

Envisioning an Environmentally Just Transition

A Case Study of the Democracy in Europe 2025's Green New Deal
Campaign for Societal Transformation



James Mace-Moore

Abstract

The continued increase of greenhouse gas emissions and the growing danger this poses has led to the emergence of several strategies to guide society away from further environmental degradation. Green growth is the pertinent global strategy, it calls for continued growth with the hopes to advance toward technocratic solutions. Conversely, the degrowth movement has emerged as a counter-hegemonic critique of growth and calls for a democratic downscaling; however, it has not yet been embraced by any powerful political institution. A third alternative, the Democracy in Europe 2025's Green New Deal, offers a consolidated policy plan for reform of the EU and its member states toward an environmentally just society, and is one of the first campaigns to be developed in conjunction with degrowth intellectuals. Applying Gramscian and Gorzian theories of change and reform, this thesis analyses the Democracy in Europe 2025's Green New Deal campaign according to its actors, demands, audience, and the transformation envisaged. The thesis concludes that the Green New Deal's proposed societal transformation aims to emerge from within capitalist institutions but has the potential to develop into a more transformative and potentially counter-hegemonic reform at a later stage, in this sense resembling a non-reformist reform.

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1 Introduction

In 2015, the Stockholm Resilience Centre published a report that found that current levels of economic activity fall well beyond the safe operating space of four out of the nine critical biophysical boundaries analysed (Stockholm Resilience Centre, 2015). Continued neglect for any of these boundaries poses a risk to the integrity of our ecosystems. The most widely considered of these four boundaries is climate change: the effect of a global temperature increase owing to the sustained release of greenhouse gases (GHGs), gases that are intrinsically related to economic activity (Hoffman, 2016:24). The 2015 Paris Climate Agreement represents a worldwide pledge to keep the global temperature rise well within 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, and for countries to strive for no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius; to do so, countries must reduce their GHG emissions. Collectively, the G20 is not on track to reach their Nationally Determined Contributions as signed during the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015 (Ibid.); what is more, GHG emissions are expected to rise by almost 5 percent at the end of 2021, reversing last year's emission decline related to the Covid-19 lockdowns (IEA, 2021).

This climate inspired historical juncture has led to the emergence of differing strategies to address this emergency. Green growth is the most widely accepted strategy: emanating from capitalist and neoliberal institutions - such as the UN summits for Sustainable Development - this involves to a reformed version of capitalism which relies on the hope that continued economic growth will lead to technological advancement to create an absolute decoupling of environmental degradation from economic activity (Jackson 2017:85-86; Hoffman, 2016:23). Conversely, degrowth has emerged as an alternative to this ideal, representing a new societal imaginary, one that views sustained economic growth within the industrialised countries as the reason for this climate crisis, and asks us instead to reorder our priorities around a needs based-society (Kallis et al., 2020:5). Degrowth represents a break from the fetishisation of growth and – followed to the end of the line – it may even call for an end to capitalism (Kallis et al., 2020:27-18; Jackson, 2017:105). While support for degrowth across Europe has grown in recent years, it has yet to be embraced by any powerful political institution. A third strategy, and the case study of this paper, is the Democracy in Europe 2025's campaign for a Green New

Deal for Europe (DiEM25's GNDE). Developed in collaboration with degrowth academics, this blueprint questions the imperative of growth and represents a strategy for a reformed European Union (EU) according to climate justice and social fairness (DiEM25, 2019). This represents a tangible transformative movement to be analysed that breaks from and questions the dominance of green growth discourse.

The transformative potential of the DiEM25's GNDE has received little academic attention; as such, this thesis will analyse the DiEM25's GNDE employing Gramscian theory on societal change in combination with Gorzian theory of capitalist institutional reform. As core theories of change, these will help to analyse the actors, demands and audience of the GNDE's proposal, unearthing the particularities of the envisaged societal transition. This research will thus buttress the highly relevant field of societal change within Political Science, adding to the research on counter-hegemony and reform (Goodman & Salleh, 2013). Moreover, the study is a relevant topic within Development Studies: the lacklustre response to the ecological crisis from industrialised countries is exacerbating the climate crisis, a crisis felt disproportionately across the Global South (Rice et al. 2021; Thomas et al., 2019). The climate crisis is not a crisis of equal responsibility either; indeed, as reported by Hickel (2017), the poorest 60 percent of humanity receive only 5 percent of new global economic growth; following this trend, it would take 100 years to eradicate absolute poverty measured at \$1.25 (Hickel, 2017:57). To eradicate poverty at \$5 a day would require a global GDP increase to 175 times its current state and would still take over 200 years (Ibid.). Thus, GHG release from economic activity does not benefit the Global South, it is almost entirely beneficial for the richest of humanity. Any study thereby related to the transformation of environmental policy away from the maximum output oriented policy of green growth is a relevant topic for Development Studies students.

2 Research aims and objectives

The research aims to analyse the DiEM25's GNDE campaign according to its societally transformative potential. The chosen case offers a valuable insight into a transformative movement that questions the popular growth imperative, and that has been buttressed by anti-systemic degrowth writers. Employing Gramscian and Gorzian respective theories on social change and reform, the research aims to explore exactly the type of transformation proposed by the DiEM25's GNDE. Two research questions will guide the study: the first acting as a primary question broadly encapsulate the aims; the second acts as a more specific guidance to the analysis in accordance with the theoretical chapter.

How does the DiEM25's GNDE campaign envisage societal transformation?

- Who are the actors behind the campaign, how does it articulate its demands, and to whom?

3 Background

This background chapter introduces three ideals that pertain to the fixing of the environmental crisis. Beginning first with the most internationally prevalent strategy of green growth, the background will then move to introduce two alternatives: degrowth and the DiEM25's GNDE.

3.1 Capitalist green growth

The global capitalist economy is based on economic growth with surplus reinvested in production. Since the 1980s, development discourse has framed poverty as the paramount problem for development practitioners, with sustainable development emerging as a prominent aim in the 1992 UN Rio conference following growing environmental concerns, the core aim of which being economic growth (Demaria & Kothari, 2017). Focus on economic growth is threefold for capitalist advocates: foremost, supporters argue that with economic growth comes greater human wellbeing; secondly, surplus allows for reinvestment in production, thereby driving further capital production and generating greater efficiency; thirdly, capitalism is only able to sustain itself on the premise of the infinite according to its meritocratic promises, this in turn sustains economic relations and requires a constant opening of new frontiers to support the input of production (Mahnkopf, 2016:143-144; Akbulut, 2020). As such, instead of focusing on whether constant growth is necessary for a good life, the question instead is how to continue life according to maximum output. This shifts what is arguably a social question into that of technocratic question to be answered by market solutions which themselves subscribe to and exist because of the capitalist system (Kallis, 2019:48).

