio’s (2019) case of U.S. disability policy, shows that political insiders began leading the movement of disability rights by means of professional and personal commitments.

Bridging the two perspectives, Bereni (2019) exemplifies the leverage of a field approach by studying gender ‘parity’ in political representation in France. The cross-sectional dimension

of the movement is captured in what she labels the ‘women’s cause field’; a transversal movement formed by a continuum of actors from institutional constituents to extra-institutional actors, whose mobilizing structures are embedded in distinctive social fields (electoral-partisan, state, academia, and autonomous). The bridging of movements with institutions commonly impacts organization’s level of contention, aligning their repertoire to the appropriateness of the institutional setting in which they partake. A standard account of this process is called institutionalization (Staggenborg 2013). Environmental organization, in this view, lost ground as its established constituents transitioned to professionalized organizations, showing a high level of centralized bureaucracy and leaving behind contentious forms of practice (Dowie 1996; Brulle 2000; Jamison et al. 1990; Rootes 2007; Diani and Rambaldo 2007). Thörn and Svenberg (2016) analyze the institutionalization of the environmental movement in Sweden, as a case of neoliberal ‘responsibilization,’ creating a new configuration in the field of power between movement, state, and market forces. Describing a field of ambivalence, they demonstrate movement organizations “attempting to ‘negotiate’ conflicts and systemic contradictions defining contemporary environmental politics” (Thörn and Svenberg 2016, 605). Some organizations reproduce dominant ideas of ecological modernization as a problem-solving technical approach, while some were resisting and re-defining ‘moral agency’ in the scheme of responsibilization. The commencement of the community renewable energy (CRE) field in Denmark (Mey and Diesendorf 2018) provided evidence to the same fostering of institutionalization. The initial bottom-up driver of CRE was superseded by the goal of climate change mitigation, due to the sustained focus from internal governance units and governments on intensifying field activities “through regulatory and financial support” (Mey and Diesendorf 2018, 114).

### 3 THE FIELD APPROACH

The section aims to analytically disaggregate the field approach into distinct – though empirically entangled – components. By chiefly drawing on Fligstein and McAdam's (2012) framework of strategic action fields (SAF), my approach has a departure point. However, showing the theory to be analytically readable entails some degree of deviation from their theory. In attempting to consolidate different theories on fields, I establish a conceptualization of how political logics organize field (inter)action. Exoterically, fields are groups of actors organized around a collective enterprise whose ability to influence this enterprise in accordance with their particular interest depends on how it resonates with the other actors' interest and form.

As a vector around which collective action is organized (Martin 2011, 280), a field is a system of actions whose constituency is (disproportionally) interdependently affected by each other (McAdam and Scott 2005, 10–12). In addition to those organizations sharing a common mission or attentiveness to similar set of issues (the stakes), which characterizes them as social movement industries (Zald and McCarthy 1987), this field conceptualization considers interaction between SMOs in a circumscribed social sphere including opposing groups, corporations, and governmental bodies (Minkoff and McCarthy 2005, 291). Being embedded in a field renders some positions more or less powerful vis-à-vis actors' interaction and genuineness of an organization's incentives and activities. This embeddedness is the so-called *affordance* of the field (Martin 2011, 315f). Understanding field as affordance adequately explain how the field's stakes are adapted by SMOs and how they adopt the dominating political logic of the field. As some aims and conduct are an entrenched part of a field, other appearances are peripheral (Walker 2012). Thus, the feasibility of objectives pursued depends on the constellation of the field. The ability to affect the common field enterprise (e.g., how a state takes action on green transition) is not proportionately distributed across actors, hence we have to understand the different agentic positions in the field. Moreover, the field composition are mostly stable but is by no means static, thus we ought to know the transformation processes by which changing and enduring junctures in the field's trajectory can be identified. The following sections outline the field's compositional state, its agentic components, and processes of field transformation.

### 3.1 THE FIELD'S COMPOSITIONAL STATE

The field's compositional state is constructed by identifying a "set of understandings" lumped together into the notion of political logic (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 10; Armstrong 2002, 13). Such point(s) of convergence are pivotal, as they allow for the organizational connection to be made analytically. The conceptualization of political logic from Armstrong (2002, 12ff), lumps together and brought into focus both the "taken-for-granted" and contentious nature of field dynamics, which Fligstein and McAdam (2012, 10f) outlines as four different but related "categories of shared understandings that are critical to field-level interaction." Political logics consist of presuppositions about the goals of political action and appropriateness of distinct organizational repertoires to pursue the desired ends. Constraints and opportunities (the nature of fields) are mirrored in political logics because specific logics will be dominant at different times, rendering some goals and agendas more socially feasible. Dissimilar from a Bourdieusian conceptualization<sup>3</sup> of logics, the political logics organize the field dynamic across a set of actors strategizing around a shared substantive interest thereby capturing how mutually attuned actors in different positions respond to the stakes of the game from their vantage point.

Approaching the field's developmental aspects from this perspective permits firm analytical clarity between episodes of routinely reproducing the terms of a dominating logic, and the advancement of successful expansion of the repertoire of political tools available to actors within the field of green transition politics. Accordingly, a SAF is guided by a consensus of what is at stake (i.e., the progression of green transition policy), albeit containing multiple converging and competing logics (i.e., green transition politics advanced by market forces, state interventions, or lifestyle politics). When fields are structured by political logics, the shared meaning is by no means consensual for two reasons. According to Fligstein and McAdams' (2012) the field's constituency is an assembly where "actors with varying resource endowments vie for advantages" (10). While actors accept field settlement by emulating organizational identities considered legitimate, they also "routinely engage in behaviors that are designed to improve their position in the field" (103). In other words, the field's compositional state is

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<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, Mayrl's (2013, 291f) theorization utilizes Bourdieu's notion of fields to analyze movements and organization which are not connected by a substantive interest (in sexuality, or environmentalism) but have a shared affiliation in being motivated by the same logic (for instance, redistribution in general). In my assessment, three political logics exist at the field-site, all of which are fueled by the same substantive interest.

constructed by a set of political logics, which becomes apparent in routinized practices and struggles over jockeying for. Attuning the field analysis to changes (what I call the processes of field transformation) is reflected in the stability and conflict among the agentic composition of the field.

### 3.2 AGENTIC COMPOSITION

Investigating how different logics are at play in (de)stabilizing fields by the actors populating the SAF, the political logics are mirrored in their strategic activities. A field's configuration is composed of a triadic relationship between so-called incumbents, challengers, and governance units. These are the units populating all SAFs:

- (I) Incumbents are the dominating organization of the SAF, whose interest heavily reflects the primary logic of the field, resulting in the shared meaning of the field tending to favor their position. According to McAdam and Fligstein (2012, 96), the activities and interest of incumbents sustain settlement (e.g., what the appropriate ways of 'dealing' with green transition are). As resourceful actors (in terms of power, analytical and political leverage, and economic capacity), they exercise disproportional influence on the field, as they are geared to cooperate with and influence internal governance units.
- (II) Challengers have niches within the fields, and as such, their ability to shape or influence relies on political coalition work and adaption to the appropriate stakes of the field. However, challengers usually express an alternative or oppositional vision of the field. Their position is more contextually ambiguous; they articulate an alternative version of the field (oppositional logic) but conform to the prevailing limits of discussion and tactics. Thus, they are jockeying for position but tentatively await "new opportunities to challenge the structure of the and logic of the system" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 13).
- (III) Internal governance units are facilitating and channeling the function of the field, serving to legitimize the dominating logic and rules of the field (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 13f). IGUs are institutions such as state councils, agencies, and ministries,

coordinated by state facilitation<sup>4</sup>. Justifying this agentic position by reference to the interest of the field as a whole, IGUs assume a vital sign of incumbents' interests. Their function is overseeing the rules and facilitating the functioning of the stakes of the field (i.e., transition policy), as the state jurisdiction over the reproduction and reconfiguration of different policy areas is mirrored in the position of each field member as they (incumbents and challengers alike) are cultivating the interaction and alignment of tactics. Albeit not an all-encompassing set of forces, the state's facilitation of field stabilization, reproduction, and transformation shapes the prospects of transformation (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 77f, 96). More so, facilitation is highly important (107f), as the resolution of an episode of contention (e.g., actors struggling to define what green transition politics consists of) relies on the state's capacity to ratify a new settlement in the field.

Fligstein and McAdam (2012, 15) provide much insight into how these units' interaction depends on the state and type of field investigated; therefore, I find it adequate to present how the units interact in my analysis.

In the field of green transition politics, the incumbent position is occupied by business confederations (the union of trade associations), which coordinate various labor market branches' shared means and ends, thus maintaining a certain political leverage by means of representing the workforce. Situated in different fields (as they represent various political interests), I concentrate on their attention to transition policy. I found that their ability to stabilize fields derives from forming political coalitions and partnerships with the IGUs, deepening their influence.


The challengers are civic society organizations arranged along a continuum from protesting grassroots organizations to lobbying NGOs (i.e., the environmental movement in Denmark). Their position and influence depend on inhabiting niches in the field, by means of either mobilizing people or serving as expertise on different issues related to green transition politics (e.g., energy renewables).

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<sup>4</sup> Since my field's stakes essentially are the status and shape of green transition policy formed by the government in power, treating state facilitation as an internal part of the field was proven fruitful (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 14)

The IGUs are the Climate and Energy Ministry (and associated agencies), the different governments (alternating within periods of election) that focus on green transition, and the Danish Council on Climate Change. This position has the ability to instigate policy development and reaffirm the state institutional ways of dealing with green transition policy. As such the struggle to make these actors act in accordance with specific interests is pivotal in understanding the state of the field as oscillating between periods of settlement and change.

**Figure 3.1 The composition of the field of green transition politics**



**3.3 PROCESSES OF TRANSFORMATION**

Against this backdrop, identifying the processes changing the field rests on apprehending the dominating political logic at play in state departmental action and policy development. In my case, how the IGU-constellation is being adopted and adapting to challengers’ and the incumbent’s tactical behavior is the crucial empirical vector around which transformation occurs. Comprehending what changes and how requires knowing not only the organizational history of green transition politics in Denmark, but also the interplay of political organizations’



role in embracing and adjusting how the government did/should “arrange” green transition policy.

Consensual understanding of the field’s purpose and the processes of field transformation are uncovered mainly by ongoing interaction within the field called the “contest for positioning” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 83). Hence, change and settlement in logics are displayed in the agent’s activities. Opportunities pursued (primarily by challengers) tend to be strategically positioned vis-à-vis the opportunities in the field. Settlement is detected when fields begin to gravitate toward institutional settings. This is readable in reassertions of specific kinds of practices, where incumbents’ interests are reaffirmed by state actors (e.g., state diplomacy assuring green transition innovation on behalf of the market incumbents). In a similar vein, but more rarely, oppositional logics may result in a new settlement if challengers’ strategic activities start to result in the institutionalization of practices and rules (e.g., if state and market units adapt to a new oppositional logic offered by challengers). Such contest for positioning is ongoing, but transpires (in my analysis) in salient episodes of field negotiations, that is: (I) the transfer of formal political authority to state institutions, (II) the establishment of new IGUs and organizations within the field, (III) retrenchment of resources, and (IV) new challengers reinvigorating or innovating vantage points for mobilization. This contest is the empirical outline of processes of field transformation, as (re)positioning will reveal what logics are at play, when, and where. The thorniest problem with this conceptualization of processes, is denoting how practices of cooperation, competition, and accommodation shape the dynamics of the field since the all-encompassing notion of “processes of transformation” refers both to dynamics of settlement and changing configurations. The transformations identified in the analysis resemble “internal” ruptures, which Fligstein and McAdam (2012, 103) clarify as permeating the field by “[germinating] slowly through the kinds of routine jockeying for advantage and incremental shifts in the strategy and relations that are part and parcel of routine field dynamics.” In this vein, transformations become endogenously apparent from the gradual, fractional reconfiguration of the political logics on which the field’s reproduction rests. When aggregated, these incremental changes (103) are ostensibly “threshold effects”. In order to render the theory readable, I end this section with an example of a process of transformation from the analysis.

In 2007, the beginning of development toward a cross-sectional understanding of transition policy was set in motion by the government in power (threshold effect), affecting the diversity

and number of incumbents and challengers jockeying for positions. This proliferation created a setback in the ENGOs' accommodated role as privileged challengers (configurations of realignment) and enhanced the dominant "dealing" with green transition policies as a matter of green growth. As the Climate Commission set these transformations of the ENGO-position in motion, the effects can first be detected when additional market incumbents started to appropriate their field position in 2009 to 2010, after the Climate Summit meeting in Copenhagen.

#### 4 METHODOLOGICALLY DELINEATING THE ASSESSEMENT

The following study is a field analysis of the “states” of the field of green transition politics, investigating the peculiar undercurrents of this illustration of collective dynamics. The analysis is historically oriented toward explaining the political development of green transition politics in Denmark from 2007 to 2020 by describing the phenomena as processes of field transformation. The inquiry employs qualitative techniques (interviews and archival work) asserting theory as a set of orienting concepts to make sense of the findings. But the techniques can never be isomorphic to field theory, nor can methods substitute for concepts (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 185ff). The research inquiry, then, entails a continuous reflexive connection of theory with methodological considerations. Permeating the methodology chapter, is a discussion of the pitfalls and gains of such a connection. Disaggregating my inquiry, I first discuss the epistemological commitment, the interview position, data-generating strategies, the variant of sampling, and the data analysis strategy used in the research design.

