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**Barriers and Enablers for the Coordination of Climate Change-related Official  
Development Assistance in Mozambique: expressed perceptions of involved  
stakeholders**

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## Abstract

Coordination of Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been an important topic in debates focused on improving the outcomes of international development. The subject assumes particular importance with the expected increase of ODA flows to support developing countries addressing climate change-related issues. The case of Mozambique is of special relevance due to the heightened consequences of climate change, the profusion of ODA providers, and the fundamental changes in ODA flows resulting from the country's debt crisis in 2016. This research explored the expressed perceptions of technical-level staff from donors and recipient-government representatives on the enablers and barriers for the coordination of climate-related ODA. With a few exceptions, the findings of this research corroborate with previous studies exploring ODA coordination broadly, as well as in specific sectors. The thesis concludes with practical insights that may contribute to improved coordination of climate change ODA in Mozambique.

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## List of Acronyms

AfDB – African Development Bank

COVID-19 – Coronavirus Disease 2019

DAC – Development Assistance Committee

DINAB – National Directorate of Environment

DNC – Climate Change Department

DNPO – National Directorate for Planning and Budgeting

GIIMC – Inter-institutional Group on Climate Change

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GNI – Gross National Income

MITADER – Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development

MICOA – Ministry for Coordination of the Environmental Action

NDC – Nationally Determined Contribution

IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

ODA – Official Development Assistance

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development

PA – Paris Agreement

UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

USD – United States Dollar

## 1. Introduction:

Climate change is increasing its relevance in global development circles due to the growing body of scientific evidence indicating how a changing climate will negatively impact social, economic, and ecological systems (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2014). To date, 191 countries have signed the Paris Agreement [PA], an international accord that outlines global goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], no date). However, current commitments fall short of what is needed (Rogelj et al. 2016) and are expected to lead to severe impacts worldwide (IPCC, 2014).

As part of the Paris Agreement, developed countries made commitments to mobilize technical and financial resources to support developing countries to reduce greenhouse gases emissions while adapting to the impacts of climate change (UNFCCC, 2015). More specifically, developed countries committed to mobilize 100 billion USD annually to support developing countries (UNFCCC, 2016). This is a considerable sum considering the 2018-2019 annual average of official development assistance [ODA] provided by the Development Assistance Committee's [DAC]<sup>1</sup> developed country membership was 152.6 billion USD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], no date a), and the total amount of ODA that had climate change as a principal objective in 2017 was 18.72 billion (ibid.).

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<sup>1</sup> The OECD Development Assistance Committee [DAC] is an international forum comprised of thirty of the largest providers of ODA (OECD, no date b). The DAC's aim is defined as follows: "*The overarching objective of the DAC for the period 2018-2022 is to promote development co-operation and other relevant policies so as to contribute to implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, poverty eradication, improvement of living standards in developing countries, and to a future in which no country will depend on aid.*" (OECD, no date b)

Official development assistance (ODA), or AID, is defined by DAC as *“government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries.”* ODA includes contributions from donor countries to developing countries in the form of *“grants, ‘soft’ loans, and the provision of technical assistance”*. From 2018, only the *“grant portion of the loan, i.e. the amount ‘given’ by lending below market rates, counts as ODA” (OECD, 2021).*

Multiple studies have explored the systemic lack of coordination amongst ODA providers and how it leads to adverse development outcomes and resource inefficiency (Acharya et al., 2006; Bourguignon and Platteau, 2015; Buse and Walt, 1996; Djankov et al., 2009; Gehring et al., 2017; Knack and Rahman, 2007). While the bulk of studies focused on quantitative and global-scale analyses, including how the lack of ODA coordination is related to different economic and policy outcomes, there remains a dearth of scrutiny employing qualitative approaches that explore stakeholders' perceptions directly involved in the coordination processes at the country level (Sundewall et al., 2010). This assumes particular importance in efforts addressing climate change, given the fragmented environment of climate governance and finance (Van Asselt and Zelli, 2014), the expected increase in climate-related ODA in the coming years, and the limited number of academic studies focused on donor coordination for climate change at country level.

The case of Mozambique is of specific consequence in this context. Climate change has the potential to acutely exacerbate several challenges the country already faces due to floods, drought, coastal erosion, and extreme weather events such as the cyclones that periodically impact the country (African Development Bank [AfDB], 2018a). Mozambique also makes for a germane case given that the country has a high number of donors relative to the global average and that ODA has historically represented a significant portion of the country's development investments (Vollmer, 2013).

Additionally, in 2016, hidden debts totalling USD 1.4 billion, or 10.4 per cent of the country's Gross Domestic Product [GDP], were disclosed (Bon and Cheng, 2020). State companies contracted the debts with international private financial institutions without parliament approval as required by law (ibid). This event substantially changed the way donors provide ODA to the country, interrupting direct support to the government budget, fracturing the distribution of financial support and consequently ballooning the number of organizations independently implementing ODA projects (AfDB, 2018b), all factors expected to directly impact coordination efforts (Djankov et al., 2009; Gehring et al., 2017; Kimura et al., 2012; Knack and Rahman, 2007).

Given this context, this research aims to explore the coordination of climate-related official development assistance in Mozambique to contribute to the scientific debate and provide practical insights on how coordination processes could improve at a country level. More specifically, this study explores expressed perceptions of key actors involved in the coordination of climate-related official development assistance in Mozambique, the core interest being to address the following two questions:

*Which factors are mentioned by technical-level staff from donors and recipient-government organizations as barriers and enablers for coordinating climate change-related official development assistance in Mozambique?*

*Which processes and administrative procedures the research participants identify as favouring coordination of climate-related official development assistance in Mozambique?*

The researcher recognizes that coordination of official development assistance is a complex topic that includes several dynamics at national and international levels and different actors and intervening factors (Hensell, 2015). For this research, the focus narrows on expressed perceptions of the actors working with climate change-related ODA at the level of Mozambique's capital, Maputo. Stakeholders operating outside the

country and those working at subnational levels were not included in the scope of the research.

The following section presents a literature review of the coordination of official development assistance and positions the research in the global development discussions. Subsequently, the research's theoretical background and analytical framework are presented, including the concepts explored in the study. This is followed by an elaboration on the study's methodology, followed by Mozambique's case and the contextualization of development coordination in the country. Finally, the results and conclusion sections present the thesis's findings and their relation to current academic and policy debates while outlining aspects to be further explored in future studies.

## 2. Literature review

This section starts with the definition of official development assistance coordination and how it is explored in this study. It then turns to the relevance of the topic for international development, elaborating on how the lack of ODA coordination can affect development outcomes and the current status of ODA coordination. Finally, the intervening factors affecting coordination are presented and discussed.

### 2.1 Defining official development assistance coordination<sup>2</sup>

The term coordination has been used in the international development literature to explore several processes and phenomena (Buse and Walt, 1996). For this reason, it is essential to specify the working definition used in this particular study.

Starting with broad definitions of the term, Mooney (1947:6) defines coordination as an "*orderly arrangement of a group's effort to provide unity of action in the pursuit of a common purpose*", and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] defines coordination as "*bringing donors<sup>3</sup> together to streamline the way they provide aid*" (OECD, 2012:61). Balogun (2005:16) provides a more operational definition and outlines three aspects of donor coordination:

- (a) the development of common arrangements for planning, managing, and delivering aid;*
- (b) the gradual simplification of procedures and specific requirements to reduce their burden on partner governments; and*

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<sup>2</sup> Harmonization and Coordination will be used interchangeably in this research.

<sup>3</sup> In the context of this study, donors are defined as international organizations implementing official development assistance (ODA). This includes donor countries (bilateral donors) and multilateral organizations (i.e. multilateral development banks and United Nation agencies).

*(c) the sharing of information to promote transparency and improved coordination (Balogun, 2005: 16).*

The definition of coordination used in this research combines elements from these different authors. From Mooney (1947), the research uses the concepts of the arrangement of a group involved in achieving a common purpose. In this context, the objective being the implementation of national climate change policies and plans in Mozambique. While the research did not explore Mozambique's climate policies' achievements, the focus of the study is on the experiences and perspectives of actors involved in this task.

From Balogun's (2005) definition, the study explores aspects related to planning and management of ODA and information sharing to improve coordination. However, arrangements for delivering ODA and the simplification of procedures and requirements are elements of Balogun's definition that are not approached in this research. The reason for this exclusion being that the definition of such procedures and requirements occurs at the donor organizations' headquarters (Winters, 2012) and involve stakeholders and processes beyond the scope of this research.

Finally, the actors considered for this research are the donors and recipient countries involved in planning and managing climate change-related ODA at the country level, including staff from recipient-government and donors. As donors, the study includes donor countries (bilateral donors) and multilateral organizations (i.e. multilateral development banks and United Nations agencies).

## **2.2 Is there a case for official development assistance coordination?**

The increase in the number of donors providing Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the last several decades has led to a phenomenon called fragmentation, or in other words, the presence of multiple donor organizations simultaneously

planning, managing, and delivering ODA in a particular country (Aldasoro et al., 2010; Knack and Rahman, 2007; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013). Fragmentation is associated with negative impacts on the limited capacities of governments receiving ODA as each donor has its missions, consultations, negotiation processes, project implementation requirements, as well as monitoring and reporting arrangements (Acharya et al., 2006; Bourguignon and Platteau, 2015; Buse and Walt, 1996; Knack and Rahman, 2007).

Beyond the pressure on recipient countries human resources, fragmentation of ODA is also associated with undesirable development outcomes. For instance, Djankov et al. (2009) found through a study of ODA supply in 112 countries over the period 1960-1999 that the presence of multiple donors is negatively related to economic growth. Kimura et al. (2012) conducted a cross-sectional study in countries receiving ODA and found a positive correlation between ODA concentration and economic growth, supporting Djankov et al.'s (2009) results. Djankov et al. (2009) also associate higher levels of donor fragmentation with corruption. The authors suggest that the presence of multiple donors working independently at different government levels can increase the likelihood of improper money tracking, opening the door to the appropriation of ODA benefits by government officials and local elites (Djankov et al., 2009).

