

The Intelligence Threat

An analysis of the concept of security in Swedish
policies



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Abstract

This study set out to investigate the concept of security and the intelligence threat set in a Swedish context regarding its national and intelligence security policies. The aim of this paper is to examine whether or not there is any ambiguity of the concept of security. By applying Baldwin's conceptual framework "The Concept of Security", a set of dimensions is used to analyse the Swedish national security policies, as well as the annual reports of the Swedish intelligence agencies. The dimensions studied include threats, referent objects, values, means, cost, time and how much security that should be attained. The findings show that only three of these dimensions is clearly specified, one is partially specified, and the remaining three lack a clear specification of their respective dimensions regarding security. The conclusion of the thesis is that the policies fail to define a set of crucial dimensions, and thus risk being an ambiguous concept.

Keywords: Concept of Security, Baldwin, Sweden, National security policy, Intelligence threat

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Table of contents

1	Introduction	4
1.1	Purpose and research question	4
1.2	Definitions.....	5
1.2.1	The Swedish Security Service.....	5
1.2.2	The Swedish Military and Security Service	6
1.2.3	The National Defence Radio Establishment	6
1.3	Previous research	6
1.4	Delimitations.....	7
2	Theoretical framework	8
2.1	The concept of security	8
2.1.1	Specifying the security problematique	9
3	The research process	12
3.1	Research strategy	12
3.2	Research design	12
3.3	Research method.....	13
3.4	Data collection and source reflection.....	14
3.5	Conceptual and operational definition	15
4	Analysis	16
4.1	Security for whom.....	16
4.2	Security for which values.....	18
4.3	How much security	21
4.4	From what threats	22
4.5	By what means	24
4.6	At what cost	26
4.7	In what time period	27
5	Conclusion	29
6	References	31

1 Introduction

Espionage, or intelligence activities, has increased all over the world in the recent decades. The security political landscape has hardened, and many countries is preparing for armed conflicts. The mistrust between the largest actors is considerable and security-political observers is often using terms as *unpredictability*, *increasing complexity* and *rapid changes*, to describe the geopolitical landscape of today.¹

Even Sweden is affected by the deterioration in the world security-political order. The country is affected by the divergence between Russia and the Western World. Russia feel threatened by the West and has carried out an expansive rearmament of its armed forces. The domestic issues have simultaneously increased, and the Russian economy stagnated due to the decline of oil prices and international sanctions. Sweden is also increasingly affected by the development in China, where the regime as a clear ambition to be leading global superpower. The Chinese interest of the Arctic and possible trade routes through the Arctic Ocean would amount to a new actor with vast recourses that influences our zone of accumulation. Whilst China make large efforts on the military field, the country's cyber capabilities is developed even further from an already high level.²

The threats against Sweden are more extensive than in several years, as they have widened and has adopted new shapes. State actors conducts daily acquirements of secret information. The attempts of indecorous influence occur persistently. The rapid technological development has at the same time, that to a large extern is positive, increased Sweden's vulnerability. This development creates the need for an increased ability of Sweden's intelligence agencies to face the intelligence threat as a precondition to be able to maintain the security of Sweden.³

1.1 Purpose and research question

“The threat from foreign intelligence is also a security threat.” – Klas Friberg, Chief of the Swedish Security Service.⁴

¹ Kristiansson, 2019, p. 1

² Kristiansson, 2019, pp 1–2

³ Säkerhetspolisen, 2019(a), pp. 4–5

⁴ Säkerhetspolisen, 2019(a), p. 4

The foundation of this thesis was influenced by Klas Friberg's statement here above and sets out to examine the implication of the content in this statement. A statement like this raises many questions on security as a concept such as "Where does the threat come from?", "What is to be protected?", and "How can the threat be confronted?", just to name a few. The use of a term such as "security" can therefore run the risk of becoming an abstract or ambiguous term if it is without a clear definition.

The general purpose of this paper is to investigate the concept of security and the perceived threat deriving from foreign intelligence sources, set in a Swedish context, by examining the national security policies of Sweden.

This study will be using a qualitative approach by reviewing Sweden's official national security policy documents and the annual reports of the Swedish intelligence agencies. By utilizing Baldwin's conceptual framework "*The Concept of Security*" the aim of this paper is to determine whether or not there is any ambiguity with the concept of security in Sweden's national policies concerning the intelligence threat against Sweden. As well as to produce an understanding on how the foreign intelligence activities can be interpreted as a security threat, what is to be protected, how the threat is met in order to attain security.

Based on the purpose of the thesis, two research questions have been formulated:

- *How is security as a concept specified in Sweden's national security policy regarding the intelligence threat?*
- *Is the concept of security clearly defined, if not, what ambiguities can be found?*

1.2 Definitions

1.2.1 The Swedish Security Service

The Swedish security service is an intelligence agency with a national task as a police authority, and is working to raise the level of security in Sweden. This is done partly by detecting and preventing security threats directed at the country and essential security-worthy activities, and partly by reducing vulnerabilities in these activities.⁵

⁵ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, p. 10

1.2.2 The Swedish Military and Security Service

The Swedish Military and Security Service conducts defence intelligence and military intelligence and security services where the mission is to identify and analyse the external threats directed against Sweden and Swedish interests. The activities aim to provide support for Swedish foreign, defence and security policy and otherwise to map external threats to Sweden, together with preventing, detecting, and countering the security threats directed against the Swedish Armed Forces and its interests in Sweden and abroad.⁶

1.2.3 The National Defence Radio Establishment

The National Defence Radio Establishment conducts defence intelligence work with the aim of mapping external military threats against Sweden, and to keep the state leadership and the Swedish Armed Forces up to date with reliable information about current circumstances in Sweden's immediate area. This includes information on how military capabilities and intentions develop in the longer term, and information on military situations on the ground, at sea and in the air. Such intelligence make it possible, when necessary, to take measures to address possible threats and to deter a possible enemy.⁷

1.3 Previous research

In the search for previous research on the subject concept of security linked to the intelligence threat, nothing of material has been found. As Baldwin explains, the concept of security has not been the subject of the research it deserves, and has mostly been neglected by other scholars.⁸ And in relation to the fact that the intelligence studies, as a research object, is a fairly new phenomenon compared to other research fields such as social and political science, it can provide an explanation for why previous research on the subject is missing. With this in mind, the expectation is that this paper will be able to make a small contribution to this subject field, and with the hope that the concept of security in relation to intelligence studies will be explored more in the future.