One of the central answers to this dilemma is referred to as green growth or green capitalism. These are synonymous of one another and hold that the proper mix of intelligent macroeconomics and efficiency advancements will create sustainable growth (Jackson 2017:85-86). It represents a win-win situation wherein profit driven action results in environmental protection and broad qualitative development: in the short term, this constitutes

investment in the energy sector, environmental protection, and public infrastructure, thereby creating new jobs and forming low carbon infrastructure (Mahnkopf, 2016:132). In the longer term, the idea follows that this advances national energy security and reduces energy imports, while inspiring innovation through the competitive advantages of leading technological advancement (Ibid.). Overconsumption with its bubbles and busts would be solved with a new scheme of investment and accumulation; new investment opportunities would create higher quality jobs for workers; and governments would be given the opportunity to reduce their debts and improve both economic and political stability (Ibid.).

Sound too good to be true? It might well be. The primary premise of this thinking rests on the notion of absolute decoupling: the idea that through technological improvements to economic productivity and efficiency, economic growth can detach from environmental degradation - including GHG emissions – and may thus continue at maximum output (Hoffman, 2016:26-27). This idea however has been scrutinised as lacking historical supporting evidence (Jackson, 2017:102). Indeed, Vadén et al.'s (2020) systematic literature review analysed 179 academic articles and found that absolute decoupling rests almost entirely on faith, with cases demonstrating that a growing economy does not lead to a sustained decrease in environmental pressure owing to the mitigation of efficiency gains following the increase in throughput (Vadén et al. 2020; Goodman & Salleh, 2013).

Subscription to the notion of green growth thereby accepts the substantial risks of the climate crisis, with faith resting on a capitalist imaginary that has little empirical backing from case studies nor from the course of history (Jackson 2017:85-89). It is however to this green growth that the major international organisations such as the World Bank as well as regional organisations such as the EU subscribe (Lorek & Spangenberg, 2014). In particular, the EU's environmental policy is situated within the neoliberal capitalist discourse wherein market solutions will pave the way out of the climate crisis, according to green growth policy. Market instruments such as pollution charges, emission trading and voluntary commitments are all central to the EU climate policies (Mahnkopf, 2016:134; European Commission, 2019). As outlined in the European Green Deal “effective carbon pricing [...] will encourage changes in consumer and business behaviour” (European Commission, 2019) indicating that the EU's environmental policies are to be embedded within the current system and do not require an altering of the capitalist growth model. This form of environmental imaginary thus represents a reform of the current system, but one that does not require an overrule rebuttal and total

reorganisation. This is what is referred to as a reformist change, an idea expanded upon later in the theoretical chapter.

3.2 Degrowth imaginary

Degrowth represents a challenge to the fetishisation of growth: it asks for a reordering of priorities and to instead favour a democratically decided needs based approach to life over an unending imperative for growth (Kallis et al., 2020:5; Liegey & Nelson, 2020:45-47). This downscaling takes the form of democratic control over production and resource usage, in turn taking the power out of market forces and into the hands of an environmentally conscious society. It asks for this transformation first in industrialised countries whose excessive consumption habits have exacerbated the climate crisis and in turn share an unequal burden for this (Liegey & Nelson, 2020:5); its supporters therefore do not take issue with economic growth in countries with high absolute poverty levels (Ibid.).

The degrowth critique diagnoses the environmental crisis, and its connected social crisis, as being related to constant economic growth (Kallis et al., 2020:8); thus, degrowth supporters are those engaged with building a new imaginary which differs from prominent neoliberal thinking wherein green growth is widely regarded as the means through which to solve global social, economic, and environmental crises. Whilst pointing to the connection between economic growth and environmental destruction, degrowth supporters also point to the diminishing qualitative returns of economic growth. Past studies have shown that beyond a certain point of comfortable living, higher economic activity and income fails to translate to a proportional rise in well-being and happiness (Pineault, 2020:31; Gerber & Raina 2018; Kallis et al., 2020:4).

Degrowth is not a homogenised strategy, rather, it can be understood as a social movement wherein loosely connected groups across civil society have rallied behind the general critique of development (Demaria et al., 2013). Different strands exist within the degrowth discourse: I will borrow from Eversberg and Schmelzer (2015, 2016, 2018 in Schoppek, 2020) who, through questionnaires at a 2014 degrowth conference, identified some of the main strands within the degrowth social movement. One such strand, referred to as *Sufficiency-Oriented Critics of Civilisation*, include those who believe degrowth ought to be embodied on the individual level through a change in personal lifestyles to be less ecologically disruptive (Schoppek, 2020).

Strategies of this kind include voluntary simplicity, slowing down of life, and living with less; a total break from the capitalist system that valorises economic work (Liegey & Nelson, 2020:58-59). Examples of this include Italy's Reti di Economia Solidale or the Transition Town movement in England whereby localised economic circuits have been designed to work together to sustainably support one another (Demaria et al., 2013; Kliemann, 2020:172). These networks and communities are sustainable and work toward the collective prosperity of their inhabitants, utilising direct participation (Kliemann, 2020:179). This approach to living follows the lines that individual action will eventually lead to a societal change toward a degrowth imaginary; in their current state however, they represent miniature parallel societies within the status quo (Schoppek, 2020).

A second strand within degrowth is labelled the *Alternative Practical Left* whose approach contrasts with the more individual *Self-Sufficiency* angle. Degrowthers within this strand focus more on confronting the institutionalised social order and the institutions that underpin it (Ibid.). The *Alternative Practical Left* point to the alienation of capitalism which sustains unequal economic relations and will forever require economic growth, in turn meaning a macro-social transformation is required (Ibid.). Those within the *Practical Left* are oftentimes active across a number of issue points or social movements, and engaged with large networks of likeminded activists (Ibid.); here there is no such focus on building parallel structures, rather, the aim is for structural change. A member of this strand may have for example been involved in the Occupy Wall Street Movement, could now be a member of Spain's Podemos party, and may frequently attend Black Lives Matter protests. Whilst the *Alternative Practical Left* is more systematically engaged, both strands represent a rejection of the pre-eminence of growth and the capitalist system of production.

