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Master of Science in International Development and Management

# Reclaiming History to Rebuild the Present

A qualitative case study of stakeholder perceptions on reparations for  
slavery as a development strategy in Jamaica

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## Abstract

In 2014, Caribbean countries declared to claim reparations for slavery from former colonising states. A Reparative Justice Framework covering ten points of action formulated reparations as a regional development strategy, widening stakeholders to include development actors and focalising beneficiaries to those disproportionately suffering from post-slavery legacies.

Jamaica is signatory to the claim, and a regional precursor for reparations activism on multiple levels, including by Rastafarians and other local advocates. However, a complex post-colonial history, including discrimination of Rastafarians, seemingly impedes multi-stakeholder national endorsement. Yet, public mobilisation is a priority to forward the case.

This qualitative case study fills a scholarly gap in the case-specific research by investigating broad stakeholder perceptions in Jamaica to identify and explain areas of contestation impacting on public endorsement of reparations conceived as a development strategy. Thematic analysis of empirical data from interviews and focus group discussions distinguished three loci: diverging development conceptualisations, redistribution and representation. Findings were analysed using Honneth's critical theory of recognition, framing recognition as a central concept to comprehend emergent contradictions and complexities. The analysis suggests that historically originated but unresolved frictions, manifested through a system of inadequate institutions, entail multidimensional recognitive denial which ultimately hamper global, cross-sectoral support.

*Key words: reparations, slavery, CARICOM, Jamaica, Rastafari, Honneth, recognition.*

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*What men want and what they will*

*Working for a dollar bill*

*Sad to see the old slave mill*

*Is grinding slow, but grinding still*

*Walking home, a child gets killed*

*Police free to shoot at will*

*Hurts to see the old slave mill*

*Is grinding slow, but grinding still*

Excerpt from the lyrics of "Slave Mill", Damien Marley Damian Marley / Sean Diedrick /  
Stephen Marley / Stephen McGregor, ©Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC, Suelion Music.

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# Acronyms and abbreviations

CARICOM	The Caribbean Community and Common Market
CERD	UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CG	Coral Gardens (massacre)
CRC	CARICOM Reparations Commission
CRR	Centre for Reparation Research
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HR	Human Rights
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JLP	Jamaica Labour Party
JNBC	Jamaica National Bicentenary Committee
JNCR	Jamaica's National Commission on Reparations
NCR	Jamaica's National Council on Reparation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OHCHR	The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PIOJ	Planning Institute of Jamaica
PNP	People's National Party
RCC	CARICOM Regional Cultural Committee
ToR	Theory of Recognition
TPP	The CARICOM Ten Point Action Plan for Reparatory Justice
TTA	Transatlantic Trade in Africans
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNIA	Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League
US	United States of America
UWI	University of the West Indies

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Overview

In 2014, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM<sup>1</sup>) announced a Reparatory Justice Framework, including a ten point plan demanding symbolic and economic compensation from European nations<sup>2</sup> for the acts and consequences of slavery, colonialism and native genocide, the legacies of which they asserted had stunted the Caribbean countries' development (Rauhut, 2018a:137). The initiative was presented as a regional development strategy, outlining ten general points of action to remedy post-slavery development challenges<sup>3</sup>.

Jamaica is among the signatory countries and its high-level reparations activism was imperative to the regional endorsement. The intense exploitation suffered during slavery rendered Jamaica the most economically profitable colony in the British Empire (Reid, 2016). The ensuing colonialism maintained the racially and socioeconomically structured society as an import-dependent plantation economy (Beckford, 1972:210). Following independence in 1962, the residual 'colonial mess'<sup>4</sup> and foreign financial interferences allegedly laid the foundations of a national debt (Beckles, 2013; Girvan, 2012) that in 2017 amounted

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<sup>1</sup>CARICOM, the Caribbean Community and Common Market, is a supranational, economic and political organisation promoting regional integration. It consists of 15 member states and five associate members. Jamaica is a member since 1973 (CARICOM, n.d.). The claim is predominantly propagated by the Commonwealth Caribbean (Rauhut, 2018a).

<sup>2</sup>Including the United Kingdom (UK), France, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal and Denmark. For the Commonwealth Caribbean, including Jamaica, the UK is the main target country.

<sup>3</sup>See Appendix A: The CARICOM Ten Point Action Plan for Reparatory Justice (TPP).

<sup>4</sup>This expression is often employed within the debate, notably by one of the most prominent reparations advocates, Sir Hilary Beckles (cf. *Jamaica Observer*, 2018).

## 1.2 Purpose and research problem

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to 117.8 % of GDP (Cia.gov, 2018), further debilitating development efforts.

Since the 1990s, reparations were increasingly embraced in official spheres. Lobbying by a multi-stakeholder national movement contributed to changing the government's position, establishing the regions first reparations commission in 2009. Today, several high-level politicians promote reparations and new organisations have been founded to further the case (Morris, 2017). Domestic focus lies on public advocacy and sensitisation to unite and mobilise Jamaicans, particularly targeting youth. However, colour- and class-based social stratification and rigid institutional infrastructures, including the emergent post-independence political system, allegedly perpetuate pre-independence power dynamics which continue to fuel violence and poverty (Thomas, 2011). This, in addition to poor transparency and accountability, has generated mistrust against the government and its agencies, complicating public endorsement of the reparations claim. Its conceptualisation as a development strategy further probes its apprehended viability among development professionals.

Additionally, Rastafarians, since their formation in the 1930s, have persistently demanded reparations and repatriation to Africa (Chevannes, 1990). However, their pan-Africanism and anti-colonialism were shunned in the colonial and post-colonial state, where Rastafarians suffered persecution and structural discrimination (King, 1999; Thomas, forthcoming). In addition to citizens and development actors, Rastafarians are therefore acknowledged stakeholders (Rauhut, 2018a) since an international appeal to principles of historical and social justice also redirects attention to the domestic adherence and processes of internal reparative justice (Thomas, 2011:222-223).

## 1.2 Purpose and research problem

The claim's conceptualisation as a development strategy widens stakeholder groups to include not only beneficiaries, but also actors involved in development conceptualisation and implementation. Notwithstanding, many stakeholder views are missing from the scholarly

debate.

This is salient since the reparations movement prioritises public advocacy to ascertain public support while elaborating the strategy's operationalisation. Assuming that multi-sectoral endorsement of and inclusion in the process are crucial for its successful evolution, perceptions on the claim among those hypothetically concerned by such a strategy are essential to consider. Unified public endorsement is further important for strengthening the claim's perceived legitimacy internationally.

This case study seeks to contribute to research on the claim and its future elaboration in Jamaica, by providing a preliminary overview of some stakeholder perceptions regarding reparations as a development strategy<sup>5</sup>. The aim is to identify and explore cross-sectoral categories of contestation<sup>6</sup> and to illuminate internal aspects of the debate, which might intensify as the government-endorsed claim progresses and which, if left unaddressed, risk to be detrimental to national and international support.

The research question guiding this endeavour is:

*To what extent can stakeholder perceptions of the reparations claim, conceptualised as a development strategy in Jamaica, illuminate local concerns relevant to its public endorsement and successful progression?*

## 1.3 Delimitation and rationale

This study does not provide a historiographic account of slavery, colonialism or post-colonialism in Jamaica or the Caribbean, nor an ethnography of the Rastafari community. Neither will it enumerate the multidisciplinary dimensions of reparations in general or for

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<sup>5</sup>For a detailed list of consulted informants, see Appendix B: List of informants and attended events. For included stakeholder groups, see section 5.3: Note on stakeholders.

<sup>6</sup>The premonition of hypothesised contradictions surmised through professional experience and informal exchanges in Jamaica, and awoke an interest in the research topic. However, it did not constitute a research hypothesis. See section 5.6: Data analysis.

slavery or colonialism in particular. Extensive literature already covers these topics and over a broad geographical scope<sup>7</sup>.

The study does not attempt to evaluate or determine the legal, economic or even moral case of the claim. These and historical aspects have already been investigated by others<sup>8</sup>. Despite the transnational nature of reparations (Rauhut, 2018b), this case study is delineated to Jamaica.

The study is timely since a clarification of socio-ethical foundations is essential at the inception stage of the case<sup>9</sup>. The application of recognition theory constitutes a novel contribution to case-specific research, since focalising on driving forces of interaction between societal agents to understand philosophical-sociological underpinnings and implications of the international appeal on a domestic level. Despite the theory's normative aspirations, this study does not propose an ethical judgement. Rather, it maps prevailing discourses and point to loci which could benefit from additional analysis for the purpose of consolidating diverging groups in their common interest of reparations and development.

## 1.4 Thesis outline

The thesis has seven sections. A background section contextualises and describes the national and regional development of the reparations claim. Particular attention is given to the Rastafari movement. This is followed by a literature review focusing on reparations for

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<sup>7</sup>A vast array within the reparations literature concern contemporary conflicts and transitional justice processes, e.g. in post-war Europe, particularly reparations for the Holocaust (Ludi 2012; Torpey, 2000), and in South America and South Africa (de Greiff, 2006; Elster, 2006). General works include de Greiff (2006) who gathers elaborations and implementations of reparations programmes, focusing on forms of material compensation; Wolfe (2014), who traces the evolution of reparations politics in view of international criminal law, while Torpey (2003, 2006, 2015) focuses on global reparations politics from a sociological perspective. Reparations for colonialism have been covered i.a. by scholars writing on claims issued by ethnic minorities and indigenous people (cf. Tsosie, 2007; Thompson, 2007). For selected works on reparations for slavery, see 3: Literature review.

<sup>8</sup>See section 3: Literature review.

<sup>9</sup>So much more when, as Thomas points out, “[...] the space of international law, and the sense of international morality that supposedly grounds it, is always already *interested*” (2011:225, author's emphasis).

## 1.4 Thesis outline

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slavery and case-specific research. The fourth section describes the theory of recognition inspiring the conceptual foundation of the analysis. The methodology is presented in section five, including limitations and reflections of ethical concern. The sixth part analyses the identified categories of contestation. Part seven discusses and concludes the analysis, and suggests approaches for further research.

## 2 Background

This section situates the contemporary reparations movement in Jamaica within global, regional and local contexts. It contains key elements regarding the national movement's emergence and development, including main challenges and Rastafari's relevance to the struggle. Finally, it outlines the regional endorsement and present claim.

### 2.1 Situating the (hi)story and presenting the case

The transatlantic trade in Africans (TTA) and the institutionalised slavery in the Caribbean was the foremost industry enabling the historic and contemporary economic prosperity and industrialised development of colonising European countries and elites in Northern America (Williams, 1944; Shepherd et al., 2012; Beckles, 2013; Wittman, 2013; Rauhut, 2018b). Though relatively recent, its temporal and geographical scope, cruelty, calculated systematisation, commodification of humans and denigration of human dignity, are unprecedented<sup>10</sup>. Resistance and demands for reparations and repatriation perforated the slavery era (Aruajo, 2017), including in Jamaica (Sherlock & Bennett, 1998:133-151; Hutton, 2015)<sup>11</sup>, and have since been voiced by victims and their descendants in colonial

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<sup>10</sup>The TTA lasted between 1441 and 1852 when Brazil as last enslaving nation declared the trade illegal, although slavery continued in many countries after having abolished the trade. Estimates of how many were trafficked, or died in Africa and during the middle passage, from suicide, plantation labour, torture, punishments or other terrors of slavery, are various and contested (Shepherd et al., 2012:1). An expert-authored report suggests over 210 million Africans died during the slavery era (UNESCO, 1979). For an overview of the history of slavery, see the documentary series *Les Routes de l'Esclavage* (2017).

<sup>11</sup>In particular, Maroon communities, formed by escaped enslaved Africans, organised violent attacks on plantations. Their success was sealed in the 1739 treaties, granting the Maroons semi-autonomy provided



## 2.1 Situating the (hi)story and presenting the case

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and post-colonial countries (Aruajo, 2017; Rauhut, 2018a:139).

No official apology or reparations have ever been issued, whereas many have declared it among the worst crimes ever committed against humanity (Shepherd et al., 2012; Wittman, 2013; Beckles, 2013; Aruajo, 2017; Goffe, 2012).

Despite the economic prosperity generated for the British Crown 1655-1962, independent Jamaica faced high levels of illiteracy, unemployment, underdeveloped infrastructure and stark socio-economic inequalities (Sherlock & Bennett, 1998:376, Shepherd et al., 2012; Beckles, 2013)<sup>12</sup>. Today's Caribbean countries must "confront the legacies of centuries of slavery, colonial dominance, economic exploitation, and racial-cultural categorization of its population" (Rauhut, 2018b:135), whose persistent debilitating effects include the "deeply ingrained [...] patterns of a colonial thought and reinforced social inequalities along the lines of race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, and religion" (ibid.). That legacies of slavery and colonialism have caused and continuously reproduce current 'underdevelopment' of Caribbean countries is the fundamental argument of the reparations movement.

During the 20th century, reparations advocacy groups rebounded, especially in the US alongside the civil rights movement<sup>13</sup> (Beckles, 2013; Aruajo, 2017:3). Holocaust reparations are considered a precedent, since these were state-issued on behalf of previous governments to an entire people (i.e. not the victims or direct descendants) for a crime against humanity (Gifford, 2000; Shepherd et al., 2012; Beckles, 2013). Reparations issued for colonial-historical injustices against ethnic minorities, notably by the UK, also fuelled the Caribbean claim (Rauhut, 2018a:141)<sup>14</sup>.

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attacks ceased, and future runaways were returned. For an overview of the African-Jamaican liberation wars 1650-1800, see Sherlock & Bennett (1998:133-151). For later resistance, see Hutton (2015) on the uprising in Morant Bay in 1865.

<sup>12</sup>The limited scope of this study prevents an in-depth, historical elaboration on the impact of slavery and colonial rule in Jamaica and the Caribbean. Other scholars and authors have written extensively on these topics. See e.g. Beckles (2013, 2016), Beckles and Shepherd (1991) and Thomas (2011).

<sup>13</sup>Afro-American reparations movements work in close connection with their Caribbean counterparts (Rauhut, 2018a:139-140).

<sup>14</sup>The UK has issued apologies for genocide and mass atrocities to groups of indigenous people, e.g. the Maori in New Zealand (Beckles, 2013:12), and to the Mau Mau in Kenya (Elkins, 2013). This has led some

## 2.1 Situating the (hi)story and presenting the case

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From the 1990s, slavery reparations received increasing international attention<sup>15</sup>, culminating in the UN World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR) in Durban in 2001 (ibid.). Its final declaration was an important hallmark in the reparations struggle, since it pioneered intergovernmental acknowledgement of the persistent legacies of slavery and colonialism, and their disproportionate contemporary impact on persons of African descent (Rauhut, 2018a:137). However, a Western-controlled consortium of mainly upper-income countries<sup>16</sup> allegedly tried to block reparations off the agenda (Shepherd et al. 2012; Beckles, 2013:172-193). While Caribbean delegations' insistence preserved the item (Beckles, 2013:191), several African states hesitated to endorse it, following purported threats of decreased aid<sup>17</sup>.

Western pressures hollowed the declaration formulation (Beckles, 2013:189-193), contending that slavery is “a crime against humanity, and *should* always have been so” (WCAR, 2001:§13, author's italics), securing ex-colonisers from reparations obligations. Yet, WCAR boosted the transnational momentum for slavery reparations, oxygenating discourses on the multidimensional legacies of the mass terror of slavery and colonialism (Shepherd et al., 2012:xiv; Beckles, 2013:172-193; Rauhut, 2018b). In 2015, the United Nations (UN) launched the International Decade for People of African Descent, with the theme “Recognition, Justice and Development”, integrating the Durban declaration (UN General Assembly, 2014).

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Caribbean advocates to imply that only African people have been denied redress (Beckles, 2013; Shepherd et al., 2012). CARICOM is considering engaging the same British legal firm who brought the Mau Mau case (RCC, 2018a).

<sup>15</sup>For example, the First Pan-African Congress on Reparations for African Enslavement, Colonisation, and Neo-colonisation was held in Abuja, Nigeria in 1993 (Rauhut, 2018b:145).

<sup>16</sup>Including the European Union, Australia, Canada and Japan.

<sup>17</sup>Interview with Sydney Bartley, Consultant to CARICOM's Reparations Commission. See Appendix B.1 for a detailed list of informants.

## 2.2 Calls for reparations in Jamaica: Marcus Garvey and Rastafari

Rastafarians are important stakeholders in the official reparations movement, since they persistently petitioned for reparations, defended black pride and accentuated their African heritage to restore black minds from the ‘mental slavery’ imposed by white rulers. Also during post-independence, Rastafari was central to “exorcis[ing]” the “ideology of racism” (Chevannes, 1990:60). Rastafari emerged in the 1930s as a religious-cultural ‘antisystemic’ group who opposed the Eurocentric colonial oppression (Price, 2003). This can be traced to Marcus Garvey, pan-Africanist, anti-colonialist and founder of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA)<sup>18</sup> who urged people of African descent to unite and promoted repatriation to Africa (Chevannes, 1990:66-68)<sup>19</sup>. In 1927, Garvey exhorted Africans to “look to the east for the crowning of a black king” (Barrett, 1977:81). Rastafarians came to believe the coronation of Hailie Selassie I (born Ras Tafari) in 1930, was a confirmation of Garvey’s “prophecy” (Chevannes, 1990:67). Selassie was the returned Messiah who would save Africans from their oppressors. Rastafarians’ ideological anti-colonial resistance took i.a. cultural, religious and political form<sup>20</sup>. Their goal remains to free African descendants from persisting legacies of slavery (Prophet Greg, 2017<sup>21</sup>). Initially inspired by Garvey’s ‘back-to-Africa’ programme, reparations through repatriation were always on Rastafarians’ agenda (Chevannes, 1990:68-69), and some have repatriated<sup>22</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup>The full name is the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League.

<sup>19</sup>Marcus Garvey is today considered a National Hero in Jamaica.

<sup>20</sup>For an in-depth anthropological account of the origins and belief systems of Rastafari, see especially Chevannes (1994), *Rastafari: Roots and Ideology*.

<sup>21</sup>This text is not an academic or peer-reviewed text, but was authored and edited by Prophet Greg, general secretary of the Ethio-Africa Diaspora Union Millenium Council (EADUMC) and informant in this study.

<sup>22</sup>Migration to Africa began much earlier. When Hailie Selassie accorded land to Rastafarians who wished to return (and supported his rule), many migrated ‘home’ to Ethiopia and places like Shashemene where they, ironically, also have experienced marginalisation due to Ethiopian views of them as immigrants from the West (MacLeod, 2014:246-247).

Proclaiming Afro-centrism, black superiority and an alternative religion in a Christian and white minority-ruled society subjected Rastafarians to structural discrimination by colonial and later post-colonial authorities (Price, 2003). Their use of cannabis, or ganja, was demonised and Rastafarians were denied land, civil and social rights, education and employment. Their refusal to assume Jamaican nationality increased tensions around independence, when national unity was essential for the post-colonial government (Thomas, forthcoming). In 1963, a land dispute between a Rastafarian and a land owner resulted in the Coral Gardens massacre, killing several Rastafarians and triggering a persevering demonisation. Hundreds were jailed and tortured (ibid.).

In the 1950s and 1960s, Rastafari political activity intensified (Chevannes, 1990:68-70), and Rastafarians undertook missions to Africa to investigate possibilities for repatriation<sup>23</sup>. In 1964, the Rastafari delivered their first reparations petition to the British Queen, still Head of State of independent Jamaica<sup>24</sup>. In 2002, another petition was delivered. Coincidentally, a Rastafarian attorney ventured to sue the Queen<sup>25</sup> for reparations (*Price of Memory*, 2014). None of these efforts gave long-term results.

