FACULTY
OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES

Graduate School
At the Faculty of Social Sciences

Crusaders and Invaders:
How Islamic State and the Christchurch Shooter Portray Their Enemies in Propaganda

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements of the degree of
Master of Arts
in Middle Eastern Studies

Author: Shane Grzegorczyk
Advisor: Darcy Thompson
Date: 08/2021

Abstract

Research comparing the ideological beliefs, radicalization pathways, and extremist rhetoric of both Salafi jihadists and militant white supremacists has become increasingly prevalent over the past decade. However, there has not yet been an in-depth comparison of how those extremists portray the communities they incite violence against. In light of this gap in the existing research, the author of this thesis conducted a qualitative content analysis comparing two prominent cases of extremist propaganda. One was *Dabiq*, Islamic State's first major English-language magazine. The other was *The Great Replacement*, a manifesto written by the Christchurch shooter. This analysis found that both *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* portray those they call for violence against as enemy soldiers in a global war, insidious threats to their own communities, and traitorous elites with selfish agendas. While each text also portrays its targets in unique ways, these findings hint at a significant overlap between how Salafi jihadists and militant white supremacists conceptualize those they incite violence against. Understanding the means by which characteristic works of Salafi jihadist and militant white supremacist propaganda depict those their authors aim to victimize could be critical in formulating counter-narratives and deradicalizing extremists from both ideological camps.

Keywords: *Dabiq*, *The Great Replacement*, *political violence, extremism, social identity theory*, *dehumanization, jihadism*, *Salafism*, *white supremacy*, *white nationalism*

Acknowledgments

To my family, who graciously supported me while I worked on this thesis.

To Darcy Thompson, who was the best advisor I could have asked for and patiently shepherded me through all too many bouts of academic confusion.

To CMES Class of 2019, who taught me more than any course ever could.

To Toby Bruce, Jia Liu, and David Norcross, who were sources of compassion and understanding on every step of this protracted research process.

To Heather Heyer, who died standing up against extremist violence in my hometown of Charlottesville. You will be remembered.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Writing in 2017, Julia Ebner described the recent "terrorist attacks in Paris; San Bernandino [*sic*]; Brussels; Orlando; Nice; Munich; Berlin; Quebec City; London Westminster; Manchester; Portland; London Bridge; Finsbury Park; Charlottesville; [and] Barcelona" as symptomatic of a new political era, one which has increasingly become characterized by "a vicious circle of emotionally driven actions and reactions" (2017, 11-12). What Ebner (Ibid.) referred to as the "Age of Rage" has elevated two varieties of violent extremism to positions of global prominence and infamy: Salafi jihadism and militant white supremacy. In light of the regular violence proponents of these ideologies inflict upon their communities, from the cities of Iraq and Syria to the mosques and community centers of New Zealand, understanding and confronting these extremists is likely to become one of the many significant challenges of the twenty-first century.

In trying to wrestle with this problem, it is tempting to approach the study of Salafi jihadism and militant white supremacy as two entirely distinct areas of research. While both groups of extremists regularly commit shocking acts of violence, the religious millenarianism of Salafi jihadists would seem to be a far cry from the secular race-based bigotry of militant white supremacists. However, research in a variety of different fields has begun to reveal numerous similarities between these two categories of extremists (Jikeli 2015; Berger 2016; Laqueur and Wall 2018). Scholars have compared the psychological profiles (Lankford 2013), propagation of internet propaganda (Berger 2016), binary in-group/out-group thinking (Berger 2018, 51-74), and anti-Semitism (Jikeli 2015) of Salafi jihadists and militant white supremacists, and found proponents of the two ideologies to be more similar than different in a number of observable ways. However, their portrayal of those they call for violence against has yet to be explored in such a cross-ideological manner.

While the role a negative portrayal of a community can play in fomenting violence against it has been the subject of regular scholarly attention for numerous decades now (Kelman 1973; Callahan et al. 2006; Richter et al. 2018), research into how contemporary extremists understand and depict the victims of their own violence rarely ventures beyond a singular

ideological context.[1] This remains a striking gap in the literature given the current prominence of both Salafi jihadist and white supremacist violence on the world stage. While proponents of both varieties of extremism have published a wide range of violent screeds delineating the frontlines of their global struggles, these texts have yet to be analyzed as the critical window they are into how both Salafi jihadists and militant white supremacists view the victims of their violence. Such a comparative analysis could uncover overlapping beliefs among ideologically divergent violent extremists, highlight recurring insidious narratives that must be addressed in order to deradicalize those who have bought into them, and help demystify the hatred which animates today's extremist violence. Therefore, informed by contemporary theories of violence, dehumanization and social identity, this thesis will determine how those targeted by extremists are depicted in two well-known and characteristic cases of extremist propaganda: Islamic State's flagship magazine *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement*, a white nationalist manifesto posted by the Christchurch shooter immediately prior to his killing of 51 people at a New Zealand mosque in 2019. In doing so, it seeks to compare how contemporary extremists conceptualize and portray the communities they target.

In essence, this thesis aims to both illuminate and compare how the Salafi jihadist magazine *Dabiq* and the militant white supremacist manifesto *The Great Replacement* depict those they incite violence against. Its findings will contribute to a burgeoning understanding of how contemporary extremists conceive of those they seek to terrorize as well as highlight which of those conceptions cross cultural and ideological boundaries. Such a nuanced understanding of how paradigmatic Salafi jihadists and militant white supremacists see their enemies will be critical in confronting future violence, deradicalizing those responsible, and building an emerging body of literature on contemporary extremism.

[1] A notable exception is the theoretical exploration of violent extremism recently published by J. M. Berger (2018), which will be employed later in this thesis.

Disposition

Following the introduction, this thesis will briefly trace the ideological contexts in which *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* emerged. This chapter will define Salafi jihadism and militant white supremacy, outline their historical roots, and introduce a few of the figures who helped make those extremist ideologies what they are today. The next chapter will explore the current state of the literature regarding contemporary extremism, political violence, deradicalization, and the analysis of *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement*. This will be followed by an in-depth examination of the theories of social identity and dehumanization that inform this thesis. Then, the structure of the qualitative content analysis, the specifics of the coding process, and the rationale behind the selection of texts will be discussed in detail. Following the methodology chapter, the findings will be presented. That presentation will lead into a discussion of how those findings can be understood in the context of existing theory and literature. Finally, the thesis will conclude with a brief discussion of its contributions to the field and a few avenues for further research.

Research Question: How do the Salafi jihadist magazine *Dabiq* and the militant white supremacist manifesto *The Great Replacement* depict those they incite violence against? How do those depictions relate to one another?

Context

In order to properly explore how *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* depict those they incite violence against, it will be critical to preface that analysis with a brief overview of the ideological and socio-political roots of the texts. While this will be far from a comprehensive history of Salafi jihadism or militant white supremacy, it will provide some necessary context.

I. Salafi Jihadism and *Dabiq*

Salafi jihadism has been defined in a variety of different ways by academics discussing the phenomenon. However, there is hardly a firm consensus on which of these definitions is most appropriate. While Shiraz Maher, a British analyst predominantly concerned with the study of Islamic extremism, may have defined Salafism as "a philosophical outlook which seeks to revive the practices of the first three generations of Islam" (2016, 7) and Salafi jihadists as "violent-rejectionists [who] are irreconciliably estranged from the state, regarding it as a heretical and artificial unit" (Ibid., 11), that did not prevent a 2019 report by the RAND Corporation from taking issue with his definition on the grounds that "harkening back to an idealized early Muslim community as a model for reforming its modern counterpart is hardly exclusive to Salafis" (Baffa et al. 2019, 2). While no perfect definition exists, this thesis will employ Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen's inclusive yet succinct definition of Salafi jihadism as "a heterogenous phenomenon characterized by, among other things: a strict Salafi interpretation of Islam; *takfirism*; rejection of democracy and other man-made systems; and justification of the use of violence against enemies by references to a narrow interpretation of the Islamic concept of Jihad" (2011, 1201). However, understanding the history of what would eventually become known as Salafi jihadism is at least as important as defining it.

The ideological roots of contemporary Salafi jihadism, embodied and popularized by Islamic State and al-Qaeda, can be traced back to the writings of Ibn Taymiyyah, a Muslim theologian who lived during the Mongol invasions of the Middle East and famously issued a fatwa authorizing the killing of those professing to be Muslim on the grounds of apostasy if those Muslims swore loyalty to the Mongol khans (Kadri 2012, 144-150). He was also responsible for

fomenting anti-Shia sentiment by blaming them for divisions in the Muslim community which he felt were responsible for the horrors inflicted upon the Islamicate world by the Mongol invaders (Nasr 2006, 94). Both secular scholars (Ibid., 94-96; Byman 2015, 72-76) and jihadist leaders such as Osama Bin Laden (1996) have stressed the importance of Ibn Taymiyyah's fatwas and other religious writings in justifying Salafi jihadist violence. Bin Laden (Ibid.) cited Ibn Taymiyyah multiple times in his fatwa authorizing the killing of American soldiers stationed in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and the takfiri ideology[2] of numerous Salafi terrorist organizations is rooted in his writing (Atwan 2015, 202-203).