Demaria et al. (2013) posit that the different strands and ideas for degrowth need not be mutually exclusive; this conclusion ties into the building toward a pluriversal world of a more qualitative, environmentally conscious, and equitable form of development (Escobar, 2015). However, within this multiplicity of strategy lies unanswered questions related to power, society and action. D'Alisa (2019), through a literature, has noted that degrowth has engaged very limitedly with the role of state for example (D'Alisa, 2019:244-248). Indeed, for the *Sufficiency Oriented-Critics of Civilisation* strand, these strategies can and are being adopted within current capitalist states; however, there appears no consolidated answer as to how this

will be transformative of the larger society. By which I posit that such personal actions can only go so far owing to the radical transformation of this living, are those who are marginalised within societies and trapped in debt able to adopt these radical lifestyle projects? Likewise, for those within the *Alternative Practical Left* strand, how is that they aim to revolutionarily shift society? Are all capitalist institutions to be rejected, or may some institutions be utilised for a gradual shift? These are just some of the questions that degrowth literature has yet to answer, all of which relate to degrowth's interaction with both social and political spheres and their strategy for transformation.

Though homogenous in its position as a dissident movement opposing growth, the gaps in the discourse need addressing for degrowth to develop an exhaustive theory of change. Degrowthers have however contributed to a strategy for change in the form of the DiEM25's GNDE, representing one of the only campaigns degrowth intellectuals have allied themselves with.

3.3 The Democracy in Europe Movement 2025's Green New Deal

Degrowth then is hard to study in terms of its concrete transformative potential. Unlike the green growth imaginary with its panoply of governmental endorsements and actions plans, degrowth has no endorsement within mainstream politics, nor has it had any clear policy impact having been adopted into no powerful political institution. However, degrowth does not stand alone as a European focused climate justice movement, one such movement that shares some synergy is the DiEM25's GNDE. Founded in 2019, the DiEM25 is a pan-European progressive movement, its core aim is to improve democracy, the environment, and the social equality across the EU (DiEM25, 2021). It is funded by member contributions and has a number of campaigns including the following: Tech Sovereignty, a campaign pushing for the rights of citizens and democratic institutions to decide for themselves on technological innovation; Refugee Campaign, the main aim of which is to overrule the EU-Turkey Agreement; and finally, its flagship campaign, the Green New Deal for Europe (GNDE) (DiEM25. 2021).

The DiEM25's GNDE has been developed with core degrowth contributors such as D'Alisa, Barca, Kallis, Hickel and Chertkovskaya, this more radical version of a Green New Deal can

hence be studied as a potential strategy toward a new society that, like degrowth, questions the fetishisation of economic growth. It is however curious that despite being one of the only campaigns degrowthers have aligned themselves with, it does not present itself as a degrowth movement. As such, questions remain pertaining to the exact strategy and envisagement of its societal transformation.

As this represents a blueprint for transformation, it lends itself well to be studied as a strategy according to theories of change, outlined in the following chapter.

4 Theoretical framework

This thesis employs the Gramscian notion of hegemony and counter-hegemony, and Gorz's theory on reform to analyse the DiEM25's GNDE campaign. Gramsci was an Italian Marxist writer and leader of the Italian communist party who was imprisoned by Mussolini's fascist regime (Bianchi, 2019:22). In prison, Gramsci studied and theorised the ways in which the Italian society may disrupt and change the fascist hegemony, and instead install a new societal order (Morton, 2007:86-90). The value of the theory nowadays relates to the way in which it has been adopted into the study of social movements and their potentially counter-hegemonic properties. As demonstrated by Goodman and Salleh (2013), employing Gramscian theory can be a useful tool to better understand the amalgamation of NGOs, citizens, and social movements who together opposed the green economy agenda of the Rio 2012 UN conference, establishing instead a counter-hegemonic Peoples Summit (Goodman & Salleh, 2013). This research will thus deploy Gramsci's theory for a similar contemporary analysis.

4.1 Hegemony

Gramsci's work posits that the ruling ideology does not survive through a continuous exercising of force or suppression, rather, power is sustained through the establishment of hegemony (D'Alisa & Kallis 2020). The notion of hegemony refers to a cultural-ethical leadership which has universalised its primary interests, which in turn gains consent from the masses thereby subordinating oppositional ideologies (Karriem, 2009; Schoppek, 2020). Hegemony thus involves a constant process of production and reproduction of consent that is manifested as institutions and practices that respond to demands of the people (D'Alisa & Kallis, 2020). The combination of consent from civil society, as achieved through the development and reproduction of supporting common sense via organic intellectuals (Gramsci in Hoare & Smith, 1971:4), and the coercion from the supporting political society ensures that hegemony is sustained, all the while appearing to serve the interest of the mass.

The concept of common sense refers to the subliminal understanding of the world that has become ubiquitous in the current epoch (Hoare & Nowel Smith, 1971 in D'Alisa & Kallis, 2020; D'Alisa, 2019:250-251). A plurality of common *senses* is what make up the common sense understanding of daily life, through prioritising some of these common *senses* the dominant social forces can ensure the reproduction of the common sense that serves the interest of the dominant classes; this common sense thus works toward sustaining hegemony without the use of force (D'Alisa, 2019:250). Common sense itself constitutes the demands of the mass, thereby a transformation in common sense will cause a shift in the demands, and a possible relinquishment of the mass consent given to the current hegemonic thinking should it be seen to not adequately answer these requirements (D'Alisa, 2019:250-251). Through achieving the consent of the masses and positioning itself as a neutral power relation through which to serve broadly supported demands, hegemony can continue to preside as the neutral answer and provisioner of the common sensical desires (Akbulut, 2020). Hegemony will incorporate the requests of different social groups insofar as they do not pose a real threat; ideals that are deemed counter-hegemonic are labelled irrational and subject to forms of sanctions from both the hegemonic supporting political and civil society (Ibid.). As stated above, in addition to the common sense, hegemony requires the support of both political and civil society, a cooperation Gramsci refers to as the integral state.

4.1.1 Integral state

Gramsci's notion of the integral state refers to the unification of the two superstructures that make up the state within a liberal democracy: political and civil society, both of which are reinforcing of one another (D'Alisa, 2019:250; Gramsci 1971 in Morton, 2007:89). Political society can be understood as that which holds the legitimate tools of coercive power – the state's military for example - and civil society is the arena within which groups vie for consent based on their respective ideology, this includes the likes of the educational institutions, media, or unions (D'Alisa, 2019:250.). Accordingly, coercion and consent appear in both civil and political society, thus the abolition of one does not itself secure the abolition of a dominant ideal (Ibid.). This conceptualisation grounds hegemony as not that which exists solely in the political society; rather, it is to be understood as permeating through civil society too. As aptly put by D'Alisa and Kallis (2020), even if a revolution or shock election placed a surprise candidate as head of state, their power for substantial change would be limited owing to the objection of

civil society. Though they may deploy coercive force through the likes of the military, hegemony would not be established, and power eventually relinquished. For substantive change to occur, there needs both a shift in the political as well as the civil society.

