



LUND UNIVERSITY

Welfare Provision in Two EU Countries

A Comparative Study of Integration-Oriented Welfare Provision
in Germany and Sweden

Sanja Pfister

Master of Arts in European Studies
Centre for Languages and Literature

Master's Thesis, 30 ECTS

Supervisor: Mattias Nowak

Submitted: May 2021

Abstract

Through different events and developments in the recent 30 years, the generally comprehensive understanding of welfare within the European Union has shifted and one of the aims of this thesis is to investigate if EU welfare states have converged or diverged regarding the provision of welfare. The theory on which the research was based is a typology of welfare states from 1990 by the Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen. This theory is scrutinised in regard to whether it is still applicable in present day European contexts. One welfare-oriented topic has been chosen, which has become more prevalent in the last 30 years – being immigration to EU countries. Public reports, articles and webpages describing the integration work for immigrants of three welfare providing actors in two different countries constitute the main research material. Thus, the purpose of the thesis was firstly to investigate different approaches of the governments, of trade unions and of the main Churches of Germany and Sweden regarding the provision of welfare in the context of the integration of immigrants. Secondly, the paper investigated in what ways the 30 years old welfare model of Esping-Andersen should be modified in the light of those different approaches regarding the issue of the integration of immigrants. For the analysis a comparative methodology was used in order to give a comprehensive understanding of welfare mechanisms in different countries and through different providers. The key results are firstly that Germany and Sweden, representing two EU welfare states, have become more similar in regard to their welfare-related integration work for immigrants. Secondly, the results also indicated a modification of Esping-Andersen's welfare typology, in so far as to also include religious labels and structural foundations apart from political frames. Thirdly, this analysis also showed that Esping-Andersen's labels conservative, liberal and social democratic are not applicable to the same extent anymore, as they were 30 years ago.

Key words: European Union, Provision of welfare, Immigration, Welfare model, Conservative, Liberal, Social democratic

Table of Contents

1. Introduction: Why Should Welfare Be Studied?.....	1
1.1. Background.....	1
1.2. Academic Relevance and Hypothesis.....	3
1.3. Aims and Research Questions.....	4
1.4. Analytical Framework and Structure.....	6
1.5. Material and Limitations.....	7
1.6. Literature Overview.....	8
2. Theorisation of Welfare in a Historical Perspective.....	11
2.1. European Welfare States in a Historical and Theoretical Perspective.....	11
2.2. Esping-Andersen's Typology of Welfare States.....	16
2.3. Migration / Integration as a Welfare Feature.....	19
2.4. Governments as Welfare Providers.....	22
2.5. Trade Unions as Welfare Providers.....	24
2.6. The Church as a Welfare Provider.....	27
3. Main Analysis.....	29
3.1. Comparative Methodology – Comparing Welfare State Types.....	29
3.2. Findings.....	31
3.2.1. The Welfare Work of the German and Swedish Governments in the Context of Integration of Immigrants.....	31
3.2.2. The Welfare Work of German and Swedish Trade Unions in the Context of Integration of Immigrants.....	34
3.2.3. The Welfare Work of the Church in Germany and Sweden in the Context of Integration of Immigrants.....	37
3.3. Comparative Analytical Discussion of the Main Findings and Modification of Esping-Andersen's Model.....	41
3.3.1. Conclusion.....	47
4. Remarks and Final Discussion About Welfare States in a EU Context.....	50
4.1. Convergence or Divergence of EU Welfare States Since 1990?	50
4.2. Suggestions for Further Research.....	53
Bibliography.....	56

1. Introduction: Why Should Welfare Be Studied?

1.1. Background

"Many interviewees fear populisms from the left and the right, climate change, and the fact that competition for jobs and status has become fiercer and global in scale. They associate these risks with higher levels of inequality."¹

In 2020, the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) composed a report on socio-economic inequality within the European Union. What this report through interviewing the top 10% of income earners in four EU countries found, was a rising level of socio-economic inequality. Inequality is a widespread phenomenon in contemporary times and also academia should analyse what structures lead to increasing socio-economic differences. Thomas Piketty, professor of economics, argues that extreme inequality of wealth has a negative impact on economic growth and that economic inequality contributes to social inequality.² What could counteract that type of inequality are different measures, for instance equally distributed access to education or access to healthcare, or other so-called welfare benefits. Another finding the report made, was attitudes from the wealthiest top 10% towards the poorer members of society. Either they thought the misfortune is the poors own fault, or they saw inequality as a government-made phenomenon. Also in Sweden the result indicated a common perception of poverty as something that only concerns immigrants and their inability to integrate into a well-functioning system.³ Whatever their attitudes and perceptions were, they show clearly that socio-economic inequality is directly connected to the well-being, the welfare of the members of any society. In general, welfare in contemporary Europe is something essential and should be strived for by all member states. There is a need for the study of welfare – may it be the attitudes towards it, concrete figures on poverty or socio-economic mechanisms leading to inequality - in order to give governments a basis for policy-making.

Through historical, political and economical events with impact, the 20th century came to be the century to recognise, to observe and to study welfare and welfare states. Especially the

1 Foundation for European Progressive Studies 2020, p. 176

2 Thomas Piketty 2014, interview.

3 Foundation for European Progressive Studies 2020, p. 176

years 1945-1975 were outstanding, when countries, such as West Germany, Sweden or France had rapidly growing economies. These years of economic prosperity, also known as *trente glorieuse*, led to the development of social benefits systems.⁴ A concrete theorisation of welfare states will be given further down, however the most prominent welfare states model should be mentioned already here. In 1990, Gøsta Esping-Andersen suggested a classification of welfare states into three distinct models – the social democratic, the conservative and the liberal one.⁵

4 Nullmeier and Kaufmann 2010, p. 84

5 Esping-Andersen 1990

1.2. Academic Relevance and Hypothesis

Recent international developments, such as globalisation, Europeanisation, the European debt crisis or the refugee crisis, but also developments on national level, such as retrenchment or austerity measures forced most EU countries to sharper reforms and harnessed social expenditure. This thesis' hypothesis is that these developments caused a shifting of boundaries of Esping-Andersen's welfare characterisation. The pre-assumption of this thesis is thus that migration movements are one of the factors that had a strong impact on welfare models in Europe.

It will be interesting to see in the following analysis, whether these developments had a negative impact on welfare distribution in Germany and Sweden. My basic assumption therefore is that Esping-Andersen's model, more than 30 years after it was presented in his famous book *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, does not live up to the characteristics of welfare states in the contemporary European Union. The hypothesis of this thesis is that nation states in Europe have changed in terms of welfare features and that Esping-Andersen's model from 1990 may need theoretical modification. This paper suggests that – through EU enlargement and new ideologies – Esping-Andersen's typology is not applicable anymore and demands an adjusted classification. That may be particularly important regarding welfare-oriented work with social integration in increasingly multicultural societies. While "the accession of new member states to the EU is generally considered a success of European integration [...]", this process also brought difficulties in some policy areas – such as the integration of immigrants in the Union.⁶ New ideologies have emerged through that and have for instance "created a fertile ground for the emergence of populist movements [...]"⁷

6 Juncos and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2019, p. 267

7 Smismans 2019, p. 138

1.3. Aims and Research Questions

A lot research on welfare states and welfare systems has been conducted. Scholars, such as Titmuss (1963) and Pierson (2006) were mainly focusing on political mechanisms within welfare states, whereas other scholars, such as Briggs (1961) and Nullmeier and Kaufmann (2010) placed welfare development in larger historical and cultural perspectives. Among all existing publications only Esping-Andersen in 1990 has suggested an extensive model on types of welfare states. Today, more than 30 years later, due to different events, crises and politics, the mechanisms of welfare distribution have changed and therefore the model needs a modification. Of special interest in this paper are mechanisms regarding the integration of immigrants and how welfare states handle them in cooperation with various social actors.

The aim of this thesis is to comparatively analyse the activities of main welfare actors towards an increasingly relevant issue for welfare states, namely the socio-economic integration of immigrants. This will be investigated through analysing welfare approaches within two specific countries – Germany and Sweden. Besides the governments and politics, also trade unions and the main Churches in Germany and Sweden as social actors will be in the analytical focus of this thesis. The approach of those actors towards the issue of integration will be analysed and it will be focused on where the similarities and differences between the welfare state of Germany and the welfare state of Sweden lay. Consequently, based on empirical findings, a following theoretical aim is to provide a modification of Esping-Andersen's typological model on welfare states and to adjust it to current contexts. Another following aim finally is to provide a short discussion around the question whether EU countries have converged or diverged in terms of welfare provision. Hopefully politicians in charge can be encouraged to put more effort on the features that matter and to make them meet a common ground.

To sum up, this thesis will be guided by the following main research question (RQ) and two more subordinated research questions (RQ2, RQ3), that take this study to a larger, European context:

- RQ: What are the different approaches of the governments, trade unions and main Churches in Germany and Sweden regarding provision of welfare in the context of migration / integration?

- RQ2: How could the welfare states model of Esping-Andersen be modified in the light of those different approaches regarding the issue of migration / integration?
- RQ3: Have EU countries, exemplified by Germany and Sweden, converged or diverged in terms of welfare approaches towards the issue of migration / integration?

1.4. Analytical Framework and Structure

The traditional narrative on welfare states and especially Esping-Andersen's model will be interrogated in the following chapters. Chapter 2.1. explores historical events paving the way for welfare states. Important related theories will also be discussed in 2.1. The following chapter, 2.2. gives a summary on Esping-Andersen's model on welfare states. In 2.3. the focus lays on the issue of immigration and integration within welfare states. The chapters 2.4., 2.5. and 2.6. contain a description of the integration-oriented welfare provision of the governments, the Church and trade unions in Germany and Sweden.

Chapter 3 covers the main analysis, whereas 3.1. gives a short introduction into the methodology of qualified comparative analysis. 3.2. describes the findings of the collected data and analyses the work of the governments, trade unions and the main Churches in Germany and Sweden towards the welfare issue of migration, before analysing and comparing the findings in 3.3.. In 3.3. it will also be discussed, whether Esping-Andersen's model has to be modified, followed by a conclusion in 3.3.1.. Following, chapter 4 provides remarks and a final discussion, whereas in 4.1. a response will be given to the question whether EU welfare states have converged or diverged since 1990. 4.2. finally provides suggestions for further research.

1.5. Material and Limitations

For the analysis, a range of reports, articles and webpages were studied in order to give a comprehensive understanding of how the different actors in two different countries execute their welfare work.

Every study has its limitations and so does this thesis. In a research paper of this scope it is not possible to cover all angles that would be worth covering. A comparative examination has to be made and therefore one feature out of many more welfare characteristics has been chosen to be analysed towards the approach of three different welfare providers in two specific countries. The issue of migration / integration in welfare states seemed to be a very representative feature as it is a contemporary issue all EU welfare states had to face in recent years. By 'recent years', developments since 1990 are meant, as the aftermath of German unification in 1990 challenged not only the German welfare state, but also world order. Also Esping-Andersen's model covered welfare states until 1990 and this thesis aims in some ways to compare these days' welfare states to Esping-Andersen's model, and therefore the history of welfare will not be mentioned into detail.

Obviously also characteristics as for instance gender or families usually come to mind when thinking of welfare, but I found that there has been made a lot of research on these topics already. The issue of migration / integration on the other side is a very recent and contemporary phenomenon and accordingly not too much research has been made yet. The work of trade unions and the Church towards immigration and integration is important to investigate, as often only the state itself is seen as responsible for immigrants and for providing welfare. Of course the state itself should cover a major part of the responsibility for the equal and fair distribution of welfare among citizens. However, this thesis is mainly interested in how non-governmental social actors can contribute with welfare benefits. Furthermore, I explicitly want to mention, that this thesis does not aim to give an overview over all welfare states there are, but to give an overview of the three most distinct welfare models and to compare two European countries as examples for two of the models.

1.6. Literature Overview

In order to justify and legitimate my assumption and conception of a lack of a typology of contemporary welfare states, I have to give former scholars a righteous platform for their findings. Thus, this chapter will present earlier studies.

