

Square-pegs for Round Holes?

What's the Problem Represented to be in Public Sector
Reform in Zambia?

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Abstract

Efforts to reform the public sectors of Zambia have been ongoing since the 1990s with objectives to ensure efficient and high-quality provision of public goods and services to all citizens and battling persistently high levels of poverty. Outcomes have however been mixed at best.

This study assesses how reforms to the public sectors of Zambia have been framed in terms of what problem representations underpin the solutions prescribed in reform programs driven by international financial institutions. The questions of the *What's the Problem Represented to be?*- analysis by Carol Bacchi will be answered to establish the problem representation, the assumptions that constitutes its conceptual logic and effects produced by it. The analysis is applied to three interrelated reform programs produced by the World Bank and the Government of Zambia. A theoretical framework operationalizes two perspectives, form over function (good governance) and function over form be used inductively to pinpoint the rationale of the problem representation as well as how it may be thought of differently

The study finds that reforms have been prescribed according to a conviction that a particular *form* of governance can replace a failing one, based on the problem representation of *Bad governance, or lack of good governance, as a constraint on economic growth and use of public resources for poverty reduction*. It is also found that fixed convictions silence complexities of the realities of individuals living in poverty and may disrupt positive momentums of functions that are not aligned with the forms proposed by the good governance agenda.

Keywords: Public sector reform, Good governance, Zambia, Decentralization, Poverty reduction, Economic growth

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1 Introduction

“Think of a carpenter producing thousands of large square pegs that win awards for their design but never fill the small round holes that need filling”

(Andrews, 2013: 19)

A good and well-functioning public sector is generally held as key to ensure equality, opportunity and protection of the weak in society. In developing contexts it is increasingly important as it may act as an accelerator of national development and facilitator of a fair distribution of the benefits of economic and social development for everyone (Ayee, 2008: 7-8). However, what makes the public sector good and what makes it function well, and how to turn bad public sectors good is a more contested matter. Whether there is a set of institutional and structural changes and transformations that will generate efficient and effective public sectors or if there is need for identifying and approaching the key factors that need to change and work with what is given on the hand in specific contexts, divide the common approaches employed by major donors and the academic community.

Good governance has become a staple model for reform as it contains all the ‘good’ components needed to run public sectors effectively and sustain a well-oiled government, based on the experiences and appearances of developed countries. Issues of corruption, political unwillingness to genuinely implement reform, lack of legitimacy from the public and wasteful use of resources, are tackled by promoting decentralization, performance-based management, and privatization, to name some examples of an extensive menu of interventions (Grindle, 2004; Nadeem, 2016). Critics assert that good governance is *institutional isomorphism* in action (Levy, 2014: 206), excessively top-down and ignorant towards the complexities of changing political behavior (Hickey, 2012), and overly confident in the impact of changing the *form* of governance, instead of the *functions*, to spur development and poverty reduction (Levy, 2014: 135).

As indicated in several program and project evaluations and research, progress and improvements following ambitious reform efforts have been unsatisfactory and sometimes outright disappointing (World Bank, 2016, 2005; Faust et.al, 2012; Levy, 2014: 82). Andrews (2013: 22) find that results based on Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) and

Quality of Governance (QoG) indexes are generally poor, varied at best, and that reforms have not produced better governments, but governments that look better.

Zambia is no exception to this trend. Levy note that Zambia has been a stable democracy free from conflicts since the early 1990s and enjoyed encouraging economic growth, creating an illusion of economic growth through democratization, as personalized competition within the bureaucracy and corruption puts dents in the expectations of determined steps towards prosperity (Levy, 2014: 74-75, 86). Further, Zambia are still struggling to battle high levels of poverty and dismal results on the Human Development Index, as well as raising the effectiveness of government (World Bank, 2016: 2-3), after almost three decades worth of reforms. Tying back to the quote by Andrews at the very top, begs the question of whether square-peg-reforms are fitted into round-holed problems?

In light of the disappointing results and slow-moving progress as a result of the reform efforts, it is relevant to scrutinize the grounds upon which reforms are produced and justified. At the core there is a *problem* that urges solutions. Based on the divergence between donors and research briefly presented this far, there are reasons to believe that there is not *one* objective problem or set of solutions, but rather different ways of framing the problem. Understanding the central rationale of reform policy, i.e. the problem it addresses, perhaps better than the authors themselves, may provide further understanding of how to approach reform in developing countries and achieve tangible improvements of public sectors that are vital for reducing poverty. To this end, the *What's the Problem Represented to Be?*- analysis (WPR henceforth) by Carol Bacchi will be used to identify the problem representations in three reform programs by the World Bank and the government of Zambia to improve the public sectors and reduce poverty. This method is particularly useful when disseminating prescriptive documents as it uncovers the problem, assumptions underpinning this representation of the problem, what is not problematized or *silenced*, as well as examining what effects a certain problem representation may produce (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016: 18).

1.1. Research Question

The research question for the study is as follows:

How have reforms to the governance of the public sector of Zambia been framed and approached?

1.2. Relevance & Scope

The aim is to prompt orthodoxies of development trajectories as they affect the lives of people in poverty that are to be the beneficiaries of reform. By disseminating the representations of problems and what assumptions and justifications that make these dominant in policy, there is opportunity to further our understanding of what aspects become silenced and unaddressed and the flaws of the rationale of reform as a result of a specific problem representation. The aim of the study is to through analysis of large reforms undertaken to change the public sector, pinpoint the problem-framing, the effects caused by it, and also attempt to present alternative problem-framings.

There is no aspiration to provide any normative claims from the findings of the study. The aim is to challenge notions of objectivity of problems and models for solutions that are commonly occurrent in development interventions, much in line with the central concept of the WPR- analysis. The alternative views presented are aimed to provide nuance to how problems may be framed differently and are in other words not intended as suggestions to better approaches, but rather representatives of alternative interpretations of an identical subject.

1.3. Outline

The first section outlines previous research on public sector reform in developing contexts, a historical background on political and economic events and previous reform efforts. The following section introduces the two components of the theoretical framework that consists of good governance representing *form* and the function over form component representing *function*. The third section elaborates on the WPR-analysis by Carol Bacchi (2009) and how it will be used along with an introduction of the documents

used in the study, ethical considerations and limitations. The fourth section presents the analysis where questions 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the WPR are answered in turn and concluded with a summative discussion. The final section presents the final conclusions of the study and avenues for future research.