The writings of Sayyid Qutb have also had a great influence on contemporary Salafi jihadism. Qutb wrote *Milestones* while languishing in a Nasser-era Egyptian prison in order to illuminate "the nature of those qualities on the basis of which the Muslim community can fulfill its obligation as the leader of the world" (Qutb 2013, 10). *Milestones* helped popularize the notion that contemporary Islamic power structures had to be violently overturned if the Muslim community wished to escape the corruption and ignorance of modern society (Byman 2015, 73-74). This call for the violent overthrow of corrupt, secular regimes throughout the MENA region was given additional weight by Qutb's execution in 1966, an act which, according to Tarek Osman, transformed the jailed activist into "the godfather of militant Islamism" (2013, 104). Qutb's execution would inspire fifteen year old Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda, to begin plotting against the Egyptian state (Byman 2015, 92).

However, the rise of contemporary Salafi jihadism is often traced back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet-Afghan War saw the emergence of a fierce mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan backed by the United States (U.S.) and Saudi Arabia. The conflict created an environment which facilitated the rapid construction of jihadist networks, and these networks persisted and spread following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 (Ibid., 3-10). This would indirectly lead to al Qaeda's attack on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11th, 2001. The reaction of the U.S. and its allies to this attack resulted in two wars that many agree thoroughly destabilized the MENA region (Atwan 2015, 32-58; Gelvin 2016, 300-316). Following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an Islamist insurgent leader

[2] Abdel Bari Atwan succinctly defined 'takfir' as "denouncing fellow Muslims as apostates" (2015, 203).

from Jordan, swore allegiance to Bin Laden and renamed his militia al-Qaeda in Iraq (Laqueur and Wall 2018, 102-103). Zarqawi's fledgling organization was a catalyst for the sectarian slaughter that permeated Iraq from 2004 to 2008. However, this brutality helped drive a wedge between al-Qaeda in Iraq and Bin Laden and his associates (Ibid.). Nonetheless, al-Qaeda in Iraq would outlive Zarqawi and go through a number of reorganizations before achieving international infamy as Islamic State following a major military incursion into Syria and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's establishment of his so-called caliphate (Atwan 2015, 50-58). Baghdadi was able to take advantage of the chaos in Iraq and Syria following the violent devolution of the 'Arab Spring,' and Islamic State was soon widely known for its cruelty and brutality. Global infamy, along with an unprecedented internet presence, allowed Islamic State to rapidly emerge as the dominant voice of Salafi jihadism, even eclipsing al-Qaeda's own considerable influence (Atwan 2015, 9-31; Maher 2016, 11-13).

Islamic State's preeminent English magazine *Dabiq* began publication in July 2014. *Dabiq* was a significantly more substantial publication than Al Hayat Media Center's previous magazines, *Islamic State News* and *Islamic State Report*, containing around fifty pages per issue (Macnair and Frank 2018, 110-111). Rather than focusing almost exclusively on propaganda images from Iraq and Syria, each issue of *Dabiq* contained multiple lengthy articles that elaborated upon the ideological beliefs of Islamic State, the personal lives of its insurgents, and current events related to the organization (Ibid.). While *Dabiq* was replaced by *Rumiyah* in 2016 following Islamic State's loss of the Syrian town the magazine was named after, it ran for fifteen issues comprising almost 1000 pages of propaganda (Ibid.).

II. Militant White Supremacy and *The Great Replacement*

Unlike Islamic State insurgents, contemporary militant white supremacists have been unable to effectively coalesce into anything more significant than a smattering of terror cells, fringe organizations, and disgraced political parties (Laqueur and Wall 2018, 165-173). It is therefore more difficult to trace their major ideological influences, let alone define 'militant white supremacist.' As a result, many academic works on the subject such as Ghassan Hage's *White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society* (2000) and David Gillborn's "Rethinking White Supremacy: Who Counts in 'WhiteWorld'" eschew formal definitions altogether (2006). Consequently, this thesis will employ an original definition of militant white supremacy as: explicit and violent support for a society in which one or more white-identifying communities hold political power over the rest of the population on the basis of race or ethnicity. [3] This definition is inclusive of both the militant far right of Europe and the violent white nationalists found in settler colonial states without including right wing extremists who exclusively champion a religious identity or do not consider themselves white.

In spite of its fractured, underground nature, some of the roots of militant white supremacy are still apparent. For example, the fascist movements of the 1920s and 30s in Europe have clearly influenced the iconography, basic beliefs, and tactics of many contemporary white supremacist groups (Ebner 2017, 57-61). Even the current proliferation of street violence can be traced back to tactics employed by the Brownshirts in Weimar Germany and the Blackshirts in Italy (Weinberg and Assoudeh 2018). Many militant white supremacists also still admire Hitler and share his hatred of Jews (Gardiner 2005, 63-64; Larsson 2014), an affliction clearly present in Stephan Balliet when he murdered two individuals attempting to attack a synagogue in Halle, Germany on Yom Kippur (Connolly 2020). This anti-Semitism is often bound up in a fervent belief in 'scientific racism,' a pseudoscientific belief system which flourished in Europe and North America in past centuries. While today such beliefs have largely been discredited, they continue to play an important role in sustaining the ideology (Harmon 2018).

[3] Following the precedent of Audre Lorde (1984) and other scholars, I will generally not capitalize 'white' when discussing the term as it is understood by white supremacists.

However, one of the most significant and well-nigh universally shared beliefs among contemporary white supremacists is the virulent anti-Muslim sentiment that emerged following the September 11th attacks, the subsequent destabilizing U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the devolution of the so-called Arab Spring, and the resulting refugee crisis in Europe (Ebner 2017, 60-62). This rise in Islamophobia has rejuvenated many organizations championing a militant white supremacist ideology as it gives them a critical raison d'etre (Laqueur and Wall 2018, 166-168). In fact, this new Islamophobic moment has led many white supremacist groups to embrace symbols associated with the crusader armies that once fought in the Levant (Koch 2017, 13-14). According to Ariel Koch, these symbols celebrating past violence against Muslims at the hand of European Christians reflect a powerful anti-Muslim sentiment among the far right (Ibid., 14-20). The clear threat these violent extremists pose to MENA immigrant communities and non-immigrant Muslims throughout the world makes understanding the beliefs present in white supremacist manifestos crucial to preventing future Islamophobic violence.

Brenton Tarrant's *The Great Replacement* can be seen as a product of these various influences. The manifesto espouses white nationalism, a variety of white supremacism succinctly defined by Steven Gardiner as "a secular political orientation, grounded in an ideology of biologically determined racial hierarchy and the presumption of a necessary link between race and nation, and a praxis that includes, but is not limited to, pragmatic engagement with electoral and pressure group activity on the model of identity politics" (2005, 61). In fact, *The Great Replacement*'s title itself refers to a white nationalist conspiracy theory popularized by Renaud Camus' *Le Grand Remplacement* (*The Great Replacement*) in 2011 (Davey and Ebner 2019, 8). Camus argued that a capitalist elite was intentionally orchestrating mass immigration in order to replace white European populations with non-white immigrants (Camus 2011). Ideas such as these motivated Anders Behring Breivik's killing of 69 people, 33 of them children, on Utøya Island in Norway in 2011 (Önnerfors 2017). That terrorist attack would inspire Brenton Tarrant to follow in Breivik's footsteps and kill 51 people at Al Noor Mosque and the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019 (Moses 2019, 202). *The Great Replacement*, posted online immediately prior to the attack, is currently the most accessible window into the worldview that led to that tragedy.

Literature Review

This chapter will begin by reviewing the current literature on extremism, particularly that which pertains to the comparative study of Salafi jihadism and militant white supremacy. It will then explore existing research on how negative depictions in propaganda facilitate political violence. Next, it will briefly cover some contemporary studies on deradicalization. Finally, it will conclude with an examination of previous content analyses of *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement*.

I. Extremism: Salafi Jihadism and Militant White Supremacy

Extremism has historically been defined in a variety of different ways (Berger 2018, 1-5). Some scholars have been content to understand extremism within the specific ideological context they are concerned with, leading to contextual definitions such as the one in Rippl and Seipel's "Gender Differences in Right Wing Extremism: Intergroup Validity of a Second-Order Construct" which understood right-wing extremism as being based upon an "ideology of inequality and the acceptance of violence" (1999, 385).[4] Others have presented inclusive enough definitions to implicate even generally deviant political platforms as varieties of extremism (Glaeser et al. 2005). Some collaborative texts, such as *Political Extremism and Rationality* (Breton et al. 2002), have even had to offer a plurality of definitions in order to accommodate varying approaches to the study of the phenomenon. Therefore, while J. M. Berger's definition of extremism as "the belief that an in-group's success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile action against an out-group" (2018, 44) is most relevant to this particular content analysis given its clarity and flexibility, it will be important to examine a variety of the major works comparing Salafi jihadist and militant white supremacist extremism in order to appreciate how those phenomena are currently understood.