Welfare – the well-being, in terms of fortune, equal opportunities or simply happiness is a rather universal term and difficult to grasp, as it is a very individual conception. The welfare state on the other hand has been studied a lot. One of the most all-encompassing definitions is proposed by Asa Briggs (1961):

"A "welfare state" is a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least three directions— first, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property ; second, by narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain "social contingencies" (for example, sickness, old age and unemployment) which lead other wise to individual and family crises; and third, by ensuring that all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services."⁸

60 years later her definition is still highly applicable and especially her third point is distinctively important. It presents a very detailed description of what entities should be covered but still leaves open, what specific features welfare states should provide to its citizens. Each and every welfare state government, influenced by its history, politics, society and culture has to interpret and construct a feasible welfare system with features fitting in this specific state's context.

A wide-spread assumption may be that the maintenance and distribution of welfare is the state's responsibility only. In the following thesis we will learn that there are other vital actors that also take responsibility to secure citizens' welfare. The social researcher Titmuss distinguishes between three types of welfare: social, fiscal and occupational welfare. With social welfare he refers to social benefits provided by the state. Fiscal welfare covers tax grants directly for the individual or through firms providing welfare. With occupational welfare finally, he means welfare benefits provided through the workplace as part of one's employment. Occupational welfare can for instance be secured through collective agreements between employers and trade unions.⁹

⁸ Briggs 1961, p. 228

⁹ Titmuss 1963, p. 42-55

In recent years, research on welfare states has been expanded with the connection between welfare and migration. For instance sociologist Maurizio Ambrosini (2008) contributed in the field with his introduction of the term of *invisible welfare* and his suggestion that through the development of the European welfare states, migrants are a needed workforce. Whereas his general focus is on the political influence on immigration, one of his more in-depth arguments is that the well-functioning modern European welfare states contributed to a growing female workforce. This fact in turn led to a need for a bigger workforce in domestic work and child care. This gap can be filled by immigrants and foreign workforce.¹⁰ Ambrosini turned the welfare narrative around, from migrants exploiting the welfare state to migrants contributing with so-called invisible welfare, such as care services within private households, performed by immigrants.¹¹

Political scientist Alan Siaroff (1999) broadly studied the political ideology of corporatism. He suggests an ideal type of the concept of corporatism on national level and highlights that corporatism is about "the management of the national economy by the state, centralised unions and employers [...], to the relative benefit of all three actors."¹² Siaroff's concept of corporatism is directly related to welfare states studies, since he emphasises the importance of business as well as labour being part of the governments policy-making. The relation to welfare states studies can also be seen in the fact that an economic and social consensus between business, labour and the state is needed for the ideal type of corporatism, according to Siaroff.¹³

Focusing on the German welfare state, Lutz Leisering contributed to the study of welfare states through identifying key elements of the German corporatism, including among others social partners and voluntary welfare organisations. The mix of welfare provision and the concept of subsidiarity are according to Leisering the ground on which the German welfare state is built.¹⁴

10 Ambrosini 2013, p. 58

11 Ambrosini 2013, p. 27

12 Siaroff 1999, p. 177

13 Siaroff 1999, p. 178

14 Leisering 2001, p. 155

Within the Swedish welfare context Anders Lindbom, professor of political science should be mentioned. He studied the Swedish welfare state in the last three decades and investigated whether Sweden shifted from its social democratic character. What he found was actually a strengthening of the universalist character of the Swedish social democratic model in recent decades.¹⁵

However, none of those scholars ever made an attempt to characterise welfare states or to refute Esping-Andersen's model from 1990. He was the one, who gave the most detailed classification of welfare state clusters, which will be described below. Trying to highlight lacking details even in this model will be my aim and challenge with this thesis.

¹⁵ Lindbom 2011, p. 61

2. Theorisation of Welfare in a Historical Perspective

2.1. European Welfare States in a Historical and Theoretical Perspective

"The pooling of our social, cultural, and administrative experience doubles the strength of our national potentialities, and preserves them from all danger of decline, by giving them fresh impetus towards the creation of a still more advanced and still nobler civilisation."¹⁶

- Alcide De Gasperi, Prime Minister of Italy 1945-1953

The vision that former Prime Minister of Italy and one of the founding fathers of the European Union, Alcide De Gasperi expressed as early as 1951, perfectly reflects the vision of the so-called European idea. The aim with the foundation of the European Union and what was called the process of European integration was initially to create a common internal market and peace first and foremost. Along with that came also the idea of a common welfare state or at least to regulate the national welfare states in a more common way. The social well-being of its citizens was also one of the main intentions of the foundation of the EU and the term Social Europe was soon to be established.¹⁷ This idea maybe even gained importance through recent events and crises.

Still far away from today's understanding of a welfare state, but anyway the very first modern welfare state was Imperial Germany (1871-1918) with social policies implemented by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Neglecting Karl Marx's prediction that the state would always put capital before labour, Bismarck effectively implemented the so-called Socialist laws, through which he supported the redistribution of income from rich to poor. Between 1883 and 1889, he implemented social insurance programs for sickness, accident, old age and invalidity.¹⁸ With Bismarck as a forerunner, the interest in welfare grew also in other European countries during and after World War I. Especially in Scandinavia the agrarian middle class started to gain political importance.¹⁹ The fact that ideology always has an impact on social policy gets clear more than ever during WW2 and Nazi-Germany. The earlier established idea of social citizenship changed into racial citizenship. Welfare schemes were established, but only distributed to Nazi-type Aryan families.²⁰

16 De Gasperi 1951

17 Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2019, p. 3

18 Kuhnle and Sander 2010, p. 64

19 Kuhnle and Sander 2010, p. 76

20 Kuhnle and Sander 2010, p. 79

The post-war era after 1945 was characterised by a more universalistic approach, changing the socio-economic discourse from 'social insurance' to 'social security', and from 'social policy' to 'welfare state'. The following years from 1945 to around 1973 were characterised by a long period of expansion and a followed period of retrenchment in most Western European states.²¹

The founding father of the modern welfare state however and especially the liberal model as described below was William Beveridge in 1942, who successfully implemented a government report in the United Kingdom, called Beveridge Report, which included National Insurance and a proposal for National Health Service. The report layed the ground for an universalistic reform model until 1950.²²

One must differentiate the welfare in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from Germany's welfare discourse. From the very formation of the GDR (1949-1990) the aim with implementing welfare provisions was not out of governmental goodwill, but out of political goals. The GDR government hoped to stabilise the regime through welfare measures and to counteract the prevailing negative sentiment and growing criticism within the country.²³ Different to other regimes, welfare state and social policy measures were influenced by economic measures and vice versa. This came clear through the housing construction sector, a government led and government financed priority with work executed through state-owned companies. Connecting welfare benefits to the workplace led to an almost unexisting unemployment rate in the GDR.²⁴

Germany, as described below, was initially a more traditionally and conservative shaped welfare state, where "rights [...] were attached to class and status".²⁵ But also this welfare state has been subject to recent retrenchments and developments. After the 1970's energy crisis most European economies were moving towards neoliberalism and so did Germany. Since the 1980's privatisations of big enterprises, curbing the public sector and restraining workers'

21 Nullmeier and Kaufmann 2010, p. 84

22 Kuhnle and Sander 2010, p. 79

23 Burdumy 2013, p. 873

24 Burdumy 2013, p. 878

25 Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 27

rights became prevailing affairs in most Western European governments.²⁶

However, in 1999 the characterisation of Germany as a neoliberal economy was clearly confirmed. Still struggling with the ramifications of unification, Germany was not able to handle the newly created Eurozone, what resulted in a rapidly rising unemployment rate. Neoliberal remedies were seen as the solution. In 2003, the social democratic government with Gerhard Schröder being chancellor finally introduced 'Agenda 2010', what implemented harsh reforms and cuts to social welfare, such as unemployment, sickness and pension benefits, aiming to save the economy and to secure competitiveness. Obviously, these retrenchment measures led to impairment of welfare and dissatisfaction spread as inequality of incomes and poverty grew.²⁷ Neoliberal ideologies proliferated further through the 2008 economic crisis and came to stay.²⁸

In the context of shrinking welfare states in a governmental meaning, non-state actors have gained importance in recent years. In 1996, welfare associations in Germany employed already over one million waged employees and many voluntary helpers. Subsidiarity is the key principle of Germany's welfare providers. This is even laid down in the Social Assistance Act and in the Children and Youth Welfare Act.²⁹

The described linear development of social policy and of the implementation of welfare measures was true for most Western European Countries, including Sweden. The ground for the egalitarian character of the Swedish political culture however was laid much earlier. "Strivings for equality, homogeneity and togetherness [...]" symbolise the Swedish idea of an effective welfare state, what has its origin in the concept of *Folkhem*.³⁰ The idea of *Folkhem* was invented in the 1920's with the aim to favour social equality. Central for *Folkhem* is a strong state, covering for most citizens.³¹ Therefore, Sweden will below be characterised as a social democratic welfare regime, where "[a]ll benefit; all are dependent; and all will presumably feel obliged to pay".³²

26 Kershaw 2018, p. 275

27 Kershaw 2018, p. 473f

28 Kershaw 2018, p. 489

29 Leisering 2001, p. 168

30 Eastmond 2012, p. 19

31 Eastmond 2012, p. 20

32 Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 28

This Northern European country, often referred to as the ideal welfare state however has also undergone some changes due to policy reforms and neoliberal ideas since the 1990's. Also Sweden's economy was facing changes since the 1990's. Its financial crisis following a housing bubble in 1990-1994 led to a huge banking crisis, which in its turn led to a wave of unemployment. From those crisis years onwards, Sweden adjusted its economy and implemented privatisation of state-owned enterprises, restrictions of the budget and most importantly retrenchment and austerity of welfare provisions.³³

The role of the European Union in shaping welfare states is somewhat complex. In 1957 the ground for a more common welfare organisation on European level was laid - the European Social Fund (ESF) was established. Focusing mainly on employment and fairer job opportunities, it is still today a valid institution to coordinate a just labour market on EU level. The Amsterdam Treaty from 1997 further concretised employment policy guidelines.³⁴ A common notion among scholars is that member states' power for social policy making became restrained and limited through decision-making of EU institutions.³⁵ However, in 2007 the Treaty of Lisbon (TFEU) was signed with the intention to increase the efficiency of the EU, including for instance regulations on full employment and solidarity between generations.³⁶ The TFEU nevertheless is by many perceived as too vague and many believe that too few actions actually got permuted.³⁷

Europeanisation, which explains the relations and interactions between the European Union and its member states, can also be applied on welfare issues. Top-down Europeanisation describes the impact the European Union has on domestic level within the member states. A common field of interest and research hereby is the effects of membership and whether the states converge in terms of policies as a result of being a member country of the EU.³⁸

Culture, interests and the construction of identities play a significant role when comparing the EU and its member states. This approach is called constructivism and is concretely interested

33 Kershaw 2018, p. 495

34 European Parliament 1997, Title VIa

35 See Leibfried 1994 and others

36 European Parliament 2020

37 Church and Phinnemore 2019, p. 44

38 Börzel and Panke 2019, p. 121

in how identities and norms shape the communication of institutions on EU level, but also on member states level. Constructivists perceive European integration as an ongoing process.³⁹

³⁹ Rosamond 2019, p. 92

2.2. Esping-Andersen's Typology of Welfare States

In 1990, the Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen published the book 'The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism', including a typology on the concept of welfare regimes. This typology came to gain great importance within the research field of welfare capitalism. Crucial for the following analysis is the fact that Esping-Andersen's typology is government-oriented and only focuses on the impact of politics on the welfare state and overlooks the role of other actors.