As Rastafari receive increased international acknowledgement through Bob Marley and reggae in the 1970s, Jamaica eventually incorporated Rastafari into its national narrative. While this enhanced the Rastafari cultural identity, it did not entail true legitimacy since unaccompanied by policy changes. Their Afro-centrist ideology remained repressed (King, 1999). Conversely, the formal acknowledgement allegedly hid a widespread co-optation of the internationally recognised and profitable elements of the Rasta 'brand', especially ganja and reggae (ibid.).

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<sup>23</sup>In 1961, the government exceptionally funded a Rastafari mission to Africa. In 1963, Rastafarians personally funded a second mission (*Price of Memory*, 2014).

<sup>24</sup>The answer to the petition came through the Queen's representative in Jamaica, the Governor General, saying that "general instructions" would be forwarded to the government. Of this, nothing was passed on to the Rastafarians (*Price of Memory*, 2014).

<sup>25</sup>The plea was dismissed in 2003, since "it is [...] law that the Queen cannot ordinarily be named as a defendant or respondent in an action, the reason being that the courts are the Queen's courts, and she cannot be answerable in her own court [...]" (Michael Lorne in *Price of Memory*, 2014).

## 2.3 Emergence of a national movement

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Today's Rastafari community in Jamaica consists of several mansions, but has somewhat lost their political impetus<sup>26</sup>. While sharing the basic creeds (Selassie is 'God on Earth', the superiority of Rastafarians and black people, and repatriation) internal divisions exist and several centralisation efforts have failed, undermining the community's negotiation power. To rehabilitate this situation, the Ethio-Africa Diaspora Union Millennium Council (EADUMC) was founded in 2007 to "promote, protect and preserve the sacred legacy of the Rastafari Indigenous Culture worldwide" (EADUMC, 2012). As a legally registered entity, it asserts a mandate to represent a dozen signatory mansions.

## 2.3 Emergence of a national movement

Aside from Rastafari, individual Jamaican high-level reparations advocates had since the early 1990s promoted reparations nationally and internationally (Beckles, 2013; Rauhut, 2018b)<sup>27</sup>.

Post-Durban, the Jamaica Reparation Movement (JaRM) was founded in 2002 by a Rastafari activist. Open to non-Rastafarians, it united Rastafarians, the UNIA, educational institutions, politicians, artists and private individuals (Rauhut, 2018b). They synthesised objectives and action plans, and lobbied the government, the Rastafari community, researchers and professionals to further the cause. This work was crucial in elaborating the Jamaican case (Shepherd et al., 2012:98-105).

In 2005, the government launched the Jamaica National Bicentenary Committee (JNBC) to prepare the Abolition bicentenary in 2007, during which public debates were organised in Jamaica and overseas (Shepherd et al., 2012:vii). In 2009, as region pioneers,

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<sup>26</sup>Though a Rastafari political party exist, informants stated it did not exert particular influence.

<sup>27</sup>These include Dudley Thompson (Jamaican diplomat), Mike Henry (Member of Parliament), Lord Anthony Gifford (attorney, Member of Parliament and of the British House of Lords). Jamaica was represented at both the Durban and Abuja conferences. In Abuja, Lord Gifford first presented his often referred to document summarising the legal basis for reparations for slavery in international law (cf. Gifford, 2000).

## 2.4 Linking reparations to regional development

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Jamaica’s National Commission on Reparations (JNCR) was established, which in 2016 was renamed the National Council on Reparation (NCR). The NCR counts several Rastafari members (*Jamaica Observer*, 2016), and one NCR subcommittee considers internal reparations.

## 2.4 Linking reparations to regional development

In 2013, CARICOM governments expressed “unanimous support” for pursuing reparations, mandating a CARICOM Reparations Commission (CRC) to elaborate the case (CARICOM Regional Cultural Committee [RCC], 2018a)<sup>28</sup>. Led by Hilary Beckles<sup>29</sup>, it includes chairpersons of the 12 national reparations committees<sup>30</sup> (*ibid.*) established predominantly in the Anglophone Caribbean (Rauhut, 2018a).

In 2014, CARICOM adopted a “Reparatory Justice Framework”, a ten point action plan (henceforth TPP), elaborated by the CRC (Leigh Day, 2014)<sup>31</sup>. The plan outlines regional-wide development challenges, and conceptualises reparations as investments in areas of education, culture, health, work and integration, demanding a formal apology, debt cancellation, and technology transfer. Repatriation is included on the list<sup>32</sup>.

Between 2015 and 2017, the CRC initiated communications regarding reparations with former colonising nations (RCC, 2018a). In 2017, the Centre for Reparation Research

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<sup>28</sup>The mandate of the CRC included to “establish the moral, ethical and legal case for the payment of Reparations by the Governments of all the former colonial powers and the relevant institutions of those countries, to the nations and people of the Caribbean Community for the Crimes against Humanity of Native Genocide, the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and a racialised system of chattel Slavery” (RCC, 2018a).

<sup>29</sup>Sir Hilary McD. Beckles is professor in economic history and leading reparations advocate. He is vice-chancellor of the University of the West Indies (UWI), and author of one of the most referred case-specific publications, entitled *Britain’s Black Debt: Reparations for Caribbean Slavery and Native Genocide* (2013).

<sup>30</sup>To date, only nine are active (RCC, 2018a).

<sup>31</sup>Whereas the TPP is a regional strategy, the outlined development challenges are common to all signatory countries, including Jamaica. Administrations of both dominating political parties in Jamaica, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP), have embraced the claim. Additionally, as Jamaica is active in its pursuit and elaboration, it is assumed relevant for future national development in Jamaica. The TPP will therefore henceforth be referred to in this interpretation.

<sup>32</sup>See Appendix A: The CARICOM Ten Point Action Plan (TPP).

## 2.4 Linking reparations to regional development

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(CRR) directed by Verene Shepherd<sup>33</sup> was launched at the University of the West Indies (UWI) in Jamaica, to support the regional movement and lead the implementation of the TPP (UWI, 2017). The reparations movement continuously lobbies the governments to prioritise reparations to not lose momentum (RCC, 2018a).

CARICOM's claim spurred worldwide support, from human rights activists to foreign governments (Venezuela, Cuba), international organisations and conferences<sup>34</sup>, oxygenating global reparations discourses and movements in both academic and political arenas (Rauhut, 2018a:140).

The official response from the West, particularly the UK, has been “no apology, no reparations” (Beckles, 2013:194)<sup>35</sup>. While expressing ‘regret’, slavery and its legacies are relegated to the past<sup>36</sup>, arguing that since slavery was not criminal at the time it cannot be judged according to contemporary international law (Shepherd et al., 2012:xiii; Beckles, 2013:195-196; Wittman, 2013)<sup>37</sup>. Instead, Britain's official narrative emphasises their role in abolition (Shepherd et al., 2012:xv; Rauhut, 2018a:141-142)<sup>38</sup>, exhorting the claimants

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<sup>33</sup>Shepherd is professor in history, Co-Chair and former Chairperson of the NCR. Alongside Hilary Beckles, she is a prominent reparations advocates, having served on multiple missions as expert within the UN.

<sup>34</sup>Including from the Eighth Meeting of the Pan-African Congress, 2014; the Fourth Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), 2016; reparations movements in the US; and the International Reparations Summit in New York, 2015 launching a National African American Reparations Commission (NAARC) (RCC, 2018a). Regional support has also been manifested through the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) (Rauhut, 2018a:140).

<sup>35</sup>Shepherd et al. argue that this is because formal apologies legally entail reparations (2012:xiv).

<sup>36</sup>At the end of slavery in the Caribbean, former enslavers received the equivalent of 11.6 billion British pounds (in 2010 currency) in compensation for their loss of ‘property’ while the enslaved were refused any compensation (Franklin, 2013:365). Ironically, despite Britain's persistence in disconnecting the past from the present, on 9 February 2018, its Treasury Department tweeted: “Here's today's surprising #FridayFact. Millions of you helped end the slave trade through your taxes” and below; “Did you know? In 1833, Britain used £20 million, 40% of its national budget, to buy freedom for all slaves in the Empire. The amount of money borrowed for the Slavery Abolition Act was so large that it wasn't paid off until 2015. Which means that living British citizens helped pay to end the slave trade” (Olusoga, 2018).

<sup>37</sup>Wittman argues that the transatlantic trade in Africans at its instigation was illegal and that slavery had since long been abolished within the colonising countries (2012).

<sup>38</sup>Britain has been criticised for its self-apologetic stance, as the British narrative has upheld their moral superiority in abolishing slavery, negating the active resistance of the enslaved (Rauhut, 2018a:141-142; Beckles, 2013:194-210). This is still done in contemporary debate (cf. Wenar in Warburton & Edmond, 2016).

## 2.4 Linking reparations to regional development

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to “move on” (Mason, 2015).

Having contextualised the empirical-practical dimensions of the reparations movement, the following section explores literature relevant to this study.



## 3 Literature review

This section introduces the notion of reparations before providing a brief account of relevant literature on reparations for slavery and colonialism. Finally, it discusses multidisciplinary sources on the Caribbean claim and Jamaican case, identifies existing gaps and situates the present study.

### 3.1 The reparations concept

To explain reparations is to disentangle a complex notion, especially when employed in relation to international justice and human rights (HR). Reparations are often considered one among complementary approaches within transitional justice, which concerns how post-conflict countries “address large scale or systematic human rights violations so numerous and so serious that the normal justice system will not be able to provide an adequate response” (International Center for Transitional Justice [ICTJ], 2018). However, reparations are particularly important since providing victims with a direct “tangible manifestation” of remedy for and recognition of the injustices committed against them (de Greiff, 2007:153). Conceptually, reparations are means to perform reparative justice to make amends for past wrongs (Aruajo, 2017:2). They can take various forms, e.g. symbolic, financial or material, since such “wrongs” may include physical, psychic, material, political, cultural and moral harm committed against an individual, group or nation (ibid.). Generally, reparations shall entail redress, reconciliation and rebuilding of a groups physical, psychological and socio-cultural wellbeing (ICTJ, 2018).

## 3.2 Reparations for slavery and colonialism

The historical, transnational and transdisciplinary nature of reparations for slavery has inspired a vast literature on its manifold dimensions and with a broad geographical scope. Many have focused on the Americas (Aruajo, 2017) and African-American reparations (Winbush, 2003; Brooks, 2004; Henry; 2007; Coates, 2014).

### 3.2.1 General research

Iconic Caribbean scholars have long investigated aspects relevant to today's movement. Williams (1944) economic-historiographic exposé *Capitalism and Slavery* advanced the thesis that slavery was intrinsically connected to European hegemony in the world economy, since the European-controlled slavery provided the basis for modern capitalism and Western industrialisation. Rodney (1972) furthered this argument, exploring the relation between capitalism, colonisation and resource extraction, and its connection to the developmental state in African countries. Psychiatrist and philosopher Fanon, while pointing to the wealth “stolen” by Europe (2002:99-100), primarily investigated psycho-social effects in colonial and post-colonial states, arguing for pan-African redress, solidarity and advancement (2008).

The historical approach is naturally common in literature on reparations for slavery and colonialism, but scholarly attention has also been lavished on legal aspects often considering how and why reparations can and should be obtained, especially from the perspective of international criminal and HR law (Brennan & Packer, 2012; Wittman, 2013). Accounts on beneficiaries' perceptions on reparations have been registered post-reparations (Danieli, 2007), and thus not regarding reparations for slavery.

The moral-philosophical, political and institutional dimensions of reparations are often interlaced in aforementioned works, but have been more explicitly connected in interdisciplinary publications focusing on historical and global justice, including slavery reparations (Posner & Vermeule, 2003; Torpey, 2003, 2006; Miller & Kumar, 2007; Dixon, 2015; Neu-

mann & Thompson, 2015a). The underlying rationale of reparations for slavery connect to the persistent discrimination of persons of African descent, and discussions on the normative foundations of reparations have investigated the correlation between past injustices and contemporary social justice (cf. Barkan, 2007; Coates, 2014; Thompson, 2015) and political motivations (Torpey, 2006, 2015). Butt (2015) and Tan (2007) agree on the moral justification of reparations and that formal acknowledgement is crucial, as is the reparative responsibility of former colonisers, though appropriate forms of such reparations are less apparent. Amidst the theoretical and moral-philosophical discussions, Posner and Vermeule caution that arguments perfused by “abstractions about justice and injustice” (2003:747) might distort the normative debate, which must reconnect to actual institutional infrastructures which often delimit reparations design and operationalisation.

### 3.2.2 Case-specific research

While the general content of these publications is conceptually applicable to the CARICOM claim, the specific literature is predominantly historiographic, adopting economic or legal approaches to justify the case. Beckles (2013) details how slavery and the TTA enabled British industrialism to the detriment of Caribbean economic and social development<sup>39</sup>. He presents legal, economic and political evidence supporting the case, including a description of the movement’s evolution and resistance from Western hegemonic interests. The Jamaican case for reparations has also been considered from a historical-economic perspective, especially in works led by Shepherd (cf. Shepherd et al., 2012).

The legalist-rights based approach has been adopted by Gifford (2000, 2012), Wittman (2012, 2013) and Goffe (2012). Competing accounts include Buser (2017) who questions the claim’s legal validity, while asserting this results from historically inherent imperialism within international law.

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<sup>39</sup>For recent contributions on the topic of Western capitalism through slavery and colonialism, though not directly linked to reparations, see e.g. Inikori and Engerman (1992) and Inikori (2002, 2017).

### 3.2 Reparations for slavery and colonialism

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Also adopting an international law perspective, Strecker (2016, 2017) accentuates the paradox of including indigenous land rights in the Caribbean claim, while not addressing post-colonial land appropriation and contemporary indigenous rights<sup>40</sup>. She concludes that while European governments must acknowledge their past, current Caribbean governments are responsible for discontinuing ongoing legacies of colonialism (2017:646).

Though historical, legal and economic considerations are crucial to build the case, fewer studies have been dedicated to contemporary sociological dimensions. Thomas, in her socio-anthropological work, employs interdisciplinary approaches to explore post-imperialist community building and subjectivity formation in Jamaica, investigating multiple dimensions of the post-colonial history and contemporaneity of violence and oppression (2011, 2013, 2016, forthcoming). Her co-directed documentary *Bad Friday: Rastafari After Coral Gardens* (2011) lifts Rastafarians' perspectives on the 'incident', breaking the silence and revealing the epistemological violence which thus far enclosed the issue in official narratives<sup>41</sup>. She further connects the psycho-social and political dynamics to the emerging reparations movement (2011:221-238; forthcoming). The historically and socially embedded complexities of Jamaican society leads her to pose a critical view on conventional ideas for social appeasement and justice. While Meeks (2007) proposes a truth-telling commission to achieve reconciliation, Thomas argues this would risk silencing unwanted dimensions of the national narrative, and not address the underlying power structures perpetuating inequalities. Instead, transformational reparations require constant and multi-perspectival expressions of historical witnessing that also englobe the present. She suggests that “[r]eparations is *the* framework through which we must view contemporary inequalities”, rather than a tool to merely address past injustices (Thomas, 2011:238).

Rauhut (2018a, 2018b) has written about transregional practices of activism for slav-

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<sup>40</sup>See Appendix A, point 3.

<sup>41</sup>The Coral Gardens massacre is considered an apogee of the political oppression of Rastafari. In Thomas' documentary, it constitutes the point of departure around which the discrimination and marginalisation of Rastafari is discussed including from a Rastafarian perspective.

### 3.2 Reparations for slavery and colonialism

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ery reparations, and has also focused on the case of Jamaica. Tracing the Caribbean claim’s history and development, she presents empirical data on its relevance and validity while inserting the movement into a wider, global context, emphasising its transnational character. Rauhut explores the claim as a struggle for reversed agency in the Western-dominated politicised space of development (2018a). She asserts the case is embraced not only by “community activists, human rights advocates, Rastafari people, or academics” but also by high-level politicians, states and international organisations. Other unique features include the breadth of the allegations and the various types and levels of addressees (ibid.:140-141). She also emphasises the inclusion of Rastafarians in the government-led claim as a result of their role in the reparations struggle, supporting her arguments based on interviews with members of the JNCR, today NCR (Rauhut, 2018a)<sup>42</sup>.

A focus on regional and transnational dimensions obscures the relevance of internal politics and local power dynamics, and how reparations are conceived at the local level. Rauhut does point out “the need for local and micro-level empirically grounded research that would allow a more differentiated understanding of the local, regional, and national specificities among the respective groups, dynamics, and debates of reparations” (2018b:134), justifying the relevance of further consideration of local-level stakeholder perceptions in Jamaica or other signatory countries.

Having examined relevant literature, the following section outlines the theoretical foundations which inform the analytical framework later applied in the analysis.

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<sup>42</sup>Rauhut interviews Rastafari reparations advocates who have long been fighting for reparations and are active within the reparations movement. She also points to the inclusion of repatriation in the TPP as one example of recognition paid to Rastafarians for their struggle (Rauhut, 2018b:143).

## 4 Theory and analytical framework

This section presents the critical theory of recognition (ToR) which underlines the analytical framework. It situates the concept of recognition and the ToR within social philosophy and outlines the theory's principal features. Key criticisms are considered before reconceptualising the ToR as a theory of justice with social scientific relevance for reparations and development.

### 4.1 The concept of recognition and critical applications

Critical theory within social philosophy emerged in the 1920s, institutionalised through the Frankfurt school (Bronner, 2011). It aimed to “critically diagnose social reality” (Honneth, 2007:63) by identifying impediments to self-realisation and emancipation. It eventually lost its impetus and inner coherency (Bronner, 2011) due to a perceived empirical inapplicability of universalistic claims posited as goals for self-realisation (Honneth, 2007:36-42). This abstraction entailed an inability to effectively ‘diagnose’ complex modern societies (ibid.)<sup>43</sup>.

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<sup>43</sup>Honneth argued that the predominance of negativist approaches, connecting the dehumanisation of social reality to an increase in technological systematisation, eventually became incompatible with the Frankfurt school's critical philosophers' *raison d'être* (Honneth, 2007:34, 67). Their passive stance instead relegated them to a describing rather than prescribing position for successfully establishing normative criteria of ethics. While Honneth thought Habermas' theory of Communicative Action “re-establish[ed] [...] access to an emancipatory sphere of action” (ibid.:69), it failed to fulfil the purported emancipatory aim of critical social theory since based on assumptions rather than being empirically grounded in social reality (ibid.:70).

## 4.1 The concept of recognition and critical applications

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Honneth<sup>44</sup> therefore prompted social philosophy to reorient towards empirical investigations of what social conditions allow communal members “undistorted self-realisation” (ibid:35). Yet, normative standards for such investigations must be “culturally independent” to be operationalisable (ibid.), while remaining contextually relevant, i.e. founded in subjective, social living conditions (ibid.:74-75).

To revive and fulfil the purported aim of critical theory, Honneth developed the ToR as a research programme to dialectically diagnose and prescribe solutions to obstructions restraining individuals’ from attaining a ‘good’ life.