2 Background

This section will provide a review of the literature on public sector reform in developing contexts to introduce different perspectives on the mechanisms, opportunities and challenges to reforming the public sectors in developing contexts. A brief country profile on Zambia to outline some significant historical events and give an introduction to the context under study will follow.

2.1. Getting Reform Right: Previous Research on Public Sector Reform

As many externally driven efforts to reform the governance and public sectors of developing countries have entailed adopting neoliberal principles of efficiency and performance, a large body of literature, apprehensive towards the appropriateness of pursuing reform along such principles, has emerged. It is found by many that reforms since the dawn of the Structural Adjustment Plans, New Public Management (NPM henceforth) and now good governance are overly top-down and insensitive to bottom-up developments that may unlock the required conditions to achieve the goals (Nadeem, 2016; Fritz, 2016). Olowu (2012) has pointed to the focus on *outputs over inputs* inherent to top-down reform. An input-oriented approach would mean promoting some of the basic Weberian values of bureaucracies, such a merit, fairness, impersonality and professionalism and cementing these in society and forging strong bonds between citizens and government. He finds that the encouraging performance of many African countries in achieving MDG objectives (output related) was covered by a wet blanket of backsliding on democratic indexes of Freedom House (input related). Along similar lines, Wallis & Dollery (2001) argue that prioritizing strengthening the weak civic and democratic institutions and raising the legitimacy of the state through actively addressing issues of social capital is key. In their view, top-down reforms focus excessively on raising the technical capacities of elites and leaders. In addition, Abebe (2017) note that reform efforts to decentralize and draw on market-functions to ensure efficient and high-quality provision of services is likely to be unsuccessful as this relationship between citizens, state and market has

not been sufficiently established. The ways that resources are spent, and services organized remain haunted by corruption and nepotism.

In contrast to the above assertions that output, and performance is insufficient to provide the essential legitimacy and robustness of bureaucracy and public sectors, Gustavsson (2014: 168-170) conclude that legitimacy can be achieved through outputs without dealing too much with the complex efforts of input-driven, bottom-up approaches. She arrives at this conclusion through interviews with auditors using Western-standard auditing methods experienced coherence and efficiency when using well-known practices and experienced a general satisfaction.

As a mediating contribution, Ohemeng & Ayee (2016) proposes a hybrid between top-down and bottom-up, output and input-focused, approaches to overcome the syndromes carried by both. The process-leaping of top-down reforms, and the gradual, intricate and uncertain process of bottom-up both fail to address the realities of developing contexts in isolation. That is, providing goods and services to those who need it urgently, and at the same time do so through robust and sustainable systems.

Pollitt & Bouckaert illustrate the often awkward choices when reforming with trade-offs. Such trade-offs are for example *responsiveness and efficiency* or *poverty reduction and motivate staff and promote cultural change* or *weaken tenure and downsize* (2011: 2, 187). They believe that solving these awkward choices through generic models are unrealistic and that overemphasizing uniqueness of contexts comes off as unambitious, and that the way forward should instead be drawing on well-tested knowledge with contextual considerations (ibid: 219-220).

2.2. Zambia: A Brief Country Profile

After gaining independence in 1964 and up until the election in 1991, Zambia was led by Kenneth Kaunda and the *United National Independence Party* (UNIP) through a one-party political system that only legally allowed the ruling party between 1973 and 1990. During this period the government heavily centralized the state apparatus and the public sectors, by e.g. turning the copper mining industry into a state enterprise after previously being operated by several private actors (Van Donge, 2009). Zambia also constituted a curious case in 1970s having the fourth highest GDP among African countries, mostly due to the rich copper endowments, but simultaneously being one of the worst scorers on social- and poverty

indicators. From the late 1970s to 2002 copper prices fell drastically and all indicators, economic and social, followed in the fall (Whitworth, 2015). As a consequence, the public resources were far from enough to provide essential services and address social- and poverty challenges, making Zambia one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world in the mid-90s (Faust et.al, 2012) and joining the *Highly indebted poor countries* scheme (HIPC) in 2000 to free up resources for poverty reduction (Whitworth, 2015).

In 1991 the *Movement for Multi-party Democracy* (MMD) led by Frederick Chiluba took office and ushered in a new era that was hailed for its big leaps towards democratization, liberalization and good governance (Craig, 2000; Faust et.al, 2012). The pace of committing to reforms to the public service and the economy by the MMD to reverse the ‘bad policies’ of the UNIP in the 90s and early 2000s, made the MMD a radical force for change in the eyes of donors (Craig, 2000; Whitworth, 2014). The Public Sector Reform Program (PSRP) of 1993 launched the first efforts to reform the public sectors of Zambia through retrenchments of public employees, liberalization of the current structure of the public service to create an environment where the private sector could play a significant role in service provision, as well as substantial decentralization of the health and agricultural sectors as a first step (World Bank, 1999). The PSRP thus marked the start of a major restructuring of the state, governance and the public sectors of Zambia.

Although maintaining an approximate 5% growth per annum since 2005, the distributive effects have been less encouraging. Faust et.al (2012) find that most resources still benefit economic and political elites and poverty indicators have been stagnant, and static at best. Further, the democratic momentum has also been stagnant since the turn of the millennia. Corruption and personalized interests have resulted in several scandals between 2000-2010 involving officials high-up in the hierarchy, including former president Chiluba. Cases of repressive actions against the press as well as a failed attempt to change the constitution to allow Chiluba to extend his presidency into a third term (Levy, 2014: 85), has called the optimism of donors into question, as macroeconomic stability has been the sole clear-cut improvement (Levy, 2014: 82; Van Donge, 2009).

3 Theoretical Framework

The analysis will focus on how problems are framed, the motivations and justification of that framing and the effects, in accordance with the WPR-analysis. Finding the existing problem represented in reforms and then apply alternative perspectives to think of the problem differently requires a set of theoretical, and in this case also practical, approaches to enrich the analysis and discussion.

Theory on public sector reform in development is seldomly crafted in or specifically for its contexts, but rather applications of theory produced in and for Western experiences. Theory-building is naturally difficult in developing countries due to the great variance between contexts and lack of consistency in research to build theory on viable generalizations (Smoke, 2015). The first component of two of the theoretical framework, representing the *form over function* perspective, is *good governance*, which is expected to be represented consistently throughout the documents. The theoretical and normative underpinnings of good governance will be discussed separately below.