Concurrently, some authors argue that the presence of multiple donors also can bring benefits as multiple donors may increase innovation and add different perspectives to address complex challenges (Acharya et al., 2006; Gehring et al., 2017). Rowlands and Ketcheson (2002) state that donor fragmentation increases recipient countries' power in bilateral negotiations, as they remain less dependent on single ODA providers. The reduced dependency on individual ODA providers also reduces the impact when specific donors leave the country.

While there are differing views on whether fragmentation results in positive or negative outcomes, most authors emphasize the importance of donor coordination in

a fragmented ODA landscape (Acharya et al., 2006; Aldasoro et al., 2010; Knack and Rahman, 2007; Bourguignon and Platteau, 2015). For instance, Gehring et al. (2017) expanded quantitative studies from Djankov et al. (2009) and Kimura et al. (2012) using a broader set of indicators and different econometric models. They found that donor fragmentation only correlated negatively with lower economic growth in the absence of coordination elements such as a lead donor and low bureaucratic capacities of recipient countries.

In fact, the lack of ODA coordination is associated with several undesirable development outcomes. Uncoordinated ODA can erode a country's administrative capacity (Knack and Rahman, 2007) and negatively impact recipient countries' policymaking, planning, and implementation of programs and initiatives (Buse and Walt, 1996). Furthermore, the absence of donor coordination is associated with higher transaction costs, reducing the money that reaches intended beneficiaries (Acharya et al., 2006; Djankov et al., 2009; Bourguignon and Platteau, 2015; Klingebiel et al., 2017). Anderson (2012) estimates that between US\$1.4 to US\$ 2.5 billion of transaction costs<sup>4</sup> could be reduced annually through the increased coordination of donors. All these elements make a strong case for increased ODA coordination.

On the positive side, besides reducing the abovementioned negative impacts, donor coordination can facilitate the enforcement of ODA conditionalities, such as maintaining investments in essential development areas, improving their governance and transparency (Torsvik, 2005). Coordination is also pointed out as a mechanism

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<sup>4</sup> Anderson (2012:800) considers in his study *"all administrative costs of development assistance programmes which are not an integral part of the programmes themselves"*, including *"salary costs of in-house agency staff and contractors, recurrent costs of premises, and travel expenses"*. This is a conservative estimate as it does not consider transaction costs of the recipient-government side (Anderson, 2012).

to increase the coherence of the planning and delivery of development interventions (Acharya et al., 2006; Klingebiel et al., 2017).

The increased awareness of the importance of coordination in ODA has led the development community to prepare and commit to several international agreements, such as the Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonization<sup>5</sup> (OECD, 2003), the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the related Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2008). All these initiatives include commitments from the donor community to increase ODA coordination.

### **2.3 Where do we stand in official development assistance coordination?**

Despite the aforementioned benefits of official development assistance coordination and the related international commitments, advancements in practice have been slow. Coordination has become a buzzword in the development circles or, in Hensell's (2015:96) words, a "rationalized myth". Hensell argues that coordination is a legitimating narrative that everyone agrees with but is not implemented due to the difficulties in tackling underlying political conflicts related to power to control resources and determine tasks (Hensell, 2015). The assessment realized by the OECD in 2012 showed that international organizations failed to achieve commitments to increase donor coordination (OECD, 2012). More specifically, the report shows that donors achieved little progress in uniting aid, implementing common arrangements and procedures, and even in more basic aspects such as joint missions and analytical work (OECD, 2012).

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<sup>5</sup> Donor harmonization and coordination are used interchangeably in the literature and international development circles.

Academic studies have also shown that ODA has not followed a coordinated approach. Aldasoro et al. (2010) studied the provision of development assistance from OECD countries between 1995-2006 and found that coordination was deficient. Nunnenkamp et al. (2013) assessed ODA provided to 140 recipient countries between 1998-2009 and found that donor coordination has weakened over the studied period.

Concurrently, multilateral organizations created to increase coordination of international ODA, such as the World Bank and the United Nations, have kept their share of OECD countries' allocation of ODA stable since the early 1970s. This value was approximately 28% of net disbursements between 1972 and 2007 (Aldasoro et al., 2010:923) and continued with a similar average (27%) in the 2007-2016 period (OECD, no date c.). These figures suggest that bilateral donors are reluctant to give away control of their aid allocation (Aldasoro et al., 2010).

Climate change-related ODA studied in this research is a subset of the overall ODA provided by donor countries. Between 2016 and 2018, it represented approximately 12% of the total ODA flows (OECD, no date a). These resources are allocated to activities that contribute to (i) reducing the emission of greenhouse gases, including renewable energy projects and reforestation, and (ii) activities to support countries in adapting to adverse weather events, such as infrastructure adapted to extreme climatic events, climate-resilient agriculture, and early warning systems (OECD, no date a).

## **2.4 Challenges for official development assistance coordination**

Several challenges are reported to intervene in the coordination of ODA. This section elaborates on recurrent factors hindering coordination.

### *2.4.1 Objectives and Interests*

The diverse interests of donor and recipient-countries add substantial complexity to ODA coordination and the agreement on objectives and specifics of ODA allocation and management (Hensell, 2015; Winters, 2012). Donors pursue a mix of altruistic and selfish goals or private and public goods when distributing their ODA support (Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Steinwand, 2015). In this context, donors are willing to support “public” goods such as poverty reduction, environmental conservation, education and health, while also pursuing “private” goods such as commercial interests, recipient countries' support in multilateral negotiations, and other geostrategic interests (Buse and Walt, 1996; Winters, 2012).

These diverging interests originate from stakeholders in donor countries, and the need to satisfy these different constituencies directly impact ODA allocation and coordination (Klingebiel et al., 2017; Knack and Rahman 2007). The existence of multiple objectives and goals when designing and delivering ODA represents a barrier to coordinate donor activities as they limit room for manoeuvring (Cassen, 1994; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013). For instance, Winters (2012) studied foreign aid harmonization in the context of decentralization in Indonesia and found that the dominance of some donors' interests hinder coordination.

Another barrier to ODA coordination is the need and competition for visibility. To justify and secure funding, ministries in charge of ODA in donor countries need to demonstrate results to the different interest groups in their countries (Bigsten 2006; Knack, and Rahman, 2007; Nunnenkamp et al. 2013). Notwithstanding, the ability to demonstrate impacts is diluted when several donors jointly deliver programs and projects (ibid.). Moreover, when multiple donors collectively support a specific initiative, there is also the risk of free-riders or donors with limited contributions claiming the results of others (Bourguignon and Platteau, 2015; Klingebiel et al., 2017).

Resistance to donor coordination may also come from recipient countries themselves. Coordinated donors have more bargaining power when imposing unwelcome conditionalities tied to ODA provision (Acharya et al., 2006; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Knack and Rahman, 2007; Winters, 2012).

All this to say, aligning donor and recipient countries' interests appears to be paramount in coordination efforts. Buse and Walt (1996) developed a framework for donor coordination in the health sector that highlights the central role of interest alignment which is materialized by government and donor ownership and leadership in coordination processes. Similarly, Michaud-Létourneau and Pelletier (2017) studied coordination of multisectoral nutrition interventions in Mozambique and found a significant role of political interest in coordination initiatives. Nonetheless, interest alignment is not the only challenge facing coordination. Procedural and organizational challenges approached in the next section also offer their own set of obstacles.

#### *2.4.2 Bureaucratic procedures and organizational capacities*

Each donor has different processes and systems for planning, managing, monitoring and evaluating ODA. These are designed and implemented to ensure oversight and control of resources, mitigate risks, and report back to constituencies in donor countries (Winters, 2012). Several authors highlight that these different procedures and the varied planning and delivery cycles of donors reduce the flexibility of involved actors and their ability to coordinate (Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Sundewall, 2010; Winters, 2012).

Added to this intrinsic organizational factors, coordination processes are intense and time-consuming for staff of donor organizations and recipient-governments due to the need to negotiate the terms and details of resource allocation, manage multiple stakeholders, and agree on the division of labour (Hensell, 2015; Acharya et al., 2006).

This is worsened by the facts that (i) over time, donors have spread their support to multiple countries, reducing the time that headquarters' staff can dedicate to each recipient country, and (ii) staff turnover in donor organizations is high, directly affecting the continuity of coordination processes (Acharya et al., 2006). These elements can be further hampered by rules and procedures within donor organizations that may restrain coordination (Winters, 2012). For instance, promotion and salary increases are more influenced by the visibility of projects that bring prestige to the donor country, rather than the success of coordination efforts themselves (Winters, 2012), so the significant effort needed to coordinate is not likely to be reflected in individuals' career advancements.

The literature shows that bureaucratic inefficiencies, limited donor organizational capacity and internal policies play a role in reducing donor coordination. These challenges are amplified when recipient governments' lack the capacity to provide an institutional framework for coordination (Bourguignon and Platteau, 2015). Recipient countries with clear and well-functioning governance structures and coordination procedures are better equipped to support donor coordination and align different programs and initiatives (Winters, 2012).

#### *2.4.3 Resource competition*

Donors compete for resources to conduct their work and achieve their objectives, including good projects, attention of policy and decision-makers, qualified local staff, funding, and the ability to influence recipient-government policies (Acharya et al., 2006; Knack and Rahman, 2007; Steinwand, 2015). For instance, the number and availability of projects that can show results in the short- and mid-term may be limited, so partners may compete to support specific projects and secure funding for those (Acharya et al., 2006; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Winters, 2012). Donors also compete for public servants' (high-level and technical staff) time and attention as they

are central to successful implementation of donors' projects (Acharya et al., 2006; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Knack and Rahman, 2007; Steinwand, 2015).