⁶ Försvarsmakten, 2021, p. 38

⁷ Försvarets Radioanstalt, 2021, p. 6

⁸ Baldwin, 1997, p. 9

1.4 Delimitations

This study will examine threat and security on a state level, which will exclude threats to the national security deriving from non-state sources such as: terrorism and extremism; organized crimes; diseases; as well as natural disasters and other environmental threats. However, threats by proxy derived from state-actors through non-state actors will be included. The threat from foreign intelligence activities will exclude refugee espionage on foreign refugees in Sweden.

2 Theoretical framework

2.1 The concept of security

The concept of security was, according to David A. Baldwin, suggested by Arnold Wolfers in his article “*National Security*” as an *Ambiguous Symbol*. Baldwin states Wolfers did not view the concept of security as meaningless or hopeless, instead he was concerned about the confusion that rose from the lack of a clear specification of concept when used, thus making it an ambiguous symbol.⁹ Baldwin writes that he draws inspiration from Wolfers’ work and states that it would not be an overstatement to claim that conceptual analysis of security began and ended with Wolfers’ article in 1952. Baldwin argues that the concept of security is neglected in the academic field and gives two reasons for his statement.¹⁰ The first reason is that even though security as a concept has been used to “justify suspending civil liberties, making war, and massively reallocating resources” it has obtained far less interest than it deserves in the scholarly field. The second reason is that previous scholarly attention on security have not been interested in any conceptual analysis. Thus, giving it far lesser attention in relation to other concepts, such as justice, freedom equality and power.¹¹ Baldwin writes that some scholars have described security as an “essentially contested concept”. Baldwin explains that an essentially contested concept is a concept that is considered to be too loaded with value to be able to have a collectively acknowledged meaning and explanation.¹² Baldwin does however question if the security can be classification as an essentially contested concept, and argues instead that safety can be more appropriately described as a confused or insufficiently explained concept, and that one cannot use the label of security as an essentially contested concept as a justification for not formulating a clear and precise depiction of the concept of security as possible.¹³

⁹ Baldwin, 1997, p. 6

¹⁰ Baldwin, 1997, pp. 8-9

¹¹ Baldwin, 1997, p. 9

¹² Baldwin, 1997, p. 10

¹³ Baldwin, 1997, p. 12

2.1.1 Specifying the security problematique

National security is described by Baldwin as “a dangerously ambiguous concept if used without specification”. The purpose of Baldwin’s conceptual framework “the concept of security” is to identify some specifications that would facilitate a rational analysis of security policies. In order to identify some specifications that would enable the analyse of the rationality of the security policies, Baldwin presents a series of dimensions for defining security as a policy objective and for defining policies for pursuing that objective.¹⁴ Baldwin specifies security with respect to the actor whose values are to be secured, the values concerned, the degree of security, the kinds of threats, the means for coping with such threats, the costs of doing so, and the relevant time period.¹⁵

Security for whom?

In the first of Baldwin’s dimension the question is in search of a referent object. He argues that a concept of security that fails to specify this, or specifies too vaguely, “makes little sense”, as too abstract specifications, such as “the state” or “the individual” can lead to confusion between the concept specification and the empirical observation. Baldwin argues that the specification of the question “Security for whom?” requires more specified answers to suffice, such as “some, most or all individuals” or “some, most or all states”. The choice of on the specification is depended on the underlying research question according to Baldwin.¹⁶

Security for which values?

The second of Baldwin’s is in search of the values to be protected. Baldwin states that the absence of a specification of the core values in a security concept often leads to confusion. He continues by explaining that these values has traditionally been associated with political independence and territorial integrity, but that these values may also include physical safety, economic welfare, autonomy, and psychological wellbeing. These are all objective dimensions, according to Baldwin, and a subjective dimension could also include values as “absence of fear” and “peace of mind” to be specified.¹⁷

How much security?

¹⁴ Baldwin, 1997, p. 12

¹⁵ Baldwin, 1997, p. 17

¹⁶ Baldwin, 1997, p. 13

¹⁷ Baldwin, 1997, pp. 13–4

The third of Baldwin's dimensions needs a specification on how much security is enough. Baldwin claims that absolute security is unattainable, instead it is a value that can be measured in greater or lesser degrees. Baldwin compares this to the economic question of how to allocate scarce resources amongst other competing ends. He means that the specification of how much security that is enough is not an objective question, instead it is important to specify this amongst other competing resources.¹⁸

From what threats?

In the fourth of Baldwin's dimension the importance of the threat needs to be assessed. Baldwin once again emphasises the importance of a clear specification as threats can arise from many sources and vague references impede a rational debate on the nature and magnitude of the threat. He means that those who use the term often have a specific threat in mind, but without a clear specification it is unclear of the threat is of an ideological, economical, or military nature, or if it includes a more expansive concept of threats, such as natural disasters. Either way, the security threat must be clearly defined according to Baldwin.¹⁹

By what means?

The fifth of the dimensions Baldwin that presents is concerned about the means of security. Here Baldwin states that confusion can arise if the dimension is solely defined in the terms of "the use and control of military force", as the means of security can be pursued by a wide range of approaches. Other than just military solutions, Baldwin argues that many different policies can be implemented to attain security, this is particularly critical in the discussions of international politics.²⁰

At what cost?

The cost of security is the main focus in the sixth of Baldwin's dimensions. Baldwin explains that the cost of security is often neglected. Either by not understanding that security is one goal amongst others competing for scarce resources, or by silence, not paying enough attention to the cost of security. Baldwin means that costs always matter, as the search for security always involves the expense of other goals, whose resources has to be overridden. Specification of this dimension is therefore of importance in the pursuit of security, according to Baldwin.²¹

In what time period?