The second component of the theoretical framework for the analysis will thus be a combination of similar approaches put forward by Andrews (2013), Grindle (2004) and Levy (2014) that argues for identifying and addressing the *functions* in need of change in collaboration with stakeholders, over implementing institutional *forms* that are assumed to produce these functions. This theoretical framework is sprung from literature that has a critical disposition towards the mainstream reform programs of major donors.

The reasoning behind including these two components are the different characteristics. As indicated by the name, the first component, good governance, puts form before function, and the second component the other way around. They are also distinguishable on the grounds that good governance is output rather than input-oriented, as well as being geared towards a normative disposition of what is considered *good* (Rothstein, 2012: 151).

3.1. Good Governance

There is no established theoretical framework to depart from for good governance, but there is an extensive body of literature defining its theoretical underpinnings and it will make up the framework used here.

Adhering from a positivist school of thought, good governance can be theoretically pinpointed with the epitomes of rational choice, with additional reference to public choice theory, and institutionalism. The similarities of these theoretical traits are the claims of objectivity, predictability of outcomes and as mentioned, positivist motivations (Bevir, 2002). The positivist and normative foundation of good governance is also made visible in the use of the word ‘good’, as it signals ‘what the state ought to do’ to turn from bad to good (Rothstein, 2012: 151). Further, as there is assumed to be good and bad, there is also some loose conceptions and assumptions of right and wrong.

The core features of rational choice and institutionalism will be succinctly outlined below and at the end discussed in reference to how they overlap and relate to the good governance agenda.

3.1.1. Rational Choice Institutionalism and Good Governance

Rational choice theory establishes assumptions about individual behavior that allows for predictable analysis. Individuals are *self-interest-driven* and *utility-maximizers* regardless of context (Dowding, 2011: 37) and individuals are thus seen as a homogenous group where potential differences among them are actively rejected (Green & Shapiro, 1994: 17). Markets are ascribed considerable importance as efficiency and effectiveness are closely connected to utility maximization and self-interest and these are best achieved through arrangements where market functions are effectively put into play (Bevir, 2002).

Two central aspirations of the theory is to (1) provide causal arguments and (2) make claims for universalism, which is held as both a strength in terms of providing predictable and consistent interpretations of complex and varied phenomena, and a weakness in terms of the inherent theoretical parsimony and axiomatic deduction of ‘true explanations’ (Green & Shapiro, 1994: 17-18, 30).

Institutionalism does not provide explanations to what shapes behavior, but rather see institutions as vehicle to provide rules of the game, routinization and predictability to enable

utility maximization and create linkages between the self-interested actors both inside and outside the institutions (Peters, 2011: 81; Olsen, 2016: 13)

As a combined theoretical framework, rational choice theory provides explanations on the behavior of individuals, and institutionalism on how behavior is aggregated through institutional arrangements to achieve predictable outcomes and maximized output.

Institutions can be set up in ways that creates positive and negative incentives to achieve predictable patterns of behaviors among its actors. If institutions are poorly built, maximization and self-interest become an unpredictable and potentially predatory force. Based on the Ostrom's problem of the commons, an equilibrium needs to be created to avoid the disequilibrium caused by individual maximization (Peters, 2011: 80). Ordeshook (1986: xiii) describe an equilibrium as a prediction about the choices of people along the process as follows; *if the institutional context of choice is X, and if peoples preferences are Z, then the only choices and outcomes that can endure are XZ (X and Z added for clarity)*. The causal and universalist underpinnings of the theory is here clearly exemplified. The right institutional order will produce predictability and efficiency, regardless of context since all individuals share the same behaviors (Peters, 2011: 83).

In direct reference to the good governance agenda, the rational choice institutionalism framework is comprised of normative assumptions of good and bad (right and wrong), universalism and positivism. In other words, individual behavior is determined and universal, and institutions, when done right, will accommodate individual behavior. Institutions have naturally given forms that can inevitably create developments and trajectories (Bevir, 2002), e.g. by incentivizing and enabling market functions to get most out of self-interest and maximization and thus generate output (Dowding, 2011: 37). This is held as objectively true and sufficiently explained by the theory (Green & Shapiro, 1994: 30).

3.1.2 Good Governance in Public Sector and Economic Reform

Before the insurgence of the good governance paradigm, approaches were too focused on economic reform, namely the structural adjustment programs and the New Public Management era of the 1980s. Too little importance was ascribed to governance in reforms that championed the *lean state* and reduced influence of the government, in favor of market-forces (Rothstein & Tannenber, 2015). In the World Bank report *Governance and Development* (1992) the failures of the previous approaches are addressed and governance is put forward as a key factor for providing an environment through which institutions and laws are upheld to support a

liberalized society, as well as ensuring effective provision of public services and goods to its citizens. Good governance is here defined as “*the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a county's economic and social resources for development*”, and synonymous with “*sound development management*” (World Bank, 1992: 1, italics added). From initially including 45 indicators for improvement, the good governance agenda grew to 116 in the 2002 report by the World Bank, urging government to get their political, administrative and fiscal houses up to par (Grindle, 2004). Good governance as a solution to failure in this sense touches upon every aspect of the public sector (ibid).

Good governance is a step away from hard-boiled neoliberalism of the NPM, as the state is ascribed more importance, e.g. through an emphasis on its capacity to formulate and implement policy, monitoring and sustaining a strong fiscal integrity (Ayee, 2008: 28). Good governance also came to include a more pronounced pro-poor approach with reforms targeted to reduce poverty (Hickey, 2012) Many of the NPM tools do however persist with the emphasis on performance-orientation, outputs, and the increased involvement of market functions in public sectors (De Vries & Nemec, 2013). Ohemeng & Ayee provide a succinct definition of good governance being “*a policy strategy in which aid distributors combine New Public Management with advocacy of liberal democracy in stressing the political, administrative, and economic values of legitimacy and efficiency*” (2016: 282).

Meisel & Ould-Aoudia (2007) argue that proponents of good governance view the world as binary and that institutional characteristics are shared among all countries, however those suffering from pathologies such as corruption and weak democracy are on the back foot. Improving governance will thus have them catch up. Opponents argue against the idea that developing countries would be “wealthy if they were not ill”, and that countries are in fact structurally and systemically different (Sundaram & Chowdhury, 2012: 10).