Esping-Andersen's typology builds on the fact that there is a system that connects legal concepts and institutions between the regime – or state – and the economy.⁴⁰ Central for Esping-Andersen's categorisation are two terms – de-commodification and stratification. De-commodification comes into force when on the one hand assistance and resources are distributed because it is a legal right for a society's citizens to receive those services, and on the other hand – what tells a lot about Esping-Andersen's view on capitalism – when members of this society do not have to rely on the market in order to be able to make a good living.⁴¹ Stratification describes the fact that there is a tension and competition between the individual citizen herself and the state. A dependency occurs from the citizen towards the state as an institution of power.⁴² Accordingly, the individuals' status is put to the test against her position within society.⁴³

In terms of welfare-state regimes, Esping-Andersen suggests a three-types typology. One of the types is the liberal model, for what the United Kingdom can be given as an example. The liberal welfare state is characterised by the fact that mainly the less wealthy members of society with a low income are entitled to welfare services. Esping-Andersen argues that this system easily can be exploited by citizens through choosing to lean on welfare services rather than to work for earning their living. Therefore, the rules for entitlement are strict and the benefits modest. Through this structure, the liberal model advocates private welfare systems. The liberal model is highly oriented towards market efficiency. The founding document of the liberal model is said to be the Beveridge Report from 1942.⁴⁴ Liberalism in general however is

40 Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 2

41 Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 22

42 Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 16

43 Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 21

44 Kuhnle and Sander 2010, p. 79

following the Keynesian idea that employment and economic growth should be the focus of the work of governments rather than seeking economic advantages, such as low inflation.⁴⁵

Secondly, there is the conservative welfare model, with Germany as an example. In conservatively shaped regimes every strata of society has its individual rights. The market here does not play as much a role in the provision of welfare as in the liberal model. According to Esping-Andersen, the conservative welfare state of Germany is a corporatist state, meaning that interest groups work hand in hand with the state. However, the state is the one providing most of the social benefits, but because one's social rights depend on one's status in society, a redistribution of goods and services is almost impossible in the conservative regime. The importance of status in this regime type is reflected in the importance of safe family structures. A citizen is only entitled to state substitutes when the nearer family environment is not able to cover those needs. This applies for instance for the caring for older family members or for the costs of education.⁴⁶

The third welfare model according to Esping-Andersen is the social democratic regime. Most Northern European countries are examples for this model. For example Sweden is according to this model a universalistic regime, where de-commodification was high and welfare was tax-financed. What distinguishes the social democratic cluster from the other two systems is that it aims to provide a high level of welfare for all social classes. The market does not play any role in providing social benefits or welfare substitutes. In terms of state economy, the social democratic model was also following Keynesianism with the idea of politics controlling economic life.⁴⁷ The social democratic model's vision is the independence of every individual. No one is dependent on one's family and everyone is eligible to achieve help from the state.^{48 49}

45 Pierson 2006, p. 29

46 Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 27

47 Pierson 2006, p. 28

48 Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 28

49 Not explicitly mentioned by Esping-Andersen, the universalistic model of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) (1949-1990) was also seen as a social democratic type welfare state. (Burdumy 2013, p. 874)

Table 1: Summary of Esping-Andersen's Typology of Welfare States

Welfare Model	De-commodification	Stratification	Dominant Welfare Provider
Liberal	Low	High	Market (Means-tested social assistance)
Conservative	Medium	Medium	Family (Bismarckian social insurance programs, NGO-based welfare); Corporatism
Social Democratic	High	Low	State (Universal social welfare programs)

Source: Compiled by author based on Esping-Andersen (1990)

2.3. Migration / Integration as a Welfare Feature

Germany as well as Sweden are both countries which have experienced a large amount of immigration in recent years. Beginning with an organised guest worker immigration in the 1950's, 60's and 70's, labour migrants from Southern Europe and Turkey got invited to come and work in Germany and Sweden. During the 1990's, but most prominently since 2015, during the so-called migration crisis, both Sweden and Germany experienced a high amount of immigration.⁵⁰ In 1992, Sweden welcomed 70,000 asylum-seekers from Yugoslavia alone and the public debate started to openly express concerns about the sustainability of the Swedish welfare state with many people to take care of, coming from outside of Sweden.⁵¹

The prevailing conception of refugees as vulnerable and incomplete plays an important role when it comes to the distribution of welfare through state institutions with equality and multiculturalism being the main goals in policy making.⁵² Especially in the case of Sweden the long established notion of the country as the People's home (*Folkhem*) should be taken into account, as it symbolises an "universalist and effective welfare system with strong state presence and popular legitimacy [...]" Those preconditions entail nonetheless a very deeply rooted inflexibility and authoritative character, leading to the need for foreigners to adapt.⁵³ In the case of Germany, Goldschmidt (2015) found that immigrants are not more likely to claim welfare benefits, but more likely to remain unemployed.⁵⁴

Transnationally have globalisation, European integration and other factors led to a growing amount of people immigrating into the European Union. The established welfare states however, with high entry thresholds into the labour market and a limited access to education caused migrant exclusion and in some sense a socio-economic exclusion or even a second class citizenship.⁵⁵ Many scholars however see migrant labour as an advantage for welfare societies. Welfare services, and especially the care sector can actually profit from the additional workforce in ageing societies. Furthermore, through doing the housework in local households, migrant domestic workers can pave the way for local women to enter the labour

50 Goldschmidt 2017, p. 5

51 Eastmond 2012, p. 98

52 Eastmond 2012, p. 110f

53 Eastmond 2012, p. 111

54 Goldschmidt 2015, Study 1

55 See Faist 1998 and others

market more easily.⁵⁶

Following Esping-Andersen's model, the Swedish welfare state is built up of universal welfare programs, meaning that every member of society is contributing and receiving welfare support at the same time. Whereas the Swedish system is based on universal welfare, the German one is based on contributory welfare, with benefits depending on prior contribution. This structure makes it easier for immigrants in Sweden to become eligible for welfare benefits provided by the state, as no prior contribution to the system is needed.⁵⁷ However, a general challenge for many countries is, to evenly distribute access to occupational welfare across all socio-demographic groups. Migrants are usually less likely to receive, as they are employed in industry that does not provide occupational welfare.

The whole discourse about immigration into welfare states is a discussion about attitudes and deservingness. Two distinct attitude patterns can be found. The first one is making a difference between labour migrants and refugees. This pattern follows the opinion that there should be made a distinction between labour migrants and refugees, when it comes to welfare benefits. This public perception includes that only labour migrants, who contribute to the welfare system should be allowed to receive benefits.⁵⁸ The second attitude pattern, mainly represented by the populist right, is focusing rather on a strict distinction between migrants as a homogenous group and the natives as another group. Their perception is that only natives should be allowed to benefit from welfare services and that migrants only come to well-functioning welfare states in order to take advantage, to abuse and to overwhelm the system.⁵⁹

A sentiment, present in many contemporary public debates in Europe is the so-called welfare chauvinism, describing the ideology that immigrants should be excluded from receiving welfare benefits.⁶⁰ The concomitant resulting opinion, mainly represented by right-wing, conservative or liberal politicians, is the zero-sum tradeoff between welfare for natives and immigrants. In Sweden the political term *Folkhem* is used to describe the vision of a society, in which politics aim to improve the people's living conditions. Whereas the term and the idea

56 See Poster 2004 and others

57 Goldschmidt 2017, p. 6

58 Goldschmidt 2017, p. 13

59 Goldschmidt 2017, p. 41

60 Goldschmidt 2017, p. 11

had their peak between 1930-1960, the vision is still strong in Sweden. However, in recent years another sentiment arose connected to *Folkhem*.⁶¹ A prevailing opinion in the Swedish society today, amongst Sweden Democrats as well as Social Democrats, is that the *Folkhem* is a good system for shaping welfare, but it must be preserved, and it can only be preserved through not letting immigrants take advantage from it. The aforementioned report on inequality by FEPS also found that the wealthiest perceive poverty as something that mainly concerns immigrants and their inability to integrate into a well-functioning system.⁶² According to me, this is a welfare chauvinist, nationalist and rather neoliberal stance.

61 Nordiska Museet 2021

62 Foundation for European Progressive Studies 2020, p. 13

2.4. Governments as Welfare Providers

As seen in Esping-Andersen's typology, of course the state and its public institutions cover a major part of welfare distribution in Germany as well as in Sweden. Sweden's economy, what has been a rather stable economy until 1990 was also hit by the late 1980's inflation. The competitiveness of the Swedish industry deteriorated. The social democratic government saw itself obliged to implement savings and retrenchment, followed by rising unemployment. These measures led to dissatisfaction, a shift in power and a center-right government in 1991. Comprehensive tax reforms led to a high unemployment rate even within industry focused on the domestic market. Budgetary restructuring and fiscal consolidations were needed and thus the election campaign in 1994 was characterised by the debate about what cuts should be implemented, rather than if they should be implemented.⁶³

The social democrats were the winners and with them came the *convergence programme*. This programme involved the state taking big loans in order to cover the deficits. It meant also a huge cut of welfare benefits, especially pensions, the study finance system, sickness leave benefits, parental allowance, unemployment benefits and child allowance. The cuts developed to be effective for the government and by 1998, the state economy was balanced again, which did not change until the 2008 financial crisis. Unfortunately, the developments in the 1990's left their marks on the Swedish welfare state.⁶⁴

Exceptional for the Swedish welfare state is its nonintervention in wage bargaining. Employers and trade unions only are responsible for it.⁶⁵ Even though an effort was made in 1994 to recentralise the wage bargaining system, it remained mainly a threat from the government in order to control wage settlements.⁶⁶

Welfare distribution in Sweden is not the sole responsibility of the state only, but also to a high degree of the municipalities and county councils. However, in a government report from 2017 the aim of the Swedish model is described as *inclusive growth*, meaning that a universal welfare policy and a flexible labour market should be safeguarded, but also an open economic policy should be maintained.⁶⁷

63 Lindbom 2011, p. 37-41

64 Lindbom 2011, p. 42-43

65 Mares 2006, p. 83

66 Mares 2006, p. 122

67 Government Offices of Sweden 2016, p. 1

One major difference between the German and the Swedish welfare state is that the social benefits in Germany are mostly financed by contributions, whereas the Swedish welfare state is financed by taxes.⁶⁸

The federalist character of Germany plays also a major role when it comes to the governmental implementation of welfare. The 16 *Bundesländer* themselves enjoy legislative, fiscal and administrative powers, which allows them to implement different local social policies, which in its turn leads to a rather fragmented welfare mix in the country. For instance education is regulated on *Bundesländer* level and also when it comes to integration-oriented welfare distribution the *Länder* enjoy some margin and freedom in implementing policies. This freedom contains decisions about people's permissions to stay et cetera. This leads to very different strategies and a rather liberal approach to asylum questions in one *Bundesland* compared to a rather regulatory and conservative approach in another.⁶⁹

After the German reunification in 1990, the country was forced to comprehensive welfare cuts, as financial transfers to the East German labour market were needed. By 1998, the unemployment rate in East Germany was as high as 19.5% and unemployment insurance had to experience high deficits throughout the decade.⁷⁰ Still today, huge differences in welfare distribution between East and West are tangible.

The welfare mix is also represented in the type of welfare providers. Most of the public welfare state institutions are intermediary institutions and not part of the state directly.⁷¹ They work side by side with private social services and other welfare providers as for instance trade unions and the Church, two social actors described in the following chapters.

68 Leisering 2001, p. 167

69 Schammann 2015

70 Mares 2006, p. 168

71 Leisering 2001, p. 169

2.5. Trade Unions as Welfare Providers

The capital-labour conflict has influenced the shaping of social rights even before the development of welfare states. According to the corporatist approach, post-war welfare states were shaped by Keynesianism. The social consensus was preserved through the extension of social protection, but also of social market economy, which led to a balance between capital and labour.⁷² Trade unions have taken the place of a social partner of the labour movement when it comes to shaping labour market conditions, collective bargaining or social policy making.⁷³

Another approach, which also gained importance within labour market issues is the aforementioned theory about Europeanisation. Transnational economic changes and political development structure the welfare within every nation state, which also leads to a competition between countries, when it comes to capital and labour markets. Political actors on domestic level accordingly aim to lower labour costs and trade unions have to act to keep good working conditions.⁷⁴ Trade unions aim to support employees' interests both in society, but mainly at their workplace.

