

Framing the Swedish Huawei Ban

A comparative case study of Chinese English-language and Swedish newspapers' framing of the Huawei ban in Sweden

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Abstract

This thesis examined and compared the framing of Swedish and Chinese English-language newspapers about the Huawei ban in Sweden. Drawing on Robert Entman (1993) definitions of framing and Bodystun et al. (2014) policy frames codebook. The empirical findings of this thesis finds that Swedish newspapers and Chinese English-language newspapers are framing the Huawei ban in Economic, Security and Defense, and Political frames with their own respective issue-specific framing per dimension. In addition, the tones of the Swedish newspapers were more negative than the Chinese English-language newspapers, which were overtly positive towards Huawei. The Chinese English-language newspapers were also found to rely more on selected experts' framing of the Huawei ban than the Swedish newspapers, which focused more on individuals' actions. The findings are significant as they partly confirm Yang and Kang (2020) text-mining study of Huawei frames in relation to national security; but also provides new information towards the emerging studies of framing Huawei.

Keywords: Huawei, Huawei ban, Framing, Media, Newspapers, Sweden, China.

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Abbreviations

CPC:	The Communist Party of China
Di:	Dagens Industri
DN:	Dagens Nyheter
IoT:	Internet of Things
LEK:	Law on Electrical Communication (Lag om Elektronisk Kommunikation)
WTO:	World Trade Organization
SvD:	Svenska Dagbladet
SÄPO:	Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen)
PTS:	Post and Telecom Authority (Post- och Telekomstyrelsen)
PLA:	People's Liberation Army
5G:	Fifth-Generation network

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	1
Acknowledgements.....	2
Abbreviations.....	3
List of Tables.....	6
List of Figures.....	6
1 Introduction.....	7
1.1 Background.....	8
1.1.1 Huawei.....	8
1.1.2 The ‘Huawei ban’.....	9
1.2 Research questions and aims of the thesis.....	11
1.3 Academic contribution.....	12
2 Literature review.....	13
2.1 Framing Huawei.....	13
2.2 The Swedish news media environment.....	14
2.3 The Chinese news media environment.....	14
2.4 China’s response towards the Huawei ban.....	16
3 Theoretical framework.....	18
3.1 Framing theory.....	18
4 Methodology.....	22
4.1 Research design.....	22
4.2 Framing analysis.....	22
4.2.1 Frame discovery: Policy frames coding codebook.....	23
4.3 Data collection.....	25
4.4 Reliability and validity.....	27
4.5 Reflexivity, Limitations, and Ethical considerations.....	28
5 Findings.....	30

5.1	Frames from the Swedish news articles.....	30
5.1.1	Economic frame.....	30
5.1.2	Security and Defense frame.....	32
5.1.3	Political frame.....	34
5.1.4	Law and order, crime and justice frame.....	36
5.1.5	Morality frames.....	37
5.1.6	External regulation and reputation frames.....	38
5.2	The tones of the Swedish articles.....	39
5.2.1	Negative tones.....	39
5.2.2	Neutral tones.....	40
5.2.3	Positive tones.....	40
5.3	The frames from the Chinese English-language newspapers.....	40
5.3.1	Economic frames.....	40
5.3.2	Security and Defense frames.....	43
5.3.3	Political frames.....	43
5.3.4	Law and order, crime and justice & Fairness and equality frames.....	44
5.4	The tones of the Chinese English-language articles.....	45
5.4.1	Positive tones.....	45
5.4.2	Neutral tones and Negative tones.....	45
6	Discussion.....	47
6.1	Swedish national newspapers.....	47
6.2	The Chinese English-language newspapers.....	50
6.3	Comparing Swedish framing versus Chinese framing.....	51
7	Conclusion.....	53
8	References.....	54
9	Appendix.....	71
9.1	The Policy Frames codebook: Frame dimensions from Bodystun et al. (2014).....	71

List of Tables

Table 1. Headings used for the coding process.....	25
Table 2. Keywords and settings used for retrieving Swedish articles	26
Table 3. Frequency and percentage of the Swedish frame dimensions	30
Table 4. Frequency and percentage over the Chinese English-language frame categories	40

List of Figures

Figure 1. Percentage and frequency of the Swedish articles' tones.....	39
Figure 2. Percentage and frequency over the tones in the Chinese English-language articles	45
Figure 3. Tones spread over the Swedish newspapers.....	48

1 Introduction

Since 2017, there has been increased friction between China and US under Trump administration. The friction has led to a full-on trade war, which has notably affected the technology sector negatively. The trade war between the two superpowers has caused big ripples in not only the smartphone (Huawei, 2020), semiconductor market (Finely, 2019) (Larkin, 2019), but also the telecommunications industry (Cherrayil, 2019). One Chinese company in particular had been targeted amidst the trade war – Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company known for their flagship smartphones that is being sold in many countries and been subject to much media attention and rumors about security breach concerns, especially in connection with 5G (O'Flaherty, 2019).

These rumors surrounding the brand have led to what has been branded the ‘Huawei ban’ by media, that is the direct and indirect ban of Huawei equipment by many countries fearing national security breaches. The bans have led to strained relations with China both diplomatically and economically wise, including a trade war between China and Australia (Srinivasan, 2020). Furthermore, the ban on Huawei and other Chinese tech companies, trade war with US and COVID-19 has led to a more negative view on China worldwide (Silver & Devlin, 2019) (Silver, et al., 2020).

Along with the anti-Chinese agenda brought on by the Trump administration and the global press focus on Huawei; Chinese technology has as a result been brought into attention more than ever before.

This begs the question of: How have the Western media framed Huawei? How have Chinese media responded to the Huawei ban, what is their framing of it?

To answer these questions this study uses Sweden’s Huawei ban as the case study. Sweden is an interesting case, since the country recently banned Huawei’s 5G equipment from being rolled out in the country’s infrastructure (Tiezzi, 2020). Furthermore, Sweden was the first and only country in Europe to date to specifically name a company as a national security risk in Europe (Tiezzi, 2020). Other European countries has not implemented full-on ban on Huawei to the same degree as Sweden (Fouquet & Drozdiak, 2020). It is documented that Sino-Swedish relations were increasingly strained before the Huawei ban (Thörnqvist, 2020). On top of that studies show that Sweden, especially the general public has grown a more negative picture of China (Silver, et al., 2020).

Despite its importance for the contemporary media and diplomatic landscape, this area is under-researched. There is a small but emerging literature on the frames employed by

English-language media on Huawei. However, there is a lack of representation of the frames employed by non-English-language media. The lack of representation leaves a lot of questions regarding non-English speaking countries framing of Huawei and leads to a skewed picture of that all countries frames Huawei in the same frames as English-language media. Furthermore, there is missing literature that takes into the account of all frames with Huawei instead of just national security frames. Not to mention that there is a lack of qualitative in-depth research regarding the frames surrounding Huawei and how the frames reflect on the Chinese bilateral relations.

This thesis provides a qualitative comparative case perspective of how Huawei is framed in a Western non-English speaking country's media by examining the Swedish media framing and comparing it to the Chinese English-language media framing of the Huawei ban.

1.1 Background

1.1.1 Huawei

Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., or Huawei, is a Chinese company that provides information and communication technology services such as build-out services of 5G network and smart devices such as smartphones, smart TVs and laptops, and more (Bloomberg, 2021) (Huawei, 2021). The company was founded in September 1987 by Ren Zhengfei the current director of Huawei. Ren was before Huawei a former deputy regimental chief in the People's Liberation Army (Huawei, 2021).

The company is the biggest network and telecommunications provider in the world, surpassing Ericsson in August 2012 (Economist, 2012). After seven years of the duopoly of Apple and Samsung at the top of the list of the world's largest smartphone seller; Huawei surpassed Apple and became the second-largest smartphone seller in the second quarter of 2018 (Gibbs, 2018). In July 2020, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and trade war with the US, Huawei surpassed Samsung for the first time and became the world's largest smartphone seller (Pham, 2020). Even with a strong second quarter in 2020, Huawei still had to sell off their low- to mid-end *Honor* smartphone brand to Shenzhen Zhixin New information technology Co., Ltd.; because of the difficulty of getting access to key smartphone parts caused by the US ban (Huawei, 2020). As of 2018, the company provides telecommunications services and products to up to 170 countries (McCaskill, 2019).

Despite the global commercial success that Huawei has had over the years, the company has faced some difficulties in some markets e.g. the US, for alleged state support in the form

of subsidies (Corcoran, 2019), connections with the People's Liberation Army (Allen-Ebrahimian & Dorfman, 2020), harsh work culture (Laufer & Fanta, 2021), providing services and assistance in the mass surveillance and detention of Uighurs in the re-education camps in Xinjiang (Harwell & Dou, 2020) (Kelly & Rodrigo, 2020) and cybersecurity concerns (Corcoran, 2019). Especially the claim of cybersecurity concerns has led to different kinds of direct and indirect bans on Huawei phones to equipment (Collines, 2018) (CRS, 2017). The bans have severely damaged China-US trade relations and resulted in a trade war between the two countries that is continuing as of writing.

1.1.2 The 'Huawei ban'

What is the 'Huawei ban'? There is not one right answer to this question as the definition differs depending on the country and context. 'Huawei ban' could refer to only the US bans or all global Huawei bans. For this section, 'Huawei ban' refers to the global Huawei ban.

The ban is broadly defined, as it could mean specific restrictions or urging towards not using Huawei products. For example, the Trump administration signed an executive order in 2017 that says that US Department of Defense is prohibited from using equipment, system and services from Huawei and ZTE (CRS, 2017), whilst Canada that has not formally banned Huawei has delayed the decision process to force telecom companies to exclude Huawei (Ljunggren, 2020). To understand how the 'Huawei ban' came about, it is important to look at different aspects of the Huawei ban, such as the technical, security, geopolitical, and economical aspects of the ban.

First, it is important to understand what 5G is, as 5G plays the center role in the Huawei ban. 5G is the fifth-generation mobile telecommunications technology, a wireless network that enables data to be transferred up to 20 times faster than the 4G network that is the existing standard as of 2021 (Wired, 2017) (Purkayastha, 2020). The buzz surrounding this new technology is its speed and massive data transferring capability that will enable gadgets to be able to communicate with one another over internet in real-time, also called Internet of Things (IoT). An example of this is self-driving cars and smart cities (Purkayastha, 2020). The 5G technology will not only be important for future technology and innovations, but it is also estimated to drive trillions of dollars of economic output for the installation of 5G networks over the next years (Purkayastha, 2020).

Second, the importance of the technology breeds national security concerns, because of risks such as data leakage and shutdowns of the network in case of war (Browler, 2020). Concerns like those are especially significant if the whole society, such as industries, hospitals

and other important infrastructure are going to be connected to 5G (Rayome, 2019) (O'Flaherty, 2019). With those fears among other reasons, the Trump administration decided to ban Chinese equipment, specifically pointing out Huawei and ZTE (CRS, 2017). Other US-allied countries such as UK, Australia, and Japan have followed suit (Hobbs, 2018) (Gold, 2020) (Denyer, 2018) (Tajima & Hadano, 2019). European countries have mixed opinions regarding Huawei, but Sweden and France have officially banned Huawei equipment from being used in the 5G infrastructure (Tiezzi, 2020).