As this research focuses on the DiEM25's GNDE operation within the EU, it is important to note here that the EU itself is not an integral state. Whilst the EU represents a dialectic between civil and political society, it does not possess the coercive political power to enforce dominance. The DiEM25's GNDE may well shape the integral states within the EU, that is the member states of the union; however, Cox's theory on world order can better extrapolate this theory to the international context of the EU. For Cox, the creation of an alternative institution amounts to the building of a counter-hegemony within the established hegemony (Cox & Sinclair, 1996:128-129, 136). As it stands, the EU represents a hegemonic institution that itself is a product and a facilitator of hegemonic order, the altering of which can amount to a counter-hegemonic strategy owing to its institutional influence of both civil and political society. However, the EU is itself governed by its member states, as such, for an EU focused counter-hegemonic movement to be successful, it must transform the integral states within the bloc else a clashing of member state interests will occur (Cox & Sinclair, 1996:136).

4.1.2 Counter-hegemonic *strategies*

A counter-hegemonic movement refers to that which challenges the fundamentals of the current hegemony, working toward the disruption of the common sense that supports a hegemonic order, for the eventual societal transformation into a new hegemony. To be successful, it must operationalise in such a way as to ensure that its demands cannot be absorbed by the hegemony, thereby serving only to strengthen the status quo with the addition of minor reforms that do not disrupt hegemonic order – a situation Gramsci refers to as a passive revolution (Cox & Sinclair, 1996:129).

Gramsci theorised that societal change may be brought about using two tactics: war of manoeuvre and war of position (Morton 2007:190). The former relates to an open conflict wherein direct opposition is brought against hegemony, the likes of a revolutionary uprising or even environmental protests such as the Extinction Rebellion shutdown of London could be considered a war of manoeuvre. These actions alone are only successful when the change

required is not change that is embedded within civil society: Gramsci referred to this form of change when considering the Russian revolution whereby Czarist political society was physically overwhelmed, this was successful because the Czarist hegemony was not supported in civil society (Gramsci in Hoare & Smith, 1971:238). Conversely, the war of position refers to the gradual change of civil society in support of the counter-hegemonic movement, only once there is a compounded and united war of position may the counter-hegemony successfully install leadership in political society and in turn succeed in its counter-hegemonic transformation (Gramsci in Hoare & Smith, 1971:207).

Within the liberal democratic societies within which the DiEM25's GNDE operates, hegemony is supported by civil society, thus, a two-pronged assault on both civil and political society is imperative: success in either the civil or political sphere does not translate to successful counter-hegemonic movement, both societies must be transformed owing to their mutually reinforcing nature. Without support of civil society, an aspiring counter-hegemonic movement will find the masses rebel against what they deem as a hegemony incapable of answering their demands; likewise, without the support of political society then the institutions and power of coerce will push back and attempt to quash that which is deemed a threat. It is here that Gorz's theory can complement Gramsci's: whilst Gramsci is focused on the broader counter-hegemonic transformation and its strategies, Gorz's theory more specifically focuses on the reform of capitalist institutions in terms of how to engender societal transformation from within.

4.2 Gorz's theory on reform

Gorz's Strategy for Labour focuses on the ways in which socialism can better connect with the everyday struggles of the workers, leading to the development of what Gorz described as reformist and non-reformist reforms of capitalist institutions, headed by the needs and demands of the workers (Gorz, 1967:5-6). Reformist reforms are those whose objectives can be operationalised within the current system, prioritising the practicability of integrated reform and rejecting demands that represent an incompatibility with the system (Gorz, 1967:6-7). These reforms aim at improving the immediate outcomes of an arrangement: a minimum wage for example, this policy can be implemented into the system and would improve the immediate

material circumstance of workers; however, this reform does not alter the root causes of material inequality. Conversely, non-reformist are reforms that do not on the surface appear to challenge the deeper structures of injustice; in the longer term however, they work toward a new imaginary that breaks from the current system, one that would ultimately challenge the root cause of the problem (Ibid.).

Nancy Fraser (2003) has worked in-depth with Gorz's theory and provides another useful way of conceptualising this. Fraser (2003) refers to affirmative and transformative strategies: the former, like Gorz's reformist strategy, works toward addressing the immediate outcome of an unfavourable social arrangement – income wealth transfer for example, wherein the end-state distribution is altered (Fraser, 2003:74). The latter – the transformative strategy - addresses unjust outcomes through restructuring the social framework that causes them: the example provided by Fraser (2003) is socialism which would address the likes of labour divisions, capital, and property ownership, in turn addressing the root structures (Fraser, 2003:74). Fraser (2003) holds that affirmative strategies not only fail to address the true issue at hand but can worsen the problem. Relating it back to social welfare, social benefits do not address the causes of poverty, in turn meaning a repetition of income reallocation causing an oftentimes negative public perception of those that must repeatedly rely on these strategies (Fraser, 2003:77).

Transformative strategies, then, are preferential owing to their more holistic conceptualisation of the issue that can work not only on solving the ultimate problem but work toward solidarity across societal divides that affirmative strategies might cause (Ibid.). It is here then that Fraser (2003) combines her work with that of Gorz's on non-reformist reform. Whilst transformative strategies are the preferred type, they are problematic on the grounds that those who are subject to unjust economic circumstance are likely to gain more in the immediate under affirmative strategies of income distribution as opposed to transformative societal change, leading to a general preference for the more easily implemented affirmative strategies (Fraser, 2003:78). Moreover, transformative strategies require collective action from a wide range of peoples, meaning there are very few instances wherein widespread support may align behind a single transformative strategy (Fraser, 2003:78). With this in mind, Fraser (2003) refers back to Gorz's non-reformist reform as the mediation between affirmative and transformative strategies.

In essence, non-reformist reforms combine the real world practicability of affirmative strategies, with the radical undertone of transformative (Fraser, 2003:80). At surface level, this

translates into not directly challenging the institution or societal framework; however, through the altering of power away from the current elites and into the hands of democratic control, they can, in the longer term, work toward a new and more radical imaginary that does challenge the root problem causes (Gorz, 1967:6-9; Fraser, 2009). This then means a preference not for a swift single revolution, rather the non-reformist reform will set in motion a trajectory which continuously expands its demands and audience, in turn causing a transformative shift over time through the achievement of intermediate objectives (Ibid.). Core to this is the notion that non-reformist reform is not to be enacted from the top-down; rather, it should be a bottom-up movement that evolves according to the democratically decided needs of the people directly affected by and subject to the current power relations (Gorz, 1967:6-9).