Some early research pertaining to the comparative study of Salafi jihadism and white supremacy took place at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In *Terror and Liberalism*, Paul Berman (2003) examined the animosity held by many jihadists toward the hegemonic liberal

[4] This definition was itself adapted from one formulated by Wilhelm Heitmeyer (1995).

democratic order established at the end of the Cold War. As the current wave of white supremacy and white nationalism had not yet begun in earnest at that time, Berman (Ibid.) compared the emerging jihadist resistance to the global liberal order to the animosity the fascist powers of the 1930s held toward similar global institutions. This comparison was further developed by David Charters (2007), who likened the origins and ideological convictions of the two movements in order to explore whether or not al Qaeda's ideology could be understood as a new form of fascism. However, the fascism of twentieth-century Germany and Italy is not the white supremacy of today, which makes these studies merely precursors to more recent comparative assessments of Salafi jihadist and militant white supremacist extremism.

Salafi jihadists have also been compared with other violent extremists in order to downplay the supposed exceptionalism of any particular violent ideology. In *The Myth of Martyrdom*, criminologist Adam Lankford (2013) theorized that suicide attackers from a variety of ideological backgrounds were suicidal before they were terrorists. He compiled an extensive dataset made up of suicide terrorists, which showed many had exhibited risk factors for suicide in the years leading up to their attacks (Ibid., 177-190). This research led Lankford (Ibid., 21-39) to posit that suicide terrorism stemmed from the channeling of taboo suicidal feelings into socially acceptable violence rather than personal zealotry. A similar dismissal of the unique significance often afforded Salafi jihadism appeared in *Jihad and Death*, a book by Olivier Roy (2017) that investigated the radicalization of youth by Islamic State propaganda. While Roy acknowledged the novelty of "the association of terrorism and jihadism with the deliberate pursuit of death" (Ibid., 1), he argued that the extremism associated with Islamic State fell squarely within a longer tradition of radicalism that included the anarchist terrorists of the late nineteenth century and leftist insurgents active across Europe and the MENA region during the Cold War (Ibid., 1-10). Roy claimed that the current Salafi jihadist wave was simply "the Islamization of radicalism" (Ibid., 41), new paint on an old nihilistic gravitation toward violence.

Walter Laqueur and Christopher Wall (2018, 44-61) also approached their analysis of Salafi jihadist and white supremacist extremism through the lens of terrorism. *The Future of Terrorism* discussed the increasing prevalence of white supremacist terrorism in North America, the threat posed by both major terrorist ideologies in Europe, and the current status of both

al-Qaeda and Islamic State in the MENA region (Ibid., 132-175). While Laqueur and Wall's comparative analysis of Salafi jihadist and white supremacist violence was limited and overly dismissive of the threat posed by far right white supremacy in Europe, another scholar had already thoroughly explored the interplay between the two ideologies.

Julia Ebner's *The Rage: The Vicious Circle of Islamist and Far-Right Extremism* (2017) remains one of the most prominent analyses of the shared identity politics, propaganda proliferation techniques, and violent acts of far-right and Islamist extremists. While Ebner (Ibid.) did not exclusively focus on those openly professing Salafi jihadist or white supremacist ideologies, her research highlighted the numerous ways in which the extremist narratives of Islamists and the far right feed into one another. Ebner argued that:

> [F]ar-right and Islamist extremist narratives […] complement and amplify each other, leading to a bizarre form of interdependency between the two. Far-right and Islamist extremists succeed in penetrating each other's echo chambers because their messages are mutually useful. This effectively makes the two extremes 'rhetorical allies' (Ebner 2017, 197).

This notion of "reciprocal radicalization" between proponents of the two ideologies raises numerous questions about the extent to which radicals from both camps depend on each other's propaganda and criminality in order to increase their numbers and justify their own calls for violence (Ibid., 10-11). It also indicates that the messaging emerging from the two opposing camps is more similar than one might expect. Ebner's exploration of the interdependence of the narratives employed by Islamists and the far right helped inspire this thesis.

Some of Ebner's ideas were supported by a collaborative study conducted by Milan Obaidi, Jonas R. Kunst, Nour Kteily, Lotte Thomsen, and James Sidanius (2018) published in the European Journal of Social Psychology a year later. It utilized a series of four separate but interrelated studies to explore the relationship between threat perception and open hostility in various communities. The researchers examined the correlation between how threatened non-Muslim Norwegians and Americans were by Muslims and their willingness to justify hostile

actions against Muslims; as well as a similar correlation between how threatened Muslim Swedes and Turks were by 'the West' and their willingness to justify violence against 'Westerners' (Obaidi et al., 570-575). The researchers found that "symbolic and realistic threats were equivalently associated with outgroup hostility across the samples, confirming the proposed common psychology of outgroup hostility" (Ibid., 580). While these results are both intriguing and support Ebner's thesis, this is simply one angle from which the topic has been explored.

A variety of articles comparing specific elements of Salafi jihadist and white supremacist ideology and propaganda have been published over the past decade, many specifically concerned with the online activity of both groups. In an article on anti-Semitism in Germany, Günther Jikeli (2015) compared the ways in which Islamists and far-right extremists discuss and disparage Jews through music and on social media. In a similar vein, J. M. Berger (2016) explored the presence neo-Nazis and Islamic State supporters have carved for themselves on Twitter. While many such studies focus on extremist social media usage, little has been written comparing how Salafi jihadists and militant white supremacists portray their victims in more traditional and extensive works of propaganda. This is a significant gap in the research that this thesis intends to fill.

II. Portrayal, Propaganda, and Political Violence

While knowledge of the existing literature comparing Salafi jihadist and militant white supremacist extremism is important in framing this novel exploration of the subject, this thesis also draws on a selection of books and articles concerned with the relationship between propaganda and violence.[5] The earlier studies featured in this section focus on how historical victims of state violence were portrayed by their victimizers, while the more recent research attempts to understand how propaganda facilitates political violence.

Many prominent twentieth century explorations of the relationship between propaganda and political violence tended to focus on events in which state violence was carried out against noncombatant populations (Haslam and Loughnan 2014, 401). Herbet Kelman (1973) notably explored the roles played by dehumanization, the routinization of violence, and the glorification of the military in the perpetuation of what he labeled "sanctioned massacres" during periods of

[5] Propaganda is aptly defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as "information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view" (*Oxford English Dictionary* 2021).

genocide and ethnic cleansing. He argued that these three processes led to "the weakening of moral restraints against violence," thereby facilitating the slaughter of large groups of defenseless civilians (Ibid., 38). Ervin Staub (1989) would further explore these notions in *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*, a text which employed a series of case studies comprising some of the most famous examples of mass killing during the twentieth century in order to explore the psychological profiles of the individuals responsible. Staub further stressed the role the dehumanization of threatened minorities regularly played in facilitating genocide, arguing that "the Nazis were able to kill more Jews in those countries where anti-Semitism and discrimination against Jews were already strong" (Staub 1989, 61). The leading role of dehumanization in these assessments of past political violence is striking. For this reason, a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon will be utilized in this thesis' own theory chapter.

More recent studies have sought to explore how extremist propaganda facilitates real-world violence. One article by Travis Morris (2014) examined how neo-Nazi and violent jihadist propaganda employs diagnostic frames in order to manipulate a target population and indoctrinate them into an extremist worldview. This topic was also explored by Elihu Richter, Dror Kris Markus, and Casey Tait (2018), who posited that the indoctrination of young Muslims by organizations espousing extremist worldviews made them susceptible to incitement, defined in the text as "speech, writing, and images whose purpose is to rouse individuals or groups to violent action" (Ibid., 3). The authors argued that this incitement typically took the form of "dehumanization, demonization, delegitimization, disinformation, and the denial of past atrocities perpetrated against the target" (Ibid.). Therefore, the study favorably presented blocking and censoring public messaging deemed extremist on account of its role in making young people vulnerable to individuals or groups inciting real-world violence (Ibid., 5-16). Analogous anti-extremist strategies have been adopted by numerous governments over the past decades (Adams 2019; Delcker 2020). However, given the speed and efficacy with which extremist propaganda can be disseminated in the twenty-first century, it will also be important to understand the current literature on deradicalization.

III. Deradicalization

While the field of deradicalization studies is still in its infancy, researchers and practitioners have already begun dissecting the topic (Koehler 2017, 1-9). According to Arie Kruglanski, Michele Gelfand, Jocelyn Bélanger, Anna Sheveland, Malkanthi Hetiarachchi, and Rohan Gunaratna:

> [R]adicalization reflects (1) a high-level commitment to the ideologically suggested goal (e.g., liberating one's land from occupation, bringing about the return of the caliphate) and to violence as a means to its attainment, coupled with (2) a reduced commitment to alternative goals and values. Its obverse, deradicalization, represents (1) a restoration of the latter concerns and/or (2) a reduction of commitment to the focal, ideological goal, or to the recommended means (of violence and terrorism) to that goal (Kruglanski et al. 2014, 84).

Their article understood deradicalization as the 'obverse' of radicalization and associated the process with either the rehabilitation of former values, the rejection of the radical ideology, or the abandonment of violence. The authors also observed the impact a deradicalization program had on imprisoned insurgents of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). A decrease in the support for violent struggle was observed among the recipients of the program, while no such decrease was observed within the control group (Ibid., 88). Results such as these illuminate the potential real world benefits of understanding deradicalization.