Third, in connection to Huawei, it is important to have in mind the Chinese state's goals and plans. 5G are one of the Chinese government's focus places as of the thirteenth five-year plan (2016-2020) and the fourteenth five-year plan (2020-2025). In the five-year plans, the Chinese government recognizes that there is a need to shift towards more sustainable engines of growth that matches China's increasingly high-educated workforce (Koleski, 2017, p. 9). Another reason to the shift is because the government wants Chinese companies to become competitive in the global market, which is often dominated by western companies, mostly US, and to graduate from the country's prior reputation for low quality and counterfeit goods (Koleski, 2017, p. 11). Thus, the move from heavy industry and low-end manufacturing towards innovation and upgrading emerging industries such as artificial intelligence, 5G, biotechnology, robotics and more have been the focus of the Chinese government for the past years and the next upcoming years as well (Koleski, 2017, p. 11).

Fourth, the importance of being ahead in technology is an aspect that needs to be kept in mind when it comes to the Huawei ban. For example, EU has for a long time been criticized by its member countries for being slow with the roll out of 4G, which led to EU lagging behind the US and China in the tech area in the form of smartphone and app development (Finley, 2019) (Finley, 2018); but also in the field of artificial intelligence (Scott, 2020) (Candelon & Carlo, 2020). Thus, 5G is seen as a priority issue for many countries. However, critics have charged that early adoption of 5G is overrated and that it does not matter much if one country rolled out 5G a few months after the other (Finley, 2018). The example that was used to argue for this is the launch of 3G, in which Japan was the first to roll out with 3G in 1998 (docomo, 1999). Despite, Japan's early roll-out of the 3G, the US dominated the field of smartphone and app development since the release of iPhone in 2007 (Finley, 2018). Thus, the critics argue that the order of launch does not matter much, and that it's more of a geopolitical battle and the glory of who gets to launch it first (Finley, 2018). However, the importance of being in the lead in the next generation network are argued to be significant as it gives the country in lead a head-start in developing next generation of high-tech products

and services, not to mention the given ability to compete in the global technology market at an early stage (Mariani & Bertolini, 2019, p. 6) (Finley, 2018). Thus, there is a risk that late-adopting countries may be left behind as mentioned with the case of EU.

Fifth, the 5G market shares of Huawei and other Chinese tech companies are important in relation to the Huawei ban. For example, Huawei and ZTE have been some of the fore-faces when it comes to marketing 5G-compatible equipment internationally. Especially Huawei. Huawei has seen significant growth in the 2010s, aided by its ability to undercut competitors when it comes to prices (Calhoun, 2020), many international partnerships (McCaskill, 2019), and the success of its smartphone business (Pham, 2020). The big market shares that Huawei and ZTE have are threatening, especially towards US position as the lead in technology. Not to mention that as of 2021, the only major manufacturers of 5G equipment are the European rivals of Ericsson, Nokia, and the Korean Samsung; they, along with Huawei and ZTE, account for two-thirds of the overall 5G market (Purkayastha, 2020) (Grand View Research, 2020).

Lastly, the Chinese brands had an early dominance in the 5G market because of their aggressive pricing in comparison to their rivals. Thus, a lot of countries, in the beginning, thought and planned to use Huawei. However, in the light of US pressure and the bans, rivals such as Samsung, Ericsson and Nokia gained more contracts and traction globally over the Huawei bans.

1.2 Research questions and aims of the thesis

This study investigates how national Swedish newspapers and Chinese English-language newspapers have framed Huawei in relation to the Swedish Huawei ban.

The following research questions will be addressed in this study:

- How have the Swedish national newspapers framed the Huawei ban in the press?
- How have the Chinese English-language newspapers framed the Swedish Huawei ban?

1.3 Academic contribution

This thesis contributes to the emerging studies about the framing of Chinese enterprises in media such as Huawei - with the Swedish and the Chinese English-language newspapers' framing of the Huawei ban in Sweden. The body of literature for this topic is limited as of writing since the Huawei ban is a recent and an ongoing issue. Aside from contributing new information about the framing of Huawei in relation to the Swedish Huawei ban, this thesis inspired by other framing studies also provides a comprehensive framing methodology aside from existing Huawei framing literature on how to frame Huawei issues.

2 Literature review

Previous research on the framing of Huawei, the media environment in Sweden and China and China's responses towards the Huawei ban are brought up in this chapter.

2.1 Framing Huawei

In recent years, Huawei as a study subject has emerged. The interest in Huawei derives from its rise in the global market as one of the major players in 5G mobile communication infrastructure and equipment. Another factor is how the company has prompted national security concerns in the West. This has brought forward recent studies such as Kenneth C. C. Yang and Yowei Kang's (2020) text mining study of the framing of Huawei in national security debates. Aside from Yang and Kang's (2020) study, other studies had Huawei as their framing subject such as (Hawes, 2015) (Bach & Blake, 2016). Yet other studies have examined the geopolitics surrounding Huawei (Cartwright, 2020) (Waldemarsson & Löwenberg, 2020). As can be seen, there is an undersized, though emerging literature about Huawei. Most of the studies referenced above came out in 2020.

Yang and Yowei Kang's (2020) study in terms of its approach is the closest to this thesis among the available studies at this writing moment. The study by Yang and Kang (2020) used the concept of country animosity to show that there was a connection between the negative perception of China and Huawei. The text mining method that the study used to find frames, is a newly emerging method for communication scholars to study news frames in a non-subjective way than the traditional manual coding by hand that has been criticized for being subjective and hard to reproduce the same results by other framing studies (Bodystun, et al., 2014) (Entman, 1993). However, despite the positive aspects of the method, there are several issues regarding the privacy, legality, and data storage of mining the data (Yang & Kang, 2020, p. 326). When it comes to the data mined in the study, Yang and Kang (2020) focus only on newspapers in English and ignores countries that do not have English-language newspapers. Thus, the countries that are represented the most are the US, UK, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Chinese English-language newspapers (Yang & Kang, 2020, p. 327).

Therefore, this thesis chose the Huawei ban in Sweden as the case study. Sweden being one of the first countries in Europe to explicitly ban Huawei and ZTE from its 5G infrastructure is interesting to examine because of the explicit mention (Tiezzi, 2020). Furthermore, Sweden's newspapers, especially the national newspapers are not in English. Thus, the Swedish framing of Huawei was not covered by Yang and Kang's (2020) text

mining study. On top of that this thesis wanted to make a more extensive analysis of the found frames to understand the frames context, which Yang and Kang's (2020) study just briefly touched upon.

2.2 The Swedish news media environment

The media environment in Sweden is based on the democratic fundamentals of freedom of expression and belief (Vries, 2020, p. 10), and are free and independent from the state (Freedom house, 2020). The media are assessed by government organs such as Granskningsnämnden, to see if the media is following the constitution. However, there are also self-regulated instances such as Allmänhetens Medieombudsman (MO) and Mediernas Etiknämnd (ME) that also assess the media (Vries, 2020, p. 10). The mentioned instances are mostly for radio and tv, but it applies to the press as well.

The market of press media is based on a free-market model and are privately owned. Meaning that media companies, both international and domestic ones, are free to own, compete, buy, and produce newspapers. However, since 2008 new ways of consuming news media such as social media has hastened the consolidation of the Swedish press media market, leaving only a handful of media companies owning the 130 existing newspapers (Olsson, 2020, p. 44). In 2019, it was documented that big media companies such as Bonniers, Amedia and Schibsted had significantly bought up a lot of smaller media concerns such as Mittmedia, Stampen Lokala Medier and more, all over the country (Olsson, 2020, p. 44). The buy-ups of smaller media concerns has to do with the increased digitalization of news media, and the decreased advertisement in newspapers (Olsson, 2020, p. 44). The government subsidizes daily newspapers regardless of their political affiliation for the sake of there being a selection of newspapers to choose from (Freedom house, 2020). Since 2020, Bonniers AB and the Norwegian media conglomerate Schibsted owns some of the biggest newspapers in Sweden such as the Dagens Nyheter, Expressen, Dagens Industri, Sydsvenska Dagbladet, Aftonbladet and Svenska Dagbladet (Olsson, 2020, p. 45). All of the mentioned big newspapers are all liberal (DN, 2021) (Expressen, 2021) (Sydsvenskan, 2021), except for Aftonbladet, Svenska Dagbladet and Dagens Industri that are social democratic (Aftonbladet, 2021), conservative (SvD, 2021) and independent (Di, 2021) in their political alignment.

2.3 The Chinese news media environment

Under chapter 2 of the fundamental rights and duties of citizens in China's constitution, it is stated in the article 35 that the "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration." (gov.cn,

2019). Despite that it is written in the constitution that there is freedom of speech and press, the media environment is heavily supervised by the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Freedom house, 2020). The CPC has an extensive and direct ownership of media agencies and news media outlets, such as the domestic Xinhua news agency, China International Publishing Group, and Australia's Pacific times and New Zealand's Chinese Herald etc. (Alviani, 2021).

Censorship and control over social media and websites are notorious for the Chinese media environment. The state management of the telecommunications infrastructure enables blocking, removal of both domestic and international smartphone applications and websites, such as Facebook, Google, Twitter etc. Furthermore, it enables the deletion of social media posts and user accounts that do not align with the CPC's opinions or that writes sensitive topics regarding politics, religion and more (Freedom house, 2020).

Ownership of printed media are more liberal in its structure compared to other media such as audiovisual media and telecommunications sectors (Hang, 2016, pp. 742-743). The General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) regulates print media; however, the CPC does not claim ownership over the print media companies. But there are exceptions, examples are People's Daily and Xinhua News Agency's Reference News, two newspapers that existed before the founding of People's Republic of China and are of importance to the CPC (Hang, 2016, p. 742). The ownership for books and magazines is more "liberal" compared to the newspapers because the ownership is not claimed by the CPC entities. Despite that the GAPP regulates all three of them and that the Publicity Department of the Communist Party oversees the media content (Hang, 2016, p. 742).

The consolidation of media groups when it comes to newspapers are on municipal and national level. Examples are Guangzhou Daily Group and People's Daily Group (Hang, 2016, p. 743).

The People's Daily Group publishes People's Daily newspaper and Global Times, both targets different audiences and have different political stances. The Global times focuses more on international news and has a relatively liberal political stance compared to People's Daily that strictly aligns itself with the CPC (Hang, 2016, p. 743). Another notable newspaper that relates to this thesis research is China Daily, a newspaper that targets a non-Chinese audience and is solely in English, its political stance is like Global times more liberal while still aligning itself with CPC views (Alviani, 2021).

2.4 China's response towards the Huawei ban

The literature on how China responds to issues is fragmented and scarce. Literature that leans towards this topic mostly concerns political studies (Zheng & Keat, 2007), communication studies (Wu & Zhao, 2016), energy policy studies (Zhang, et al., 2017) and government policy studies (Wallace, J. L., 2014) etc. As of early 2021 there are yet any literature on China's response towards the Huawei ban. Thus, this thesis will instead provide an overview over the responses China has made towards the Huawei ban on a global level.

The response from China towards the Huawei ban has taken form in different ways towards different countries, such as warnings towards other countries and companies through statements by state representatives, banning certain companies in retaliation, delayed imported goods, and complaining to the World Trade Organization.