The thesis analysis classifies different kinds of processes based on what structural linkages of data the analysis reveal. I deliberately argue that some episodes are more pivotal, comparing the solidity of the obtained evidence (see figure 4.1 for an overview of processes). The processes became detectable through the data-generating phase; other processes remain unknown because the sample draws on outlines of particular communities of actors (see table 4.1 for an overview). Accordingly, as the concatenation of events which led to a process stems from parsimonious perspectives, hence it does not exhaust all the constitutive elements of a process (Demetriou 2012, 60).

##### 4.1 EPISTEMOLOGICAL STAKES – HOW IS THE KNOWN, KNOWN?

The crux of my methodology regarding what techniques can adequately capture the field-level dynamics of interest corresponds to the empirical object of inquiry. My assessment of the context is treated as a field, which entails that the analysis is rooted in a specific sociological history of how actors get organized and what processes produce the change I observe. The epistemological stance has to emphasize the case as a real historical composition investigated by a particular set of technologies. To lend my conceptualization of the green transition historicity, I treat the conduct of inquiry as real processes (e.g., the field approach) acquired through specific vantage points (e.g., the methods).

My research reflects a realistic approach, concerning theory as the vector of understanding. Ontologically speaking, the nature of the field's transformation is understood as a process highlighting that the characteristics observed are the outcome of historical development. This reality exists, and my analytical conjectures will lead to a knowledge discovery regarding the field's interactional dynamics. Echoing Fligstein and McAdam's realist conception (2012, 194ff), fields are governed by analogous (general) processes displayable in "historically and culturally contingent meanings." Then, my inquiry's epistemic view needs to capture the field's transformation processes in a multifaceted investigation (Massimi 2017, 171). Adopting Massimi's (2017, 165f) conceptualization of perspectival realism to acquiring knowledge, I generated the empirical knowledge from a dual scheme of assessment. First, as a *diachronic* assessment, the outcome of a particular process is historically situated and thus relatively objective to the historical period on which it is contingent. Second, vying within such processes are prevailing, *synchronic* schemes of perceptions within which knowledge is formulated. Connecting these assessment points (diachronic and synchronic) in the conduct of inquiry is used as a "bridging constituent" between the more profound concepts of my theory and the unique cultural-historical context of my case.

In effect, my analysis is rooted in a specific history of the actors involved, thus, when I investigate the development of the field empirically it provides "culturally contingent meanings" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 194). Accordingly, interview techniques were used to establish a synchronic meaning of the field (i.e., the cultural context of each field position). Archival and secondary work was conducted prior and subsequently to interviewing, which provided the means to assess the field's diachronic meaning.

## 4.2 INTERVIEW POSITION

Acquiring data and selecting techniques from the social sciences' methodological repertoire entails obligations and commitments. In this vein, Bourdieusian reasoning is presented, providing the inquiry with sociological legitimacy. Generating the data through contextual qualitative and historical investigations (Bourdieu 1996a, 214-31; 1996b, 261ff; Bourdieu et al. 1999), I follow an exploratory approach in studying the processes of field transformation "to read in their [the actors'] words the structure of the objective relations, present and past, between their trajectory and the structure (...) and through this, the whole structure and history of the (...) system expressed there" (Bourdieu et al. 1999, 618).

To determine the salience of processes of field transformation, I interviewed actors from organizations representing the different field positions (Dezalay and Garth 1996, 16). As such, the interview technique seeks “to get beyond the self-presentations of the subjects and critically examine the personal assumptions (...) expressed in their statements” (Brinkmann and Kvale 2018, 31). This interview modality is exploratory because the knowledge produced is treated as information about events and social development. Practically the interview information interacts with archival data to situate the interviewees’ self-perception in the historical development of interest (Flybjerg 2001, 137f). The ability to go beyond the self-representations, also stems from my capacity to understand the interview context due to my familiarity with the topics and the general Danish culture. This aptitude is the consequence of being born, raised, and educated in Denmark and volunteering to educate high school students in sustainable development as climate ambassador at Concito (Denmark’s green Think Tank).

#### 4.3 DATA-GENERATING PROCESS

Signified as the “field-mapping” is a dataset of seventeen semi-structured interviews with field stakeholders, reinforced by archival and secondary sources, generating the data presented in the analysis (Holstein and Gubrium 1995, 2). Before interviewing, I obtained information about the development of each interviewee’s organization and/or professional trajectory to match the question of interest according to their contextual position and previous experiences. Despite variation in the substance of questions, the interviews were guided by three loosely structured operational themes (See appendix 1 for a full interview guide/operationalization):

- I. The political practices of the organization (organizational structure). Under what circumstances is the organizing and dissemination of advocacy or protest structured?
- II. Values and goals of the organization (agency). The critical aspects or capabilities around which protest and advocacy are organized – i.e., how the interviewees contextualize past habits and future projects at the moment.
- III. Their self-understanding of the societal discussion on climate policy (Benford and Snow 2000) and its development (the struggle and stakes). What specific concerns and issues do they articulate, what kinds of criticisms do they articulate, and where do they direct them?

The stakeholders' participation in the field's "game" varied, providing shortcomings, as the actors focused on different topics and periods of (un)settlement. In effect, validation of claims was difficult because of the informants varying years of experiences. Despite maintaining well-informed knowledge of each interviewee's practice, some were unwilling to accept the assumptions with which I started the interview. All interviewees were expert actors, meaning those who occupy figurehead positions within the organization. As a consequence, I chose to conduct the interviews in an open-ended fashion. This course of action provided wide-ranging possibilities to organize their answers according to how they perceived the questions I asked (Aberbach et al. 1975). Moreover, it enabled the actors to evaluate their own and others' roles in policymaking, protesting, and advocacy processes. Combining the interviews with archival work demonstrates some potentials for evaluating the interview data. I collected documents produced by organizations from 2007 through 2020 (see appendix 3 for an overview), before and after interviewing, to get a more profound understanding of which episodes and developmental aspects were solid enough to present if they could not be verified by other interviewees.

Moreover, triangulating the data using text-based sources and interviews proved to be a good combination to detect each method's pitfalls. The researcher inarguably will introduce bias in collecting the interview data, while text-based sources are "inanimate" objects which pre-exist the researcher. In contrast, since document information tends to favor sources deriving from more institutional organizations where richer data can be extracted, rank-and-file practices from small organizations (where text-based sources are more limited) can be covered by interviews (Kapiszewski et al. 2015, 151–3).

#### 4.4 SAMPLING FROM THE FIELD'S CONSTITUENCY

The purposive sample (Patton 1990, 112) spans from campaigners and protesters to state officials and private interest groups. The selection scope was state-oriented activism and advocacy, differentiating between the constituency by way of the different agentic positions offered by Fligstein and McAdam. For the sake of clarity, in the analysis I visualize the network of the field at two different stages in its development (See figure 6.1 and 8.1). Operationally, an initial list of field organizations was constructed based on a review of website listings, in combination with organizations designated as key actors to the Council on Climate Change's 'Climate Dialog Forum' (MCEU 2019). Industry confederations functioned as a proxy for

incumbents, and ENGOs and grassroots organizations served as a proxy for challengers. Organizations with representatives formally serving as head of policy or political counselors on climate policy were selected as part of the field. Challengers were chosen by way of direct interaction: (I) either being part of the same coalitions or (II) taking part in the same protest network working around climate politics issues. In situ, I found thirty-four organizations inside the population boundary. During the process of interviewing, if unknown actors were mentioned, they were contacted as well. After scheduling and conducting interviews, my sample consisted of seventeen interviewees (see table 4.1). After acquiring permission, all interviews were recorded, and all quotes in the analysis were consented to by the interviewees (Halperin and Heath 2020).

**Table 4.1 Summary of interviewed organizations**

<i>Name</i>	<i>Organizational Branch</i>	<i>Repertoire of action</i>
<b>Challengers</b>		
Danish 92 Group (92-group)	NGO-coalition	Coordination and policy-recommendation
The Bridge to the Future (BttF)	Union-environmentalism alliance	Coordination and policy-recommendation
Green Transition Denmark (GTD)	Council	Policy-recommendation and project development
The Danish Climate movement (DCM)	Grassroots' coalition	Protest, campaigning, and service
The Green Student Movement (DGSB)	Grassroots organization	Protest and campaigns
Green Peace Denmark (Greenpeace)	NGO	Single-issue campaigns and policy-recommendation
The Danish Society for Nature Conservation (DSNC)	NGO	Service organization, policy-recommendation, and coordination
The People's Climate March	Protest movement	Protest and campaigns
CARE	NGO	Campaign and lobbying
Sustainable Energy (SE)	NGO	Project development and policy-recommendation
Global Focus	CSOs for Development Cooperation	Coordination and development
The Council on Climate and Green Transition (KOR)	Nonprofit science advocacy organization	Knowledge-sharing
<b>Incumbents</b>		
Confederation of Danish Industry (DI)	Industrial interest group	Service organization
Danish Trade Union Confederation (FH)	Private-public coalition of trade unions	Service organization
<b>Internal Governance Unit</b>		
Danish Agency of Energy	Administration	Policy implementation, climate and energy calculations and predictions
<b>Professional entrepreneurs</b>		
"This Is It: Render the Election Green."	A campaign in spring of 2019	Politics-campaign-opinion advisors
Policy Coordinator, Climate Change & Sustainability	Advisor	Former head of section at international Environmental NGO

At a glance, the sample is ‘representative’ regarding all agentic units’ representation. Nonetheless, when contacting and planning meetings, a considerable part of government and incumbents identified as key stakeholders were inaccessible within the allotted time frame of conducting interviews (from August to October 2020). Evidently, the interview data acquired draws heavily on the narrative of the challenging constituency. Leaving room for diverging answers and variation nonetheless rests on a perspectival view of the field’s development, which could have been different (Georg and Bennett 2005, 220). As the analysis will show, as an illustrative example, the governing NGOs in a network called the 92-Group were particularly accessible, and so the different junctures of the field concern in great detail their development.

Interviews and the majority of archival data were conducted and collected in danish and, when reported or quoted in the analysis, translated into English. In such translation, inevitably, a gap of meaning exists between applying words in different languages. Despite meaning lost in translation are entirely my responsibility, in cases were meaning decreased because of idiomatic or wordy language, changes were made to adequately express the original meaning in English.

#### 4.5 DATA ANALYSIS STRATEGY

The inquiry has been cyclical, and as such a linear coding practice could be performed (Saldaña 2016, 67). To make transparent the circularity in the process of analysis (Biernacki 2012), I describe the process of the data analysis strategy instead of showing transparency by presenting a codebook in the appendix. In effect, the coding of data follows the operational themes described above. Coding was done not just for labeling but for the sake of linking the different positions presented in the interviews. As the analysis process consists of more ‘chunks’ (Saldaña 2016), my coding practice was the first step in organizing the distribution of the field’s political practices and organizing (e.g., strategy, positioning, and coalitions) and the different self-understanding of the discussion surrounding green transition policy (e.g., the contention, transformation, and accommodation).


To identify various positions and underlying conceptions of the field rules, by virtue of the case’s historical nature, the dataset should reconstruct the landscape of organizations advancing for positions. Tracing the sequence of events to constitute an explanation of the field transformation, I lumped the data through process-tracing as a means of data analysis strategy. Being an iterative research strategy, the analysis has to reflect on the probative value (Halperin



and Heath 2020, 269f; George and Bennett 2005, 207), that is, the degree of proof of findings so that the analysis is open to what evidence has been marshaled to support the claims presented.

I follow Beach and Pedersen's (2013, 18ff) strategy, called explaining-outcome process-tracing, as the aim of the analysis is to serve the "best possible explanation of an outcome" based on the evidence of the dataset. Heuristically, by focusing on "minimally sufficient explanation" in my case, the tracing required (I) an eclectic combination of processes as a deductive path through theory and (II) an inductive path working backward from the empirical level using the material as the basis. I deployed two chief measures for determining whether to report findings. First, if an interviewee constructed one or more fragments of the field's development, I sought to verify the statement's feasibility in similar suggestions from other interviewees. If a particular episode, protest, policy-making process, or commission was highlighted as creating an impact on the field constituency, it was used as a threshold to report the effect on various organizations. Second, if interviewees underscored a pivotal episode of change not recounted by others, archival data were used to critically reflect on the value of the meaning presented. Practically, when detecting transformation processes, I do not treat them as the outcomes of a causal relationship but instead as "valuing the discovery of knowledge through conjecture" (Demetriou 2012, 52) by acknowledging explanations cannot account for all generative processes at work in the phenomenon. As the analysis shows later, to understand the processes of field development "backward" it can be helpful to examine the early stakes, which present the seeds of motifs or ideas in latter junctures. Some events were formative of ideas (e.g., the Climate Commission report, COP15, etc.) but these do not exhaust all sources of influence. I deliberately outline each process of transformation by foregrounding what evidence is constructed empirically and how I became aware of and understand the various processes identified (Theis 2002). As the richness of the dataset cannot adequately substantiate all the findings, I present the core discoveries that responds to the research question. As such, features of generalizability relies on the replicability and transparency of the construction of the dataset and the theoretical scheme of perception used in presenting the results. But the field of green transition politics comprised of the state, market, and civic associations is general to most liberal market economies (See Thörn and Svenberg [2016] and Rucht and Roose [2001] for similar cases), hence the social processes investigated are not unique but the cultural history is.