¹⁸ Baldwin, 1997, pp. 14–5

¹⁹ Baldwin, 1997, pp. 15-6

²⁰ Baldwin, 1997, p. 16

²¹ Baldwin, 1997, pp. 16–7

In the last of Baldwin's seven dimensions, the period of time in which the security policy is to be operational must be defined. Baldwin argues that different policies can have different effects and outcomes, whether they are used in the short or in the long run. A short-term policy might be rational when it comes to protect oneself against a neighbour, while it might be more desirable to befriend the same neighbour in a long-term policy. These kinds of policies can also be in conflict with each other and thus have a negative impact if it is used in the wrong time span.²²

Baldwin concludes by stating that not all of the dimensions need to be specified all the time and that the degree of the specification can vary in both broad and narrow terms. But for most purposes it is meaningful to require at least some indication on the dimensions of how much security is being sought, for which values, for whom and from what threats.²³

²² Baldwin, 1997, p. 17

²³ Baldwin, 1997, p. 17

3 The research process

3.1 Research strategy

A research strategy refers to a general orientation to the conduct of social research where a qualitative research strategy usually is emphasized around words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data.²⁴ When researching concepts there is also a distinction between quantitative and qualitative research where the former, once a concept has been developed, becomes fixed and is seen exclusively in terms of the indicators that have been developed for it.²⁵ Since this thesis is exploring the ambiguity of the concepts of threat and security these concepts are not fixed. The thesis will instead have a qualitative approach to concepts where they provide a general sense of what to look for and act as a means for uncovering the variety of forms that the phenomena to which they refer can assume.²⁶ The qualitative research strategy will fit this thesis in its attempt to find the different interpretations of the concepts in order to compare them against each other.

3.2 Research design

The research design of this study refers to a framework or structure within which the collection and analysis of data takes place. The research design reflects upon decisions about the priority being given to a range of dimensions of the research process and is influenced by the chosen research question.²⁷ As this thesis intend to examine security policies of Sweden, a case study design has been chosen. Case studies focus on the occurrence of a specific phenomenon with the intention of providing an in-depth account of events, conditions, experiences, or processes occurring in this particular case. The main purpose of a case study can be said to highlight the general by looking at the specific and is based on investigating something that is already an existing, naturally occurring phenomenon.²⁸ A great advantage of the case study design is that the case can be extensively examined and

²⁴ Bryman, 2016, p. 33

²⁵ Bryman, 2016, pp. 382–3

²⁶ Bryman, 2016, p. 383

²⁷ Bryman, 2016, p. 40

²⁸ Denscombe, 2018, p. 85

thus provide a contextual description of a particular phenomenon in a particular country.²⁹

The validity of this research is dependent upon the definitions of the concepts of threat and security. As the concepts is covering a full range of different aspects and is therefore difficult to define, an operationalized definition will help to construct a more explicit clarification.³⁰ To prevent inaccurate measurements and unreliable data a coding scheme will be used to produce a higher reliability and more consistent results. This coding scheme will be constructed by following Baldwins specifications and thus increase the chances for the same results on repeated occasions.³¹

3.3 Research method

A research method is a technique for collecting data and involves specific procedures and approaches in order to achieve relevant samples.³² For this study, a content analysis has been chosen as it is a method of textual analysis where the content of the text is broken down and categorized in order to answer the given research question. Following the qualitative research strategy, the content analysis will thus be of a qualitative nature, where the material will be gradually categorized by using a coding scheme in order to systematically describe the content of the data.³³ A content analysis is suitable for this thesis as it is a method for finding and classify patterns in a larger material of textual content, as well as being an adequate method for comparing official political documents.³⁴ An advantage of using a content analysis is that it is an unobtrusive method of data collection, where the chief advantage is that it can reduce bias as policy material can be obtained without interviewing decision-makers. Another advantage is that the method enables gathering of information that may be difficult or impossible to research through direct, personal contact.³⁵ The difficulty of interviewing the ministers of the Swedish government as well as classification of the intelligence agencies makes this true regarding this study.

A qualitative content analysis generally involves four steps, where each step is relating to a specific question that the researcher must ask and answer.³⁶ *Step one* – select the material to be analysed through identifying the population of texts that will provide evidence appropriate to an investigation of the hypothesis and select a representative sample of this material. *Step two* – define the categories of interest

²⁹ Halperin & Heath, 2020, pp. 234–7

³⁰ Halperin & Heath, 2020, pp. 189–90

³¹ Halperin & Heath, 2020, pp. 191–2, 384–5

³² Bryman, 2016, p. 40, 664

³³ Boréus & Kohl, 2018, p. 50

³⁴ Boréus & Kohl, 2018, pp. 51, 55

³⁵ Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 374

³⁶ Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 377

that will be sought for in the material that has been selected for analysis. *Step three* – choose a recording unit for the portion or segment of the text to which a category label will be applied. *Step four* – create a protocol for identifying the target variables and categories; create codes that will signal their presence in the text; and coding the texts using protocol and codes.³⁷

3.4 Data collection and source reflection

For this study, the material consists of secondary data in the form of official Swedish governmental documents. These documents can be divided into two categories: Sweden's national security policies and the annual intelligence reports.

The foundation of the Swedish national security policy can be found in three policy documents: the Government Policy Statement, which is presented by the Swedish Prime Minister before the Swedish Parliament and briefly outlines the fundamental policies of the Swedish Government;³⁸ the Statement of Government Policy, presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs which summarise the Governments foreign-policies for the year to come;³⁹ as well as the National Security Strategy document, which presents Sweden's national security policy in more detail which outlines the security goals of Sweden.⁴⁰ A wide variety of other official documents regarding Sweden's national security policies has been examined for this study, including reports, press leases and legal documents, including governmental bills. All of these documents have been boiled down to a selection that meet the criteria of answering the stated research question.

As for the Swedish annual intelligence reports, they are presented by the three Swedish intelligence agencies. The Swedish intelligence and security agencies consist of the Swedish Security Service, a security service with national police authority tasked to disclose and reduce security threats against Sweden;⁴¹ the Military Intelligence and Security Service, a military intelligence service aimed at supporting Sweden's foreign policies and to detect external threats;⁴² and the National Defence Radio Establishment, a civilian agency under the Ministry of Defence that is conducting signals intelligence.⁴³ The choice of for material regarding the intelligence policies was limited to these three documents as most of the documentation of the intelligence agencies is classified. Prior annual reports were rejected due to the unclarity if the stated policies could be seen as current or not.

³⁷ Halperin & Heath, 2020, pp. 377–9

³⁸ Sveriges Riksdag, n.d.

³⁹ Regeringen, 2020(b)

⁴⁰ Regeringen, 2017

⁴¹ Säkerhetspolisen, n.d.

⁴² Försvarsmakten, n.d.

⁴³ Försvarets Radioanstalt, n.d.