In August 2018 Australia banned Huawei from their 5G network. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang responded towards the ban and said:

“We are gravely concerned by the statement issued by the Australian government. Instead of exploiting all kinds of excuses to create hurdles and taking discriminatory measures, we urge the Australian side to abandon political biases and create a sound environment for fair competition for Chinese enterprises in Australia.” (Hobbs, 2018).

Similar statements from the foreign ministry were made towards the Japanese ban (Tajima & Hadano, 2019) (Denyer, 2018), UK ban (Gold, 2020), Swedish ban (Bloomberg, 2020), French ban (Doffman, 2020), US ban (Chen & Young-Lee, 2019) (Kuo & Siddiqui, 2019). Countries such as Germany (Czuczka & Arons, 2019) and India (Reuters, 2019) that have not banned Huawei yet and are contemplating the decision are threatened with sanctions and retaliation if they do. Companies that are Huawei's competitors such as Ericsson and Nokia have been used as leverage if EU bans or do not drop the bans (Doffman, 2020).

In April 2019, the Chinese state complained to the World Trade Organization about the Australian ban on Huawei. The complaint by the Chinese state told the WTO that the restriction on Chinese companies such as Huawei was “obviously discriminative” and goes against global trade rules of non-discrimination (Korporaal, 2019). The actions that Australia took towards restricting Chinese 5G technology would according to the Chinese representative at the WTO's Council on Trade in Goods make “a great impact on international trade” (Korporaal, 2019). However, WTO ruled that Australia had the right to ban Huawei on the basis of national security, and that it was within the WTO rules. Under the same period, China had slowed down imports from Australia in the form of hold ups of coal and wine at

the ports (Korporaal, 2019), delayed containers at the customs and most recently in November 2020, put tariffs up to 200 percent on Australian wine (Gross, 2020). Tariffs is not only exclusive for Australia as US goods has also been affected by this. However, the difference is that China put tariffs on US goods as a retaliation against US 25 percent tariffs (Chen & Young-Lee, 2019).

The Chinese state has created a “unreliable entity list” in 2020 as a combined retaliation towards the Huawei ban worldwide, trade war with US, US ban of other Chinese tech companies such as Tiktok and ZTE. The list puts foreign firms and individuals that could potentially affect or damage the interests of domestic companies (Bloomberg, 2019).

Lastly, this thesis hopes to fill some of the gaps mentioned in this chapter by providing extensive framing analysis and new information of Swedish newspapers’ framing of the Huawei ban in Sweden and comparing it to the Chinese English-language newspapers’ framing of it.

3 Theoretical framework

In this chapter, the framing theory and definitions used in the study are presented.

3.1 Framing theory

Framing research is an interesting research field as there is a lack of commonly shared theories and definitions on what framing entails (Scheufele, 1999). Despite its theoretical vagueness, research on framing is popular and is adopted by disciplines outside of communications such as psychology, behavioral economics, political science, and sociology (Cacciatore, et al., 2016). Furthermore, there are attempts by researchers in political communication to form common definitions and theories that hope to ease scholars through the framing jungle (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Goffman, 1974; Entman, 1993; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Scheufele, 1999, etc.).

The framing of mass media is constructivist as the communicator of a text, speech, any form of communication relies on the audiences. According to Neuman et al. (1992), the audiences rely on “a version of reality built from personal experience, interaction with peers, and interpreted selections from the mass media” (p. 120; Scheufele 1999, p. 105).

A frame consists of the following four framing functions according to Entman (1993, p.52):

“define problems-determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values;

diagnose causes-identify the forces creating the problem;

make moral judgments-evaluate causal agents and their effects; and

suggest remedies-offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects.”.

The four framing functions can be found in communicating texts in the form of what Entman (1993) named as the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture (p. 52). The communicator being, for example a journalist that consciously or unconsciously decides what to say with the guidance of the frames. The text points to the frames used, which are indicative of there being or lack of certain keywords, stereotyped images, information sources, stock phrases, and sentences that reinforces judgments. For example, in a war frame, the mention of military or concurring phrases could be indications of the frame (Entman, 1993, p. 52). The receiver alludes to the audience that receives the frames from the communicating texts that may or may not make a conclusion that reflects the framing in the text and the

framing intention of the communicator. The culture alludes to what Entman (1993) describes as “the stock of commonly invoked frames”, such as cold war frames, economic frames and more.

Entman (1993) points out that the four framing functions may be found in a single or many sentences in a text. However, it may not necessarily include all four of the functions (p. 53). In some cases, the four framing functions may not be found at all in the sentences. Thus, it depends on the communicating text and context.

Priming, agenda-setting, and framing are common words and concepts mentioned with framing. Before going into the discussions of this the words will be defined. First, priming is described as how an individual receives and processes information that leads them to change their standards to judge political evaluations (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, p. 63). For example, when the individual makes judgments and attitudes for a topic or an issue, it is assumed that the individuals judge other people or issues based on information that is easily retrievable from their memory. Priming is based on the psychological concepts of priming and memory-based models of information processing (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Tulving & Watkins, 1975 in Scheufele, 2000).

Second, agenda-setting on the other hand is the process of setting the agenda, one could think of it as the process before the priming happens when the information is selected for the individual to process. Within a media context, agenda-setting is the idea of emphasizing certain media issues towards the audience (Scheufele, 2000).

Lastly, framing is described as a process of selection and salience, a process in which the communicator makes a conscious or unconscious decision of framing a judgment in text. Selection is the act of “framing”, it involves selecting one or more aspects of a certain reality and make it more apparent to the audience or in Entman’s words “salient” in a communicating text (Entman, 1993, p. 52). The appearance of “salience” can be in the form of repetition or placement of certain keywords, symbols, phrases, and so on, but it could also be the lack of it too (Entman, 1993, p. 53). The text contains the frames that guide the receiver’s thinking (Entman, 1993, p. 52). However, it is important to clarify that even though framing studies show the frames present in a communicating text, it does not guarantee that it will influence the audience's thinking.

There is a debate on whether all three of the mentioned concepts are extensions of agenda-setting or separate theories altogether. According to Weaver et al. (1998) and

McCombs et al. (1997) and Price et al. (1997) priming and framing are natural extensions of agenda-setting, as Price et al. (1997) summarizes:

“Agenda setting looks on story selection as a determinant of public perceptions of issue importance and, indirectly through priming, evaluations of political leaders. Framing focuses not on which topics or issues are selected for coverage by the news media, but instead on the particular ways those issues are presented.” (p. 184)

On the other hand, Scheufele (2000) thinks that all three of them should be considered separately and should not be put into a single theoretical framework. Scheufele (1999), Entman (1993), Pan and Kosicki (1993), McNamara (1992) argues similarly that the reason for the vagueness and lack of common theoretical models is because researchers are using the same terminology but incorporating it into the same theoretical models that do not help to clarify the vagueness surrounding media effects research, such as what Weaver et al. (1998) and McCombs et al. (1997) tries to do. Thus, leading to Scheufele’s (2000) theoretical premises of agenda-setting, priming, and framing – an attempt at setting the premises for what is argued as three separate theoretical models.

The results are that the premises of agenda-setting and priming are compatible to be put together in a single theoretical framework that also includes Cobb and Elder’s (1971) agenda building or what Rogers et al. (1993) call media agenda-setting. The single theoretical framework looks like the following:

Agenda-building (beginning of creating the emphasized media) =>

Agenda-setting (process from media to audience’s memory) =>

Priming (influences an individual judgment about a political actor).

On the other hand, framing was seen as a separate framework of itself. It is what Entman (1993) clarified in his article called “Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm” in which he laid out the theoretical framework of framing research. In the framework is also frame-building a concept that examines the potential influences, ideological or political orientations, norms, and values, etc. that may affect communicators such as journalists in with their framing (Tuchman 1978; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Furthermore, individual-level frames are what Entman (1993) describes as “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information” (p. 53). The framework for framing looks like the following according to Entman (1993) and Scheufele (2000):

Frame-building (what influences the journalists) =>

Frame-setting (the guiding process from the media frames towards the audience) =>

Individual-level of framing (how the individual will frame it).

The framework by Entman (1993) and Scheufele (2000) is strongly relevant to this thesis since this thesis wants to understand how the Swedish and Chinese framing of Huawei can potentially lead one into different frames of perceiving and thinking about Huawei as a company. The other framework by Cobb and Elder (1971) and Rogers et al. (1993) does not capture the purpose of this study as the framework by Entman (1993) and Scheufele (2000), because of the priming level. Furthermore, much literature builds upon Robert M. Entman's (1993) definition of framing (Scheufele, 1999, Pan & Kosicki 1993, Bodystun et al., 2014).

Thus, the use of the framework by Entman (1993) and Schefuele (2000), and the definitions of frames and framing by Entman (1993) was deemed to be suitable for this study's purposes.

4 Methodology

In this chapter, the overall research design will be elaborated upon. Framing analysis, how data was collected and, as well as issues of reliability and validity will be presented and discussed.

4.1 Research design

This study is a qualitative research on framing analysis of a comparative case study. Designed in consideration of Scheufele's (2000) way of framing research, and the Policy frames codebook by Amber E. Bodystun et al. (2014) and Entman's (1993) definitions of framing. The research was inherently inductive in its nature.

The positions that this study took are the following. First, this study positioned itself opposite of a natural science epistemology and adopted an interpretivist one, which believes that the study of the social world requires a different logic of research procedure to the positivist epistemology that the natural science adopts (Bryman, 2016, p. 26). Second, this study considers that the nature of social entities is not considered objective entities that have a reality external to social actors, rather it believes that the social entities are constructs built from the interaction of social actors (Bryman, 2016, p. 28).

4.2 Framing analysis

Framing analysis based on Robert Entman (1993) and Amber E. Bodystun et al. (2014) was used in this study. More specifically this study's methodology used Entman's (1993) definitions on the framing process as per defined in the theory section. On top of that, Bodystun et al. (2014) Policy Frames codebook was used as a method to code the data and analyze it along with the theory based on the framing theory of Entman (1993).

The reason for choosing Bodystun et al. (2014) way of framing analysis is because of the flexibility of the policy frame codebook. Not only is the codebook designed for both human and automated content analysis (pp. 7-8), but it also provides an established categorizing system for framing cues across policy issues. There are other frame schemas in the world of framing research (Iyengar, 1991; McCombs 2002; Baumgartner et al., 2008), however, they are either too issue-general or issue-specific in nature to be used commonly (Bodystun, et al., 2014, p. 6). Thus, the Policy frames codebook by Bodystun et al. (2014) provides a schema that can be used for both issue-general and issue-specific approaches to categorizing frame cues.

Framing analysis consists of two parts: frame discovery and frame analysis. First, in the instance of frame discovery, it is to identify what Amber E. Bodystun et al. (2014) describes as ‘/.../catalogue of frames in a political discourse about a particular issue (p.2). A process that is used along with the Policy frames codebook. Second, after discovering the frames through coding the frame cues based on the codebook, the frames will then be textually analyzed (Bodystun, et al., 2014, p. 2).

4.2.1 Frame discovery: Policy frames coding codebook

The policy frames codebook is a framing analysis method proposed by Amber E. Bodystun et al. (2014). The coding scheme is used to code data such as news articles into different pre-existing categories (see appendix 9.1) that Bodystun et al. (2014) has created and tested. Furthermore, the codebook is created to be used as a general system for categorizing frame cues across policy issues, but also for specific issues that require more in-depth coding (Bodystun, et al., 2014, p. 6).