The theories as set out in this chapter provide a set of analytical tools through which to analyse reform, the following chapter will demonstrate how such tools are to be applied.

5 Methodology

5.1 Research design

This research is designed as a single case study of the DiEM25's GNDE campaign, the aim of which is to explore the transformative nature of the campaign, as well as the actors engendering the campaign, the exact parameters of the campaign's demands, as well as its audience. As an in-depth single case study, findings cannot be generalised (Halperin & Heath, 2017:214-217); however, owing to the relatively new field of environmentally conscious societal transformations, the analysis of this case provides an insight into one of the few policy oriented campaigns for societal transformation.

5.2 Research method

To unearth the intricacies of the GNDE, a qualitative content analysis will be deployed owing to the research being concerned with the latent content of the campaign (Halperin & Heath, 2017:346). Applying both theories discussed in the theoretical chapter will work toward the analysis of the transformative strategy of the DiEM25's GNDE campaign. On one hand, considering Gramsci's theory of change will determine the wider plausibility of its counter-hegemonic abilities; on the other, Gorz's theory specifically relates to the ways in which a movement ought to pitch its demands and engage with and within capitalist institutions to enact a transformation in the longer term. As such, both theories complement the analysis of the campaign owing to its engagement with both the capitalist growth hegemony, and the capitalist institution of the EU. The analytical framework below details the core tenets of the analysis according to the theories.

Question to answer through analysis	Reasoning derived from theory
Who are the actors that embody the movement?	Determining this will enable the analysis of the movement according to Gorz's notion that non-reformist reform must include an audience that is the subject and victim of the current power dynamic.
What is the content and demands of the movement?	Counter-hegemonic and non-reformist change requires a departure from the current hegemony according to a needs-based approach. The hegemony of growth incorporates subaltern ideologies insofar as they are not incompatible with this goal, determining the plausibility of the DiEM25's GNDE campaign demands being absorbed into current hegemonic order will determine its nature as reformist or non-reformist and counter-hegemonic movement.
Whom are the demands being made to?	This will dissect the movement according to the society in which it aims to alter: is it aimed at political society, civil society, or both? In analysing this, the counter-hegemonic influence will be unearthed.

Table 1: Analytical framework

These questions translate as deductive codes throughout the analysis of the GNDE campaign. This qualitative analysis will expose motives and purposes that may not be visible from a more quantitative analysis of the data, instead employing an approach that is more conscious of the context within which the campaign has been developed and the messaging between the lines (Halperin & Heath, 2017:346). Derived from theories of change, these deductive codes provide the suitable tools to analyse and draw conclusions from the DiEM25's GNDE campaign.

5.3 Data selection and collection

The DiEM25’s GNDE campaign was chosen on the grounds that it is fully developed plan for a societal transformation, one that breaks from the current growth paradigm of business-as-usual. It was also selected owing to the contributions from degrowth writers, who themselves represent a clear and transformative break from neoliberal growth. Together, this case offers an insight into what an environmentally conscious transformation may look like.

The data derives from the DiEM25’s webpage as of March 2021, with specific focus on the GNDE campaign. This page, the executive summary, and the GNDE’s Blueprint for Europe’s Just Transition, make up the units of analysis. When analysed together, this data represents the entirety of the campaign’s published material and has been selected so an analysis of the full campaign may be carried out.

Data Unit	Pages
DiEM25’s GNDE Webpage	1
GNDE Executive Summary	5
Blueprint for Europe’s Just Transition (GNDE full document)	93

Table 2: Data units

5.4 Data analysis

The qualitative content analysis will involve coding according to recurrent themes, and categorisation of these across the units of analysis. The analysis will utilise deductive coding according to those which have been drawn out from the theory chapter and visualised in the analytical framework. Unearthing hidden meaning between the lines in relation to these codes will determine how the campaign envisages societal transformation (Halperin & Heath, 2017:346-347). Owing to their interdependence, analysis of the demands and audience will be interlinked and presented as such – the decision to structure in this way was consolidated during the analysis itself wherein delineation between the two led to incoherence. The broad nature of

these themes allowed for sufficient analysis and insight in accordance with the research question and aims. Conclusions have been drawn in relation to the research questions throughout the analysis (Halperin & Heath, 2017:353), and brought together in the discussion chapter.

5.5 Limitations

The analysis is limited to societal transformation in accordance with Gramscian and Gorzian theory. There are other theories of change that have been developed across social science, as such, this analysis reflects my theoretical selection in a panoply of alternatives. Researchers who apply alternative theories to that of my own may thus derive different conclusions. Furthermore, limitations related to the method itself concern those of the researcher's personal interpretation of the findings (Punch, 2005:194); with that being said, the analytical framework has been included for transparency related to my own avenues of analysis.

In addition to this, to buttress my understanding of the DiEM25's GNDE further, I engaged in a conversation with one of the campaign's contributors via a Zoom call. This call was not transcribed and does not constitute any data analysed; however, as a single contributor of the campaign and a degrowth scholar, the opinions disclosed will have affected my understanding of the campaign itself. Ideally, alongside the literature and my own reading, more informal conversations or formal interviews with contributors to the campaign would have helped to balance any background understanding.

5.6 Reflexivity

As a student engaged in degrowth initiatives and environmental protest, I have a vested interest in societal transformation that breaks from continued environmental destruction. To uphold reflexivity, I engaged in conversation with others who share different beliefs and interests throughout the process and attempted to ground myself with reflections throughout the research. This however does not and cannot mitigate all bias I have toward the need for a societal

transformation. Despite this, I engaged and analysed the data according to the theoretical framework and previous literature on the topic of societal imaginary.

6 Analysis

Below is the analysis of the campaign, demonstrating the connection and value of applying Gramscian and Gorzian theory to the DiEM25's GNDE proposed societal transformation. First, the findings in accordance with the actors of the campaign will be presented; after which the content and demands of the campaign will be presented in conjunction with the audience of these demands.