Initially, trade unions, emerging out of labour movements, naturally represented mainly voters of the social democratic party due to similar agendas. Over the years however, trade union members became more diverse also in their political orientation. A survey from January 2020 shows that 36% of the members of the biggest umbrella organisation for trade unions in Sweden would vote for the populist Sweden Democrats, whereas the Social Democrats would only receive 29% of the votes.⁷⁵

In Germany, the development is even more dramatic. A new, right-wing trade union established in 2009 and is growing ever since. In the elections to the employee representatives in the Stuttgart Daimler plant, 1.800 out of 14.000 employees voted for the representatives from "Zentrum Automobil". Trade unionists and elected representatives from this "alternative worker representation" - as the union calls itself - are deeply rooted within populist parties and other populist organisations, such as the AfD and Pegida.⁷⁶

72 Ebbinghaus 2010, p. 198

73 Ebbinghaus 2010, p. 196

74 Ebbinghaus 2010, p. 199

75 Eriksson 2020

76 Kiesel 2018

Whereas the trade unions in Sweden work hand in hand with - and are also economically and legally bound to - the Social Democratic party, trade unions in Germany are not politically bound. Still, trade unions in Germany are accepted negotiation partners in policy shaping and play a big role in the fight for workers' rights. The German Trade Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) is the umbrella organisation for eight German trade unions and comprises more than 6 million members.⁷⁷ The most prominent issue German trade unions are facing is shrinking membership. This is an issue trade unions in most countries have to handle and it concerns mainly younger employees, immigrants and women.

The trade unions in Sweden still possess an important role when it comes to wage bargaining and shaping labour market conditions in general. The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen i Sverige, LO) is an umbrella organisation for fourteen Swedish trade unions. The two other umbrella organisations one can find in Sweden are the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation, TCO) and the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (Sveriges akademikers centralorganisation, Saco).⁷⁸

Quite different from other European countries, LO is still tightly connected to the Swedish Social Democratic party (S). This cooperation means that the trade unions (and the individual members through their membership fee) endow a significant amount of money to the party. Trade unions play a significant role in unemployment insurance, since state-supported union unemployment funds (A-kassa) are included in the trade unions membership fees. At the same time, the unemployment funds may be union-run, but are state-subsidised, which consolidates the strong collaboration between trade unions and government in Sweden.⁷⁹

The union density of Sweden is still high compared to Germany's. In 2019, 68% of all employees in Sweden were affiliated to a trade union⁸⁰, whereas in 2016, only 18.5% of all German employees were members of a trade union.⁸¹ The general public narrative around

77 DGB – Home, Accessed April 9, 2021

78 The Swedish Trade Union Confederation, Accessed April 9, 2021

79 Ebbinghaus 2010, p. 207

80 Landsorganisationen i Sverige 2019

81 Welt 2018

trade unions in Sweden seems to be more positive than in Germany. In Sweden all stakeholders, the government and political actors included, are mainly positive about the work of trade unions and their role in policy shaping. In Germany on the other hand, trade unions are perceived more as an obstacle when it comes to policy making and they work more as a counterpart towards the government.⁸²

82 Ebbinghaus 2010, p. 203

2.6. The Church as a Welfare Provider

As much as Social Democracy has played a role in the shaping of welfare states, also Christian Democracy had its impact on the development. Religious roots and the moral foundations connected to it had and still have a big impact on any nation state's social policy.⁸³ The prevailing religions in Germany and Sweden – Catholicism and Lutheran Protestantism – have helped to shape different types of welfare states. Whereas Catholicism, as found in Germany, has had influence on the shaping of the welfare state in the sense of a political movement, Lutheranism, as found in Sweden, rather took the role of a social policy partner through the Lutheran state Church.⁸⁴ The Swedish Church (Svenska kyrkan) still has a significant role within Swedish society, even if it is not a state Church anymore since 2000. Before 2000 the Church had a lot more impact on state level and a strong connection to the parliament.⁸⁵

Already here should be mentioned one of my findings. Interestingly enough I found that non-governmental actors are difficult to place in the welfare context. Recalling Titmuss' characterisation, Churches neither can be seen as social, fiscal or occupational welfare.

The Church in Sweden taking an own role as non-political welfare actor has its reasons. The Swedish society never had to face a conflict between the Church and the state. Prevalent was rather the conflict between agrarian parties and social democratic parties, especially during industrialisation. The narrative of welfare state development therefore describes cooperation between social democratic and agrarian parties rather than with the Church.⁸⁶

The Catholic Church in Germany on the other hand felt threatened when politics started to take care of what were the Church's responsibilities before the expansion of the welfare state, which led to a Church-state conflict.⁸⁷ An important factor for the formation of Christian welfare states was therefore - different from the Nordic welfare states - rather a cooperation between social democratic parties and the Catholic middle class.⁸⁸ Eventually, religious actors in central Europe, imbued with Christianity, began to realise that they have to take action on

83 Nullmeier and Kaufmann 2010, p. 99

84 Van Kersbergen and Manow 2010, p. 268

85 Svenska kyrkan, Accessed April 9, 2021

86 Van Kersbergen and Manow 2010, p. 273

87 Van Kersbergen and Manow 2010, p. 273

88 Van Kersbergen and Manow 2010, p. 275

political level – within Christian democratic parties.

According to the Christian belief it is an obligation to help people in need. This belief is brought into politics and welfare through the Christian democratic parties. According to the values of Christianity, the Christian democratic parties favour and support mainly the traditional family. This implies the distribution of welfare provisions through external actors, the state or other social actors, only if the closer family members are not able to cover these needs anymore. This rule applies for all welfare areas, for instance costs of education or the care for the elderly, sick or disabled. The Christian democratic model therefore fosters the male breadwinner model over the individual, which is furthermore manifested in different tax-groups.⁸⁹

The state in Germany is in actual fact not the main provider of welfare, as subsidiarity is the key principle of German welfare. Voluntary welfare associations are to consult before state aid can be claimed. "Major umbrella organisations of voluntary welfare include Caritas (Roman Catholic) and Diakonie (Protestant), mirroring the bi-confessional structure of German Christianity; the Non-Denominational, Workers and Central Welfare Associations; and the Red Cross."⁹⁰

89 Daly 2010, p. 142

90 Leisering 2001, p. 168

3. Main Analysis

3.1. Comparative Methodology – Comparing Welfare State Types

Now, that we got an understanding of different welfare states and different welfare actors, the following study will analyse how three distinct actors – the state / the government, the Church and trade unions – work as welfare providers within one concrete field of welfare – the work for the integration of immigrants. The countries of Germany and Sweden, representing countries within the conservative model, respectively the social democratic model, according to Esping-Andersen, will be compared in a narrow sense, only focusing on the issue of migration / integration and the work of the governments and the Church and trade unions as social actors.

Chapter 3 will consist of the main study of this thesis, the study on European welfare states. The hypothesis of this thesis as stated in chapter 1.2. will be verified through a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). This systematic comparative method is very suitable for the approach of this thesis because it is the most legitimate method to give a comprehensive and broad understanding of different mechanisms of welfare distribution.⁹¹ QCA seems very fitting for the aim of my thesis, being to study one specific topic (integration-oriented welfare provision) and to compare the approaches of two specific countries (Germany and Sweden) towards it. In other words, I select "[...] a dependent variable and [seek] to test or devise an explanation for it. [...] QCA limits analysis to strictly dichotomous qualitative dependent and explanatory variables."⁹²

As my attempt is to scrutinise an existing model on welfare states and to investigate in detail two of the clusters, I must compare two distinct countries as examples for each cluster. Concretely, the countries Germany and Sweden will be compared according to three different welfare actors. As the study aims to be as detailed as possible, only one welfare feature will be investigated, being integration-oriented welfare distribution. The advantage of QCA is that both the qualitative and quantitative techniques will be covered in the outcome. QCA therefore combines the case-oriented and the variable-oriented techniques, which will help getting the desired outcome both towards the comparison of the two countries, but also

91 Amenta and Hicks 2010, p. 109

92 Amenta and Hicks 2010, p. 110

towards the legitimacy of the chosen welfare actors.⁹³

Within the comparison of two welfare states there will be case studies, investigating the three chosen welfare actors, the state, trade unions and the Church and their approach towards the welfare issue of the integration of immigrants. Since the aforementioned welfare model by Esping-Andersen only covers the welfare work by governments, the aim of this thesis is not only to investigate whether this model has changed throughout the years, but also to enlarge the model by the work of non-state actors.

The contemporary welfare states of Germany and Sweden regarding the issue of migration / integration will be studied, analysing concrete documents and other public statements by the German and Swedish governments, by the biggest German and Swedish trade unions and by the biggest German and Swedish Churches.

93 Berg-Schlösser et al. 2012, p. 5

3.2. Findings

3.2.1. The Welfare Work of the German and Swedish Governments in the Context of Integration of Immigrants

In september 2020 the migration committee (Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken (Migrationskommittén)) of the Swedish government with members from eight parties published its report on a sustainable migration policy (En långsiktigt hållbar migrationspolitik). The report is mainly covering immigration developments to Sweden since the European refugee crisis in 2015. The committee discusses new laws and changes to existing migration legislation.

Throughout the report, the committee is frequently highlighting its aim of making Sweden less attractive as destination country for refugees. It refers to laws implemented in recent years to make it more difficult to obtain a residence permit and to be entitled to assistance as well as to more open measures, such as conducting identity checks on the border or longer processing times for asylum procedures.⁹⁴ Regarding the issue of longer processing times the committee reflects over two possible outcomes. The preferred outcome would be for it being another restrictive measure to influence Swedens attraction for refugees.⁹⁵ The other possible outcome discussed in the report is, according to my interpretation, a rather right-wing stance full of preconceptions concerning refugees. It assumes that some refugees know beforehand about their chance of being granted asylum being rather low. They would come to Sweden anyway to stay in Sweden. Longer asylum procedures are hereby assumed being attractive for those individuals in order to lean on the reception system. The longer the asylum procedure, the longer the refugees have a right on accommodation, daily allowance and a right to work.⁹⁶ The committee however also sees advantages in helping immigrants to achieve their goals. Through that, the immigrants would be more likely to return to their homecountry, what would lead to an economic development in the homecountry, but also to the prevention of labour shortages in Europe.⁹⁷ The committee also stresses the fact that Swedish migration law should not differ from the law of the rest of the European Union. All implementations and changes made in migration law in recent years are made in order to meet other EU countries'

94 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 120

95 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 120

96 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 137

97 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 116

approaches. Sweden should not be more generous than other EU countries, when it comes to welfare for immigrants.⁹⁸ One concrete example is the protection category 'subsidiary protection status', which when it applies to an asylum seeker, would give him or her residence permit. The need for protection hereby has to be rooted in either armed conflict, difficult conflicts in the home country or environmental disasters. This category has to be removed, according to the committee, because it is more generous than other EU countries.⁹⁹ This shows that the Swedish government is losing more and more its universal social democratic approach to immigration. To be granted residence permit on the ground of a connection with a person residing in Sweden the immigrant must be legally married to a person residing in Sweden or at least to live together with that person.¹⁰⁰ The report states clearly that the total expenditures are expected to decline due to changes in immigration law.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, the committee highlights that the reception of asylum seekers can also generate revenues for municipalities, when for instance empty flats can be rented as asylum accommodations.¹⁰² Finally, the narrative around limiting the amount of refugees through the new proposal is also expressed in the aim to reduce crowded living conditions.¹⁰³

The approach of the German government to immigration is not too different. In 2020, the Federal Ministry of the Interior published its 16th report on migration for the year 2019, edited by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. The report covers migration activity to and from Germany. The aim of the report is to provide data and statistics in order to give politicians and other administrative institutions a basis for policy making.¹⁰⁴ One focus of the report is on the 'migration package', which was adopted in 2019, including seven new laws aiming at the development of German migration law on national level. Simplified, the migration package made it on one hand more easy for academics and professionals to immigrate to Germany and on the other hand more easy for authorities to deport and send back non-professionals.¹⁰⁵ This attitude is manifested in the report with several examples. On the one hand, part of the migration package is the Skilled Workers Immigration Act (Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz) in which the possibility to immigrate to Germany with the