Recognition has long been used as a descriptive, explanatory and analytical concept in social philosophy (Honneth, 2007:129; Markell, 2009), but emerged as a central notion in the 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>45</sup> (Brink & Owen, 2007b:1-2; Markell, 2009). In the 1990’s, it ignited renewed scholarly attention, often attributed to Taylor’s essay “The Politics of Recognition” (1994), and Honneth’s *The Struggle for Recognition* (1995)<sup>46</sup>. In the latter, Honneth builds on Mead and Hegel<sup>47</sup> to schematise reciprocal recognition as a central notion around which society and social conflicts are organised (Brink & Owen, 2007b:2-3)<sup>48</sup>.

While Taylor investigated recognition through a state-centred multiculturalist approach<sup>49</sup>, Honneth offers a broader conceptualisation of recognition as foundational for

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<sup>44</sup>While Honneth prefers to refrain from such classification (Anderson, 2011:31), he is often referred to as a third generations critical theorist of the Frankfurt school (Bailey, 2009:645; Haacke, 2005:181).

<sup>45</sup>Various philosophers have developed the concept in manifold directions, including Sarte, Lacan, de Beauvoir, Fanon, Bourdieu, Althusser, Mead, Habermas and Butler (cf. Markell, 2009).

<sup>46</sup>Both works were originally published in 1992. The full title of Honneth’s book is *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*.

<sup>47</sup>Mead’s and Hegel’s dialectical approaches informed Honneth in developing the meaning of reciprocal recognition and identity-formation (1995:71-130). Hegel illustrates struggles for recognition through the ‘master-slave’ model, problematizing the relationship between self-consciousness and individual independence; if independence is contingent on recognition from others, the ‘master’ can never become fully independent, since not recognising the moral autonomy of the ‘slave’, the recognition of whom he depends upon to confirm his self-conception as a moral agent (Markell, 2009; Laden, 2007:272).

<sup>48</sup>This implied a rejection of the libertarian assertion of an atomistic Homo Economicus’ pursuit of self-interest as the sole basis for social conflict (Brink & Owen, 2007b:2-3), and is another example of how Honneth initially derives his reasoning from a young Hegel’s social analysis (Honneth, 1995:37).

<sup>49</sup>Taylor focuses on liberal pluralism and multiculturalism, especially state-level recognition of cultural minorities. This approach inspired literature on recognition of cultural specificities and moreover, group

subjective agency formation and social emancipation. It is therefore considered more suitable for this study.

## 4.2 Honneth's Theory of Recognition (ToR)

If in social interaction moral subjects are denied the recognition they expect or feel deserving of, feelings of moral injustice and social disrespect arise (Honneth, 1995:131-139, 2007:71)<sup>50</sup>. These feelings may, if social conditions allow, give rise to struggles for recognition. That social struggles are motivated by demands for recognition to overcome feelings of disrespect seems plausible when considering e.g. movements of anti-colonial resistance and civil, minority and labour rights movements (Smith, 2012).

If misrecognition is the cause and recognition the objective of such struggles, it is because they are rooted in the individual's or group's self-conception. As social recognition is essential for the "development of human identity", its denial implies a "sense of a threatening loss of personality" (Honneth, 2007:71-72).

This "psychic integrity of the self" (Smith, 2012:6) is protected through self-affirmation of the self-worth, which necessitates forming "practical relations to self" (Brink & Owen, 2007b:1). These are not innate but formed through socialisation. An individual's conception and confirmation of his value and identity is therefore contingent on the "internalisation of [...] affirmative attitudes" of others (Smith, 2012:6), i.e. conditioned by interdependency. Consequently, reciprocal relations of recognition are necessary for a subjective agent's full self-realisation (autonomy) and ultimately, social emancipation (Laden,

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identities (Jones, 2006; Seymour, 2010; Smith, 2010), but also received critique for insufficiently acknowledging individual recognition within cultural minorities (Smith, 2012). The shift in focus in recognition literature from culture to identity politics in turn raised Marxist-inspired critiques for obscuring more tangible aspects of recognition, such as material distribution (Fraser, 1995, 1997, 2003), considered later in this section.

<sup>50</sup>Including feelings of condescendence, unmotivated treatment as less than others, being denied basic rights or respect as opposed to other groups in society, and unjustified social and political exclusion (Smith, 2012).



2007).

These relations are acquired within the categorical spheres of love (emotional support in interpersonal relationships), respect (cognitive-legal recognition) and solidarity (social esteem) (Honneth, 1995:92-139). Since the first category refers to the private sphere<sup>51</sup>, only the two latter are considered here.

Cognitive respect is enacted through legal relations and rights (1995:107-121). It recognises universal features of free individuals, acknowledging their autonomy as community members within lawful societies. Recognitive reciprocity presupposes right-holders' moral-legal responsibilities and accountability towards de-objectivised others (ibid.:108-109). Full communal political inclusion consists of "civil rights guaranteeing liberty, political rights guaranteeing participation, and social rights guaranteeing basic well-fare" (ibid.:115). When individuals can claim their rights, self-respect is developed through empowering legal-recognition.

Social esteem (1995:121-130) is recognition of an individual's or groups' societally beneficial particularities or achievements. It is acquired when subjective agents "mutually sympathize with their various different ways of life because, among themselves, they esteem each other symmetrically" (ibid.:128), i.e. acknowledge reciprocal inclusion in a broader spectrum of shared values. As communities are cultural entities, recognition through solidarity is contingent on culture-specific values (ibid.:122).

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<sup>51</sup>Recognition within the sphere of love acknowledges physical needs and desires, expressed through affective devotion (Honneth, 2007:139). This axis precedes other forms of recognition "because [...] it prepares the ground for a type of relation-to-self in which subjects acquire basic confidence in themselves" (Honneth, 1995:107).

## 4.3 Select critique of recognition theory

### 4.3.1 Recognition vs. redistribution

Insofar the ToR has normative ambitions for social development, it is often conceived as a theory of justice, a conception framing Fraser's main critique<sup>52</sup>. She locates recognition struggles in a "postsocialist" era of material and non-material inequalities (1995, 1997), and argues that recognition must be accompanied by measures of material redistribution to achieve transformational social justice (2003)<sup>53</sup>. Omitting this aspect limits the ToR's emancipatory potential. Instead, Fraser proposes a model of "perspectival dualism" (2003:63), separating identity struggles (culture) from struggles for distribution (economic-material resources).

Honneth replies that since cultural values imbues economic institutions (2003a:157), redistribution cannot be separated from recognition. Rather, struggles for redistribution are inherently struggles for recognition (ibid.:150-159). This applies both to legal claims (recognition through equal and specific distributions of rights), and to demands for social esteem recognising particular achievements (differential material distribution for e.g. labour). Recognition is the objective of redistribution struggles since these seldom merely concern material aspects. Instead, they morally denounce inadequate applications of expected recognition principles, causing the initial skewed distribution. Feldman (2002) adds that Fraser's model eclipses the locus of political participation, which he considers essential to incorporate in articulating a normative theory for social justice. Though he does not mention Honneth, others have shown the embeddedness of this dimension in the ToR (Thompson, 2006).

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<sup>52</sup>This connection could be argued embedded in critical theory considering its emancipatory ideals for society.

<sup>53</sup>The interrelation between recognition and redistribution has been debated in studies ranging from social and political philosophy and theory (Fraser & Honneth, 2003; Meijl & Goldsmith, 2003; Thompson, 2006; Markell, 2009; Collins & Lim, 2010) to international development and relations (Weber & Berger, 2009a; Nel, 2010).

Asserting that recognition encompasses redistribution is important to justify the reconciliation of Honneth's theory with the specificities of development – in particular regarding reparations, whose very nature often transcends theoretically isolated spheres of culture and economy.

#### 4.3.2 Recognition, power and other critique

The ToR's trajectory has been further marked and enriched by critiques spanning concerns from its philosophical origin and reading of Hegel (Pippin, 2007) to its applicability regarding transnational phenomena (Owen, 2012) and explanatory potential for social injustices and emancipation struggles (Giles, 2017). The latter signals an alleged failure to encompass social power structures as determining features of subjective identity and agency formation (Bader, 2007; McNay, 2008; Petherbridge, 2013). McQueen (2015) similarly asserts that Honneth's focus on individual-psychological dimensions underestimates interlinkages between recognition, power and wider institutions within social life.

This is important to consider since multifaceted power dimensions are arguably inherent in recognition dynamics, as in reparations. Honneth disputes that merely contending that social norms are bound to power relations embedded in complex societal structures, is inadequate to critically analyse social struggles since deficient of normativity criteria (2007:40). As the ToR generally avoids to distinguish or hierarchise specific social aspects<sup>54</sup> (Honneth, 2003a), power is assumed embedded in recognitive enactments<sup>55</sup>.

Though the early ToR predominantly regarded psycho-social aspects of individual development, its evolution towards broader empirical applicability has been confirmed in studies of political theory and philosophy (Brink & Owen, 2007a), social sciences (O'Neill & Smith, 2012), international relations (Haacke, 2005) and international development (We-

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<sup>54</sup>Such as culture, class or material distribution.

<sup>55</sup>Notably, Brink and Owen (2007a) have edited an entire volume dedicated to intersections between Honneth's theory and the concept of power, demonstrating its contested terrain. However, a meaningful elaboration of the definition of power in relation to the ToR lies beyond the scope of this study.

ber & Berger, 2009a)<sup>56</sup>.

### 4.4 Linking recognition, development and reparations

This subsection demonstrates the ToR’s suitability for this study, explicating key conceptual intersections between development and reparations.

Within the recognition-development-reparations nexus, recognition can equally be posited as a means and objective for both reparations and development. This becomes further salient when, as in the CARICOM-case, the demanded reparation-recognition is formulated as the necessary precondition for development (i.e. social justice and autonomy), and the previous misrecognition, motivating the struggle for reparations, is denounced as the cause of ‘underdevelopment’ (i.e. a denial of access to relations of recognition, obstructing self-realisation). As development is a multifaceted notion, a conceptual delimitation is required to further the arguments outlined below.

#### 4.4.1 Social recognition theory and human development

Human development has been defined as “the process of enlarging people’s choices” to achieve well-being and freedom (UNDP, 1990:10), a conceptualisation promulgated by Sen (1989, 2001) and Nussbaum (2000, 2011) through the capabilities approach. Its paradigmatic reconsideration of economic growth as a development tool rather than objective still renders it preferable by many considering its connection to and importance for social and distributive justice and freedom (Alkire, 2002, 2005; Nussbaum, 2003; Fukuda-Parr, 2003; Berges, 2007).

Recognition theory and human development both subscribe to a Rawlsian understand-

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<sup>56</sup>While not explicitly utilising Honneth’s conceptualisation of recognition theory, studies employing recognition as an analytical concept have notably included transitional justice processes, reparations and reconciliation (Meijl & Goldsmith, 2003; Kutz, 2004), whereas Strecker (2016) has discussed recognition and restitution concerning indigenous land rights in the Caribbean in relation to the present reparations claim.

ing of justice as fairness (Rawls, 1973) and a Kantian universalist HR-based conception of justice, positing moral subjects as unconditionally and intrinsically worthy of dignity and respect (Honneth, 2007:141). Similarly, the ToR and the human development paradigm both emphasise that all members of society must have access to adequate social conditions which enable full self-realisation (i.e. autonomy) and freedom.

In conceptualising recognition as both means and purpose of social justice, Honneth's theory is applicable for analysing emancipatory struggles and underlying experiences of injustice (Brink & Owen, 2007b:1). The centrality of justice connects it to the initial premise of human-centred development, which normatively interpreted aspires to decrease multidimensional injustices by increasing the universal equity for all to access the most favourable conditions for accommodating their basic needs and obtain freedom through self-realisation. In this regard, recognition theory and development share the same emancipatory goal, where recognition becomes a means to achieve development.

Smith contends that the rationale of a society's moral norms is to protect its members from misrecognition (2012). These norms include all members of society. Society must thus assume the moral responsibility to provide propitious conditions conducive to adequate relations of recognition for all, independent of variables such as culture, identity or socio-economic status, to live a 'good' life. The moral accountability of societies is linked to their institutional manifestation and social infrastructure, making all modern institutions "answerable to some moral norm or principle of recognition that they more or less explicitly claim to embody" (ibid.:6). The embeddedness of moral norms in society renders ethical criticism applicable to all realms of society and social relations therein (ibid.:7), as these are constructed through social negotiations.

#### **4.4.2 Recognition theory and reparations**

Thompson (2015) links the surge in reparative justice claims to increased demands for recognition, asserting that cases of historical injustice predominantly regard insufficient recognition of differences, i.e. demonstrations of social esteem. Notwithstanding, the

moral-legal perspective infusing much reparations literature reveals the equal importance of recognition through rights, i.e. the international HR paradigm<sup>57</sup>.

Following the ToR, misrecognition manifests in experiences of social injustice, which obstructs self-realisation and freedom. Social injustices foment social conflicts, which drive and explain struggles for recognition to amend the experienced injustices. This interrelation is doubly manifested in reparation claims, which are founded in perceptions of historical injustices but often triggered by persistent experiences of contemporary social injustices (ibid.).

Claimants struggle for symbolic-legal recognition through respect (formal apologies and asserting HR) and a substantiation of this recognition through material-economic compensation (restitution and compensation) to achieve social justice and emancipation (reconciliation and rehabilitation). Denial of the claimed recognition through reparations is perceived as impeding individual and collective autonomy and freedom. Gifford illustrates this, stating “the reparation movement seeks to identify and redress the wrongs committed so that the countries and people that suffered will enjoy full freedom to continue their own development on more equal terms” (cited in Shepherd et al., 2012:xix). This citation connects reparations, recognition and development, as it stresses the right to social preconditions allowing full identity formation.

#### **4.4.3 Recognition theory, development and reparations**

Regarding struggles for historical justice, it becomes important to consider the historical contingency of social standards and preconditions for recognitive relations (Honneth, 2003a:138-150). This parallels the philosophical rationale of development, since what may be considered as a moral standard for a certain time and social setting, sanctioned only by a dominant minority or majority, by later ideals might be judged as “perpetuating relations of misrecognition” (Brink & Owen, 2007b:5).

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<sup>57</sup>See section 3: Literature review.

It further questions by what criteria and means ‘misrecognised’ persons may claim redress in form of recognition (ibid.). This concern is central in both development and reparations debates (particularly when reparations are formulated as development) and stretches across legal, economic and moral spectra, since it determines if, why, when and how a person, group or society can access conditions conducive to autonomy and freedom.

While recognition theory applied to development studies remains novel (Weber & Berger, 2009:1-5) it is inherently relevant. In positing the personal, moral experience as primary point of reference, it reallocates the interpretative prerogative to the subjective agent (Weber, 2009:46-47). This is important in development, where skewed power distribution might condition interstate relations e.g. in aid and trade, contingent on the dominant party’s epistemological interpretation of history and understanding of development and justice, which does not necessarily resonate with that of the recipient country’s point of view.

Demanding reparations, i.e. that an experienced injustice is recognised and redeemed, can entail an important albeit symbolic shift in inter-state power balances in development, as the plaintiff reclaims subjective agency as an autonomous actor deserving of respect. In this regard, reparations subvert conventional development models (Rauhut, 2018a) and recognition becomes a means of empowerment, which thereby renders it a development objective.

### 4.4.4 Analytical framework

Table 4.1 schematises basic features of the ToR. Based on the theoretical discussion, two categories have been added to the below adaptation of Honneth’s basic structure (1995:129). The first is the empirical dimensions of each sphere, to substantiate the identity-related dimensions. Furthermore, two rows outlining specific and general effects of misrecognition have been added to clarify the implied causal relationship between disrespect and social struggles.

The analytical two-partite framework below (Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2) derives from the

#### 4.4 Linking recognition, development and reparations

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Sphere of Recognition	RIGHTS	SOLIDARITY
Mode of Recognition (for claims of autonomy)	Cognitive respect	Social esteem
Form of Recognition	Legal relations	Community of value
Identity-related dimension	Moral responsibility	Traits and abilities
Empirical dimensions	Civil rights (liberty) Political rights (participation) Social right (individual welfare)	Symmetrical esteem Appreciation of the specificity of capabilities and characteristics
Practical relation to self (leading to subjective agency and identity formation)	Self-respect	Self-esteem
Form of disrespect/misrecognition	Denial of equal rights, exclusion	Denigration, insult
Endangered element	Social integrity	Honour, dignity
Specific effect of misrecognition	Social death, loss of self-respect	Psychosocial scars, social humiliation
General effect of misrecognition	Experience of injustice Collapse of identity Social harm	Social struggles ⇒ Social pathologies

Table 4.1: Honneth's Theory of Recognition (adapted from Honneth, 1995:129).

schematisation above (Table 4.1), combined with an understanding of recognition theory as a theory of justice. To align with the ontological and epistemological stance of this paper, a reversed outline to that of Honneth's is proposed, the rationale being that grounding the analysis in the experience of injustice validates the informants' ontology<sup>58</sup>. The framework

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<sup>58</sup>For example, it posits the reparations claim as an existing social justice struggle, instead of seeking to determine the extent to which it may be classified or qualify as such from an external point of view. It also conceptualises reparations as a pursuit of recognition, rather than investigating hypothesised future misrecognitions.



#### 4.4 Linking recognition, development and reparations

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is to be read in conjuncture with Table 4.1. Whereas it informs the summative analysis ending each subsection, it is not structurally applied since the study’s purpose is not theoretical-deductive. Rather, the framework serves as a reflective, conceptual foundation to analyse the empirical data and interpret identified themes.

ANALYTICAL CONCEPT	SPECIFICATION
<b>Experienced injustice</b>	What is the injustice and by whom is the injustice committed? Who is the victim?
<b>Form of disrespect</b>	What is the perceived form of disrespect/misrecognition causing the experience of injustice?
<b>Empirical manifestation</b>	How does the disrespect manifest (Empirical dimension and specific effect of misrecognition)?
<b>Immediate consequence for autonomy formation</b> Implication on realisation of subjective and moral agency	What element of self is impacted (Identity-related dimension and practical relation to self)?
<b>Long-term consequence for development</b> Long-term implication for self-realisation	What is the consequence for identity formation (Endangered element)?
<b>Remedy</b> Pursued mode of recognition	What is the form of recognition needed to amend the perceived injustice according to the disrespected agent (Connects to one of the two endangered elements for self-realisation)?

Table 4.2: Clarification of analytical framework (part 2).




Figure 4.1: Conceptual representation of analytical framework (part 1).

# 5 Methodology

This section presents the methodological approach. After outlining the philosophical foundations and research strategy, it presents the methods employed in data collection and analysis. Lastly, it delineates main limitations before summarising reflections of ethical concern.

## 5.1 Philosophical underpinnings

This study employs a constructionist ontology, which understands social reality as constantly constructed and reconstructed by subjective agents, rendering veracity and meaning creation contingent on and embedded in idiosyncratic-empirical apprehensions (Moses & Knutsen, 2012:169-171; Stewart-Withers et al., 2014:78). Accordingly, an interpretivist epistemology understands knowledge to be context dependent and created through subjective perceptions (Moses & Knutsen, 2012:183-185; Bryman, 2012:28-30)<sup>59</sup>. The constructivist approach is relevant since this study seeks to comprehend stakeholder perspectives emanating from diverse social contexts without judging or evaluating either one as objectively true.

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<sup>59</sup>This further reverberates with a conception of development as a socially constructed notion, insofar its discourse and practices are culturally and historically contingent (Schech & Haggis, 2000:3).

## 5.2 Strategy of inquiry

A qualitative approach is frequently used to understand the social world and human experience within it (Stewart-Withers et al., 2014:59) and is often applied in conjuncture with a constructionist stance (Bryman, 2012:380), thus suitable for this study. A quantitative approach could explore the prevalence and potential indicators of preconceived notions on reparations among a wider section of the population, but is less useful to answer the research question which concerns subjective interpretations.