3.5 Conceptual and operational definition

As research in political science usually starts with a tentative prediction about an aspect of political reality, this study started with the ambiguity of the concept of security. To systematically investigate this political phenomenon, it is necessary to move from the abstract plane into the empirical one in order to acquire data that is relevant to answering the research question. The first step involves having a clear understanding of what it is that is supposed to be analysed, a conceptual definition. This process of deciding what a specific term mean is called conceptualization.⁴⁴ Instead of providing with an own conceptual definition of security, this thesis will be using Baldwins conceptual framework of the security dimensions as a guideline in order to investigate the different understandings of security. The way this is utilized is by having this conceptual definition as a basis where an operational definition is built upon. The process of operationalization involves moving from the abstract to the particular by defining in what the concept of security can be determined as present of absent.⁴⁵ The way this is done is by formulating a set of questions out of Baldwins dimensions, each with a set of commonly used terms in order to determine whether they can be found in the material or not. These questions will be divided into distinct categories, following Baldwins seven dimensions of security.

⁴⁴ Halperin & Heath, 2020, p 187

⁴⁵ Halperin & Heath, 2020, pp. 149, 187

4 Analysis

4.1 Security for whom

The first of Baldwins dimensions that has to be defined is the one that should specify a “referent object”. When it comes to the legal definition of security as well as definitions in policy documents and in the political discourse, there is not much of a definition to be found.

In the 19th chapter of the Swedish penal code “About Crimes Against Sweden’s Security” a number of crimes, including espionage and illegal intelligence activities, is presented as a harmful to the Swedish security, but does not specify the term “Swedish security”.⁴⁶ The absence of a definition in the law is further presented in the document “Guidance in Security Protection” from the Swedish Security Service, where it is stated that the term security is widely used in legal documents but lack a legal definition.⁴⁷ This points to an inherent ambiguity concerning the concept of security in the Swedish law. But this is expected as terms and concepts is sometimes not defined in the written Swedish law, instead, the intent of the law can be found in the law’s legislative history which includes various material generated in the course of creating the legislation. While examining the legislative history on the laws that concerns the Security of Sweden one can observe that there is still no clear definition of the concept.

In the governmental bill “Security Protection” it is written that there is not any legal definition of the concept of security but could relate to the outer and the inner security of the state.⁴⁸ Another bill, “Enhanced Protection Against Foreign Powers Intelligence Activities”, also states that the concept lack a legal definition while adding that the term has “a relative intact unambiguous bearing”, which could be summarised as the protection for Sweden’s independence and persistence.⁴⁹ This implies that it is the state of Sweden which is regarded as the referent object, but fails to state this explicitly. The bill do further explain that the concept of the state’s security is “associated with uncertainty” as the intention of the concept can alter over time alongside with the development of the society.⁵⁰ This statement can be seen as contradictory to the “unambiguous bearing” of the concept, as a concept cannot be both unambiguous and uncertain at the same time.

⁴⁶ Brottsbalk (1962:700)

⁴⁷ Säkerhetspolisen, 2019(b), p. 16

⁴⁸ Prop. 1995/96:129, p. 22

⁴⁹ Prop. 2013/14:51, p. 20

⁵⁰ Prop. 2013/14:51, p .20

The absence of a distinct definition of the concept of security is elaborated in the Swedish government official report “Espionage and Other Illicit Intelligence Activities”, where the security of the state is compared to the security of the individual, concerning the legislation of murder. Considering murder, the report states that it is not problematic to not define the individual as the referent object, because there is no need to clarify the interest of what is to be protected. But without a clear definition of a referent object, the concept of Sweden’s security has more difficulties to specify what is intended with the concept and what is to be protected.⁵¹

This lack of a clear definition has been criticised by a range of Swedish governmental agencies, whose work concern the security of Sweden. This including the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, responsible for issues concerning civil protection, public safety, and civil defence. In the bill “A Modern and Consolidated Protection for Sweden’s Security” the agencies – in their statement of opinion – request a clarification of what is compromised in the expression “Sweden’s security” and discern that the absence of a closer definition can amount to the risk for inconsistent interpretation and enforcement of the concept.⁵² The response from the Swedish government states that the proposed legislation could consider concreting the intent of the expression “Sweden’s Security”, but that the committee stays with the proposed description, without any further instantiation of the national security interests.⁵³ These findings points to the absence of a clear definition of the concept in the Swedish legislative history and the sources of the Swedish law concerning its security. It also shows that the problem is known, but yet no further action has been taken to make the concept any clearer.

The lack of a clarification is also present when examining official policy documents produced by the Swedish government. The Government Policy Statement outline that “the foreign policy shall support and defend the security of the country”, but does not elaborate the subject any further.⁵⁴ Nor does the Statement of Government Policy of 2021,⁵⁵ failing to bring up the subject at all, in contrast to the previous year’s document where the purpose of Sweden’s foreign policy is stated to “assure security in both its own country as well as the surrounding world”.⁵⁶ In the Swedish government’s communication to the Swedish parliament “Sweden’s Feministic Foreign Policy” – which give an account for the foreign policy’s field of work – the notion of the concept of security is also absent.⁵⁷ The last governmental finding on the concept of security is from an debate article written by Sweden’s prime minister Stefan Löfven, where he mention that “the

⁵¹ SOU 2012:95, p. 165

⁵² Prop. 2017/18:89, p. 37

⁵³ Prop. 2017/18:89, p. 41

⁵⁴ Regeringen, 2019

⁵⁵ Regeringen, 2021, p. 1

⁵⁶ Regeringen, 2020(a), p. 1

⁵⁷ Skr. 2019/20:17

widened security political development set new demands on the state's capacity to ensure security for the inhabitants of Sweden.⁵⁸ In this mention the prime minister is vaguely specifying the individual as a referent object for the Swedish security, but still, a debate article cannot be seen as a strong source of policy and the same specification has not been found in any official documents either. This point to that this statement is not an official view on Sweden's security policy.

The last examined documents on the referent object of Sweden's security is the annual reports of the three Swedish intelligence agencies. Two of them – the Swedish Security Service⁵⁹ and National Defence Radio Establishment⁶⁰ – write extensively about the Swedish security in their respective report, but fail to specify the concept at any point. The Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service do on the other hand specify Sweden's security – even though it is briefly and vaguely – as “the national security”, on the subject of the protection of the Swedish 5G network.⁶¹ The lack of a specified definition can be explained on the premiss that the focus of the Swedish intelligence agencies is based on the security political goals of Sweden.⁶² If the security political goals fail to present a referent object it is not astonishing that this will reflect on the documents of the intelligence agencies as well.