98 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 196

99 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 322

100 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 239

101 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 388

102 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 415

103 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 442

104 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2020, p. 6

105 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2020, p. 16

aim to attend vocational training or to pursue a job has been alleviated.¹⁰⁶ However, this is only one way to favour those individuals that are not so likely to exploit the welfare system, because they will have a salary and more importantly social insurance. Another progress has been made towards the integration of work-related asylum seekers. After three months in Germany they can attend a German course or integration course.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, the law has been expanded with the possibility to receive residence permit, if the applicant has an apprenticeship affirmation within a bottleneck occupation.¹⁰⁸ The contemporary demand for skilled labour on the German labour market can be met through the liberalised labour migration.¹⁰⁹ On the other hand, the migration package has made it more difficult for the more vulnerable. It is now easier to put asylum seekers, who are obliged to leave, into detention in prison.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, conditions for irregular migrants, meaning people staying in Germany without right to permanent residence and without knowledge of the immigration authorities, have been further restricted - strictly according to EU law.¹¹¹ The need for asylum seekers to find work is stressed throughout the whole report and it is usually accompanied by the word "sozialversicherungspflichtig", meaning employment, subject to compulsory social insurance contributions.¹¹² Different projects and programs were implemented by the German government in order to support the integration of immigrants and one project especially should be mentioned here. It is called 'Neustart im Team' for which the Federal Ministry of the Interior is responsible. The aim of the project is to give particularly vulnerable refugees support. This support is expressed through both economical and moral support by voluntary German citizens. Partner organisations are among others the Protestant Church and the Caritas, an organisation by the Catholic Church.¹¹³ This strong cooperation and interconnection between non-state actors and the German state is not unusual when it comes to support projects for immigrants or refugees.¹¹⁴ Predominant however among the private aid providers are the Church or Church-related organisations. Thus, welfare provision in Germany is strongly shaped by the Christian Church, which will be further confirmed and elaborated in chapter 3.2.3.

106 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2020, p. 71

107 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2020, p. 14

108 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2020, p. 15

109 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2020, p. 74

110 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2020, p. 16

111 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2020, p. 36

112 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2020, p. 15

113 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2020, p. 35

114 See Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2020, p. 26, 33

3.2.2. The Welfare Work of German and Swedish Trade Unions in the Context of Integration of Immigrants

Apart from the state itself, also non-state organisations can act as welfare providers or at least as welfare negotiators. For instance, the Swedish trade union organisation Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO) has reacted on the governments' report *En långsiktigt hållbar migrationspolitik*. LO proposed its respons in a report in december 2020. It highlights values such as solidarity and how they should be applied on the Swedish labour market and on welfare.

According to LO, migration is about defending and developing the Swedish labour market and welfare model. Migration actively affects the labour market and therefore migration policy should be coordinated together with labour market policy, education policy and housing policy. A well-functioning labour market forms the basis to build society on, and in its turn leads to welfare in general.¹¹⁵ However, LO's chairperson wants to see a rather strict approach to labour migration. Occupations with labour shortages should be identified and work permit should only be delivered in those occupations. Furthermore, they call for employer's associations with their professional knowledge to be part of the decision-making.¹¹⁶ Moreover, LO demands that Swedish employers should not recruit low-skilled and poorly qualified workforce from abroad, especially not within occupations and industries without labour shortages. These vacancies should be filled by unemployed people who already live in Sweden.¹¹⁷ In other reports and articles from LO, the trade union calls frequently for a closer cooperation with *Migrationsverket* (Swedish Migration Agency), thus state authorities.¹¹⁸ This confirms the strong connection between all welfare providers in Sweden – state and non-state actors. Through different actions and projects LO is working actively for foreign workers as soon as they are part of the Swedish labour market. They can for instance become members of a trade union and take part in mentorship programs. Different trainings and information centres are also part of LO's work for the integration of immigrants.¹¹⁹ An article from LO from 2015 describes in what ways Sweden needs immigration. Immigration is needed to gain a sufficient number of people paying taxes in order to secure pensions, eldercare, child care or health care. Foreign workforce is needed to

115 Landsorganisationen i Sverige 2020, p. 1

116 Landsorganisationen i Sverige 2020, p. 3

117 Landsorganisationen i Sverige 2020, p. 3

118 See Landsorganisationen i Sverige 2008; Landsorganisationen i Sverige 2013

119 Landsorganisationen i Sverige 2008, p. 21

raise staffing levels within welfare services.¹²⁰ Hereby the narrative is not about immigrants in relation to their welfare, but rather about immigrants as a workforce in relation to the welfare of Sweden as a whole. Attitudes and ideologies within trade unions have changed, which is also due to a rising immigration into European countries, and especially Sweden and Germany. In Sweden, this led to a higher right-wing sentiment within the established trade unions and an increased sympathy with the right-wing party Sweden Democrats (SD) and the party seeks to raise its influence within the trade unions.¹²¹ The aforementioned article also focuses further on the positive market-outcomes. Enterprises can grow because of immigration and revenues can raise through export, import and foreign investment.¹²²

The German Trade Union Confederation (DGB) has a rather different stance towards the integration-work with refugees and immigrants. In different brochures the DGB accuses the state of providing insecure status of residence to newly arrived and highlights also administrative, social and civil obstacles standing in the way for immigrants to take up an employment. This in its way would lead to discrimination in job seeking and vocational training.¹²³ Making access to the labour market more easy for refugees and immigrants would also help avoiding illegal types of employment and human trafficking.¹²⁴ DGB sees its role more in a provider of integration through different supporting projects. It is working strongly together with other non-state actors, especially the Church. For instance in an open letter in cooperation with the Churches in Germany they demanded in 2015 that young asylum seekers should be allowed to start and to finish vocational training even if their asylum application gets rejected.¹²⁵ DGB is highly interested in influencing the political level as well. However, access to the German labour market is strictly dependent on one's residence status, for which immigration authorities are responsible. This is criticised by DGB as it provides no security for young asylum seekers and forces them to stay outside the welfare system.¹²⁶ More recently, DGB was mainly focusing on labour migration. In 2020, it presented several demands at the European level. Many seasonal workers are subject to exploitation and bad living- and working conditions. Firstly, minimum standards for accommodations provided by the employer should follow EU regulations. Secondly, also social insurance should be

120 Landsorganisationen i Sverige 2015, p. 2

121 Landsorganisationen i Sverige 2015, p. 6

122 Landsorganisationen i Sverige 2015, p. 1

123 DGB Bundesvorstand 2015 a, p. 21

124 DGB Bundesvorstand 2015 a, p. 21

125 DGB Bundesvorstand 2015 b, p. 23

126 DGB Bundesvorstand 2015 b, p. 4

protected through EU regulations. This should apply especially on mobile workers that are very vulnerable towards social security abuse. Since labour migrants often work as mobile workers, a Europe-wide social insurance should be applied to secure employees being insured no matter where they work in the EU.¹²⁷ Moreover, they demand the "[...] abolition of periods of employment free of social security contributions in all Member States, harmonised at EU level, and a legally binding rule that all employees are covered by social security regardless of their employment status and place of employment [...]".¹²⁸ Furthermore, DGB highlights job placement agencies that illegally place mobile workers in countries abroad and reclaim high amounts of fees. DGB therefore demands that job placement should not be left to the free market and that the EU must ensure to undermine those private agencies with legal ways of job placement, regulated by the EU. Another demand of the trade union is to establish an EU regulation regarding transparent working conditions and a legal right to labour law support. Labour conditions should be controlled transnational EU-wide.¹²⁹

127 German Trade Union Federation 2020, p. 4

128 German Trade Union Federation 2020, p. 4

129 German Trade Union Federation 2020, p. 1

3.2.3. The Welfare Work of the Church in Germany and Sweden in the Context of Integration of Immigrants

Apart from trade unions as social actors, religious institutions can also play an important role as providers or negotiators of welfare. In 2016, the Church of Sweden (Svenska kyrkan), presenting the prevailing religion of Lutheran Protestantism, published a comprehensive report about its work with asylum seekers and newly arrived in different parishes in Sweden.

One concrete example of what the Church of Sweden provides in its welfare support is helping migrants and refugees in their access to the labour market through offering them internship places or temporary employment.¹³⁰ The report describes how there was a need after the refugee crisis in 2015 for civil society to take action and contribute to the support of the newly arrived immigrants. According to the Church's narrative, the state was not able to fulfill its tasks as welfare provider anymore, leading to non-state actors to take over this role partially.¹³¹ The development of welfare distribution in Sweden in recent years is described as a decreasing of the public sector. Politicians raise their expectations towards civil society to perform certain services.¹³² An event with impact mentioned in the report is when *Svenska kyrkan* officially separated from the Swedish state in 2000.¹³³ The result was a stronger cooperation and contact with public authorities, such as municipal councils or the Swedish Migration Agency but also with non-state actors, such as other Christian communities, the Red Cross or educational associations.¹³⁴ However, this development also leads to dilemmas in cases, where the parishes do not agree with the authorities' rules and decisions.¹³⁵ The opposite view on asylum law is based on Christian faith, which comes clear throughout the whole report. Christian faith is also the reason why *Svenska kyrkan* is engaged in the work with refugees and asylum seekers in the first place. The basic idea of Christianity is that all human beings are equal and deserve a life in dignity. Religious texts often contain stories about escape and migration.¹³⁶ Humanity and the aim to help each other are rooted within the gospel and are key concepts within Christianity.¹³⁷ Religious organisations have therefore access to values they share with people of different religions, which makes it easier to find a

130 Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 44

131 Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 7

132 Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 15

133 Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 19

134 Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 34

135 Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 167

136 Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 17

137 Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 186

dialogue.¹³⁸ The report further claims that Swedish culture, society and the *Folkhem* were initially shaped by Lutheran Christianity. The connection between religion and society also helps foreigners to understand underlying values and relations within Swedish society, such as gender equality, even within the Church, where for example both men and women are allowed to become priests.¹³⁹ Immigrants from other religious backgrounds, such as Islam, do not see Svenska kyrkan as a religious institution only, but mainly as a business providing welfare.¹⁴⁰ This is also in line with the reports' assumption that refugees already come with a bad opinion about states, since they often come from non-democratic countries where the state has treated them badly.¹⁴¹ Svenska kyrkan does not follow any profit-making purpose with its integration work. It is in good economic health and funds its activities with its own financial resources, which can also be seen as positive by the immigrants.¹⁴² The economy of Svenska kyrkan is nevertheless one of the pillars that constitute the fear of the opponents to immigration. They see a trade-off between putting resources on the integration of immigrants and other ecclesiastical responsibilities.¹⁴³

The fear for this trade-off is also the Catholic Church in Germany aware of. The "Guidelines for the German Catholic Church's commitment to refugees" from 2016 describe that the Church is not neglecting the well-being of the poor and disadvantaged in the German society, when at the same time working for welfare for refugees.¹⁴⁴ Solidarity hereby as a principle is mentioned in several places of the Church's online presence, not only in the guidelines.¹⁴⁵

The German Catholic Church tries to approach its target audience with rather secular values, where not only solidarity should be mentioned, but also the humanitarian and social sense for responsibility and human dignity of all human beings.¹⁴⁶ On the other hand narratives used in the Church's public appearance are well-chosen, as they in some cases have their origin in biblical history. This is for instance the case, when they refer to refugees as defenceless *Geschöpfe*, meaning God's creature and also describing the earth's creation in a religious sense. The Church is also openly referring to Catholic values and practices when it comes to