**Figure 4.1 Processes of Field Transformation**



## Second Part: The Analysis

5 THE EMERGING PHASE OF THE FIELD

The field of green transition politics’ ability to balance the commitment to a political logic (which made interorganizational activity possible) with the capacity to compete and coordinate was built into the field as it commenced to recrystallized in the late-2010s. The underpinning salience of climate politics debates became more comprehensive, rendering possible the incorporation of the politics of green transition in various societal matters. The climate justice framework had yet to find its organizational embarkment in the Danish environmental movement, despite its transnational diffusion in 2009 (Hadden 2015). From 2007, the field struggle gradually changed from being a dualistic discussion of the ‘realness’ of climate change, to a focus area for all sectors of society (a discussion of the means, ends, and haste of the transition, rather than realness of anthropogenic climate change). Realizing the ideational difference in the fields modus vivendi, the political logics of the field are intersected by three different sets of understandings mirrored in various organizations and institutions. These distinctive aspects of the political logics are summarized in table 5.1.

**Table 5.1 Political logics in the field of green transition politics**

Political logics	Ecological modernization	Sustainable development	Climate justice
Form	Interest groups, companies, State	Professional interest groups	Workers and citizens, popular mandate (union-movement Network)
Goals	Maintaining economy growth from the green transition	Climate equity, north-south relation, international agreement	A just green transition, visibility, carbon reduction, public mandate
Strategy	Influence electoral politics, administration, lobbying	Influence electoral politics, administration, lobbying	Electoral politics, administration, and public debate
Relationship between organizations	Competitive alliance	Coordination (articulate structure) but competing on resources.	Core cooperative, extensive informal network
Size and formality	Large and bureaucratic	Large and bureaucratic	Small, informal but also large and bureaucratic
Organization example	State of Green,	Danish 92 Group	The Bridge to the Future, The Danish Climate Movement

Table adapted from Armstrong (2002)

These typologies emerged from the analysis and exist to varying degrees at different stages. In capturing the different stages, the analyst needs to acknowledge that detecting the starting point

of a process is dubious<sup>5</sup>. In my assessment, the field's stakes were formed in the late-1980s. As part of the Danish liberal-conservative government's environmental plan of action, the Ministry of Environment initiated the public awareness campaign "Our Common Future," which took place between 1989-1992. As such, the field's foundation was established when a wide group of organizations got together to design what the campaign for public awareness of sustainable development should contain, and how it should be conducted. At its emergence, the field was encompassing at least five significant actors: the environmental movement, green NGOs, parliamentary officials, market incumbents.

Echoing the concerns of the United Nations report "Our Common Future," published in 1987 by the Brundtland Commission (Brundtland 1987), the essence of the campaign was to popularize the link between environmental limits of economic and social development intersected by the notion of sustainable development. Accordingly, the Danish campaign intended to shed light on environment-unfriendly systems of habits through knowledge-sharing activities. In the campaign, the Danish government emphasized three primary objectives: (I) popularize the statement "think global act local," (II) redevelop the concept of sustainable development, and (III) facilitate the mediation of knowledge concerning ecological and economic processes and interdependency (Gram et al. 1992, 113). Environmental concerns ought to be mainstream,

"basically because of the Brundtland report prescripts that in order to render sustainable development an acknowledgeable area of action, the public need to consider it as part of their everyday life. This anchoring is not durable by one or two decrees from a ministry. It's a vast widespread movement that needs to be started. The movement cannot be instigated top-down only; it's a crucial part of it that sustainable development needs to be a recurring theme in all legislation. Nevertheless, the change has to come from below too, as ordinary people need to realize it is part of their interest to recycle their waste in eight different factions, etcetera. – otherwise, this exercise simply does not succeed" (Interview, Danish Agency of Energy, 2020)

The entrenched aim was to create a broad public appeal and including various stakeholders in the coordination would trigger the campaign's effectiveness. The coordinating structure (Gram et al. 1992) was organizationally planned on a generous scale with this aim; many interest

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<sup>5</sup> For the purpose of answering the research question, I knowingly depart from the year of 2007 after identifying the structural emergence of the green transition field. I take into consideration the ideational evolution of the danish environmental movement represented elsewhere (See: Jamison et al. 1990).

groups were encouraged to participate in the campaign, such as environmental organizations, labor, and industry sector organizations. The executive committee was formed by five representatives, accompanied by secretaries from different social sectors (the Ministry of Environment, DSNC, employees, and employers' associations) and a sub-committee of 60 organizations constituting the board of representatives, divided into workgroups. From this outset, the focal point of the field struggle was motivated by many different considerations<sup>6</sup>, rendering the substance of the campaign a tentative matter. As such, the campaign's capacity to disseminate knowledge (which was its objective) was impeded by the heterogeneous network of administrating organizations (Gram et al. 1992, 33ff). Discussions concerning the campaign's substance grew and disrupted the diffusion of information between the administrative body and the local activists carrying out different awareness strategies. The organizations involved embodied different and converging social and environmental systems of beliefs, as they represented different spheres of the social body (Gram et al. 1992, 17ff). As a consequence, due to the many different opposing interests at stake, the public awareness campaign's composition obfuscated the original desire to teach citizens concrete patterns of action. As described by Læssøe (2007, 247), "[as] the state adopted responsibility for involving citizens in sustainable development policies there were still a variety of discourses at play and the approach was still relatively open to interpretation and experiments." When sustainable development was domestically translated into action and policy, the substance of the issues became grounds for debate. This campaign, then, made explicit the essence of the issues at stake: how do we define the idea of sustainable development? The Danish 92 Group (92-Group) was formed during the campaign, and as such was the field's first challenger comprised of ENGOs, which focused on policy recommendation and lobbying<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> For instance, Gram et al. (1992, 35ff) highlight that stakeholders could not agree on a pamphlet on environmental guidance encouraging to prevent groceries and merchandise wrapped in PVC-plastic as this was unfavorable to the Confederation of Danish Employers and the Confederation of Danish Industry, representing the PVC-consummating industry.

<sup>7</sup> In 1992, the network was comprised of international organizations as Greenpeace and the World Forest Foundation (WWF) but also national organizations such as DSNC and Sustainable Energy, ActionAid Denmark, The outdoor Council (Gram et al. 1992, 162).

## 5.1 FIRST THRESHOLD

Environmental advocacy in Denmark had until the 1990s been a niche area (Jamison et al. 1990), divided into different subdivisions and issues with sporadic interaction with one another. By the time of the instigation of the “Our Common Future” campaign, social movements, ENGOs, and public and private interest lobbyists experienced that their different matters of interest could overlap within a general political issue of sustainable development. The awareness of sustainable development reflected a commitment to a global agenda channeled through the political goals of particular organizations. The developmental aspect of sustainable development was restricted to a fixed-term campaign, signifying that an actual “field” was not made possible. The shared affiliation of public interest groups within civil society, market incumbents, and public authorities deliberating the operationalization of sustainable development was initiated but experienced a lack of a shared political logic, which they were trying to produce.

Through the dynamic interactivity in the 1990s, the sustainable agenda took the form of a more stabilized field, and the “rules” of the field emerged from the web of action during the transnational summit meetings (peaking in 2009 in Copenhagen). In other words, the rules of the field precede consensus processes, which started in 2007 in the form of a deliberative negotiation regarding the rules themselves. The consensus was displayed in the formation of a broad acknowledgement of green transition politics as vested in the logic of ecological modernization.

## 6 2007–2013: THE DEFEAT OF A MOVEMENT AND SOCIO-POLITICAL ENTRENCHMENT OF THE FIELD

The political awareness of pathways toward the conversion to a sustainable society was animated by the upcoming hosting of the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention (COP15). As the frontrunners of climate expertise since 1992 had been a combination of ENGOs and state delegates, the aftermath of COP15 changed the field's organizational landscape. It commenced as the newly appointed Liberal government formed the Climate Commission in 2007. The Liberal party-led government's platform, published in November 2007 and titled *A Society of Opportunities (Liberal-Conservative Government III 2007)*, designated a Climate Commission to develop recommendations on how a "statutory framework [could] be established for the vision of Denmark becoming independent of fossil fuels and achieving significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions" (Danish Commission on Climate Change Policy 2010, 50). The new commitment to reform climate policy was entrenched by the political logic of ecological modernization. This logic, which treats green transition and socio-economic growth as interdependent by the means of technological advances, becomes visible in different practices. Foremost, it transpired in interorganizational activities analyzed in the next sections and has been embedded in public opinion<sup>8</sup>. On the term of ecological modernization, consequently, the Commission had to take three (among six) economic criteria into consideration in deliberating: (1) cost-effectiveness by suggesting market-based solutions, (2) high level of economic growth, and (3) "[e]nsuring positive business development and promoting international competitiveness of business in Denmark" (Danish Commission on Climate Change Policy 2010, 16).

An interviewee from the Danish Agency of Energy called it a paradigm shift in Danish climate policy development, as it changed the direction of the green transition field's main stakes. Until then, the challengers of the field were occupied contending with skeptical climate change deniers, personified in political scientist Bjorn Lomborg. *Green Transition Denmark* (2016) reported in a historical overview of its trajectory that Lomborg's environmental

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<sup>8</sup> Energy efficacy and renewable energy sources in the energy system had been the backbone of sustainable development and thus a large part of most Danes' mindset. Surveys highlight that most Danes acknowledge climate change; however, the solvability of the range of issues attached to climate change is primarily treated by utilizing technological advances. In 2016, more than 80 percent of Danes acknowledged the realness of climate change, but 46 percent agreed that altering our ways of living is needed to cope with the challenges (Minter 2016).



skepticism toward green progression created a backlash to the frame of discussion, reducing the public debate to deliberating the realness of climate change. As anti-environmentalism had challenged epistemic claims since the 1980s, it remained a strong antagonist of how climate change was debated. The contending knowledge on climate change from skeptical environmentalists maintained this discussion on the realness of anthropogenic climate change between 1998-2007 (Interview CARE 2020; Former WWF 2020; Jamison 2010). Despite such cleavages, the outcome of the Climate Commission changed this debate significantly (Interview, Danish Agency of Energy, 2020).

Fossil fuel independence had until then been a utopian idea to most of the public sphere. In particular, Danish Energy (a lobby organization for Danish energy companies) was skeptical about its business feasibility (Interview, former WWF, 2020). Nevertheless, the Commission's suggestions were presented through reasonable political reforms and legislative change, making it an achievable goal to the political system; the conversion was portrayed as challenging but imaginable. Danish governments alternating within periods of elections since 1990 had been pioneering energy policy rooted in a climate change framework and entrepreneurial leadership in EU and the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC) process (Andersen and Nielsen 2017, 84f). However, concurrently in 2007 was the establishment of the Ministry of Climate and Energy, when Connie Hedegaard (Conservative) was appointed as its first minister (Dyrhauge 2020). As a consequence of the report and the changing institutional frame, Danish Energy engaged in promoting renewable energy systems and electrifying society's significant sectors<sup>9</sup> (Interview, CARE, 2020). In other words, business incumbents were realizing the (market) potential in transition policy.

The Commission's deliberation was, most notably, the first cross-sectional framework for reducing emissions nationally (Interview, Danish Agency of Energy, 2020). A transition of this magnitude entailed analyzing trajectories toward fossil fuel independence in all areas of society. Hence climate policy had to become a cross-sectional area of legislation, taxes, and research. Until then, climate change mitigation had primarily been considered in tandem with the evolution of the national energy system in terms of upscaling the share of renewable energy sources. While the Climate Commission report's subtitle was "the road to a Danish energy

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<sup>9</sup>Market incumbents, indeed, had been part of the energy sector of society since the 1970s oil crises (Mey and Diesend 2018).

system without fossil fuels,” they emphasized incorporating decarbonization of other sources into the framework-condition of green transition policy:

“Even 100% conversion to renewable energy would ‘only’ reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by about 75% in 2050 compared with 1990. Reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases from other sources than energy consumption are therefore necessary (...) [A]griculture is the second-largest emitter of greenhouse gasses, so if Denmark intends to live up to an 80%-95% reduction [EU-target in 2050] in greenhouse gas emissions by just reducing domestic emissions, it is vital to focus on a development in agriculture which considerably curbs emissions from production” (Danish Commission on Climate Change Policy 2010, 45)

The Commission’s recommendations and their focus on cross-sectional policy shaped the developmental aspects of the green transition. Therefore, the Climate Commission’s deliberative effort can be seen as establishing a shared affiliation of the stakes of the field. All sectors of society (civic as well as market) had an interest in shaping the terms of reference for the climate policy to come, as fossil fuel independence would not only impact the energy system and its actors, it would be a broad transition for all emitters (Interview CARE 2020).

## 6.1 THE COPENHAGEN MOMENT

While the Climate Commission shaped the field’s stakes, the actors involved were all affected by internal changes from 2009 to 2010 as an increased focus on climate activism and politics is detected during pinnacles of political engagement. The field’s entanglement in the global climate regime surrounding UNFCCC’s Conferences of Parties’ (COP) process marks the compositional starting point for organizational retrenchment and entrenchment of a consensus on the ecological modernization logic. Since 1992, to use Jennifer Hadden’s (2015) expression, COP meetings have been a ‘coral reef’ of social movement activities, state delegates, and interest groups from the industries and civic society, deliberating the politics of climate change during annual meetings (such as the Kyoto protocol and Paris-agreement). In December 2009, COP15 took place in Denmark’s capital. As a frontrunner in green transition and renewable energy innovation, expectations from global society assumed the Danish hosting to mark the time for a successor to the Kyoto-protocol<sup>10</sup>. The focus was formulating and agreeing on legally

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<sup>10</sup> In short, the Kyoto Protocol from 1997 was the first binding agreement by UNFCCC parties, committing developed countries to reduce greenhouse gases in accordance with individual targets (something the Convention in itself did not).

binding carbon emission reduction targets and a maximum level of global average temperature increase. Despite the Copenhagen meeting's salience, most spectators and participants considered it a multilateral disaster (Klein 2015, 11-14). A lesson from the Copenhagen moment was that the transferability of climate science consensus by no means spurs political action (Hadden 2015). According to two interviewees, as the Danish-led delegation sought to amend the basic agreement of the convention and to establish a binding agreement on keeping the increase in average temperature to 1.5 degrees, the international agenda was not ready for such alterations and governments failed to coordinate a collective policy to address climate change (Interview, former WWF, 2020; Interview, 92-Group, 2020). The Copenhagen Accord (2009) – a declaration of intent without a legally binding agreement – was the output of 14 days of negotiation, creating waves of disappointment in global society (Hadden 2015, 34f). Organizations such as the 92-Group participated in the negotiation process, but their action was limited by the grassroots organizations' contentious trajectory mobilizing outside the COP-processes.

