



LUND UNIVERSITY

ECONOMICS

BACHELOR'S THESIS

Human Trafficking and the Palermo Protocol

**Does Ratification Have Any Effect on
Anti-Trafficking Efforts and the Prevalence of Victims?**

Author:

Linn Larsson

Supervisor:

Petra Thiemann

June 2021

Abstract

Human trafficking is not only an offence in the eyes of the law, but a violation of human rights. The Palermo Protocol is the most widespread international legislation, and 178 countries are state parties to the treaty. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate whether ratification of the Protocol has any effect on countries' anti-trafficking efforts and/or the rate of victims per 100.000 citizens. This is done by regressions on data on the 3P index, evaluating performance in the aspects prosecution, prevention and protection, from 190 countries during 2000-2015, and data covering victims from 33 countries during 2002-2019, with ratification as the explanatory variable. Country fixed effects, time fixed effects and clustered standard errors on a country level are applied to eliminate the endogeneity problem. The results on the 3P index data indicated that prevention is the area where efforts increased the most upon ratification. The regressions on the data covering victims did not show any statistical significance, hence no conclusions could be made about how ratification impacts prevalence of human trafficking.

Key words: human trafficking, Palermo Protocol, international legislation, anti-trafficking

Table of Contents

1 Introduction	4
1.1 Scope of the Study	5
1.2 Thesis Purpose	6
2 Background	8
2.1 Institutional Framework	8
2.1.1 The United Nations Convention	8
2.1.2 The Palermo Protocol	10
2.1.3 Definition of Ratification	11
2.2 Theoretical Framework	12
2.2.1 The 3P Index	12
3 Literature Review	15
4 Description of the data	18
4.1 The 3P Index Data	18
4.1 The Global Dataset	18
4.3 The World Bank Population Data	20
4.4 The Worldwide Governance Indicators	20
4.5 Dependent Variable	21
4.6 Independent Variable	22
5 Methodology	23
5.1 Simple Linear Regression	23
5.2 Normal Distribution of Error Terms	26
6 Results	27
7 Discussion	31
8 Conclusion	33
9 Bibliography	34
10 Appendix	38

List of Abbreviations

CTDC	Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	The International Organisation for Migration (UN Migration)
OHCHR	The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNTC	United Nations Treaty Collection

1 Introduction

The terrible crime of human trafficking is bound to increase as a result of various inevitable global crises – research has established that individuals that are exposed to the consequences of climate change, armed conflict and poverty are at higher risk of falling victim to human trafficking (ILO, 2017; UNODC, 2018; IOM, 2016). As a matter of fact, we are living through a global crisis at the time of writing. In light of the ongoing global health crisis that is COVID-19, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published their annual report on trafficking in persons, expressing concern about the possible reverse of progress over the course of the years since the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto (hereinafter: the Convention) entered into force in 2003. Since then, the number of perpetrators brought to justice per 100.000 persons has increased nearly threefold (UNODC, 2020). Human trafficking is not only an offence in the eye of international humanitarian law, it is a horrible violation of basic human rights as well as a global health issue (Gajic-Veljanoski and Stewart, 2007). In the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) from 1948, Article 3-5 state:

“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.”

“No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.”

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

These are, in accordance with UDHR (1948), fundamental freedoms that every human being is entitled to, and the absence thereof is an obstacle to living a meaningful life (Logan et al., 2009). All over the world, people are vulnerable to victimization. One of the main reasons behind this is globalization (Wheaton et al., 2010). Brewer (2008) states that “It must be acknowledged that forms of slavery and human trafficking are not just outcomes of globalization; they are part of the globalization process itself that involves a functional integration of dispersed economic activities”. Globalization is a procedure deep-rooted in the world economy that causes the trade network and the global finances to intertwine, allowing human trafficking to rapidly increase and

become the profitable criminal enterprise that it is today (Brewer, 2008). In contrast, human trafficking is an obstruction to global economic development, as perpetrators seek profit through crime against the freedom of choice – the core of productivity (Wheaton et al., 2010). Domestic counter-trafficking strategies are trivial – as human trafficking is a global crime, it calls for global measures. With the aim to combat human trafficking, a number of efforts have been conducted by international institutions and organizations (Brewer, 2008; Bryant and Landman, 2020). The UN developed the Convention, which contains three supplementary treaties, one of them being the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (henceforward: the Palermo Protocol or the Protocol) (OHCHR, 2000a; 2000b). The Palermo Protocol is probably the most important international anti-trafficking instrument to this day. Upon this initiative, multiple state governments have implemented new anti-trafficking laws, or adjusted already existent laws in accordance with the international requirements (Brewer, 2008). This dissertation will investigate how ratification of the Palermo Protocol has affected human trafficking and the efforts to eradication, through regressions where the main explanatory variable is binary, and refers to whether the Protocol is ratified or not. Two different datasets are tested; one containing evaluations of countries' anti-trafficking endeavors from 2000-2015 (Cho et al., 2014), measured by indices developed by scholars in preceding research for this particular purpose, and one covering observed individuals who are victims of human trafficking, collected by the Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative (hereafter: CTDC; 2020) during the period 2002-2019. In regressions on the latter dataset, control variables corresponding to the rule of law for each country in every year are added with the purpose of investigating if a strong rule of law coincides with a strong effect of ratification, and vice versa. For all of the regressions, time and country fixed effects are applied as well as clustered standard errors on a country level, in order to address the assumed endogeneity problem.

1.1 Scope of the Study

This paper focuses on how ratification of the Palermo Protocol affects the anti-trafficking efforts and the prevalence of human trafficking victims on a country level. In previous research on anti-trafficking legislation, scholars have strongly focused on how the occurrence of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in a country is affected by their laws on prostitution, like Cho et al. (2013).

Human trafficking is not limited to sexual exploitation, which is why other contexts should be considered to get a legitimate understanding of the offence (Savona and Stefanizzi, 2007). Thereby, the research of this paper aims to address how ratification of the Palermo Protocol impacts the flow of human trafficking victims of all kind, not solely those who are trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation. To further explore the impact of the Protocol, an index on anti-trafficking efforts is evaluated against ratification. The countries that were investigated (see list of countries in the appendix) are dependent on the available data, and the most comprehensive sources have been selected. The Global Dataset provided by CTDC (2020) is the best collected data on victims of trafficking in persons, and the 3P index evaluates 180 countries worldwide. This study focuses on both transnational and domestic human trafficking, despite the transnational criteria in the Palermo Protocol. This choice is made based on the assumption that implementation of stricter anti-trafficking legislation has an effect on domestic human trafficking as well.