138 Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 28

139 Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 184

140 Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 176

141 Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 189

142 Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 192

143 Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 220

144 German Bishops' Conference 2016, p. 7

145 German Bishops' Conference 2016, p. 7

146 Katholisch.de, Published May 11, 2020

how refugees should be treated. Church asylum for instance is a tradition practiced since ancient times.¹⁴⁷ According to the Catholic belief, God created every human being out of love and gave her unconditional dignity.¹⁴⁸ Also, both the Old and the New Testaments include experiences of flight and migration and can therefore state religious evidence that it is a Christian obligation to help people in need.¹⁴⁹ "The Biblical passages are typified in equal measure by appeals to exercise hospitality and to particularly care for those in need of protection and assistance."¹⁵⁰ The Church makes clear that Christianity has its origin in the Middle East. Many refugees come from that region and should therefore meet solidarity of the Christians in Europe too.¹⁵¹ Similar to Svenska kyrkan, the German Catholic Church is however not only working in a spiritual sense regarding the migration topic. Besides spiritual, brotherly and pastoral care activities, the Church is mainly operating in the shape of an economic business, which is reflected in awards distributed by Church institutions and aid organisations connected to the Church that mainly operate financially.¹⁵² The Church's relationship towards the state is shaped by criticism. An abess for example in 2020 called the German asylum system inhumane. Also the aforementioned Church asylum is highly controversial between the Church and state authorities.¹⁵³ Furthermore, the Churches in Germany jointly criticised the EU refugee policy. Hereby they were recalling Jesus Christ as a role model, but at the same time they also refer to democratic values.¹⁵⁴ This confirms the ambivalent relationship between the Church and the state in Germany. As strong the criticism is against the state and the EU, cooperations with civil society, non-state actors and state institutions are ultimately taking place. The *Neustart im Team* (NesT) programme is a cooperation between state and public organisations implementing preventive measures, in order to keep refugees from life-threatening flight movements.¹⁵⁵ The relationship between the Church and the state in Germany is based on consitutional arrangements and legal regulations. There are different cooperations between the state and religions, but a state Church is not existing.¹⁵⁶ When it comes to concrete welfare support, the narrative of the Church is about spiritual and material needs of refugees and aylum-seekers.¹⁵⁷ The welfare commitment ranges

147 Katholisch.de, Published August 26, 2020

148 Bätzing et al. 2020

149 German Bishops' Conference 2016, p. 4

150 German Bishops' Conference 2016, p. 4

151 Deutsche Bischofskonferenz b, Accessed April 9, 2021

152 Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz 2020, p. 53

153 Katholisch.de, Published August 26, 2020

154 Katholisch.de, Published May 5, 2020

155 Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz 2020

156 Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz 2020

157 German Bishops' Conference 2016, p. 5

from support in entering the labour market to health care and prevention work in international assistance.¹⁵⁸ A recurring topic hereby is the criticism towards political positions on national and EU level. Of certain concern for the Catholic Church are refugee families and their welfare. The holy family was also a refugee family and therefore the unity of the family deserves considerable importance according to the Christian belief.¹⁵⁹ ¹⁶⁰ The Catholic Church is aware of the divergent family structures that can be very different to the smaller nuclear family structures one can find in Germany.¹⁶¹

158 German Bishops' Conference 2016, p. 10

159 German Bishops' Conference 2016, p. 19

160 Deutsche Bischofskonferenz a, Accessed April 9, 2021

161 Deutsche Bischofskonferenz a, Accessed April 9, 2021

3.3. Comparative Analytical Discussion of the Main Findings and Modification of Esping-Andersen's Model

In the following, the three analysed welfare providers will be discussed and compared on the basis of the aforementioned findings. First of all, the Swedish governments' narrative on a sustainable migration policy seems to be to reduce migration to Sweden, to send back as many refugees as possible and to make the country less attractive for refugees. The deliberations from the Swedish government concerning their aim to make the country less attractive for refugees, as described in 3.2.1., makes one think about welfare chauvinist ideas. The Swedish government is, according to me, following the narrative of refugees exploiting the welfare system. Recurrent is also the term and idea of *Folkhem* and the concern of strains and exploitation to it¹⁶² and together with the need to have sufficient means to be eligible for family reunification this further confirms my argument about Sweden having a welfare chauvinist government.

When it comes to the welfare states characterisation, conservative and liberal characteristics could be found within the Swedish governments approach to immigration. The conservative welfare approach can be sensed for instance when it comes to residence permit on the ground of a connection with a person residing in Sweden. To be included in this category, it is required to be legally married to a person residing in Sweden or at least to live together with that person.¹⁶³ Swedish migration law therefore has a very narrow vision of the nuclear family. In that sense it follows the more traditional idea of the conservative welfare state that the state provides help only if the nearer family is not able to cover the individuals' needs. Also according to Esping-Andersen, in conservative welfare regimes, the "[...] state will only interfere when the family's capacity to service its members is exhausted."¹⁶⁴ The liberal ideas are reflected in the overall focus on the economic consequences immigration to Sweden has on the Swedish welfare state. This is for instance the case, when the report states clearly that the total expenditures are expected to decline due to changes in immigration law.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, the committee highlights that the reception of asylum seekers can also generate revenues for municipalities, when for instance empty flats can be rented as asylum accommodations.¹⁶⁶ This is also a rather neoliberal approach, which I will elaborate lateron, as

162 See for instance Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 269

163 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 239

164 Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 27

165 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 388

166 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 415

it seems the refugees are welcome mostly because of economic reasons. Finally, the narrative around limiting the amount of refugees through the new proposal is also expressed in the aim to reduce crowded living conditions.¹⁶⁷ However, the underlying neoliberal argument hereby seems to be that the amount of refugees must decline in order to counteract housing shortages, which are not confirmed by the report being a result of immigration only. To sum up, the report's content is mainly aiming on one hand to make it more difficult for refugees to come and settle in Sweden and on the other hand to complicate for migrants already living in Sweden to become part of the society.

The approach of the German government however is still more conservative, compared to the Swedish one. It is following a rather excluding approach, since it is made easier for academics and professionals to immigrate, but also easier to be sent back as a non-professional. Furthermore, as described above, work-related asylum seekers can attend integration courses. As this possibility does not apply for refugees, who are not part of the labour market, this is a rather excluding approach and makes it even more difficult for those who already have a hard time becoming part of the labour market to actually become part of German society. The immigrants are also seen as workforce that can fill gaps within German labour market. This is a highly liberal approach as labour migration was liberalised only because of a demand for skilled labour on the German labour market. It follows that it is difficult for immigrants to actually take advantage of the German welfare state as mainly financially stable migrants receive a residence permit. It is remarkable that in the whole report the fear for immigrants exploiting the welfare system seems central. This can be sensed as the need for asylum seekers to find work is stressed throughout the whole report and the need for employment, subject to compulsory social insurance contributions is central. Thus, it is not enough to earn a salary, but to contribute to the German welfare system directly from the beginning. According to me, this is in line with Esping-Andersen's definition of the conservative welfare system being a contributory welfare system.¹⁶⁸

As mentioned before, access to the labour market, especially for immigrants, in Germany as well as in Sweden, lies still mainly with the state and politics. Stratification can therefore be seen in both countries, since the immigrant as an individual is highly dependent from the state. What trade unions as non-state actors in the analysed cases do, is to highlight

167 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 442

168 See Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 27

shortcomings and abuse of existing regulations. However, the criticism looks different in both countries. Whereas the analysed German trade union works as an opponent to the state and acts through criticising state regulations, the Swedish one also criticises, but tries to find a solution together with the state. This is also due to the strong interconnection between LO and the Swedish social democratic party. LO therefore has more possibilities to affect welfare issues also on political level.

LO's strict approach to labour migration, as described in 3.2.2. shows firstly rather welfare chauvinist demands, since a clear distinction is made between migrants who can contribute to the welfare system through working in these specific industries and migrants who can not. Migrants are therefore seen as good possibility to fill gaps in the Swedish labour market. The "imagined zero-sum tradeoff between spending on natives and spending on immigrants, with one always coming at the cost of the other"¹⁶⁹, which according to Goldschmidt is one of the main components of welfare chauvinism, can be sensed in LO's approach towards immigrants, for example when they demand that "work permits should only be granted in industries with labour shortage in Sweden"¹⁷⁰. Secondly, this approach is also liberal in the sense that it is very market-oriented and favours employers before employees. Furthermore, in 3.2.2. we also found that LO demands no recruitment of low-skilled and poorly qualified workforce from abroad. Besides that this is also a welfare chauvinist approach to labour migration, it is liberal and market-oriented, seeking the best outcome for the labour market and not for the individual. This approach would also practically make it more difficult for newly arrived to find a job as the sole aim seems to be to prevent those already living in Sweden from being unemployed, and thus exploiting the welfare system. Also a conservative stance can be identified, since a ban on recruiting low-skilled workforce from abroad would also mean that poorer migrants and those with lower education would not have the same preconditions and chances as the more wealthy and well-educated. This would ultimately lead to a class-society, favouring one strata of society and ignoring the others. Another finding made is LO's focus on positive market-outcomes. Their approach is therefore a rather liberal one, in which the state encourages the market even when it comes to immigration. This stance of the Swedish trade union disproves Esping-Andersen's argument, according to which Sweden is a very de-commodifying state, meaning that citizens do not have to rely on the market in order to make a good living.

169 Goldschmidt 2017, p. 11

170 Landsorganisationen i Sverige 2020, p. 3 (Own translation)

This market-oriented and liberal approach to immigration could not be found in the studied German Trade Union Confederation (DGB). On the contrary, the DGB wants the state to take more responsibility for refugees and immigrants. Different to LO, they want refugees and immigrants to be part of the welfare society, rather than to exclude them from it. DGB proved themselves not to be liberal, since they do not want that job placements are left to the free market. In that regard, DGB also calls for an EU regulation. Compared to LO, DGB is also more EU-oriented in general, what could be seen in their demands for EU-wide minimum standards for accommodations and an EU-wide social insurance. With all those demands, DGB is strengthening the need of a cooperation of all EU countries and all those demands are welfare demands towards the state too, since welfare has to be provided on state-level.

The separation of *Svenska kyrkan* in 2000 from the state did not only lead to independence, but also to a stronger connection to state and non-state actors. The findings in 3.2.3. imply that the Church can act stronger for its values and aims, being in the opposition now. It was first 10 years after Esping-Andersen¹⁷¹ established his welfare model that the Church became an actor by itself and maybe even a counterpart. *Svenska kyrkan* developed a very important role as welfare actor since then. Of course, Esping-Andersen could not have foreseen such developments, however he should have widened his view not only on the state, but also on other welfare providers and civil society. Instead of the label social democratic, Sweden maybe would have been labeled a progressive or universal welfare state instead. As stated in 3.2.3., the Swedish Church's opinion is that the state was not able to fulfill its tasks as welfare provider anymore. Hereby, I can identify an underlying criticism towards Sweden losing its character as an universal welfare state encompassing all members of society and forcing some members to look for help outside the welfare system of public authorities.

As described in 3.2.3. an ambivalent relationship between the Church and the state and a strong criticism against the state and the EU could be found. Similar to the Swedish Church, the German Church also experienced a progressive development. The Church is more open now for family structures that are very different to the smaller nuclear family that is common in Germany. This approach has developed a lot in recent years and is a rather progressive one. The male breadwinner model, on which Esping-Andersen's theory on Germany being a conservative welfare state is based, does not apply anymore. Esping-Andersen's label

171 Esping-Andersen 1990

"conservative" for Germany is mainly based on the male breadwinner model and is still true for instance for the fiscal welfare. However, it does not take other welfare areas into consideration. The integration-oriented welfare work of the German Church is not following the male breadwinner model anymore, as described above, even though the impact of traditional values and of the Church is still strong in Germany, which can also be stated through the strength of the Christian Democratic party. Instead for the label conservative, maybe Christian democratic would describe the German welfare state more correctly. Not only the nearest family is required to provide welfare for the individual anymore, but also Churches and trade unions take on that role now.