Other studies on deradicalization have explored which methods are most effective. "Terrorism, Radicalization and De-Radicalization," specifically highlighted the role of "exposure to alternative viewpoints" on deradicalizing former extremists (Doosje et al. 2016, 82). This notion was also embraced in *Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online*, a policy brief commissioned by the Danish government (Briggs and Feve 2014). In that document, Rachel Briggs and Sebastien Feve emphasized both "working with at risk youth to deconstruct extremist messages" and "funding non-governmental organisations able to offer credible alternatives" (Ibid., 3). As also pointed out by Julia Ebner, "[t]he first step in tackling extremism is to listen to extremists' stories" (2017, 1). This makes actually understanding extremist propaganda critical.

IV. Content Analyses: *Dabiq*

This thesis is merely one of the numerous content analyses of *Dabiq* that emerged following the conquest of Mosul, an event which catapulted Islamic State into the international spotlight in June 2014 (Colas 2017, 173-175). Content analyses of *Dabiq* typically fall into one of three categories: assessments of the use of religion, assessments of the imagery, and assessments of the language. Examples of all three categories will be presented below.

Rather unsurprisingly, many of the content analyses conducted on *Dabiq* chose to examine how the magazine incorporated religious themes in its articles. "Capitalizing on the Koran to Fuel Online Violent Radicalization" (Frissen et al. 2018) explored how passages from the Quran found in *Dabiq* were tailored to fit a specific and violent narrative. The aim of the article was "to examine in a systematic and quantitative way to what extent ISIS utilizes the Koran in an atomistic, truncated and tailored manner to bolster its religious legitimacy" (Ibid., 491). This tailoring of Quranic verses was found to have occurred frequently throughout *Dabiq* (Ibid., 450). Another similarly structured content analysis was performed by Tim Jacoby (2019), who examined how *Dabiq* analyzed the Quranic verses it printed as well as which classical Muslim scholars the magazine frequently cited. While his findings largely overlapped with those of "Capitalizing on the Koran to Fuel Online Violent Radicalization" (Frissen et al. 2018), Jacoby (2019, 41) did find Ibn Taymiyyah had been quoted significantly more times than any other classical scholar, reaffirming his ideological significance to the organization.

The next category of content analyses examined the imagery employed throughout *Dabiq*. While some articles discussed details as foundational as color choice and visual modes (Abdelrahim 2019), many others fixated on the use of 'gore images' throughout the magazine (Lakomy 2019; Winkler et al. 2019a; Winkler et al. 2019b). One such analysis was conducted by Miron Lakomy (2019), which ironically helped highlight a lack of emphasis on gore found in *Dabiq* when compared to Islamic State's other digital output. *Dabiq*'s utilization of violent imagery was also examined in both "The Medium is Terrorism" (Winkler et al. 2019a) and "Images of Death and Dying in ISIS Media" (Winkler et al. 2019b), content analyses largely focused on how death and dying were portrayed in the magazine. These studies all reflect an academic fascination with the grimmer content of *Dabiq*.

The final category of content analyses assessed the language used in *Dabiq*. The magazine was poured over by countless scholars looking for insights into the values and worldview of Islamic State. Macnair and Frank (2018) employed a sentiment analysis to explore which words in *Dabiq* were attached to positive sentiments and which were attached to negative ones. Tyler Welch (2018) outlined five categories he believed captured all of the articles ever published in *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*. However, of the greatest significance to this thesis was a study by Haroro Ingram (2017) concerning how *Dabiq* and al-Qaeda's magazine *Inspire* present a global conflict between a chosen in-group and a series of dangerous enemy out-groups in order to attract supporters and new recruits. Ingram (Ibid.) was particularly concerned with how such negative depictions could empower and radicalize readers. His analysis of how *Dabiq* and *Inspire* foment conflict between different communities, while largely pertaining to the recruitment of new extremists, helped structure this investigation of how *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* portray those they incite violence against.

While a number of content analyses have been conducted on *Dabiq*, none have holistically explored how the magazine portrays those it promotes violence against, nor compared the language found in *Dabiq* with that of a characteristic white supremacist text. In fact, such a comparison was even called for at the end of "Capitalizing on the Koran to Fuel Online Violent Radicalization" (Frissen el al. 2018, 501). Therefore, despite the overwhelming amount of research into *Dabiq*, there is still more to be done.

V. Content Analyses: *The Great Replacement*

While an enormous amount of attention has been afforded *Dabiq* by the academic community, white supremacist manifestos have received comparatively little scholarly attention. This is to be expected given the enormous impact of Islamic State on the global community. While the violence inflicted upon Christchurch's Muslim community was far from insignificant, it was not on the same scale as the destruction wrought in Iraq and Syria by Islamic State. However, the comparative lack of research on Brenton Tarrant's *The Great Replacement* could also be attributed to the current trends in academic research on violent extremism, highlighted by J. M.

Berger, which see "three times as many academic studies referencing jihadism as […] white nationalism" (2018, 4). As such, analyses of Tarrant's manifesto are few and far between.

One significant exception to this is a content analysis recently conducted by Jacob Ware (2020), which analyzed six far right terrorist manifestos including *The Great Replacement*. Over the course of Ware's exploration of the manifestos, he determined five general themes within the texts. Four of those themes, "race, Europe, the political climate, and the portrayal of an act of terrorism as self-defense and as a last resort," were discussed in detail (Ibid., 4). The fifth pertained to the regular calls for further violence that permeated all of the texts (Ibid., 9). While these themes do not directly pertain to the portrayal of those the manifestos incite violence against, Ware's policy brief is a step toward a better understanding of militant white supremacy and an excellent example of a thematic analysis of several different extremist texts.

Tarrant's *The Great Replacement* has also received more specific attention. In an article published mere weeks after the Christchurch shooting, Dirk Moses (2019) examined the 'white genocide' theory upon which much Tarrant's political arguments were based in order to assess how Tarrant's ideas mirrored or stood out among the various paradigmatic beliefs that have come to be associated with the international white nationalist movement. According to Moses, "Tarrant's eclectic bundle of views will be familiar to anyone who has studied fascism and modern right-wing terrorism" (Ibid., 206). In fact, the only place in which Moses found Tarrant's views not to be paradigmatically white nationalist is his complete disregard for anti-Semitic conspiracy theories (Ibid., 203-211). Another report on Tarrant's manifesto was written by Jacob Davey and Julia Ebner (2019) and primarily concerned Renaud Camus' 'great replacement' conspiracy theory. As such, Davey and Ebner (Ibid.) addressed the far right notions of 'white genocide' and 'remigration'[6] that inspired Tarrant without analyzing his manifesto in any great detail. They concluded that the 'great replacement' conspiracy theory's capacity to inspire violence was far more important than the writings of one such perpetrator of violence (Ibid., 10). These reports say little about *The Great Replacement* itself, and further research will be required to understand how Tarrant saw the communities he called for violence against.

[6] Davey and Ebner define 'remigration' as "the call for forced deportation of migrant communities, with the intent of creating an ethnically or culturally homogenous society, essentially a non-violent form of ethnic cleansing" (2019, 6).

Theory

This chapter will begin with an exploration of social identity theory, paying close attention to how it has previously been employed to better understand extremist worldviews. It will then turn to dehumanization theory, which models the relationship between dehumanizing language and violence against the dehumanized. Finally, it will conclude with a brief discussion of how these two theories fit together as one coherent theoretical framework.

I. Social Identity Theory and Extremist Social Categorization

Social identity theory is rooted in the social psychology research of Henri Tajfel, who developed the theory in order to understand "the role played in intergroup behaviour by processes of social categorization" (Tajfel et al. 1971, 150). It originated in a series of experiments conducted by Tajfel and his fellow researchers, which found the actions of an experimental delineated in-group to be consistently and "unambiguously directed at favouring the members of their ingroup as against the members of the outgroup […] despite the fact that an alternative strategy - acting in terms of the greatest common good - is clearly open to them at a relatively small cost" (Ibid., 172). These findings were further elaborated on in a collaborative piece by Tajfel and Turner positing that the "aim of differentiation is to maintain or achieve superiority over an out-group on some dimensions" (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 41). Tajfel's theoretical model inextricably linked the processes of intergroup distinction, in-group favoritism, and out-group denigration.

J. M. Berger (2018, 23-28) built on Tajfel's model and tailored social identity theory to the study of violent extremism in his appropriately titled *Extremism*. Berger (Ibid.) established a theoretical model for how extremist groups divide the world into a legitimate in-group, a community sharing a collective identity, and a series of illegitimate out-groups, communities excluded from that collective identity. He defined 'legitimacy' as "the belief that an identity collective has a right to exist and may be rightfully defined, maintained, and protected" (Ibid., 26). Therefore, legitimacy is key to his understanding of 'extremism,' which he defined as "the belief that an in-group's success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile action against an out-group" (Ibid., 44). In the mind of an extremist, an out-group lacking

legitimacy does not have the same right to exist as the legitimate in-group. According to Berger (Ibid., 51-74), this worldview allows extremist ideologues to justify massive violence against out-groups in the name of protecting the in-group.