The evidence illustrates that the first of Baldwins dimensions – security for whom – is not clearly specified, as there is not any clear definition on what is supposed to be the referent object of Sweden's security. The state and the individual is mentioned on some occasions, but only as vague statements and could therefore only be understood if the documents is read in between the lines. And even though these statements is to be considered as evidence for a referent object of Sweden's security, they are not specified in detail and therefore fail to meet the criteria of Baldwins specifications.

4.2 Security for which values

The second of Baldwin's dimensions that needs to be specified is for which values to be protected. In contrast to the previous dimension, this dimension is better specified in the Swedish policies. But the findings show that the presence of values differ in regard to what is to be protected.

When searching for which values to be protected in Sweden's security policies the document “National Security Strategy” is a good place to set out from. While it only has the status of an information material, the document present the framework for which values is to be protected in the Swedish national security

⁵⁸ Regeringskansliet, 2017(b)

⁵⁹ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021

⁶⁰ Försvarets Radioanstalt, 2021

⁶¹ Försvarmakten, 2021, p. 48

⁶² SOU 1999:37, p. 169

policies and has a wide view on the security concept.⁶³ The values found here will be compared to official policy documents and the annual reports of the intelligence agencies.

The first set of values to be protected is the safety, security, life, and wellbeing of the population of Sweden.⁶⁴ When examining the annual reports of the intelligence agencies the value of the population of Sweden is not present in any of the documents. As mentioned in the previous section, the works of the intelligence agencies is based on the security political goals of Sweden.⁶⁵ One finding on the documentation regulating Sweden's security policy is found in the governmental bill Orientation of Defence Policy – Sweden's Defence 2016 – 2020, stating that one of the security goals is to “protect the life and wellbeing of the population”.⁶⁶ Yet, the most recent national security bill named Total Defence 2021 – 2025 has narrowed the specification of this value down to “cherish the civil population”⁶⁷ even though the preparatory work for the bill proposed to keep the previous security goals intact.⁶⁸ This shows that the values of the physical safety is not clearly defined in the Swedish security policies, and is totally absent in the values of the Swedish intelligence agencies.

The second set of values is those concerning the provision and support of Sweden's socially important functions.⁶⁹ The social functions that the Swedish Security Service is concerned about is those they call “the worthiest of protection”, including the Swedish businesses and authorities that has operations of importance for the function of Sweden.⁷⁰ The most protection worthy is the operators which is of importance for the military and civilian defence or has importance for Sweden's security in other ways.⁷¹ There is no definitive definition regarding which businesses and agencies that is qualified for protection, instead – stated in The Protective Security Act – the operations which is conducting security sensitive activities shall investigate the need for security protection.⁷² Other than the outer and inner security (for which values will be discussed below), socially important activities has been concretised in the bill of the act as activities in the sectors of energy, food supply, electronic communication, water supply, transport and financial services.⁷³ The National Defence Radio Establishment also share the social infrastructure as protection worthy,⁷⁴ but out of a narrower, digital perspective.⁷⁵ The values is based in the information and systems that the

⁶³ Regeringskansliet, 2017(a), p. 6

⁶⁴ Regeringskansliet, 2017(a), p. 14

⁶⁵ SOU 1999:37, 1999, p. 169

⁶⁶ Prop. 2014/15:109, p. 3

⁶⁷ Prop. 2020/21:30, p 89

⁶⁸ Ds 2017:66

⁶⁹ Regeringskansliet, 2017(a), p. 14

⁷⁰ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, p. 39

⁷¹ Säkerhetspolisen, 2019(b), p. 8

⁷² Säkerhetsskyddslag (2018:585)

⁷³ Prop. 2017/18:89, p. 44

⁷⁴ Försvarets Radioanstalt, 2021, p. 30

⁷⁵ Försvarets Radioanstalt, 2021, p. 26

businesses and agencies is using in their activities.⁷⁶ The findings points to a wide and clear definition of the values regarding the social functions of the society amongst the intelligence agencies and the national policy.

The third set of values of the National Security Strategy is those upholding the fundamental values of Sweden's democracy, constitution, human rights, and independence.⁷⁷ In this category The Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service⁷⁸ and The National Defence Radio Establishment⁷⁹ solely mention the democracy as a value to be protected, but does not elaborate this any further. The Swedish Security Service do on the other hand keep the protection of Sweden's democracy as a theme throughout their annual report and states that their commitment is to "secure the future of the democracy".⁸⁰ To uphold the human rights and independence is also a common theme in the document, but the agency do not specify neither these values, nor the value of the democracy.⁸¹ These specifications can instead be partly found in the bill for the Intelligence Act, which set the values to include freedom of speech, opinion and information as well as the protection of the individuals private sphere.⁸² In the inquiry report, The Protective Security Act, further specifications is presented as the protection of physical safety and the freedom of movement; the political system and its design; as well as judicial system.⁸³ As these findings show, the value of democracy and human rights is associated with the work of the Swedish Security Service, and is explained further in the examined policy documents.

The fourth and last set of values examined is those concerned with Sweden's freedom, sovereignty, territorial integrity and right to self-determination.⁸⁴ As with the precious set of values, The Swedish Military and Security Service and The National Defence Radio Establishment only mention the values briefly in their respective report. Where the former only mention Sweden's latitude as a value,⁸⁵ the latter mention the armed forces as well as the territorial integrity of Sweden.⁸⁶ The main focus of the Swedish Security Service is the nation's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Yet, the only definition consist of small section, stating "In order for Sweden's democracy and sovereignty to be functional and maintained the chief of state, the parliament, the government as well as the information concerning Sweden's defence and buildings with important functions is to be regarded as protection worthy".⁸⁷ This demonstrates that these set of values is present, but not clearly defined in the reports of the Swedish intelligence agencies. A clearer

⁷⁶ Skr. 2016/17:213

⁷⁷ Regeringskansliet, 2017(a), p. 14

⁷⁸ Försvarsmakten, 2021, p. 12

⁷⁹ Försvarets Radioanstalt. 2021, p. 46

⁸⁰ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, p. 8

⁸¹ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021

⁸² Prop. 2013/14:51, pp. 26–8

⁸³ SOU 2015:25, pp. 297, 341 & 562

⁸⁴ Regeringskansliet, 2017(a), p. 14

⁸⁵ Försvarsmakten, 2021, p.14

⁸⁶ Försvarets Radioanstalt, 2021, pp. 13 & 26

⁸⁷ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, p. 12

definition is found in the preparatory work for the Intelligence Act, where it is written that the previous main value of security was “situated in the activities of the armed forces and its protection against a military aggression”. These values has since widened to include a broader scope of definitions of Sweden’s independence and persistence. The values that is presented include those that uphold the border integrity of the nation, the preservation of its independence and governmental system, as well as the functions that is vital for the nation. The broader scope does also include values asserting Sweden’s sovereignty which intend to make sure that Sweden can uphold its freedom under the international convention, execute state function in its own territory as well as its outer and inner communication.⁸⁸ Even though just mentioned in the intelligence reports, the values of Sweden’s sovereignty is clearly defined in the preparatory work and documents that the agencies is work is based upon.