1.2 Thesis Purpose

Exploitation of human beings has a negative impact on equity and efficiency, which obstructs economic development. This is acknowledged by the global development movement, whose efforts to mend the problem include social protection, legislative development and presence in labour market areas (Koettl, 2009). Human trafficking is not merely an economic obstacle, but more importantly a threat to human rights, one which is dismally increasing. This makes the actual impact of the efforts to combat trafficking an interesting research subject. The law enforcement of highest global relevance is the Palermo Protocol, which has been ratified by 177 UN parties and three non-UN nations. Contemplating the world-wide scope of the human trafficking crime, the Protocol is the legislation chosen for the study. There have been previous evaluations of the Palermo Protocol and a number of indices have been created for this purpose (Cho et al., 2014), one of which will be taken into account in this paper, namely the 3P index. By running a regression on the index for all of the countries and years available, this study aims to estimate the effect of ratification on countries governmental efforts to combat human trafficking. In addition, a second analysis is executed on data covering the prevalence of human trafficking, to examine if the anti-trafficking endeavours have any impact on the flow of victims. The following two research questions are used:

How does countries' ratification of the Palermo Protocol impact the government's anti-trafficking efforts globally?

How does countries' ratification of the Palermo Protocol affect the global occurrence of human trafficking?

Human trafficking is researched frequently, as is the number of victims and the performance of countries in reference to the Palermo Protocol. Though, to my knowledge, the prevalence of the crime has not previously been measured with regard to ratification of the Protocol. As for the 3P index, earlier studies have evaluated how ratification affects the score, but since then data on the index has grown over 50 percent (Cho et al., 2014), which is an incentive for new estimations.

2 Background

Human trafficking as an industry grosses approximately 150 billion dollars annually according to the International Labour Office (2014). It is considered to be the fastest-growing crime globally and the second most lucrative illegal business after drug trafficking (United States Department of Justice, 2016). Logan et al. (2009) identify multiple different factors that differentiate human trafficking from other offences, among these are victim bias, difficulties recognizing the crime, great needs of the victims, less assets and facilities to handle the offence, victims and their families are distressed and need protection, little possibility of justice for victims and the complexity of cases of human trafficking (2009). Estimations suggest that 40.3 million people are currently caught in modern slavery, when considering forced labour, commercial sexual exploitation and forced marriages (ILO, 2017). Though human trafficking occurs all over the world and in every single country, it is regarded a hidden crime – especially during the time of the internet, as it allows perpetrators to operate at the underside of the global economy (UNODC, 2020a). One common misconception about human trafficking is that victims are exploited exclusively through prostitution, but it also includes, inter alia, domestic servitude, forced labour and child labour (United Way Worldwide, n.d.). The crime does not have a typical victim or location; it can happen to men as well as women or children, in both suburban and urban areas. It even happens at places that are exposed to the public eye, such as nail salons, fields, factories and mines and on fishing boats or at truck shops (UNODC, 2020a). Most exposed to the risk of being trafficked are children who live in households of severe poverty, and the majority of reports on identified child victims are derived from countries in Central America, South Asia, West Africa and the Caribbean (UNODC, 2020a). Other indicators of vulnerability are isolation, being young, an immigrant or a woman and the hope of a better life. Victims have a hard time escaping human trafficking – they are likely scared and unaware of other options, and they may be isolated and imprisoned, both mentally and physically (Logan et al., 2009).

2.1 Institutional Framework

2.1.1 The United Nations Convention

December 9th 1998, the General Assembly of the United Nations established an open-ended, intergovernmental Ad Hoc Committee, whose purpose was to form an international convention against transnational organized crime. Following eleven sessions, the Ad Hoc Committee

finalized the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto. The three supplementary Protocols are the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (UNODC, 2000b). The UN General Assembly adopted the Convention with two of its supplementary Protocols, particularly the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, on 15 November 2000 (OHCHR, 2000b). Member states were invited to sign the Convention at a Political Conference, held only for the sake of this cause, in Palermo, Italy, between the 12-15 of December 2000 and could thereafter sign at the United Nations Headquarters in New York no later than 12 December 2002 (UNTC, 2021). Before signing any of the Protocols, Member States were required to sign the Convention itself (OHCHR, 2000b).

For a crime to be covered by the Convention, it must comply with the terms in Article 2 (OHCHR, 2000a). It must be committed by an “organized criminal group” as well as a “structured group”, which means that it must be a group of at least three individuals that has not just recently been randomly formed. There is no need for neither the structure of the group nor the roles of the members to be defined, and the membership does not have to be of a continuous manner. Moreover, the aim of the organized criminal group must be to commit a “serious crime” with the goal to make a financial or material profit. A “serious crime” is defined as an offence that is punished by a minimum of four years of deprivation of liberty. Article 3 specifies the scope of application and states that the offence must also be “transnational in nature” – this requires for the crime to be committed in more than one country. For the crime to be considered transnational if the offence is carried out solely in one country, it must be either extensively administered (e.g. prepared, planned, directed or controlled) in another country or involve an organized criminal group that operates in at least two countries or if the consequences of a crime in one country have significant effects in another country (OHCHR, 2000b).

2.1.2 The Palermo Protocol

The Palermo Protocol is covered in the second appendix to the Convention (OHCHR, 2000a). The main purpose of the Protocol is “to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, paying particular attention to women and children”, “to protect and assist the victims of such trafficking, with full respect for their human rights” as well as “to promote cooperation among States Parties in order to meet those objectives”, as defined in Article 2. In Article 3, trafficking in persons is defined as:

“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (OHCHR, 2000a).

Further, it is stated that the consent of a victim of human trafficking is to be disregarded if any of the methods stated above have been used. Moreover, if a child is in any way inducted or transported with the intent of exploitation, it is considered to be “trafficking in persons” despite it not involving the methods used in the definition. A child is defined as “any person under eighteen years of age”. Article 4 clarifies that the scope of application is transnational crimes involving organized criminal groups, and protection of victims of those offences. Article 5 conveys mandate on enactment of legislation and other appropriate measures to criminalize human trafficking in compliance with the convention (OHCHR, 2000a). However, there is no obligation for state parties to implement punishment for perpetrators (Gallagher, 2001).