3.2. Function over Form

Andrews argue that the reforms implemented are generally blueprints of a *form* of public sectors desired by donors. Decentralization, performance-based management and meritocratic hiring are some components deemed effective to untangle knots but much too often premature for the contexts they are targeting (Andrews, 2013: 26-27). By recognizing the *process* as being as important as the *product*, there is opportunity to avoid negative outcomes of premature reforms (ibid: 3). Through a *Problem-Driven Iterative Approach* (PDIA) a process of problem

identification in close correspondence with national stakeholders is initiated to respond to locally defined problems. Relevant solutions are then prescribed with the criteria of being both politically acceptable and practically possible. Further, respecting the process and the needed experimentation through trial and error may yield an effective conjunction of both internal and external ideas (ibid: 3).

Grindle's frequently cited 'good enough governance' carries the message that "(...) all good things cannot be pursued at once" (Grindle, 2004: 526). Being mindful of the evolution of institutions and capabilities of governments as well as acknowledging what works instead of what holes in governance that needs filling, indicates an approach focused on processes and functions and a close eye on change. In addition, being open about trade-offs and priorities when shaping reform may help addressing those functions that are actually failing instead of those that are good enough (ibid, 2004).

Levy's 'Working with the grain' (2014) argues along similar lines as Andrews and Grindle. Initiating a momentum of positive change and maintaining it, is a balancing act. Being too cautious may stop it in its tracks but exaggerating it through reform overreach exposes risks for disruption (ibid: 118). Learning is thus a central component, what works and what does not, and what is urgent and what is merely desirable (ibid: 92-93)? Levy proposes an approach that moves on from orthodoxies and triumphalist approaches that are thought of being complete, as it short-circuits the process of learning and being able to combine best practices with the contextual realities that are addressed (ibid: 92-93, 156). A guiding message is thus that public service provision and economic development can be sustained through a positive momentum without getting all good governance institutions in place (ibid: 118).

The Function over Form-framework can be summarized into some key components:

- Quality of outcomes
- Avoid applying quantitative benchmarks
- Experimental processes or learning and collaboration
- A main focus on functions that need change and how, not the forms (institutions) that may produce change

Acknowledging the difference between initiating and implementing reform is here central, as signaling a restructuring of the form and actually doing it, is two wildly different things. The

process of change is thus of interest and how to address the existing functions in a manner that leads to genuine commitment to reform (Andrews, 2013: 28-29, 33).

This theoretical perspective is putting forward ways public sector reform *could* or perhaps *should* be approached, which at first glance may appear as out of touch with the *how*-oriented research question. However, a significant component of the function over form framework is its direct contrasting rationale compared to the good governance framework, i.e. putting function ahead of form. The problems to address are specifically identified in reference to the conditions at hand, with a more exploratory ambition.

4 Methodology

4.1. What's the Problem Represented to be?

The *What's the problem represented to be?*- analysis by Carol Bacchi employs a critical lens when analyzing policy or programs, i.e. documents that are prescriptive, by answering the six key questions presented below. It departs from the idea that problems, and the prescriptions to solve them, are produced by the ones crafting the policies. Bacchi thus rejects positivist notions of objectivity and that problems are 'out there' for us to find (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016). As indicated by the name of the analysis, it is *problem-questioning* in style. As put forward by Bacchi (2012: 23), such an approach is necessary in an environment of problem-solving hegemony where the problems to solve are deemed objective and fixed.

Further, for the purposes of this thesis and the question it seeks to answer, the WPR-analysis does not aim to frame policy-makers in governments or major donors as ill-willing actors that strategically pursue 'bad' policies for cynical ends, it rather aims to understand policy better than the policy-makers themselves. By departing from the conviction that problems are produced and not policy-makers best efforts to solve problems, one is able to explore the implicit problem statements in policy and in turn explore what will get done and what won't as a result of the problems represented (ibid: 22).

The six questions of the WPR-analysis are as follows:

1. What's the 'problem' represented to be in a specific policy or policy proposal?
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the 'problem'?
3. How has this representation of the 'problem' come about?
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the 'problem' be thought about differently?
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the 'problem'?

6. How/where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been (or could it be) questioned, disrupted and replaced?

(Bacchi, 2009: 2)

The third question on how the representation of the problem has come about will not be answered under a section of its own. The theoretical framework outlines the genealogy of the good governance agenda, which is the aim of the question (Bacchi, 2009: 10-11). The answer to the sixth question will provide complementing answers to complete the analysis, since question three and six interrelate (Bacchi, 2009: 19).

As indicated from the lack of theory-testing and deductive ambitions of the thesis, WPR requires an inductive approach to utilize its exploratory features. With a special reference to question four where alternative representations of the problems are analyzed, it is appropriate to draw on theoretical approaches that may formulate problems differently and derive contrasting conclusions from the same evidence. Using theory inductively is key to realize the main idea of the WPR, namely questioning the objectivity of problems and solutions. Or in other words, draw on the Foucauldian foundations of the method to find *what could be thought*, or *what is possible to think* (ibid: 5).

The analysis will not be concerned with rhetoric or language, otherwise common for discourse analysis, but strictly focused on the representation of problems or what is deemed as in need of ‘fixing’ (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016: 16-18)

4.2. Material

The government of Zambia in collaboration with donor agencies, most predominantly the World Bank and the IMF, has crafted many projects, programs and policies for reform to accelerate development and most importantly reduce the high levels of poverty in the country dating back several decades. The selection of documents for the analysis is based on the direct relevance for public sector reform and management, thus deliberately leaving out programs targeting financial reforms. These are not irrelevant or unrelated to the public sector reform criteria, as some implementations are connected to common, overarching goals. They are however less fit to fall within the scope of the thesis. Three documents have been selected for the analysis that represents the aspects under study most directly, those are the *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* (PRSP), the *Public Service Capacity Building Program* (PSCAP),

and the *Public Sector Management Program* (PSMP). They are especially focused on measures to change the structure and functions of the public sector to achieve the goals for poverty reduction and making them more responsive and efficient. The relevance of these documents in particular is the connection between them, PRSP being the overarching steering objectives of poverty reduction, PSCAP constituting a first phase with the aim to “to design and begin to implement the critical system-wide reforms that will support improved service delivery in the sectors” (2000: 3), and PSMP building on this first phase to in a second phase make “public service delivery processes more effective and efficient in order to facilitate economic growth and reduce poverty” (World Bank, 2016: 3).