The findings on the dimension of values in the security concept show that three of the four examined set of values is present in the security approach of the Swedish intelligence agencies. This indicates that it is the values of social functions, independence and sovereignty that is important to protect in the work of the intelligence agencies. The absent value is the one of physical safety of the population of Sweden, implying that this value is not of interest in the intelligence operations.

4.3 How much security

Baldwins third dimension, how much security, is seeking which degree of security is enough among other competing ends and resources. First off, any valuation on how much security Sweden require in relationship to the intelligence threat cannot be found in any of the reports or policy documents, which points to that the term security is seen as an absolute condition. As this dimension is difficult to define and to simplify things, the budgetary allocation of the intelligence agencies will be reviewed and compared in a five-year timeframe. The allocation of a higher degree of resources would point towards a higher value of Sweden’s security amongst other competing ends.

In the Swedish Draft Budget of 2021 and the Swedish Armed Force’s Budget of 2021, the evidence show that all of the intelligence agencies allocation has increased and is proposed to continue to increase in a five-year period. The outcome of 2019 for the Swedish Security Service was 1.555 billion Swedish Crowns, and is proposed to increase to 1.740 billion in 2021, and 1.785 billion in 2023.⁸⁹ An increase of 230 million SEK in a five-year period. For The Swedish Military and Security Service, the allocation has increased from 958 million SEK

⁸⁸ Prop. 2013/14:51

⁸⁹ Prop. 2020/21:1(a), p. 53

in 2019, through proposed 1.192 billion in 2021, to 1.298 billion in 2023.⁹⁰ An increase of 340 million SEK. The National Defence Radio Establishment will get a proposed increase from 1.217 billion in 2019, through 1.418 billion in 2021, to 1.634 billion in 2023.⁹¹ Increasing its allocation with 417 million.

These budgetary allocation in the period from 2019 to 2023 show a proposed increase of 987 million Swedish Crowns, or an increase of 26%, to the Swedish intelligence agencies. While the value on how much security is not specified in the Swedish policies, the increased allocation to the intelligence agencies suggest that the value of security, in relation to the intelligence threat, is prioritised in the Swedish security policy.

4.4 From what threats

The fourth of Baldwins dimensions to be specified is the dimension of threat. This includes the clarification of the nature and the magnitude of the threat. This specification is mostly absent in the official policy documents but is instead found elaborated in the annual reports of the intelligence agencies.

There is a consensus between the intelligence agencies that the threat against Sweden has widened and has become more complex. The Swedish Security Services states that the traditional intelligence threat is persistent and that the security threatening activities has intensified in the recent years as several states is conducting intelligence operations against Sweden in several areas.⁹² From traditional intelligence threatening activities such as industrial, influential, and military espionage towards new areas such as Sweden's economical and human well-being.⁹³ The Swedish Military and Security Service writes that these new kinds of threat do not replace the old ones, instead they are combined and can occur gradually from peacetime through a crisis and during a conflict as they do not distinguish between the civil and the military, the official and the private.⁹⁴ According to The National Defence Radio Establishment the threat also derives from the high military presence in Sweden's surroundings, where several major exercises has taken place in the recent year.⁹⁵ These statements indicates that there is a coherent depiction of the magnitude of intelligence threat amongst the intelligence agencies, even though it is difficult to specify a magnitude that is hidden and thus is hard to measure.

⁹⁰ FM2019-9956:17, p. 31

⁹¹ Prop. 2020/21:1(b), p. 56

⁹² Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, pp. 11 & 25

⁹³ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, p. 25

⁹⁴ Försvarsmakten, 2021, p. 14

⁹⁵ Försvarets Radioanstalt, 2021, s. 9

The description of a widened threat is linked with a widened course of actions. The National Defence Radio Establishment describes that foreign states coordinate systematic attempts to infringe computer network through IT and cyber-attacks. These infringements has intensified in the recent years due to the increased amount of transferred data traffic and thus a widened attack surface for the aggressor. As cyber attacks do not take distance into account these threats is substantial, where an infringement can be prepared to use as a sabotage in a later more appropriate occasion according to the agency.⁹⁶ The Swedish Military and Security Service report that the use of hybrid, hidden and deniable methods is getting more frequent. This is often utilised through non-military means, such as continuous influence and cyber operation, in order to create or exploit de-stabilisation in or between countries.⁹⁷ The agency also observe the threat from more typical intelligence methods, such as technological and human intelligence. The former involves information gathering through signals intelligence. Where the latter involves advances or harassments by foreign intelligence and security services towards official or military personnel in order to acquire sough information or to enlist an informer as a spy.⁹⁸ The Swedish Security Service states that the foreign powers that conduct intelligence operations against Sweden is characterised by investing large amounts of money and personal resources as well as the ability to be perseverant over several years in order to achieve the set security political goals. Another characteristic is the use of all of the resources of the society and the ability to coordinate different means.⁹⁹ This illustrates that the Swedish intelligence agencies have a clear understanding of the means of the intelligence threat.

With the use of intelligence activities there is always a goal with it. The National Defence Radio Establishment only touches this briefly by associating it with political ambitions.¹⁰⁰ This is a viewpoint shared with the Swedish Security Service which also elaborates this further by including the set goals of creating stability for the own regime and to strengthen the own state's status as an economical and military power. These states often act offensive in order to promote their own interest and to force other states to act according to their will. Swedish Security Service states that another goal with the intelligence operations is to destabilise other states and to keep them outside military alliances in order to strengthen the own position.¹⁰¹ The Swedish Military and Security Service also add that a goal with the activities is to acquire and to get access to strategical technology both for civilian and military purpose.¹⁰² This depiction given by the Swedish intelligence agencies provides a good demonstration on the strategic goals of the intelligence operations conducted by foreign states.