The point with the policy frames coding scheme is to ease the researcher in their research and make framing measurable in the form of coding frames. The policy frames codebook has three main points: 1) to see the frame development over a period, 2) discover frames in the medium, and 3) to see how the frames will spread or have spread to different mediums (Bodystun, et al., 2014).

To answer our research questions, the data was coded following the schema Bodystun et al. (2014) have provided. The coding looked at text cues in the textual mediums to sort it into the right frame. For example, a sentence that alludes to a certain frame or a word that has recurred in the text that can be connected to a frame.

In Bodystun et al. (2014), it was recommended that one should code for additional frames outside the primary frame, to get more frame dimensions that will lead to a more nuanced discussion (p. 8).

After having tracked for frame cues in the text according to the frame categories, it is possible to code additionally – tracking the tone and position cue of each text (Bodystun, et al., 2014, p. 9). The additional coding allows the researcher to study implicit frames (Bodystun, et al., 2014, p. 9). The tones that Bodystun et al. (2014) used were three tones: Positive tone, Negative tone, and Neutral tone. Each tone has a certain position of view as illustrated by the following example provided by Bodystun et al. (2014, p. 9):

“Positive tone: Immigration and immigrants' rights are portrayed in a positive light or from a generally sympathetic point of view, so that immigrant advocates and supporters of less restrictive immigration laws would be pleased to see the news article.

Negative tone: Immigration and immigrants' rights are portrayed in a negative light or in a non-sympathetic manner, so that immigrant advocates and supporters of less restrictive immigration laws would be disappointed or upset to see the news article.

Neutral tone: Immigration and immigrants' rights are portrayed using both positive and negative tones that balance each other out, or the news article does not appear to discuss the issue either positively or negatively.”

In the example, Bodystun et al. (2014) put themselves in the position of the immigrants and imagined how they would react towards each tone. Following this pattern, this study applied the tones by using Huawei’s viewpoint in place of the immigrants that Bodystun et al. (2014) used. The tones and position cues for the coded data are the following three tones.

- Positive tone: Huawei is portrayed in a positive light; Huawei employees, and/or executives is pleased to see the news article as the article aligns with Huawei’s view on the issue.
- Negative tone: Huawei is portrayed in a negative light; Huawei employees, and/or executives is not pleased to see the news article as the article’s portrayal does not align itself with Huawei’s view on the issue.
- Neutral tone: Huawei is portrayed both positively and negatively in the article that balances each other out, or the news article does not appear to discuss the issue positively nor negatively.

All the data related to the frames was coded into a so-called coding schedule to simplify the analysis that followed (Bryman, 2016, p. 293). The coding schedule used to discover the frames in this study is based upon a combination of Bodystun et al. (2014) and Bryman (2016, p. 294). The following table (Table 1.) was used to code the frames and tones of the data:

Article number			
Newspaper organization			
Newspaper/digital article			
Article title			
Date of the article			
Author, Co-author			
Position of news item			
Tone			
Tone indicator			
Primary frame			
Secondary frame			
Primary frame Indicators			
Secondary frame Indicators			

Table 1. Headings used for the coding process

4.3 Data collection

The research questions in this study are focused on how Swedish and Chinese newspapers' frame Huawei in relation to the Huawei ban. Therefore, the primary data selected for this study is news articles. Secondary data relevant to the analyzation of the primary data, such as articles, documents and journals was also used. The primary data was collected from a database and the secondary data was collected from websites.

The primary data was drawn from the three national Swedish morning newspapers: Dagens Nyheter, Svenska Dagbladet, and Dagens Industri. The three-morning newspapers were chosen, because of their big subscription base in Sweden: Svenska Dagbladet (220 800 total subscribers) (Sifo, 2019), Dagens Nyheter (350 000 total subscribers) (Opitz, 2021), Dagens Industri (around 100 000 subscribers) (Di, 2020). In addition to that, they were chosen since they are the only newspapers considered to be national newspapers in Sweden.

The newspapers were accessed through a database called Retriever Research that archives all published news articles from all newspapers in Sweden. In the search engine of

the database, the time frame of the articles was set from 2020-06-01 to 2021-03-01. Thereafter, the keywords in the following table were used to bring up relevant articles.

Keywords and settings used to find relevant Swedish articles in the Retriever Research database	
All these words included	Huawei
Should include at least one of these words	Sverige, Kina, svenska, bannlyst, bannlyste, portad, bannlysning, förbud
Exclude articles that have any of these words	Börsen, börsuppgång, aktie, aktier, Alibaba, Jack Ma, coronavaccin, Samsung, Apple, WHO, Premier league, säkerhetslag, Tiktok, Donald, Volvo, kurslyft, lönetoppen
Articles found	Printed: Dagens Nyheter (53), Svenska Dagbladet (79), Dagens Industri (70) Digital: dn.se, (55), svd.se premium (84) Di.se plus (41)
Total articles found	382 articles
Total articles left after sorting	119 articles

Table 2. Keywords and settings used for retrieving Swedish articles

The reasons for the time frame are because Huawei got banned in October 2020 from participating in the auctions for 5G in Sweden (TT, 2020). By looking at the reporting four months before and after October 2020 lets us see how Huawei was framed during this eventful period and if there were any changes or noticeable high points in framing.

The decision to study both printed and digital subscription articles is because a large percentage of the Swedish population reads their news on the online version of the newspapers (TU, 2016) (Andersson, 2020). However, a significant percentage are also using the printed version to stay updated, hence why both are included. The special digital subscription articles were included, since if the people read online, especially when it comes to Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet, they certainly would have a subscription since the articles require one to be subscribed to be able to read.

Initially, there were 382 articles, however, upon sorting the data a lot of the articles were discarded as irrelevant or as duplicates. The reason being that a portion of the articles were advertisements or was about another topic that briefly mentioned Huawei or the ban and did

not go further into it. Thus, in the end, 119 articles were left. The same reason is behind the exclusion of certain words from the search (see table 2.) to avoid even more advertisements, duplicates and articles not related to this study.

The other primary data that was collected was Chinese English-language newspaper articles. The newspapers that were chosen was the following three: Global times, Peoples' daily and China Daily. These three newspapers were chosen because they are national newspapers in China. Furthermore, these three newspapers are popular news sites that targets an international audience with their English articles. Another noteworthy mention is that this study only had access to internet articles from these newspapers' websites. Hence, only the digital articles of these newspapers were collected.

The three newspapers are all state media. For example, People's daily is owned by the central committee of the Chinese communist party and is considered one of the official newspapers of China (People's daily, 2021) (Fish, 2017). Global times that are published by the same group behind People's Daily has a more liberal political stance, however is still under the party (Alviani, 2021) (Hang, 2016). China Daily is owned by the Chinese communist party and controlled by the party as well (Lams, 2017, p. 3) (Landay, 2020). Thus, the opinion of the articles directly reflects the Chinese state's opinion on the Swedish Huawei ban.

The keywords that were used in the newspapers' search engines were like the keywords used for the Swedish newspapers: 'Huawei' 'Sweden' 'ban'. The time frame was the same as well, to see how Chinese media responded towards the Swedish reporting at the same time frame.

In total, there were 20 articles found after sorting out irrelevant ones. As can be seen there is a significant difference between how many articles found compared to the Swedish newspapers. However, since the ban happened in October 2020, it makes sense that the reporting of the ban in Sweden was non-existent before this month. Thus, explains the lesser number of articles.

4.4 Reliability and validity

The reliability of the data and its sources are validated and assessed through John Scott's four criteria (1990, p. 6 in Bryman 2016, p. 546). The criteria consist of: Authenticity, Credibility, Representativeness and Meaning. Authenticity asks the question if the evidence comes from a genuine and trustworthy place. Credibility assesses whether the evidence itself is trustworthy, does it have any errors in it, for example is the content credible? Representativeness looks

towards the evidence whether it is commonly found, created or not. Leading to the last criteria, Meaning, which assesses if the evidence is comprehensible or not, and if there are any potential hidden meanings lying in the evidence (Bryman, 2016, p. 546). The news articles, documents, internet sources are all assessed using these criteria.

4.5 Reflexivity, Limitations, and Ethical considerations

The positionality of the researcher in this study must be addressed as it is crucial, especially since this study have an interpretivist epistemology that recognizes that researchers are a part of the social world that are being researched and is constantly interpreted by other existing social actors (Gary & Holmes, 2020, p. 3). Following this, I believe that my Chinese ethnicity, upbringing in the Swedish society and cultural upbringing have an influence on the choice of this study, how this study was formed and how the results were interpreted, in the form of unconscious stereotypes, biases towards non-western and western countries.

Every study strives to be as objective as possible, however, in a qualitative framing study such as this study and how hands-on the researcher must be with the data it is hard to not let one's biases influence the results. For example, the western biases that I have from my upbringing in a western country such as Sweden are shown in for example the choices of sources, collection of data, language of the thesis and the interpretation of the data. Therefore, this thesis acknowledges that there is an unavoidable subjective western bias that permeates throughout this thesis.

This study had two main limitations, 1) the Chinese articles were significantly fewer than the Swedish articles, 2) the words used to find the data could be more extensive, however for practical reasons other words were used to not risk of wading through advertisements.

The subjectivity of the study was also a concern since I was the only one coding and interpreting the data. However, since the policy frame codebook was used as the coding manual, it eliminated part of the subjectivity when it came to frame discovery since the coding was not fully based on the researcher's subjectivity, but more on the data itself (Bodystun, et al., 2014). Although, the codebook relieves a bit of the subjectivity, there are no method that can take away the subjectivity 100 percent. As Gary and Holmes (2020) says “/.../no matter how much reflexive practice a researcher engages in, there will always still be some form of bias or subjectivity.” (p. 4), which this study believes in.

When it comes to limitations of the study, there were many news articles about Huawei that could not make it into this study, since this study focused solely on the Huawei ban. If the

study looked at a broader range of media coverage of Huawei overall, rather than being restricted to only the Huawei ban, this study might have yielded partly different results.

Ethical considerations were taken by following the Swedish Research Council's guidelines for research ethics (CRB, 2021). They were taken in the form of not singling out journalists and naming them in the thesis to safeguard their right to privacy and consent as human beings. The reason for the considerations is because of the vague line of whether a journalist is considered a private- or a public figure (McArthur-Self, 2021). Company executives and political authority figures are public figures (Council of Europe, 2018) and are therefore used and named liberally in this thesis.

5 Findings

In this chapter, the findings of the study will be presented and discussed. The chapter start with the frames of the Swedish news articles and the tones detected from them, which is followed by the frames from the Chinese English-language news articles and their respective tones.

5.1 Frames from the Swedish news articles

Frame dimensions	Primary frames	Secondary frames	Combined frequency	Percentage
Economic	48	23	71	33%
Security and Defense	27	34	61	29%
Political	33	13	46	22%
Law and order, crime and justice	10	10	20	10%
Morality	0	8	8	4%
External regulation and Reputation	1	4	5	2%
Total of frames			211	

Table 3. Frequency and percentage of the Swedish frame dimensions

A total of six frames out of the codebook's 15 frames were present in the articles. The table 3 presents the total number of primary- and secondary frames found in the news articles. In which the Economic frame was the most present followed by the Security and Defense frame.