6.1 Homogenous campaign architects

The DiEM25's GNDE was developed with democracy in mind; indeed, the shorthand description at the top of the campaign's frontpage describes the GNDE as 'an international campaign for a swift, just, and democratic transition to a sustainable Europe' (DiEM25's GNDE Webpage, 2021). Whilst the demands may be democratically oriented – as will be analysed later in the analysis – the architects of the campaign are skewed toward experts and academics. Of the 44 contributors listed, 25 are academics or members of thinktanks, with the rest made up of members of the DiEM25, NGOs, or private professionals – a lawyer and a risk assessor from an insurance firm (DiEM25's GNDE, 2019:92). Representing a ready-made plan to be implemented across the EU, this constitutes a top-down reform that has been designed predominantly by academics. Adding to this, there is just one feminist NGO listed as a contributor, with no contributor intrinsically focused on minorities, be that race, disability or sexual orientation. This has been a common critique of Northern transitional discourse, with Escobar (2015) pointing to the ways in which discourse from the Global North has traditionally been developed within homogenous academic institutions, as opposed to on the ground collaborations with a plethora of local activists, citizens, and community leaders, as is common in transitional discourse from the Global South.

In this sense, it departs from the Gorzian notion of a non-reformist reform as the campaign itself has not been developed by the communities its reforms will affect; however, because of the

nature of the climate crisis, this line is not so easily defined. Whilst these contributors may predominantly be experts who are not representative of the general population, they are themselves subjects of the current system. Though written utilising their expertise, these contributors are thus also concerned citizens and victims of a growth fetish. With that being said, a campaign that seeks to democratically shift society ought to embrace more voices from the most marginalised sectors of society, else it risks a continuity of the current inequality.

6.2 Content and audience of the demands

This section will present the themes of the campaign and its audience together owing to their intertwined nature, exploring five subthemes that pertain to different demands and societal audience.

6.2.1 A focus on Europe

Foremost, the DiEM25's GNDE is targeted at the EU and its member states (DiEM25's GNDE Webpage, 2021) This delimitation is grounded in the notion that European countries share a 'greater responsibility for historical emissions, and greater technological and financial capacity' (DiEM25's GNDE, 2019:16.). Such delimitation shares resemblance with the more radical degrowth discourse which likewise calls for societies who have the capacity to function with less growth to do so before calling on any other country to follow suit (Liegey & Nelson, 2020:5). The GNDE posits that if its policies are implemented across the bloc, then Europe could 'reach net-zero CO2 emissions by 2025' (DiEM25's GNDE, 2019:17).

This point grounds the rest of the analysis in focusing on both civil and political society of the EU and its states, with the ultimate goal to democratically transition to net-zero emissions. Whilst many of the demands and proposals may be expanded to other societies, the campaign itself is tailored to the EU bloc.

6.2.2 Mobilising civil society to change political society

As laid out in section 6.1, the campaign is a top-down proposal from a largely homogenous set of actors. However, it is in the implementation and sustained evolution of the GNDE that a more bottom-up campaign emerges. The GNDE recognises the power of the EU as a well-developed institution that is ‘the locus of continental political mobilisation capable of responding at scale to the immediacy of the challenge ahead’ (DiEM25’s GNDE:17); however, fundamental to the development and deployment of the GNDE is the development and support for the campaign within the member states. The GNDE proposes two strategies: grassroots action across the EU, with advocacy for the likes of protest for the support of the GNDE. This amounts to a call for a war of manoeuvre to be waged across the EU states, with explicit direction given to the deployment of this action within the centre of the EU in the form of ‘civil disobedience at Brussels’ (DiEM25’s GNDE, 2019:22).

In addition to the calls for action from civil society, the GNDE proposes the establishment of People’s Assemblies at every level: starting first with self-organised assemblies at the municipal level, these will then feed into regional assemblies, and from there national assemblies, each level formulating their own self-determined priorities and policy recommendation (DiEM25’s GNDE, 2019:23). It is noted in the proposal that these assemblies do not necessarily need to be formally politically sanctioned, but self-organised and feeding upward (Ibid.) These thereby represent a bottom-up self-organising of political society that will, once implemented, determine the explicit direction of the GNDE’s proposed green investments, and will form the vehicle through which to negotiate with political society.

It is here then that the outline of a counter-hegemonic movement is being launched. Through the advocacy for civil society action, and the establishment of assemblies that themselves interact with traditional institutions; a movement that simultaneously targets political and civil society is being launched. This strategy is demonstrated in the below excerpt:

People’s Assemblies, then, will catalyse meaningful change at both the local and international level. They will also reproduce a culture of civic participation — engendering norms of public engagement on which the success of many of the proposals set out in this Blueprint depend (DiEM25’s GNDE, 2019:25).

The aim thus appears to be a compounded war of position that brings ‘communities together around a shared vision for the EU (DiEM25’s GNDE, 2019:21), for an eventual transformation of the societies of EU member states (Gramsci in Hoare & Smith, 1971:207).

6.2.3 Demands to political society: more social consumption means less total consumption

Core to the demands of the GNDE is the state provisioning of services and democratic control of resource; this nationalisation of services will be financed with green bonds that are ‘issued by public investment banks’ and ‘purchased by private investors on secondary markets’ (DiEM25’s GNDE, 2019:32). The DiEM25 is adamant that this can provide adequate means of funding and thus does not propose any new taxation (Ibid.)

Through the provisioning of social goods - be that the expansion of public spaces, healthcare, or free transport and childcare - and the unconditional allowance for all to enjoy them - the GNDE decouples the association of social progress with economic growth and environmental breakdown. Whilst green growth calls for the importance of property rights and the supposed efficiency benefit to market ownership, harking back to the disproven notion of the tragedy of the commons (Goodman & Salleh, 2013; Ostrom, 2009), the GNDE’s strategy is aimed at changing the common sense understanding of social security, providing instead an alternative to the market based economic growth imperative that is currently the premise of development strategies. Through the provisioning of these services, which equate to a more equal distribution and an inequality reduction, less pressure is mounted on the desire for growth owing to the more comfortable standard of living (Gough, 2017:163). Moreover, evidence suggests that public ownership of social services equates to lower emissions: the healthcare system within the United States makes up 8 per cent of the country’s emissions, whilst the United Kingdom’s National Health Service accounts for 3 per cent of emissions (Ibid.), presumed to be owing to a better use of resource and procurement (Chung & Meltzer, 2009 in Gough, 2017:163). This proposal is thus in line with the overall goal of the campaign to transition society into that which is environmentally conscious and just.