At the same time, competition is also present on the recipient-government side (Winters, 2012). Recipient governments have multiple ministries, departments, and teams eligible to receive ODA, each with their interests and political agendas (ibid.). In several cases, ODA is a relevant component of the government's funding and operational budgets, an element that may fuel political disputes and affect coordination (ibid.). Competition may be present at the individual level. Recipient-government officials receive, in some cases, additional compensation to 'top up' their local salaries when involved in ODA projects (Knack and Rahman, 2007), and the pursuit of personal interests might lead to choices that affect coordination efforts (Acharya et al., 2006; Knack and Rahman, 2007).

### **3. Theoretical background and analytical framework**

ODA coordination is commonly positioned in the context of governance and inter-organizational studies and explored through different social science disciplines lenses, such as sociology, political science, and economics (Gulrajani, 2014). Departing from these disciplines, authors have used or proposed theoretical frameworks and concepts from political economy (Gulrajani, 2014; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Michaud-Létourneau and Pelletier, 2017; Naik, 1984), new institutional economics (Bourguignon and Platteau, 2015; Gulrajani, 2014; Knack and Rahman, 2007; Naik, 1984; Winters, 2012), and organizational and inter-organizational theories (Hensell, 2015; Moshtari and Gonçalves, 2017; Naik, 1984).

Each of these approaches explores different factors intervening in ODA coordination. Political Economy investigates the power and economic dynamics at play and how those drive ODA allocation and mediate the relation between the different actors involved (Gulrajani, 2014; Hensell, 2015; Winters, 2012). New Institutional Economics usually examines the transaction costs and efficiency in allocating human and financial resources when several donors simultaneously run projects in the same recipient-countries (Acharya et al., 2006; Bourguignon and Platteau, 2015; Knack and Rahman, 2007). Inter-organizational studies explore the relations between organizations. In the context of official development assistance, it commonly explores how contextual, internal, and relational dynamics hinder or promote organizational interaction (Moshtari and Gonçalves, 2017; Naik, 1984). Finally, organizational studies delve into organizations' features such as goals, policies, incentives, resources, and administrative procedures and how those impact ODA coordination (Klingebiel et al., 2017; Sundewall, 2010; Winters, 2012).

As the current study aimed to identify the several factors that may enable or hinder coordination of climate-related ODA in Mozambique, the researcher opted for a broader analytical framework to capture participants' expressed perceptions. In fact,

using a wider lens that builds on insights from different disciplines can be a promising way to approach governance studies (Frödin, 2008). Following this rationale, the analytical framework used in this research originates from three categories proposed by Moshtari and Gonçalves (2017:1683) based on a review of twenty-eight papers that assessed inter-organizational collaboration of humanitarian assistance in a context of natural disaster relief. The proposed framework allows for flexibility and sets broad categories that can identify different elements expressed as relevant by participants. Another advantage of the proposed framework is its focus on barriers and enablers for collaboration, similar to what is explored in this research.

The three categories adapted from Moshtari and Gonçalves (2017) are contextual factors, inter-organizational factors, and intra-organizational factors. As Moshtari and Gonçalves's (2017) developed their framework within a disaster relief context, the key concepts within each of these categories were adapted based on the ODA coordination literature relevant for this particular study. Figure 1 presents the adapted analytical framework used in this research.




Figure 1. Analytical framework of the study (Adapted from Moshtari and Gonçalves (2017:1683)).

The following subsections present and explain the different key concepts and how they were used in this research.

### **3.1 Intra-organizational factors**

#### *3.1.1 Political and economic interests*

Political and economic interests are relevant intervening factors for development assistance coordination (Gulrajani, 2014; Knack and Rahman, 2007; Naik, 1984; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Steinwand, 2015). More specifically, the tension between self-centric and altruistic interests of donors may influence the interest and ability of different donors to coordinate (Gulrajani, 2014; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Winters, 2012). Amongst the identified factors driving development assistance allocation are altruistic and moral motives; business, economic and political self-interest; and regional geostrategic interests (Klingebiel et al., 2017; Riddell, 2019).

Government political and economic interests are also important factors influencing recipient-country willingness to engage and promote coordination. Donor provision of ODA is usually associated with conditionalities in terms of specific policies and procedures to be adopted by recipient countries to improve democracy, transparency, and the rule of law (Bourguignon and Platteau, 2015; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Torsvik, 2005). Donor coordination increases donors' bargaining power and the ability to impose unwelcome or burdensome conditionalities (Acharya et al., 2006; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Knack and Rahman, 2007; Winters, 2012). Additionally, potential power disputes between recipient-government ministries might also affect coordination efforts (Winters, 2021).

This study will not expand to the reasoning and drivers influencing donor ODA allocation or high-level decision-makers' interests within Mozambique's government,

as interviews were conducted at the technical level. Nevertheless, elements emerging from the interviews might indirectly suggest constraints and influences related to political and economic interests and how those affect the coordination in Mozambique's case.

### *3.1.2 Organizational capacities for coordination and internal procedures and systems*

The task of coordinating the work of multiple donors and their projects is an endeavour that demands substantial efforts (Hensell, 2015). Each donor has its planning cycles, systems, and processes for disbursing, managing, and reporting ODA. Ensuring those are soundly coordinated requires time and resources (ibid.). This task becomes more challenging with the limited time and resources that donors can dedicate to coordination in each country (Acharya et al., 2006; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Winters, 2012), as well as potential constraints arising from donors' systems and regulations (Sundewall, 2010).

On the government side, the multiplicity of donors poses a significant burden on already limited capacities of recipient governments due to requirements on project design, management, and evaluation processes that demand government involvement, compliance, and approval (Acharya et al., 2006; Bourguignon and Platteau, 2015; Knack and Rahman, 2007).

From this account, the current research aims to explore whether the organizational capacities and resources to engage in donor coordination and the administrative procedures of both donors and recipient countries are mentioned as relevant factors in the Mozambique case.

## **3.2 Inter-organizational factors**

### *3.2.1 Alignment and Competition*

Alignment in the donor coordination literature usually refers to ideological consensus of donors and shared values (Cassen, 1994; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Moshtari and Gonçalves, 2017; Naik, 1984). From this account, like-minded donors are expected to coordinate their interventions (ibid.). Concurrently, actors involved in implementing ODA may compete for several resources (Acharya et al., 2006; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Knack and Rahman, 2007; Steinwand, 2015). Amongst the elements subject to competition are funding, attention and time of government officials, promising projects, visibility and recognition, amongst others (Klingebiel et al., 2017). Previous studies indicate that both alignment and competition may promote or hinder the interest and willingness to engage in coordination (Klingebiel et al., 2017). This research will explore if and how stakeholders mention alignment and competition as important factors for coordinating climate-change ODA in Mozambique.

### *3.2.2 Coordination processes*

The specific coordination processes used are also stressed in the literature as highly relevant for success. For instance, Buse and Walt (1996:81) include (i) the level of participation and periodicity of meetings, (ii) the integration of mechanisms with national policies, (iii) the costs of the mechanism, and (iv) the objective of the mechanism as critical elements in the coordination of the ODA. Moshtari and Gonçalves (2017:1685) identify additional inter-organizational factors for coordination processes in their analytical framework, including performance evaluation, accountability, transparent policies, clear roles and responsibilities, and communication. This research will capture the elements that respondents express as relevant in Mozambique's case as they emerge in the interviews.

### 3.3 Contextual factors

#### *3.3.1 Number of donors active in the country*

The capacity to coordinate different actors and achieve policy objectives becomes more challenging as the number of organizations and actors involved increase (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Several actors and multiple chains of interaction increase the complexity of relations and the chance of uncoordinated action and policy inconsistency (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). As presented in the literature review, research on donor coordination is rich on how fragmentation may impact development outcomes (Djankov et al., 2009; Gehring et al., 2017; Kimura et al., 2012).

Mozambique is a country with a high number of donors compared to the global average (Vollmer, 2013). Additionally, as donors' financial support to the national budget support halted in 2016 due to the debt crisis, the number of organizations managing and disbursing ODA funds has increased substantially (AfDB, 2018b). For this reason, this element may assume particular relevance for this study. Being a recent event, it is anticipated that participants will elaborate on this topic during the interviews.

#### *3.3.2 Government-donor relations and trust*

Trust plays an essential role in the coordination of development assistance (Bourguignon and Platteau, 2015; Moshtari and Gonçalves, 2017; Sundewall et al., 2010). Several studies indicate that trust is crucial for creating and managing successful coordination arrangements amongst development organizations as it creates conditions for organizations to engage with each other and share information and resources (Nolte and Boenigk, 2011; Seybolt, 2009; Schulz and Blecken, 2010; Tatham and Kovács, 2010; Tchouakeu et al., 2011).

Trust assumes particular relevance in Mozambique's case due to the event of the undisclosed debts in 2016. With the government's failure to adequately report on debts contracted by state companies with private sector financial institutions without parliament approval, and the expectation that this event affected coordination processes, it will be interesting to observe if participants mention the event, its impact on trust, and how those have affected the coordination of climate-related ODA in Mozambique.

### **3.4 Defining the level of analysis**

The allocation of ODA results from multiple decisions, relations, and processes taking place at different levels (Canavire et al., 2006; Gulrajani, 2014). Hensell (2015:93) outlines two intervention levels, (i) donor-country-level, which encompasses the definition of ODA objectives, mobilization of financial resources, and design of strategies, and (ii) recipient-country-level, which includes the translation of those strategies into specific initiatives and the implementation of programs and projects. At the country level, interactions between donors providing the ODA and recipient-countries occur, including identifying, designing, implementing, and evaluating projects and programs (Hensell, 2015). These involve political-level representatives and the technical/operational representatives from the various organizations involved in a given ODA scheme (ibid.). This study will explore the country-level action and the perception of technical-level representatives from donors and recipient-country government officials.