It is worth noting that the PRSP is included in the National Development Plan (NPD) that is updated and issued in four-year intervals. The choice to use the 2002 version is due to it being the first Poverty reduction strategy issued, and to align it with the other two documents issued in 2000 and 2005. Upon a shallower review of the later NDPs no significant changes were found that would render the PRSP of 2002 inappropriate for analysis.

The Public Sector Reform Program (PSRP) launched in 1993 is an influential and central program that initiated the reform trajectory of decentralization, retrenchments, liberalization and privatization (World Bank, 1999). Unfortunately, however, retrieving an acceptable copy of the program documents. i.e. a full and official version, has proven difficult and it will thus not be subject for analysis. The documents of the PSRP that was retrieved were short program descriptions and summaries that is not elaborate and prescriptive enough for this type of analysis. The PSCAP and PSMP are however extensions to the PSRP and thus represent the key features of it.

4.3. Ethical Considerations

The use of textual and discourse analysis, official documents, statistics and published research relieves the study of obtrusiveness, putting anyone at risk and issues of consent.

Bacchi urges those who use WPR to be practice reflexivity throughout the analysis to acknowledge that we are ourselves governed by conceptual logics of problem representations (Bacchi, 2009: 19) and influenced by our own position in society and the world, culture and knowledges (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016: 24). It is thus important to reflect upon these aspects to do the subject under study justice. Reflexivity is here important to ensure a high ethical standard

as well as raising the validity of the study through avoiding and being aware of potential biases (Cresswell, 2018: 200-201).

4.4. Limitations

The single case design of the study will not be able to forward any general claims of how policy is framed and what effects it produces in other contexts. The aim is as mentioned to disseminate problem representations that are externally driven and thus contribute to the current knowledge on the topic and future research.

A second limitation is that the point of focus is on the reforms of institutions and the specific implications for the public sectors, e.g. agriculture, health and education, can therefore not be fully covered within the limited scope of the study.

5 Analysis

Questions 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 will be answered in order followed by a discussion to summarize and link the answers. Due to the many different aspects of reform, the answers will be divided into shorter sections to present the analysis more thematically.

5.1. What's the Problem Represented to be in Public Sector Reform in Zambia?

Taken together, all programs put forward a similar problem representation; *Bad governance, or lack of good governance, as a constraint on economic growth and use of public resources for poverty reduction.*

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2002) specifies economic growth as the key determinant to reduce poverty. Expanding the opportunities to accumulate resources is priority to increase the means available to re-invest in poverty reducing interventions. Redistributive aspects are in addition put forward as crucial to ensure that resources are used efficiently and fairly through well-functioning public and private sectors (PRSP, 2002: 37, 39-40).

Poor economic growth and inefficient use of resources and responsiveness to the needs of the poor is attributed to the previous over-involvement of the state and too centralized organization that effectively shut out private sector involvement in, as an example, the mining industry, the biggest source of national income, and reduced the reach of citizen participation of poor as rural areas were largely neglected (ibid: 41). The goal of poverty reduction is prevalent throughout the documents and is clearly linked to the importance of reforming the public sectors through good governance. Economic growth is held as key for poverty reduction and is best achieved by institutional and structural reforms to the public sector (PRSP, 2002: 34). An excerpt from the PSCAP exemplifies this link, “*The objective of Public Service Capacity Building Program (PSCAP) is to make public service delivery processes more effective and efficient in order to facilitate economic growth and reduce poverty*” (PSCAP, 2000: 3).

Good governance is explicitly stated as being indispensable for stimulating economic growth and reducing poverty and transcend all sectors, agriculture, education, health, industry and government. The main objectives are to; further entrench the process of liberalization and market-orientation, create new and strengthen existing institutional linkages between public and private sectors, increase civil society and business involvement, decentralize the government to allocate discretion and resources at local levels, promote meritocracy and abolish corruption (ibid: 32-34).

The PSCAP and PSMP both specify more technical interventions to improve the performance of the government and the public sectors. The objectives are to achieve an efficient structure, predominantly through decentralization and involving private actors, reduce the amount of employees through retrenchments to free up resources to adjust wages to more attractive and appropriate levels, as well as changing the institutional structures to introduce performance-management as a measure to motivate staff to carry out efficient and quality work, as well as ensuring merit-based movements within public ranks (PSCAP, 2000: 10, 16-18; PSMP, 2005: 10-12).

The problem stated for Zambia in the document is in sum the too centralized structure of government and negative wage policies that hinders efficient and professional service provision and in turn poverty reduction and positive momentum for growth. In other words, poor institutional government, or bad governance, and public sector structures as a constraint on economic growth and poverty reduction (PSCAP: 6).

5.2. What Presuppositions or Assumptions Underpin this Representation of the ‘Problem’?

At the very core of the assumptions found in the documents as well the conceptual logic of the problem representations, are the basic assumptions that underpins the good governance agenda. Firstly, the belief that decentralizing government and increasing the role and influence of local authorities and increasing the use of markets to achieve efficiency, effectiveness and quality of public service delivery and stimulating economic growth. Secondly, the aspect of staff and the presupposition that performance-based payments will motivate staff to conduct work in accordance to the values of professionalism and fairness, as well achieving efficiency and

effectiveness. These represent assumptions of the behavior of individuals and how it is universal and predictable and thus possible to change from one structure to another.

5.2.1. Decentralization and Marketization

Two central factors to the poverty reduction plan is to increase the participation of citizens, both seen to input on public services and acting as a feedback system for the institutions as well as engaging citizens in market activities to achieve economic growth. Two assumptions are presented to achieve increased participation; decentralization of government activities and creating linkages to the private sector through marketization.

As outlined in the PSCAP, bad governance structures are those that entail an overly involved central state. Floating responsibilities to local levels of government that can dispose over resources will result in an organization that is more absorbent of local demand and needs. In addition, hiving of public service responsibilities to the private sphere will ensure efficient delivery of services, especially in places that the central government struggles to reach. The rationale draws on the assumptions of market logics, e.g. supply and demand, and that citizens are familiar with these mechanisms and without hesitance active in utilizing them. The PSMP (2005: 12) aims efforts towards ‘demand-side interventions’ which empowers citizens to have an influence over the service provision and demand better quality or different variations to fit their needs.

In sum, there is an assumption that there is a ‘good’ institutional structure where the state delegates responsibilities through market-driven mechanisms to stimulate a supply and demand relationship between providers and recipients (Bevir, 2002). Underpinning this assumption is a conviction of causality that restructuring the state into an enabler of positive linkages between public and private spheres and citizens through markets will spur economic growth and reduce poverty through efficient service provision.