⁹⁶ Försvarets Radioanstalt, 2021, pp. 9 & 30

⁹⁷ Försvarsmakten, 2021, pp. 7 & 19

⁹⁸ Försvarsmakten, 2021, pp. 28 & 54

⁹⁹ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, p. 24

¹⁰⁰ Försvarets Radioanstalt, 2021, p. 9

¹⁰¹ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, p. 24

¹⁰² Försvarsmakten, 2021, p. 12

According to the Swedish intelligence agencies, the most serious intelligence threat against Sweden is derived from three states: Russia, China, and Iran. Russia has the intention and ability to diminish the security and decision-making capacity of Sweden, and is evident in the continuous Russian security threatening operations against Sweden, according to the Swedish Security Service. The reason for this is that Sweden is a part of the Baltic Sea Region, a military, economical, and security political important region for Russia.¹⁰³ The Swedish Military and Security Service writes that the central goal is to strengthen Russia's position as an autonomous superpower and strive after a European security policy that acknowledge its right to a sphere of influence in the region.¹⁰⁴ The National Radio Defence Establishment writes that China's increased political ambitions and economical power have led to an altered security political climate.¹⁰⁵ The general goal is set by the ruling Chinese communist party, and involves a high economic growth and national affinity in order to preserve the political position of power of the party, according to the Swedish Military and Security Service. Another goal is to become self-sufficient within key technologies and the defence industry.¹⁰⁶ The Swedish Security Services notes that China has the intention to constrain the political initiative of Sweden, when and if Swedish acting is perceived to be a threat against the Chinese interests. Sweden is geographically far from China, but within a clear sphere of interest with regard to the Chinese long-term military, economic and political goals. Another intention with the Chinese intelligence activities is to obtain existing and developing technology and knowledge located in Sweden.¹⁰⁷ The Iranian intelligence operations against Sweden is mostly carried out through industrial espionage, according to the Swedish Security Service. This is mostly aimed at Swedish high-tech industry and products that can be used in the Iranian nuclear weapon programme. It is stated that Iran is putting large resources into these operations, and a large amount is used against Sweden.¹⁰⁸ This illustrates that the Swedish intelligence agencies has a good understanding of the different actors that is conducting intelligence operations against Sweden.

The evidence illustrates that the Swedish intelligence fully specify Baldwins fourth dimension, from what threats, both clarifying the nature and the magnitude of the threat. In addition, there is specifications on the means and goals of the actors, as well as examples of which states that make up the major threat.

4.5 By what means

¹⁰³ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, p. 30

¹⁰⁴ Försvarmakten, 2021, p. 19

¹⁰⁵ Försvarets Radioanstalt, 2021, p. 9

¹⁰⁶ Försvarmakten, 2021, p. 26

¹⁰⁷ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, pp. 30-1

¹⁰⁸ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, p. 31

The dimension of “what means” is the fifth of Baldwin's dimensions, and is supposed to specify the wide variety of different means and policies that may be adopted in the pursuit of security. In similarity with the dimension of threat, this dimension is mostly specified in the reports of the intelligence agencies. When examining the documents, counterintelligence is found to be the main means of attaining intelligence security, as well as the importance of collaboration between the agencies.

Counterintelligence includes the prevention and detection of espionage and other illegal intelligence activities that can target Sweden and its interests abroad, as well as foreign interests in the country according to the Swedish Security Service.¹⁰⁹ Its purpose is to pre-empt, prevent and detect, as well as investigate and prosecute crimes against Sweden's security. Counterintelligence includes intelligence gathering and assessment of foreign espionage. This work provides the basis for various types of measures to counter security-threatening espionage. The Swedish Security Service continues by stating that a way to do this is to systematically follow up on a known intelligence threat, for example the countries that the agency know from experience is conducting intelligence operations in or against Sweden.¹¹⁰

The Swedish Security Service writes that they are conducting intelligence operations both national and international. The national collection of information takes place through, among other things, reconnaissance, sources of persons, interrogations and contacts with other authorities and organisations. Internationally, data collected that is essential for the agency's mission is often collected by its liaison officers stationed abroad. Once the information has been processed, investigated, analysed and conclusions drawn, these are further processed within the Swedish Security Police. An investigation may be initiated and conducted by the agency or by a prosecutor. The government, other authorities and organisations can also be informed in order to be able to take action in their areas. This could, according to the Swedish Security Service, include initiating a legal process, declaring a foreign diplomat in Sweden, or improving the security protection in some respects.¹¹¹ The Swedish Military and Security Service writes that they are using defence attachés stationed abroad in order to collect intelligence. A defence attaché's tasks include the collection of open information, which involves monitoring and assessing defence related developments in the country and reporting on it. The attachés knowledge of the countries in which they work and the open information collection they conduct strengthen the Swedish Military and Security Service's ability to make assessments and contribute to early warning. The defence attachés are an important asset for Sweden's foreign, security and defence policy, according to the agency.¹¹² The National Radio Defence Establishment writes that its signal reconnaissance gives them the ability to detect and follow the

¹⁰⁹ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, p. 13

¹¹⁰ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, p. 44

¹¹¹ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, p. 12

¹¹² Försvarsmakten, 2021, p. 51

most advanced aggressors. The agency collect signals against foreign intelligence activities that are directed against Swedish interests, and the reconnaissance is always about foreign conditions. This provides intelligence for the benefit of Sweden's counterintelligence, which is carried out by the Swedish Security Service. The aim of the operations is to prevent and complicate foreign espionage.¹¹³

A vital part of the counterintelligence operations is the collaboration between the intelligence agencies. The National Radio Defence Establishment writes that they work close together with the Swedish Security Service and the Swedish Military and Security Service in order to identify, analyse and respond to the threats directed at Sweden, and continues with that good cooperation is the basis for the agencies to be able to prevent an aggression.¹¹⁴ The Swedish Military and Security Service states that the collection and reporting of the National Defence Establishment in combination with their own intelligence gathering provides important information when they put the pieces together on the threat that Sweden is exposed to. This circle of information between the agencies is considered invaluable for Sweden's security.¹¹⁵ The exchange of knowledge and information is necessary to fulfil the mission to protect Sweden, according to the Swedish Security Service. The agency also states that it is important to remember at both strategic and operational level that mandates, and assignments differ between the agencies and that there is information that they cannot share. Having said this, the Swedish Security Service continues by stating that the developed ability to work in common has led to success in operations where there have been threats against Sweden, which would not have been possible without the cooperation.¹¹⁶

In this dimension, the Swedish intelligence agencies gives a clear picture on their use of counterintelligence to face the threat from the foreign threat. They also give a good explanation on the importance of collaboration between the agencies.