A counter-summit deliberating climate actions, the so-called Klimaforum09, organized by an international SMO-network, accompanied the formal COP process. The Danish organization NOAH, the Climate Collective, and the Danish Climate Movement (DCM) participated in organizing the alternative forum. In my interviews, DCM were most involved in processes. The political outcome or lack thereof during the formal negotiation devastated most of its participants, who declared that, to bring about change: “needed is a broad alliance of environmental movements, social movements, trade unions, farmers, civil societies, and other aligned parties that can work together in everyday political struggle” (Klimaforum09 2009, 11). Despite limited scope conditions, the climate network had considerable opportunities for mobilization. One of the first instances of mass protests during COP15 got more than 100.000 people to take their agitation to the street (Wahlström et al. 2013). On December 16<sup>th</sup>, 2009, the two international climate action networks, Climate Justice Now! and Climate Justice Action, formed an immense social movement assembly, staging a mass non-violent action called “Reclaim Power” to cope with the imminent failure of the COP process. Approaching the conference center from different starting points, this event became the epitome of the emerging climate justice movement (CJN! 2009). The onset of the networks amplified an already ongoing episode of contention, which had been formed by international gatherings in the last decade (See Thörn et al. [2017] for an overview). Indeed, Copenhagen was a peak in transnational

social movement gathering to shape climate politics. However, when climate politics did not transform as expected, the grassroots challengers demobilized (Interview, DCM, 2020). As the devastating outcome of the COP processes is attentively analyzed elsewhere (rigorously by Hadden [2015] and processually by Cassegård and Thörn [2017]), I focus on developing four interrelated characteristics of the Danish transition field in the post-Copenhagen processes.

## 6.2 ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT

Notwithstanding the fact that the settlement of the field around ecological modernization had been a criticized subject for climate activists since the mid-1990s (Kruse 2013), this period of the field's organizational proliferation reinforced the dominating political logic by strengthening the IGU's position. Bureaucratically, to host the COP meeting was not only challenging in terms of logistical difficulties, but also in regard to the administrative density. Precluding the COP meeting, the Ministry of Climate was organizationally expanded. Evidence shows that the governance unit's (foremost, the Ministry of Climate and Energy, supported by the Agency of Energy) area of administrative expertise was scaled up to handle the institutional processes of COP15. In 2007, the department and agency consisted of eight officials, but after COP15 in 2010, the department existed of one hundred officials<sup>11</sup>. An interviewee from the Danish Agency of Energy describes this development:

“When the liberal government initiated an administrative change in the Ministry of Climate and Energy, they moved people from the Ministry of Environment and the Energy Agency and hired many new officials, creating an organization geared to run the COP-meeting in 2009. Afterwards, the organization's structure was not dismantled (...) [B]etween 2007-2009 when the Ministry of Climate was created, 20-25 officials working on climate negotiations were moved to the newly established ministry, and an additional 75 new officials were hired. They created a new department consisting of around 100 persons. They created a parallel structure to the Energy Agency, leaving behind the old structure of a large agency and a small department (...) The organizational structure of the areas of policy, then, is maintained by a large department and a large agency to contribute with policy-supporting analyses, while the political proceedings, to no small extent, occur in the department close to the minister” (Interview, Agency of Energy, 2020)

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<sup>11</sup> The evidence stems from interviewing; however, official records as to the development and expansion of full-time positions at the ministry was not obtainable.

This administrative change signifies an increased state institutionalization of climate action. Relationally, the IGU most decisive to the work of the 92-Group's (the ENGOs) conventional means of lobbying was expanded to extend their role, incrementally simulating their field position. In this chapter and the next – as a catalytic effect, my data display, the transfer and expansion of climate and transition expertise to IGUs (and, as will be shown, market incumbents) impacted the ENGO's role in environmental struggle.

The Liberal government initiated the paradigm shift, and the Social Democratic government (in power between 2011-2015) continued the political scheme of conversion from fossil fuel to enhancing renewable energy systems by developing the “Energy Strategy 2050” (The Danish Government 2011). Notwithstanding a focus on reducing carbon emissions, the strategy maintained the narrative of enhancing business's leading position in green innovation and technology. By advancing market incumbents' interests, the Liberal government (2007-2011) had spent much effort on enhancing Danish climate diplomacy, partnering for ecological modernization, and green growth with state and business actors (Liberal-Conservative Government III 2007). Indeed, during the COP15 negotiations, grassroots organizations mobilized coalitions and so too did state and business sectors. When the rules of ecological modernization started to reverberate as the salience of climate policy became politicized by institutional expansion and by new avenues for market actors vying for advancement, the ENGO-milieu focusing on sustainable development amalgamated. While the grassroots organizations were recalibrating their mandate after the Copenhagen moment demise, the field's green NGOs were affected differently.

To ramp up climate accomplishments, to quote an interviewee, “the world needed a trail of action instead of only long negotiation tracks” (Interview, 92-Group, 2020). In 2008, a new field incumbent was formed. The outcome of the Climate Commission was a general acknowledgment of green transition policy, which meant having more extensive groups of organizations from the market sector take up the ideational framework of green transition as a market strategy. The State of Green, a public-private partnership between the Danish government and the most prominent business associations, was created to sustain diplomatic ties and promote Danish solutions enabling the green transition. The government could secure the reproduction of green technologies as an export adventure, reinforcing the logic of ecological modernization. Actively shaping the international, commercialized image of

Denmark as a green frontrunner, this partnership maintained the settlement of field, as the challengers also started to focus on the private sectors as an area of influence.

Moreover, Partnering for Green Growth (P4G) was formed in 2009 during COP15 to sustain global interaction between state and business sector actors to promote green growth. Annually, a conference is hosted in Denmark's capital, reproducing the shared meaning of market-based action of ecological modernization. The 92-Group became part of a P4G advisory board to focus on influencing the market-based action on sustainable development, as such a point of intersection was necessary when the unilateral institutional system did not extensively prioritize climate policy (Interview 92-Group 2020). As the market incumbents got a foothold in the transition field, the ENGOs found new ways of influencing climate policy by engaging in cooperation and dialog with the market sector. Such an approach, jockeying for positions along different avenues and the affordance of the consensus of ecological modernization, was evidenced in other interviews as well. The following serves as an example of adapting to the political logic. DSNC and Danish Energy did a shared project on the realizability and commercially viable aspects of heat pump technologies to enhance energy transition (Interview, DSNC, 2020). Second, after the Climate Commission report was published in 2010, a general framework for emission reduction and transition policy was suggested by challengers (NOAH, WWF, NSNC, Sustainable Energy, and Greenpeace) formulated as a joint response to the new Climate Act (NOAH 2013). The main argument for creating a Climate Act, according to the alliance, was to establish a cumulative national budget for greenhouse gas emissions and reduction targets. Secondly, echoing the government's "Energy Plan 2050" from 2011, the goal was to "strengthen companies' innovation in green technologies, (...) so that the solid Danish skills are harnessed for the future" (NOAH 2013). Furthermore, at the instigation of the green thinktank Concito in 2008 (sustained by a network of industry organizations and NGOs), the field's political logic was further retrenched to that of ecological modernization. Accordingly, constituted by a research and technological agenda, the body of interest coordinated by the thinktank aligned with a focus on "sustainable technologies and export" (Soneryd of Wettergren 2017, 176). Inasmuch as both poles of the challenging field constituency (the 92-Group and the grassroots) adjusted to this consensus, their interaction was scarce and therefore they were affected differently.

The climate regime emerged in the transnational sphere, and as such, concerns were minimally deliberated by "politicians and very rarely debated in parliament" (Soneryd of

Wettergren 2017, 176). Climate politics, then, first became salient to the United Nations, hence Denmark had little institutional expertise on the subject. As such, a climate ministry did not exist until 2007, which forced the delegation attending the COPs to rely on the interest organizations' expertise (Interview, CARE, 2020). Sustaining this role, the ENGOs focused on bridging the outside position as a challenger with an inside position as expert stakeholder. This represents an organizational role that a former member of WWF, resonating with CARE and Sustainable Energy descriptions, refers to as "translators:"

"Positionally we were lobbyists, but at that time, lobbying was, to no small extent, to explain and deliberate all the weird and politically demanding issues on the areas of climate change, in a fashion tangible to ordinary citizens. My role was to explain to journalists what the different UN amendments and accords entailed. For instance, when we agreed to X, Y, and Z, what implications did it have on our national energy or transport system. Usually, the agreement was illegible and incomprehensible to outsiders – had it not been for the NGOs' role as translators of international politics, nothing would be nationally deliberated" (Interview, former WWF, 2020).

Actively positioning their effort as critically important, the idea of ENGOs as translators shows what the constellation of the field had been until then. Comprising only professionalized organizations situated inside the governance system, on account of their expertise in climate-related policies, the 92-Group members gained legitimacy as knowledge experts in the Danish delegation during UN climate meetings (Interview CARE 2020). The function the ENGOs, read in the immediate meaning of the excerpt, was somewhat of an activist position to make publicly apparent the climate agenda, so journalists could confront the politicians; thus, through the ENGOs' knowledge-sharing an actual debate would be rendered possible. Nonetheless, as private stakeholders and IGUs started to get a more entrenched position in the field, the ENGOs' role gradually changed.

As the 92-Group coordination was sustained by a shared focus on sustainable development as the intersection of poverty eradication and protection of the processes of nature (Danish 92 Group 2006, §2), not all the interviewed ENGOs in the network experienced this development. The division of labor between the organizations made some more exposed to the consequences of the consensus on ecological modernization (as displayed in the next chapter, Sustainable Energy was primarily affected by the commercialization of green transition). For instance Green Transition Denmark (GTD) was more engaged with providing expertise-related guidance to municipal and private projects – as such, reproducing their position and area of expertise

through project development (Interview CGT 2020). The division is also displayed as “there exists a division between those focusing the efforts on changing the system and us [Sustainable Energy and DSNC] focusing on the side-effects of implementing green transition, citizens involvement and local conversion” (Interview, Sustainable Energy, 2020). Others, like WWF, Greenpeace, and CARE, had a more systemic focus, targeting the national government and legislative assembly.


Different effects of the encompassing nature of ecological modernization are also displayed in grassroots activities. Emerging in 2008, the Danish Climate Movement (DCM) utilized the political opportunity of climate justice. They saw their mode of existence in bridging the climate scientific urgency of increasing carbon emission with the systemic critique of global justice. At the core, “climate justice” cognize the UNFCCC’s focus on “differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities” (UNFCCC 1992) in a critique of ecological modernization approach which renders climate change a matter of stabilizing global carbon emissions by facilitating market solutions and technological innovation. Without socially embodying the problem of carbon emissions, according to this critique, ecological modernization reduces climate change politics to a technological matter of interest (Bendall and Görg 2013).

Once the contentious events in 2009 ended, the aftermath marks a period of demobilization, as a leading member in DCM says, “in 2010, the Climate Movement was in a climate depressive state of mind” (Interview, DCM, 2020). After the “defeat” of the climate movements at COP15, DCM strategically realigned its approach to an intermediate system critique, progressively deemphasizing its anti-capitalistic vocabulary by assimilating into the framework of 350.org (an American climate movement organization). By focusing their enterprise on organizing ‘divestment campaigns’ (called the “Responsible Future”-campaign) they focused attention on making retirement funds and other institutions get rid of stocks, bonds, or investment funds associated with heavy emission industries (350.org 2012). Since 2014, this campaign became a permanent part of the DCM’s repertoire of action. By means of associating the leftist practice of climate justice with a more institutional appearance, the movement organization adapted to the appropriateness of the institution they tried to change. As a leading member expressed it, “the message was not to participate and disrupt board-meeting at the pension funds, but to use more conventional tactics of influence” (Interview, DCM, 2020). The strategic approach of the DMC adjusted through the divestment tactic, appropriating the politics of the organizations they tried to influence.



### 6.3 SECOND THRESHOLD

In the post-Copenhagen era, the cessation of climate transition utopianism stimulated administrative and political adaptation to occur. Although ecological modernization's political logic was dominating, it was a break in the governmental/public/market "understanding" on the realness of green transition policies. After the Climate Commission established the political feasibility of green transition pathways, climate change (instigated by an increased focus on fossil fuel divestment) became the intersectional issue around which more and more organizations intermingled. The feasibility of transition toward a low carbon society had been part of communal ways of organizing in Denmark since at least the 1970s. For instance, technological projects developed into a national network of renewable energy (wind) projects (Jamison and Baark 1999, 211f, Sustainable Energy Interview 2020). Later on, such experimentation proved commercially viable, which gave companies and branch organizations a commercial interest in transition, affecting the ENGOs strategizing around environmental issues. As state-market partnerships emerged, the challenging constituency was forced to seek new modes of influence because their jockeying for position by conventional means (lobbying or protesting) became more difficult to reproduce under the institutional reorganization after COP15.