Berger's model is informed by social identity theory's understanding of how in-group and out-group identities initially emerge as a result of the social categorization of a community based on a set of beliefs, traits, and practices (Ibid., 54-57). However, this set of shared traits eventually "stops being a list of facts and starts being the 'story of us' […] a powerful tool for establishing legitimacy and group cohesion" (Ibid., 56). This narrative allows the in-group to assert its distinct character and separate itself from any given out-group, even when the grounds for that separation are hazy and imprecise. Berger posited that intergroup distinction becomes extremist in nature when "the in-group starts to adopt hostile attitudes toward the out-group or -groups" (Ibid., 57), a process he argued is inextricably bound up in increasingly negative depictions of an out-group that "may shift toward fiction and become more toxic, aggressively highlighting negative data points and ignoring or rebutting positive data points" (Ibid.). It is at this point that extremists begin to call for violent action against those out-groups (Ibid.).

One last key element of Berger's brand of social identity theory is its focus on two major varieties of out-group: the 'enemy out-group' and the 'ineligible in-group' (Ibid., 56-64). While an enemy out-group is explicitly excluded from an extremist definition of the in-group, an ineligible in-group emerges "[w]hen members of the eligible in-group reject the extremist movement" (Ibid., 63). This ineligible in-group is soon treated as a distinct out-group of its own, and "[a]ttitudes toward the ineligible in-group can be more hostile and violent than toward a more distinct out-group, due to the ineligible's 'betrayal'" (Ibid., 63-64). Berger (Ibid., 61-64) referred to this phenomenon as 'dividing the in-group' and believed it to be indicative of the threat posed by anti-extremist elements of the in-group to the extremists themselves. This distinction of an ineligible in-group and enemy out-group is somewhat reminiscint of the Salafi jihadist conceptions of 'near enemy' and 'far enemy' popularized by Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda (Stenersen 2018, 5-6). While Berger's understanding of the 'enemy out-group' and 'ineligible in-group' differs from the jihadist conception of 'near' and 'far' enemies, which are typically distinguished geographically, the similarities are intriguing (Ibid., 5-6).

Before moving on to an examination of dehumanization theory, it will be important to address two obstacles to the utilization of social identity theory in this thesis. The first of these is how, as discussed previously, the theory is rooted in social psychology and is bound up in psychological experimentation. This brings the applicability of the theory to a content analysis of extremist texts into question. This critique can be addressed in three ways. The first is the inclusion of Berger's formulation of social identity theory, which connects the theoretical model to contemporary extremist thought. The second is the focus of this thesis on how individuals and groups who are the target of extremist violence are portrayed by those extremists, a subject in which the theoretical applicability of social identity theory is difficult to question. The third is the precedent set by past, non-experimental applications of social identity theory such as "Social Identity Theory and the Discursive Analysis of Collective Identities in Narratives" (Dorien Van De Mieroop 2015). The second obstacle pertains to the association of social identity theory with quantitative research (Jackson and Sherriff 2013, 260-261). This can also be addressed by the precedent set by past applications of the theory in qualitative research (Dorien Van De Mieroop 2015; Jackson and Sherriff 2013).

II. Dehumanization and Violence

Given the focus of this research on how Salafi jihadist and militant white supremacist propaganda portray those they incite violence against, a theoretical model for the role dehumanization plays in violence will be invaluable. While Nick Haslam (2006) established a prior comprehensive theory of dehumanization which divided the phenomenon into 'animalistic' and 'mechanistic' varieties, it did not center the relationship between dehumanization and violence. David Livingstone Smith's theory of dehumanization, popularized by *Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others* (2011) and rooted in the philosophy of psychology, did exactly that.

Smith defined dehumanization as "the act of conceiving of people as subhuman creatures rather than as human beings" (Ibid., 26). This definition is informed by a very particular conception of humanity that distinguishes between 'human beings' and "creatures that look like humans, but who are not endowed with a human essence" (Ibid., 101). Smith (Ibid., 100-101)

argued that this socially constructed and entirely immaterial 'human essence' is what distinguishes humans from those who are not quite human, those worthy of respect and dignity from those not deserving of such recognition, *we* from *them*. Smith's 'human essence' could be likened to Berger's idea of 'legitimacy.' However, according to Smith (Ibid.), 'human essence' exists in a binary. You either have it or you do not.

Smith argued that "dehumanized people are shorn of their individuality […] [and] typically thought of as fungible, as parts of an undifferentiated mass" (Ibid., 89). This conception of a community strips its members of any traces of individuality, replacing them with whatever negative stereotypes have come to define them in the mind of the dehumanizers (Ibid., 89-90). This is just one of the ways in which dehumanization facilitates violence. This, according to Smith, is precisely its intended purpose. He posited that dehumanization "occurs in situations where we want to harm a group of people, but are restrained by inhibitions against harming them. Dehumanization is a way of subverting those inhibitions" (Ibid., 264). Dehumanization is presented as nothing less than "a prelude and accompaniment to extreme violence" (Ibid., 13), and Smith argued that its utilization in this manner is innately human (Ibid., 223). While he accepted that dehumanization's "content in any given case is culturally determined," Smith also asserted its universal relationship with violent rhetoric and action (Ibid., 265).

Though his theoretical model of dehumanization emerged from the field of philosophy, Smith (Ibid., 277) acknowledged its remarkable similarity to one put forward by social anthropologist Paul Roscoe (2007) in "Intelligence, Coalitional Killing, and the Antecedents of War." Roscoe (Ibid., 488) was also concerned with reconciling the human aversion to conspecific killing, the killing of a member of the same species, with the reality that humans regularly kill one another. Roscoe theorized that humans have become "sufficiently intelligent to recognize when it [is] advantageous to kill" (Ibid., 488) and have subsequently devised methods "to short-circuit the mechanism that inhibits them from doing so" (Ibid., 489). Roscoe (Ibid., 491-492) posited that this phenomenon has produced a natural tendency in humans to dehumanize out-groups with the subconscious intention of facilitating their murder.

III. Categorize and Condemn: A Joint Framework

The theory of dehumanization conceptualized by Smith (2011) neatly aligns with Berger's framing of social identity theory to understand extremist identity formation (2018). In fact, the dehumanization of Berger's extremist out-group could be understood as part of the process by which violence against an out-group becomes inextricably bound up in the identity of the extremist in-group (Ibid., 44). While the killing of a fellow human being usually gives rise to profound personal distress and the condemnation of one's peers, the killing of a pest, parasite, or disease is often perceived as necessary (Smith 2011, 263-265). If an out-group could be dehumanized in such a way, killing them could become both sensible and prudent in the minds of the extremists dehumanizing them. This joint theoretical framework for understanding group identity, dehumanization, and violence will be invaluable when exploring how *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* portray the communities they incite violence against.

Methodology

This chapter is broken into eight sections in order to clearly illustrate the steps taken to obtain the data examined in the subsequent findings and analysis chapters. The first section briefly describes the interpretivist paradigm and inductive approach of this research. The second discusses this thesis's research design, a qualitative content analysis comparing two ideologically distinct extremist texts. The third explains and justifies the selection of texts. The fourth briefly recounts how they were obtained. The fifth details the process of data analysis. The sixth indicates the steps taken to ensure trustworthiness, consistency, and applicability. The seventh elaborates upon the role played by the researcher, and the eighth briefly discusses some ethical considerations.

I. Research Paradigm

This thesis' ontological and epistemological assumptions firmly root it within the interpretivist paradigm. Interpretivism has traditionally supported a relativist ontology that posits numerous realities which are "apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature [...], and dependent for their form and content on the individual persons or groups holding the constructions" (Guba and Lincoln 1994, 110-111). While this ontological framework has been legitimately critiqued for its apparent rejection of objective reality by theorists of ontology such as Ron Weber (2004), it is most appropriate for this thesis given the focus of the research on how two ideologically distinct extremist texts construct their own realities. These constructed realities will be explored through an inductive research design which will "allow research findings to emerge from the frequent, dominant, or significant themes inherent in raw data" (Thomas 2006, 238). Such an inductive approach to content analysis is informed by an interpretivist epistemology in which "[t]he investigator and the object of investigation are assumed to be interactively linked so that the 'findings' are *literally created* as the investigation proceeds" (Guba and Lincoln 1994, 111). The above assumptions guide the following research design.

II. Research Design

This thesis is built around a qualitative content analysis of *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* which aims to uncover how the two extremist texts portray those they incite violence against as well as how those portrayals relate to one another. In *The Practice of Social Research*, Earl Babbie simply defines content analysis as "the study of recorded human communications'" (2010, 333). He also claims it "is particularly well suited to [...] answering the classic question of communications research: 'Who says what, to whom, why, how, and with what effect?'" (Ibid.) This makes it a natural research method for the study of magazines and manifestos such as *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement*. However, Babbie (Ibid., 334-37) also stresses the importance of clearly defining the units of analysis and observation in a content analysis. In this case, the units of analysis or "the individual units that we make descriptive and explanatory statements about" are the extremist texts *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* (Ibid., 334). Given the focus of this research on how these texts depict those they incite violence against, the units of observation will be the passages depicting the individuals and communities targeted. This focus lends itself to a qualitative research design.