## 4. Methods

### 4.1 Research design

This section presents the research design used in this study, justifies its selection, and points to the limitations of the methods used. This thesis uses a qualitative approach which is appropriate for exploring perceptions, perspectives and experiences of different respondents involved in climate-related ODA coordination (Storey and Scheyvens 2003; Bryman 2012; Moses and Knutsen 2012). The research adopts a case study as its strategy of inquiry. Creswell (2009:13) defines the case study as "*a strategy in which the researcher explores in depth a program, event, activity, process, or one or more individuals*". In this thesis, the focus is on the events, activities, and processes involved in coordinating climate-related ODA in Mozambique. Case studies are appropriate to explore the case's internal features and the surrounding context (Neuman, 2014), therefore appropriate to explore the three categories (contextual, intra- and inter-organizational factors) and the related key concepts of the analytical framework used in this study (see Figure 1). It is also a suitable strategy to link abstract ideas with "*complex, multiple-factor events that occur over time and space*" (Neuman, 2014:42). Finally, this inquiry strategy is also appropriate for this research as it focuses on the participant's contexts and experiences (Yin, 1994).

Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data, as this method allows flexibility in the order of questions ensuring a good flow of the interview and the opportunity to explore themes as they emerge during the conversation (Dunn, 2008). This is particularly relevant for this study as participants based their responses on different experiences regarding climate-related development assistance coordination and the factors perceived as barriers and enablers for ODA coordination in Mozambique. Consequently, even though all interviewees responded to the same questions, flexibility and adaptability were essential to capture different aspects throughout the interviewing process.

The interviews were conducted between November 2019 and December 2020 and took on average 50 minutes each. Out of the thirteen interviews, two happened by video conference due to the inability to schedule the interview during the field work. In both interviews, the video was kept on minimizing the effects of distance. Overall, the researcher did not notice differences between these interviews and the others conducted in person, probably because these particular individuals were outspoken and engaged in the interview.

The questionnaire used simple language, avoided questions that could influence interviewees in a particular direction, and respected each participant's culture and background (Dunn, 2008). The questionnaire was designed to start with broader questions and, based on interviewees' responses and experiences, narrow down to explore further specific factors emerging during the interview. All interviews were conducted in Portuguese, which is the official language in Mozambique. All participants were either native or fluent in Portuguese. The researcher is a native Portuguese speaker. Interviews were conducted in Maputo, Mozambique, where participants are based and work (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Location of Mozambique on the continent African continent (left) and the capital Maputo (right) (Aide et al. 2019:2).

Thirteen technical-level officials were interviewed from donor and recipient-government organizations dealing with climate change-related official development assistance based in Maputo, Mozambique. Out of the thirteen interviewees, seven were staff from donor organizations, including bilateral and multilateral organizations, and six were staff from recipient government organizations. Seven participants were female, four from donor organizations and three from recipient governments, and six male respondents, three of which represented donors and three from recipient government organizations.

All participants ranged between forty and sixty years old. The focus was on technical-level representatives, as they are engaged in day-to-day coordination processes and implementation of climate change programs and have contextual and rich knowledge about the coordination dynamics. Sampling was purposefully aimed at participants with long-term experience in climate change development assistance in Mozambique and coordination processes. At the time of the interviews, all participants had at least ten years of experience in climate-related official development assistance in Mozambique and some degree of engagement in ODA coordination. Table 1 provides information about the participants and the corresponding codes used in the quotes in the results section.

Table 1. Participants of the study

Code	Affiliation	Sex	Years of professional experience
G1	Government	Male	+ 20
G2	Government	Female	+15
G3	Government	Female	+25
G4	Government	Female	+15
G5	Government	Male	+15
G6	Government	Male	+15
D1	Donor	Female	+25
D2	Donor	Female	+25
D3	Donor	Male	+20
D4	Donor	Female	+10

Code	Affiliation	Sex	Years of professional experience
D5	Donor	Male	+20
D6	Donor	Male	+15
D7	Donor	Female	+20

Eight participants were known to the researcher from previous professional interaction. These respondents suggested the remaining five interviewees based on the criteria informed by the researcher, following a snowball sampling approach (Bryman, 2012). Data generated through the interviews were rich in details and broad in coverage. After the tenth interview, topics started to repeat across participants, indicating theoretical saturation (ibid.).

Before starting the interview, the researcher read the consent form that stated the study's purpose, procedures, and confidentiality (Annex 1). The researcher emphasized participants' liberty to interrupt their contribution at any time and that their identity would not be disclosed throughout the process, including any association that could lead to their identification. This was an ethical consideration to avoid any harm or negative consequence to participants. It was agreed that the names of donors and government entities would not be disclosed to avoid association or any potential undesirable consequence. All participants provided their oral consent to participating in the research.

All interviews were recorded with participants' consent and subsequently transcribed into word documents. Data were then imported to the NVivo software. NVIVO was instrumental in organizing and analyzing the data collected in the interviews. The data was divided by source (donor and government official) and then coded. The codes were refined over three successive cycles to improve the codes and their representation of the data. Once the codes were finalized, they were then organized into categories and subcategories following a hierarchical logic. Finally, the categories and subcategories derived from the interviews were linked to the

categories and key concepts from the analytical framework to inform the data analysis.

## 4.2 Limitations

The researcher's position and background should be considered throughout the entire research process. It is essential to be aware that personal traits such as cultural background, social class, skin colour, gender and age may influence the interviewers' interpretation of the results, especially when interviewing people that may not share the same characteristics (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2005). Throughout the research process, a continuous effort to be self-conscious and self-critical about collecting and interpreting data was undertaken. Another strategy to try to limit the potential impact of personal biases was respondent validation. After the conclusion of each interview, the main elements captured were summarized to the interviewee to verify whether the researcher had adequately captured the respondent's perspectives and allow for the opportunity to improve and clarify the understanding.

Another potential limitation includes how the respondents perceive the researcher. In this particular case study, being a foreigner from an international organization involved in climate change ODA may have influenced how interviewees framed their answers to the interview questions. The researcher recognizes these biases as a potential limitation to the interview outcomes. To mitigate such biases, before starting the interview, the researcher emphasized his neutrality and the confidentiality of all information gathered throughout the interview process (Meadow, 2013; Sultana, 2007). A factor that might have minimized some of those biases was establishing rapport with some of the interviewees through previous interactions. However, it should also be noted that the established relationships between the researcher and a subset of interviewees may have itself introduced biases. Overall, participants seemed to be comfortable sharing their knowledge and perceptions.

Participants were only interviewed individually due to the difficulties scheduling a time for focus group discussions and restrictions related to COVID-19. Focus groups could have added valuable insights into how the research topics would be addressed in a collective context, including potential agreements and disagreements. In this way, focus groups might have added an opportunity to further elaborate on results gathered through individual interviews.

Due to the limited time available for the study, the researcher opted to focus on the technical-level officials from donors and recipient-countries as they are closely engaged in the coordination processes approached in this study. However, different perspectives would likely be captured by expanding the study to political-level representatives, project beneficiaries and civil society. These stakeholders could be explored in future studies and contrasted with the findings of this research.

## 5. Context of the study

This section has three subsections and provides a brief overview of the context of the study. The section does not aim to analyze nor discuss findings but to provide background information relevant to the case study and identify elements that will be further discussed in the analysis. The first subsection contextualizes climate change at the national level. The second provides an overview of general and climate change-specific ODA flows to Mozambique, followed by a presentation of the government's climate change coordination outlined in national policy documents.

### 5.1 Mozambique and Climate Change

Mozambique is located on the east coast of Southern Africa and had 29.5 million inhabitants in 2018 (World Bank, no date). Despite socio-economic advances in the last several decades, the country still faces several development challenges (Republic of Mozambique, 2020). The country has one of the highest poverty rates in Africa, and it is estimated that between sixty-two and sixty-nine per cent of the population live below the poverty line of less than USD 1.90 per day (AfDB, 2018a:4).

Mozambique is highly vulnerable to climate change, and frequent climatic events such as droughts, floods, and tropical cyclones represent a constant threat to the country (AfDB, 2018a). For instance, the two cyclones that hit the country in 2019 were estimated to have reduced GDP growth from 3.7 to 2.4 per cent (World Bank, 2019:4). The poor are especially impacted by these climate events, with approximately 1.33 million inhabitants in poverty conditions affected by cyclone IDAI alone (World Bank 2019:1) and an estimated 6 million people affected by droughts between 1996 and 2018 (AfDB, 2018a:4). Forecasts predict that climate change impacts will increase in agriculture, fisheries, water, infrastructure, human settlements, and health (AfDB, 2018a).

## 5.2 Official Development Assistance in Mozambique

Official Development Assistance flows have historically represented a sizeable contribution to Mozambique's development efforts (Vollmer, 2013). After the end of the civil war in 1992, various donors increased their support to the country, and the value of ODA expanded significantly to finance reconstruction and provide essential services to the population (ibid.). Even though the country has experienced economic growth in the last decade, ODA still represents a significant share of the national economy, with net ODA<sup>6</sup> representing 13.1% of the Gross National Income [GNI] in 2019 (OECD, no date a).