## 7 2014-2016: (INTER)NATIONAL CLIMATE POLITICS AND FIELD DESTABILIZATION

By way of the state and market's attention on climate change from 2007 onward, which strengthened the political logic of ecological modernization, the empirical evidence from interviewing field constituents shows that the period from 2014 to 2016 was a turning point for the challengers' repertoire of organization. First, the Paris-agreement specified a unilateral framework around which formal and grassroots organizations would sustain a common point of departure in shaping the nationally determined contributions to mitigate climate change. Second, the organizational areas of advocacy viewed as legitimate within the field context proliferated as a result of the climatization of surrounding issues. Third, while ENGOs embodying positions as legitimate challengers and public experts on climate science and policy had experienced a setback, their locus in the field further eroded as a second reconfiguration of the IGUs was set in motion. Whereas reconfigurations in the dominant political logic first transpired in 2018-2019, preceding openings detected in this section nourished the underpinning impact of how the field would become during the electoral upheaval in 2019.

### 7.1 POLITICAL OPENING

The contours of the challengers' political opportunities after the Paris Agreement were twofold. First, as the newly established international covenant to stabilize the increasing average temperature between 2°C–1.5°C compared to preindustrial levels, the Paris Agreement's (UNFCCC 2015) commitment coined the use of intended nationally determined contribution (INDC) mechanisms. This mechanism unified a collective agreement of the targets through domestic transition policy to ramp up the transnational emission reductions. The adoption of this agreement forced the parties (including Denmark) to take action accordingly and formulate INCDs. The means for such goals signified a new shift in UNFCCC's mode of governance (Hale 2016) from top-down through binding agreements (like the Kyoto-protocol) to bottom-up climate action by the use of facilitative conditions of policy, hence offering new areas of influence to the challengers, targeting local non-state actors and national policy. Thus, the rapprochement of transnational climate action (Hale 2016) affected the channeling of demands from civil society organizations dealing with climate change. 'The return of the state,' as Brunnengräber (2013) calls it, indicates the reshaping of climate politics – from multilateral

agreements to nationally determined contributions – opening the opportunity for civil society to address climate concerns at the national level now attributable to the state. A renationalization<sup>12</sup> of climate action based on this development was thus predicted (Bäckstrand et al. 2017). The Paris agreement became a cornerstone of transnational climate policy and affected the field by serving as a shared goal of green transition (the 2°C–1.5°C target), an agreement which, as we shall see, serves as a brick in the development of the consensus of a new political logic.

Secondly, the 21<sup>st</sup> Conference of Parties during which the Paris agreement was formulated also produced the juridical framework of climate finance (Paris-agreement 2015, article 9). In the Copenhagen Accord, it was already acknowledged that developed countries should jointly mobilize 100 billion dollars per year by 2020 in climate finances (UNFCCC 2009, article 8). The Paris agreement included “support mechanisms” for financial aid for mitigation and adaptation projects, which were ratified by Denmark in 2016. Then, while the 92-Group members were a mix of development aid and environmental organizations, after COP21, development aid organizations broadly became more integrated in climate mitigation and adaptation. This process is referred to as the climatization of development issues<sup>13</sup>. An interviewee from the Danish coordinating network Global Focus highlights this process:

“What I’m experiencing is that it has become more politically mainstream (...) [I]n the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the climate agenda is going to permeate all development policy, and it has become an integrated part of NEXUS [Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding Nexus] conceiving the long-term progress of development and humanitarian work (...) climate mitigation and adaptation projects is going to be an imperative, and also a potential lever for many development policy agendas that we as a civic association are concerned with. Climate change, then, becomes an issue of the economic system, the north-south cleavage, supporting local change, all of which you can look at with new eyes via a climate agenda” (Interview, Global focus, 2020).

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<sup>12</sup> (Bäckstrand et al. (2017, 562) use the term ‘hybrid multilateralism’ to indicate that “[w]ith the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the observer groups [non-state actors] present at the annual COPs are now invited to play a more integrated role in multilateral processes through.”

<sup>13</sup> Foyer, Aykut, and Morena (2017) use the term as a heuristic in capturing the symbolic and discursive process by which climate change concern became – during COP21 – an all-encompassing category of environmental considerations—that is, climate action is (now) including a variety of new topics such as security, agriculture and financial regulation while still re-enhancing existing links to others, such as development, fossil fuel regulation etc.

While the link between environmental and developmental concerns had been associated with sustainable development since the 1980s, the climatization of development policy from around 2015 organizationally proliferated within the Danish field of green transition politics. Climate financing channeled a more systematic link between the two NGO networks in the intersection between the national and international dimensions of Danish climate politics in 2020 (Global Focus and Danish 92 Group 2020). Strategic alignment in Global Focus' 2020-2023 strategy signifies that "member organizations take the lead in sustainable organizational transition and play a leading role in integrating climate into development work" (Global Focus 2020). Movement intellectual and professor at Copenhagen University Jens Friis Lund frames it as: "[t]o assess the Danish climate target, we should consider it in tandem with what is required globally, to achieve the Paris Agreement's goals, keeping the global temperature increase well below 2 degrees" (Lund 2019).

## 7.2 RECONFIGURATIONS OF FIELD POSITIONS

Despite the expanding breadth and depth of climate policy, the field's reproduction of the link between institutional climate politics and science amalgamated during 2014 with the adjudication of the Danish Climate Act (a strategic framework upon which Denmark's nationally determined climate would develop). As a reconfiguration, it changed the core of climate administration from being a matter of energy system evolution to becoming a cross-sectional policy area surveying emissions in all the major domestic emitting institutions (farming, industry, transport), operating as a point of "transparency to make publicly available the status, trajectory, and progression of the climate change policy" (MCEU 2014). To this end, a new IGU was established by the founding of the Danish Council on Climate Change (DCCC). DCCC is a scientific interdisciplinary advisory board serving to scientifically reinforce the decision-making processes on national climate policy development (MCEU 2014). The baseline from which the Council operated is to secure a cost-effective transition toward a carbon-neutral society by 2050, and to ensure public transparency in the development of climate policies. Moreover, as a field actor, DCCC was contributing to the public debate by involving stakeholders from the business sector and civic associations (MCEU 2014). Monitoring policy-development, this actor changes the field's interorganizational relationship in three ways. First, albeit an advisory board, the Council was based on a scientific mandate, balancing the political debate and momentarily contradicting the government's climate policies:

“The significance of the DCCC during the liberal government [2015-2019] was first and foremost, to tell the truth, scientifically-speaking – the policy pursued is not consistent with the climate targets and objectives they are striving to achieve. Simply, comparing the objectives of the Climate Act with the policy-development on energy, which could have been planned years ago, the political visions are unambitious” (Interview, CARE, 2020).

While the ENGOs had been the guarantor of the critical position in the climate debate, the field now had an IGU surveying and deliberating the institutional politics. As a state-institutionalized voice of science, the DCCC was positioned inside the realm of governance but outside the electoral system (as an independent council), their voice was quickly co-opted in the public debate.

The opportunistic nature of DCCC was greeted by the ENGO-milieu – Greenpeace’s policy advisors highlight that the Council was an advantage in communicating the required political objectives toward low-carbon society, making the area of policy more publicly legible. The consequence was that its positional function belittled the ENGOs’ position as public intellectuals on the matter of the green transition. Interviewees highlight that ENGO lobbyists’ position was formed in the 1990s and on, participating as state delegation during the UNFCCC summit process. The reason for such civic participation relates to climate policy as technically challenging to navigate and politicians having a low interest in the area. As said earlier, Danish representatives required experts to ‘translate’ the outcome and meaning of the negotiation processes both for themselves and the media.

The role of ‘translators’ in the overall framework on climate policy was incorporated into the DCCC, surveying the development of all policy-making seeking to reform society toward carbon neutrality. The massive demand for scientific knowledge to guide decision-making, the institutional backdrop of the field, was the core function of the ENGOs in the 1990s transitional climate participation and negotiations (Interview, 92-Group, 2020). Incorporating this mandate into a scientific, policy-analytical, state-governed organization changed the field’s dynamics:

“When the first Climate Act [2014] was implemented, a large climate NGO was created – the DCCC is in effect a state-funded NGO producing one professional-based report after another (...) each time the government is proposing something the first commenting is not Greenpeace nor is it WFF or the Council on Green Transition, it is the chairman of the DCCC. The green NGOs are stuck in the same position, namely that they sit 1-2 persons in a huge organization focusing on climate policy as their area of advocacy, but also various other subjects of interest (...) But to take effective action against the DCCC – including ten scientists supported by twenty top qualified academic staffs who has a series of reports in

current production, on issues salient to the government – none of the NGOs can match that organizational capacity” (Interview, former WWF, 2020).

While modifications to the field’s governance structure took form, jockeying for positions was rendered challenging for the ENGOs because their usual role as disseminators of knowledge on scientific and political issues gradually was appropriated by the function of the DCCCC. Considering the ENGOs’ different positions, the 92-Group’s affiliated organizations, such as Green Transition Denmark rely on funding and economic support, and engage in partnership with the local government and businesses to maintain their position as experts in green transition politics (Interview, GTD, 2020). To the extent actors such as Greenpeace and CARE still lobbied during climate negotiations, their public mandate as the voices of science changed during 2014, as the DCCC routinized surveying policy by circumscribing the voice of climate science. The ENGOs had played a significant part in getting issues on the political agenda, but their general role as ‘science guarantors’ was diluted.

Moreover, the commercialization of environmental expertise on energy efficiency forced members of the 92-Group to change their mandate of purpose. Sustainable Energy, a member-based ENGO with expertise in deploying energy efficacy, show this development in their strategic plan for 2018-2021 (Sustainable energy 2017). Since the mid-1970s, their strategic focus has been developing concrete solutions to integrate renewable energy into the Danish energy supply, aspiring for carbon neutrality. The professional know-how on these matters made their position fashionable to many actors, nationally and globally. Due to the demand for renewable energy solutions since the mid-2000s, the market has taken over this position on energy projects. Rendering difficult the reproduction of their position, the organization’s strategic focus gravitated toward ‘less’ expertise-based approaches, consolidating their activities around a broader sustainability agenda (Sustainable Energy 2017, 5). Despite the lack of evidence showing similar transformation of other ENGOs, the new focus on coalition-building in 2018 and onwards somewhat affirms these processes of reconfiguration.

### 7.3 THIRD THRESHOLD

As NOAH (first modern environment group in Denmark) describe in their 50-year anthology of the movement, most of the initial and subsequent work on environmentalism was to convince the public and legislators of the magnitude of the problem; its ‘realness’ so to speak (Hougaard 2019, 34). In 2015, if only discursively, climate change was the dominating agenda around

which the field actors were jockeying for positions. By means of the Paris-agreement, the challenging constituency had a new indispensable target to guide their effort in shaping the national contributions. The processes of field transformation in the two preceding chapters, moreover, signify that the ENGOs' status as professionals suffered from the formation of IGUs to sustain the status quo of the field, as the climatization of environmental issues set in motion a broader political focus on climate change after 2015. While such alignment did not happen overnight, it emerged when institutional policy was formulated, creating openings in the field structure for various players to join the game.

The movement had left behind their mobilizing effort, pointing their agitational energy toward other institutional actors (pension funds and market development), and the ENGO-milieu was marginalized by actors permeating their area of expertise. However, these years of policy development fertilized the episode of contentious rupture in the dominating political logic instigated by the challengers. Indeed, contentious politics transpiring in 2018-2019 were directly linked to the yielding ENGO-milieu and the strategic shift of the DCM. While the climate justice frame had been adopted during the COP15 mobilization, it reverberated in new organizational forms emerging.



## 8 2017-2019: HEYDAY OF CONTENTIOUS POLITICS & PROLIFERATION OF THE FIELD

In this section, the rupture in the field logic transformation is detected in the challengers' innovative practice. As a new youth movement emerged, it became the dominant factor in shaping the new domain of struggle. Its involvement in and interaction with the rest of the challenging constituency provided the necessary strategic realignment of action to expose the political vulnerability offered through the general election campaign in 2018-2019. The 92-Group, professional entrepreneurs, and new SMOs drew on lessons from trade union solidarity, the transnational climate justice framing, and climate science knowledge in organizing the citizen's initiative that composed the political awareness underpinning the adjudication of the new Climate Act in 2020. The political evolution of the green transition field in 2018-2019 is an interplay of three processes: (I) the resurgence of SMOs; (II) the joint formulation of a policy around which protest and advocacy was coordinated; (III) the emergence of new organizational forms. The outline of contributions of the joint efforts of activists and advocates in the episode leading up to the formulation of the new Climate Act shows how the challengers entrenched a new political logic.

### 8.1 ORGANIZATIONAL EXPANSION OF CHALLENGERS

Social movement mobilization facilitated the field's organizational expansion in this period. As Fridays For Future diffused globally, medialized and commenced by the Swede Greta Thunberg, started to take action to the street in 2018, Denmark saw another justice-oriented movement emerge, expanding the challengers' positions. To this effect, however, a particular professor had a sense of entrepreneurship to politicize two society sectors, the scientists and the university student, co-organizing the Green Student Movement (DGSB) and The Council on Transition and Climate Change. The students gained momentum championing policy-recommendation and coalition-building with the rest of the challengers.