5.2.2. Performance Management

An underlying assumption of good governance is that individuals respond to incentives in predictable and universal ways (Dowding, 2011: 37). If one is evaluated, compensated or awarded based on clearly defined performance indicators, then it is assumed that one, out of self-interest, would seek to perform as well as possible to reap the highest rewards.

The second component of the PSMP (2005: 10-12), especially aimed at performance-management, emphasizes the need to reshape the institutional environment to create one where performance, or output, is virtue to ensure that services are provided efficiently and effectively to reduce poverty. By establishing individual performance indicators, staff is assumed to change their behavior to value accountability, professionalism and efficiency in the use of public resources to satisfy performance evaluations. Further, ‘good’ behavior is here assumed as latent among everyone regardless and can be made active when appropriate incentives are successfully in place (Dowding, 2011: 37). This is in line with the model presented by Ordeshook (1986), if the institutional form is ‘right’ and accommodate the preferences of the individuals within it, only one ‘choice’ or outcome can suffice, in this case efficient service delivery.

The PSCAP (2000: 16-17) outlines similar assumptions. Result- and performance-orientation with monetary benefits for the staff is key to keep them motivated to deliver services with efficiency and quality. An additional underlying assumption is here that outputs, in this case results, and the evaluation of these are the dominant determinants of behavior, as individuals rather than values shared within a group are central. Thus, an institutional structure or environment where individuals are subjected to incentives based on performance is assumed to aggregate the self-interest among individuals to generate a satisfactory output and as a result deliver efficient goods and services with minimal loss (Peters, 2011: 83).

5.2.3. The Conceptual Logic of the Problem Representation

For a problem representation to cohere and make sense, a set of meanings must be in place to form a conceptual logic (Bacchi, 2009: 5). In this case these meaning are constituted by the assumptions discussed above. The problem of bad governance, or lack of good governance, is thus based on the conceptual logic that there is an institutional and governmental structure that has objectively good attributes and is thus best suited to spur economic growth and reduce poverty, by creating efficient, accountable and affordable governments and public sectors.

The conceptual logic of problems is, in addition, often based on binaries or dichotomies that simplify relationships and influences our understanding of an issue handled in policy (ibid: 7). In the examined documents it is made clear that there is a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ type of governance, where one type is obviously better and more desired than the other. To further elaborate, the problem representation builds on conceptual logic that a deficit of ‘good’ serves

as a constraint to produce desired outcomes and assumes an on/off relationship between good and bad.

5.3. What is left Unproblematic in this Problem Representation? Where are the Silences? Can the ‘Problem’ be Thought about Differently?

It has probably, and hopefully, been made clear that public sector reform touches upon many aspects of governance and society. The answers to this particular question will thus constitute a large portion of the analysis to adequately discuss these aspects as well as presenting alternative options to the problem.

5.3.1. The Beneficiaries of Public Sector Reform

The problem representation in the documents, most explicit in the PRSP, focuses on institutional change that will create positive incentives for individuals working within the public and private spheres and individuals living in poverty. Imboela (2005) assert that the PRSP in Zambia solely address the poor as individuals within a narrow framework of neoliberalism that is insufficient for capturing realities of the poor. This is clearly seen in the PRSP document (2002: 29-31) where the accounts of poor reflecting over their situations is actively silenced. A section outlining causes of poverty and the perceptions of poor in an urban and rural area in Zambia conclude that emotional well-being is important for the respondents and that material aspects are not dominant. The PRSP strategy immediately move onto establishing that economic growth is the most important focus for poverty reduction. The PRSP do devote considerable funds and attention to sector-specific measures for human development initiatives, however, the overarching rationale can be represented from an excerpt “(...) *she (Zambia) recognises that through better governance and enhanced efficiency in the administration of her resources, including those specifically meant for safety nets, she would reach more needy people. Improved governance and good implementation of the PRSP are, therefore, important objectives*” (PRSP: 31). Silencing the complexities of the realities of the poor means to frame poverty without consideration to historical, relational or structural aspects (Imbuelo, 2005). The reforms are approached with money-metric methodology that emphasizes increased outputs of

public sectors and service provision to stimulate growth-focused objectives over direct actions to address the self-expressed realities of poor

5.3.2. Marketization

Institutionalizing market-orientation to ensure economic growth and efficient service delivery of high quality based on the assumption that markets are the most efficient option and utilized by rational individuals acting in predictable patterns creates several silences. The PSMP states that this goal is achieved by “(...) focusing on “demand-side” interventions which empower citizens and clients to put legitimate pressure on the public service to do better” (2005: 11). The previously mentioned assumption that frame poor as individualists and utility-maximizers (Imboela, 2005) is not in line with research that hold that traditional societies in African countries may instead function through ‘the economy of affection’ that is driven by reciprocity and social networks where utility is centered around the gains of a group rather than the individual (Hydén, 2013, 1980).

Private actors that provide services do not necessarily share the same values as the public bureaus and put as high premium on quality. Prices to access services may thus be too high for citizen to muster and their ability to influence the provision through consumer power is not to be taken for granted (Marobela, 2008).

The problem representation and its underlying assumptions is insensitive to aspects falling beyond the conceptual logic. If these aspects were to be accounted for, the problem representation would have to be re-framed to accommodate them, as a ‘good’ institutional environment where markets are successfully integrated and operational does not solve the issue of how citizens respond to or maneuver them.

5.3.3. Decentralization

Decentralizing government to local units is one of the main objectives of the PSCAP (2000: 5) to achieve efficient service delivery as well as better response systems to what local populations need and what they are willing to pay to acquire services.

In the PRSP it is stated that decentralization *will* enable local authorities to provide goods and services based on local preferences and needs, and that local authorities *will* be able to plan and execute own policies if resources and autonomy is given (2002: 132). The PRSP strategy and the PSCAP thus share the same notion that decentralization is vital for both improving the

service end of reforms as well as increasing citizen participation. However, they fail to address decentralization as a complex process. Pollitt (2009) emphasizes that decentralization *can* lead to increased efficiency and responsiveness but it is far from inevitable and automatic. Weak decentralized units may for example benefit from the ‘economies of scale’ organizations of a centralized arrangements. Smoke (2015) argues that the outcomes hinges on certain preconditions that is connected to the contextual realities. Behavioral change is needed at all levels, central governments has to genuinely commit to decentralizing, citizens has to learn how to interact with decentralized government units to demand accountability and participate, and local authorities need to adapt to new responsibilities and have the capacity to carry out work. In addition, the dichotomy of centralized and decentralized structures fails to nuance that centralized service delivery does not have to be uniform and unresponsive to localities. Where decentralization lacks appropriate preconditions, it may do more harm than good, just as it may increase efficiency under adequate conditions (Prud’Homme, 1994).