Despite the transnational nature of slavery reparations (cf. Rauhut, 2018b), the research was designed as an idiographic case study since the topic of interest is the case in the particular context of Jamaica (Bryman, 2012:68-69). The research design inflicts on generalisability (Bryman, 2012:71; Stewart-Withers et al., 2014:77), a validity criterion also concerned by the conventional criticism against qualitative research, commonly denoting low transparency and high subjectivity (Bryman, 2012:405-406). While case studies are useful to extend knowledge without formal generalisability (Flyvbjerg, 2006), methodical triangulation was employed (Bryman, 2012:390; Mikkelsen, 2005:96-97) and analytical preference was given to themes emerging across sectors (Creswell & Miller, 2000:126-127) to counter these pitfalls and improve overall credibility. The cross-country prevalence of development challenges emphasised in the Caribbean claim suggests a potential transferability of such overarching findings.

Theoretical saturation was not foreseen, due to limited sampling, time restraints and the constructivist viewpoint (Bryman, 2012:421), but partially occurred for some thematic areas.

## 5.3 Note on stakeholders

Reparations formulated as a regional-national development strategy renders ‘stakeholders’ an all-encompassing notion, incorporating multiple actors relevant to national development

### 5.3 Note on stakeholders

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and its end beneficiaries, i.e. all citizens. This study delineated stakeholders as either relevant to the strategy's conceptualisation and implementation or targeted beneficiaries<sup>60</sup> (see Table 5.1 below). Appendix B contains a detailed list of informants.

Four NCR-members (of which one Rastafarian) were interviewed for their insight and centrality in promulgating the case nationally<sup>61</sup>. As a government agency, the NCR reports to the Ministry of Culture and advises the parliament in reparations issues. Despite its governmental affiliation, its members are not decisionmakers. The views reflected in interviews are individual and subjective, non-representative of the government. This also applies to informants from other public institutions and organisations<sup>62</sup>.

Public officials from other government agencies provided complementary perspectives on the conceptualisation of development and of reparations.

Various international and intergovernmental agencies operate in Jamaica's development industry. Moreover, several normative, international instruments are referred to by the reparations movement, particularly regarding HR. Two UN employees from this sector were interviewed. One had worked with HR both with government agencies and Rastafarian organisations.

Two independent entrepreneurs were interviewed for a youth perspective.

Rastafarians are key beneficiaries, as a cultural minority but primarily considering their implicated positionality and importance for the current movement<sup>63</sup>. The EADUMC

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<sup>60</sup>Several informants simultaneously pertained to different groups (youth, reparations advocates, Rastafari etc.) and all can be included in "general citizens". In Table 5.1, interviewed stakeholders have been registered in their main role relevant to this thesis.

<sup>61</sup>See Appendix B: List of informants and attended events.

<sup>62</sup>While views from this stakeholder group have been considered before (cf. Rauhut, 2018a, 2018b), they have not been regarded in conjuncture with other stakeholder groups' perceptions, and neither considering internal reparations dynamics in Jamaica. Furthermore, the interviewed NCR-members in this study differ from those in earlier research.

<sup>63</sup>This include their historical role in claiming reparations, but also for having suffered oppression due to this assertion. A contradiction arises as the government not only embraces the claim for which Rastafarians have been shunned, but also since the appeal alludes to the same ethical principles which had been denied Rastafarians.

### 5.3 Note on stakeholders

Role in strategy	Identified stakeholder group	Included in this study (Number of consulted informants)		
Conceptualisation & Implementation	CRC (Caribbean Reparations Commission)	CRC: National Consultant for agenda implementation (1)		
	Government	-		
	Government agencies	National Centre for Youth Development (1)	National Council on Reparation (NCR) (4)	Planning institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) (1)
	National reparations advocates			
Implementation	Private sector	-		
	International and intergovernmental development organisations	Anonymous (1) UN agency (1)		
	National and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs)	Jamaicans for Justice (1) Other NGO (1) Community development foundation (1)		
	Beneficiaries	Youth	Individual entrepreneurs (2)	
Beneficiaries	Minority groups	The EADUMC (4)		
	Rastafarians	Non-organised Rastafarians (2)		
	Ordinary citizens	-		
	The poor	-		
	Other key informants	Jamaican documentary film producer (1) Economist/UWI(1)		

Table 5.1: Identified stakeholder categories.

coordinates Rastafari organisations and actively seeks engagement in political and economic negotiations, including at the CARICOM reparations conferences. Three EADUMC-members were interviewed and participated in focus groups. A fourth member participated in one focus group. Two non-organised Rastafarians were interviewed to complement EADUMC's account, to which the Rastafari NCR-member also contributed.

Informants not directly connected to the development industry were chosen based on specific knowledge or experience pertaining to important aspects of the research, including Jamaica's economic situation and the Rastafari struggle ("Other key informants" in Table 5.1).

For non-included stakeholder groups, see 5.7 Limitations.

## 5.4 Sampling strategies

Non-probability, generic and purposive sampling approaches were used to select informants relevant to the research objective (Bryman, 2012:418-422). For interviews, typical and critical case sampling were applied to ensure a variety of perspectives.

Field work was carried out in parallel with a consultancy at UNESCO. This engagement often served as a nominal gatekeeper to otherwise difficultly accessed spheres, and occasionally allowed for opportunistic sampling (ibid.:419). These techniques combined with snowball sampling were used for certain high-level interviews and for initial contact with the EADUMC and later focus groups, for convenience reasons and to utilise the EADUMC's voluntary gatekeeping function.

Stratified sampling was applied to include non-governmental organised Rastafarians, Rastafari members of the official reparations movement (NCR) and non-organised Rastafarians. This triangulation was utilised to nuance and improve credibility regarding Rastafari input (Bryman, 2012:419). The EADUMC was the only interviewed non-governmental Rastafari organisation. While mandated from other mansions and key actor for Rastafari political activism, its members' views cannot be determined exclusively representative for this group, since inter-mansion differentiation exists.

## 5.5 Data collection methods

The methods utilised in this study are common in qualitative research, and include interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), field observations and document review (Stewart-

Withers et al., 2014:63-64).

Interviews and FGDs are particularly suitable when investigating subjective experiences and perceptions (Hammett, Twyman & Graham, 2015:139-140), and thus in consonance with the research objective. I also attended lectures and events<sup>64</sup>. Data was collected March – June 2018.

Interviews and FGDs were audiorecorded with informed consent. This was obtained predominantly through written but also verbal agreement, depending on the situation and respective form's perceived appropriateness. At events where informed consent could not be obtained by all speakers or where noisy surroundings impeded audiorecording, this was replaced by notetaking.

### 5.5.1 Interviews

Semi-structured interviews with open-ended and semi-structured questions were conducted with informants, who chose location<sup>65</sup>. Interview sequencing was spurious since depending on informants' availability, but each encounter infused new understanding in the formulation and sequencing of questions for the ensuing interview.

A malleably designed interview guide steered the dialogues, amenable to contextual adaptation and spontaneity (Bryman, 2012:487)<sup>66</sup>. Question sequencing, content and formulation varied along variables including informant background and interview dynamics (Hammett, Twyman & Graham, 2015:146-147). While aware of the subjectivist nature of and potential bias in interview results – since emerging from intersubjective exchange (ibid.:147) – this method was still preferred, since the research purpose focuses on content rather than comparability (Boolsen, 2005:171).

Two interviews interchangeably turned into FGDs, when by-listeners occasionally in-

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<sup>64</sup>See Appendix B: List of informants and attended events.

<sup>65</sup>See Appendix B for interview and focus group details.

<sup>66</sup>See Appendix C for an example of guiding questions for an interview with a member of the NCR.



tervened<sup>67</sup>. Upon request, one interview included two informants.

### 5.5.2 Focus group discussions (FGDs)

Focus groups are useful when studying collective meaning creation of a phenomenon and to complement individual interview results (Bryman, 2012:516). Two focus group discussions were held, one with the EADUMC through Skype (four informants), and one open FGD ensuing a presentation of my research at an EADUMC-organised mansionwide gathering (5-10 informants)<sup>68</sup>. The latter also allowed overt field observation of inter-mansion dynamics (ibid.:432), and an extended viewpoint on Rastafari opinions on reparations.

Challenges of this method arising in this study regarded organisation<sup>69</sup>, maintaining focus and assuring equal participation (ibid.:516-517). Internal hierarchies mostly affected the latter, but my appearance further induced occasional suspicion and/or shyness<sup>70</sup>, in which case I emphasised my genuine interest in learning (Stewart-Withers et al., 2014:61), maintaining a respectful, open and curious approach. However, it is possible that contrasting views were left unheard. Repeated requests to individually interview those who had kept silent remained unanswered.

Organisation and focus were affected by participants leaving and joining during the second FGD. As this could affect audio quality, rigorous field notes were taken during and after the session.

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<sup>67</sup>Since predominantly dialogues, these sessions have been registered as interviews in Appendix B.

<sup>68</sup>The presentation was performed on invitation by the EADUMC. Their idea was to seize momentum to reinvigorate the reparations debate, postulating my approach could provide interesting perspectives to inform their agenda. The ensuing discussion included several members of different mansions and lasted the entire day. All were aware of my research purpose and gave verbal consent. However, the fragmented organisation and general ambiance did not encourage name registration, as the number of informants varied throughout the discussion. In Appendix B, only EADUMC-members who were present and whose full identity was known to me are therefore included.

<sup>69</sup>A third focus group discussion was planned with non-organised Rastafarians, but was cancelled since a majority did not show up. This was probably due to miscommunication or a lack of priority and interest.

<sup>70</sup>This was also the case for a few interviews.

### 5.5.3 Field notes and observations

Detailed field notes enabled continuous reflexivity and preanalysis of data throughout the research process (Bryman, 2012:447), allowing for emerging patterns and new directions to be explored (Stewart-Withers et al., 2014:75).

## 5.6 Data analysis

As the objective was to map cross-sectoral concerns regarding reparations as development strategy, results were not analysed per stakeholder group. Thematic analysis was chosen as the most appropriate method for the research purpose to discern and organise data towards broader categories of stakeholder perceptions. While unprecise concerning identifiable techniques (Bryman, 2012:579-580), this approach is useful to apprehend meaning-bearing complexities (Guest, MacQueen & Namey, 2012:11), thus relevant for investigating perceptions. This study defines a theme as an abstract denomination attributing meaning to a category of interrelated codes emerging from and applied to the data, pertinent to the research focus (DeSantis & Ugarriza, 2000:362; Bryman, 2012:580). Criteria were kept broad to allow for novel perspectives and emerging interconnections within and across sources, taking note of recurring topics or patterns (Bryman, 2012:580).

Data included interviews and FGDs transcriptions, field notes and analytical memos. NVivo was used to organise and code the data, using techniques suitable for thematic analysis, including initial, InVivo and versus coding (Saldaña, 2009:70-93). Since the employed analysis is susceptible to preconceived bias, parallel desk research enabled important contextualisation. Critique of NVivo include fragmentation of the “narrative flow”, hollowing the data of complexity and risking decontextualisation (Bryman, 2012:592). However, the chosen approach made NVivo’s advantages exceed its potential drawbacks.

The inquiry predominantly subscribed to an inductive approach, independently grounding emerging conceptual ideas in empirical data (Boolsen, 2005:161; Bryman, 2012:380). The study had deductive elements since the topic evolved from hypothesised tensions re-

garding domestic conceptions of reparations<sup>71</sup>. Because this assumption resonated with informants, it was maintained as the research progressed in an iterative manner, striving towards abductive reasoning i.e. grounding the study in the interviewees' worldview (Bryman, 2012:401) and respecting their knowledge systems (cf. Stewart-Withers et al., 2014:72-75) to minimise risks of perpetrating epistemological violence, elsewhere experienced by certain informants (cf. Shilliam, 2014).

Lastly, the application of an established theory partly imposed a deductive 'filter'. A reflexive stance was thus critical to avoid inventing inexistent interrelations.

## 5.7 Limitations

The topic's perceived political sensibility entailed some interview requests to be denied<sup>72</sup>. While the importance of the private sector emerged during data collection and analysis, I was unable to organise relevant interviews on short notice. Similarly, limited access impeded interviews with government representatives with decision-making power, though a key category appearing throughout the analysis. This restriction also applied to other central international development actors<sup>73</sup>.

Despite the study's global intent, main limitations concern informant variety in terms of number and background. This imply a non-representativeness, which in turn impacts on the validity and generalisability. Though this study does not aim for generalisability, conclusions drawn from the analysis are at best indicative of thematic areas relevant for further research. Notwithstanding, the amalgam and range of in-depth viewpoints strengthened validity since allowing a "360-degrees perspective", as one informant commented.

The language occasionally entailed difficulties, as some informants code-switched between Patois and English. However, their bilingualism enabled instant clarification.

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<sup>71</sup>This inference was first derived from professional experiences acquired during my consultancy.

<sup>72</sup>Notably by international informants in diplomatic positions.

<sup>73</sup>For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), or the Department for International Development in the UK (DFID).

## 5.8 Ethical considerations

Ethical reflexivity permeated the research process (Sultana, 2007) to respect the ‘do-no-harm’ principle (Bryman 2012:135-138). Data collection respected age limits and was treated with confidentiality (LUMID, 2013).

Though I at each request and interview articulated the research’s detachment from UNESCO, this association could have influenced informants’ stance. I did not experience a negative impact. Rather, it served initial legitimatisation.

The constructivist avowal in combination with my phenotype sometimes rendered the process challenging. Researching an Afro-centric topic in a racialised, post-colonial and socio-economically stratified society implied attention to positionality and legitimacy<sup>74</sup>.

Several informants cautioned I would experience suspicion, occasionally confirmed at interviews and events. Precedent experiences of foreign extractive researchers often explained this scepticism<sup>75</sup>.

Efforts were made to avoid epistemological misappropriation or other measures reinforcing or developing powers imbalances (Mohanty, 1984:334-33), while motivating and defending my research purpose. The latter had to be clarified in rare instances, e.g. when expectations of research outcomes exceeded reality<sup>76</sup>.

An over-reflexivity can be debilitating (Sultana, 2007:375) but also risk a reductionist stance towards informants’ agency and power (Hammett, Twyman & Graham, 2015:104)

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<sup>74</sup>An extreme constructionist could argue that racism is a social construct and only exists as long as its discourse, which recreates and reinforces its presence and societal impact. Nonetheless, its wide institutionalisation has transferred racism into an ontological state of almost positivist nature, as it very tangibly determines concrete and fundamental aspects of a person’s life situation. If a person’s skin colour ostensibly conditions and sets the boundaries for life opportunities, its philosophical origin or nature matters less. Since racism manifests in society and is lived and perceived as real and impactful, it exists, and can thus be validated as an element of reality. A constructionist viewpoint, by unveiling the circular argument, both confirms and contradicts a rationale of consciously incorporating race aware measures in planning and conducting research.

<sup>75</sup>Some interviewees reversed the interview roles. One suggested I should look into Sweden’s role in slavery and prerogative to pay reparations, if I genuinely sought to forward the cause.

<sup>76</sup>One Rastafari informant initially believed I would help people repatriate.

especially when in an unfamiliar environment. I constantly questioned my position and conduct, to avoid relegating me or informants to preconceived categories of victimisation, contingent on culture and circumstances.

Several informants even considered my approach useful to their own positioning and argumentation. This occurred with the EADUMC<sup>77</sup>, the NCR and with other public employees, infusing an ethical dimension of reciprocity (ibid.:105-106) and authenticity (Bryman, 2012:393).

An overarching concern regarded legitimacy. However, realising that reparations were racialised partly because not legitimised as serious within the knowledge production hegemony, it might be argued an ethical imperative to academically discuss reparations beyond separatist rooms.

Another concern considered eventual impacts on internal relations within the relatively small and cross-cutting reparations and development circles in Jamaica, despite informed consent and anonymisation of informants upon request<sup>78</sup>.

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<sup>77</sup>Particularly at the invited presentation, I was concerned to purvey a sense of epistemological appropriation. However, the EADUMC assured it would be a reciprocal knowledge exchange and good opportunity for both parties.

<sup>78</sup>Anonymised informants were given a pseudonym for narrative purposes (see Appendix B).

## 6 Findings and analysis

This section analyses findings from field work conducted in Kingston, Jamaica. The purpose was to investigate stakeholder perceptions on Jamaica's national-regional claim for reparations formulated as a development strategy, and to illuminate discursive and practical contestations relevant to its public endorsement and future implementation.

Thematic analysis generated three categories. The first considers diverging conceptualisations of development, the second discusses redistribution and operationalisation, while the third explores the locus of representation. Each category presents global findings, before a final subsection provides further analysis informed by recognition theory.

Specific information on informants is presented in footnotes at their initial in-text appearance<sup>79</sup>.

Considering Rastafarian's particular positionality in the reparations case, their experiences, when applicable, are given prominence in the analysis to illuminate the global argument.

### 6.1 Reparations as a development framework

The centrality of the development concept in the claim provokes an inquiry concerning how this notion is understood and operationalised among different stakeholders and sectors.

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<sup>79</sup>See also Appendix B.1: Informants in interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs).

### 6.1.1 Diverging conceptualisations of development

All informants supported the moral rationale of reparations, but several national and international development professionals either did not engage in reparations, believe it would happen or considered reparations credible as a development strategy<sup>80</sup>. Few had read the TPP. Two international development professionals referred to reparations as a political concern between Jamaica and the UK, preferring not to comment<sup>81</sup>. This indicates that the reparations claim is not taken seriously by those who would be concerned by its implementation and that reparations are conceived as a national or bilateral political matter rather than a sector-wide development thrust. Other hesitations regarding its credibility related to perceived philosophical and practical disparities between the current development plan, Vision2030, and the proposed TPP.

Vision2030 is the current and first national development strategy. It coordinates national and international development actors aiming to achieve “developed country status” by 2030 (Planning Institute of Jamaica [PIOJ], 2009:vii). It is future-oriented, emphasises cross-sectoral economic growth and promotes entrepreneurialism. Ergo, it approximates a neoliberal approach to development, following a market-based capitalist logic and focusing on industrialisation and technology development, where economic growth equates development (Peet & Hartwick, 2009:78-91).

Though Vision2030 occasionally indicates a focus on human development<sup>82</sup> and alludes to the social impact of slavery and colonialism (PIOJ, 2009:90-92,100), it does not mention reparations, minority rights or adopts an Afro-centric approach to education and culture<sup>83</sup>.

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<sup>80</sup>These included interviewees from international organisations and those involved with local NGOs (see Appendix B.1).

<sup>81</sup>These have not been included in the list of interviewees (see Appendix B.1).

<sup>82</sup>For example Goal 1 of four states “Jamaicans feel empowered to achieve their fullest potential”, with the underlying outcomes “A Healthy and Stable Population”, “World-Class Education and Training”, “Effective Social Protection” and an “Authentic and Transformational Culture” (PIOJ, 2009:36-97).

<sup>83</sup>Vision2030 was published the same year as the JNCR was established, in 2009, so official endorsement of reparations was recent. Some informants also reminded that state-endorsement does not necessarily translate into prioritisation. At the most recent CARICOM meeting in June 2018, reparations working

## 6.1 Reparations as a development framework

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One NCR-member contrastingly affirmed that reparations share the common goal with Vision2030 to make Jamaica the choice of living but agreed that reconciling the diverging views was important to elaborate a coherent development strategy (Laleta Davis-Mattis<sup>84</sup>).