Alongside these proposals, the GNDE asks that EU institutions transition away from ‘a focus on Gross Domestic Product to a Genuine Progress Indicator’ (DiEM25’s GNDE, 2019:31). This

is grounded in the critique that ‘GDP measures of “growth” include the pollution of our environment, damage to our climate, sales of unsafe food or products, or practices that damage labour and social rights – so long as they have contractual value’ (Ibid.). This new measure could thus act as a means to alter the goals within the EU’s political society, perhaps adopting something similar to Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness (GNH) wherein minimum thresholds pertaining to happiness and wellbeing have been established to help guide policy to specific areas that fall below these thresholds (Gerber 2019:195). These demands to political society alone however will not alter all societal conceptions of progress, thus the GNDE also proposes changes to civil society’s understanding of work.

6.2.4 Demands to civil society: questioning notions of work and growth

As set out in the theoretical chapter, successful counter-hegemonic transformation requires the subverting of common sense to that which supports a counter-hegemonic position. For the GNDE campaign, this amounts to a strategy of ‘door knocking’, before the greater mobilisation and spread of the goals through the People’s Assemblies (DiEM25’s GNDE 2019:25). A part of this altering of common sense relates to the common sensical understanding of work, traditionally as that which operates in the public and economic sphere (Gregoratti & Raphael, 2019:88-89).

To alter the societal conception of work, the GNDE proposes the implementation of a Care Income (CI) which is ‘based on the recognition of the necessity of the activities of caring, which are often undervalued or invisible in our societies’ (DiEM25’s GNDE, 2019:36), activities that are disproportionately performed by women and migrant workers (Goodman & Salleh, 2013; Mies, 2014 in Gregoratti & Raphael, 2019:89). Made available to anyone who is not formally employed but engaged in part-time or full-time care work – be that caring for children, elderly, disabled, or members of a community caring for the environment or one another – the CI is, according to the DiEM25’s GNDE, aimed at providing greater security for those who need care, and is proposed as a remedy to the structural disadvantage faced by women (DiEM25’s GNDE, 2019:36). This idea is connected to Maria Mie’s conception of subsistence work as that which breaks from the capitalist growth fetish: instead of representing that which generates wealth, it

includes only that which satisfies direct human needs (Mies, 2005 & Mies, 2012 in Gregoratti & Raphael, 2019:89).

The CI could thus represent the valorisation of subsistence work within the common sense, and would no doubt help to address the inequality of material outcome of a system that disproportionately relies on women. The GNDE does not however provide a strategy for the disruption of these gendered roles, in essence adding a wage to the work instead of disrupting the system that overly relies on women as care givers. This is particularly troubling as among the suggestions of the GNDE is the reduction of formal workday hours, and the changing of the work week from five days down to four (DiEM25's GNDE, 2019:36, 51). In failing to address the structures that position women as care givers, women would disproportionately not be able to take advantage of a reduction in working hours in the same way that men would, owing to the oftentimes round the clock nature of care work. The CI at its surface then represents more of an affirmative or reformist strategy, one that could easily be absorbed within the current exploitative system and perhaps even consolidate the gender and racialised division of labour even further. Moreover, the omission of migrant workers from the explicit reasoning for the CI indicates a lack of consideration for the racialised aspect of care work.

With that being said, whilst the CI could be implemented and absorbed within the system, in doing so it would alter the balance of power between traditional capital holders and labour. Implemented alongside an expansion of public childcare (DiEM25's GNDE, 2019:46-49), this could challenge the power within patriarchal households for a greater transformation to the division of labour at a later date (Fraser, 2003:78). The likes of CI could also help to address what might constitute a job crisis amid the reduction in work hours and the defunding of 'brown' industries (DiEM25's GNDE, 2019:33). Should the likes of the CI be expanded to engross other forms of work that are deemed environmentally and socially beneficial, then the CI could constitute an instrument through which to expand subsistence work across society. This I believe to be the endgame strategy owing to the pairing of this policy with the likes of a Genuine Progress Indicator across the EU.

It is thus not always clear as to the type of reform the DiEM25's GNDE proposes: through the subversion of common sense understanding of work, a non-reformist reform can be imagined; however, failure to expand on this could work in opposition and further consolidate the current common sensical notion of work and labour division.

6.2.5 Demands to corporation and EU legislation: incentivising sustainable corporate behaviour and hardening EU regulations

Having already presented the content of the demands as being proposed to both political and civil society, it is evident that the DiEM25's GNDE has future potential as a counter-hegemonic movement within the integral states of the EU, and thus potentially lead to a wider transformation of the neoliberal EU institution. A finding that falls beyond these parameters relates to the demands to corporate behaviour within the EU, these demands are also backed by a proposal for political society to adopt harder environmental legislation.

With its aims to reduce GHG emissions and growth reliance, all GNDE proposals inherently affect the behaviour of corporations which themselves contribute to the GHG output. It is here then that a number of the demands are made specifically to corporations, most of which rely on a carrot over stick approach to behavioural shifting. For example, the GNDE proposes a 'Europe Award' that is made available to the top performers across industry, agriculture, housing, and infrastructure and which 'mimics Roosevelt's "Patriot" award in the Great Depression, giving public recognition to companies that make great strides towards sustainability and democracy' (DiEM25's GNDE 2019:52). This award constitutes additional financing from the GNDE's proposed Green Public Works initiative, with the aim being to award businesses whose operations offer the greatest contribution to effective environmental solutions that improve social outcomes also (Ibid.). This represents a similarity with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), drawing from the competitive nature of businesses to innovate for the betterment of the sector overall (Scheyvens et al., 2016). This approach is not without its drawbacks, indeed over reliance upon business voluntarism assumes businesses are more interested in global sustainability than they are in the sustainability of corporate growth, which so far has not been the paramount trend across business practice (Ibid.).

It is however this which the GNDE posit as a fundamental issue within EU regulation today. Pointing to the Environmental Crime Directive (ECD), the GNDE argues that businesses are permitted to continue business-as-usual, despite responsibility for the majority of GHG (DiEM25's GNDE, 2019:74). Seen below is an excerpt from the ECD:

Member States shall ensure that the following conduct constitutes a criminal offence, when unlawful and committed intentionally or with at least serious negligence: (a) the discharge,

emission or introduction of a quantity of materials or ionising radiation into air, soil or water, which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to the quality of air, the quality of soil or the quality of water, or to animals or plants
(Directive 2008/99/EC, 2008).