Prior to the Palermo Protocol, there was no globally established definition or legally binding instrument on human trafficking, and the introduction of thereof is considered a great step in the right direction (OHCHR, 2000b). This allows for more efficient collaboration between states, as human trafficking has the same definition in all legal frameworks of parties to the Protocol. It will also be of significant help when developing common indicators of the crime, its victims and methods for obtaining data (Gallagher, 2001). The second part of the Protocol covers the aspect

of victim-protection, though it does not contain any obligations for state parties. Instead, states are urged to offer victims assistance and protection “in appropriate cases and to the extent possible under its domestic law” (OHCHR, 2000). Gallagher (2001) shines light on the vague and voluntary nuances in the terminology in parts 2-6 of Article 6; words like consider, endeavour and ensure does not put much pressure on state parties to implement victim-protection in their national legislation, which opens up for possible shortcomings of effectiveness in this matter (Gallagher, 2001). Part three of the Protocol deals with “prevention, cooperation and other measures”, and Article 9 alludes to prevention of human trafficking through policies and programmes, research and media campaigns and measures to eradicate the factors causing vulnerability to victimization as well as the demand of human trafficking (OHCHR, 2000).

According to Ezelio (2015), former UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, progress has been made in the global anti-trafficking movement on account of the Palermo Protocol, but some aspects leave more to be desired – for instance there are no measures for holding state parties accountable for enforcement of the Protocol. On a similar note, Cho (2015) concludes that weak enforcement increases the rate of human trafficking, as the disregard for enforcement benefits persecutors through reduced expenses and decreased risks exposition. Moreover, legal punishment of traffickers has not proven efficient in diminishing the crime, although it is the main legal procedure for combatting human trafficking (Cho, 2015). The question of how the regulations should function is an impediment in the process of enforcement, as the instructions in the Protocol focuses more on compliance through policy-making than legislative execution (Abramson, 2003).

2.1.3 Definition of Ratification

Upon the introduction of the Protocol in Palermo in 2000, and later at the UN headquarter in New York, and as of this day, 178 countries have ratified, accepted, approved or accessioned the Palermo Protocol. The Protocol itself went into force on 25 December 2003, but some countries ratified it even prior to that, hence the earliest year of ratification being 2001 (UNTC, 2021).

Then, what is the legislative difference between signing, ratification, acceptance, approval and accession? The definition of the different terms regarding member states’ perception of a UN

Treaty is described in the Vienna Convention (1969) and a simplified explanation is provided in the Glossary of terms relating to Treaty actions (UNTC, n.d.).

When a member state signs a Protocol, it is to show willingness to persist in the process of policy-making and later on ratifying the treaty. This is called “Signature Subject to Ratification, Acceptance or Approval”, and despite the intention to ratify it is not binding, though it does constrain the state from any action defying the purpose of the Protocol (UNTC, n.d.). If a country signs a treaty but subsequently realizes that it is not ready to actually ratify it for entry into force, this can be amended by adding an “ad referendum” to the signature. This implies that the ratification of the Protocol is postponed (Aust, 2013). This might be the case for Congo and Uganda. If a member state has signed a Protocol, it can later declare its ratification, which signals compliance to be legally bound to the treaty and that the government is to enforce the measures necessary on a national level. However, if a member state has not signed the Protocol to begin with, but later agrees to become a party, the act of accession takes place. Legally, there is no difference between ratification and accession (UNTC, n.d.).

2.2 Theoretical Framework

2.2.1 The 3P Index

The 3P index is developed through the EU project Indexing Trafficking in Human Beings, carried out by Seo-Young Cho during 2010-2012. Its aim is to provide a complex and insightful index for human trafficking activities for each nation and year, using data from the U.S. State Department, ILO, UNODC and IOM (Cho et al., 2014).

The index is based on the three areas of importance identified in the Palermo Protocol; prosecuting human trafficking perpetrators, protecting victims of human trafficking, and preventing human trafficking in persons. These divisions serve as criminal justice, victim-protection and crime prevention and the focus of these means is not only to diminish the establishment of human trafficking, but to protect human rights. Distinguishing between the three areas is of importance, as they may be opposing by nature. Cho (2015) gives an example of how a country could enforce rigorous prevention policies, such as control of illegal immigration, but yet disregard victim-protection, and vice versa. If so, two countries might receive the same overall 3P score despite fulfilling different parts of the Palermo Protocol, but the advantage of

the 3P index is that the countries' differences in performance will show in three separate subindices, as they provide individual evaluation for each of the aspects (Cho, 2015).

The index provides ratings on a scale from 1 to 5 by country and year, 1 representing no efforts to realize the Protocol, and 5 representing the country being fully committed to the policy. The comprehensive index score for each country and year ranges from 3 to 15. The 3P index is benchmarked against the directives specified by the UN in the Palermo Protocol, hence there being slightly different criterias for the implementation of the different areas. The following policy indicators are presented by Cho (2015).

Prosecution policy evaluation indicators:

- “1. Adoption of anti-trafficking laws criminalizing trafficking of human beings;
2. Legislative adoption against child trafficking;
3. Application of other relevant laws in prosecuting traffickers;
4. Stringency of penalty;
5. Level of prosecutions and convictions;
6. Collection of crime statistics on human trafficking.”

Protection policy indicators:

- “1. Granting amnesty for victims for the violation of law that is directly related to the fact that they have been trafficked (“no punishment” principle);
2. No self-identification required as a prerequisite for the recognition of a victim's status;
3. Legal consultation for victims;
4. Provision of residence permits;
5. Provision of housing and shelters;
6. Medical assistance;
7. Job training opportunities;
8. Assistance for rehabilitation;
9. Assistance for voluntary repatriation to a home country.”

Prevention policy indicators:

- “1. Public awareness campaigns against human trafficking;
2. Training executive and judicial personnel regarding the implementation of anti-trafficking policy measures;
3. Cooperation among different governmental authorities, such as information exchange;

4. Controlling borders, train stations, and airports, etc.;
5. Adoption and implementation of national action plans for fighting human trafficking;
6. Cooperation with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations that operate anti-trafficking programs;
7. Cooperation with foreign governments for combating human trafficking.”

As these indicators provide a comprehensive evaluation of the actual counter-trafficking efforts achieved by a country, the 3P index will be utilized for the purpose of measuring how the ratification of the Palermo Protocol has affected the score on the 3P index, which in turn indicates how well the above-listed criterias have been fulfilled. Two reports on human trafficking serve as sources of information which the evaluation is based on, namely *Trafficking in Persons Annual Reports* (United States Department of State, 2001–2014); and *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons* (UNODC, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2014) (Cho, 2015).