4.6 At what cost

In the sixth of Baldwins dimension, the issue of the cost of security has to be specified. The cost in this sense amounts to the sacrifices of other values in the pursuit of attaining security. In the issue of intelligence security, the integrity of the individual is the main sacrifice found in the policy documents as this value will be a trade-off against the means of intelligence operations.

As in previous dimensions, much of the discussion on the costs of intelligence security is found in the preparatory work of the intelligence laws. In the bill for the so called “FRA-Law”, it is written that “the interest of protecting the individual

¹¹³ Försvarets Radioanstalt, 2021, pp. 14, 27 & 38

¹¹⁴ Försvarets Radioanstalt, 2021, p. 29

¹¹⁵ Försvarsmakten, 2021, p. 41

¹¹⁶ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, p. 33

integrity cannot be seen secludedly but has to be weighted with other just interests, in this context foremost the need of an efficient intelligence establishment”. The “just interests” is in this case describes as “the public safety and security against outer and inner threats”, a necessity that is stated to outweigh certain restrictions in the protection of privacy.¹¹⁷ The importance of security is further elaborated in the preparatory work for the Intelligence Act, describing that the security of Sweden has very strong protective interest and the crimes against it is often hard to investigate. With this premiss the bill argues that “the needs of the agencies in this case weighs heavier than the intrusion into the personal integrity”.¹¹⁸ This emphasis on security does not mean that the opposing interest of integrity is not prioritised in Swedish policy. In another bill on the subject of secret means of coercion, the outset of the use of coercive means is stated to “not to be used else it is absolutely necessary”, where it is explained that there must be strong arguments and considerable advantages for the public security in order for an intrusion of the personal integrity to be considered.¹¹⁹

These findings show that the value of personal integrity is the main trade-off in the pursuit of security by the means of intelligence. Any discussion on this subject is not to be found in any of the intelligence reports, but as these values is a part of the laws and policies of the intelligence agencies it is inherently a part of their operations.

4.7 In what time period

The seventh and last of Baldwins dimension is the one that seek to define the time period in which a security policy is to be operational. On the subject of intelligence security, the time period is not elaborated in any of the annual intelligence reports nor official policy documents. Some findings do though indicate the difficulties of a specific time aspect on the intelligence.

The Swedish Security Service writes on the subject of threat, that “Intention and capability can alter over time and the assessments and arrangements of the Swedish Security Service adapts after the present situation”.¹²⁰ This implies that the agency need to base its operations on the current state of affairs and to be flexible upon the nature of the threat. The agency also states that “The work with security and protection is something that must take time and cost money”,¹²¹ which illustrate that intelligence operations is a continuous work without a clear timeframe.

¹¹⁷ Prop. 2006/07:63, p. 60

¹¹⁸ Prop. 2013/14:51, pp. 49–50

¹¹⁹ Prop. 2007/08:163, p. 59

¹²⁰ Säkerhetspolisen, 2021, p. 12

¹²¹ Säkerhetspolisen, 2020, p. 24

The evidence shows that there are no defined time period of the intelligence operations, other than “continuous”. Baldwin emphasise on the importance of a defined time period in a security policy, but the intelligence operations might be better off without one.

5 Conclusion

This thesis set out to find an answer to the question “How is security as a concept specified in Sweden’s national security policy regarding the intelligence threat?”. With the help of the seven dimensions presented by Baldwin, each of these dimensions have been examined one by one in order to find out whether or not they are sufficiently specified. In short, the evidence show that three of these dimensions is clearly defined, one is only partly defined, and the remaining three is not defined at all.

The three dimensions that is clearly defined in the Swedish nationals security includes the dimensions of what threat, what means and what cost. The dimension of what threat is clearly defined in the regards that the Swedish intelligence agencies specifies the nature and magnitude of the threat by giving examples and explanation on: in what form the threat is embodied; the different methods used by foreign operators in order to conduct intelligence operations against Sweden; the set strategic goals of the use of intelligence activities by those state actors; and specific actors especially threatening Sweden with their espionage. Thus, providing a clear depiction of the whole dimension of how Sweden’s security is threatened. In the dimension of what means, the intelligence agencies once again provides with a clear depiction of its importance to security by specifying and describing their use of different kinds of counterintelligence operations to thwart the intelligence threat, the importance of the collaboration between the agencies to attain intelligence security, and how the work and methods differ between each intelligence agency. The dimension of what cost is also specified in clear with the help of the legal documents and policies that regulates the work of the intelligence agencies. These documents specify that there has been made trade-offs in the value of personal integrity in the pursuit of intelligence security, and the arguments of why this choice is made.

The dimension that is only partially explained is the one concerning the values of security. The evidence show that only three out of four of the national values set by the Swedish government is present in the policies regarding intelligence, the values of social functions, independence, and sovereignty. There is an absence of the value of physical safety, and the lack of any explanation for this can only lead to speculations that it is not of interest in the search for intelligence security.

The three dimensions that totally lack a specification is those of security for whom, how much security and in what time period. In the dimension of security for whom, there is a complete absence on any clear definition on what is supposed to be the referent object of Sweden’s security. Some referent objects are just occasionally mentioned vaguely, but not clearly defined. Thus, fail to meet the

criteria set up by for this dimension. On examining the dimension of how much security, the value is not specified in any policy or intelligence report. One can find the answer of the importance of the work with intelligence by examining the budgetary allocation for the intelligence agencies, but this only suggest that value of security is prioritised when comparing against other resources. This only leads to interpretations by the reader on the value of the amount of security and not clearly defines it. The dimension of what time also lack a clear definition in the Swedish policies regarding intelligence. It is said that the intelligence work is a continuous work, but is cannot be found defined as a policy. One can argue that Baldwins emphasise on the importance of defined time period should not be applied on the specific works of the intelligence agencies, but it does not justify an absence of a clear definition.

Baldwin did explain that not all of the dimensions need to be specified all of the time, but did emphasise that at least some indications on the dimensions of for whom, for which values, how much and from what threats. Considering this, the Swedish national policies on the security from the intelligence threat fails to clearly specify two of them, partly defines one, and only one of them is clearly specified. The conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that the concept of security, regarding the intelligence threat, is not clearly defined in Swedish policies and thus run the risk of being an ambiguous concept. This establishes an understanding of why Friberg's stresses that "The threat from foreign intelligence is also a security threat".

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