The problem representation is fixed at the bad form of the institutional arrangements rather than specific problem diagnostics. As decentralization represents trade-offs and a more or less viable fit, the function over form approach would more carefully consider how to manage these trade-offs to utilize the strengths of decentralized, as well as centralized, solutions. Pursuing all good things at once is in other words no guarantee for hitting the mark all around (Grindle, 2004)

5.3.4. Behavioral Change and the Issue of Corruption

Bad governance as the problem implies that institutions are faulty, in the sense that they allow for negative incentives that leads to incidences of corruption. Low wages and no performance evaluations is in this view fertile ground for corruption. However, all of the policies fail to address the behavior of political elites beyond the theoretical underpinnings of the good governance agenda, that would entail more careful considerations of clientelism and predatory behavior. Some stand-out aspects that fails to be problematized are (1) the historical issues of informal entrenched elite systems of patronage, and (2) the risk of patronage and corruption at the local levels as a consequence of decentralization.

Corruption is dealt with in the documents as a central and persisting issue for Zambia. The PRSP (2002: 6) emphasizes a ‘zero-tolerance’ against corruption and continuous public denouncements by political leaders to establish an ideal of no corruption. The practical aspects to institutionalize a non-corrupt public service are consistently tied to good governance between

the documents, and the improvements of accountability and transparency in service delivery and use of public resources as result of it (PSCAP: 65). The PSMP (2005: 50) for example prescribe arrangements for increased monitoring and oversight to change the culture for transparency and accountability. Pay reforms of the PSMP (2005: 32) promotes monetization of incentives to deliver services well with professional means to mitigate risks for petty corruption and resource extraction as a consequence of low wages. The causes of corruption are here seen as lack of incentives. i.e. lack of demand for accountability and monitoring through performance-orientation and insufficient compensation, but there is no reference to more deep-rooted behavioral causes. This is well exemplified when considering the persisting corruption in Zambia even after good governance reforms, and the trials against top officials in the reform-pioneering administration of the MMD (Van Donge, 2009). Predatory and corrupt behavior may thus be allowed to mold the new institutional structures to continue to accommodate it, thus making predatory intentions the determinant of outcomes instead of the institutions (Van Donge, 2009). Personalized and informal systems of maximizing power and retaining it or maintain the status quo through systems of patronage is common where institutions have been weak, often as a result of colonial heritage (Aye, 2008: 19-22). Even in institutions that are based on performance-management, staff is still able to string together networks of patronage and loyalty for personal ends that is not aligned with providing quality services for citizens (Webb, 2010). To further elaborate, personalized institutional settings may have dual goals when in control of public resources, providing goods and services, and accessing the spoils. Constraining the impunity of public servants and limiting their access to spoils is available for Zambian citizens and growing, but Levy assert that the result has led to cementing a status quo rather than a movement towards the service provision end (Levy, 2014: 88-89).

Transforming weak or bad institutions to strong and good is thus not as simple as it seems as behavior is more complex and unpredictable than implied from good vs. bad dichotomies. Anti-corruption can be reduced to mere rhetoric as it fails to address what may actually instigate changes to governance by focusing on what is good and vital to have (Hickey, 2012).

In the case of decentralization, accountability towards local constituencies both seen to service delivery and responsiveness to preferences is assumed to improve and the increased involvement of citizens may create positive political competition. Both providers and receivers are in this view seen as rational actors without reference to traditional structures of loyalty and patronage. Prud'Homme (1995) argue that the risk of corruption is high at the local levels since local politicians and bureaucrats are more closely related to and dependent on the support of

local interest groups. In addition, staff at local levels are likely to have a locational connection that is difficult to simply ignore when new rules to the game are introduced. Moreover, delegating increased discretion to local levels to more efficiently make decisions and carry out services also cause concern for continued corruption if personalized interests remain prevalent (Webb, 2010). Aspects of individual behavior is thus not well understood, or silenced, in the good governance agenda due to its theoretical belief in universal and predictable patterns of behavior that is not reflective of real-life circumstances.

The problem of bad governance is thought differently when function is prioritized over form. Seen in the light of a persisting predatory behavior among elites alongside steady growth, this perspective would frame political behavior as a separate problem, as other parts of the governance are not necessarily dysfunctional. The problem is in this view not the *form* of institutions causing grounds for corruption, but it is consciously split up in different functions that all have effects of their own and it becomes a question of what, when and how aspects of these functions needs to change (Grindle, 2004). In other words, there is not a fixed solution to a problem, since when seen as separate functions an overhaul of form may dislodge working functions, improve some functions or make some worse. *Unsilencing* the complexities of behavior may also in this perspective mean to approach problems in a more open-ended fashion and respect change as process where learning and input through collaboration with stakeholders may more clearly expose the problems that underlie the slow-moving change in political behavior (Andrews, 2013: 3).

5.4. What Effects are Produced by this Representation of the ‘Problem’?

When discussing *effects* within the WPR-analysis one is interested in what is likely to change or stay the same as an effect of a problem representation, or who benefits or who is harmed. In sum, the point of interest is ‘deleterious’ effects that could be rethought (Bacchi, 2009: 18). The intentions are thus not to discuss outcomes of problem representations.

The problem of bad governance and the solution prescribed by donors to implement good governance as a complete ‘form’ creates an effect of undesired and desired functions that is not necessarily representative of reality. Pursuing a set form of institutional reform actively rejects alternative functions that would not replace, but rather complement this form. As held by Levy

(2014) some functions, although not perfect, may instigate a positive momentum upon which one can build on reform. Such a function and momentum may also be upholding important social functions for citizens that they rely on. A strict distinction between good and bad in reform policy can therefore be disruptive and hit the weakest in society the hardest.