3 Literature Review

Cho, Dreher and Neumayer (2014) introduce the 3P index which measures the extent to which governments implement policies to combat human trafficking in persons, using raw data from two human trafficking reports, on 180 countries worldwide during the time period 2000-2010. They create three separate indices which directly correspond with the three main aspects of the Protocol, mentioned in 2.2.1. Additionally, an overall accumulated index is presented, namely the 3P index, calculated from the unweighted sum of all three dimension indices, in order to provide an overall evaluation of the spread of anti-trafficking policies. When analyzing the general compliance with the components of the 3P index through regressions, prosecution was the aspect that had the highest average score worldwide during the whole period. However, the protection efforts proved to be poorer than the prevention efforts, and the protection policy also had the worst global performance. With regard to the countries' compliance with the anti-trafficking policy, this signals the aspect of "justice and prevention" being surpassed in favor of the human rights aspect.

Yoo and Boyle (2015) investigate how implementation of international human trafficking policies impact national-level efforts of prosecution, prevention and victim-protection. Using the 3P index constructed by Cho et al. (2014) combined with a dataset covering 105 countries from 2000-2008 in an ordered-probit model, they have found that all of the 3Ps have an uptrend from 2000-2002. This is when the Palermo Protocol was initially presented and it can be assumed that member states made an effort to enforce the basic requirements during this time. Throughout the period, prosecution was the area with the highest overall score and largest growth, which might have been caused by a mandate in the Protocol. However, as the average score did not reach its full potential, there is room for advancement for even the best performing P out of the three. This outcome upholds the findings of Cho et al. (2014), and is a sign that regimes are criminalizing human trafficking in their national legal framework. Protection is found to be the aspect that is most neglected in enforcement, despite a slight increase over time, which can be understood from the obscure obligations in the Protocol. Furthermore, they find that ratification of the Palermo Protocol was not related to compliance with international anti-trafficking legislation (Yoo and Boyle, 2015). Surprisingly, they did not find any effect of ratification neither prosecution, prevention or protection.

To address the impact of the Palermo Protocol, Cho and Vadlamannati (2012) have tested panel data from 147 countries between 2001-2009 to investigate the effect of ratification, distinguishing between the 3Ps from previous research. The hypothesis states that the most efficient form of compliance is achieved by mainly implementing the prevention aspect of the Protocol when ratifying it. The hypothesis is based on the assumption that the interests of the major countries are mirrored in the Protocol, and member states deliberately choose commitments with low expenses of consistency to pursue these interests. The empirical analysis is performed through a pooled Time Series Cross-Section regression, and from the descriptive statistics they conclude that the countries' performance in all aspects of the 3P index has improved over the time period, the prevention area outperforming the two others. Further, the results demonstrate a great increase in the number of countries ratifying the Protocol. This led the authors to raising the question about whether early ratification is driven by a high level of human trafficking in a country. However, they found no proven relationship between trafficking inflow and the early ratifiers among the member states. As Cho and Vadlamannati (2012) suspected, they found that when countries ratify the Protocol, it has a notable positive effect on the prevention policies but not as much of an effect on the protection and prosecution policies, thus confirming their hypothesis.

Landman (2020) argues that human trafficking could be measured in the same manner as human rights, as they share the same characteristics and challenges. These parameters can be operationalized and delineated in order to measure the occurrence through various types of data. Landman (2020) measures the prevalence of human trafficking globally by analyzing survey-based data collected between 2016-2018 to reveal abuse of human rights in workplaces. The results show that the prevalence of human trafficking, measured in percentages, is low in a large number of countries, and high in a small number of countries. The results also indicate that the rate of human trafficking is lower in South, Middle and North America and Europe, and higher in Asia. The author concludes that though progress has been made in the attempts to measure human trafficking, there are several obstacles that need to be overcome to be able to reach anti-trafficking goals – especially the fundamental ones; unobservability and bias caused by the way of reporting victims (Landman 2020).

Datta and Bales (2013) estimate the number of victims of human trafficking in 37 European countries, using a dataset based on random sample surveys. They state that crimes investigated in such surveys are assumed to be of short duration, time-bound and discrete. However, this is not the case with human trafficking, as the duration of the victimization is undetermined and the victims are less likely to partake in reporting due to the stigma of enslavement and/or sexual assault. A system that utilizes the survey data is built from the estimations of total human trafficking prevalence. Then, through a cross-sectional comparative analysis, an estimation of the proportion of human trafficking victims in the population is made, in order to calculate the dark figure of slavery in Europe. The results are presented in two tables, one depicting the estimated actual number of victims of human trafficking in every European country and one presenting the estimated dark figure percentage of victims. For the vast majority of the countries, the dark figure percentage is higher than 90, which indicates that the policies and law enforcements in Europe are seriously inadequate. The authors claim that if this amount of any other criminal activity would go undetected, it would be considered an immense scandal, both judicially and societally. They urge for reflection upon the current economic and human resources dedicated to anti-trafficking policies, victim support and preventative measures.

When not considering the ratification of it, scholars evaluating the 3P index found that prosecution is the best maintained aspect when ensuring compliance with the Protocol. Enforcement of prosecution laws is declared mandatory, which is believed to be the reason for this outcome. On the contrary, when taking ratification into account, prevention is the policy area that countries perform the best within. This is presumed to be a consequence of low expenses in compliance. The measurements on prevalence of human trafficking are performed through tests on survey-based data, and the outcome implies that the prevalence is affected by geographical factors, and that the dark number is very high due to unobservability. The intimate nature of human trafficking is argued to be a challenge, as is discouraging victims from participating in reporting and seeking help.

4 Description of the data

4.1 The 3P Index Data

To answer the first research question, a regression on the 3P index for all available years will be performed, with ratification of the Palermo Protocol as the binary independent variable. The information on the 3P index is provided by the Economics of Human Trafficking website, which is administered by one of the originators behind the index. To find out how the information about the governmental efforts of each country is procured, see section 2.2.1. The data covers 189 countries over the years 2000-2015, but the dataset is unbalanced as there is a lack of continuous data on all years from every country (Cho et al., 2014). 178 UN member states have ratified the Protocol, some of the countries in the dataset have not yet ratified the Protocol and some are not members of the UN, and therefore have not agreed to the obligations that come upon ratifying the Palermo Protocol (UNTC, 2021; OHCHR, 2000). Palestine is the only country that is a non UN member state that has ratified the Protocol, but as Palestine is not included in the dataset, 13 countries that have not yet ratified the treaty remain (UNTC, 2021). These will still be included in the regression, as they still serve the purpose of investigating the effect of ratification.