Around the capital region universities, groups of concerned students on the green transition were formed after COP21 in 2015. During a meeting hosted by a political ecology professor, Jens Friis Lund, these groups got together, commencing the DGSB. The public sphere got to know DGSB on the 5<sup>th</sup> of September 2018, when the second People's Climate March took place in Copenhagen. The Danish capital had previously witnessed climate demonstrations create

media visibility during COP15, where more than 100.000 people protested (Wahlström et al. 2013). After the devastating outcome of the COP-meeting, no remarkable street manifestation is detected until 2017. The People’s Climate March ignited a mass-mobilization on the 27<sup>th</sup> of April 2019 – as part of the general electoral campaign in Denmark, 40.000 people took their demands to the streets (Interview, DGSB, 2020). Despite the importance of newsworthiness, however, as McAdam (2017, 202) emphasized, “[t]o encourage this shift in consciousness, those working to build a grassroots movement will need to find ways to promote broad identification with, and ownership of, the issue of climate change.” Understanding the issue in question, then, relied on an open-ended identification with the goals of the movement.

DGSB was an organizational expansion of the field in two significant ways. First, their framing of climate change as an issue of climate justice was paramount. They used a moderate version of the notion to resonate with young people who could not identify with the whole spectrum of justice-related politics, helping to recruit politicized and less politicized students. The clear-sightedness encouraged many to participate as the organizers’ framing strategy emphasized loosely framed narrative to fit in many contexts and identities. The identity of DGSB, compared to the DCM in 2008-2009, then, appears as an intermediate justice grassroots movement. The purpose of the DGSB was to be used as a vehicle for political pressure, “pushing the system in such a way that we maintain the narrative of being young and angry but not rabid” (Interview, DGSB, 2020). The movement had to appeal to the general public, albeit focusing their demands on particular issues of climate policy. As one activist formulated it, a goal, to begin with, was not to become “hippish,” excluding others as a consequence of having a particular collective identity. Evidence from the DGSB’s initiating meetings suggests (See appendix 4.B) that the activists were deeming it vital the organization would capture the inter-political landscape, to successfully present themselves as channeling the demands of genuine citizens.

Shaping their mandate, they also drew on a particular political framing of climate science. Professor Jens Friis Lund’s role in the process cannot be underestimated. Having prior experience coordinating the Copenhagen Climate March in 2017 and as main organizers behind a ‘Scientists Call for Climate Action’ (2018) in the Danish newspaper Politiken, he helped portray a scientific picture of the rapid climate change development, serving as a framing of the progression of Danish climate policies. As such, DGSB were disputing the core of ecological modernization by claiming that no scientific evidence shows that global economic growth and

global carbon footprint reductions is co-conceivable. Combating the current paradigm of growth, by virtue of a global just transition, the movement encouraged the Danish Government to agree on spearheading carbon reduction targets in accordance with the Paris-agreement (DGSB 2019; Lund 2019). Moreover, climate justice signified a socially just transition, taking into action the distributional effects from a green transition of society. Indeed, this message also transpired in the People's Declaration from the alternative climate Forum in 2009. Yet, the public appearance as a student organization supporting scientifically based demands eased the legitimization of the movement at the field-site. They succeeded in developing an oppositional consciousness by drawing on climate justice and developing a mobilizing structure geared to sustain a movement.

By the spring of 2019, DGSB had already developed into various local groups at most educational institutions in Denmark far beyond the capital region. Although DGSB developed a coordinating system early in its trajectory (through a national coordination committee) the preamble of the movement had to be maintained, staying with the initial structure as a loosely demarcated network, hosting demonstrations and stimulating the local organization of climate activism. In effect, the movement's expansion had to be coordinated. DGSB, then, agreed to join the Danish Climate movement (DCM) in the autumn of 2018, providing the necessary administrative arrangement to handle the maintenance of the former. Juridical and economic administration was "outsourced" so DGSB could focus on the means of action and tactical appearances, while still having the internal structure of a formal organization. Examining the organization of the DCM in 2019 highlights their coordinating capacity of most of the new grassroots of the field.<sup>14</sup> From interviewing organizers in DGSB and DCM, it became clear the latter function as a coordination secretary, having an accountant, being registered as an organization in the central business register (CVR), channeling economic and political resources while approving/ surveying project and activities of local groups acting following the organization's program of principles. Similar to the function of the 92-Group, they coordinated the climate organizations activities, sharing information and deliberating the demands of the movements to sustain the shared meaning of action. Harmonizing the means of action and demands with their peers through information sharing made possible a coordinated

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<sup>14</sup> DCM consists of six different movement organization comprised of multiple subgroups and campaigns.

mobilization around a specific set of demands during the national electoral campaign in the spring of 2019.

The field-building endeavor in this period can be explained as the professionalized ENGOs reorganized their involvement in the green transition field, infusing their expertise in the SMOs reinvigorated attention on climate justice. The uniqueness of these coalesced means of action, bridging the routinized tactics with the contentious forms of mobilization, generated a rupture in the field's political logic in 2018-2019. The upheaval of mobilization and agenda-setting led to new organizational formations. As the Klimateforum09 acknowledged it in 2009, the need for a broader alliance had to get a new organizational vessel.

## 8.2 NEW ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS & COALITION-BUILDING

In the midst of the general election campaign, an organization was formed by a network of green organizations (ENGOs and SMOs) and trade unions. The Bridge to the Future (BttF), as the organization is called, was an organizational synthesis of social justice and climate policy. By broadening the constituency of green transition to the labor movement, the established public support for a progressive climate policy was reinforced by a new institutional actor. Green and just transition was the core feature of the network, bridging green organizations' expertise with the long-term focus on justice of the labor movement and their broad member-based structure. Climate justice became a common denominator to strategize around. The labor-climate coalition's goal was twofold: (I) a carbon-neutral society in 2040 (ten years earlier than the government's goal) and (II) a just transition for all (See Appendix 4.A).

The Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (FH) joined the green transition struggle, publishing their climate plan for 2030, emphasizing that transition has a socially just dimension (FH 2020, 17). Although scholars have detected various uses of the term climate justice (Chatterton et al. 2013), the labor movement co-opted the justice dimension of green transition to further its long-lasting objectives of safeguarding employees' rights (Interview, FH, 2020). Accordingly, social justice was a cultural extension of the role of the labor movement. As the policy advisor at FH formulates it: "social justice has been an important consideration for us (...) it's a guiding principle between analyzing what is important to your members and then deliberate and express these considerations as policy-recommendations in, for instance, shaping the political features of a green tax reform" (Interview FH 2020). Another interviewee highlights that the societal arrangement of green transition, then, became not only a matter of

expertise; it required a rooting in ordinary people's conduct of everyday life (This-is-it! Interview 2020).

The intersection of trade unions and green challengers was a new organizational form in Denmark, formative for the challengers as the ENGOs have the expertise and the labor unions have the institutional reverberation to create politically broad support for the green transition policies they presented (Interview, BttF, 2020). Accordingly, the field's political logic would not have coalesced as it did without bridging the 'climate justice' framing approach with popular backing from the DGSB's oppositional consciousness and the institutional linkage embodied by BttF.

A third field newcomer was the Council on Climate and Green Transition (KOR). Emerging from a Call for Action from concerned scientists in Denmark, whereas 301 scholars signed a petition calling for a progressive climate mitigation strategy (301 Scientists 2018), the council utilized scientific information and cooperation with the effort to organize 'counter-expertise' vis-à-vis the already established governmental DCCC and the media. According to one of the members KOR "began by looking at it [climate policy] globally, based on a principle of global climate justice, and then working backward, what it means for the Danish policy of transition" (KOR interview 2020). Most importantly, they interacted from the beginning with DGSB and BttF. To the extent the role of movement intellectuals (Gramsci 1999, 134f) can be used, KOR provides substantial information to the grassroots expanding the space of ideas. Utilizing the notion of movement intellectuals in Eyerman and Jamison's (1991, 97f) cognitive approach, the intersection is a formative process, where a "cognitive praxis" of collective identity and policy demands is sustained by the relational identification of what ought to be done. This relationship, moreover, points to the shifting role of the ENGO-milieu in coordinating and developing the demands of the grassroots organizations. While KOR used their organizational link to DGSB, coordinating a shared demand to take form, similar processes were made possible by the coordination efforts of the members of the Danish 92 Group (Interview Danish 92 Group 2020). Describing the SMO-ENGO connection, the coordinator at the 92-Group highlights:

"We [the 92-Group] are providing policy inputs as well as they [the DGSB] are asking for inputs (...) the Danish Climate Movement is a member of 92-Group and they want the policy advisors from the establish NGO-milieu to assist them in formulating movement demands. An example of such knowledge-sharing is the Climate March held on the 5<sup>th</sup> of September [2020]. The climate movement's demand was twofold. First, they advocated for the Danish

Government to take responsibility for its global carbon footprint [not part of the Climate Act from 2019]. Secondly, they insisted that 5 billion DKK on the government's annual budget was reserved for climate aid, the financial support provided to developing countries, according to Denmark international commitments. Concerning climate aid, there is no doubt that it has been greatly influenced by the 92-Group's member organizations which have work on this idea for quite some time" (Interview, 92-Group, 2020)

Internal efforts to coordinate the shared meaning of the challengers had ten years earlier been less likely to occur, due to the different vantage points from which grassroots organizations and ENGOs were operating. As the DCM started to strategize around divestment (moving away from their initial point of disruptive leftist practices), and IGUs challenged the ENGOs agentic position as carrier of knowledge, SMO-ENGO cross-fertilization was made possible. The new organizational form was shaped by the new attention of the ENGOs – not only coordinating their interest in lobbying – co-opting the DCM into their network. In situ, the coalition-building efforts and political urgency of climate mitigation strategies challenged the field's taken-for-granted assumptions about the primary organizational repertoire, instigating a rare moment of field innovation.

### 8.3 CHALLENGERS CLIMATE POLICY DEMANDS

Despite the shared interest and linkage of this new coalition, the challengers still lacked a shared message around which the coordinated common strategy was organized. By reason of a new opportunity to formulate citizens' initiatives<sup>15</sup>, the DCM sought to propose a Carbon fee-and-dividend (a climate tax) together with the 92-Group. Deliberating this, they agreed to recommend a new Climate Act amplified by the slogan "Climate Act Now!" (Interview, DCM, 2020). To that extent, the recommendations (Christensen et al. 2019) were partly met by the adoption of the new Climate Act (MCEU 2020), but the transformation of Danish climate policy in 2019 was affected by another campaign accompanying the Climate Act-campaign, which

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<sup>15</sup> The parliamentary appropriation of environmental awareness has historically in Denmark been co-opted by the leftist parties (Andersen 1990). Embodying a new democratizing project, the new green party, the Alternative, first and foremost, sought to make less distant the decision-making process to citizens. By proposing the establishment of the so-called 'citizen's initiatives,' they fertilized the fields' strategical capacity in favor of the challenging constituents. In 2018 the initiative platform entered into force as a tool for direct democracy and civic engagement. By gathering 50.000 signatures, ordinary citizens could mobilize public opinion as a direct channel into the Parliament, and the law proposal (if formulated as such) would be discussed in the Parliament.

demanded a political commitment to a 70-percent reduction target. Such an aim had to be achieved by 2030 for Denmark to live up to the Paris-agreement (Haaland 2017).

The public and political interest in the goal was induced by a small network of campaigners, intellectuals, and activists who formulated the campaign ‘This is it: Render the Election Green.’ The goal was to create a broader public interest in greening the electoral agendas before the Parliament election in May 2019, by way of targeting political parties/government leaders and engaging in a variety of agitating activities (demonstration in front of the Parliament, a public conference, news articles) (Interview Global Focus 2020). The campaign’s starting point was to formulate a ‘green generation contract,’ emphasizing Denmark must be CO<sub>2</sub>-neutral by 2040, and emissions reductions must be at a minimum 70 percent in 2030 (DSNC 2019). The outcome of the campaign was that most of the members of Parliament signed the contract, and the campaign got over 100.000 signatures from citizens.

With the underpinning focus on political commitment and a broader mobilization of the public, a new form of support for environmentalism was set in motion. The agitation stemming from the People’s Climate March in 2019 (strategizing around the slogans of “a new climate act now!” and “render the election green”) triggered institutional political action (at least rhetorically) when the newly appointed prime minister of the Social-Democratic government, Mette Frederiksen, acknowledged: “Dear young people: You made this election the very first climate election in Danish history” (Nobel et al. 2019, 87).

#### 8.4 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ELECTORAL UPHEAVAL IN 2019

Encouraging the transition toward a low-carbon society, the new Social Democratic government outlined the political contours of the new Climate Act (Climate Act Agreement 2019). In June 2020, almost unanimously, the Danish Parliament passed the New Climate Act (MCEU 2020) to shape legally binding climate strategies. As the Danish Parliament adopted the framework for the next decade’s climate policy to come, it has yet to formulate in-depth Climate Action Plans. The core of the new Act was reducing national emissions by 70 percent by 2030, compared to the 1990 emissions level (the so-called ‘70-percent-target’).