The challenge of prosecuting any violation of this article is related to the vague notion of “substantial damage” and what constitutes this (Ragaišytė, 2021). Accordingly, in a society that values growth, business-as-usual has not constituted significant damage despite environmentalists arguing otherwise (Jackson, 2017:22, 211; Hornborg, 2019:197-198). The GNDE thus includes incentivisation via the Europe Award, and also an expansion upon the ECD, replacing it with the Environmental Abuse Directive (EAD) (DiEM25’s GNDE, 2019:74-75). This directive would ensure that any person or corporation that significantly contributes to climate damage – quantitatively measured through megatons of GHG – is liable to compensate for this damage; this includes personal liability for directors and significant stakeholders (Ibid.). This directive hence seeks to remove the grey area surrounding “substantial damage”.

This mixing of a carrot and stick approach to behavioural shifting offers a calculated approach to its corporate audience and a powerful compliancy tool for its EU audience. Ultimately, the GNDE is asking for an eventual complete reform of the industry, energy, agriculture, infrastructure and housing sectors, putting the GNDE in conflict with powerful vested interests. Through the overhauling of the European Investment Bank, and incentivisation of lucrative green investment, the GNDE is proposing a plan to fracture this oppositional corporate audience, whilst reserving the means to ensure compliancy in accordance with the EAD. A coalition of corporate opposition would slow down the transition the GNDE is proposing, as such, a reform that offers a generous path to corporations engendering environmentalism is more likely to emerge amid the capitalist society that the GNDE is being operationalised within.

7 Discussion: A reform of potential

The analysis has explored the major themes drawn out from the DiEM25's GNDE campaign, grounding these in the language and theory of Gramsci and Gorz. The analysis has shown that the GNDE is focused on transforming society within the parameters of capitalism, pushing for change without pitting capitalist institutions as incapable of dealing with the climate crisis outright. In this sense, it is a non-reformist campaign owing to its non-confrontational formulation at surface level, whilst the potential to expand according to locally decided needs through the proposed People's Assemblies indicates an avenue for greater transformation at a later stage.

It is useful to compare the GNDE's proposed transformation with the likes proposed by degrowth movement whose supporters often call for an end to all growth, which by extension could cause a collapse of capitalism (Kallis et al., 2020:27-28; Jackson, 2017:105). The DiEM25's GNDE is not nearly as openly transformative; it is however here that its potential may be greater in the immediate than the likes of degrowth owing to its less radical vision. Degrowth has failed to be adopted within powerful political institutions in part because it is highly disruptive of our current way of life. It is inherently counter-hegemonic and poses a serious risk to the dominant social and political forces owing to its rebuttal of growth. The uncertainty within degrowth relating to the likes of power and state has likewise impeded its current ability to formulate a successful war of position and counter-hegemonic strategy. For a whole societal shift to a degrowth imaginary, it is unclear as to whether this would begin to operationalise within capitalist societies or after the fact, in turn fracturing any position it may launch.

Conversely, the DiEM25's GNDE represents a consolidated and well developed campaign that targets both civil and political society, without representing anything overly transformative at face value. The choice to work with capitalist values in the form of green bonds over taxes, or to mix corporate incentivisation with harder regulation demonstrates the campaign's desire to emerge from within the current capitalist society. Its potential to transform society lies in its

subversion of the contemporary understanding of growth and progress, one that encompasses more environmentally and socially just policies. Adopting the likes of a Genuine Progress Indicator and Care Income is promising in the sense that it indicates a transition away from the valorisation of economic growth as the main marker of societal progress. Through challenging and disrupting these hallmarks of progress, the common sensical understanding of growth and the desire for continued economic expansion may be subverted, perhaps leading to a counter-hegemonic position at a later historical juncture.

However, the GNDE does not elaborate on how the likes of the Genuine Progress Indicator will be decided, leading to further questions pertaining to the transformative potential of this policy. Referring back to the example of Bhutan and the National Progress Indicator, although this has been used to transform the areas such as working hours within the country (Gerber, 2019:195), it has not ensured an inclusive agenda wherein all voices – including minority groups – have been included within policy formulation owing to the hostility toward LGBTQI within the country (Chuki, 2019). Similarly, the failure to include voices from minority groups in the construction of the GNDE campaign cannot be repeated in the formulation of these indicators else minorities will continue to be excluded with their concerns remaining unaddressed. This is a point of issue for the campaign: although it possesses potential for greater expansion, failures to incorporate unheard voices and shortfalls related to the elaboration of potential expansion could lead to a situation whereby aspects of the campaign are incorporated into the EU and its member states, but the greater transformation does not arrive. Similarly, although the decentralised People's Assemblies are in theory a valuable tool, will people who lack the time and are instead concerned with survival in the current system be able to join and voice their opinions? These concerns need addressing if the DiEM25's GNDE is to be successful as a non-reformist reform that includes all voices for a just transition, else it falls into the trap of replicating top-down proposals that risks failing vulnerable members of society.

8 Conclusion

The purpose of this research was to analyse the Democracy in Europe 2025's Green New Deal for Europe campaign, according to the societal transformation envisaged across the campaign's published material. Gramscian and Gorzian theory have been applied to the analysis of the campaign to better determine and explain its transformative characteristics, leading to my conclusion that the campaign represents a non-reformist strategy for change to emerge within the capitalist societies of the EU. At its surface, it is not counter-hegemonic, indeed its reforms have the potential to be adopted and absorbed in the immediate. It does not call for an end to all growth, nor for the abolition of capitalism; however, it does provide a steppingstone from which to build a more transformative and potentially counter-hegemonic position at a later stage. Compared to the likes of degrowth, this campaign offers a more consolidated and potentially easier avenue for societal change to emerge within the current growth hegemony. With that being said, there is valid concern that without further expansion of demands, and a failure to incorporate the voices of the more marginalised members of society, then the demands will be absorbed and will not lead to a greater transformation, whilst potentially leading to further marginalisation.

There is no *deus ex machina* around the corner, and if we have learned one thing this past year over the course of the Covid-19 pandemic, it is that many of our national governments are woefully ill prepared for a society altering crisis. The environmental crisis represents exactly that, except on a greater scale. The DiEM25's GNDE campaign offers a different approach, and one that could see Europe accept its historical responsibility to help pave the way for living within the boundaries of nature. Though the GNDE does not question the likes of capitalism with its commodification of labour and nature, it may provide the platform from which to do so later. Ultimately, a transition into an environmentally just world may not involve a revolutionary act, and indeed both Gorz and Gramsci argue against this suggestion; rather, it might entail a reform such as the GNDE which could see the tenets of capitalist growth hegemony questioned on a scale not yet seen.

This research has focused on the published material of the campaign and not on its current progress, further research ought to be conducted into the state of the campaign today as this may help to shed light on the current progress and direction of the campaign. Another avenue for research could also compare the several emerging Green New Deals, incorporating this research into a future comparative study.

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