The TPP proclaims a human-centred, psychosocial stance, pursuing development through rehabilitation to foment propitious conditions allowing for individual capability development. This approximates a human development approach (UNDP, 1990). All informants agreed that meaningful and sustainable development must be human-centred, and can only be induced by economic growth if accompanied with social welfare.

Others associated aforementioned divergences to insufficient contextualisation. A relevant and successful development strategy must acknowledge historical and sociocultural contingencies and specificities. This allegedly constituted the principal inadequacy of Jamaica's current approach:

“With a country like Jamaica [...] some of what we are, and how we are, are coming out of an experience [...] as a post-slavery society. And within a post-slavery society, you've got to therefore construct the development prospects along with the realities, and that is what has not happened in many of our countries. We assume development positions, and strategies [...] without confronting the cultural [...] being that you're dealing with.” (Sydney Bartley<sup>85</sup>)

The lingering idealisation of the West, permeating all aspects of Jamaican society, was believed to further hamper identification of adequate development goals.

“We tend to adopt European models of development [...] while [condescending to] our own model which is based on our own cultural expression and identity [...] We

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groups appealed for an increased budget allocation (RCC, 2018a).

<sup>84</sup>Laleta Davis-Mattis Co-Chair of the NCR, and lecturer at the Faculty of Law at UWI.

<sup>85</sup>Sydney Bartley is Regional Consultant for the CARICOM Reparations Commission (CRC) for the implementation of the Regional Reparations Agenda. He also has extensive experience working nationally and internationally with cultural policy development.



## 6.1 Reparations as a development framework

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don't recognise that it is a form of development or that it will also help in empowering ourselves with respect to development.” (Davey Haughton)<sup>86</sup>

The reparations rationale could explain Vision2030's growth focalisation as the only, even imposed, alternative because of colonialist-induced 'underdevelopment' and locked periphery in a global capitalist economy. Some informants asserted the government was doing its best considering Jamaica's tenuous economic history<sup>87</sup> which obstructed investments in capacity building (Karen Marks Mafundikwa<sup>88</sup>). CARICOMs endorsement of reparations emanated from the very realisation of these insurmountable constraints (Clinton Hutton<sup>89</sup>).

However, offers of policy guidance and 'best practices' from the international community were met with resistance (Anita<sup>90</sup>). One informant accentuated that “limited resources do not account for entrenched attitudinal issues [constraining] human development, of which negative attitudes to human rights and equality form a part” (Rodje Malcolm<sup>91</sup>).

### Rastafari community development

As communities often transcend geographical spaces, “national development ought to be the aggregation of community-level development” (Rodje Malcolm). While Vision2030 lacks strategies for minorities or community-specific development, the TPP comprises a programme to strengthen Caribbean native populations<sup>92</sup>. While Jamaica does not count

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<sup>86</sup> Davey Haughton is Youth Empowerment Officer at the Youth & Adolescent Policy Division, National Centre for Youth Development of the Ministry of Youth and Culture and also member of the NCR Reparation Youth Subcommittee.

<sup>87</sup>The national debt and ensuing abated negotiating power, informants argued, resulted from Jamaica's difficult position at independence, with lacking infrastructure and industry diversification.

<sup>88</sup>Karen Marks Mafundikwa is an independent filmmaker, director and producer, and creator of *Price of Memory* (2014), a documentary on reparations in Jamaica particularly attentive to the Rastafari struggle. She is also a former government investment agency employee.

<sup>89</sup>Clinton Hutton is professor in Caribbean Political Philosophy, Culture and Aesthetics at the University of the West Indies (UWI). He is also lecturer in transitional justice and in the philosophical foundations of slavery and anti-slavery resistance.

<sup>90</sup>Anita is a human rights expert at an international organisation. See Appendix B.1.

<sup>91</sup>Rodje Malcolm is Executive Director of Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ), an independent NGO advocating for human rights, transparency and accountability.

<sup>92</sup>See Appendix A, point 3: “Indigenous Peoples Development Programme”.

## 6.1 Reparations as a development framework

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indigenous minorities specifically, other historical minority groups pursue support.

EADUMC-members<sup>93</sup> experience exclusion in both development strategies. They wish to develop an autonomous community with Rastafari infrastructure (Ras Kremlin<sup>94</sup>) and be allowed economic participation. Despite having accommodated to organisational requirements, EADUMC asserted persistent exclusion from relevant policy discussions. They required support for organisational capacity building to measure their added value to the national economy and international ‘brand’, since “hard numbers” would catalyse their political and economic inclusion<sup>95</sup>. The denied endorsement of their community development model has made the EADUMC turn to international instruments, especially for claiming their denied profits from their asserted co-opted and misappropriated ‘Rasta brand’<sup>96</sup>.

While repatriation, included in the TPP<sup>97</sup>, remains central for long-term Rastafari community development, repatriation as reparations must imply a holistic Afro-centric re-orientation<sup>98</sup>, since only by linking “your fundamental development [...] to your African heritage” can the diaspora be meaningfully connected (Maxine Stowe<sup>99</sup>). This was echoed by other EADUMC-members and by a Rastafari NCR-member (Jahlani Niaah<sup>100</sup>). Repa-

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<sup>93</sup>The Ethio-Africa Diaspora Union Millennium Council. See Appendix B.1 for interviewed EADUMC representatives.

<sup>94</sup>Ras Kremlin is Chair of the EADUMC. Such an infrastructure would involve schools and curricula, hospitals and transportation.

<sup>95</sup>In this sense, EADUMC is pursuing similar goals and by similar means as the reparations movement.

<sup>96</sup>The EADUMC has realised the efficiency of “naming and shaming” (Prophet Greg), and has turned to internationally recognised classifications to protect Rastafari interests, including Intellectual Property Rights and an Indigenous Knowledge Systems classification. These pursuits are important to strengthen their negotiating power with governmental authorities. Regarding co-optation of Rastafari culture, see King (1999) and Price (2003).

<sup>97</sup>Notably, this inclusion is an alleged tribute to the Rastafari struggle (Rauhut, 2018a:139).

<sup>98</sup>These include political and economic relations. Repatriation of Jamaicans to Africa was pointed out as complex and involving all aspects of society – the physical transfer per se, but also making sure that appropriate infrastructure, employment security, education opportunity integration policies and so forth would be in place in receiving countries. As such, it would require bilateral and international negotiation but also local sensitisation.

<sup>99</sup>Maxine Stowe is Director of EADUMC, Managing Partner at Rasta Ganja Global, culture manager and consultant.

<sup>100</sup>Jahlani Niaah is lecturer at the Institute of Caribbean Studies and coordinator of the Rastafari Studies Center at UWI.

ration policies must benefit the pan-African community, the ultimate beneficiary of reparations, while remaining human-centred. Jamaica's current engagement with Africa, Maxine Stoweopined, was motivated by economic interests, since not "linking the people" but only the trade, dominated by non-Africans. Yet, the TPP appears more aligned with Rastafarian community development than Vision2030.

### 6.1.2 The human rights argument: who is a rights holder?

Reparative claims for historical justice increased in parallel with the emergent HR paradigm as the "moral and legal reference point" in the 20th century, and with modern international law in which HR are embedded (Neumann & Thompson, 2015b:12). Though their susceptibility to political misuse has caused contestation of their universality or desirability<sup>101</sup>, HR provide the legal-moral foundation in demands for reparative justice (Evans, 2012; Kariyawasam, 2012; Robertson, 2006; Torpey, 2015), including the Caribbean claim (Gifford, 2000; Shepherd et al., 2012; Beckles, 2013)<sup>102</sup>.

However, Anita contended Jamaica is part of "group 77", countries who "separa[te] development and human rights". She argues Jamaica's constitution has serious shortcomings with regard to modern constitutional development, since it does not embrace the many signed human rights treaty provisions, the immediate implementation of which is obstructed by the constitution's design<sup>103</sup>. Since the "elites" would never consider HR,

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<sup>101</sup>For example, Pagden (2003) points out that the allegedly universal HR are a European imperial legacy in that their normative foundation is based on European ideals and definitions. Conversely, the HR paradigm has been accused of being an imperialist imposition on local, traditional cultures with diverging notions of justice (cf. Neumann & Thompson, 2015b:12). Ignatieff, Gutmann and Appiah (2001) and Douzinas (2007) are among those who advert that HR as a global paradigm hollows it of its normative force, and instead risk becoming a convenient tool to increase political power.

<sup>102</sup>The JNBC emphasised the right to reparations alluded to in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (Shepherd et al., 2012:45). The Durban conference in 2011 also underscored HR as the moral-legal basis justifying the right to seek reparations, especially in relation to racist discrimination (WCAR, 2001:§104).

<sup>103</sup>Jamaica's constitution was amended in 2011, but Anita claims the reform did not include any improvement regarding social and economic rights, despite Jamaica being a party of the ICESCR and having received several international recommendations to do so.

## 6.1 Reparations as a development framework

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which would endanger “their wealth and their system”, Anita dismissed government-led reparations as a “dust-curtain”.

“[T]hey just want that other nations continue to turn a blind eye on what they really are. It’s always the outside who is guilty. [T]he human rights, and LGBT [are] brought by the Western [...] the whole social legislation is so far behind - it is the will of the elites to do so!”

The constitution neither mentions slavery or colonialism, which starkly contrast TPP’s emphasis on interconnections between Jamaica’s history and contemporary development. This is further significant since ratified HR conventions are circumscribed by the constitution (Lijnzaad, 1995:161).

Several HR treaties underscoring the reparations rationale<sup>104</sup> have not been domesticated and lack institutions for individual complaints procedures (OHCHR, n.d.). Anita claimed most Jamaican government agencies, including PIOJ, remained suspicious and disinterested in HR:

”A country [...] interested in having development creates institutions and channels and mechanisms and policies and laws to benefit those who are not benefitting. And [...] provides services to those who don’t have access [...]. Jamaica hasn’t done that. And as long as Jamaica doesn’t do it, they’ll never reach through the legal and policy race to people who need it.”

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) is among the aforementioned neglected treaties, despite affirmative declarations<sup>105</sup>.

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<sup>104</sup>See Shepherd et al. (2012:45). Apart from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by Jamaica in 1971, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), ratified in 1975, these also include the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ratified in 1975 (OHCHR, n.d).

<sup>105</sup>Regarding ICERD, Jamaica declared its constitution “entrenches and guarantees to every person in

## 6.1 Reparations as a development framework

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Embedded in the Durban declaration (WCAR, 2011), the convention is central for reparations, especially since refusing reparations to African descendants has been implied a racist manifestation<sup>106</sup>.

The TPP asserts the social entrenchment of racist colonial structures, impeding human development. Though racism was never explicitly institutionalised in Jamaica, Chevannes reminds that the “ideology of racism” was “one of the most debilitating features of colonial underdevelopment” (1990:60)<sup>107</sup>. Despite demographics counting a majority (92.1%) ‘black’ population<sup>108</sup> (Cia.gov, 2018), all interviewees emphasised how skin colour consistently permeates social life, the poor being disproportionately affected<sup>109</sup>. Contrastingly, Jamaica affirms “racism and racial discrimination is not overly manifested in the Jamaican society” (International Organisations Department, 2011), persistently refusing access to CERD Special Procedures<sup>110</sup>.

Like Anita, local development practitioners and EADUMC-members asserted that Jamaica’s refusal to ratify the competence of the CERD Committee, and to allow access to other Committees of relevant treaties indirectly supporting reparations, undermined the

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Jamaica the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual irrespective of his race or place of origin” and “prescribes judicial processes to be observed in the event of the violation of any of these rights whether by the State or by a private individual”. They added, however, that they do not accept any obligations which went beyond their constitution. This may allow discriminations prohibited by ICERD (Lijnzaad, 1995:161) and was still criticised in 2013 (CERD: 2013).

<sup>106</sup>Shepherd et al. (2012:xi) write: “Indeed, it would appear as if reparation has been paid to every other group of claimants except those who are of African descent”.

<sup>107</sup>Though informants maintained that racial segregation and discrimination during later decades have turned to concern skin colour rather than race, it was indicated that the same power dynamics still surround the issue.

<sup>108</sup>Demographics from 2011.

<sup>109</sup>Informants claimed this was demonstrated e.g. by higher prevalence of bleaching in poorer neighbourhoods.

<sup>110</sup>Special procedures are experts evaluating adherence to conventions. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) have accentuated Jamaica’s lacking HR institutions and domestication of ICERD (CERD, 2013), exhorting Jamaica to “ensure that the lack of court cases on racial discrimination is not due to victims’ lack of awareness of rights, individuals’ lack of confidence in police and judicial authorities, or the authorities’ lack of attention or sensitivity to cases of racial discrimination” (ibid.).

claim's credibility<sup>111</sup>.

### 6.1.3 Reparations as development: implications for recognition

Examining ethical dimensions of development conceptualisation is primordial as its translation into practice determines who gets to be recognised as having the right to develop, how and why. In determining preconditions for self-realisation, it has moral implications.

Juxtaposing Vision2030 and the TPP indicates diverging conceptualisations regarding national development, philosophically (HR) discursively (strategies and plans) and practically (institutions and concession of rights). These contrasts may explicate the perceived incredulity of the TPP among development professionals operating within the current strategy, but also for alleged beneficiaries, since both plans eclipse broad considerations of community-based development which could enhance social justice. While national economic adversities might explain Vision2030's orientation, informants sustain available resources should not determine the definition or purpose of development i.e. who gets to develop and how.

Reparations, informants across sectors stressed, *must* be conceptualised as a development strategy, since its legitimising rationale is addressing development obstacles directly and indirectly caused by institutionalised effects of historical injustices. From a recognition-theoretical viewpoint, these crimes constitute the original disrespect, having caused systematic negations of recognition in all spheres for victims and their descendants. Development obstacles are empirical manifestations of this experienced injustice of 'underdevelopment' motivating the reparations struggle<sup>112</sup>. Reparations are considered due remedy for a long-standing multidimensional debt, necessary for symbolical and material redress to reverse

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<sup>111</sup>Allowing access to these Committees could enable international complaints to be submitted, which in turn could engender recommendations for reparations. The reparation movement has exhorted the Caribbean governments to implement ICERD and related for the OHCHR-coordinated UN International Decade for People of African Descent, which considers reparations and has yet to be fully embraced by Jamaica, despite reparations advocates' insistence (OHCHR, 2014; RCC, 2018a, 2018b; Rauhut, 2018a:146).

<sup>112</sup>Cf. Appendix 1: The CARICOM Ten Point Plan (TPP).

the ‘underdevelopment’, and ultimately achieve development and freedom.

Rauhut remarks that formulating reparations as a development strategy challenges dominant development models (2018a:142-143). In detailing the mode and objective of reparations, claimants restore their subjective agency in a political space where this may be otherwise denied. NCR-members affirmed experiencing this accumulated right<sup>113</sup>. The exhortation to European powers and the international community to seriously consider the claim is a demand for cognitive respect, i.e. to be recognised as a subjective agent endowed with moral agency<sup>114</sup>.

However, a society’s moral agency also entails moral obligations (Smith, 2012). While the TPP seemingly assumes these through its human-centred and decolonising approach, Vision2030 contrastingly embraces a modernisation-theoretical view of development, looking to Western ideals and ideas of development (Peet & Hartwick, 2009:104)<sup>115</sup>. This implies a de-valorisation of the own, a non-recognition of from where development must emanate and for whom. Colonial injustices having caused ‘underdevelopment’ seem undisrupted in Vision2030 rather than being addressed by undertaking a moral responsibility of redistribution through social welfare.

For EADUMC-members, the experienced obstruction from realising their development vision demonstrates social disrespect, manifested through economic and political exclusion and impeding autonomy formation. Considering Jamaican authorities’ pursuit of foreign affirmation and ideals for development standards, the EADUMC aims to utilise international standards to achieve national recognition.

Insofar development implies freedom to self-realisation, both the TPP and EADUMC’s

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<sup>113</sup>Laleta Davis-Mattis explained: “I think that’s a right we have gained over the years. To say - this is [what] I want. You owe me money, this is the value of the debt, this is how I want my payment.”

<sup>114</sup>The connection to the sphere of rights becomes particularly salient here, as an affirmative response from the accused European states would be to acknowledge the position of the Caribbean countries as legitimate right-holders.

<sup>115</sup>This approach has been widely critiqued for its linear and Euro-centric understanding of societal progress (Peet & Hartwick, 2009:131-134).

## 6.2 Concerns of redistribution: reparations for whom and how?

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recognitive claims can be considered social struggles, since emerging in reaction to perceived legal-moral misrecognition and exclusion from negotiating normative standards for reciprocal recognition. Their respective obstructed development inhibits adequate social conditions for achieving autonomy and emancipation.

Since HR constitute the normative moral-legal standards underlying reparations' criteria for recognition, not addressing inadequacies of domestication undermines the claims' moral validity among international and national development professionals. The TPP's HR rationale could instead risk being dismissed as a political tool<sup>116</sup> since "the strongest arguments for international justice are equally strong arguments for domestic justice" (Rodje Malcolm).

## 6.2 Concerns of redistribution: reparations for whom and how?

The reparations claim demands justice through fair redistribution of illegally acquired profits which developed the enslavers to the detriment of the enslaved (Beckles, 2013). But local operationalisation of reparations remains to be elaborated.

NCR-members emphasised that the government's adherence was a moment evolved from a historical struggle, joining a "gathering stream" towards redemption (Clinton Hutton). Since the claim remained emergent, redistribution was a deterrent aspect<sup>117</sup>.

Nonetheless, it constituted a concern among other stakeholders and is therefore elaborated below.

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<sup>116</sup>Cf. Ignatieff, Gutmann and Appiah (2001) and Douzinas (2007).

<sup>117</sup>Concurrently, NCR-members also affirmed operationalisation was being analysed by each country in developing the claim.



### 6.2.1 Implementing reparations

Reparations advocates<sup>118</sup> sustained reparations must restore the Jamaican psyche from the ‘mental slavery’ imbuing Jamaican society and disproportionately impacting the poor. Reparations must be invested in sustainable solutions to rebuild society and create opportunities for future generations to achieve “intergenerational equity” (Davis-Mattis). The widespread conception of reparations as individual handouts or ‘shameful begging’ “frustrates the discussion and the call for reparations” (Davis-Mattis) and is short-sighted. This indicates that the TPP remains to be successfully conveyed, possibly explaining low public endorsement.

Not all non-advocate informants were aware of reparations’ strategical conceptualisation. Their reasons for not embracing reparations, however, coincided with those who were, and included inadequate distribution mechanisms<sup>119</sup>. As the current political and economic system is perceived to consolidate class-segregation and power structures, they did not see how reparations could materialise to benefit the poor or marginalised<sup>120</sup>.

One informant suggested money *should* be distributed. Others remonstrated individual estimations would be inconceivable. Additionally, financial distributions in a Western-aspiring ‘consumer culture’ would only enrich the original perpetrators, whose high-value imported products Jamaicans would buy – another symptom of “post-traumatic slave syndrome” (Steven Golding<sup>121</sup>) wherein ‘development’ equalled material wealth and Western products (Bartley).

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<sup>118</sup>Including Sydney Bartley, Davey Haughton and NCR-members.

<sup>119</sup>For example, Annie, project manager at a community development foundation, doubted that money could “solve the historical trauma” and that reparations were the appropriate social remedy: “[I]f you get money, is the government actually going to use it for anything good? [...] How will it be used? I just don’t trust that it will be used well.” Likewise, André Haughton questioned: “First of all, who would that money go to? The government? The thieving government?”