The findings in 3.2.3. have shown that both the Swedish and the German Church appeal, besides from religious values, such as humanity and solidarity to secular values and more progressive values. They are furthermore calling for more contact and dialogue between the religions which also confirms the progressive and more liberal development. As described above, non-state actors gain more and more importance when it comes to the provision of welfare. One of the most important ones is the Church. I therefore suggest a model that does not follow political labels only, but also religious labels, as they have been prevalent and had a huge impact on the shaping of European welfare states. Many scholars believe that the ideological foundations of each nation state led to different welfare state models.¹⁷² Also in today's welfare states of Germany and Sweden the Church does have a big impact on how welfare is distributed in each country. The Swedish Church for instance plays almost as much a role in social policy shaping as politics does. It is the religious approach that helps explain Esping-Andersen's ideas and what later on leads to the distinction between the social democratic model, influenced by Lutheran Protestantism and the Christian democratic model, influenced by Christianity.¹⁷³ As mentioned before, the Church is not yet acknowledged as a welfare provider according to established arrays, as it does not follow conventional patterns in welfare distribution.

Non-state actors, in the analysed cases trade unions and Churches, repetitively refer to the state, and the government specifically, as the most important welfare provider. The state is described as the only institution that can implement policies and legally binding laws.¹⁷⁴ Even

172 See Titmuss 1963

173 The liberal model was shaped by reformed Protestantism, which was much more state-sceptic. (Van Kersbergen and Manow 2010, p. 268)

174 See for instance Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 11 and Landsorganisationen i Sverige 2020, p. 3

though, according to the previously presented model by Titmuss¹⁷⁵, stating that trade unions and Churches do not really play any role in welfare, I found that their impact in both countries is undeniable. Whilst the state still keeps main responsibility, non-state actors were taking more action in recent years. In the chosen topic of integration-oriented welfare distribution, this commitment from both trade unions and Churches increased in both Germany and Sweden, particularly after the refugee crisis in 2015 as described above. Significant in the findings was also the interconnection between the three actors. Trade unions and Churches in both countries are active in raising political awareness and lobby for changes in the treatment of refugees, for instance within the area of working conditions and access to the labour market. In the analysed trade unions LO and DGB also a commitment for better occupational welfare could be found.

175 Titmuss 1963

3.3.1. Conclusion

In this concluding chapter, the research questions 1 and 2, as stated in 1.3., will be answered. It can be concluded that the narrative about welfare should be adjusted in so far, as to concretise what and who can be defined as welfare provider. Esping-Andersen's model builds on the assumption that it is the sole responsibility of the state / the government to cover welfare for its citizens. For the case of Sweden this might be true to some extent, but especially in the case of Germany, this approach has to be redefined. Non-governmental actors, such as the Church and trade unions, can take the role of social actors as well and cover a huge part of welfare distribution within the country, especially in the field of the integration of immigrants. Following Esping-Andersen's model, the Swedish welfare state is built up of universal welfare programs, meaning that every member of society is contributing to and receiving welfare support at the same time. Whereas the Swedish system is based on universal welfare, the German one is based on contributory welfare, with benefits depending on prior contribution.¹⁷⁶ Within welfare distributed by the state, the Swedish approach has changed in the sense that not every member of society is included in that system, since immigrants have to fulfill certain conditions. Non-state actors, as for example the Church do not make a difference between Swedish natives and newly arrived. The German approach to immigration is similar. The state benefits are still based on contributory welfare, whereas socio-economic support from non-state actors does not depend on prior distribution. As described in 2.1. the German welfare state during WW2 was based on the Nazi-type Aryan family. It was still a welfare state, but only for chosen ones. This shows that political and ideological labels should not be the only focus of a model on welfare states, as it is the case in Esping-Andersen's model. A legitimate welfare states model should instead rather focus on the internal structural foundations and mainly on how welfare distribution is organised and who are the providers in each nation state. That the conservative model, and Germany in particular, favour the male breadwinner model has its origin in religion, and since Germany is becoming more and more diverse through immigration, this model is not applicable anymore. Welfare benefits have been adjusted towards more gender-equality, giving women and especially mothers the possibility of working and earning their own income. However, the Church in Germany is still holding on to the traditional breadwinner-model and with the conservative CDU in government it will be difficult to change this pattern. In summary, concerning the immigration context, both countries are still very state-centred and non-state

¹⁷⁶ Goldschmidt 2017, p. 6

actors and interest groups do not have a say in policy-making. Even if de-commodification is still high in Sweden and welfare is still mainly tax-financed, it was decreasing in recent years. Both countries are still stratified also when it comes to immigration since especially refugees are dependent on the state as an institution of power.

After a thorough empirical evaluation and comparison of both the German and the Swedish trade union, it can be stated that the Swedish one deserves to be particularly mentioned and the role and power of the Swedish trade unions should be highlighted here. What is special about the trade unions in Sweden is their strong connection to politics, to the social democratic party and to the labour market, as stated above. Therefore, trade unions actually can be seen as social or occupational welfare providers too. An example for this connection is for instance the unemployment funds in Sweden that are state-subsidised, but union-run, which in the end makes it welfare benefits distributed by the state. Here, even the strong connection between the Swedish trade unions and the social democratic party should be mentioned again. Through that connection, welfare chauvinism towards immigrants could be found not only within the government, as stated before, but also within the studied trade union. In regard to its trade union landscape, we can see, that the Swedish welfare state is characterised by its highly corporative structure. This can be proven by the Siaroff index, which "measures a long-term cooperative pattern of shared economic management involving the social partners and existing at various levels such as plant-level management, sectoral wage bargaining, and joint shaping of national policies in competitiveness-related matters (education, social policy, etc.)".¹⁷⁷ However, we can see that this cooperative pattern between state and social partners, in this case trade unions, can have a rather negative output. With a strong connection between trade unions and the social democratic party, both economically and legally, dissatisfaction among employees is rising. Many believe that trade unions should not be politically bound and should focus on the protection of workers' rights only, without assessing their political affiliation. On the other hand, one could also argue that the strong connection between the Swedish trade unions and the social democratic party strengthened the welfare state. With the Siaroff index, characterising Swedens corporatism still as high, and the highest union density within the EU, Sweden's welfare approach regarding workers rights can be evaluated as successful.

This study can conclude that Germany in the last 30 years moved from a conservative welfare

¹⁷⁷ Siaroff 1999, p. 189

state - to use Esping-Andersen's terminology - to a more Christian democratic welfare state, whereas Sweden moved from a social democratic one to a somewhat liberal or conservative one. In Germany, a rising support for the responsibility of the state to abolish socio-economic inequality could be sensed, which can be marked as a characteristic for a Christian democratic welfare state. Furthermore, the German Church still has much impact, but more in a social sense now, which also confirms the German welfare state's move towards the label Christian democratic. The Church in Sweden became itself more progressive and liberal. Churches as well as trade unions can therefore be seen more like social antagonists and complements to conservative, neoliberal and Christian democratic governments. Finally, the political ideology of corporatism is central, since in both countries public actors as well as social actors increased their impact in recent years. Both societies are organised by corporate groups and social actors, following their common interests.

4. Remarks and Final Discussion About Welfare States in a EU Context

4.1. Convergence or Divergence of EU Welfare States Since 1990?

In 1.3. a short third research question was posed: Have EU countries, exemplified by Germany and Sweden, converged or diverged in terms of welfare approaches towards the issue of migration / integration? This question will be answered in this chapter. I have found that EU countries in times striving for welfare have converged in terms of welfare. This has been shown with the example of welfare states' work with the integration of immigrants and can be explained with the theory of constructivism, as described above. In the Swedish context, constructivist ideas could be found in both the government's and the Church's approach to immigration. Both actors stressed the importance of *Folkhem* for the Swedish culture and the construction of identities and expressed their concern on how to preserve it with EU-wide regulations coming into force.¹⁷⁸ Also in the German context, the idea of culture and identities playing a significant role to shape the EU could be analysed. The Christian belief is deeply rooted even within the government and lays the ground for the approach towards immigration also on EU level.¹⁷⁹ Within the Church, a strong criticism towards the EU could be found, stressed through arguments rooted in the Christian belief.¹⁸⁰ The refugee crisis and immigration to the EU in recent years have led to a need for cooperation between EU states. Apart from some national regulations, both Germany and Sweden are mainly following UN and EU laws. The approach from both countries can therefore be said being a social relations network on international level, thus very much in line with constructivist ideas.

The Swedish government expressed its concerns towards a high immigration rate and its negative impact on European integration.¹⁸¹ Both governments are strictly following EU regulations and laws and a top-down Europeanisation can be sensed. Germany and Sweden can therefore be said to converge in the context of migration and in their work with integration-oriented welfare distribution. Both the German and the Swedish government stressed in their reports the importance of harmonised regulations regarding immigration. That both governments do not want the migration law to differ from other EU countries also

178 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 269; Svenska kyrkan 2016, p. 184

179 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2020, s. 35

180 Deutsche Bischofskonferenz b, Accessed April 9, 2021

181 Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 116

indicates that EU welfare states are converging, at least within the immigration context.¹⁸²

Esping-Andersen did not take into account immigration to welfare states in his characterisation. In 1990, immigration into the EU was not yet a very prominent issue. Accordingly, it was not a concern for welfare states. The rising immigration into EU welfare states since 1990 and especially the refugee crisis from 2015 highly influenced the categorisation of welfare states.

Whether or not the European Union initially was thought to become one large welfare state remains speculative. What can be concluded however is, that attempts have been made to distribute welfare between nation states in the EU. EU legislation – especially within welfare and social policy - is still too vague and too weak to have a sincere impact on member states. This can surely be seen, comparing a social democratic country like Sweden and a Christian democratic country like Germany. But even more explicit can this contrast be seen looking to very conservative countries, such as Hungary or Poland for example. It can be concluded that the EU performs the role of a coordinator in the shape of an umbrella organisation, but within welfare on nation state level the EU possesses a rather minimal role.

Many scholars argue that most EU welfare states developed to become neoliberal welfare states. Through comparing two distinct welfare states it comes clear that it is not as easy as that. Of course, through post-industrialisation and accordingly changing family patterns even Germany is on its way towards a more equal society. Germany is moving slowly but steadily away from the male breadwinner model towards a more gender-balanced model. However, at least within the analysis of the governments' and the trade unions' stance towards immigration the sense was still rather corporatist than neoliberal.

According to my findings in 3.2.1. the Swedish government is indeed mainly concerned with the economic consequences and focuses on possible revenues that immigration could bring. Also within the trade union, a neoliberal stance could be found. However, the impact of the Church should not be forgotten, where a neoliberal stance could not be found, which may also be the case for other non-state welfare providers. In both countries the private sector does still not play a major role in the distribution of welfare within the context of the integration of

¹⁸² Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2020, p. 36; Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken 2020, p. 196

immigrants.

4.2. Suggestions for Further Research

To summarise, we have proven that non-state actors, such as trade unions and the Church can be good welfare providers, but the state itself has to implement legal regulations. Non-state welfare providers mainly take action where the state fails in providing welfare.

This thesis focused on only two of three welfare models according to Esping-Andersen (1990). The third model however, the liberal one, is worth analysing too, especially with recent events in mind. The United Kingdom is the most typical liberal welfare model in Europe. In what way welfare services have changed due to Brexit would definitely be worth analysing. Highly interesting in this context would be to investigate both how the liberal welfare model as such changed through recent events, but also if the European Union as a huge welfare state is getting exposed to changes within welfare, with one member state less.

A huge lack of Esping-Andersen's model is that it compares welfare states from different models. Any welfare state should only be compared to another with a similar background, as every welfare state has to be analysed in its own context. Historical circumstances and other socio-economic developments have to be analysed in their rights. Esping-Andersen's model mainly mentions social transfers. Especially in the case of integration-oriented welfare distribution however, we can see that this is not the only welfare source. Social services, such as private institutions or non-profit associations cover a major part of especially the immigration and integration welfare.¹⁸³ Esping-Andersen's model should therefore be adjusted with regard to immigration. Regarding other welfare features this study is not able to provide any conclusions.

It should also be kept in mind that Sweden and Germany are countries that have changed a lot in the last 30 years also outside the welfare system itself, as for instance more women are part of the workforce, which contributed to challenge the welfare states.