The country has built relationships with numerous donors leading to a highly fragmented donor landscape (Vollmer 2013). Vollmer highlights that in 2009, 36 donors provided ODA to Mozambique, significantly higher than the global average of 21 at the time (Vollmer 2013:4). In 2018, 62 donors supported the country, with 42 contributing more than USD 1 million (Atteridge et al., 2019). Climate change-related ODA averaged USD 107.6 million between 2016 and 2018, and support was provided by 25 donors (ibid.). The main sectors targeted include (i) energy, (ii) agriculture, forestry and fishing, and (iii) general environmental protection.

## 5.3 Climate change-related coordination in Mozambique

Mozambique's National Climate Change Strategy (Ministério para Coordenação da Acção Ambiental [MICOA], 2012) defines the governance structure to coordinate the implementation of projects and initiatives related to climate change. Building of the National Climate Change Strategy, the government approved the Nationally

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<sup>6</sup> Net ODA includes “grants, ‘soft’ loans and the provision of technical assistance”. From 2018, only the “grant portion of the loan, i.e. the amount ‘given’ by lending below market rates, counts as ODA” (OECD, 2021).

Determined Contributions [NDC] Operational Plan 2020-2025 in 2018 (Ministério da Terra, Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Rural [MITADER], 2018). The Plan specifies the climate change actions that the country aims to conduct during the period between 2020-2025 and revises the coordination mechanism designed in the National Climate Change Strategy to reflect changes in the name of government ministries and further specify some functions.

The Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development [MITADER]<sup>7</sup> is the ministry responsible for climate change coordination in Mozambique (MITADER, 2018). Within the ministry, the National Directorate of Environment [DINAB] hosts the Department of Climate Change [DMC] (MITADER, 2018). DINAB and DMC have the mandate to *"coordinate and facilitate the interinstitutional linkages"* related to climate change *"and provide technical advice on climate change projects and programs."* (MITADER, 2018:56).

The National Directorate of Environment and the Department of Climate Change are technically advised by the Inter-Institutional Group on Climate Change [GIIMC] and the Climate Change Knowledge Management Center (MITADER, 2018:57). The Inter-Institutional Group on Climate Change is coordinated by MITADER and meant to have participants from several ministries, the private sector, and civil society (MICOA, 2012:10). The group was created to be convened at the request of MITADER to discuss relevant topics in the climate change agenda. The Climate Change Knowledge Management Center's purpose is to gather knowledge and information in different institutions and serve as a centre to create, store, and disseminate information and knowledge on climate change in the country (MITADER, 2018).

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<sup>7</sup> In 2020, the government of Mozambique has made some changes to the Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development. The ministry name was changed to Ministry of Lands and Environment and a new directorate for climate change was created. However, due to the fact that the research was conducted previous to these changes, for the purpose of this study, reference in this section will be made to the structure that was operational at the time of this study. Additionally, by the time of the finalization of this study, no new policy document were issued changing the structure here presented.

The NDC Operational Plan 2020-2025 states that GIIMC and the knowledge center have yet to be formalized (MITADER, 2018:57). More specifically, the Plan indicates that the knowledge centre is not operational due to the lack of funds (MITADER, 2018:58).

To improve the cohesiveness of its climate actions, the government of Mozambique deployed in 2018 specific efforts. The Department of Climate Change at MITADER and the National Directorate of Planning and Budgeting [DNPO] in the Ministry of Economy and Finance have conducted efforts to collect information on ongoing programs and projects related to climate change in different ministries and the support being provided by different donors. Two years into the initiative's official launch, this research offers a timely opportunity to approach different stakeholders involved in climate action in the country to gather perspectives on challenges and enablers to improve coordination. Moreover, the research results can feed into national efforts to strengthen Mozambique climate change coordination mechanisms.

## 6. Results and Discussion

This section presents and discusses the results of the study. First, an overview of the findings gives an initial understanding of the recurrence of factors mentioned by participants during the interviews and a comparison of how the expressed perceptions of donor and recipient-government staff were similar or differed. Subsequently, the following subsections discuss the study's findings in light of the different key concepts of the analytical framework, providing details on interviewees' expressed perceptions and pointing to relevant overlaps with previous studies. Finally, the last subsection provides insights that could be considered in future climate change ODA coordination efforts in Mozambique.

Table 2 presents an overview of the recurrence of aspects mentioned by participants in relation to the analytical framework used in this study.

Table 2 – Number of interviewees that mentioned factors related to key concepts of the analytical framework.

Categories	Key Concepts	Number and percentage of respondents		
		Total (n=13)	Donor (n=7)	Government (n=6)
<b>Contextual factors</b>	- Government-donor relations and trust.	8	5	3
	- Mode of financial support	9	4	5
	- Number of donors active in the country	1	0	1
<b>Intra-organizational factors</b>	- Political and economic interests.	11	6	5
	- Organizational capacities for coordination.	11	6	5
	- Internal organizational procedures and systems.	1	0	1
<b>Inter-organizational factors</b>	- Alignment and competition.	10	5	5
	- Coordination processes.	13	7	6

Legend:

Green: mentioned by more than 10 participants.

Blue: mentioned between 8 and 10 participants.

Light orange: Mentioned by less than 2 participants.

Participants mentioned inter-organizational and intra-organizational factors more frequently than contextual factors. Within those, 'coordination processes' were mentioned by all respondents, followed by 'political and economic interests' and 'organizational capacities for coordination' that were cited by eleven out of thirteen respondents each. 'Alignment and competition' between stakeholders were alluded to by ten out of the thirteen respondents, closely followed by mode of financial support and government-donor relations and trust, with nine and eight mentions each, respectively. Interestingly, two aspects present in the literature as important factors for coordination, the 'number of donors active in the country' and the 'internal organizational procedures and systems', were only mentioned by one participant. This seemingly low level of importance among respondents was unexpected and may be unique to Mozambique, but could also be related to the fact that all research participants have been in the development field for more than ten years and, therefore, may take these aspects for granted or think they are so evident as to not warrant mentioning.

No substantial difference in donor or recipient-government respondents was observed, exhibiting a certain level of alignment across the different factors. The following subsections elaborate on the findings regarding the different concepts of the analytical framework.

## **6.1 Contextual factors**

### *6.1.1. Government-donor relations and the role of trust*

According to participants, there was an evident change in the coordination of official development assistance in Mozambique after the debt crisis of 2016. Eight out of thirteen interviewees indicated that the event negatively impacted coordination. Participants mentioned that the 2016 debt crisis affected the trust of partners in the ability of the government of Mozambique to properly manage resources and

transparently disclose information. Transparency was, according to participants, a cornerstone of the pre-existent coordination mechanism and failing to report on the hidden debts made several partners limit their engagement with the government.

*"They [donors] thought that there was a breach of trust because when the debts case came up, they thought they were hidden in this process, and there was a breach of trust, so there was no point in continuing since there was no trust" (Government staff – G2)*

According to respondents, the lack of transparency regarding the debts raised concerns on the use of funds being provided by donors. The breach of trust led to the interruption of donor financial support to the national budget (budget support), which was a central mechanism for ODA coordination. This mechanism had the engagement of high-level representatives (Ministers, ambassadors and heads of cooperation) and was linked to the national planning, budgeting, and monitoring processes led by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (further details provided in section 6.2.2 Coordination processes and 6.3.1 Political and economic interests).

The role of trust and transparency in the coordination of development assistance found in this study is consistent with previous studies (Bourguignon and Platteau, 2015; Moshtari and Gonçalves, 2017; Sundewall et al., 2010). Sundewall et al. (2010) found that trust in the system and the leadership, and transparency are necessary for effective donor coordination.

According to one of the recipient-government participants, the government of Mozambique is working to regain partners' trust and strengthen transparency measures. The quote below presents this participant's perception:

*"Looking at all the small reforms that are being introduced to improve transparency, the opening up of the system, all of this is going to lead to this return of trust [...] It depends more on the government's effort, on measures*

*to recover that confidence and also the levels that the partners will identify that, yes, we already have a mechanism [...] The technical work has already started between the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the partners, even without [financial] support. Support may come later, but we are establishing this structure." (Government official – G2)*

This participant highlighted that monitoring and transparency measures to manage, allocate, and track financial resources are being improved to build trust and bring donors back to national planning and budgeting processes, indicating a perception that transparency and accountability will strengthen relations and improve coordination.

The above-quoted respondent said that the government of Mozambique and donors had reactivated elements from the previous ODA coordination process to provide a harmonized response to the social, economic, and health emergencies created by the cyclones IDAI and Kenneth that hit the country in 2019. The participant highlighted that the coordination mechanism was copied from the model in place before the debt crisis. A plan with objectives, targets, and indicators was jointly elaborated upon, and was accompanied by a mechanism to monitor and track progress, as well as the associated budget support to centralize resources. This may suggest that a common framework for planning, channelling resources and assessing impacts is important for coordination processes. The following subsections, 6.1.2 (Mode of financial support) and 6.2.2 (Coordination processes), will elaborate on these elements.

### *6.1.2 Mode of financial support*

Nine participants, both from donors (four respondents) and recipient government (five respondents), acknowledged that coordination of ODA worked better when donors' support to the national budget was in place (pre-2016 debt crisis). According

to participants, a joint mechanism established by the government with the majority of donors was beneficial to coordinate and align ODA.

*" [...] they (donors) knew that "this supports this, that supports that" and it was done in a very good way for ODA." (Government staff – G1)*

The budget support mechanism was based on the National Development Plan and its corresponding monitoring and evaluation framework and used to identify priorities and coordinate support. In the annual plan, objectives and targets were set and based on these, the government of Mozambique indicated where national financial resources were going to be allocated, and donors did the same. At the end of the year, the government and partners assessed the achievements according to the plan's monitoring and evaluation framework indicators through joint assessments.