<sup>120</sup>Including Annie, André Haughton, Anita, Flex, Rodane, EADUMC-members and Maya. See Appendix B for detailed information.

<sup>121</sup>Steven Golding is president of the United Negroes Improvement Association (UNIA), entrepreneur and member of the NCR.

## 6.2 Concerns of redistribution: reparations for whom and how?

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Other informants, having worked in poor areas, connected Jamaicans' short-term, money-focused attitude towards reparations to poverty, also associating poverty, the low public mobilisation, since fighting for daily survival reduced the attention scope and societal engagement<sup>122</sup>.

Mafundikwa added that Jamaicans' lacking engagement stemmed from a disbelief that reparations would happen or benefit them. André Haughton<sup>123</sup> substantiated: “[T]he system itself does not provide the resources for everyone”.

### 6.2.2 The system of development implementation

While the philosophical difference between reparations and aid is fundamental, perceived risks of elite capture of reparations operationalised as development investments might emanate from perceptions of how development is usually ‘done’, and the often obscure political processes piloting distribution and targeting criteria in development projects (Ferguson, 1990; Dixon, 2015). This view was confirmed by many non-advocate informants<sup>124</sup>.

Foreign actors dominate Jamaica's development industry<sup>125</sup> and the presence of multinational companies and intergovernmental and international organisations is considerable<sup>126</sup>. This has engendered the perception that foreign agendas play an important role in Jamaica's development. The private sector is equally strong. André Haughton contended that “banks run the island” while “foreign banks and interest rates squeeze the capital out of the country”, granting loans to consumption rather than sustainability and productiv-

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<sup>122</sup>In 2015, Jamaica's estimated poverty rate was 15.9 percent (World Bank, 2018). Experiments on cognitive implications of scarcity on long-term thinking seemingly confirm that poverty impedes rational allocation of attention (Shah, Mullainathan & Shafir, 2012).

<sup>123</sup>André Haughton is lecturer in International Finance at UWI.

<sup>124</sup>EADUMC-members, Anita, André Haughton, Rodane, Ras Malekot and Maya.

<sup>125</sup>China's political and economic influence steadily increases (The Caribbean Council, 2018; Ministry of Transport and Mining, 2018; Pellegrin, 2017), and the US dominates Jamaican trade. According to numbers from 2016, the partner share for the US was 41,47 % for import and 39,46 % for export (World Integrated Trade Solutions, 2018).

<sup>126</sup>These include i.a. the EU, the IMF, the World Bank Group, and various UN agencies and programmes.

## 6.2 Concerns of redistribution: reparations for whom and how?

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ity, since “they want to be the providers of goods and services”<sup>127</sup>. There are no policies encouraging banks to provide services serving development (Anita)<sup>128</sup>.

For many informants, current development projects either did not depart from or benefitted the poor - disproportionately suffering from legacies of slavery and colonialism. Maxine Stowe asserted that millions of dollars are invested in aid and development, but not “to change the fundamental inequities in the society”. The government’s “talk of reparations” only concerned “their own self-interest as politicians and serving the business class which is with them” (Stowe). Others affirmed that poverty alleviation programmes often failed due to stigmatisation, but moreover, that they are “not designed to help people get out of poverty, but to live in poverty less poor” (Anita)<sup>129</sup>. These aforementioned conceptions made non-advocate informants hesitant towards reparations conceived as development investments.

Regarding corruption risks in development contract allocation, reparations advocates reminded this “happens anyways” and everywhere. When it was stressed that reparations philosophical-moral foundation would render reparations-related projects particularly sensitive to this, all maintained transparency is key, and affirmed the necessity of anticorruption systems<sup>130</sup>.

Other informants demurred that even without corruption, state-led reparations could not alleviate poverty as it was “the state who is discriminating and [...] creating poverty” and since the system itself “does not work for the poor” (Anita). Elite capture would not necessarily be a question of will but of causality, due to entrenched structures surround-

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<sup>127</sup>A local columnist has affirmed the perception that socio-economic inequalities are consciously reinforced by elite-privileging policies (Espeut, 2017).

<sup>128</sup>For instance, Anita added, credits for productive aims to sectors identified by governments needing support for boosting sectoral development. This was perceived as consciously elaborated by intersecting business and political elites; the private sector is “the holy graal”.

<sup>129</sup>Some informants who had grown up poor asserted social mobility was possible and that desires for quick results, lack of ambition or not believing in a possible future hindered young and poor from advancing.

<sup>130</sup>Davis-Mattis nuanced the risk of elite capture of reparations. Firstly, the elite would not be targeted beneficiaries and even if they could profit, perhaps they would not want to be associated with benefitting since “already seen as part of the vestiges of the colonial system”, enjoying “undocumented privileges”.

ing development implementation and the profit-driven interests regulating them (André Haughton).

Anita contended that transformational reparations must change elite-protected systems perpetuating inequalities, and install wealth redistributing mechanisms. Otherwise, reparations would exacerbate disproportionate distributions of wealth and power. Reparations portrayed as development therefore “diverted from the real problems” (Anita). Instead of addressing the post-independence “fifty years of mismanagement, of stolen money, of corruption [and] lack of democracy” problems were blamed on the “outside”. Reparations were an “excuse for not having the democracy, the development, the wellbeing, the justice [and] the fairness established in society” (Anita). André Haughton inferred the global system, sustaining reparations would never be granted:

“This whole reparation thing is a shambles [...] a gimmicks, [...] another avenue to add one more layer of politics to an already existing complex scenario [...] if the farmer wanted to feed the dogs bones, they could [...] But [...] it’s not in the farmers interest to feed the dogs bones, because with deprivation, comes conflict. And conflict itself is a big industry[.]”

Whereas most informants agreed inequalities were reinforced by preserved pre-independence structures, what diverged among interviewees – and which proved determining for their stance towards the reparations claim – were the perceived underlying reasons, ranging from conscious inertia of a content elite to economic and political path dependency.

### 6.2.3 Underlying reasons for system inadequacies

NCR-members contended that foreign interference in financial policy was unavoidable<sup>131</sup>, since the post-slavery economic-political periphery (cf. Beckles, 2013)<sup>132</sup> confined Jamaica to underdevelopment and structural dependencies (Beckford, 1972:210)<sup>133</sup>. Debt cancellation and technology transfer are therefore included in the TPP.

Others contended the debt was accumulated post-independence due to mishandling and outdated policies<sup>134</sup>. André Haughton further maintained it was Jamaicans' import-fixed consumerism that made governments engage with the IMF to access external capital<sup>135</sup>.

Moreover, informants confirmed colonial institutional structures remained largely unchanged at independence<sup>136</sup>, whose “handover of power” to the elites was “the original sin of the birth of the Caribbean states” (Anita). Others suggested independence and post-independence development decisions were less a matter of choice than of necessity; independent Jamaica, despite insufficient human and material resources, had to “clean up all the British colonial mess” (Hutton). This included taking loans to develop societal infrastructures<sup>137</sup> while concurrently lacking adequate competence to engineer a solid

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<sup>131</sup>Informants often referred to the role of IMF in the country. Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), including measures to liberalise and privatise finance and trade during the 1980s first seemed to alleviate poverty (Handa & King, 1997), but long-term effects did not improve socio-economic inequalities (Kirton & Ferguson, 1992; Clarke & Howard, 2006).

<sup>132</sup>This included colonial continuity of restrictive infrastructure developed through the plantation model and based on massive mono-crop cultivation for exportation. Jamaica's physical infrastructure had been designed to transport primary resources to the ports rather than to create a functioning society (Hutton, André Haughton).

<sup>133</sup>The Caribbean Dependency Theory (CDT), developed by Caribbean scholars in the 1960s, particularly focused on multidimensional structural dependencies, including cultural, epistemological and political (Girvan, 2006).

<sup>134</sup>Anita, Prophet Greg, Rodane, Stowe, Ras Kremlin.

<sup>135</sup>André Haughton explained that the national debt did not come from loans, but from paying interest returns in foreign currency on Jamaican bonds which were sold to boost the economy. As these were risky investments in post-independent Jamaica, the IMF facilitated access to state credit. The IMF's role in Jamaica has been critiqued (cf. Scott, 2018), though André Haughton asserted that IMF had lately improved fiscal responsibility of the government.

<sup>136</sup>Including NCR-members, André Haughton, Anita, Malcolm, Mafundikwa.

<sup>137</sup>Hutton emphasised that “the great majority of schools built in Jamaica were built after independence from funds borrowed by the government, which they have to repay”.

state-building trajectory (André Haughton).

For NCR-members, to focus on the present political-economic system was “ammunition for the enemy” (Davis-Mattis), diverting attention from reparations’ essentiality: amending the historical debt of racialised poverty and structural oppression. Reparations were not invented to accommodate contemporary political interests since “change is not the issue, repairing is the issue” (Golding). Dismissing reparations as an attempt to blame internal failures on external actors was yet another manifestation of ‘mental colonisation’ defending the persistently oppressive West.

### 6.2.4 The centrality of land rights

Interviewees across sectors affirmed “squatting” was a main impediment to development and foundation of “the impoverishment of the majority of people” (Stowe)<sup>138</sup>. Some own land on hostile hillsides where former enslaved escaped plantations, but “the arable land, the land that can make money, are not owned by Black people” (Stowe). Non-reparations advocates<sup>139</sup> agreed that land rights must be central for reparations, especially since the disproportionate distribution directly stems from land-owning patterns of the plantation system<sup>140</sup>. Independence neither instigated land reforms, and land privatisation during the expanding tourism industry entailed many de facto evictions (Anita)<sup>141</sup>.

As squatting prevents infrastructure development, squatters must “catch water at the standby with bucket, steal electricity, [and] can’t cook a proper meal” (Annie<sup>142</sup>). Ras

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<sup>138</sup>Squatting implies “illegal occupation and use of land and/or buildings”, and is an acknowledged issue in Jamaica (Tindigarukayo, 2002:95).

<sup>139</sup>Including Ras Malekot, Annie, Anita, André Haughton and EADUMC-members.

<sup>140</sup>At Emancipation in 1838, ‘freed’ slaves did not receive any land. Instead, they were obstructed from ownership by facing prices 60 times the market value (Hutton). Most formal land rights have been inherited since slavery. Clinton Hutton contended that post-Emancipation, “the emerging ruling class” and “remnants of the plantocracy” appropriated land while “no land was taken from them” for redistribution.

<sup>141</sup>Anita affirmed an incremental distribution of land titles today, but which is too slow to entail transformative change.

<sup>142</sup>Annie is project manager for a community development foundation.

Robert<sup>143</sup>, often threatened over his few square meters, argued the squatter denomination implied to not be “recognised as a citizen with rights”. The land problem reinforced desires for repatriation; land was “abundant” in Africa, but denied to Jamaicans having worked it for centuries, despite repeated petitions throughout history for land concessions<sup>144</sup>.

The TPP addresses slavery’s impact on land rights for indigenous people<sup>145</sup>, but omits post-independence discriminative practices (Strecker, 2016, 2017). The term “indigenous” further excludes other equally affected marginalised groups, e.g. poor and Rastafarians<sup>146</sup>. For Rastafari, the impact is grave as nature and agriculture are integral to their philosophy and lifestyle (Chevannes, 1994).

### 6.2.5 Redistribution to Rastafarians

NCR’s current historiographic orientation, Stowe argued, shielded discussions from more important issues for contemporary community development. Rather than repatriation, access to economic markets culturally relevant to Rastafari, e.g. ganja and reggae, must be part of meaningful reparations to this community.

The ganja industry is a cornerstone in Jamaica’s real economy<sup>147</sup>, and expanding internationally. Rastafarians’ sacramental use of ganja was long used as a legitimising factor for their discrimination, and EADUMC-members asserted continuous exclusion from this market. Rastafarians’ association to reggae has generated considerable profits through e.g. the tourism industry, but without being reinvested in Rastafari communities (EADUMC-members). Instead, EADUMC-members argued the Rastafari ‘brand’ was continuously

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<sup>143</sup>Ras Robert is a non-organised Rastafarian, working as a fruit store manager.

<sup>144</sup>In 1865, inhabitants of the parish St. Ann appealed to the Queen for land to counter post-Emancipation poverty and unemployment. The answer exhorted them to work harder when “their labour [was] wanted” to render plantations more profitable and thereby increase their wages (Williams, 1970:345). Since then, Rastafarians have repeatedly petitioned the Queen, including for land allocation (Shepherd et al., 2012). André Haughton opined it was futile to speak of reparations while the Queen remained owner of the land.

<sup>145</sup>See Appendix A, point 3

<sup>146</sup>Notably, the Coral Gardens massacre started with a land dispute between a Rastafarian and a non-Rastafari land owner (*Bad Friday: Rastafari after Coral Gardens*, 2011).

<sup>147</sup>According to André Haughton, it amounted to 70 %, including the formal market.

exploited without any benefit sharing mechanisms to redistribute profits (cf. King, 1999; Price, 2003)<sup>148</sup>. The EADUMC-established trust for collecting financial returns from their brand and economic activities remains unrecognised by the government, whose current disinterest in redistribution confirmed to EADUMC-members that reparations were a political grandstanding.

### 6.2.6 Redistribution: implications for recognition

The TPP conceives reparations as necessary to reconstruct propitious social conditions enabling social development. In a morally responsible society, these conditions must be unconditionally offered to all community members (Smith, 2012). Development investments are to ensure fair distribution. Since the reparations rationale denounces colonialist injustices, such investments must not perpetuate or reinforce remnant colonialist structures causing the social injustices reparations seek to subvert.

However, many stakeholders perceived that current development projects evaded the moral accountability of social institutions, since enacted within a system influenced by foreign interests and tailored to benefit a powerful elite investing in consumption rather than development. Reparative development investments into this system could therefore not be operationalised without consolidating prevailing power imbalances, enriching those not suffering from slavery's legacies.

Some argued this resulted from the failure of former colonisers to assume *their* moral social responsibilities, while counterarguments maintained that if contemporary expressions of such systems, no matter their origin, were not addressed, reparations could not be transformational for the alleged beneficiaries i.e. achieve their emancipatory ambition. Contradictorily, the movements' struggle for recognition would enhance misrecognition of the poor.

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<sup>148</sup>Various non-Rastafari informants pointed out the difficulty of claiming ownership over reggae and ganja, arguing these were neither discovered nor invented by Rastafari.



Intact pre-independence institutions perpetuated unequal redistribution of wealth, including land, a disrespect which empirically manifests through poverty, whose societal exclusion violates all spheres of recognition. Restrained civil rights impede self-respect, and denigrated social rights inhibits self-esteem and dignity since obstructing the fulfilment of basic needs. This long-term exclusion from identity-forming relations to self entails social disintegration and disbelief in social structures. Thus, alleged beneficiaries may not mobilise around reparations if these are perceived as reinforcing a system already denigrating their status as autonomous citizens.

The official endorsement of Rastafari cultural particularities is experienced as false recognition. While seemingly demonstrating social esteem, it does not prove genuine solidarity, since not accompanied by cognitive-legal recognition through economic and political inclusion and profit redistribution. Contrarily, as the co-opted elements grow in foreign recognition, so do the economic incentives to control the market and further commodify Rastafari identity. This ‘illusory legitimacy’ (cf. King, 1999) invoked through esteem-recognition obfuscates the denied respect-recognition since Rastafarians’ rights are continuously stifled. The prevented access to relations of recognition hampers Rastafari autonomy formation, contradicting the TPP’s objective. Meaningful reparations to Rastafarians must aim for their full recognition by addressing current obstacles preventing their participation in markets whose popularity they helped generate.

## **6.3 The issue of representation**

Aside from its legal elaboration, public sensitisation and mobilisation are prioritised to strengthen the case (RCC, 2018a; interviewed NCR-members):

”If the beneficiaries don’t see the value of it and don’t want to be a part of what they’re going to receive, then why would the giver give? The giver needs to trust this is on the behalf of the beneficiaries. If the beneficiaries have no interest, then, the giver is not gonna give” (Davis-Mattis).

Views on the need for unity in a socio-economically stratified society condensed in the category of representation.

### 6.3.1 Public mobilisation and political distrust

Awareness-raising activities include lectures, movie screenings and events. Youth being a target group, NCR has organised baton relays and school lectures and reparations have been incorporated into highschool curricula. Financial restraints limited outreach, especially to poorer and rural communities. New adherents are necessary since events often attract returning or socio-economically undiversified audiences<sup>149</sup>. This risked purveying that reparations only concerned “a bunch of intelligentia” (Davis-Mattis) which would restrain public support. Though NCR-members defended reparations already before the governments’ adherence, reparations became publicly visible (and political) through the state-level proclamation<sup>150</sup>. Many therefore relate the claim, and the NCR, with the government’s agenda.

This is problematic considering the widespread distrust of politics and politicians, which also imbued sceptic opinions towards reparations across stakeholder groups. Lacking transparency, accountability and socio-economic segregation between politicians and the people they allegedly represent have caused transgenerational sensations of misrepresentation: “[T]here is no transparency. [...] my [grandfather] said that he would never take even a bottle of water from a politician, because they are going to expect something back” (Rodane<sup>151</sup>).

Contextualising this enunciation relates to Jamaica’s binary political system and garrison infrastructure. Since independence, two major parties are interchangeably in power,

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<sup>149</sup>This was confirmed in field observations of events attended during the research process. For a comprehensive list of these events, see Appendix B.2: Attended events.

<sup>150</sup>Rastafarian reparations activism has predominantly been associated with repatriation, their marginalisation confining any success as improbable or inconceivable.

<sup>151</sup>Rodane is an entrepreneur and volunteer at a local NGO.

the JLP and the PNP, initially related to opposing labour movements that politicised especially poor communities. A system emerged where political loyalty was exchanged for patronage (Thomas, 2016:181-182). This personalised political power and developed a clientelistic culture permeating society (ibid.) where criminal gang leaders ('dons') secured electoral allegiance of citizens held "captive" in "garrison communities" (Gray, 2004:150) in exchange for political and financial support<sup>152</sup>.

Various informants affirmed this system still exists, though less salient<sup>153</sup>. Poor urban areas still suffer disproportionately from crime and violence (Thomas, 2011)<sup>154</sup>, and remain highly politicised; around elections, tensions increased in neighbouring communities on opposing sides of the "war" (Rodane). Loyalty to 'dons' and politicians remained individualised: "[P]eople will defend [their] person to death" (Rodane). Mistrust of politicians as benevolent representatives of the people ostensibly correlate with lingering garrisons and their political-administrative function.

Political sanctioning of criminality and violence has been associated with a subversion of democracy (Figueroa & Sives, 2003). Others have interpreted the garrison system as means of empowerment and identity affirmation for the 'lower' classes, and a pursuit of dignity and respect (Gray, 2004).

Anita affirmed the interconnection between garrisons and democratic deterioration, arguing that Jamaica is an electoral formal democracy due to the "handover of power" at independence; without a pre-independence liberation movement, Jamaicans had "no possibility to formulate their own identity" as free persons. Such post-colonial societies

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<sup>152</sup>On the intersections between poverty, political clientelism and criminality in Jamaica, see especially Levy and Chevannes (1996), Harriott (2003), Gray (2004) and Thomas (2011).

<sup>153</sup>One manifestation of its persistence occurred in 2010, when a downtown community, Tivoli Gardens, in Kingston turned into a "police state" as Bruce Golding, then Prime Minister and Member of Parliament for the area, opposed a US requested extradition order for the community 'don' (Thomas, 2011:223). When Golding finally yielded, Jamaican forces entered the community to seize the 'don'. This resulted in the death of an estimated 75-200 Jamaicans, of which most died defending their leader (Thomas, 2016:183).