Along similar vein, implementing a good institutional form restrains possibilities to actively create indigenous institutions of Zambia, or institutions of their own. The good in good governance institutions are based on complex and winding processes of institutional and democratic developments of developed states where values have been established and made robust (Oluwu, 2012; Chang, 2003: 126, 138-139). Such a process does not fit within the framing of the problem as it implies a move from one form to another. Prescribing a particular form of governance means isomorphic mimicry, where one deficient form should take on the attributes of a 'complete form' (Levy, 2014: 207), and thus hampers the process of shaping indigenous institutions and assuming a form that is a result of solving specific problems. Furthermore, a public ethos and values and norms that are indigenous to the context may mitigate issues of informality and clientelistic practices in a more sustainable and penetrating way (Haque, 1996)

Finally, although all the policies address poverty reduction directly, the lives of poor citizens are simplified and seen through a lens that singles out individuals and rationalism. The technical nature of the programs and focus on economic growth as a main driver, specify how provision of- and access to public services and market interactions will have positive effects on poverty reduction when done right. This perspective employs a narrow understanding of poverty and the lives of the poor. An effect is thus that poverty is defined along lines of performance and material indicators rather than e.g. well-being and empowerment.

5.5. How/where has this Representation of the 'Problem' been Produced, Disseminated and Defended? How has it been (or could it be) Questioned, Disrupted and Replaced?

The good governance agenda was created in Western contexts and based on the end-results of successful modes of governance of countries of the West as well as countries that have had role model trajectories to becoming developed. Having final results of what is good enables for measurable indicators on what to achieve to mimic a role model and easily distinguishes the

bad (Chang, 2003; Levy, 2013: 206-207). Major donors are champions of the paradigm and several of the most active donor organizations and countries are contributors to the programs and supporters of the problem representation of bad governance being the central concern (Andrews, 2014: 17). There is legitimacy sanctioned to the agenda as these actors promote and apply it along with the thrust of the normative disposition of good and bad.

For this answer it is appropriate to reiterate that the Zambian government are producing and owning several national programs that are connected to the ones analyzed in this study and is thus not simply being told what to do by donors. The PRSP is for example a part of the National Development Plan that is issued every four years. However, as a HIPC country and highly aid dependent to muster state responsibilities, their mandate to question or refuse externally driven conditionalities is limited (Marobela, 2008). Furthermore, since the programs are jointly produced by the government of Zambia and international financial institutions the problem representation *Bad governance, or lack of good governance, as a constraint on economic growth and use of public resources for poverty reduction* is reflective of beliefs held by actors external to Zambia. Provision of aid for good governance can thus be seen as, to quote Nadeem (2016: 211), reflective of a “*contemporary discourse of hegemonic essentialization of Western models of development as universal*”.

5.6. Discussion

The PRSP, PSCAP and PSMP all employ a pro-poor focus with a consistent aim to reduce excessive waste of resources that are lost in over-sized wage bills, corruption and inefficient public sector structures, as well as increasing the amount of resources available by promoting measures for economic growth. The end goal is to facilitate quality service of public goods and services to those who need it to get out of poverty. The solutions to achieve poverty reduction are as shown fixed at these levels of economic growth and reforms to the public sector. Public sectors are also seen as having two modes, a good and a bad, as part of the conceptual logic of the problem representation, which implies that there is an optimal form that can be assumed. The reform efforts are thus focused on getting the institutional environment right to correct incentives for performance, accommodating the private sphere in the provision of services and making citizens active participants through demand-side mechanisms.

This framing of the problem is implicative of a universal understanding of individuals and how they act when subjected to different incentive systems. Values of e.g. fairness and

professionalism is therefore seen as a result of an individual acting out self-interest within a good institution where there is a pay-off for doing so, and not as something shared and institutionalized within society.

The function over form perspective is more cautious when assuming that (1) individuals can be understood universally, and (2) that there are forms that are superior and destined to succeed. The attribution of more importance to the process of change and finding what functions work would call the problem representation into question as the definition of 'bad' is not determined in reference to an axiomatic 'good'. Problem representations may in this view therefore be more explorative as the process is uncertain and every step along it is of interest. A process-focused approach will also have a more direct focus on the people involved and how capabilities are developed, and institutions shaped without a presupposition (Andrews, 2013: 3). As Grindle (2004) argued, some functions may not be in need of major change and there should thus be a focus on what does not work. This would reframe the problem of the documents as bad governance is defined as the lack of good governance, without considerations to what might be good enough.

6 Conclusions

The reviewed reform documents put forward a problem framing based on the lack of good governance as a constraint on economic growth and poverty reduction, which implies that a change of *form* is required to solve the problem. The good governance form is based on performance- and market-oriented structures and actors are seen as individuals. This requires interventions to institutionalize positive incentives for individuals, rather than groups, societies etc. In addition, the framing of economic growth as a crucial factor and the performance and cost efficiency of public sectors as central for poverty reduction, outputs become the end goal of reforms. Input-oriented interventions for democracy, citizen participation and building a public ethos become integrated in the assumptions of how individuals interact with political authorities and private actors through market mechanisms of demand.

The function over form approach offers a competing perspective that is less convinced by universal claims and causal explanations, and more concerned with processes and complexities underpinning both the input and output side of reforms.

The reforms present a tangible representation of problems as fixed and objective, in line with the positivist underpinnings of the good governance agenda. Thus, returning to the opening quote by Andrews, public sector reforms for poverty reduction in Zambia has been pursued with award-winning square-pegs to fill holes which shapes is seemingly anything but square.

6.1. Avenues for Future Research

Privatization has in this study only been addressed with broad strokes of the brush due to the specific aims but is yet highly topical for Zambia. Privatization in the mining sector and increased presence of Chinese companies has for example recently caused displacements of villages (Langlois, 2021) and the relationship between privatization, economic growth, public sector reform and poverty reduction with special reference to Zambia requires further attention.

In a more recent strategy paper by the Zambian government named Strategy for the Public Service Transformation Programme for Improved Service Delivery 2013-2018

(Government of Zambia, 2012), produced as a continuation on the PSCAP and PSMP, some lessons learnt are that it has been difficult to complete institutional change at all levels, that issues of poor service delivery remain pressing and transforming the ethos and shared values as well as fostering positive work culture has been disappointing. Qualitative studies, targeting both staff and citizens, to seek answers to *why* may illuminate how reforms materialize in practice and may in turn contribute to insights that applies to contexts other than Zambia, pursuing similar reforms.

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8 Appendix

| | DOCUMENTS ANALYZED |
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