The use of pooled funding mechanisms such as budget support and donor trust funds to coordinate ODA is well known. Klingebiel et al. (2017) indicate that these mechanisms facilitate the coordination of ODA. Winters (2012) stresses that the use of basket funding mechanisms could be of benefit for coordinating donor support in Indonesia due to the streamlining of financial and procurement requirements and the alignment with recipient-government procedures. Similarly, Sundewall et al. (2010) report that parallel, as opposed to pooled, mechanisms to channel funds reduced government ownership and negatively affected coordination efforts in the health sector in Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda. The results from the studied case corroborate with these authors' findings, indicating that a centralized planning and budgeting process can facilitate the process of coordinating ODA contributions while bringing actors together to monitor resource use and impacts of investments.

### *6.1.3 Number of donors active in the country*

The interruption of donor budget support in Mozambique led to an expected challenge for ODA coordination. As the total volume of ODA was not significantly affected in the subsequent years (AfDB, 2018b), the resources that were before centralized through the government budget started to be channelled through multiple implementing organizations (ibid.). This fragmentation of implementing channels is expected to significantly increase the complexity to coordinate ODA (Acharya et al., 2006; Buse and Walt, 1996; Knack and Rahman, 2007).

Even though the literature stresses the challenges of fragmentation for coordination due to multiple channels for delivery, this particular aspect was not singled out by the interviewees as expected. This could be related to the fact that stakeholders are already used to the historically high number of international donors in the country (Vollmer, 2013) and simply take this reality for granted. Another potential explanation is that participants perceive other factors as more relevant in the context of coordination in Mozambique, such as pooled funding, organizational capacities, and coordination processes. With those in place, the number of intervening actors may not be perceived as a major constraint. This would be consistent with Gehring et al.'s (2017) findings that fragmentation only leads to adverse development outcomes in the context of low bureaucratic capacities.

## **6.2 Inter-organizational factors**

### **6.2.1 Alignment and competition**

Ten participants, five donors and five recipient-government staff stated that alignment and competition between donors could both enable or hinder coordination. Alignment was usually referred to as similar objectives and goals, whereas competition was frequently framed in the context of competition for visibility and attention of government officials.

For instance, one participant from a donor organization described an experience of alignment when some donors coordinated to support the creation of the National Climate Change Department, a substantial milestone for the climate agenda in the country:

*"I think that the coordination [between different donors] contributed to the creation of the Climate Change Department. And it was simply because we managed to coordinate, we managed to harmonize the topic and see how we can influence, each in its place, because I also became aware that the [Organization X] has some channels of influence and other partners have other channels [...]" (Donor staff – D1)*

Based on this perception, a common agenda amongst donors can promote coordination and achieve concrete objectives. On the other hand, another donor staff shared an experience where different donors' views on rural development created an impasse and delays in the discussion of a national policy and the associated investment plan:

*"[...] we have a very different view between some donors and others [...]" (Donor staff – D3)*

The participant explained that while a group of donors had the vision to promote agricultural development based on high-end machinery, improved seeds, pesticides and modern fertilizers, others had a strong opinion against this vision and favoured strengthening small-holder farming and agroecological practices. This indicates that donors have their views on development pathways and how to approach specific topics, so the very idea of coordinating might be challenging when the goal and objectives are not shared (Cassen, 1994; Hensell, 2015; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013).

In the example mentioned above, the participant also expressed that some donors wanted to promote national economic interests in the agricultural sector, creating a divide within the donor community. This experience is consistent with previous studies that adopt a political economy lens and highlight the economic interests of specific donors as a challenge for donor coordination (Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Steinwand, 2015) and indicates the importance of acknowledging underlying interests and agendas of donors for the design and implementation of coordination processes.

Another aspect frequently mentioned by participants was the competition for visibility amongst donors. Eight participants, four donors and four recipient-government staff mentioned this factor, as illustrated in the following quotes:

*"[...] with all partners [donors], whatever you do, in the end, you know that you will hear: I want my [donor] information to be presented in the government report, which will go to the Council of Ministers and in the report that goes to the Assembly of the Republic." (Government staff – G2)*

*"I remember that one of the difficulties we felt was that each partner wanted to see their activity mentioned in the process." (Government staff – G4)*

Participants expressed that this competition hindered coordination and materialized as a pressure to give special mention to one's activities in reports and official documents. According to some respondents, this went as far as prioritizing bilateral relations with the government to strengthen recognition of a specific partners' role by high-level officials of the Mozambique government. Another aspect highlighted by two participants was the competition for government organizations with higher capacity to deliver and implement projects:

*If a particular ministry at any given time is able to implement, all donors want to be there. There has been this case in the past, but afterwards, it has*

*a reverse effect as the race of the partners can also suffocate the sector, and the sector also ends up being almost inoperative. I mean, it is not very good. It has a temporary positive effect, and then it goes bad. (Government staff – G1)*

Competition between donors is highlighted as a challenge for coordination by many researchers (Acharya et al., 2006; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Knack and Rahman, 2007; Steinwand, 2015). In this study, the elevated components included competition for visibility of recipient-government officials and building partnerships with government organizations possessing higher implementation capacities, elements that were also highlighted by Klingebiel et al. (2017). Participants in this study did not mention factors identified in previous studies, such as competition for funding, promising projects, and internal competition within the government. This could relate to the fact that participants did not feel comfortable sharing this information with the interviewer due to their sensitivity. Further studies could shed light on other aspects of resource competition and its impact on coordination in Mozambique.

From another perspective, one interviewee suggested that competition for results and impact could also be positive as it creates incentives for international partners to deliver more with their interventions:

*"Yes, there is competition, but competition is towards achieving the best results." (Government staff – G1)*

The role of competition leading to better results is seemingly scarce in the literature and an area that could be further explored in future studies on ODA.

### 6.2.2 Coordination processes

Twelve out of thirteen participants mentioned the importance of grounding coordination processes in official national and sectoral plans and associated systems. Examples provided by the interviewees included the National Development Plan and its Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, the Local Adaptation Plans created to identify priority measures to minimize impacts of climate change in local governments, and specific sectoral plans. According to interviewees, these are appropriate instruments for recipient-government and donors to align priorities, map ODA support from donors, and identify areas with more and less support. Six interviewees mentioned the use of the five-year National Development Plan and its associated one-year Plan (Economic and *Social Plan*) led by the Ministry of Economy and Finance:

*" [...] the government did not always have the resources to implement the Economic and Social Plan [one-year development plan]. So, what we did was: what were the priority actions or activities of the plan? What were the activities? [...] the sectors listed their activities and priorities with more details, if possible, the cost [...] and all these things that the cooperation partners [donors] like to have." (Government staff – G3)*

Participants mentioned that recipient-government officials have an essential role in identifying the specific areas for donor ODA support in national and sectoral plans and collecting and updating information related to projects and initiatives. Additionally, interviewees also flagged the importance of tracking progress using official monitoring and evaluation systems since the indicators from national planning instruments can serve to align support, monitor implementation and evaluate progress.

*"It was based on the indicators [of the Economic and Social Plan] that goals were established. Based on these goals, negotiations were conducted with partners." (Government staff – G2)*

According to the participant quoted above, the indicators of the national plan helped donors in identifying areas they were willing to contribute towards. Moreover, according to the participant, the plan's monitoring and evaluation framework was used to provide objectivity to the process and create a clear framework for all stakeholders to coordinate actions and measure results:

*"In the monitoring and evaluation, it was possible to see the degree of the positioning of the donors [...]. That was the mechanism that was used to coordinate support and assistance. First, the donors came and assessed the government and based on that assessment, they would make resources available. But at a given moment, because of the evolution of this dialogue, we saw that there was also a need to evaluate the donors, because, in some moments, there were goals that were not achieved because there was a delay in disbursements, because there was a cancellation of disbursements, amongst others." (Government staff – G2)*

The two-way evaluation process was perceived as positive by this respondent. According to the participant, the mechanism allowed for an understanding of the lagging areas and where more action was needed. Furthermore, it provided transparency to stakeholders involved.

Anchoring coordination efforts in national priorities reflected in policy documents, national plans and associated monitoring and evaluation frameworks have been frequently documented as critical for ODA coordination (Klingebiel et al., 2017; Michaud-Létourneau and Pelletier, 2017; Scyner, 2000; Sundewall et al., 2010). International agreements designed to improve ODA, such as the Paris Declaration for AID effectiveness, also indicate these instruments' importance (OECD, 2008). The

Declaration stresses the need to align ODA with national policies, planning, and systems (ibid.). Additionally, it also highlights the importance of mutual accountability to keep both parties, donors and recipient-governments, accountable for their actions, commitments, and performance (ibid.). Participants identified all these elements, reinforcing the relevance of using recipient-government official instruments and accountability and transparency mechanisms for ODA coordination. These findings suggest that the government of Mozambique could consider integrating and reflecting its climate change objectives in its National Development Plan and central Monitoring and Evaluation Framework to support ODA coordination processes. In fact, several factors considered important for coordination, both in terms of structure and processes, linked back to the time when the coordination for climate change was linked to the central planning and monitoring and evaluation process led by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). Indeed, six participants specifically mentioned the importance of having the coordination mechanism for climate change linked to the overarching planning, budgeting, and evaluations mechanisms led by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Ministry has control over financial resources and stronger convening power. This could be considered in the operationalization of Climate Change Governance in Mozambique, as the current governance arrangement outlined in the National Climate Change Strategy and the 2020-2025 NDC Operationalization Plan does not specify clear linkages to the central mechanisms led by the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

Another factor mentioned by six of the participants (three donors and three government staff) was formalising a coordination process and associated responsibilities through supportive legislation. According to these interviewees, it is important to codify organizational responsibilities for the different activities of the coordination process, including the coordination institution(s) and their role(s):

*"When it comes to issues of institutional and coordination arrangements, many voices call for the creation of a law." (Government staff – G1)*

A potential side-effect of lagging or inexplicit assignment of roles and responsibilities within government agencies, perhaps giving weight to the need for formalization, was further elevated by participants mentioning particular failures to implement the coordination mechanisms outlined in the 2012 National Climate Change Strategy. More specifically, six participants highlighted that the Inter-Institutional Group of Climate Change (GIIMC) convenings and the knowledge management centre, proposed to strengthen climate change coordination have not been operationalized. When asked about the reason for the lack of operation of those, participants highlighted the importance of political commitment and the apparent lack of interest, or directive, from high-level government officials as illustrated by the following quote:

*"I think it is the change in leadership, I would say it is the change in leadership. Probably it is not considered relevant." (Government staff – G3)*

The role of leadership and its importance for coordination processes in this study are further discussed in section 6.3.1 (Political and Economic Interests).