<sup>154</sup>Jamaica's homicide rate was 47.01 in 2016 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes [UNODC], n.d.) compared to an international average of 6.2 in 2012 (UNODC, 2013:12). Of total homicides between 2008 and 2011, 44% were attributed to organised crime or gang violence (ibid.:41).

seldom developed into genuine democratic societies (Anita)<sup>155</sup>.

Insofar political clientilism can be traced to social conditions emerging from colonialism and prevailing post-independence (cf. Gray, 2004), it corroborates the view that violence, criminality and a defunct ‘rule of law’ pertain to the ‘colonial mess’ obstructing contemporary social development. Whatever the origin, what matters for public mobilisation around reparations is the perceived credibility of the government as representative of the people.

Rodane feels that “too many promises” in combination with inadequate information distribution and irrational inconsistencies in development policy, caused by a “back-and-forth” attitude between changing administrations<sup>156</sup>, further undermine his trust in politicians and their genuine will to act in people’s best interest. He does not vote since it “wouldn’t really make a difference”.

EADUMC-members and NGO-employees added that at government consultations, if any, their presence was merely nominal. This reverberated across sectors: “The way we deal with representation, I don’t believe in it” (Bartley). Various informants confirmed underrepresentation of youth and marginalised groups in governmental bodies, including the NCR<sup>157</sup>. This is especially significant for reparations, since youth and Rastafari are target groups.

Others stressed that only few individuals within the government genuinely supported reparations<sup>158</sup>, a perception further impacting on the government’s broader credibility in pursuing the claim.

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<sup>155</sup>A formal, electoral or “unconsolidated” democracy is a state of governance in which free elections are periodically held, but which does not include “meaningful participation or representation” (Hinds, 2008:389). Notably, in analysing the democracy discourse in the Anglophone Caribbean, Hinds confirms Anita’s statement.

<sup>156</sup>Rodane explained that when there is a party shift in the government, ongoing development projects are aborted per principle even though their own policies may support the aborted project’s rationale.

<sup>157</sup>Davey Haughton affirmed that youth were always only included on sublevels of councils and committees, of which he himself was a proof. Anita and EADUMC-members concurred.

<sup>158</sup>Anita, André Haughton and the EADUMC-members sustained this argument. One informant mentioned inter-parliamentary oppositions, as some were concerned regarding the impact of reparations on e.g. aid to Jamaica.

### 6.3.2 Rastafari and the challenge of representation

The inherent tension in assuming Rastafari's ideological mission and previously subjugated Afro-centric approach rendered Rastafari inclusion imperative in the government-led claim. Their role for the movement has been officially recognised and emphasised by many advocates (Rauhut, 2018a)<sup>159</sup>.

However, Stowe asserted the movement was not unified. Instead, the government's interference "muddies the water" since driven by politico-economic interests rather than ethical<sup>160</sup>. Moreover, NCR-Rastafarians did not represent Rastafari, since failing to protect the community's contemporary interests despite collaborating with the government (EADUMC-members). By only inviting selected, cooperative Rastafarians, the government proved their disinterest in genuine inclusion<sup>161</sup>.

That some Rastafarians do not recognise the UWI-attached NCR-Rastafarians as representatives is known to the movement, since Rastafari's anti-governmental stance renders government-involved Rastafarians subject to suspicion<sup>162</sup>. But this approach also thwarts possible achievements in policy-related negotiations<sup>163</sup>. Another irreconcilability concerns the EADUMC's desire for reparations to benefit Rastafari communities rather than national-regional development. Others remarked that the EADUMC was not unani-

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<sup>159</sup>The affirmation of Rastafari importance and the need for their genuine inclusion in reparations were affirmed by interviewed NCR-members, Bartley and Davey Haughton.

<sup>160</sup>While the EADUMC confirmed that individuals both within the NCR, the UN, and even the government did make sincere and serious efforts to advice and support the Rastafari, they maintained this was not enough to counter established structural impediments.

<sup>161</sup>EADUMC-representatives attended the first CARICOM reparations conference in 2013, and claimed repatriation was included in the TPP only due to Rastafari persistence (Prophet Greg) and to increase legitimacy, but that it would never be seriously considered. At the second CARICOM conference in 2014, EADUMC-members were only given perfunctory attention and have since been denied access to the conference report (Prophet Greg).

<sup>162</sup>The anti-governmentality relates to Rastafari pan-African assertions (they are African citizens, not Jamaican) and a conviction of Africans', especially Rastafarians', inherent superiority (Price, 2003). This perception often emerged in interviews with Rastafarian informants. Therefore, the perceived neo-colonialism of the government in place impeded all representability (EADUMC-members, Ras Malekot, Ras Robert).

<sup>163</sup>This was pointed to by Bartley, Anita and NCR-members.

mously acknowledged as representative of all Rastafarians either<sup>164</sup>.

#### 6.3.3 Internal reparations

The centrality of Rastafari to reparations has concentrated internal reparations to particularly address the Coral Gardens (CG) massacre, which acquired symbolic value as the most significant event illustrating Rastafari oppression. Governments were long reluctant to investigate Rastafari discrimination (Anita). Not until 2015 did the Public Defender release a report (Office of the Public Defender, 2015)<sup>165</sup>. In April 2017, Jamaica’s Prime Minister formally apologised for the “incident”, declaring a trust fund would be established for the community (Cross, 2017)<sup>166</sup>.

EADUMC-members warned it would be misleading to equalise the apology and promised compensation with internal reparations to Rastafari. Contrariwise, they perceived the CG-focused apology as an “itemisation of the Rastafari oppression” (Ras Kremlin), ignoring previous and ensuing discrimination.

It also demonstrated ignorance of Rastafari miscellanies, as the compensation would not benefit the wider community (EADUMC-members)<sup>167</sup>. Neither would it empower the CG community, since managed by the government – a hypothesis later confirmed<sup>168</sup>. For the EADUMC, governmental attempts to internal reparations added to previously iterated

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<sup>164</sup>Not all Rastafarians or mansions adhere to the EADUMC. Jahlani Niaah asserted the EADUMC has “suffered manipulation at various different levels” and “doesn’t hold the credibility that it would wish to have as a representation of the all mansions”. However, this partly emanated from the acephalous nature of Rastafarianism: “the community functions best in disorganised ways, and organisation poses a range of problems” (Niaah).

<sup>165</sup>Thomas (forthcoming) asserts that if the massacre is finally addressed, it is because enough time has passed to purge it of its subversive potential.

<sup>166</sup>Non-Rastafari and Rastafari informants agreed the promised compensation was too low. It initially amounted to “no less than” 10 million Jamaican dollars (Cross, 2017), circa 75 000 US dollars.

<sup>167</sup>However, a non-Rastafari interviewee reminded that the CG community did not recognise the EADUMC as their representative either.

<sup>168</sup>The Coral Gardens community did reject the government’s trust fund, which was set up despite the community’s protests and appeal for individual, direct distribution rather than a government-controlled trust (Frater, 2018).

manifestations of superficial recognition<sup>169</sup>.

### 6.3.4 Representation: implications for recognition

The reparations claim has been construed as subverting traditional development models (Rauhut, 2018a). However, since current politics fail to strengthen social welfare, several stakeholders suspect the government supports reparations for political self-interest.

Dubieties of representation in reparations claims are problematic, as their perceived validity depends on the claimant's legitimacy in representing the alleged victims. Insofar the government demands recognition on behalf of Jamaicans and their historical-cultural identity, it fulfils the normative requirements on state representativeness in international relations (Honneth, 2012:142-144). But the case of Jamaica further illustrates how a represented national identity built on assumed collective narratives can be subject to misuse in foreign policy (ibid.:146-151). Though a majority of non-advocate informants support NCR's rationale and work, they do not feel represented by the government. This negatively reflects on NCR's efforts, despite their genuine engagement. The government's endorsement purveys reparations as driven by a privileged elite, furthering the sense of deficient representativeness.

Mistrust in politicians emanates from perceived insufficiencies of transparency and accountability, political discontinuity and interlinkages between politicians and social violence, disproportionately impacting poor areas. A perceived exclusion from, or merely nominal inclusion in, political spaces further hollows the sense of democracy. This could explain low mobilisation, especially among youth who experience political engagement as useless. If Jamaica sustains a formal rather than substantive democracy, this has implications on

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<sup>169</sup>For example, since the apology was void of structural efforts (e.g. granting Rastafari access to existing profitable markets) which would genuinely benefit the community. A formal apology issued two weeks later by Antigua and Barbuda revealed the inadequacies of Jamaica's apology, according to the EADUMC. It was directed towards the entire Rastafari community and promised extended inclusion and benefit-sharing in the ganja industry (The Gleaner, 2018).

the formation of recognitive relations.

If social and political public spheres are circumscribed by political interests, it impedes the likelihood and success of democratically conducted public discussions to determine moral normative standards of legal and social recognition (Brink & Owen, 2007b:7). Instead, top-down established normative criteria perpetuate political exclusion, further obstructing citizens' from co-determining and accessing equal social conditions to develop self-determination and autonomy i.e. "realiz[e] their life goals without unjustifiable disadvantages and with the greatest possible freedom" (Honneth, 2003b:259). Ultimately, this structure maintains experiences of social injustices.

Since publicly debated social moral claims, e.g. reparations presuppose claimants' personal autonomy, the government will not acquire representative legitimacy until citizens domestically experience political inclusion in negotiating the normative criteria regulating recognitive relations, through which said autonomy is achieved (ibid.)<sup>170</sup>.

EADUMC-members' perceived exclusion is viewed as evidencing the governments' neo-colonialism. But rather than entailing an identity collapse, it supports their anti-governmental and Afro-centric narrative. This reinforces rather than disintegrates their sense of cultural sovereignty, affirming their conviction of superiority. Contradictorily, and across recognitive spheres, their exclusion strengthens their self-esteem. The government's disrespect towards the EADUMC further fuels their misrecognition of the government – a sort of symmetrical 'dis-esteem' – counteracting the claim's international legitimisation.

Initiated internal reparations suggest that the state-level appeal for recognition prompts recognition of domestically state-sanctioned crimes, particularly regarding Rastafari, since important for the claim's credibility. A formal apology implies official recognition to redeem Rastafarians' impaired social esteem. But all Rastafarians do not feel represented in the official movement<sup>171</sup>. That contemporary discrimination is not challenged by government-

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<sup>170</sup>Similarly, Thame points to contradictions between Caribbean aspirations to freedom and the maintenance of pre-independence structures of order in post-colonial Jamaica (2014).

<sup>171</sup>This partly contradicts earlier indications (cf. Rauhut, 2018a, 2018b). However, as is alluded to in



engaged Rastafarians purportedly disproves their representativeness. Rather, Rastafari identity is perceived as co-opted for legitimising purposes. However, reciprocal misrecognition between NCR-Rastafarians and the EADUMC queries who has prerogative to decide criteria determining 'true' Rastafarianism. The negation of moral agency mutually denies conditions for self-formation and maintains internal disintegration, undermining Rastafari's negotiating power as a coherent political movement.

The locus of representation is important since recognitive relations must be reciprocal for subjective agents to achieve full autonomy. Withal, the aforementioned examples indicate that if one agent (the representative) assumes the identity of another (the represented) without prior relationships of mutual recognition (where the represented enjoys autonomy, thus possessing the moral agency required for delegating the same to the representative), false recognition occurs. This is especially significant when the assumed identity is a decisive criteria for the perceived validity of the represented, such as in reparative claims.

False recognition undermines and ultimately counteracts the reparations struggle's original aim, insofar this aspires for sustainable justice and self-restoration by instituting social conditions conducive to self-realisation and freedom.

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the analysis, this does not discredit those Rastafarians advocating through the official movement.

## 7 Concluding remarks

This thesis investigated select stakeholder perceptions on the government-endorsed pursuit of reparations for slavery and colonialism in the case study of Jamaica, in the context of its formulation as a development strategy. An underlying assumption was that international interstate appeals to principles of social and historical justice eventually incite examinations of claimant countries' own adherence to these principles, which if found unaddressed or violated might negatively impact on the claimants' perceived credibility and validity and hence overall public endorsement.

I have argued that multileveled discursive and practical contradictions within three categories relevant to the claim partly explain low multi-stakeholder support in Jamaica: development conceptualisation, redistribution and representation. Findings unveiled societal and ethical complexities reflecting ongoing domestic social and political conflicts engendered by history and entangled by contemporaneity.

A discrepancy regarding development conceptualisation can be distinguished between cross-sectoral individual convictions favouring human development, and the de facto state-level enacted 'modernist', liberal understanding of development prioritising economic growth and individual entrepreneurialism. This infers an individualisation of moral responsibility for achieving self-realisation, discharging the state of its social accountability. It also contrasts the TPP's narrative which builds on collective Caribbean identities and foreign liabilities concerning social preconditions for development and emancipation, identifying reparations as the necessary remedy for recreating propitious development conditions.

But the underlying presuppositions – the normative standards against which criteria

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are derived to determine desirable state reconstruction and redistribution of reparations – remain elusive to some stakeholders due to perceived political exclusion. Socio-economic segregation in public discussions determining cognitive criteria further questions the representativeness of a privileged representative vis-à-vis an underprivileged represented.

Despite a collective consciousness favouring the reparations rationale, findings indicate public endorsement is restrained since renovation of contemporary political and social institutions perpetuating social inequalities is absent from the TPP. Perceptions of consciously preserved colonial institutions and a hollow democracy breed mistrust against the political elite. This devaluates the perceived credibility of reparations being operationalised to benefit those most suffering from the legacies of slavery.

The poor status of human rights, underlying the reparations rationale, further undermines its credibility. In a formally democratic political culture, however, continuous need for state support may restrict elaborations of domestic critique even if crucial for reparations to achieve the transformational potential which in part constitutes their justification.

While Rastafari's importance for the reparations movement is formally recognised, some Rastafarians still perceive political and economic exclusion obstructing community development. Intra-community divisions further impede these efforts.

While Rastafari's disorganisation was identified as undermining their political credibility, it could be argued that persistent disrespect from Jamaican authorities undercut their chances of survival as a coherent movement. If their political weakness today is fragmentation, a potential root is structural misrecognition. This postulation equally corresponds to the reparations rationale wherein the African diaspora is the misrecognised subject.

Suggesting abovementioned gaps are interrelated, integral recognition (rights and solidarity) via internal reparations – measures to 'unveil' and publicly address Jamaica's historical and contemporary injustices – must encompass all Jamaicans to improve the claim's credibility and public endorsement. This requires a meaningful inclusion of stakeholders.

While the reparations rationale explains contradictory replications of patterns within

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socio-ethical, economic and political domains as institutionalised legacies of slavery, empirical data indicate it is equally naïve to completely dismiss accountability of present political-economic elites. Such a dismissal could contrariwise be argued reductionist, since undivided victimisation would negate recognising the moral agency of the Jamaican government and people. Concurrently, enforcing equal normative criteria on developing and developed countries may be similarly unjust and immoral, especially when the latter has developed on the expense of the former.

The empirical application of a recognition-theoretical framework proved useful to describe and explain identified paradoxical phenomena and their social preconditions. While the study is case-specific, the demonstrated centrality of recognition in struggles for historical justice and reparations, particularly when formulated as means for development, lay bare the parallelism between the normative foundations of recognition theory and the idea of development. Both aspire for social emancipation by addressing skewed social conditions originating from historical injustices, and both assume the ideal of individual and collective autonomy wherein development mirrors recognition. This proves the applicability and relevance of recognition theory for development studies and especially for reparations, since reparative claims are social struggles for both symbolic and material recognition.

The case of Rastafari demonstrated differential consequential effects of misrecognition across cognitive spheres, suggesting ‘false’ recognition as an emergent theoretical-analytical category.

Reparations for slavery is a transnational movement but with local implications. While historical, economic and legal studies are crucial to build the case, reparations ultimately concern the improvement of subjective life-worlds. It therefore constitutes a dynamic locus of research especially for sociological approaches, which thus far has received limited attention.

While this study focused on broader cross-sectoral conceptions, particular factors including class, gender, age and ethnicity can impact underlying tensions. Local-level re-

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search analysing disaggregated data could provide more exhaustive accounts of specific perceptions.

This approach could notably be suitable for researching a fourth emergent category which was not encompassed by this study. It regards the reconciliation between the movement's Afro-centric narrative and the officially dismissed but persisting and permeating multidimensional idealisation of the West, disproportionately impacting the poor. Rastafari's historical role for black pride further adds to this complexity.

Since redistributive implementation will receive increased attention as the claim progresses, Fraser's dualist model could allow a more accessible case-specific cognitive-theoretical analysis, since explicitly addressing material inequalities.

Finally, a recognition analysis of the interstate-level could further elucidate locally reverberating political-ethical dynamics.

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# A The CARICOM Ten Point Action Plan for Reparatory Justice (TPP)

Source: Leigh Day (2014)<sup>172</sup>.

## 1. FULL FORMAL APOLOGY

The healing process for victims and the descendants of the enslaved and enslavers requires as a precondition the offer of a sincere formal apology by the governments of Europe. Some governments in refusing to offer an apology have issued in place Statements of Regrets. Such statements do not acknowledge that crimes have been committed and represent a refusal to take responsibility for such crimes. Statements of regrets represent, furthermore, a reprehensible response to the call for apology in that they suggest that victims and their descendants are not worthy of an apology. Only an explicit formal apology will suffice within the context of the Caribbean Reparative Justice Programme (CRJP).

## 2. REPATRIATION

Over 10 million Africans were stolen from their homes and forcefully transported to the Caribbean as the enslaved chattel and property of Europeans. The transatlantic slave trade is the largest forced migration in human history and has no parallel in terms of man's

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<sup>172</sup>The full plan is available at: <https://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2014/March-2014/CARICOM-nations-unanimously-approve-10-point-plan> (Accessed 2018-08-01). Also available at <http://caricomreparations.org/caricom/caricoms-10-point-reparation-plan/> (CRC, 2018).

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inhumanity to man. This trade in enchained bodies was a highly successful commercial business for the nations of Europe. The lives of millions of men, women and children were destroyed in search of profit. The descendants of these stolen people have a legal right to return to their homeland. A Repatriation program must be established and all available channels of international law and diplomacy used to resettle those persons who wish to return. A resettlement program should address such matters as citizenship and deploy available best practices in respect of community re-integration.

### **3. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM**

The governments of Europe committed genocide upon the native Caribbean population. Military commanders were given official instructions by their governments to eliminate these communities and to remove those who survive pogroms from the region. Genocide and land appropriation went hand in hand. A community of over 3,000,000 in 1700 has been reduced to less than 30,000 in 2000. Survivors remain traumatized, landless, and are the most marginalized social group within the region. The University of the West Indies offers an Indigenous Peoples Scholarship in a desperate effort at rehabilitation. It is woefully insufficient. A Development Plan is required to rehabilitate this community.

### **4. CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS**

European nations have invested in the development of community institutions such as museums and research centres in order to prepare their citizens for an understanding of these crimes against humanity (CAH). These facilities serve to reinforce within the consciousness of their citizens an understanding of their role in history as rulers and change agents. There are no such institutions in the Caribbean where the CAH were committed. Caribbean schoolteachers and researchers do not have the same opportunity. Descendants of these CAH continue to suffer the disdain of having no relevant institutional systems through which their experience can be scientifically told. This crisis must be remedied within the CRJP.