4.1 The Global Dataset

”The Global Dataset” is used for the regression analysis investigating the second research question, and is obtained through the CTDC website. CTDC is developed on the initiative of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and was founded in partnership with Polaris, with early contribution from the anti-trafficking organization Liberty Shared. The project is heavily financed by – although does not necessarily represent the opinions of – the United States Department of State (CTDC, 2021b). The purpose of CTDC is to provide a platform that collects data from anti-trafficking organizations across the globe, and to publish these findings in order to facilitate the anti-trafficking movement’s mission to extinguish human trafficking and exploitation. The information provided by the contributing organizations is gathered through anti-trafficking hotline registers and case management services offering victims assistance and/or protection (CTDC, 2021c). The information has been converted into 62 variables that describe the socio-demographic characteristics of the victims, as well as the trafficking process itself and the means of exploitation (CTDC, 2017). However, for the estimation equation in this analysis

only two variables are used; year of registration and country of exploitation, which are discussed in section 4.2 and 4.3.

The Global Dataset is updated every year. The one used in this research was made available April 14th 2020, and the latest version of this dataset contains data on 48,801 identified individuals who are victims of human trafficking between 2002-2019. The above mentioned number has been reduced from almost 80,000 victims that were originally recorded but removed through the process of k-anonymization. This technique ensures the anonymity of each victim, and in this case $k=11$ means that there are at least 10 identified victims for any combination of attributes (CTDC, 2017). Prior to the k-anonymization, the data had already been anonymized by removal of all personal information, such as name and age (which has been replaced by an age range) (CTDC, 2021c).

In comparison to the estimated 40.3 million people trapped as victims of human trafficking, 48,801 observations seem almost negligible. Because of the underground nature of the crime, the sample cannot be considered representative of its real-world parent population (CTDC, 2017). Be that as it may, the sample is not necessarily non-representative of the population, as victim statements are the only accessible, actual and accurate source of information on the offense, and therefore the best resource available (CTDC, 2021c). Yet, the dataset is biased by the types of victims reported, as some are more likely to be identified than others. Human trafficking perpetrators are assumed to be targeting victims from a certain socio-demographic group, and consequently anti-trafficking organizations seek to help those target groups. More victims can also be expected to be identified where the organizations operate geographically. The victims are either identified by the organization or self-reported, and it can be assumed that victims of a certain socio-demographic group are easier to identify than others (CDTC, 2017). This is another possible cause of bias – especially given that most victims do not self-report (Logan et al., 2009).

Out of the 62 variables in the Global Dataset, two were selected for the regression; country and year. There are two country variables in the CTDC's Global Dataset, namely citizenship and country of exploitation. The citizenship variable denotes the nationality of the observed victim, and the country of exploitation variable indicates the last country in which the victim was

exploited (CTDC, 2017). As the Palermo Protocol regulation is best applied to the variable country of exploitation, that is the one referred to as the country variable. The second variable is called year of registration in the dataset. It is simply a numeric value denoting the year in which the individual was registered by the CTDC contributor (CTDC, 2017). The first step in processing the raw data given in the Global Dataset is to remove all of the observations where there is no data for the country variable. The reason for this being the dummy variable, which is dependent on the year and country and is therefore necessary information. This reduced the number of victims in the dataset from 48.801 to 37.782. There were initially 58 countries represented in the dataset, but after removal of countries that had only observed individuals for one year, 33 countries remained to be analyzed. All of these were chosen for this empirical study in order to get an as globally representative result as possible. This left 25.670 observed individuals in the final version of the dataset. See the appendix for a full list of countries.

4.3 The World Bank Population Data

The population for each country and each year was manually put into the dataset to present the number of victims in each country per 100.000 citizens. This information was accessed through the World Bank, where a dataset on the World Development Indicators was downloaded (World Bank, 2019a). This data is used in the regression for the second research question.

4.4 The Worldwide Governance Indicators

In the regression responding to the second research question, additional control time-invariant variables are added to the dataset as an attempt to determine if the effect of ratification of the Protocol corresponds with the quality of the rule of law in a country. The information about the rule of law has been obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) website (World Bank, 2019b). The project is financed by the World Bank, and the project presents indicators of six dimensions of governments, although the rule of law being the only source of interest for this regression. The rule of law index incorporates insights about the extent of trust in and adherence to the fundamental laws in a country. This primarily focuses on the probability of crime and violence along with the quality of the police force, the right of property and the judicature (World Bank, 2019b). The data on these factors has been acquired from surveys and expert assessments

around the world. In general, the rule of law is best in Europe, North America and Australia, and worst in Asia, Africa and Middle and South America (World Bank, 2019c).

In the rule of law dataset, countries are assigned a numerical value denoting the percentile rank for each year, which indicates the rule of law performance in relation to all other examined countries. This data was processed by dividing the rankings into four groups, each corresponding with the percentiles of the countries:

Tier 1: $> 25 \%$

Tier 2: $\leq 25 \%$ $> 50 \%$

Tier 3: $\leq 50 \%$ $> 75 \%$

Tier 4: $\leq 75 \%$

The countries in Tier 1 have the weakest rule of law in the studied year, countries in Tier 2 have the second weakest rule of law, countries in Tier 3 have the second strongest rule of law and countries in Tier 4 have the strongest rule of law in that year. As it can be assumed that ratification of the Palermo Protocol has a greater effect in a country with a strong rule of law, and vice versa, the Tier control variable is interesting to investigate.

4.5 Dependent Variable

Two different regressions are performed, one to answer each of the research questions. To investigate how ratification has affected countries' anti-trafficking efforts, the dependent variable measures the index score for the abbreviated 3P index as well as for each of the 3Ps, for every country c and year t . To measure how ratification has affected the prevalence of human trafficking, the dependent variable measures how many individuals were registered as victims of human trafficking by one of the contributing organisations, in country c (country of exploitation) and year t .

4.6 Independent Variable

The main independent variable is binary, i.e. a dummy variable. This indicates whether country c has ratified the Palermo Protocol in year t , or not. The information regarding the year of

ratification for each country is obtained from the United Nations Treaty Collection's website. For the definition of ratification, see section 2.3.1. The independent variable $ratification_{ct}$ takes the value 1 for the year t that country c ratified the Protocol and all of the years following the ratification, and the value 0 for the years t that country c has not ratified the Palermo Protocol.