Beyond the formal coordination convenings and processes, six participants noted that informal gatherings could build trust and dialogue outside formal meetings. These informal encounters were also highlighted as a space to identify innovations and out-of-the-box ideas:

*"I think that the official meetings can be very good, but they are not very good to have those innovative ideas. You get the sense of that formal environment [...] when I meet people for coffee, people get freer to actually share what is in their heart instead of what is on the agenda of the document. I think that is where interesting things come from, that actually have the potential to create that transformational change. Then [later] you can formalize them." (Donor staff – D1)*

The mix of formal and informal structures for coordination was pointed as relevant for these participants. Following the same logic, Michaud-Létourneau and Pelletier (2017) elevate formal and informal coordination in their research of multisectoral coordination for nutrition in Mozambique. Winter's (2012) study exploring donor coordination for decentralization processes in Indonesia and Sundewall et al.'s (2010) examination of ODA coordination in the health sector in Zambia also found the importance of both formal and informal spaces for ODA coordination processes. The findings of this research and previous studies point to the value of combining formal coordination structures to ensure clarity in responsibilities and provide the legal basis for the coordination processes while also promoting informal exchanges where relaxed discussions can address issues not easily captured in formal meetings.

Both formal and informal coordination mechanisms were seen as forms to generate and share information. Actually, eleven participants stressed the importance of information for coordination processes. In this regard, a few elements featured prominently among interviewees. First, interviewees emphasized the importance of easily accessing information regarding 'who is doing what' as a means of avoiding overlap and repetition of work, as illustrated in the following quote:

*"This process that we had, this mechanism that we had, helped to have information about what activity the partners are implementing [...] because we always had a map in which we had a project, when it started, when it will end, the expected results, how much it costs, who the contact person is, where it is being implemented [...] So, it was a very good way to have this information about what are the ongoing initiatives" (Government staff – G3)*

Second, information sharing was also mentioned as relevant for respondents to understand where various projects and initiatives stand, providing transparency and indicating areas where new resources could be mobilized. Interviewees also highlighted the importance of including other stakeholders, namely civil society and

the private sector, to acknowledge the activities they were implementing and improve the overall coordination results.

*"[...] a coordination and articulation mechanism for communication between the different actors, with the focus to monitoring implementation, which has contributions from governments, private sector, donors, civil society and so on. But it should have another focus which is to mobilize resources and provide information in a transparent way." (Government staff – G2)*

However, several barriers were identified to strengthen information sharing. The first one was that government organizations do not always have the culture, political cover, nor legal obligation to share information.

*"The fact is that government organizations do not have a legal instrument that frees them to be able to openly share the information they have" (Government staff – G1)*

Three participants mentioned that specific regulatory instruments that clarify responsibilities and ensure access to information could be a way to improve information sharing:

*" [...] there are those who think that if there is legislation [for information sharing] it would be improved, but there may be a law and people will not comply." (Government staff – G1)*

However, the above-quoted participant expressed concerns that even potential regulations could not be sufficient, indicating the existence of other barriers and limitations. These could be related to other factors discussed in this research.

Another important limiting factor to information sharing mentioned by five participants was the lack of systems to store and disseminate information.

Interviewees argued that this task could be complicated due to multiple projects and initiatives, a low level of institutional memory, and the inexistence of central repositories for information.

*"[...] institutions do not have a culture of having an institutional memory [...] There is no such culture. When this culture doesn't exist, then things end up staying with individuals, with people. So, when John [hypothetical name] isn't there, the information is not accessible." (Government staff – G1)*

This interviewee elaborated that information such as studies and projects, relevant plans, evaluations of projects, and general information about climate change in the country are dispersed, not readily available, and at risk of loss. Two participants said that the creation of an online repository could assist the coordination process. Participants also mentioned the importance of having periodic convenings to share information with involved stakeholders.

In this context, it is interesting to note that the governance structure for climate change outlined in the National Climate Change Strategy indicates a Center for Knowledge Management with the mandate to collect, generate, store, and disseminate information. Additionally, the strategy also proposed spaces for information exchange, such as Inter-Institutional Group on Climate Change (GIIMC). However, according to participants, none of these mechanisms has been functioning in the last years (as previously discussed in this subsection).

The role of information availability and exchange for coordination processes is emphasized in the literature and even included in some of the ODA coordination definitions. For instance, for Hensell (2015:95) *"coordination can be defined by three types of activities: sharing of information, sharing of resources and joint action."* Michaud-Létourneau and Pelletier (2017) highlight the importance of active and passive information exchange in coordination processes; active taking place in official documents and formal communication channels and passive based on events and

convenings. The recognition of the importance of both elements is consistent with the results found in this research. That said, exchanges in mechanisms such as the country's monitoring and evaluation framework appear to be of particular relevance in this case, as it was cited by nine of the thirteen participants. Furthermore, the challenges related to collecting, storing, and sharing information were also central challenges for successful ODA coordination in Mozambique. As exemplified in the above quotes, some suggested that regulations could be beneficial, but there were also concerns that laws alone are insufficient. This opens space for further exploring the right combination of formal and informal mechanisms to improve information exchange in Mozambique.

### **6.3 Intra-organizational factors**

#### *6.3.1 Political and economic interests*

According to participants, government commitment is crucial for establishing and maintaining ODA coordination processes in Mozambique. Eleven out of thirteen interviewees (six donors and five recipient-government officials) mentioned the importance of high-level political engagement of the recipient-government for ODA coordination as illustrated in the following quote:

*"High-level commitment and interest are essential. Without it, mechanisms are not going to be implemented." (Donor staff – D2)*

Respondents identified high-level buy-in as necessary for setting the foundation of the coordination mechanism, including the definition of responsibilities, approval of supportive legislation, and giving strategic guidance to the processes. High-level engagement in the coordination mechanism was also outlined as important for convening stakeholders, maintaining coordination in government and donors' agendas, and mediating conflicting interests during the process.

*"I think that in the case of Mozambique, the political part counts a lot, political involvement counts a lot [...] a decision of the minister that says let's go in this direction. While if there is no pillar, no one who hits the [decision] hammer, each one will pull things to its square, and there will always be this disagreement." (Government staff – G4)*

Or in the voice of another participant:

*"I think it has to be some political decision that says who has the mandate because we cannot have two institutions that coordinate the same thing." (Donor staff – D1)*

The importance of high-level engagement in coordination processes is well known and has been emphasized in many studies (Bourguignon and Platteau, 2015; Gulrajani, 2014; Klingebiel et al. 2017; Michaud-Létourneau and Pelletier 2017; Naik 1984). Buse and Walt (1996) proposed a framework for donor coordination that highlights the role of government leadership, ownership and engagement for ODA coordination mechanisms. Michaud-Létourneau and Pelletier (2017) also found political commitment to be central to coordination initiatives in a study in the nutrition sector in Mozambique.

Almost half of the participants remarked that donors' political and economic interests and agendas affect coordination. Interviewees mentioned that, in some cases, partners have their intervention defined at the headquarter level. For that reason, their flexibility in changing the scope and approach is limited:

*"[...] some support and some projects come from the countries that support us, a headquarter project they say. Then, the government has very little to make the decision since the donors define their criteria." (Donor staff – D6)*

The limited flexibility of donors to coordinate due to projects designed at headquarters' level is well documented (Cassen, 1994; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Sundewall, 2019). Sundewall et al. (2010), for instance, reported that several donor representatives at the country-level complained of projects being imposed on them by headquarters and that this affected their ability to harmonize priorities with other donors. Klingebiel (2017) indicates that potential causes for pre-determined interventions are donors' commercial interests in specific sectors and the aim to employ donor-based organizations to implement their ODA. Knack and Rahman (2007) argue that donors' interventions are influenced by national interests coming from parliament and specific groups. The recurrence of donors' headquarter interests and their impact on donor coordination in the literature indicates that this is not an issue only in Mozambique but a broader obstacle for ODA coordination.

The economic interest of donors became evident in the following quote:

*"[...] the idea [of a group of donors] was to bring private investors to implement these types of projects." (Donor staff – D3)*

According to this donor, there were economic interests behind donors' positions when discussing policy mechanisms and investments in the agriculture sector. All in all, this case study findings are consistent with the existing literature that indicates that political and economic interests are an essential intervening factor for ODA coordination (Buse and Walt, 1996; Cassen, 1994; Hensell, 2015; Klingebiel et al., 2017; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Winters, 2012).

### *6.3.2 Organizational capacities for coordination and internal procedures and systems*

The vast majority of participants (eleven out of thirteen) pointed to organizational capacities as a relevant factor for coordination. These interviewees mentioned the

availability of personnel with time and resources to support coordination activities as a requirement and, often, a limitation for ODA coordination. Three donors and four recipient-government staff indicated the importance of having coordinators on both sides to aid the process.