5.1.1 Economic frame

The economic frame in Bodystun et al.'s (2014) codebook is described as "the costs, benefits, or monetary/financial implications of the issue (to an individual, family, community, or the economy as a whole)." (see 9.1). This frame was the most present in the articles, and had 33% out of all the frames, or 71 out of 211 frames. In this frame, a lot of recurring keywords, and issue-specific frames were found with the Huawei ban. I will present the context and analyze the following three issue-specific frames in the economic frame: worry towards the Swedish market, monetary loss for telecom actors, speculations about Chinese sanctions towards Swedish companies.

Worry towards the Swedish market

Recurring words such as investment, free trade, trade, bidding, jobs were found in the articles whether the economic frame was the primary frame or not. The context in which these words recurred was a worry of authors of the articles and actors from the telecom business that the ban on Huawei would affect the Chinese investment in the Swedish market and business relations (Björkman, 2020) (Törnwall, 2020) that would potentially affect the job market as well. The bidding refers to the planned 5G auction that got suspended for three months because of the ban on Huawei, which was one of the main topics that recurred in this frame. The worry of the suspension of the 5G auction was prevalent mostly amongst the affected actors of the telecom sector, such as the operator Tre (Törnwall, 2020).

Monetary loss for telecom actors

The actors of the telecom industry that was in the 5G auction had comments about the ban. The statements that they did about Huawei were all within the economic frame, related to the monetary implications and costs of the ban (Liu & Fredriksen, 2020) (Mothander, 2020) (Mothander, 2020). An actor that reoccurred a lot with Huawei in the articles was the Swedish telecom company and one of Huawei's main competitors, Ericsson. The competitor is mentioned in relation to Huawei's monetary loss caused by the ban (Strandberg & Andersson, 2020) (Törnwall, 2020).

The other telecom actors that used Huawei or planned on using Huawei 5G equipment, complained about the unfair treatment they got from the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (abbreviated as PTS in Swedish), and how it would affect them economically (Strandberg, 2021) (Björkman, 2020) (Wande, 2020) (Törnwall, 2020). The executive vice-president of Huawei Sweden - Kenneth Fredriksen in combination with the telecom actors' comments and complaints towards PTS would also come forth in these contexts to argue against PTS's decision of not being fair against Huawei's and their own business (Mothander, 2020) (Liu & Fredriksen, 2020) (Mothander, 2020).

Speculations about potential Chinese sanctions

In this frame, there were a lot of recurring speculations about potential Chinese sanctions or boycotts towards Swedish companies, more specifically towards Ericsson, because of the Huawei ban (Rex, 2020). The speculation about the Chinese sanctions is often written in relation to statements, interviews, and comments from what the articles deem as an aggressive and threatening tone from the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian and the Chinese ambassador Gui Congyou in Sweden (Öjemar, 2020) (Nilsson, 2020) (Rosell, 2021)

(Larsson Hultin, 2021). Furthermore, in this context, the salience of Chinese retaliations on other countries is also significant as they go hand in hand with the comments from the Chinese spokespersons. To this context, Ericsson's vice-president Börje Ekholm and the Wallenberg family that is famously known for their investments, and for having the biggest share in Ericsson are highlighted in the articles as being the ones that the sanctions will affect the most (Forsberg, 2021) (Strandberg, 2021). The reason being that 10% of Ericsson's overall monetary gains comes from the Chinese markets (Törnwall, 2020) (Fröberg, 2021) (Mothander, 2021) (Mothander, 2020).

5.1.2 Security and Defense frame

This frame was the second most prevalent amongst the news articles. It represented 29% out of all the detected frames. Following the codebook of Bodystun et al. (2014), the indications of a Security and Defense frame are described as "Security, threats to security, and protection of one's person, family, in-group, nation, etc. Generally, an action or a call to action that can be taken to protect the welfare of a person, group, nation sometimes from a not yet manifested threat." (see 9.1). Amongst the articles, the security and defense frame recurred most in the form of the following three issue-specific frames: Huawei an outreached arm of the Chinese state, national security, and industrial espionage.

Huawei an outreached arm of the Chinese state

In this issue-specific frame, Huawei is mentioned in relation to cyberespionage, military and intelligence gathering. Huawei is as the articles put it "an outreached arm of the Chinese state" (DN, 2021) (Ljungberg & Huikuri, 2020) (Hallander & Roxs, 2020). The Chinese national security law is referenced or mentioned indirectly or directly in 13 out of 119 articles in relation to this frame. The news articles do not explicitly state what article of the law they mean in order to keep the news piece concise. However, what they describe correlates to article 7 and article 14 in the law, but also article 10 (Fredriksen & Oksanen, 2021) (Larsson & Fröberg, 2021) (DN, 2020).

“Article 7: All organizations and citizens shall support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts in accordance with law, and shall protect national intelligence work secrets they are aware of. The State protects individuals and organizations that support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts.

Article 10: As necessary for their work, national intelligence work institutions are to use the necessary means, tactics, and channels to carry out intelligence efforts, domestically and abroad.

Article 14: National intelligence work institutions lawfully carrying out intelligence efforts may request that relevant organs, organizations, and citizens provide necessary support, assistance, and cooperation.” (NPCSC, 2017) (China law translate, 2017)

These all boil down to that Huawei as a Chinese company whether it is placed in China or outside China is required to assist and cooperate with the Chinese state if the national intelligence work institutions ask for it. This interpretation of the law is prevalent amongst the articles and guides the reader to connect Huawei as an espionage organization that will and could share their information with the Chinese state. The salience on Huawei being an espionage organization gets highlighted with the repeated mentions of cyberespionage and intelligence gathering. However, the word, military, is connected to this context as well highlighting that the People’s Liberation Army will gain from the information that is shared with the Chinese state. Thus, the scale of the manifested security risk of having Huawei in the 5G infrastructure is presented as a matter of national security.

National security

National security is a frequent topic in relation to Huawei in the Security and defense frame. An example of this is a comment from the digital minister of Sweden - Anders Ygeman to telecom actors that complained about the Huawei ban: “National security takes precedence over the fact that the competition is decreasing.” (Strandberg, 2021). The overall frame of this comment that national security is more important than the economy is prevalent in connection with articles that involve actors that pushed for the ban, such as Post and Telecom Authority (PTS) the Armed forces of Sweden, and the Swedish security service (abbreviated as SÄPO in

Swedish) (DN, 2021). The manifested threat that these actors make out of Huawei is its background as a Chinese company and how the company has had numerous rumors and cases in which technology theft and espionage were involved (Sinclair & J., 2020) (Strandberg, 2021) (Oksanen, 2021). The significance that this issue-specific frame comes from security actors and is reinforced by the journalists, directs the readers to connect Huawei as a danger to the 5G infrastructure and the whole country. However, the EU toolbox for cybersecurity is referenced in the same context as a guide to especially not ban companies fully from participating in critical infrastructure (Strandberg, 2021). Actors from the trade sector and journalists from Di use the EU toolbox as a counter to the Huawei ban and critic towards the security actors. By referencing and mentioning the EU gives the parties more legitimacy towards the arguments against the security actors that already have high authority. Thus, the readers are exposed to more viewpoints on the issue and not only exposed to security authorities' framing. However, using the EU toolbox for cybersecurity as an argument, proves the argument that Huawei is a danger to the country. Hence, the encouragement towards the readers to consider Huawei as a national security issue remains in place.

Industrial espionage

Lastly, industrial espionage is a recurring issue-specific frame related to Huawei in this frame. The connection is drawn by the salience of previous cases in which Huawei was suspected and taken to court in Sweden and other countries such as the US for stealing technology. The highlighting of these cases guides the reader to connect Huawei as a threat and danger to the Swedish tech industry.

5.1.3 Political frame

The third most prevalent frame amongst the articles is the political frame that is 22% out of all the frames. The political frame is defined as “Any political considerations surrounding an issue. Issue actions or efforts or stances that are political, such as partisan filibusters, lobbyist involvement /.../, appealing to one's base, mentions of political maneuvering. Explicit statements that a policy issue is good or bad for a particular political party.” (Bodystun, et al., 2014) (see 9.1). In the articles, the political frame took form to the Huawei ban in the following three issue-specific frames: the geopolitics of 5G, lobbying, the maneuvering of authorities.

Geopolitics of 5G

In this politics frame, a prevalent issue-specific frame is that the Huawei ban has caused the 5G auction to be suspended for an unknown time. This issue-specific frame at times intersects with the two previous frames because it is also deemed as a matter of monetary loss and Sweden not getting the security of being in the forefront of launching 5G. However, the political frame puts these considerations into a bigger geopolitical picture. By being late with the launch of 5G the inherent fear is to be behind the US and China, and other countries that have started implementing 5G (Öjemar, 2020) (Mothander, 2020) (Törnwall, 2020). Putting it into other words, by suspending the launch of 5G, Sweden as a developed country loses power by delaying it. In this context, China and the US are seen as being one of the forefront runners and are often mentioned as such.

Lobbying

Lobbying was one of the more dramatic issues in connection to the Huawei ban in the articles. Three kinds of lobbying were recurrent topics for this issue-specific frame. The first being how the telecom actors tried to lobby government figures to change the ban. The second being how Huawei tried to lobby the media to write fewer negative scenarios with Huawei in it. The third being the mention of US lobbying.

The telecom actors that were prominently highlighted in the articles were Ericsson, Huawei's competitor. The vice-president of Ericsson was highlighted to have been telling different messages about the Huawei ban in the Swedish vis-à-vis Chinese press (Mothander, 2020), such as being more reserved about the topic in the Swedish media and more against the ban in the Chinese media. Within this context, the issue of the vice-president personally messaging the trade minister Anna Hallberg was brought up, in which the vice-president was depicted as lobbying for Huawei (Fröberg & Larsson, 2021) (Magnusson, 2021) (Rosell, 2021). The underlying meaning behind this lobbying by Ericsson is because Huawei is a Chinese company, the same lobbying would not have happened if it were Nokia that was banned from the 5G infrastructure. The imminent fear for Ericsson is that there would be sanctions towards them because of the Huawei ban, which is brought up in the Economic frames. In these contexts, Huawei takes the backseat and is treated as the "outreached arm of the Chinese regime".

The second lobbying was by Huawei towards the media in general. The articles highlighted that Huawei had hired PR companies and asked analytical companies to do studies about Huawei; studies that point to the issue that if a company had to change all their

equipment, then it would cost a lot to do so (Forsberg, 2021). However, the articles tried to debunk this by highlighting that it did not cost as much as the studies said for other countries such as Denmark, Australia, and Canada (Forsberg, 2021). The salience of Huawei lobbying the media and Ericsson lobbying for Huawei showcases journalists' low trust in Huawei in media.

The last lobbying was the US lobbying towards the Swedish government for a ban on Huawei (Mothander, 2020) (Larsson & Fröberg, 2021) (Öhrn, 2021). The mentions of the US lobbying were fragmented in the way they were presented. However, one distinct view from an article is that the move by US is seen as Sweden being manipulated into following the US way of a strict Huawei ban (Oksanen, 2021). And that it was inevitable for Sweden to follow in US footsteps (Mothander, 2020).