As proven before, the Swedish model is not a wholly social democratic model anymore due to many changes in welfare. The social democratic model, known as the most distributive one that provides benefits to most members of society is not comprehensively describing Sweden anymore. Sweden still makes a good attempt of equal distribution, but with rather huge

¹⁸³ Lindbom 2011, p. 48

limitations. Immigrants have a hard time becoming part of the Swedish society and to become eligible of welfare support. Sweden can therefore – drastically - be said to become a welfare chauvinist country. Through both clear-cut claims from the government as stated above, and through more underlying ideas by the trade unions and Churches, Sweden is moving towards a rather neoliberal country.

Even if this paper has not focused on party politics it should be mentioned and taken into account that different governments in Sweden have been in power since 1990, including two longer periods of centre-right coalitions. Carl Bildt (M) was prime minister 1991-1994 and Fredrik Reinfeldt (M) 2006-2014. Most certainly have the conservative governments had their impact on welfare policies, maybe even implemented cuts to the welfare. This maybe weakened the perception of Sweden as a typically social democratic welfare state. In Germany on the other hand, longer periods of time from 1990 onwards was the Christian democratic party (CDU) sitting in coalitions with different coalition partners. Of course, the party's political approaches to immigration have changed somewhat during the years. However, the party was also able to consolidate its position towards welfare and immigration in particular. The impact of party politics on welfare is definitely worth analysing more deeply.

Inequality is somewhat the origin to welfare, as described in the introduction.

Notwithstanding, inequality always has to be analysed within its context. Intergovernmental inequality definitely should be taken into consideration, can however hardly be compared. Also worldwide developments obviously have an impact on any welfare state. For instance globalisation, immigration and integration are interconnected. Globalisation is one of the push-factors leading to migration, a growing Islamic community and religious heterogeneity in the analysed countries.

Migration is an important topic for most politicians. However, there is a need to focus more on the advantages of migrant labour and the minimisation of the exploitation of migrant women. The welfare chauvinist idea of foreigners taking advantage of well-functioning systems has to change into seeing foreigners helping with the welfare work. Especially social democratic shaped countries should recall their basic idea of solidarity and to help people in need instead of exploiting them. There is a conflict between solidarity and diversity, as multiculturalism within well-functioning welfare states can lead to a failure of integration.

Bibliography

Ambrosini, Maurizio. *Irregular Migration and Invisible Welfare*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013.

Amenta, Edwin and Hick, Alexander. "Research Methods". In *The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State*, edited by Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger and Christopher Pierson, 105-120. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Bätzing, Bischof Dr. Georg, Bedford-Strohm, Prof. Dr. Heinrich and Augoustinos von Deutschland, Metropolit Dr. h. c. 2020. *Gemeinsames Wort der Kirchen zur interkulturellen Woche 2020*.

Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, De Meur, Gisèle, Rihoux, Benoît and Ragin, Charles C. "Qualitative Comparative Analysis (GCA) as an Approach". In *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques*, edited by Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012.

Börzel, Tanja and Panke, Diana. "Europeanization". In *European Union Politics*, edited by Michelle Cini, Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borrágán, 115-126. Oxford University Press, 2019.

Briggs, Asa. 1961. *The Welfare State in Historical Perspective*. European Journal of Sociology. Vol.2, No.2. On the Welfare State (1961). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23987939?seq=1>.

Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. 2020. *Migrationsbericht der Bundesregierung 2019*.

Burdumy, Alexander. "Reconsidering the Role of the Welfare State Within the German Democratic Republic's Political System". In *Journal of Contemporary History*, 873-889. London: Sage Publications, 2013.

Church, Clive and Phinnemore, David. "From the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon and Beyond". In *European Union Politics*, edited by Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-

Solórzano Borragán, 31-51. Oxford University Press, 2019.

Cini, Michelle and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, Nieves. "Introduction". In *European Union Politics*, edited by Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 1-8. Oxford University Press, 2019.

Daly, Mary. "Families Versus State and Market". In *The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State*, edited by Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger and Christopher Pierson, 139-151. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

De Gasperi, Alcide. 1951. "Speech made to the Assembly Monday, 10 December 1951". Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly. Accessed 10 April, 2021.
<http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Speeches/Speech-XML2HTML-EN.asp?SpeechID=48>

Deutsche Bischofskonferenz a. "Fünfter Katholischer Flüchtlingsgipfel 2020". Accessed April 9, 2021. <https://www.dbk.de/themen/fluechtlingshilfe/katholischer-fluechtlingsgipfel/fuenfter-katholischer-fluechtlingsgipfel>

Deutsche Bischofskonferenz b. "Lage der Christen im Nahen Osten". Accessed April 9, 2021. <https://www.dbk.de/themen/fluechtlingshilfe/lage-der-christen-im-nahen-osten>

DGB Bundesvorstand. 2015a. *Flucht. Asyl. Menschenwürde*.

DGB Bundesvorstand. 2015b. *Arbeitsmarktzugang von Flüchtlingen*.

DGB – Home. "DGB – German Trade Union Confederation". Accessed April 9, 2021. <https://en.dgb.de/>.

Eastmond, Marita. "Egalitarian Ambitions, Constructions of Difference: The Paradoxes of Refugee Integration in Sweden". In *Migration, Family and the Welfare State*, edited by Karen Fog Olwig, Birgitte Romme Larsen and Mikkel Rytter, 97-115. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Ebbinghaus, Bernhard. "Unions and Employers". In *The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State*, edited by Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger and

Christopher Pierson, 196-210. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Eriksson, Göran. "SD nya arbetarpartiet – men nästa LO-flykt kan gå vänsterut". *Svenska Dagbladet*, January 17, 2020, <https://www.svd.se/sd-det-nya-arbetarpartiet—men-nasta-lo-flykt-kan-ga-at-vanster>.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity.

European Parliament. "Social and Employment Policy: General Principles". Accessed February 28, 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_2.3.1.pdf

European Parliament. "Amsterdam Treaty, Title Via". Accessed April 10, 2021. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A11997D%2FTXT>

Faist, Thomas. "Transnational Social Spaces out of international Migration: Evolution, Significance and Future Prospects." *European Journal of Sociology* 39, no. 2 (1998): 213-47. Accessed April 8, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23997745>.

Foundation for European Progressive Studies. 2020. *Inequality and the top 10% in Europe*. Accessed February 27, 2021. https://www.tasc.ie/assets/files/pdf/top_10-report-final-oct20v.pdf.

German Bishops' Conference. 2016. *Guidelines for the German Catholic Church's commitment to refugees*.

German Trade Union Federation. 2020. *Exploitation of seasonal and migrant workers*.

Goldschmidt, Tina. *Immigration, Social Cohesion and the Welfare State*. Stockholm University, 2017.

Government Offices of Sweden. 2016. *The Swedish model*. Accessed April 9, 2021. <https://www.government.se/4a5336/contentassets/8416c4ff1410419090181fe503920390/the-swedish-model.pdf>.

Juncos, Ana E. and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, Nieves. "Enlargement". In *European Union Politics*, edited by Michelle Cini, Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 266-280. Oxford University Press, 2019.

Katholisch.de. "Äbtissin Thürmer: Würde Gefängnisarrest für Kirchenasyl hinnehmen.". Published August 26, 2020. <https://www.katholisch.de/artikel/26657-aebtissin-thuermer-wuerde-gefaengnisarrest-fuer-kirchenasyl-hinnehen>

Katholisch.de. "Kirchen in Deutschland kritisieren Flüchtlingspolitik der EU". Published May 11, 2020. <https://www.katholisch.de/artikel/25461-kirchen-in-deutschland-kritisieren-fluechtlingspolitik-der-eu>.

Kershaw, Ian. *Rollercoaster Europe 1950-2017*. Allen Lane, 2018.

Kiesel, Robert. "Rechte Gewerkschaften: Das Online-Märchen von der Alternative". *vorwärts* Published 28 February 2018. <https://www.vorwaerts.de/artikel/rechte-gewerkschaften-online-maerchen-alternative>.

Kommittén om den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken. Statens offentliga utredningar. *En långsiktigt hållbar migrationspolitik*. Stockholm, 2020.

Kuhnle, Stein and Sander. "The Emergence of the Western Welfare State". In *The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State*, edited by Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger and Christopher Pierson, 61-80. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Landsorganisationen i Sverige. *Facklig anslutning år 2019*. Accessed April 9, 2021. [https://www.lo.se/home/lo/res.nsf/vRes/lo_fakta_1366027478784_facklig_anslutning_ar_2019_pdf/\\$File/Facklig_anslutning_%C3%A5r_2019.pdf](https://www.lo.se/home/lo/res.nsf/vRes/lo_fakta_1366027478784_facklig_anslutning_ar_2019_pdf/$File/Facklig_anslutning_%C3%A5r_2019.pdf)

Landsorganisationen i Sverige. *Fackliga verktyg för migranter*. Stockholm, 2008.

Landsorganisationen i Sverige. *Fusk och utnyttjande – om avregleringen av arbetskraftsinvandringen*. Stockholm, 2013

Landsorganisationen i Sverige. LO Aktuellt. *Sverige behöver invandring*. Stockholm, 2015.

Landsorganisationen i Sverige. *LOs svar på Remiss"En långsiktig hållbar migrationspolitik" SOU 2020:54*. Stockholm 2020.

Leibfried, Stephan. "The Social Dimension of The European Union: En Route to Positively Joint Sovereignty?" In *Journal of European Social Policy*, 1994.

Leisering, Lutz. "Germany: A Centrist Welfare State at The Crossroads" In *International Social Policy*, edited by Pete Alcock and Gary Craig, 148-170. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001.

Lindbom, Anders. *Systemskifte? Den nya svenska välfärdspolitiken*. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2011.

Mares, Isabela. *Taxation, wage bargaining and unemployment*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

"Folkhemmet", Nordiska Museet, Accessed February 28, 2021, <https://www.nordiskamuseet.se/kunskapsraden/folkhemmet>.

Nullmeier, Frank and Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver. "Post-War Welfare State Development". In *The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State*, edited by Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger and Christopher Pierson, 81-101. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Pierson, Christopher. *Beyond the Welfare State*. Polity Press, 2006.

Piketty, Thomas. 2014. *Extreme inequality is useless for growth*. Interview by Economic Policy Institute, April 17, 2014. Audio. <https://www.epi.org/multimedia/thomas-piketty-extreme-inequality-useless/>.

Poster, Winnie. *Contemporary Sociology* 33, no. 6 (2004): 660-62. Accessed April 8, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3593835>.

Rosamond, Ben. "Theorizing the European Union after Integration Theory". In *European Union Politics*, edited by Michelle Cini, Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 83-101. Oxford University Press, 2019.

Schammann, Hannes. "Die Länder haben Spielräume – aber sie müssen sie auch nutzen". Interview by Günter Piening. *Heinrich Böll Stiftung*. 15 December 2015.
<https://www.boell.de/de/2015/12/15/die-laender-haben-spielraeume-aber-sie-muessen-sie-auch-bewusst-nutzen>.

Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz. 2020. *Katholische Kirche in Deutschland. Zahlen und Fakten 2019/20*.

Siaroff, Alan. "Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement". In *European Journal of Political Research* 36, 175-205. 1999.

Smismans, Stijn. "Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union". In *European Union Politics*, edited by Michelle Cini, Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 127-140. Oxford University Press, 2019.

Svenska kyrkan. "Church and state". Accessed April 9, 2021.
<https://www.svenskakyrkan.se/church-and-state>.

Svenska kyrkan. 2016. *En tid av möten*.

The Swedish Trade Union Confederation. "This is LO". Accessed April 9, 2021.
https://www.lo.se/english/this_is_lo.

Titmuss, Richard. *Essays on 'the Welfare state'*. London: Unwin university books, 1963.

van Kersbergen, Kees and Manow, Philip. "Religion". In *The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State*, edited by Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger and Christopher Pierson, 265-277. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Welt. "Weniger als 20 Prozent der Beschäftigten sind noch in einer Gewerkschaft", December

20, 2018, <https://www.welt.de/newsticker/news1/article185843206/Gewerkschaften-Weniger-als-20-Prozent-der-Beschaeftigten-sind-noch-in-einer-Gewerkschaft.html#:~:text=Die%20Deutschen%20halten%20starke,waren%20es%20%C3%BCber%2030%20Prozent.>