*"[...] a coordination mechanism was established with the cooperating partners [donors] that I find very interesting. The government had a coordinator representing the sector, and there was a coordinator on the side of the cooperation partners." (Government staff – G3)*

Coordinators' tasks were defined as being contacts point for the stakeholders involved to disseminate timely information, support the preparation of meetings and the content to be discussed, follow up on actions, and mediate discussions and processes. Three interviewees mentioned that the government coordinator should come from organizations with a formal mandate for coordination recognized by the stakeholders. These individuals should have a firm understanding of different plans, regulations and procedures involved in climate-related ODA. Three participants also emphasized 'soft skills' desired for coordinators, including the ability to listen to others, assume a neutral position and have consensus-building abilities:

*"I think that there are also many strengths in listening to others [...] and of course with an agenda, but the agenda being to find a middle ground." (Donor staff – D1)*

Participants mentioned the commonplace scenario that views and perspectives among and between donors and government recipient representatives often differ, so the capacity to navigate conflicts and deploy consensus-building methods is seen as critical for good coordinators. Similarly, Moshtari and Gonçalves (2017) identified that the level of seniority of coordinators is vital for coordination outcomes, while Michaud-Létourneau and Pelletier (2017) found that communication and facilitation

skills are critical elements of effective coordination processes, in line with the findings of this research.

Participants also cited elements related to organizational capacities that were already discussed in the 'coordination processes' subsection (6.2.2), such as planning processes, data collection and dissemination tools, and monitoring and evaluation capacities. Moreover, two participants referenced the importance of building in the financial resources to organize convenings, for example, space, transportation of participants and coffee breaks:

*"[...] resources for the meetings and convenings, water, coffee, tea, fuel so that the driver can pick up the person who is working [...] I mean, very basic things." (Government staff – G4)*

According to this participant, government budgets are scarce, and many donors do not have the flexibility to financially support convenings not directly linked to their projects, creating some limitations for facilitating coordination meetings.

Finally, a topic commonly highlighted in the official development assistance coordination literature is how donors' different administrative procedures, planning cycles, and limited incentives for coordination may ultimately hinder coordination (Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Winters, 2012). Contrary to expectations prior to the study, only one participant highlighted the impact of different planning cycles as a challenge for coordination when referring to one specific project. It is premature to say that this barrier is not present in Mozambique, and additional studies could further explore elements related to these potential impediments.

## **6.4 Implications for coordination of climate-related Official Development Assistance in Mozambique**

This study identified elements that could inform future advancements in improving the coordination of climate-related ODA in Mozambique. This final subsection presents practical recommendations related to coordination processes, trust, and organizational capacities. These build on the results of this study, previous research on ODA coordination, and the grey literature reviewed for this research.

First, regarding the coordination processes, three elements are offered: anchoring the coordination framework in national systems, formalizing the governance structure, and establishing information-sharing mechanisms. The thesis findings suggest that the coordination framework should be anchored in the National Development Plan and the associated one-year Economic and Social Plan and monitoring and evaluation framework. These processes are led by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, whose overall responsibility includes national planning and budget decision-making. To operationalize this recommendation, climate objectives, initiatives, and indicators currently outlined in the National Climate Change Strategy and the NDC Operational Plan 2020-2025, could be integrated into the Ministry of Economy and Finance's central planning instruments. In line with this suggestion, it would be relevant to specify how the proposed governance structure for climate change outlined in the NDC Operational Plan 2020-2025 would be linked to the Ministry of Economic and Finance processes and the central planning and budgeting processes mechanisms of the country. To increase its traction, the climate change governance could be linked to the highest level of government, ideally the President's Office. This would send a strong signal of the importance of the topic to all stakeholders and promote high-level engagement by donors. Finally, it is central to implement systematic processes to collect, store and share information regarding climate change in the country, including general data, studies, and updated information on the different initiatives taking place in the country in an easily accessible platform. These processes should

be underpinned by supportive legislation and opportunities for stakeholders to formally and informally share information.

Second, trust between the government of Mozambique and donors need to be gradually reestablished. The 2016 debt crisis struck a hard blow on the relationship between donors and the government of Mozambique and directly affected what was perceived as a well-functioning ODA coordination mechanism characterized by centralized planning, budgeting, and monitoring and evaluation mechanism. To re-establish trust, the government could continue to work on measures that provide transparency on budget allocations and avoid mismanagement of resources. This could be a way to reestablish donors' direct budget support or another pooled funding mechanism that is beneficial for ODA coordination.

Last, regarding organizational capacities, both the government of Mozambique and donors should consider setting aside financial and human resources for several tasks included in the coordination of climate-related ODA. Senior coordinators with experience in the topic, institutional knowledge and mediation skills could be hired to undertake coordination tasks and processes. Clear incentives to measure and compensate coordination efforts could also be designed on both recipient-government and donor sides, creating clear rewards for ODA coordination achievements.

While these are all practical insights to improve climate-related ODA coordination in Mozambique, it is paramount to be aware and recognize some underlying challenges identified in this case study. Amongst them, two assume particular prominence: (i) donors have their own political and economic interests that affect their willingness and ability to coordinate with others and, (ii) donors compete for visibility and government attention. Therefore, any coordination efforts need to consider these elements in its conception and implementation.

## 7. Conclusions

While official development assistance [ODA] coordination is a well-treated subject in the literature, this research contributed to an important gap regarding the dearth of research employing qualitative assessments with a focus on climate change ODA at country level. In particular, the study explored the Mozambique case, a country where climate change assumes central importance due to the nation's vulnerability to natural disasters.

Mozambique's donor community is extensive, reflecting the country's historical reliance on international support. Building off the literature-supported assumption that ODA coordination is central to improving policymaking, planning and implementation of development initiatives, this study explored the expressed perceptions of technical-level staff from donors and recipient-government on factors that i) act as barriers and enablers for the climate change-related ODA coordination, and ii) processes perceived as relevant in this context.

Prominent factors recognized as central to enabling coordination included organizational capacities to conduct the coordination processes, the existence of well-functioning systems to collect, store and share information, and donors' political and economic interests. The findings of the study also highlighted the importance of anchoring climate-related ODA coordination in the central planning, budgeting, and monitoring mechanisms led by Mozambique's Ministry of Economy and Finance, as well as linking the climate change governance structure proposed in the National Climate Change Strategy to the Ministry of Economic Finance and the highest level of government, arguably the president's office.

Other factors identified included the use of pooled funding mechanisms such as support to the national budget to streamline planning, resource allocation, evaluation processes thus reducing transaction costs. Trust between government and donors

also proved to be of particular relevance for Mozambique. The 2016 debt crisis triggered by undisclosed government debts affected donors' trust in the government, interrupting donors' support to the national budget. As this was the primary mechanism to coordinate ODA support, coordination was directly affected. Finally, alignment and competition between donors may undermine coordination efforts. These were mainly raised in the context of alignment of values, economic interests, and competition for visibility and government officials' time and attention.

With a few exceptions, the results of this research corroborate with previous studies exploring ODA coordination both broadly and in specific sectors such as health, and nutrition, indicating that coordination of ODA for climate change interventions may benefit from lessons learned from ODA coordination in other sectors. Specific factors not found in this research but present in previous studies included the expected impact of the high number of donors and implementing organizations on coordination efforts and the influence of donors' internal systems and processes on their ability to coordinate support. These factors may be absent in this study's findings because participants have long been active in the field and are accustomed to these factors. Additional focused studies could further explore these elements in Mozambique. Furthermore, aspects present in the literature, such as competition for funding and promising projects, as well as internal competition within the government, were not mentioned by participants in this study as expected, meriting further investigation.

In conclusion, the research findings added to the academic debate and provided practical insights to improve the coordination of climate change-related ODA in Mozambique. This topic is expected to increase its importance in the years to come due to the vulnerability of the country to climate change and its reliance on international support.

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## **Annex 1. Consent Form**

### **Consent Form for Participation in Research**

Lund University – Master in International Development and  
Management (LUMID)

Student: Joaquim Libanio Ribeiro Ferreira Leite

*Version translated from Portuguese consent form that was read to participants*

**Study Title:** Barriers and Enablers for the Coordination of Climate Change-related Official Development Assistance in Mozambique: expressed perceptions of involved stakeholders

**Researcher:** Joaquim Leite ([xxxxxx@gmail.com](mailto:xxxxxx@gmail.com)) – +**phone number (xxxx)**  
[LUMID Program – International Development and Management - Lund University

**Thesis Supervisor:** Olle Frödin, Department of Sociology, Lund University.

#### **Purpose of this Study**

The study examines the factors that are perceived by technical-level staff from donors and government employees as barriers and enablers for climate change-related official development assistance coordination in Mozambique. The research aims to contribute to the academic and development debates on how to improve the coordination of official development assistance (ODA) coordination for climate change. The study is part of the completion of the Master Thesis in International Development and Management for the University of Lund.

#### **Your Participation**

Your participation in this research is totally voluntary. You are free to deny participation and withdraw your involvement at any time.

If you have any question, please feel free to ask them now or at a later stage during or after the interview through my contact information.

### **Procedures**

Interviews will take between 45-60 minutes depending on your availability. I will ask questions regarding your experiences and perceptions of coordination of climate-related official development assistance coordination in Mozambique. With your consent, an audio of the conversation will be recorded.

### **Confidentiality**

All data captured in the interviews will be kept confidential. No association that can link you or your organization with the data will be made in the master thesis.

Any information, including the consent form, data and other personally identifiable information will only be disclosed if required by law, regulation, subpoena or court order. Otherwise, your confidentiality will be maintained in the following manner:

I will take the following steps to protect your identity during this research: (i) You will be assigned a code; (ii) I will record data according to this code, not by name; (iii) All original recordings and data will be saved in password protected location.

### **Voluntary Consent**

By consenting, you agree that all details about the study's purpose, data collection and use, and confidentiality were explained. You confirm that your questions were answered, and that you agree to participate in this study.