Toward the last stage of the national election, the demands of the challengers, channeled through the citizen’s initiative, were co-opted by most of the Social Democrats’ supporting parties, which became a crucial element in the enhancement of the challengers’ opportunity to effect progressive policy change (Interview, Greenpeace, 2020). As the 92-Groups said during

our interview, first the Alternative adopted the 70-percent-target, then The Red-Green Alliance, and during the electoral campaign, The Socialist People's Party and the Social-Liberal Party were backing up the message of a New Climate Act. This process is characterized as an "institutionalization process in a sense (...) [N]ow we had a political landscape that, on a rhetorical level, managed to capture the messages of the movement (Interview, KOR, 2020). As such, the outcome of the electoral campaign was the development of an institutionalized climate justice-narrative, to the extent that it "mainstreamed" a focus on the climatization of all policies. The occurrence of "mainstreaming" during the electoral process was made possible as

"[t]he pressure on the Social Democrats became too immersive. The 70-percent-target became synonymous with taking serious aspects of the green transition. As such, pressure by the entire red-green alliance [the supporting parties] created inflation in backing the message, and when the Confederation of Danish Industry also showed support, everyone gradually knew it was a no-brainer. Then, they [the Government] became afraid to disappoint the expectations of a climate election and all the young people protesting in the streets fueled by the slogan Climate Act Now!" (Interview, Greenpeace, 2020).

In this line of thought, by approving the Climate Act, the resolution stressed that "climate change is no longer a matter of for or against, but of sufficient political action while there is still time" (Skaarup et al. 2020). This new settlement of the field becomes apparent when actors unanimously acknowledge that climate adaptation and mitigation are salient; imperatively, "something" needs to be done. Doubt and hesitation regarding the underlying goals of mitigation and adaptation strategies have domestically been delegitimized at the field-site since 2015. This logic is a systemwide, politicized deliberative effort to settle on how the transition is acquired, not only limited to administration and policy advisors' interest, but also linking to citizens' everyday interests and the social consequences of conversion.

While this signals a break from the early field struggle, the mainstreaming also had an administrative impact. With the aim of encouraging this consensus, a restructuring of the governance of climate policy was set in motion, involving: (I) creating a Committee on Green Transition to mainstream carbon considerations in all major policy development and reforms, (II) initiating 13 partnerships with leading private business organizations to suggest sector emissions reductions, (III) sector climate action plans, (IV) upscaling the agencies and department of Climate, Energy, and Utilities. While the incumbents and the state are still inclined to the ecological modernization scheme of perception, the new all-encompassing focus on climate change and social justice affected the field's dominating political logic. From



interviewing The Confederation of Danish Industry (DI), evidence points to the incumbents' adaptation to the mainstream justice narrative. While DI started backing the 70-percent-target, they also published their policy plan concerning how Denmark would reach its green transition target in 2030. Republishing their green transition 2030-plan, it now emphasized "income differentials in balance," so that structural inequality did not increase as a result of the proposed policy – that is, inequality increased, but prosperity increased in all income groups (DI 2020, 19). Such organizational focus on social equity (as a moderate version of justice) is relatively new to the organization, stemming from its more prominent focus on green transition (Interview DI 2020). The practicality of green transition and its social consequences can also be traced to the interview with FH's political advisor. The necessary conditions for a successful green transition have primarily been understood as a matter of technological possibilities and scientific advances, but

“when you start focusing on the implementation of these technologies, then, you have to consider whether the work force has the professional skills that are necessary, whether people are able and willing to buy and use electric cars, what does it take for them to make those decisions, and how does it affect them in terms of social equality, etc. There are not many who consider these aspects of transition, you always talk about technology, but you do not talk much about the wider conditions that are necessary for implementation.” (Interview, FH, 2020).

The social consequences can be abridged as a dual mindedness on the presuppositions of the green transition. That is, for instance, paying attention to the technological feasibility of converting particular branches toward a more sustainable production, meanwhile the social feasibility (e.g., workforce, popular backing, change of behavior and habits) serves as the presupposition for the former's realization. The new logic of goals was institutionalized in the state, as the electoral outcome of 2019 became a new Climate Act. The 92-Group highlight this as a vital feature of the field's crystallization, as

“(…) you cannot underestimate the importance of the 70-percent emission target, formulating a Climate Act based on tangible aims. By the time we proposed the target [May 2018], many objected that such an aim was inconsequential as it renders the goal of transition to abstract for normal people to grasp – the most important, they said, is to set in motion a political development not to settle on a goal. But the target is important! What succeeded by the instigation of the 70-percent emission target was to induce an indispensable goalpost juridically, and now the politicians start sprawling” (Interview, 92-Group, 2020).

The crystallization of the field settlement around the nationally determined emissions goals (the 70-percent-target), supported by the majority of all three institutions of society, broadly entrenched a new political logic. Albeit the different actors' mean-rationality greatly differs. The target became the new shared meaning of transition politics, even though the means and pace by which the green transition ought to be accomplished became a new point of contention. 'Greenwashing' found its way into my conversations with the field challengers, as they were concerned that it seemed almost impossible to survey and sort the wheat from the chaff when it came to conversion proposals. The old forms of denialism were being translated into the new climatization of green transition. Back in 2007, the struggle of the field logic manifested itself in debates concerning the facts of climate change. Today, (2018-2019) the struggle entails a different climate denialism:

“The new threat of the transition is not the usual Lomborg arguments anymore. There is much debate concerning climate denialism 2.0, which is treacherous nowadays, that is (...) all those who rhetorically acknowledge the challenge and then go back to business-as-usual and dare not put action behind their utterances” (Interview, Greenpeace, 2020).


To put it differently, “pseudo-action” is the new point of contention, as the 70-percent-emissions goal created resonance with most actors from different social sectors which changed or adapted to the new political logic of the field. To the extent all acknowledge conversion in all spheres of society (public and private), the new struggle is to make stakeholders accountable for the rhetorical commitment they present. The interpretive frame by which actors make sense of their endeavor still rests on a tension between cost-effective progression and social sustainability. In other words, the mainstreaming of climate politics crystallized around a new debate, but the struggle and dominating logic remained more or less the same (Lund and Jacobsen 2019).

## 8.5 FOURTH THRESHOLD

In the midst of the “perfect storm” of the electoral campaign, the contours of a new political logic of the transition field are still in a flux of ongoing elaboration. By virtue of the organizational diffusion of climate justice through government policy, the field logic preserved the progress of mainstreaming climate politics, creating a metonymic relationship between the politics of climate change and many social agendas. This progress by no means signifies the

de-politicization of the transition policies, but it allowed a new variety of organizations to participate in contention. The new political logic of the field can be summarized by saying that politicians and societal stakeholders all support society's decarbonization and energy transition. Previous "residual" discussion of the "realness" of climate change has changed to a discussion of the means and haste by which carbon neutrality is attained. As a function of organizational innovation, the diffusion of the political logic of climate justice would not have occurred as it did, if not for the reverberation of climate policy started by the constellation of coalition-building efforts among the challengers.

**Figure 8.1 Field Formation in 2020**



## 9 2020 AND THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE OF THE FIELD OF GREEN TRANSITION POLITICS

In 2019, the field's developmental character amalgamated into new sets of configurations, as the political consolidation of green transition goals were accommodated by a proliferating organizational population. The viability of the organizational expansion are tricky to detect when situated in the middle of the cause of history – this study revealed an emerging reconfiguration that has not yet produced significant external consequences aside from those analyzed in the previous chapters. However, to capture what the future might bring, the investigation ends with a “conjunctural analysis” as an attempt to anticipate what the socio-political dynamics determining the current struggle of the field might lead to.

As revealed at the beginning of this examination, the prevalence of a climate justice logic was detected in the emergence of organization and movement intersection whose central goal was the elaboration of a green and just transition. Such organization includes The Bridge to the Future (Bttf), which defines its mission around the elaboration of “[a] green and fair transition (...) achieving a significant and ambitious positive difference to the climate without marginalizing those who are already at risk or will be at risk due to climate change” (See appendix 4.A). The BttF described itself as a labor-environmental organization. It is an alliance that premises the intersection of the institutionalized agitators of social justice and the modern forms of environmental concerns. Red-green (or blue-green in an American context) alliance is found elsewhere (Robinson 2020), and movement hybridization between organizations representing worker's rights and those focusing on climate changes in different contexts proffer a significant change to the meaning of climate justice. The bridging of such interests was made possible by the ‘mainstreaming’ of climate justice in my study, which, in studying blue-green alliances in California and British Columbia, Robinson (2020, 246) argues “the new politics of climate justice made coalitions possible.” In other words, the movement identity is transforming from being a matter of recognizing some environmental collective identities to becoming a widespread configuration of material interests in green transition. As a consequence, this development leaves the ENGOs at a crossroads; in fact, these labor-environment alignments question the significance of the green NGO-milieu (Berny and Rootes 2018, 943).

In the 2000s, the challengers jockeying for position, marked by professionalized NGOs' well-defined political practice, dominated the legitimate form of advocacy. The position

changed from 2007 through 2019, making NGOs more inclined to coordinate with and diffuse knowledge to grassroots organizations. Popularizing the new coalition demands for a just transition, in the spring of 2020 a joint response called the “Green and Just Restart” (Danish 92 Group 2020) was coordinated by the 92-Group, labor union representatives, and the DCM. Their proposal draws on the reinvigoration of people’s agentic performance and community spirit used by the Danish Government to coordinate a shared but differentiated responsibility to cope with the spread of COVID-19. Drawing the parallel between the public requirements for a justice transition and community spirit during the pandemic, the anchoring of the green conversion of society had to be firmly cemented and sustained by a popular mandate. That is, the transition cannot only be governed by the capacity of formal organizations’ political lobbying or scientific advances, but a deliberative surge of climate assemblies so that “science” does not only speak for itself. To take on the issue of green transition as a ‘both-and,’ in this regard, the public values of green transition and evidence from science need to be integrated when airing grievances. Popularizing a movement’s scientific-backed demands is the first step, but to maintain this

“requires completely different working and organization methods which has more closely shaped the Danish society of the last century, from the cooperative movement to the labor movement (...) [shapes of change] that is not so different from the movement we are in now, because there are NGO’s and movement organizations which effectually have influenced the political elite to commit to the 70-percent-target, but the underpinning enduring changes is exercised by maintaining a popular mandate. It requires not only asking the politicians for legislative action but also engaging with each other in doing something locally and in our everyday life” (Interview, This-is-it campaigner, 2020)

In other words, who (the mandate) do the ENGO-milieu and science act on behalf of when addressing decision-makers, and which concerns underpin their policy recommendations? Retrospectively, the ‘democratization’ of green transition has not been part of the green transition agenda until now (interview KOR 2020). A member of KOR denotes that this dimension of environmentalism has not always been part of the area of priority to the NGOs. Accordingly, as long as the ministry or administration responded to the activities and recommendations of the NGOs, they kept reproducing the necessary meanings for considering their strategy of science-backed policy claims sufficient (KOR interview 2020). Learning from the cultural tradition, the new momentum of green transition led by the civic associations has to embed their advocacy in a popular mandate, to secure a broader coalition of society to request

and instigate public values of transition. The 92-group highlights the coupling of a public demand with policy work as an interest of the future (as the coordinated citizen's initiative was an example of the effortfulness of coalitions). Strategically, the stability of this field logic rests on expanding the efforts of the challengers to invest in developing member-based institutions (as DSNC and Sustainable Energy), so that when demanding or proposing a policy, they speak on behalf of 'real' redistributive interest.

Coalitions such as the BttF's organizational repertoires, which synthesize environmental policy proficiency with the solidarity of the labor movement's deliberative structure, could be the organizational template for the popular mandate to be organizationally stabilized. Overall, when labor movement organizations and green NGOs produce knowledge maintained by the interests of their members, they speak with a different seriousness. Indeed, people and civic associations have different motivations for getting involved in political organizations and coalition-building; thus, broadening the identification with climate change has been imperative. Democratizing green transition through such organizational structures, according to interviewees, cultivates people to strategize and take action locally, utilizing various forms of action around many environmental issues. Deepening and cultivating citizens' ability to consider the green transition as a matter of interest is the organizing potential of the imminent field of green transition politics. That is, how collectives can organize around green transition interest requires that a focusing on recognition (expanding the ways of doing green transition as the goal of politics) of lifestyle politics and redistribution (the justice dimension in socially implementing the green transition) overlap.

## 10 CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to provide a deeper insight into the developmental aspects of how institutional and contentious means of action and organizational repertoires impacted the formation of the field of green transition politics in Denmark. To answer the research question: the field's political logic remains stagnant as to the extent incumbents, ENGOs and the state reproduce climate politics by means of the stable frame of ecological modernization. Despite various new measurements of carbon reduction targets, the techno-functionalistic politics of green growth still dominate the governance of climate transition in 2020. Nonetheless, in mapping the field dynamic, I found evidence suggesting two interconnected components of change. Restructuring the political understanding of what forms of green transition action are institutionally legitimate, the field proliferation commenced as a function of the politicization of climate politics in 2007 in tandem with the coalition-building efforts in 2018. In 2019, after almost two years of unsettlement, the shared meaning at the field-site stabilized around a new consensus of cross-sectional green transition politics (i.e., the 70-percent-target).

From the movements' point of view, the dominant logic still channels the advances of technological and professional agents, but the resurgence of justice in the transition debate has proffered new organizational forms. While the old 'expert-based' paradigm saw fit for jockeying in the field, where only the professionals concretized in special spheres consisting of professional advisors and governance bodies, the new paradigm focuses on the social consequences of transition, foregrounding the popular mandate and concerns of people.

Green transition policy represents the latest frontier in the evolution of Danish environmentalism. Albeit, when the institutional system introduced fossil fuel independence as a genuine area of cross-sectional policy, the field actors proliferated. The Danish Commission on Climate Change from 2007 to 2010 marked the institutional beginning of a change from a variety of discourses around climate change toward a coordinated variation of green transition, ending with the instigation of the Danish Climate Act of 2019. Pushing the 'administrative logic' of climate policy, as I identified in the change of the governmental feasibility of a green transition starting in 2010, altered the struggle of the field from being primary over the realness of climate change and the legitimacy of advocating for a transition, to a contentious fight over the means and logics by which transition was acquired.