In their article outlining the three main approaches to qualitative content analysis, Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah E. Shannon (2005) assert that the conventional approach generally avoids "preconceived categories (Kondracki & Wellman, 2002), instead allowing the categories and names for categories to flow from the data. Researchers immerse themselves in the data to allow new insights to emerge" (1279). This approach facilitates the free exploration of a novel research topic and prevents the researcher(s) from being limited by any preconceived notions about that topic. Hsieh and Shannon explain that conventional qualitative content analysis "is generally used with a study design whose aim is to describe a phenomenon [...] This type of design is usually appropriate when existing theory or research literature on a phenomenon is limited" (Ibid.). Therefore, given the descriptive aims of this thesis, the largely unquantifiable nature of its subject matter, and the dearth of cross-ideological research into how contemporary extremist texts portray those they incite violence against, a conventional qualitative content analysis is more than suitable for answering the research question.

Conventional qualitative content analysis is not without its methodological drawbacks though. Hsieh and Shannon discuss how it is "limited in both theory development and description of the lived experience, because both sampling and analysis procedures make the theoretical relationship between concepts difficult to infer from findings" (Ibid., 1281). On a similar note, Kathleen Carley argues that "[d]espite their richness, such analyses typically lack precision and inferential strength" (1993, 76). While these criticisms do highlight the limitations of conventional qualitative content analysis, alternative research methods are markedly less suitable for answering this thesis' research question. While a directed content analysis could be employed to test an existing theory of extremism, the holistic nature of a conventional content analysis allows this thesis to avoid privileging supporting evidence and ignoring aspects of a text not immediately relevant to the theory in question, phenomena often associated with directed content analyses (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1283).

Finally, the comparative approach of this research design as well as its author's decision to examine existing extremist documents rather than interview Salafi jihadists and militant white supremacists directly must both be justified. The comparative nature of this thesis itself is not particularly unusual. Numerous content analyses have been employed to comparatively explore a wide range of documents before this one (Hong et al. 1987; Cissel 2012; Stepchenkova and Zhan 2013). However, the decision to opt for an unobtrusive research design rather than field work requires greater explanation. A content analysis comparing two existing works of extremist propaganda was chosen over an interview-based research strategy for two main reasons. The first and more pressing of these had to do with the obvious dangers and difficulties associated with interviewing violent Salafi jihadists and white supremacists. The second pertained to the importance of selecting influential cases in order to ensure the relevance of this thesis' findings. That process will be described in great detail in the next section of this chapter.

III. Selection of the Texts

Dabiq and *The Great Replacement* were selected by way of purposive sampling, a form of non-probability sampling common in qualitative content analysis. According to Jane Forman and Laura Damschroder, in purposive sampling "'[i]nformation-rich' cases are selected for in-depth study to provide the information needed to answer research questions. It is important to choose those cases that will be of most use analytically" (2008, 42-44). In light of this, the texts were selected on the basis of how influential they were among contemporary Salafi jihadists and militant white supremacists, how characteristic they were of those ideologies, how information-rich their content was, and how much of an impact their authors' violence had on individuals from the MENA region. Additionally, given the author's lack of fluency in numerous languages, the texts had to have been written in English.

Dabiq

The fifteen issues of Islamic State's magazine *Dabiq*, published between July 5, 2014 and July 31, 2016, serve as the exemplary case of Salafi jihadist propaganda in this research. Each issue consists of several articles covering a range of topics relevant to Islamic State, and the fifteen issues collectively comprise 942 pages of content. *Dabiq* was chosen from a wide range of significant Salafi jihadist texts, from other magazines including *Rumiyah* and *Inspire* to personal manifestos such as Abu Bakr Naji's *Management of Savagery*. It was selected in large part due to it being Islamic State's flagship magazine. In addition to the tremendous amount of violence it has already inspired, various experts on jihadi terrorism have predicted that Islamic State's wildly successful propaganda will have a pronounced impact on how contemporary extremists, Salafi jihadist or otherwise, present their own violent struggles in the near future (Atwan 2015, 9-31; Maher 2016, 11-13; Ebner 2017, 44-55; Laqueur and Wall 2018, 230-244). This points to the relevance and potential applicability of any insights gained from Islamic State texts. *Dabiq* was chosen over the group's subsequent publication *Rumiyah* given the nature of its articles, which often contained lengthy depictions of Islamic State's enemies, especially when compared with *Rumiyah*'s plethora of instructional texts for the planning of terrorist attacks and misleading infographics intended to obscure Islamic State's impending defeat (Abdelrahim 2019, 70-71).

The Great Replacement

The Great Replacement, an 87 page white nationalist manifesto uploaded by Brenton Tarrant to the imageboard 8chan immediately prior to his 2019 attack on Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, serves as the exemplary case of militant white supremacist propaganda in this research (Davey and Ebner 2019). The attack itself killed 51 people, many of whom were born in the MENA region and had come to New Zealand seeking a better life (Mahmud 2019). The manifesto has been described as a relatively concise amalgamation of white nationalist talking points and explicit calls for violence against immigrants and those supportive of them (Moses 2019, 203-211). While Breivik's manifesto was considered, it predated many events that have come to define contemporary militant white supremacy (Davey and Ebner 2019, 13-14).

Furthermore, since the violence in Christchurch, at least one white supremacist terrorist has claimed Brenton Tarrant's *The Great Replacement* inspired his own attack.[7] Prior to his killing of 23 people at an El Paso Walmart in 2019 (Martinez 2020), Patrick Crusius posted his own manifesto to 8chan which began with the sentence "In general, I support the Christchurch shooter and his manifesto" (*Pulpit & Pen* 2019). Later in that manifesto, Crusius went on to say that "the Hispanic community was not my target before I read *The Great Replacement*" (Ibid.). However, *The Great Replacement*'s influence may not be limited to Crusius. 2019 witnessed another armed gunman kill two people in Halle, Germany while attempting to storm a synagogue on Yom Kippur (Connolly 2020). Lizzie Dearden, a reporter from *The Independent*, wrote that both the attack and its related manifesto were eerily similar to Brenton Tarrant's own (Dearden 2019). She also highlighted statements by Germany's chief federal prosecutor which indicated the attack had been inspired by past violence (Ibid.). Therefore, in light of both the impact it has had on other militant white supremacists and the horrors Tarrant inflicted on a MENA immigrant community in New Zealand, *The Great Replacement* was selected.

[7] Terrorism is used by this thesis' author in accordance with Boaz Ganor's definition of it as "the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims" (2002, 294).

Comparability of the Texts

Finally, the inclusion of *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* within the same content analysis must be addressed. In Reijo Raivola's 1985 article on comparison in research, he writes that "the problem of comparative research could be said to be how to find a body of material suitable for comparison" (370). *Dabiq* is a fifteen issue magazine published by what is likely the most well-known Salafi jihadist organization on the planet. *The Great Replacement* is the personal manifesto of a previously unknown Australian man. However, they both are works of extremist propaganda which have been described as highly reflective of the extremist ideologies they champion. Mahood and Rane (2017) argue that *Dabiq* is steeped in contemporary jihadist language. Abdel Bari Atwan (2015), one of the leading experts on Salafi jihadism, predicts that Islamic State's particular ideology, of which *Dabiq* is one of the chief English representations, is likely to dominate Salafi jihadism in the years to come. Likewise, *The Great Replacement* has been found to be highly reflective of contemporary militant white supremacist ideological trends by several leading scholars of white supremacist extremism (Moses 2019; Davey and Ebner 2019). Therefore, while *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* are not structurally or ideologically similar, they are eminently comparable works of extremist propaganda.

IV. Data Collection

The data collection process itself was rather straightforward. All fifteen issues of *Dabiq* were readily available on the Clarion Project's website. On that website, the Clarion Project describes itself as "a non-profit organization that educates the public about the dangers of radical Islam and other extremist ideologies" ("About Clarion Project | Clarion Project" 2019). However, it should be noted that the Clarion Project, based in Washington D.C., has been labeled an "anti-Muslim hate group" by the Southern Poverty Law Center ("Anti-Muslim" 2019) and "a shadowy nonprofit group distributing anti-Muslim propaganda" in a report by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2013, 24). While this is important to know, allegations that Clarion Project is a hate group have little to do with their viability as a source of *Dabiq* pdfs, which seemed identical to copies found elsewhere on the internet. *The Great Replacement* is, likewise, readily available online. Il Foglio, an Italian newspaper, presents the entire document as a downloadable pdf on its website (Tarrant 2019).

V. Data Analysis

The dataset of this research, comprising *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement*, was analyzed by way of a conventional qualitative content analysis. That analysis followed the three-step inductive coding process outlined by Forman and Damschroder (2008, 46-60). It consisted of three distinct stages: "immersion, reduction, and interpretation" (Ibid., 46). These stages constituted the entirety of the coding and analysis process that generated this thesis' findings.