5 Methodology

Eviews 10 (student version) was used in all regression analyses.

5.1 Simple Linear Regression

The intuition of a regression is to estimate a relationship between a dependent and an independent variable. For the first research question the 3P dataset was tested through four different regressions, one for the overall 3P score and then one index per the other three Ps, to get an indication of the impact that ratification of the Protocol has on the counter-trafficking efforts of governments globally. The estimation equation and the variables are defined as:

$$Y_{ct} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ratification}_{ct} + D_c + D_t + u_{ct}$$

Y_{ct} = the score for either the accumulated 3P or one of the Ps, for country c and in year t .

$$\text{ratification}_{ct} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if the Palermo Protocol in country } c \text{ is ratified in year } t \\ 0 & \text{if the Palermo Protocol in country } c \text{ is not ratified in year } t \end{cases}$$

β_1 is the difference in group-specific expectations, i.e. the index score that is being tested, in country c and year t between the countries c that has ratified the Protocol in year t , and the countries c that has not ratified the Protocol in year t .

D_c = country fixed effects and D_t = time fixed effects.

u_{ct} is the error term.

The second research question is addressed through a regression of the CTDC dataset, with victims as the dependent variable, to estimate the number of victims per 100.000 citizens against the explanatory variable. For this regression, time-varying controls have been added in order to investigate if the rule of law in each country has any impact on the outcome of the ratification. For each year, the countries have been categorised into one of four Tiers ranging from 1-4, with 1

being the weakest rule of law and 4 being the strongest rule of law, as described in section 4.4. The different Tiers are presented as three dummy variables – Tier 1 serves as the benchmark and is therefore excluded from the model. The estimation equation with the additional controls, *ceteris paribus*, is defined as:

$$Y_{ct} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ratification}_{ct} + \beta_2 \text{Tier_two}_{ct} + \beta_3 \text{Tier_three}_{ct} + \beta_4 \text{Tier_four}_{ct} + D_c + D_t + u_{ct}$$

Where Tier_two_{ct} corresponds to the category Tier 2 in, Tier_three_{ct} corresponds to the category Tier 3, and Tier_four_{ct} corresponds to the category Tier 4, all of which are explained in section 4.4.

The linear regression model in this paper consists of solely dummy explanatory variables. In the estimation equation $Y_{ct} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ratification}_{ct} + D_c + D_t + u_{ct}$, the dummy variable is ratification_{ct} i.e. a binary variable. When the regressor is a dummy variable, it is not feasible to think of β_1 as a slope parameter, since $\text{ratification}_{ct} \in \{0, 1\}$ meaning only two discrete values are observed unlike the usual continuous regressor value. In the case of the conditional expectation function $E(Y_{ct} | \text{ratification}_{ct})$ there is no continuous line, because the function is defined only for the positions 0 and 1 on the x-axis. It is therefore preferable to call it the differential intercept coefficient instead of the slope, as it tells how much the value of the intercept term differs between the two categorical variables (Gujarati and Porter, 2010). The coefficients in the regression model are interpret as follows:

$E(Y_{ct} | \text{ratification}_{ct} = 0) = \beta_0$ so β_0 is the expected number of victims per 100.000 citizens in countries where $\text{ratification}_{ct} = 0$, meaning the country has not ratified the Palermo Protocol.

$E(Y_{ct} | ratification_{ct} = 1) = \beta_0 + \beta_1$ or using the result from above,

$$\beta_1 = E(Y_{ct} | ratification_{ct} = 1) - E(Y_{ct} | ratification_{ct} = 0).$$

To address the problem with endogeneity, the phenomenon itself first needs to be explained. Endogeneity occurs when the independent variable correlates with the error term, for example if the prevalence of human trafficking in a country is decreasing in the years after ratification but the cause of the decrease is overall harsher penalty laws in that country, and not an effect of the Protocol. Part of the endogeneity problem in the regressions is eliminated through the assumption that the timing of the introduction of the Protocol in each country is unrelated to the potential outcome in the country. When there is assumed to be within country variation, it is appropriate to use fixed effects in order to control the average differences across countries in any observable or unobservable predictors, such as differences in legislation, equality etc. This requires at least two years of observations per country, which is why the countries with only one year of observation were removed from the dataset. The fixed effects will eliminate all cross-country action, which leaves the within-group action, which is desirable. This greatly decreases the threat of omitted variable bias. A possible limitation of the fixed effects model is that it is not possible to determine the effect of factors that have little within-group variation. This is a potential cause of omitted variable bias – one that can not be avoided (Blumenstock, n.d.).

As the data used in this study falls into categories, it is important to use fixed effects to eliminate attributes that could affect the Y variable. It is never a certainty that all of the unobservable factors that correlate with the independent variable are included in the regression, which would result in omitted variable bias. When these unobservable factors are believed to be time-invariant, fixed effects reduce the omitted variable bias (Blumenstock, n.d.). As only one independent variable is present in both regression models, fixed effects are necessary. The regression analyses are executed with both country and time fixed effects, as it is presumed that there are unobserved factors such as differences in legislation (country fixed effects) and financial crisis (time fixed effects) in both of the regressions. To further address the endogeneity

problem, the standard errors are clustered on a county level for all regressions. Clustered standard errors account for situations where observations within each group are not independently and identically distributed. Generally it is safe to expect correlation in the error terms within groups when working with panel data (Miller, 2017).

5.2 Normal Distribution of Error Terms

The Jarque Bera test was done at the 5 % level, to determine if the error terms were normally distributed, which is required for reliable estimates. The test confirmed normally distributed error terms for all regressions.

6 Results

Table 1: Evaluation of the 3P Index

	Overall 3P score		Prosecution	Prevention	Protection
	(1)	(2)			
Ratification	1.60	0.68	0.19	0.18	0.26
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
T-value	14.47	6.60	3.42	3.53	4.10
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
R-squared	0.08	0.75	0.67	0.62	0.59
Clustered SE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

In the first two columns, the effect of fixed effects and clustered standard errors is demonstrated by the difference between the values. The effect of ratification seems to be more distinct in the first regression, however the R^2 value indicates that only 8 % of the difference in the 3P score can be explained by the effect of ratification. When applying fixed effects and clustered standard errors, the value of R^2 improves significantly, suggesting that 75 % of the 0.68 point rise in 3P score can be explained by the ratification of the Protocol. The standard errors depict the deviation from the mean in the units of the dependent variable, and for both of the two first regressions the value is very similar. The true mean of the first regression is likely between 1.49 and 1.71, and for the second regression the span goes from 0.58 to 0.78. This implies that both of the estimations are fairly precise, but if all of the values are considered combined when comparing the two regressions, it is clear that the second regression is a better estimation of the reality. This confirms the intuition about fixed effects and clustered standard errors. Lastly, the p-value is significant at even a 1 % level, and corresponds to a t-value that is greater than 2, which confirms statistical significance of the estimated coefficient – this applies to all of the regressions presented in Table 1.