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## **5. PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS**

The African descended population in the Caribbean has the highest incidence in the world of chronic diseases in the forms of hypertension and type two diabetes. This pandemic is the direct result of the nutritional experience, physical and emotional brutality, and overall stress profiles associated with slavery, genocide, and apartheid. Over 10 million Africans were imported into the Caribbean during the 400 years of slavery. At the end of slavery in the late 19th century less than 2 million remained. The chronic health condition of Caribbean blacks now constitutes the greatest financial risk to sustainability in the region. Arresting this pandemic requires the injection of science, technology, and capital beyond the capacity of the region. Europe has a responsibility to participate in the alleviation of this health disaster. The CRJP addresses this issue and calls upon the governments of Europe to take responsibility for this tragic human legacy of slavery and colonisation.

## **6. ILLITERACY ERADICATION**

At the end of the European colonial period in most parts of the Caribbean, the British in particular left the black and indigenous communities in a general state of illiteracy. Some 70 percent of blacks in British colonies were functionally illiterate in the 1960s when nation states began to appear. Jamaica, the largest such community, was home to the largest number of such citizens. Widespread illiteracy has subverted the development efforts of these nation states and represents a drag upon social and economic advancement. Caribbean governments allocate more than 70 percent of public expenditure to health and education in an effort to uproot the legacies of slavery and colonization. European governments have a responsibility to participate in this effort within the context of the CRJP.

## **7. AFRICAN KNOWLEDGE PROGRAM**

The forced separation of Africans from their homeland has resulted in cultural and social alienation from identity and existential belonging. Denied the right in law to life, and

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divorced by space from the source of historic self, Africans have craved the right to return and knowledge of the route to roots. A program of action is required to build ‘bridges of belonging’. Such projects as school exchanges and culture tours, community artistic and performance programs, entrepreneurial and religious engagements, as well as political interaction, are required in order to neutralize the void created by slave voyages. Such actions will serve to build knowledge networks that are necessary for community rehabilitation.

## **8. PSYCHOLOGICAL REHABILITATION**

For over 400 years Africans and their descendants were classified in law as non-human, chattel, property, and real estate. They were denied recognition as members of the human family by laws derived from the parliaments and palaces of Europe. This history has inflicted massive psychological trauma upon African descendant populations. This much is evident daily in the Caribbean. Only a reparatory justice approach to truth and educational exposure can begin the process of healing and repair. Such an engagement will call into being, for example, the need for greater Caribbean integration designed to enable the coming together of the fragmented community.

## **9. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER**

For 400 years the trade and production policies of Europe could be summed up in the British slogan: “not a nail is to be made in the colonies”. The Caribbean was denied participation in Europe’s industrialization process, and was confined to the role of producer and exporter of raw materials. This system was designed to extract maximum value from the region and to enable maximum wealth accumulation in Europe. The effectiveness of this policy meant that the Caribbean entered its nation building phase as a technologically and scientifically ill-equipped- backward space within the postmodern world economy. Generations of Caribbean youth, as a consequence, have been denied membership and access to the science and technology culture that is the world’s youth patrimony. Technology transfer and science sharing for development must be a part of the CRJP.

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## 10. DEBT CANCELLATION

Caribbean governments that emerged from slavery and colonialism have inherited the massive crisis of community poverty and institutional unpreparedness for development. These governments still daily engage in the business of cleaning up the colonial mess in order to prepare for development. The pressure of development has driven governments to carry the burden of public employment and social policies designed to confront colonial legacies. This process has resulted in states accumulating unsustainable levels of public debt that now constitute their fiscal entrapment. This debt cycle properly belongs to the imperial governments who have made no sustained attempt to deal with debilitating colonial legacies. Support for the payment of domestic debt and cancellation of international debt are necessary reparatory actions.”

## B List of informants and attended events

### B.1 Informants in interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs)

#### B.1.1 Overview of included stakeholder groups

Stakeholder group	Included in this study (Number of consulted informants )		
CRC (Caribbean Reparations Commission)	CRC: National consultant for agenda implementation (1)		
Government agencies	National Centre for Youth Development (1)	NCR (4)	PIOJ (1)
National reparations advocates			
International and intergovernmental development organisations	Anonymous (1)		
	UN agency (1)		
National and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs)	Jamaicans for Justice (1)		
	Other NGO (1)		
	Community development foundation (1)		
Youth	Individual entrepreneurs (2)		
Minority groups	EADUMC (4)		
Rastafari	Non-organised Rastafarians (2)		
Other key informants	Documentary film producer (1)		
	Economist/UWI (1)		

B.1 Informants in interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs)

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**B.1.2 Detailed information on informants per stakeholder group**

Sector or organisation	Name (Title/Profession)	Interview/FGD	Time and place
<b>CRC Caribbean Reparations Commission</b>			
<b>CRC</b>	Sydney Bartley (Consultant to CARICOM's Reparations Commission) & International Cultural Policy Expert	Semi-structured double interview	22 May, UNESCO Cluster Office for the Caribbean, New Kingston, Kingston
<b>Government agencies / National reparations advocates</b>			
<b>National Centre for Youth Development</b>	Davey Haughton (Youth Empowerment Officer at the Youth & Adolescent policy Division, National Center Youth Development, Ministry of Education, Youth & Information, member of the NCR Reparation Youth Sub-committee)	Semi-structured double interview	22 May, UNESCO Cluster Office for the Caribbean, New Kingston, Kingston
<b>National Council on Reparation (NCR) Members</b>	Laleta Davis-Mattis (Co-chair of NCR, Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, UWI)	Semi-structured interview	14 May, Kingston)
	Jahlani Niaah (Rastafari member of the NCR, Lecturer at the Institute of Caribbean Studies, Coordinator of the Rastafari Studies Center, UWI)	Semi-structured interview	30 May, Kingston

B.1 Informants in interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs)

Sector or organisation	Name (Title/Profession)	Interview/FGD	Time and place
<b>National Council on Reparation (NCR) Members (cont.)</b>	Steven Golding (President of the United Negroes Improvement Association [UNIA], Entrepreneur)	Semi-structured interview	18 May, Kingston
	Clinton Hutton (Professor and lecturer of Caribbean Political Philosophy, Culture and Aesthetics, UWI)	Semi-structured interview	31 May, Kingston
<b>Government agencies</b>			
<b>Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ)</b>	Lauren* (Sector specialist, Vision 2030)	Semi-structured interview	21 May, PIOJ, New Kingston, Kingston
<b>International and intergovernmental development organisations</b>			
<b>Anonymous</b>	Anita* (International Human Rights expert)	Semi-structured interview	12 April, Kingston
<b>UN Agency**</b>	Vivian* (Officer in Charge)	Open interview	31 May, café, Kingston
<b>National and local NGOs &amp; CSOs</b>			
<b>NGO</b>	Rodje Malcolm (Executive Director)	E-mail interview	14 May (online)
<b>Other NGO**</b>	Maya* (Founder and director)	Open/semi-structured interview	19 March, Downtown, Kingston
<b>Community development foundation**</b>	Annie* (Project Manager)	Semi-structured interview	27 March, Kingston
<b>Youth</b>			
<b>Individual entrepreneurs</b>	Rodane (Entrepreneur, volunteer at local NGO)	Open/semi-structured interview	19 May, Barbican, Kingston
	Flex (Entrepreneur)	Open/semi-structured interview	22 May, Kingston
<b>Minority groups / Rastafari</b>			



## B.1 Informants in interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs)

Sector or organisation	Name (Title/Profession)	Interview/FGD	Time and place
<b>EADUMC (The Ethio-Africa Diaspora Union Millenium Council)</b>	Maxine Stowe (Director of EADUMC, Managing Partner at Rasta & Consultant Ganja Global, Culture manager)	Open/semi-structured interview  FGD 1 <sup>173</sup>  FGD 2 (via Skype)	6 April, EADUMC HQs, Downtown, Kingston  15 April, Kingston  25 May
	Prophet Greg (General secretary)	Semi-structured interview FGD 2 (via Skype)	16 May, Wholesome Café/Digicel building 25 May, Kingston
	Ras Kremlin  (Chair)	Semi-structured interview  FGD 1 FGD 2 (via Skype)	25 May, Jamaica Conference Centre, Downtown, Kingston <sup>174</sup>  15 April, Kingston 25 May, Kingston
	Ras Rocky (Treasurer)	FGD 2 (via Skype)	25 May, Kingston
<b>Non-Organised Rastafarians</b>	Ras Malekot (Radio host, Artist/musician, DJ, store manager)	Open/semi-structured interview	21 May, at informant's store, Kingston
	Ras Robert (Fruit store manager)	Open interview	23 May, at informant's store, Kingston
<b>Other key informants</b>			
<b>Documentary film producer</b>	Karen Marks Mafundikwa (Independent film-maker, director, producer)	Semi-structured interview	5 May, Cannonball Café, Barbican, Kingston

<sup>173</sup>Focus group 1 took place 15 April, Bournemouth Beach Centre in Downtown Kingston, which is EADUMC's Headquarters, following a presentation of my research to the meeting attendants.

<sup>174</sup>This interview ensued following the focus group discussion earlier the same day.

## B.2 Attended events

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Sector or organisation	Name (Title/Profession)	Interview/FGD	Time and place
<b>Economist</b>	André Haughton (Lecturer in International Finance, Department of Economics, UWI)	Semi-structured interview	30 May, Kingston

\* and \*\* These informants and their organisations have been anonymised upon their request.

The informants' names have been exchanged with a pseudonym for narrative purposes.

## B.2 Attended events

Event/Activity	Organised by	Panelists/Intervenants	When/Where
"Reparation - the case against France"	Centre for Reparations Research/UWI	Verene Shepherd, Director, Centre for Reparation Research; Mireille Fanon-Mendès (daughter of F. Fanon)	29 March, 10 am -12 pm, Mona Campus, University of the West Indies, Kingston
"The UPR Process and Treaty Body Reporting" (Workshop)	UN/OHCHR	NGO/CSO Practitioners: LGBTQ organisations; HIV/AIDS organisations; Rastafari organisation; UN Staff. Facilitator: OHCHR/UN, UNICEF	3 May, 9 am - 4 pm , Faculty of Law, Mona Campus, University of the West Indies, Kingston

## B.2 Attended events

Event/Activity	Organised by	Panelists/Intervenants	When/Where
<p>”Reparation and the Modern Labour Movement in Jamaica” (Panel Discussion)</p>	<p>African Caribbean Institute of Jamaica/Jamaica Memory Bank (IOJ under the Ministry of Culture Gender, Entertainment and Sports), Ministry of Labour and Social Security</p>	<p>Moderator: Prof. Ruper Lewis Op. Rem.: Mr. Bernard Jankee (Director, ACIJ/JMB) Panelists: Mr. Steven Golding (President, UNIA) Ms. Jodi-Ann Quarrie (Research Assistant, CRR) Mr. Danny Roberts (Head, Hugh Lawson Shearer Trade Union Education Institute)</p>	<p>14 May, 11 am -1 pm, Institute of Jamaica, Lecture Hall, 10-16 East Street, Kingston</p>
<p>”Vice-Chancellor’s Forum: Empire Windrush - Migration, Exclusion and Compensation”</p>	<p>The University of the West Indies (UWI)</p>	<p>Op. Rem.: Ambassador Dr. Richard Bernal (Pro Vice-Chancellor Global Affairs, UWI) Address/Remarks: Prof. Sir Hilary Beckles (Vice-Chancellor, UWI) Amb. Derrick Heaven (Former High Commissioner of Jamaica to the UK) Prof. Harry Goulbourne (Retired Prof, UWI, University of Warwick and London South Bank University) Diane Abbot (MP, British Labour Party via distance) Verene Shepherd (Director, Centre for Reparations Research, UWI)</p>	<p>15 May, 9.30 am -12.00 am, Mona Campus, University of the West Indies, Office of the Vice-Chancellor, Kingston</p>

## B.2 Attended events

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Event/Activity	Organised by	Panelists/Intervenants	When/Where
Reparation Youth Conference	National Council on Reparations/Ministry of Culture, Gender, Entertainment and Sport		25 May, 9 am - 5 pm, Jamaica Conference Centre, Kingston
African Liberation Day		Speakers: Dr. Jahlaani Niaah Dr. André Haughton Dr. K'Nife Dr. Michael Bartnett	26 May, 11 am - 5 pm, Mona Visitor's Lodge and Conference Centre, Kingston
Personal field visit to Port Royal	Jamaica National Heritage Fund (JNHT)		1 June, Jamaica National Heritage Fund, Kingston/Port Royal, Kingston

## C Interview guidelines – example for NCR-informant

1. Work/role description at workplace // OR How would you describe your work to someone who is unfamiliar with reparations?
2. Most important aspect of the ten point plan?
3. Linkages between the history colonialism and slavery and Caribbean society today?/What aspects of society in particular reflect or manifest legacies from colonial times?
4. Since the CARICOM-wide launch, has the national movement's objectives changed and if so, how?
5. Difference, if any, between the case of Jamaica different from other Caribbean states? Which, if any, dimension of reparations are more relevant to Jamaica, and why?
6. Framework employed for the claim with regards to the ethical aspects and philosophical underpinnings?
7. Methods or activities used for awareness-raising, and their most important components?
8. Response from the Jamaican stakeholders in this process? And has it differed according to group? If so, why?

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- Government
  - Private sector
  - Schools
  - General public
  - Differentiated response according to socio-economic status?
9. Most common counter-arguments encountered? Have these changed over time?
  10. Comment, and response to these arguments?
  11. Possible alternative to only make those traceable to have benefitted from slavery (through inherited money or positions of power) pay reparations?
  12. The CARICOM claim is conceived as a national and regional development strategy. Elaborate on this?
  13. Implications of this formulation have for Jamaica?
  14. What are the perceptions of the reparations movement in the government and to what extent (and on what grounds) does it endorse it? Any particular aspects they consider relevant for Jamaica? Would the attitude towards the claim for reparations differ if the current opposition would be in power?
  15. How would the reparations strategy be operationalised?
  16. Who would be involved in this process and why?
  17. If granted the requested sum, any plans for how this it would be spent (who the direct beneficiaries would be)?
  18. Having raised the issue with people, Jamaicans who are aware about the movement and process seem convinced of the claim's moral, ethical and historical justification,

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though some are hesitant that it will happen. Other concerns regard eventual implementation, how the money would be used and what it would lead to (cf. institutional and structural problems on government level). Why do you think that people say this and what would you answer them?

19. In your opinion, how much, if any, of current institutional structures stem from colonial systems, (and to what extent do these reinforce class segregation in Jamaica)?
20. Do you understand the people's fear of elite capture - i.e. reparations would reinforce existing structures?
21. Importance of race for social status? Other factors?
22. Formal apology without monetary recompense enough? Do legal or customary implications of formal apology require other forms of compensation and restitution?
23. While reparations deeply differ from aid what do you think about the current level or direction of aid or investments by former colonising countries in Jamaica?
24. How would development from reparations differ from current "skills training" and "capacity building" etc that is being undertaken by the Jamaican government and other development actors in Jamaica? Would money of reparations be invested differently than foreign investments and donations are today, and if so, how?
25. In the rationale of the Reparations movement, it is understood that path dependency due to slavery in the past has brought about significant indebtedness and un-diversified economies in the Caribbean today which impedes their development. Both the US and China seem to be significant actors in the Caribbean economies today. Parallels in today's society with the past regarding foreign involvement, and if so, how will they develop?
26. Neo-colonialist practices in Jamaican society today and if so, how do these manifest?

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27. Role of international monetary institutions such as IMF, in the Caribbean economic development?
  28. Why reparations now?
  29. Rastafarians early engaged in claims for reparations. Their position in this question?
  30. The Rastafari community's status and position in Jamaica today?
  31. If any, what are convergences and divergences between their struggle and that of CARICOM?
  32. Has the Rastafari community been involved in the work here in Jamaica for reparations (/CARICOM struggle) and if so, how? If not, why not?
  33. The Rastafari community claims to still suffer from discrimination and lack of rights in Jamaican society. How would the Reparations change this?
  34. Have other indigenous traditional communities been involved, such as the Maroon community? How does this cooperation work, if there is such a collaboration?
  35. Next steps for the Reparations movement and how do they plan to advance their work?



## **D Letter of consent**

## **Consent form for Research Project**

**Working title:** Reparations as Development Strategy in Jamaica

### **What is this project?**

This project is a self-contained research project to be formulated in the form of a Master thesis. The topic focuses on the investigation of different perspectives and perceptions of concerned stakeholders of the Jamaican and Caribbean reparations movement, its formulation and implementation in Jamaica.

### **Who funds this project?**

This research will be published as a Master thesis of the LUMID (International Development and Management) programme at Lund University. No specific or external funding has been provided for this research.

### **Why are you being contacted?**

You have been contacted because you and your knowledge are considered of especial importance to rigour and validity to this project. This refers to your extensive experience, expertise and engagement in the struggle for reparations, and also being a Jamaican citizen. The research will strive to include the views and perspective of multiple groups regarding the issues on Reparations.

### **How is the research being conducted?**

Involvement in this research is entirely voluntarily and you may withdraw at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions you are not comfortable with. The collection of data will be of qualitative nature, and involve individual (one-to-one) interviews with an expected duration of 1-2 hours, or focus groups and observations collected in field notes. Interviews and focus groups will be digitally audio recorded. You may at any time request for the recording and/or the interview to pause or stop. Interview data will be transcribed and analysed, and respondents assigned pseudonyms in any material produced from this data. If requested, names of institutions and organizations will also be given pseudonyms and information which could identify an institution will be removed. Data from this project will be securely stored at the University of Lund and may be used in future academic projects. Data from this project will only be used for academic purposes by the principal investigator named below.

No personal risks are envisaged from participation in this research, and consideration to research ethics has been given in the design of this project.

### **Who is responsible for this research?**

*Principal Investigator:* Hanna Fiskesjö (MSc student in International Development and Management, the LUMID programme at Lund University, Sweden)

*Contact:* [hanna.fiskesjo@gmail.com](mailto:hanna.fiskesjo@gmail.com)

*By phone:* In Jamaica, +1 (876) 8333590

*Thesis supervisor:* Christopher Mathieu, Associate Professor of Sociology, Lund University

*Contact:* christopher.mathieu@soc.lu.se

If you have concerns with the conduct of this research, please contact the Principal Investigator, or the LUMID programme (lumid@keg.lu.se)

**Other information:**

The Principal Investigator currently is engaged as a consultant for UNESCO, at the Cluster Office for the Caribbean, located in Kingston, Jamaica. However, this research is entirely carried out in the Principal Investigator's capacity as a student, and is to be considered as completely separated from her UNESCO engagement, in all possible aspects.

**CONSENT FORM**

1. I confirm that I have read and ha/e understood the information sheet for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my rights being affected.
3. I understand there is no payment or compensation for participation.
4. I understand that I can at any time ask for access to the information I provide and I can also request the destruction of that information if I wish.
5. I agree to take part in the above study.
6. I agree for the interview to be audio-recorded (recordings will be securely stored in digital format)
7. I give permission for the transcript of my interview/research to be used for research purposes only (including research publications and reports)
8. I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential. I understand that I have the right to anonymity. I assign copyright of my transcript to the researcher, who may quote the transcript with strict preservation of anonymity.

**Participant Name Signature**

**Date**

\_\_\_\_\_

**Researcher(s) Signature**

**Date**

\_\_\_\_\_

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If you have any concerns with the ethical conduct of this research you can request to contact the Ethics Committee of the LUMID-programme through the following e-mail address: lumid@keg.lu.se