A. Immersion

Following the model discussed by Forman and Damschroder (2008, 46-47), the coding process began with an initial reading of both *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* on a laptop. This served three purposes. It first and foremost allowed the author to immerse himself in the texts, an activity critical to drawing meaning from them. It also allowed him to take notes on any points of interest encountered while exploring the texts for the first time. Finally, it provided a chance to make sure the texts could safely be categorized as both extremist and either Salafi jihadist or militant white supremacist using the definitions provided in the context and literature review chapters of this thesis. Both cases could unambiguously be categorized as extremist based on Berger's definition of the term as "the belief that an in-group's success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile action against an out-group" (2018, 44). Likewise, *Dabiq* exemplified Hemmingen's understanding of Salafi jihadism as "a heterogenous phenomenon characterized by, among other things: a strict Salafi interpretation of Islam; takfirism; rejection of democracy and other man-made systems; and justification of the use of violence against enemies by references to a narrow interpretation of the Islamic concept of Jihad" (2011, 1201). *The Great Replacement* also fell well within this thesis' own definition of militant white supremacy by giving explicit and violent support for a society in which one or more white-identifying communities hold political power over the rest of the population on the basis of race or ethnicity. In light of the insights obtained during this immersion stage, the author moved on to the reduction stage of the coding process in which codes were generated.

B. Reduction

The reduction stage of the coding process began with the printing out of the texts and a second read-through of *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement*. While reading each case, the author highlighted all paragraphs which contained clear incitement to violence. Here, violence was understood in accordance with the *Oxford English Dictionary* definition of the term as "behavior involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something" (2021). Highlighted passages explicitly called for, justified, or praised violence against one or more individuals, groups, or communities. It should also be noted that passages discussing sexual slavery and forced marriages were also highlighted on the grounds that rape is violence, regardless of how its perpetrators depict it. Euphemisms for ethnic cleansing were similarly highlighted. The names of the individuals and groups targeted in those portions of the texts were recorded during this second read-through and placed in one of two lists depending on which text they were found in. In some cases, alternate spellings and declensions (Rāfidī/Rāfidah) or alternate terms (Rāfidī/Shia) were used to describe the same communities.[8] Alternate spellings and declensions were simply categorized in the same list entry. Alternate terms were grouped into terminology clusters in order to keep track of which communities were being targeted.[9] During this process, the author also engaged in open coding in order to capture key elements of how those individuals and groups were portrayed in the highlighted sections (Babbie 2010, 401). Those open codes were standardized and subsequently organized into a single codebook used to code both texts, a process Forman and Damschroder stressed as necessary in order "to organize codes and to help ensure they are used reliably" (2008, 51). This newly created codebook and the two lists of terms would both be employed in the second part of the reduction stage.

The aforementioned codebook was subsequently used to systematically code every non-highlighted instance in which the identifying terms on each of the lists appeared in their respective extremist texts. Microsoft Edge's Find feature was used on the pdfs of *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* to help avoid overlooking any instances of these terms in the re-coding

[8] *Inside the Jihadi Mind: Understanding Ideology and Propaganda* (El-Badawy et al. 2015), a report on jihadist propaganda by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, was referenced in order to help establish working definitions for any unfamiliar terms found in *Dabiq*. The previously discussed report on *The Great Replacement* by Jacob Davey and Julia Ebner (2019) was similarly employed in the case of the manifesto.
[9] Examples of these terminology maps can be found in the Findings section.

process. The only sections of *Dabiq* not coded in this way were quotations from so-called enemies of Islamic State, which were generally found in the regularly occurring "In the Words of the Enemy" articles. These were not included because they did not represent the views of the editors of *Dabiq* on those individuals and communities they had called for violence against. As new codes pertaining to the portrayal of the listed targets of violence were discovered, they were standardized and added to the codebook. Finally, both texts were reviewed using the complete codebook to ensure consistency and quality. This review was done in order to ensure a consistent and accurate set of codes that could be used to form axial codes and detect emergent themes in the interpretation stage (Babbie 2010, 402). Unfortunately, many of the existing codes had to be manually re-coded at this stage due to their overly general or vague nature.

C. Interpretation

Following the re-coding of *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* using a consistent codebook, the codes found in each text were re-organized and grouped into axial codes that reflected broader portrayals of those whom violence was incited against than the comparatively specific initial codes (Ibid.). Like the initial codes, some of these axial codes spanned both texts, while others were only found in one or the other. This was the first step in the interpretation stage of the coding process. In their description of this stage, Forman and Damschroder noted that "[t]here is no clear line between data analysis and interpretation; ordering and interpretation of data occurs throughout the analysis process" (2008, 56). As a result, the author of this text unavoidably played a significant role in the formation and interpretation of the axial codes which were created from the initial codes in the codebook. Then, after reformulating the codebook into a collection of axial codes, those codes helped identify five general themes concerning the portrayal of individuals and communities whom violence was incited against in the texts: 'Enemy Combatants in a Global War,' 'Insidious Threat,' 'Corrupt and Traitorous Elites,' 'God's Enemies,' and 'Demographic Challenge.' While the first three of these themes were found throughout both texts, 'God's Enemies' was only a theme in *Dabiq* and 'Demographic Challenge' was only a theme in *The Great Replacement*.

VI. Trustworthiness, Consistency, and Applicability

A quantitative content analysis will typically present the steps it took to ensure validity and reliability. However, according to Helen Noble and Joanna Smith (2015), such an approach is inapplicable to qualitative research. They propose an alternative set of terminology consisting of "truth value," "consistency," and "applicability" (Ibid.). They suggest these criteria can be respectively addressed through an honest evaluation of the researcher's role in the research, a clear presentation of the major decisions made by the researcher over the course of the study, and a discussion of the research's applicability beyond its immediate context (Ibid.).

Regarding the trustworthiness of this study, an honest evaluation of the role played by the author will take place in the following researcher reflexivity section. It will elaborate on the many ways in which the author's own perspective and interpretations have shaped the findings of this thesis. However, the trustworthiness of this analysis has also been bolstered through the careful citation of all passages found in the findings section. Given that links have been provided to all of the primary sources analyzed in this thesis, it is possible to personally confirm the existence of the pieces of evidence cited in the findings section.

Consistency is trickier to demonstrate, but it has been touched on in this chapter's explanation of every step in the selection, collection, and coding of the texts. This theoretically should allow another researcher to repeat the steps taken in this thesis and reach similar conclusions, though likely not identical ones given the role played by this thesis' author in interpreting the data he collected.

Finally, the applicability of this research has been established through the selection of texts deemed to be both influential in extremist circles and characteristic of their respective ideologies by experts in the study of both Salafi jihadism and militant white supremacy. While the findings of one content analysis cannot reasonably be understood as applicable to all Salafi jihadists and militant white supremacists, they can present a nuanced interpretation of the arguments made by prominent members of both extremist ideologies in their respective works of propaganda, interpretations which could help in understanding how similarly-minded individuals see the world.

VII. Researcher Reflexivity

As previously stated, the perspectives and interpretive decisions of this thesis' author have significantly impacted the breadth, design, and findings of this thesis. While the author's selection of which two extremist texts would constitute the cases analyzed in this qualitative content analysis naturally played an enormous role in shaping its findings, his influence on the data analysis that occurred during the 'interpretation' stage of the coding process should also not be overlooked. Given the nature of the interpretivist paradigm that structures qualitative content analysis, the author unavoidably played a significant role in determining which axial codes, and subsequently which themes emerged from the initial codes pertaining to the portrayal of certain individuals and communities throughout *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement*. This is just one of the ways in which the findings of research carried out within an interpretivist epistemology "are *literally created* as the investigation proceeds" (Guba and Lincoln 1994, 111). This process was fully appreciated by the author in the midst of manually re-coding much of *Dabiq* due to his shoddy original set of initial codes created during the open coding process. His significant influence will continue to be felt throughout the remainder of this thesis, particularly in the findings chapter, where only a small number of examples could be selected from an enormous body of text in order to illustrate the five major themes uncovered.

One final note that should be made regarding the author's role in this thesis is the extent to which his own background and perspective influenced the results. This is particularly important to address given that this research concerns contemporary ideologies with rather bloody track records. The author is neither a Salafi jihadist nor a white supremacist. This could understandably call into question his ability to fully understand how violence is depicted within *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement*. While the author has attempted to immerse himself to as great a degree as possible in the worldviews presented within the extremist texts he is examining, his understanding of those worldviews will inherently be less accurate than the understandings possessed by their proponents.

VIII. Ethical Considerations

The most prominent ethical dilemma presented by the research was how to discuss ideological works that advocate large-scale violence and occasionally even genocide without glorifying the ideologies they represent or drawing undue attention to them. This has been addressed by the inclusion of only information directly relevant to both the study at hand and the ideological origins of the texts in question. While it is important for a reader to have an understanding of the major ideological trends and non-state actors that have shaped contemporary militant white supremacy and Salafi jihadism, it is not necessary to dwell on the various acts of violence perpetrated by individual followers of either ideology.