Maneuvering of authorities

Finally, there was a recurring topic of how actors with authority were maneuvering in relation to the Huawei ban. The articles had a generally skeptical view on the government bodies communication with each other before and after the decision was made (Mothander, 2021) (DN, 2020) (Björkman, 2021) (Liu & Fredriksen, 2020) (Mothander, 2020), especially the actions of the security authorities such as Security Service, Armed Forces and Post and Telecom Authority (Mothander, 2021) (Fägersten, 2021). The document containing the decision to ban Huawei was publicly available on October 20th, 2020 (Sjöblom, 2020). In the document, it was clearly stated that PTS with the help of security authorities decided to ban Huawei from being used in the 5G network; the reason being the Chinese national security law as mentioned in the previous frames and the state of ownership within Huawei. In the articles, the criticism towards the decision rested upon the lack of intervention and communication within the government. The foreign ministry was expected to have a part in the decision making because the ban had the risk of affecting the Sino-Swedish relations. The lack of intervention from the foreign ministry was according to the articles because the security authorities did not inform them, which according to the constitution is required when dealing with decisions that could change the relations with a foreign country (Wikström, 2020) (Mothander, 2020).

5.1.4 Law and order, crime and justice frame

The Law and order, crime, and justice frame consisted of 10% out of all the frames in total and was the fourth most prevalent one in the articles. Bodystun et al. (2014) defined this

frame as being indicated by “Specific policies in practice and their enforcement, incentives, and implications. Includes stories about enforcement and interpretation of laws by individuals and law enforcement, breaking laws, loopholes, fines, sentencing, and punishment. Increases or reductions in crime.” (see 9.1). In this frame, court proceedings and law interpretations appeared the most with the Huawei ban.

Interpretations of laws and court proceedings

The court proceedings refer to the intrinsic details and updates about Huawei’s appeal to the administrative court on the PTS decision to ban Huawei from 5G infrastructure (Törnwall, 2021) (Mothander, 2021) (Holmgren, 2020).

Along with the court proceedings, interpretations of the following laws were made about Huawei: the Swedish law of electronic communication (abbreviated as LEK), the Chinese national security law, the EU toolbox for cybersecurity, the constitution of the Swedish government (Regeringsformen). The first LEK law is frequently mentioned in this frame because this law made it possible for the security authorities to ban Huawei, the journalists speculate that the amendments made in 2019 were specifically made to target Huawei (Mothander, 2021) (Törnwall, 2021). The second and last law that was seen amongst this frame was the constitution of the Swedish government. The context for this law is that telecom actors and journalists that were skeptical of the Huawei ban interpreted that the security authorities broke the constitutional law by not informing the foreign ministry before making the decision (Mothander, 2020).

5.1.5 Morality frames

This frame was prevalent amongst 8 out of 211 frames and is 4% out of all the frames. The frame indications are described as having “Any perspective, or policy objective or action (including proposed action), that is compelled by religious doctrine or interpretation, duty, honor, righteousness or any other sense of ethics or social responsibility” (see 9.1). For this frame, the issue-specific frame was Human rights, this frame was also present in the political frames; however, to avoid repeated information it will only be addressed here.

Human rights

There is a recurrence of mentioning Huawei along with other Chinese news issues, such as the breach of human rights on the Uighurs in Xinjiang. Mostly the recurrences of this connection are brief and casually mentioned (Sinclair & Carlström, 2020). However, two instances highlight this connection. The two instances being when two brand ambassadors of Huawei

Sweden, singer Zara Larsson and professional swimmer Sarah Sjöström, cut their contract with Huawei after being criticized by Swedish netizens on social media for their collaboration (L. & TT, 2020) (TT, 2020) (Baksi, 2020). The criticism towards them is because the collaboration was seen as them supporting a dictatorship that has done mass surveillance on the Uighurs in Xinjiang. The part that stands out is how Huawei is mentioned in relation to this context, despite no mention of Huawei's involvement in it. The salience of the two, guides the reader to make the connection that Huawei equals human rights issues in Xinjiang. The salience of the celebrities' issues encourages the reader to make this connection even further as it is briefly mentioned or highlighted in the articles (Baksi, 2020).

5.1.6 External regulation and reputation frames

The last category is External regulation and reputation with 2% of the frames, or 5 out of 211 frames. Indications of the frames in the articles were “/.../the external relations of one state with another/.../” (Bodystun, et al., 2014) (see 9.1).

Relation with China

The main point in this frame was the relation with China. The journalists used experts and other figures with authority such as a law professor at Lund University, the Chinese ambassador Gui Congyou and Ericsson's vice-president Börje Ekholm in their articles. The first actor, the professor speaks about the relation with China worsening from a standpoint in which they criticize how the security service did not communicate with the foreign ministry according to the constitution (Mothander, 2020). The second actor, the Chinese ambassador Gui Congyou talked about that the ban would affect the relationship between China and Sweden, more specifically alluding to the economical side to it in an interview focused on the ban (Mellqvist, 2020). Third, Ericsson's vice-president speaks that the relation will worsen with China because of the ban on Huawei and lead to economic consequences (Eklund, 2020).

This frame was expected to be one of the more common found frames in the articles as the issue is a bilateral one. Its low frequency could be explained by other frames such as the economic and security and defense frames that overshadow this frame. The reason is because the bilateral relation is briefly mentioned in relation to other frames that has more salience.

5.2 The tones of the Swedish articles




Figure 1. Percentage and frequency of the Swedish articles' tones

5.2.1 Negative tones

The following indication was used to determine whether an article was negative or not: “Huawei employees, and/or executives is not pleased to see the news article as the article’s portrayal does not align itself with Huawei’s view on the issue. If the answer is yes, it does not align with their views, then the article is judged to be negatively toned. The negative tone was the most prevalent in the articles. 45% of the articles were negative. The recurrent issue-specific frames that were found in this tone are national security, Huawei being a security risk, and espionage.

The mention of national security to Huawei is frequent in this tone. What is often said is that having Huawei in the 5G infrastructure would endanger the whole country because of the risk of sharing information with the Chinese state. Thus, the ban is legitimized.

The second frequently mentioned issue-specific frame in this tone is that Huawei is a security risk. The difference between national security and that Huawei is a security risk is that in the latter Huawei is seen as a risk not only towards the 5G infrastructure but also to the Swedish market and the consumers. The company itself is a security risk and not only its products for 5G.

The third issue-specific frame is espionage. In this tone, the word espionage is frequently associated with Huawei. The association gets as far as it is one of the ways to introduce Huawei in articles that have another main topic. The fear of Huawei spying on behalf of the Chinese state is prevalent and is mentioned in combination with the other two mentioned issue-specific frames.

5.2.2 Neutral tones

The neutral tone had the second-highest percentage among the three tones. 30% of the articles were neutral. The following indication was used to determine whether an article is neutral or not: “Huawei is portrayed both positively and negatively in the article that balances each other out, or the news article does not appear to discuss the issue positively nor negatively.”.

The neutral tone was determined because of the following reasons: first, the article had a fair distribution of both Huawei and the security actors’ arguments. Second, the article contained highly detailed court procedures. And lastly, the article was too short to determine the tone.

5.2.3 Positive tones

The tone that got the lowest percentage among the three was the positive tone. 25% of the articles were positive. The two issue-specific frames found in this tone were various actors, mostly telecom actors speaking out for Huawei and arguing against the ban, which is beneficial towards Huawei. The other issue-specific frame was actors or journalists criticizing PTS for how they handled the issue.

5.3 The frames from the Chinese English-language newspapers

Frame categories	Primary frames	Secondary frames	Combined Frequency	percentage
Economic	20	0	20	49%
Security and defense	0	14	14	36%
Political	0	5	5	13%
Law and order, crime and justice	1	0	1	3%
Fairness and equality	0	1	1	3%
Total of frames			41	

Table 4. Frequency and percentage over the Chinese English-language frame categories

5.3.1 Economic frames

This frame category was the most frequent amongst the articles, 20 out of 41 frames in the articles had this frame. Standing for 49% out of all the frames in total. In the economic frames present in the articles the following three issue-specific frames were found.

The not-so-free-market friendly Sweden and consolidation of the 5G market

The recurrence of keywords such as free market and mentions of the consolidation of the 5G market were prevalent to the Huawei ban amongst the articles. The reason being journalists question whether the ban on Huawei is fair or not towards Huawei. By banning Huawei journalists argue that Sweden is going against their free-market principles. Furthermore, the journalists are calling the ban a protectionist measure (China Daily, 2020). Quotes from foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian (Ma, 2020) and for example experts such as Bai ming, an international market researcher at the Chinese academy of international trade and economic cooperation (Fan, 2020) are referred to this frame, all stating that Sweden is violating the principles of the free market and that Sweden should not discriminate and stay open (Xinhua, 2020). The salience on Sweden breaking the free-market principles is further connected to another point that the journalists made, mainly that competition will be reduced along with Sweden banning Huawei (Wen & Liang, 2020). In this context, Ericsson is highlighted to gain from the ban (Wen & Liang, 2020).

The salience that Sweden is going against their free-market principles and Ericsson will gain from the Huawei ban, leads the reader to villainize Sweden for its decision and paints the picture of Huawei being the scapegoat for the estimated monetary loss from the ban. The reference to actors with authority such as the mentioned Zhao Lijian and experts legitimizes the framing because of their authority.

Negative impact towards innovation and economy, consequences for Swedish companies in China

Salience on how the Huawei ban will hurt the economy and Swedish companies in China and how it will dampen innovation is prevalent amongst the articles.

The Huawei ban hurting the economy is a recurring issue-specific frame (Xinhua, 2020) (Global Times, 2021). For example, a comment by the Chinese ambassador of Sweden Gui Congyou reflects this “/.../5G has been brought to life via a cooperation between Huawei, Sweden’s Ericsson, and Finland’s Nokia, and that forcing out any 5G company will make global 5G construction suffer, and that countries worldwide will pay the price.” (Global Times, 2021). The salience on the effects of the Huawei ban is highlighted further as it narrows down to how the ban will affect Swedish companies in China (China Daily, 2020) (Ma, 2020) (Fan, 2020) (Global Times, 2021). A comment by Xiang Ligang, director-general of the Beijing-based Information Consumption Alliance illustrates this: “Ericsson's threat to leave Sweden over the Huawei ban shows Swedish businesses' concern over its government's

arbitrary move to hurt market rules, putting them in a tight spot in the Chinese market, whose size is much bigger than Sweden's and is vital for some companies" (Global Times, 2021) (Global Times, 2020). The recurrence of this gives way to the reader to interpret that the ban on Huawei in Sweden will not come without its consequences.

Along with how the Huawei ban will affect the economy and Swedish companies in China, the recurrent issue-specific frame of how it will affect the will to innovate is also highlighted (Global Times, 2020) (Fan, 2020). The Chinese ambassador's comment on this illustrates the issue-specific frame in a nutshell "/.../ and worst of all, make other countries less interested and driven to compete for 6G innovation" (Global Times, 2020). This framing that the Huawei ban will constrict innovation is also a way that the journalists call out the ban to be a protectionist measure.