The three other regressions demonstrate the effect of ratification on the score of the three aspects of the Palermo Protocol. The true mean is likely between 0.13 and 0.25 points for prosecution as well as prevention, and for protection between 0.20 and 0.32 points. The value of R^2 indicates that the score of prosecution is 67 % linked with ratification, and 62 % and 59 % for prevention and protection respectively. Taking the t-values and the p-values into account, this does not necessarily mean that the prosecution score fits the regression better than prevention and protection, and for this reason the coefficient values analyzed are equally significant. The results of the regressions suggest that the protection efforts improve the most when a country ratifies the Protocol, as it increases with 0.26.

Interestingly, this differs from the findings of other scholars (Cho and Vadlamannati, 2012; Yoo and Boyle, 2015). The investigations of Cho and Vadlamannati (2012) indicated that prevention was the area in which the greatest improvements were made as a result of ratification of the Protocol. On the other hand, Yoo and Boyle (2015) found that ratification of the Protocol did not have any effect on compliance with the three aspects. As their regressions tested significantly smaller datasets that ranged from 2000-2009 and 2000-2008, an additional regression was performed on the same dataset but with all of the observations from 2010-2015 removed, to investigate whether the outcome in this regression was different from previous studies due to a more recent and more comprehensive dataset. The result did not contradict the result of the original regression, and the outcome of the regression on the years 2000-2009 can be found in Table 3 in the appendix. It can thus be assumed that the differences in this analysis and previous research are a result of the other scholars' estimation equations being more extensive and containing more explanatory variables, which implies that the regression in this study may be biased due to a lack of controls.

Table 2: Human Trafficking Victims Rate

	Full sample		Full sample with control variables			
	(1)	(2)	(3)			
	Ratificaiton	Ratificaiton	Ratificaiton	Tier 2	Tier 3	Tier 4
Coefficient	1.37	-0.20	-0.27	0.91	-0.63	-1.94
	(0.95)	(1.30)	(1.22)	(2.27)	(3.05)	(3.40)
T-value	1.44	-0.16	-0.22	0.40	-0.21	-0.57
P-value	0.15	0.88	0.83	0.69	0.69	0.57
R-squared	0.02	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66
Clustered SE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Again, the first two columns reveal the difference of fixed effects and clustered standard errors. Most notable is the change from a positive to a negative value of the ratification coefficient, which is a desirable effect as a negative value indicates that the number of victims per 100.000 citizens decrease with 0.20 upon ratification of the Protocol. The positive value in the first regression suggest that the ratification causes the prevalence of human trafficking to increase, which can be rejected. The R^2 values indicate that only 2 % of the suggested increase of victims in the first regression versus 66 % of the decrease of victims in the second regression can be explained by the ratification, which indicates that the second regression fits the estimation better. In spite of that presumption, both of the regressions are proven to be statistically insignificant when looking at the p-values and the t-values. Though the p-value for the first regression is smaller than for the second, both of them are statistically insignificant even at a 10 % level, and in combination with too small p-values, it can be confirmed that the regressions do not have any statistical significance and no assumptions can be made when testing the research question against this dataset.

When adding the control variables to test if the effect of the ratification is different depending on the quality of the rule of law in each country, there seems to be variation between the four Tier

categories. When a country with Tier 1 classification ratifies the Protocol, it seems to have a negative effect on the prevalence of victims, which is also true for the countries in Tier 3 and Tier 4. The countries in Tier 2 experienced an increase in victims upon ratification, unlike the other countries. The standard errors for the different Tiers are high, suggesting a big spread around the mean values, which is undesirable as it reduces the credibility. When further evaluating the goodness of fit for the regressions, the conclusion reached about the two previous regressions applies to the third one as well. The p-values are too high and the t-values are too low to prove statistical significance. Therefore, it does not matter that the value of R^2 is 66 %, as no implementation can be made due to the statistical insignificance.

7 Discussion

The conclusion reached through evaluating the 3P index and its three divisions contradicted the research that laid the ground for this paper. When measuring countries' efforts to implement policies in compliance with the three core sections of the Palermo Protocol – prosecution, protection and prevention – without any regards to ratification, Cho et al. (2014) and Yoo and Boyle (2015) found that the prosecution aspect outperformed the other two, for each year as well as over time. When testing with regards to ratification, Cho and Vadlamannati (2012) established that the prevention aspect had the highest level of compliance, and suggested the reason to be low costs of implementation. However, when Yoo and Boyle (2015) tested the index with regards to ratification, they did not find it to affect any of the three dimensions. It can be assumed that the ratification variable caused a difference in outcome, but as all results are contradictory, this assumption does not hold any substance. That being said, there has been coherence regarding protection, which has proven to be the aspect that countries fail to implement (Cho and Vadlamannati, 2012; Cho et al., 2014; Yoo and Boyle, 2015). Yoo and Boyle (2015) propose it is due to lack of distinct requirements on this area of the Protocol. This is supported by the fact that the Protocol does not present any obligation for countries to adjust their legal framework in favour of victim-protection (OHCHR, 2000a). That is likely the reason behind inadequate performance in this aspect.

The findings in the referred studies did not reinforce those of this paper, as they suggest the following; ratification has the highest impact on protection, second highest on prevention and the lowest impact on prosecution. As discussed when presenting the results of the regressions, the dissimilarities can be traced back to the estimation equations. The regressions in this paper tested the effect of the ratification alone as a single explanatory variable, and the lack of controls may have caused bias, resulting in unreliable outcomes. The other scholars performed more extensive regressions, thus making their findings more reliable.