Struggle over classification of climate politics and green transition led to a point of contention discarding the initial struggle of the field. The political contest over the salience of



climate policy confined the ENGO-milieu into a less pervasive field position as market and IGUs actors started to possess more power in terms of framing climate policy by appropriating the role of the ENGOs. An important part of the story, then, is the locus of the state and the role professional advocacy organizations played in generating the boundaries of this institutional form of climate policy.

The processes of institutional and market incumbents challenging the position of the ENGOs as experts on climate policy and green innovation implicated the latter's mode of operation and functioning. Changing their ways of doing, the ENGOs and climate grassroots organizations exertion of coalition-building to find common ground was foregrounded. Convergence was made possible by institutional opportunities offered by the tactical innovation of citizen's initiatives, inasmuch as the grassroots organizations' appropriation of the frame of climate justice. The politics of climate justice, supporting a total transition of society while deemphasizing the notion's original focus on the overthrow of capitalism, made the new grassroots organizations (more) isomorphic to the institutional politics of climate change. From being an appropriate term of reference to transgressive grassroots organizations, justice-related aspects of climate politics gradually became part of the common goals of the enterprise. During the electoral upheaval in 2019 the climate justice framing was incorporated into distinctive organizational forms crystallizing into overlapping coalitional communities, with formal interaction among the members of the field around a green and just societal transition. In carrying out interorganizational activities (demonstrating, co-hosting conferences and by coordination of institutional demands), the demands of the movement were adopted by and adapted to the advocacy organization seizing climate change as part of their area of interest.

From being a marginal term to resonate with familiar organizations' mode of action, we are beginning to see the contours of an institutional change in climate politics. Local experience and popular backing as part of mitigation-strategies and climate policy development are unavoidable. The developmental process of the climate field from 2018 shows how the knowledge practice of climate justice (moving from discovery/articulation of ideas in the late-1990s through application/specification in the mobilization of constituents during the Copenhagen climate COP-meeting in 2009) has now attained a certain level of diffusion. A crucial aspect of the further development of the green transition field is to keep bridging the new climate mobilizing structure, accompanying the green environmentalists with an institutional strong labor movement. Balancing between isomorphism (to gain access and

resonate) and expanding the appropriateness of transgressive forms of knowledge, that is, broadening climate politics to entail not only matters of technological development and innovation, but a reorganizing (if only gradual) of popular backing, has been one of the pivotal changes at the field-level in recent years.

The newly adopted 70-percent target was made possible by the innovative combination of classic policy recommendation amplified by a rigorous mobilizing strategy. The Green student movements camped outside the ministries, the professionally driven campaign tried to shift public opinion by pressuring the governmental constituency to sign a climate contract, and the green NGOs and climate movement organizations launched a citizen's initiative to work as the framework foundation of the new Climate Act. Resonating with the green civic associations and recognized by incumbents, this endeavor resulted in new field settlement, but the challenger's new organizational form needs to deepening the popular mandate and social consequences of climate change to maintain the legitimacy of the climate justice logic.

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## 12 APPENDIX

### APPENDIX 1: Interview guide (template)

#### Interviews conducted with Danish-speaking interviewees

Interview #

Date

Location

Organization

To begin with, I am going to ask you some questions about the organization and your place in it, thereafter I am going to ask you some more general question about the development of Danish environmentalism and climate policy.

#### Introduction questions

- How did you end up working with area of interest?
- How would you describe the work area and what does it consist of?

The political practices of the organization (organizational structure). Under what circumstances is the organizing and dissemination of advocacy or protest structured?

- What do you consider to be the most important thing about the work of your organization? That is, in terms of political interest?
- What are your organization's climate policy main topic?
- What was/is the reason your association started working on climate policy?
- What political instruments, such as protest action, lobbying, bridge-building, knowledge-sharing, etc., do you use in your political protection of interests?

Values and goals of the organization (agency). The critical aspects or capability around which protest and advocacy are organized – i.e., how the interviewees contextualize past habits and future projects at the moment.

- How does [inset organization name] understand and position itself in relation to the climate policy debate – how do you think this positioning has evolved?
- Who's working against your agenda?
- In rest years, there are many [civil society organizations/interest organizations] that incorporate the green agenda into their political interest. What do you think is the reason why this development has taken place?
- There are many [civil society organizations/interest organizations] that incorporate the green agenda into their political interest. But has it effected your position that the amount of actors has increased?

- What changes do you think have been the benchmark for the political understanding of green transition? Are there incidents or campaigns where civil society or the institutions have pushed the common perceptions or created political change?
- What does the term “sustainable green transition” mean to you – what areas of action do you think are included in the term?

Their self-understanding of the societal discussion on climate policy (Benford and Snow 2000) and its development (the struggle and stakes). What specific concerns and issues do they articulate and what kind of criticisms do they articulate, and where do they direct it?

- What do you consider to be the biggest challenges in the development of Danish climate and energy policy?
- What do you think has changed in relation to the environmental agenda? Are there any actions in this area or the tone of the debate that have brought about change in the way in which climate policy is developed?
- Think back on the last ten years: what has changed about the way you work on climate policy issues and green transition?
- What is your vision of the future, what are you working on to achieve?



APPENDIX 2: List of organizational interviews conducted by the author

<b>Organization name/ acronym</b>	<b>Description (adapted from website if any)</b>	<b>Number of interviews</b>	<b>Dates</b>
The bridge to the Future (BttF)	Environmental-labor alliance working to ensure a just green transition	1	10 <sup>th</sup> of August 2020
Green Transition Denmark (GTD)	Global NGO carrying out projects to disseminate knowledge about green solutions, capacity building in local authorities, and supporting industries.	1	5 <sup>th</sup> of September 2020
The Danish Climate movement (DCM)	Coalition of climate grassroots in Denmark agitating, campaign, facilitating capacity building of local activism	1	5 <sup>th</sup> of October 2020
The Green Student Movement (DGSB)	Protest organization and community of students who facilitate activism to ensure a fast transition to a low-emission society	1	6 <sup>th</sup> of October
Greenpeace Denmark	Regional campaigning organization, employing confrontational strategies to expose global environmental problems and develop solutions to a green future.	1	27 <sup>th</sup> of August 2020
The Danish Society for Nature Conservation (DSNC)	Incorporated, member-based national NGO. Working to secure and enhance environmental protection and biodiversity in legislation (national and local) and public planning.	1	25 <sup>th</sup> of August
CARE	Global advocacy NGO in green aid and development.	1	9 <sup>th</sup> of September
Sustainable Energy	Membership-based NGO working for a sustainable world. Activities spans from resource management projects to influencing national policy implementation.	1	26 <sup>th</sup> of August 2020
Global Focus	Civil society organization for development cooperation engaging and coordinating development aid, environmental, and humanitarian organizations in Denmark.	1	8 <sup>th</sup> of August 2020
Danish 92 Group (92-Group)	Coalition of Danish NGO's engaging in issues related to environment and development	1	16 <sup>th</sup> of September 2020
The Council on Climate and Green Transition (KOR)	Independent science council publishing papers on multiple issues related to social, political, economic, and administrative shortcomings	1	7 <sup>th</sup> of September 2020
Confederation of Danish Industry (DI)	Business and employers' organization negotiating collective agreements with the labour movement. Legal	1	26 <sup>th</sup> of August 2020
The People's Climate March	A subgroup of the danish Climate Movement, organizing climate protests and demonstrations	1	6 <sup>th</sup> of October

Danish Trade Union Confederation (FH)	Trade union alliance negotiating agreements with the state and employers' organizations. Organization workers' organization in the private and public sector.	1	2 <sup>nd</sup> of September 2020
Danish Agency of Energy	Administrative unit responsible for the policy tasks linked to energy production, supply, consumption, and Danish effort to reduce carbon emissions.	1	2 <sup>nd</sup> of October 2020
"This is It: Render The Election Green"	Time limited campaign conducting protesting, petition-making, and knowledge-sharing activities in the spring of 2019.	2	17 <sup>th</sup> of September
Former World Wildfire Fund advisor (former WWF)	Policy Coordinator at WWF in the 1990s and 2000s. Global conservation organization working to ensure that environmentalism is reflected in decision-making from a local to a global scale.	1	2 <sup>nd</sup> of October 2020

APPENDIX 3: List over documents used in the analysis

<b>Organization of production</b>	<b>Document type/ title</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Count</b>
UNFCCC	Agreements	2009-2015	2
Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities	Acts, legislation, reports	1990 – 2020	5
The Confederation of Danish Industry	Report on Plan of Action in 2030	2019-2020	1
The Council on Climate and Green Transition	Article	2020	1
The Bridge to The Future	Position Paper	2020	1
301 Scientists	Scientists Call for Climate Action'	2018	1
The Green Student Movement	Articles of Association	2019	1
Global Focus and Danish 92 Group	Position paper	2020	1
Sustainable Energy	Strategy Plan	2019	1
NOAH	Anthology	2019	1
Grassroots' Network of Sustainable Transition	Report	2011	1
Danish 92 Group	Articles of Association, Citizen's Initiative	2006	1
Danish Governments	Strategy Paper, Platform,	2007-2015	3
Danish Commission on Climate Change Policy	Report	2010	1
Climate Change Now!	Article	2009	1
Danish Society of Nature Conservation	Article	2018-2019	2
Danish Confederation of Trade unions	Report on Climate Plan of Action in 2030	2020	1
Concito	Annual Climate Outlook	2016	1

## APPENDIX 4: Documents inaccessible online

### A. The Bridge to the Future 2020 (BttF): A green and Just Transition – what is that? (Danish)



#### Broen til fremtiden

Stauings Plads 1-3  
1790 København V.  
Tlf. 25 92 15 67

AL. konto. 5301-476807  
www.broentilfremtiden.dk

## En grøn og retfærdig omstilling – hvad er det?

En grøn og retfærdig omstilling handler om at opnå en markant og ambitiøs positiv forskel for klimaet uden at marginalisere dem, der i forvejen er udsat eller bliver udsat på grund af klimaforandringer.

Foreningerne bag **Broen til fremtiden** mener, at en grøn og retfærdig omstilling indebærer at:

- Danmark som et rigt velfærdssamfund går forrest i omstillingen og viser, at velfærd og grøn omstilling kan gå hånd i hånd.
- Massive investeringer i forskning og bæredygtige løsninger sikrer, at nye grønne tiltag ikke kun erstatter, men også åbner for nye produktionsformer og muligheder til gavn for alle.
- Ændringer på arbejdsmarkedet som følge af omstillingen sikrer, at alle fortsat har adgang til arbejde, velfærd og sundhed.
- Grønne tiltag løbende følges op af efter- og videreuddannelse, sådan at alle opnår de kompetencer omstillingen kræver.
- Forskellige branchers positive potentialer for omstillingen udnyttes og kommer hele samfundet til gavn, så alle kommer med og ingen hægtes af.
- Målsætningen om en 70 pct. CO<sub>2</sub>-reduktion i 2030 og nettonul drivhusgasudledninger senest i 2040 sikres gennem socialt balancerede initiativer.
- Den grønne omstilling i sig selv er et af flere forebyggende initiativer, der medvirker til lige adgang til og vilkår for folkesundheden.

#### Broen til fremtiden er:

Blik & Rør, Danmarks Lærerforening, Dansk Socialrådgiverforening, DM - Dansk Magisterforening, Dansk Musiker Forbund, Dansk Psykolog Forening, Danske Bioanalytikere, Danske Fysioterapeuter, Djøf, ~~Eurokonferencen~~, FOA, FAOD - Forbundet Arkitekter og Designere, Forbundet Kultur og Information, Foreningen af Danske Lægestuderende, GL - Gymnasieskolernes Lærerforening, HK, IDA - Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark, JA - Jordbrugsakademikerne, Kommunikation og Sprog, Kost og Ernæringsforbundet, Lægeforeningen, Merkonomerne, Pharmadanmark, PROSA, PLS, Serviceforbundet, Danmarks Naturfredningsforening, Forskernes Klimanetværk, Greenpeace (Danmark), 350 Klimabevægelsen i Danmark, Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke, NOAH - Friends of the Earth, Så er det nu, Rådet for Grøn Omstilling.

B. Copy of The Green Student Movement's (DGSB) meeting summary May 24<sup>th</sup> 2018 (Danish)

### Noter fra første Manifest-møde d. 24. maj 2018

Vi skal:

- ramme hele det politiske spektrum
- lave en ny fortælling om det gode liv - eller *betingelserne* for det eller det eller de gode liv
- have et kompendium klar med modsvar til kritikere når vi går 'public'
- opridse de nødvendige forandringer der skal til ("vi kræver")
- passe på med at blive for hippie
- komme med et alternativ til vækst: økonomisk ansvarlighed. Evt. redefinering af vækstbegrebet.
  - Demokratisering af energiproduktion?
- Fokuserer på klimaretfærdighed: det er *rimeligt* at Danmark går forrest
- Fremme langsigtet tankegang
- Stille spørgsmålstejn ved, hvad målet er med samfundsudvikling (eks. vækst). Er det at fremme det gode liv?
- tænke *distributivt* og *regenerativt* – måske ikke blot klima?
- Overveje, hvor visionære/generelle og handlingsfordrende/konkrete, vi skal være
  - Det skal være generelt nok til at mange kan identificere sig med det, men konkret nok til at det har 'bid'