Huawei a benefit to Europe

Lastly, the recurrence of Huawei being a benefit towards Europe is prevalent in the economic frames. The mentions of these come with numbers of how much Huawei contributes to Europe's GDP and how many job positions the company has created in Europe (Ma, 2020) (Global Times, 2020). An example of how it can look in an article is the following passage from a China Daily article: "In 2019, Huawei contributed 16.4 billion euros (\$19.5 billion) to Europe's GDP and supported 224,300 jobs, according to a report released by a research agency Oxford Economics. The report said that Huawei generated 6.6 billion euros in tax revenues for European authorities during 2019." (Ma, 2020). Noteworthy is how the excerpt from China Daily refers to the analytical company Oxford Economics' report for the numbers, a report that is commissioned by Huawei (Collings, 2020). The other article by global times that also used the same numbers, also referenced Oxford Economics (Global Times, 2020).

Another salience is the pledges towards the European market. An example of this is an excerpt from Global times: "Chinese tech giant Huawei reaffirmed its commitment to the European market during the annual European Innovation Day held in Germany online on Thursday, vowing to strengthen cooperation with local firms, and boost the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) through its technological strength." (Global Times, 2020). The excerpt shows Huawei is committed to provide its services and help the development of the European market. In another article from China Daily, Huawei's corporate senior vice-president and director of the board, Catherine Chen, comment on Huawei's commitment to Europe, "Today, despite the challenges brought by COVID-19 and the uncertainties in our macro-environment, we are as determined as ever to be in Europe and

for Europe," (Ma, 2020). The comment and excerpt showcase a frame that Huawei is beneficial and part of the European market rather than a rival and enemy. The frame guides the international reader to Huawei being the scapegoat in the Huawei ban and how it will be a loss for Europe if European countries ban the company and its products.

5.3.2 Security and Defense frames

36% or 14 out of 41 frames were security and defense frames, the second most present frame in the articles. In this frame, the most prevalent topic concerned how the Huawei ban is not a matter of national security and EU toolbox on cybersecurity.

Refuting that the Huawei ban is a matter of national security

National security was mentioned in all the articles in direct and indirect sentences. An example of the context national security is mentioned in is the following excerpt from the Global times: “We have noticed that Sweden has excluded companies from certain countries from joining its 5G spectrum auctions’, Gao said, adding that, in the disguise of ‘national security’, the move of banning Chinese firms from the 5G networks in Sweden, has violated the basic principles of the WTO and international rules.” (Global Times, 2021). The comment by the spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Commerce, Gao Feng that the Global times quoted, frames the ban as a non-national security issue. Other journalists (Wen & Liang, 2020) (Ma, 2020) (Fan, 2020) (Xinhua, 2020) and Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian are seen using the same frame but adding onto that there is no concrete evidence to prove that Huawei is a security risk. The salience on the actors’ and journalists’ framing that there is no evidence proving that Huawei is a security risk guides the reader to question whether the Huawei ban is fairly decided or not.

Brief mentions of EU toolbox on 5G cybersecurity as an argument for that the Swedish decision of the ban is excessive (Xinhua, 2020) and that Huawei would be willing to do a “no backdoor” agreement (Global Times, 2020) to the mentioned contexts was also present in the articles. Although they were briefly aforementioned, the “solutions” that the articles provide are using the same “there is no concrete evidence that Huawei is a security risk” frame.

5.3.3 Political frames

The political frames are the third most prevalent frame category amongst the articles. 13% or 5 out of 41 articles are from this frame category. The notifiable recurrence in this frame is that Sweden is a pawn of the US and that China is the victim.

China the victim of the US pawn, Sweden

The Huawei ban in the five articles is seen as one of the results of US suppression and lobbying in the EU. In this context, Sweden is viewed as one of the pawns of the US and as being pressured into the ban of Huawei (Xinhua, 2020) (Global Times, 2021). An example of this is the following two excerpts from Global times “Ignoring domestic businesses' opposition against the Huawei ban and the rising plea for free market and competition, the Swedish government's unwise political manipulation under US influence will cause considerable damage to itself” (Global Times, 2021) and “/.../ US had put pressure on Sweden to exclude Huawei from its 5G network construction. Hua Chunying, a spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry, said on Monday during a press briefing that she had seen the relevant Swedish reports, which once again demonstrates that ‘it is the US that is resorting to intimidation and coercion everywhere in the world, and that China is the victim of such coercion.’” (Global Times, 2021). US is seen as leading other western countries such as Sweden to politicize economic and trade issues (Ma, 2020), allowing the reader to think that Sweden is not neutral with the Huawei ban and is a part of the US plan of suppressing China. The framing comes mostly from the journalists of the articles and actors with authority such as the spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry, Hua Chunying.

5.3.4 Law and order, crime and justice & Fairness and equality frames

These two frames were only represented in one article each among the three newspapers. The reason for these two frames existence is because one article had detailed court proceedings of the Huawei ban (Wen & Bianji, 2020). And the other article had a frame in which Huawei is depicted as unfairly treated in the whole banning process. An example of this is how the Global times article wrote about how the Post and Telecom Authority lacked “neutrality, independence, and objectivity.” (Global Times, 2020).

Two possible reasons as to why these two frames had such a low frequency compared to the other three frames could be because court proceedings are not relevant nor interesting from a news media perspective for an international audience as compared to a Swedish audience. The second reason could be because the fairness and equality frames are part of or overshadowed by other frames in the other articles.

5.4 The tones of the Chinese English-language articles




Figure 2. Percentage and frequency over the tones in the Chinese English-language articles

5.4.1 Positive tones

An overwhelming majority of 95%, 19 out of 20 articles were positive from the perspective of a Huawei employee/executive. The positive tonality showcases the positive frames that the reader will meet when reading about the Huawei ban in the Chinese English-language articles. The indications that the articles are toned positively were clear from the charged words and sentences such as “It is hard to win when the deck is stacked against you [Huawei]” (China Daily, 2020). Furthermore, the salience on certain frames were also an indication of this tonality. For example, “no evidence to prove that Huawei is a security risk” frames (Ma, 2020) (Mo, 2020) (Global Times, 2020) and the frame that the ban will delay 5G network deployment (Fan, 2020) (Global Times, 2020), but also the frame that the Huawei ban will hurt the free market and the economy of consumers (Xinhua, 2020) (Ma, 2020) (Ma, 2021). All these frames are positively toned towards Huawei and defend Huawei from the notion that Huawei is a security risk and is not beneficial towards the European market. The latter is, especially highlighted in frames where Huawei reaffirms its commitment to the European market (Global Times, 2020) and showcases statistics of their work in Europe (Ma, 2020).

5.4.2 Neutral tones and Negative tones

1 out of 20 articles was neutral toned. The reason for one of the articles being neutral toned is because of the detailed reporting on the updates regarding the court proceedings on the Huawei ban and the neutral language used in the article. Moreover, from a media perspective, neutral toned articles would be uninteresting compared to more opinionated ones.

Amongst the Chinese-English-language articles there were no negatively toned articles. A reason could be because the newspapers are state owned. If an article about the Huawei ban is deemed negative, it would mean that the articles are positive about the Huawei ban which would go against the Chinese state's opinion that in turn could be non-beneficial to the news agencies.

6 Discussion

For this chapter the findings of the thesis are discussed in more detail with comparisons between the Swedish and the Chinese framing of the Huawei ban and previous research.

6.1 Swedish national newspapers

The Swedish national newspapers have framed the Swedish Huawei ban with economic consequences, national security, geopolitics, interpretations of laws, human rights, and relations with China. Amongst the mentioned issue-specific frames, the economic frame involving the economic consequences of the Huawei ban had the most coverage amongst the 211 frames, standing for 33% of all the frames in the articles. The second and third most present frames that had a coverage of 29% respective 22% of the articles were security and defense with national security and political frames with geopolitics. The three less frequently covered frames in the articles were law and order, crime and justice with its interpretation of laws that had 10% of the coverage, Morality frames concerning human rights in connection to Huawei had 4%, and external regulation and reputation with frames about how the Huawei ban would impact the relations with China was only covered 2%.

In the economic frames, there is a common factor of the fear of getting sanctions from China because of the Huawei ban, which is speculated to affect the Swedish companies in China, especially Ericsson. This fear is especially seen in the salience of Ericsson's vice-president's detailed actions surrounding the issue (Strandberg & Andersson, 2020) (Törnwall, 2020) (Forsberg, 2021) (Strandberg, 2021) (Fröberg & Larsson, 2021) (Magnusson, 2021) (Rosell, 2021). The salience of the sanctions comes in relation to the statements from Chinese authority figures such as Foreign Ministry Zhao Lijian and Chinese ambassador Gui Congyuo (Öjemar, 2020) (Nilsson, 2020) (Rosell, 2021) (Larsson Hultin, 2021). Other actors within the telecom sector that planned to use Huawei equipment before the ban happened, are seen to frame the ban as a monetary loss (Strandberg, 2021) (Björkman, 2020) (Wande, 2020) (Törnwall, 2020). Similar framing was adopted by Huawei Sweden's executive vice-president Kenneth Fredriksen (Mothander, 2020) (Liu & Fredriksen, 2020) (Mothander, 2020).

The journalists of the Swedish articles rely on the telecom actors framing, this is especially clear for the newspaper Dagens Industri that targets their articles toward a business-oriented audience. 23 articles out of the 30 positively toned articles consisted of economic frames. If we look at the following diagram, the majority of the Dagens Industri articles are positively toned.




Figure 3. Tones spread over the Swedish newspapers

All of this indicates that the economic frame is more positively toned towards Huawei. What this means is that the economic consequences of the Huawei ban are more of a concern than the security problems that the ban is based on. This is an aspect that the Huawei framing study by Kenneth C. C. Yang and Yowei Kang (2020) could not pick up because of its macro-designed methodology. However, despite there being flaws in Yang and Kang's (2020) study, this study partially agrees with that of Yang and Kang's (2020) study. Mainly because of the second most covered frame in this research, the security and defense frame.

National security was the biggest concern under the security and defense frames in the articles. The manifested threat of Huawei being under the control of the Chinese state led to a lot of speculations and negative-toned articles. As much as 70,3% or 38 out of 54 negatively toned articles had security and defense frames in them. The negative output surrounding this frame is because of the salience on the Chinese national security law that is interpreted as Huawei being able to share information with the Chinese state if the states ask for it (Flores, 2020) (DN, 2021) (TT, 2020) and that Huawei does cyberespionage and is close to the Chinese state (Axelsson, 2020) (Larsson, 2020) (Svahn & TT, 2020) (Suhonen & Allvin, 2021). Security actors such as PTS, security service, and Swedish military all frame Huawei in this frame and fears the nation's security if they allow telecom operators to use Huawei equipment in the deployment of 5G. The negative tonality is most present in the newspaper Svenska Dagbladet, a newspaper that considers itself conservative. Thus, not as focused on the economic side of the issue. The amount of negative coverage in this frame indicates that the security and defense frame is negatively toned towards Huawei and considers the Huawei

ban as a national security concern just as the security authorities frame it. The research by Yang and Kang's (2020) also came towards similar results in their study by presenting that national security in relation to Huawei was the most used key phrase in non-Chinese media corpus. However, their results were based on English-speaking newspapers. Thus, neglecting newspapers that were not in English. In Yang and Kang's (2020) study they came towards the conclusion that Huawei in connection with national security in media affected Huawei as a brand and consumers' presumed animosity towards China. This study partially agrees with Yang and Kang's (2020) conclusion; however, this study also pertains to that there are other frames than national security that could affect the audience thinking of Huawei as a brand or whatnot. Such as the mentioned economic frames. And the following political frame and more. Thus, the national security that Yang and Kang (2020) pertained to as the keyframe for explaining the hostility surrounding Huawei is not the complete picture.