The attempt to explore if ratification of the Protocol affects the occurrence of human trafficking through estimating the number of victims per 100.000 citizens proved to be unsuccessful, as the output values did not show statistical significance. This might be a result of limitations on the data (CTDC, 2020) which according to Landman (2020) are unobservability and bias in victim

reporting. Datta and Bales (2013) explain that bias in reporting of victims is largely caused by stigma, resulting in shame and aversion towards acknowledging themselves as a victim of sexual assault and/or labour exploitation through human trafficking. This can be assumed to be a result of the inadequate implementation of the victim-protection area (Cho and Vadlamannati, 2012; Cho et al, 2014; Yoo and Boyle, 2015), along with the fact that phrasing in the Protocol gives the impression that measures are voluntary (Gallagher, 2001; OHCHR, 2000a). Had there been rigorous requirements for protection of victims, and these requirements would be met, the result would hypothetically be a way of victim-reporting that does not frighten the victims or jeopardise their safety. This would in turn encourage victims to partake in reporting and perhaps even escape to seek help and protection.

Due to the statistical insignificance of the regression on the CTDC dataset, no estimation could be made about the impact of ratification on the victim rate. If the results had been applicable, it would have been interesting to compare the effect of rule of law with the findings of Landman (2020), as he concludes that human trafficking is more widespread in Asia than in Europe and North America. This could possibly correlate with the rule of law, since the statistics provided by WGI indicate that the rule of law is weak in Asia, and strong in Europe and North America (World Bank, 2019b). If that assumption was proven to be accurate, the ratification of the Palermo Protocol would not be equally effective in every country, as can be presumed without any actual evidence. The crime of human trafficking is hidden and it is practically impossible to cover all victims when researching the subject. By using certain techniques, even the dark numbers on prevalence of trafficking can be estimated, as in the study done by Datta and Bales (2013). The lack of a reliable output from the regression analysis can be caused by insufficient data or a shortage of control variables, or a combination of both. Either way, it is safe to say that there is need for more data on human trafficking, especially if the estimation of a dark number equivalent to more than 90 percent, as found by Datta and Bales (2013), is anywhere near the truth. Again, had there been a safe way of victim reporting, this would provide more data on human trafficking, and thus more accurate mapping of the crime which would facilitate anti-trafficking efforts. This is a strong incentive for stricter guidelines on enforcement and how laws should operate, especially in the victim-protection area (Abramson, 2003; Ezelio, 2015; Gallagher, 2001).

8 Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to answer the question of whether ratification of the Palermo Protocol has any effect on countries' anti-trafficking efforts and/or the number of human trafficking victims per 100.000 citizens. The results indicate that ratification does have a positive impact on anti-trafficking efforts, most significantly on the protection area, but also on the prevention and prosecution areas. However, the results did not support findings from previous research, presumably because of bias due to lack of controls in the estimation equation. When estimating the prevalence of victims, the regression did unfortunately not show statistical significance, therefore no conclusion can be made on the effect of ratification in this aspect.

The crime of human trafficking is going to follow us into the future – we can only do our best to stop it. The Palermo Protocol has been a successful instrument in the anti-trafficking movement, but there is certainly room for improvement. As scholars before me have stated, the hidden nature of the crime and bias in victim reporting are obstacles that cause lack of qualitative data. This negatively affected the outcome in regressions of this study, in combination with lack of controls. Suggestions for future research is to keep investigating human trafficking in regards to the Palermo Protocol, but with more extensive methods and more inclusive data collections. Furthermore, I urge policymakers to reevaluate the efficiency of the Palermo Protocol, paying extra attention to possible improvements in the area of victim-protection.

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10 Appendix

Table 3: Evaluation of the 3P Index 2000-20009

	Overall 3P score		Prosecution	Prevention	Protection
	(1)	(2)			
Ratification	1.59	0.58	0.12	0.15	0.26
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.08)
T-value	10.95	4.30	1.76	3.70	3.13
P-value	0,00	0,00	0.01	0.00	0.00
R-squared	0,08	0.81	0.75	0.69	0.68
Clustered SE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Lists of included countries:

The 3P index data

2000-2019

Aruba
Afghanistan
Angola
Albania
Netherlands, Antilles
United Arab Emirates
Argentina
Armenia
Antigua and Barbuda
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Burundi
Belgium
Benin
BES Islands
Burkina Faso
Bangladesh
Bulgaria
Bahrain
Bahamas
Bhutan
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Belarus
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Barbados
Brunei
Botswana
Central African Republic
Canada
Switzerland
Chile
China
Cote d'Ivoire
Cameroon
Congo, Republic of

The 3P index data

2000-2009

Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burma/Myanmar
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Republic of
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire

The Global Dataset

(after processing)

Afghanistan
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Bulgaria
Cambodia
China
Czech Republic
Ghana
Haiti
Indonesia
Italy
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Lebanon
Malaysia
Moldova
North Macedonia
Poland
Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Tajikistan
Thailand
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan

Colombia
Comoros
Cape Verde
Costa Rica
Cuba
Curacao
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Germany
Djibouti
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Algeria
Ecuador
Egypt
Eritrea
Spain
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
Fiji
France
Micronesia
Gabon
United Kingdom
Georgia
Ghana
Guinea
Gambia
Guinea-Bissau
Equatorial Guinea
Greece
Guatemala
Guyana
Hong Kong
Honduras
Croatia
Haiti
Hungary
Indonesia
India
Ireland
Iran
Iraq
Iceland

Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
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France
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
Kosovo

Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Jordan
Japan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kyrgyz Republic
Cambodia
Kiribati
South Korea
Kosovo
Kuwait
Laos
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
St. Lucia
Sri Lanka
Lesotho
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Latvia
Macau
Morocco
Moldova
Madagascar
Maldives
Mexico
Macedonia
Mali
Malta
Burma/Myanmar
Montenegro
Mongolia
Mozambique
Mauritania
Mauritius
Malawi
Malaysia
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Nicaragua
Netherlands

Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macau
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia
Moldova
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
Netherlands, Antilles
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
North Korea
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland

Norway
Nepal
New Zealand
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Phillipines
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Poland
North Korea
Portugal
Paraguay
Qatar
Marshall Islands
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Senegal
Singapore
Solomon Islands
Sierra Leone
El Salvador
Somalia
Serbia
South Sudan
Suriname
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Sweden
Swaziland
Seychelles
Syria
Chad
Togo
Thailand
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago

Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States of America
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen

Tunisia
Turkey
Taiwan
Tanzania
Uganda
Ukraine
Uruguay
United States of America
Uzbekistan
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
South Africa
Congo, Democratic Republic of
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Zambia
Zimbabwe