The political frame is the third most present in the articles. 25 out of 54 negative articles have political frames in them and are the third most negative frame behind the security and defense and economic frame. This frame with the Huawei ban has most concerns with geopolitics. Lobbying and authorities maneuvering that is frequently mentioned in this frame is part of geopolitics. The lobbying being the most damaging towards Huawei as telecom actors such as Ericsson vice-president Börje Ekholm are caught trying to lobby government authorities to change the decision on the ban. Even though it is not Huawei themselves doing the deed, the actions of Ericsson are framed to be that Ericsson is doing it because of their market share in China and the potential threat of being sanctioned. Thus, they are pressured to do it and Huawei being associated with that is not a good image. Not to mention, Huawei referring to studies that they commissioned themselves and that other journalists have used without further research (Forsberg, 2021) (Global Times, 2020) (Collings, 2020). The authorities maneuvering relates to the speculations surrounding being sanctioned by China because of the ban, the prime minister of Sweden Stefan Löfven has made a statement that the ban is not meant to single out any countries (Nilsson, 2020). However, the act of declaring this towards the public indicates that there is a fear of being sanctioned by China, a frame that is used frequently in the articles (see 5.1.1). Huawei being mixed into this does not provide a positive image as mentioned. The salience on China with Huawei inherently makes the audience associate Huawei with China and vice versa. Thus, in this context, if China is seen as the threat and the one that can sanction Swedish companies, Huawei will be seen as a threat and a problem as well.

6.2 The Chinese English-language newspapers

The Chinese English-language media have framed the Swedish Huawei ban with economic consequences, national security, and geopolitics. The frames that got the most coverage amongst the 41 frames were the economic frames that consisted of 49% of the frames. The second most present in the articles was the security and defense frames that were 36% out of all the frames. The third most presented frame was the political frame that was 5 out of 41 frames. The last two frames that had the least coverage amongst the articles were law and order, crime and justice, and fairness and equality frames that had one frame each respectively.

The economic, security and defense, and political frames take a different form in the Chinese articles, compared to the Swedish frames. The economic frame highlighted the repercussions in wait for Sweden if they did not rethink the ban. And by not rethinking the ban, Sweden is seen as breaking the free-market principles and hurting their Chinese image as a free market and as a neutral country (China Daily, 2020) (Xinhua, 2020) (Fan, 2020) (Ma, 2020). Despite the economic consequences that the articles are promising, there are frames that reassures Huawei's continued presence in the European market (Ma, 2020) (Global Times, 2020). The issue-specific frame are an attempt to show the international audience that Huawei is loyal to the European market despite Sweden's ban.

The economic frame is a bit different from what Yang and Kang (2020) found in their study for Chinese articles. In their study, the framing surrounded the word trade war. The reason for the difference is the selection of data. Yang and Kang (2020) used the corpus of all Chinese English-language newspapers, while this study used a selection of three Chinese English-language newspapers. Furthermore, the focus of the data is different, in Yang and Kang (2020) the focus is on all articles about Huawei whilst this study focuses solely on the issue of Huawei in connection to Sweden and the Swedish Huawei ban.

The security and defense frame were the second most prominent frame in the Chinese articles and was 36% or 14 out of 41 articles. The Chinese articles' national security frame is different from the Swedish national security frame in the way that it is refuting that Huawei is a security risk. The recurrences that there is no evidence to prove it are frequently found in this context. Whilst the Swedish national security frame was more focused on the potential harm Huawei would do if they were allowed in the infrastructure. In Yang and Kang (2020) study the second most prominent key phrase in Chinese media was Meng Wanzhou and the third one was national security (p. 329). In the Chinese articles selected for this study to the Swedish Huawei ban the case of Meng Wanzhou was not mentioned in the articles. Thus, in

this study, the national security frame has more prominence amongst the Chinese articles. Thus, the selection of the data needs to be taken into consideration in this context.

The political frame was the third most prominent frame in the Chinese articles and consisted of 13% or 5 out of 41 frames. In the political frame, the Huawei ban was often put into the context of geopolitics. In the frame, the US is depicted as manipulating and using Sweden to hurt China (Xinhua, 2020) (Global Times, 2021) (Global Times, 2021). Thus, Sweden's ban on Huawei is seen not as an independent decision but because of US influence. The Swedish political frame is similar yet different in the sense that it focuses more on Sweden's role in geopolitics and individual actors' actions such as Ericsson's vice-president and how it might affect their market in China (Fröberg & Larsson, 2021) (Magnusson, 2021) (Rosell, 2021). Whilst the Chinese articles are highlighting a broader picture of the Huawei ban. Since the ban began with the US, the assumption that the Chinese articles made about Sweden being a pawn of the US could be taken as a peak towards Sweden but also towards the US. The portrayal of China in this context is that China is all knowing and sees the US as scheming through the Swedish Huawei ban despite it being Sweden that banned Huawei.

6.3 Comparing Swedish framing versus Chinese framing

Overall, the same frames recur in the Swedish and Chinese framing of the Huawei ban. However, the content in the frames is different and are presented in different tonalities from each other. The language and target audience of the two newspapers are different as well. The Swedish articles are written in Swedish and tend to have a neutral language even if the article leans towards a specific tone. Whilst the Chinese English-language articles are in English and are more explicit in their toned language. Furthermore, the content in the sentences is structured in the form of that the international audience should reconsider the ban, whilst the Swedish articles are worried about different aspects of the Huawei ban, most notably the economic consequences of it and the security issues that will come if Huawei is not banned.

The framing in general for both Chinese and Swedish articles rely on opinions by figures such as the authorities, telecom figures, and experts. The reliance on what is presented as 'expert opinion' is more prominent in Chinese articles compared to Swedish articles. As the Chinese journalists are seen using the opinions of authority figures such as the Chinese ambassador Gui Congyou and Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian the day after their statement had been done. Foreign figures such as Huawei Sweden's executive vice-president Kenneth Fredriksen and Ericsson's vice-president Börje Ekholm are used in the Chinese

framing to encourage the international audience to think that it is not just a Chinese framing of the Huawei ban, but other foreigners are also thinking in the same way.

Lastly, from the Chinese newspapers framing of the Huawei ban in Sweden, there are indications that there will be repercussions for the ban if the decision is not taken back. Furthermore, Sweden has no evidence that Huawei is a national security risk and is not being economically fair towards China. The framings go in line with what the Chinese authorities are saying about the ban (China embassy, 2020) (China embassy, 2020) (China embassy, 2020) (Reuters, 2020).

7 Conclusion

The research questions of this thesis were to study how the Swedish and Chinese English-language newspapers frame the Huawei ban in Sweden. This study concludes that the Swedish newspapers frame the Huawei ban predominantly using economic, security and defense and political frames. More specifically, it is presented as an economic dilemma in relation to national security and geopolitical concerns.

When it comes to the Chinese English-language newspapers, they employ the same frames for the Swedish Huawei ban as Swedish newspapers. However, when looking into the contents of the frames more specifically the difference is that the Chinese English-language newspapers accuse Sweden of using national security as an excuse for the Swedish Huawei ban and that there will be economic repercussions if the ban is not reconsidered. Furthermore, the Chinese English-language articles' frame Sweden as a pawn of the US.

Unexpected findings were that the economic frames were most present in both Swedish and Chinese articles. Yang and Kang (2020) found that Chinese newspaper articles used more economic frames than the English-language newspaper articles, where national security frame of Huawei were more prevalent. Similar results were expected for this thesis focus on the Huawei ban. However, this thesis results differed, in the way that both the Chinese english-language and Swedish articles frame Huawei, especially in regard to the ban, in primarily economic frames. It is also notable that the results in this study suggest that non-English language newspapers may differ in what frames of the Huawei ban are highlighted. Furthermore, the results could be specific to media framing of the Swedish Huawei ban.

The results prove to be significant in the studies of framing Huawei, as they partly confirm Yang and Kang's (2020) study of there being national security frames in connection to Huawei; but at the same time provide new information regarding another country's framing of the Huawei ban and a more elaborate methodology that gives more insight into the frames compared to Yang and Kang (2020).

Further research could include Yang and Kang's (2020) mentioned concept of "country animosity", combined with media framing to study the Huawei ban in non-English language newspapers. It could also examine how the country's media frames surrounding Huawei change over time.

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9 Appendix

9.1 The Policy Frames codebook: Frame dimensions from Bodystun et al. (2014)

1. Economic frames: The costs, benefits, or monetary/financial implications of the issue (to an individual, family, community, or to the economy as a whole).
2. Capacity and resources frames: The lack of or availability of physical, geographical, spatial, human, and financial resources, or the capacity of existing systems and resources to implement or carry out policy goals.
3. Morality frames: Any perspective, or policy objective or action (including proposed action), that is compelled by religious doctrine or interpretation, duty, honor, righteousness or any other sense of ethics or social responsibility.
4. Fairness and equality frames: Equality or inequality with which laws, punishment, rewards, and resources are applied or distributed among individuals or groups. Also the balance between the rights or interests of one individual or group compared to another individual or group.
5. Constitutionality and jurisprudence frames: The constraints imposed on or freedoms granted to individuals, government, and corporations via the Constitution, Bill of Rights and other amendments, or judicial interpretation. This deals specifically with the authority of government to regulate, and the authority of individuals/corporations to act independently of government.
6. Policy prescription and evaluation: Particular policies proposed for addressing an identified problem, and figuring out if certain policies will work, or if existing policies are effective.
7. Law and order, crime and justice frames: Specific policies in practice and their enforcement, incentives, and implications. Includes stories about enforcement and interpretation of laws by individuals and law enforcement, breaking laws, loopholes, fines, sentencing and punishment. Increases or reductions in crime.

8. Security and defense frames: Security, threats to security, and protection of one's person, family, in-group, nation, etc. Generally, an action or a call to action that can be taken to protect the welfare of a person, group, nation sometimes from a not yet manifested threat.

9. Health and safety frames: Healthcare access and effectiveness, illness, disease, sanitation, obesity, mental health effects, prevention of or perpetuation of gun violence, infrastructure and building safety.

10. Quality of life frames: The effects of a policy on individuals' wealth, mobility, access to resources, happiness, social structures, ease of day-to-day routines, quality of community life, etc.

11. Cultural identity frames: The social norms, trends, values and customs constituting culture(s), as they relate to a specific policy issue.

12. Public opinion frames: References to general social attitudes, polling and demographic information, as well as implied or actual consequences of diverging from or "getting ahead of" public opinion or polls.

13. Political frames: Any political considerations surrounding an issue. Issue actions or efforts or stances that are political, such as partisan filibusters, lobbyist involvement, bipartisan efforts, deal-making and vote trading, appealing to one's base, mentions of political maneuvering. Explicit statements that a policy issue is good or bad for a particular political party.

14. External regulation and reputation frames: The United States' external relations with another nation; the external relations of one state with another; or relations between groups. This includes trade agreements and outcomes, comparisons of policy outcomes or desired policy outcomes.

15. Other frames: Any frames that do not fit into the above categories.