A second and related ethical issue concerns the importance of impartiality when conducting scientific research. Any content analysis of *Dabiq* or *The Great Replacement* will likely result in a researcher encountering views, statements, and even graphic images they find to be morally repugnant. However, this thesis will attempt to remain neutral when discussing the ideological writings found within these incendiary works of propaganda. This should facilitate a clear analysis of how the recipients of violence are portrayed in the extremist texts. It will also help this thesis avoid one of the major pitfalls of writing about dangerous killers, dehumanizing the dehumanizers (Smith 2011).

Findings

This chapter will present the findings of the previously outlined qualitative content analysis of *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement*. It will begin with an overview of the five major themes surrounding the portrayal of individuals and communities whom the texts incite violence against. It will then present examples of the visual maps used to organize the generally derogatory terms used for several of the communities targeted.[10] Next, it will include a diagram of the coding process, illustrating examples of initial codes, axial codes, and themes. Finally, those themes will each be explored in detail using numerous quotations from the texts.

Research Question: How do the Salafi jihadist magazine Dabiq and the militant white supremacist manifesto The Great Replacement depict those they incite violence against? How do those depictions relate to one another?

I. Overview of Findings

Through the qualitative content analysis outlined in the Methodology chapter, five major themes pertaining to how *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* portray those they incite violence against emerged from the texts. Those targeted are portrayed as one or more of the following: 'enemy combatants in a global war,' an 'insidious threat,' 'corrupt and traitorous elites,' 'God's enemies,' or a 'demographic challenge.' While the theme of 'God's enemies' was exclusive to *Dabiq* and the theme of 'demographic challenge' was only found in *The Great Replacement*, the other three themes were present throughout both texts. The following examination of this thesis' findings will hopefully do much to illuminate how the extremists behind the propaganda view their enemies as well as highlight significant similarities and differences pertaining to the portrayal of those enemies in *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement*.

[10] A complete list of those terms can be found in the appendix.

II. Sample Terminology Maps

Dabiq



The Great Replacement



Dabiq



III. Diagram of the Coding Process

Initial Codes	Axial Codes	Themes
- enemy soldiers - occupying force - obligatory targets - istishhādī targets - duty to fight them - torturers of Muslims - leading a cruel bombing campaign	- invaders in our lands - expect to die fighting them - a cruel and uncaring enemy	'Enemy Combatants in a Global War'
- source of illicit drugs - sexual deviants - trying to stand in the 'grayzone' - not real Muslims (takfir) - targeted to accelerate social conflict - like animals - lurking nest of vipers - sheep to be slaughtered	- corruptors of the community - unworthy and illegitimate community members - dehumanized communities	'Insidious Threat'
- openly hypocritical - governing through illegitimate laws - government serves Israel, not the people - traitorous individuals - tools of the crusaders - hostile media - brainwashing educators - enemy propagandists	- illegitimate rulers - an international elite that is working against the common good - pushing a false narrative	'Corrupt and Traitorous Elites'
- deserve to suffer on religious grounds - fought in accordance with God - Quranic justification for killing them - worshipping false idols - worshipping the dead - support heretical customs - religiously justified sexual slaves - their rape is lawful	- God is against our enemies - violating Islamic law - subjects of sexual violence	'God's Enemies'
- of a dominant, ascendant culture - not ethnically or culturally European - they outnumber us - they will replace us - genocidal intent	- creeping demographic threat - existential threat to the 'white race'	'Demographic Challenge'

IV. Major Themes

Theme I: Enemy Combatants in a Global War

Perhaps the most prominent theme concerning the portrayal of those *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* incite violence against is their ubiquitous appearance as enemy combatants in a global war. There are no uninvolved civilians or hapless innocents caught on the wrong side of the imagined frontlines presented by the editors of *Dabiq* and Brenton Tarrant, only enemy soldiers. These 'soldiers' are depicted as unambiguous opponents of the extremist community, and giving one's life to destroy them is portrayed as every moral individual's duty.

In *Dabiq*, this theme of global war is unsurprising given the wartime conditions in which the magazine was written. Passages that stress the idea of an invading army are commonplace:

> So mobilize your forces, O crusaders. Mobilize your forces, roar with thunder, threaten whom you want, plot, arm your troops, prepare yourselves, strike, kill, and destroy us. This will not avail you. You will be defeated. This will not avail you, for our Lord, the Mighty, the Prevailing, has promised us with our victory and your defeat. Send arms and equipment to your agents and dogs. Prepare them with the most modern equipment. Send them very much, for it will end up as war booty in our hands by Allah's permission. You will spend it, then it will be a source of regret for you, then you will be defeated (*Dabiq 4* 2014, 8).

The international coalition against Islamic State is portrayed here and elsewhere in the magazine as a crusading army that will inevitably be defeated by the soldiers of the caliphate. The passage emphasizes military struggle and paints Islamic State's enemies as either 'crusaders' or their agents. In another message to the 'crusaders,' the editors of *Dabiq* state: "We hate you for your crimes against the Muslims; your drones and fighter jets bomb, kill, and maim our people around the world, and your puppets in the usurped lands of the Muslims oppress, torture, and wage war against anyone who calls to the truth" (*Dabiq 15* 2016, 32). The 'crusaders' and their allies are presented as a monstrous and omnipresent military threat.

However, the war between the supposedly righteous Muslims of Islamic State and the rest of the world is not depicted as exclusively taking place on the battlefield. Everyone is a combatant, and therefore anyone opposed to Islamic State's goals is a legitimate and potentially obligatory target:

> [W]e renew our call to the muwahhidīn in Europe and the disbelieving West and everywhere else, to target the crusaders in their own lands and wherever they are found. We will argue, before Allah, against any Muslim who has the ability to shed a single drop of crusader blood but does not do so, whether with an explosive device, a bullet, a knife, a car, a rock, or even a boot or a fist (*Dabiq* 7 2015, 37).

As exemplified by the passage above, followers of Islamic State are often called upon to kill as many 'crusaders' as they can wherever they are. This can also be observed in statements such as "O muwahhid… O you who believes in walā' and barā'… will you leave the American, the Frenchman, or any of their allies to walk safely upon the earth while the armies of the crusaders strike the lands of the Muslims not differentiating between a civilian and fighter?" (*Dabiq 4* 2014, 9) and "Islamic State took the occasion to renew its call to attack, kill, and terrorize the crusaders on their own streets and in their own homes" (*Dabiq 7* 2015, 37). According to *Dabiq*, any non-Muslim from a country whose government has taken or supported military action against Islamic State is both a 'crusader' and a potential military target, from "Jewish crusader, former US Secretary of State and US National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger" (*Dabiq 4* 2014, 39) to "the Japanese crusader Kenji Goto Jogo," a freelance journalist executed by Islamic State in 2015 (*Dabiq 7* 2015, 4).

The narrative that a large segment of the international community constitutes an invading army also permeates *The Great Replacement*. New Zealand and Australia are hardly active warzones, but Brenton Tarrant certainly portrays them and the rest of what he considers the 'European world' as such. In one passage, the manifesto claims "We are experiencing an invasion on a level never seen before in history. Millions of people pouring across our borders

[...] This crisis of mass immigration and sub-replacement fertility is an assault on the European people that, if not combated, will ultimately result in the complete racial and cultural replacement of the European people" (Tarrant 2019, 5). *The Great Replacement* presents 'non-white' immigrants as 'invaders' who will destroy 'white society.' According to Tarrant, they are not immigrants or refugees, but 'invaders' and 'conquerors' ferried ashore by a fifth column of traitorous humanitarians: "NGO groups ferry the invaders to European shores aboard their own vessels, directly shipping this vast army straight into European nations to plunder, rape and ethnically displace the native European people" (Ibid., 70). In this way, Tarrant's manifesto portrays the Muslim immigrants he targeted in his attack on the Al Noor Mosque as part of a military occupation that must be violently repulsed.

Therefore, like in *Dabiq*, Tarrant's violence against these supposed 'invaders' is generally depicted in military terms. In one passage calling for further bloodshed he states: "Whilst you wait for a sign, a signal; someone to take up the spear; to cry out in alarm, your people wait on YOU. You are the voice, you are the klaxon call, you hold the first spear to be thrust at the invaders" (Ibid., 61). This is a call to arms, one of many found throughout the manifesto. In fact, *The Great Replacement* even invokes the Crusades, utilizing excerpts from a speech supposedly given by Pope Urban II when he launched the First Crusade:

> Is it not preferable to die in war rather than suffer any longer so horrible a spectacle? Let us all weep for our faults that raise the divine ire, yes, let us weep… But let not our tears be like the seed thrown into the sand. Let the fire of our repentance raise up the Holy War and the love of our brethren lead us into combat. Let our lives be stronger than death to fight against the enemies of the Christian people (Ibid., 35).

While quotations such as the one above are undoubtedly directed at an imagined audience of Christians, *The Great Replacement* usually employs secular arguments to militarize those whom it incites violence against. According to Tarrant, "They are no innocents in an invasion, all those

who colonize other peoples lands share guilt" (Ibid., 17). In other words, any 'non-white' immigrant living in a 'white country' is an acceptable military target.

Given the supposedly enormous threat posed by these enemy armies, it is little wonder both works of propaganda stress the importance of being willing to die fighting them. In *Dabiq*, frequent praise is showered on istishhādī (suicide) and inghimāsī (immersion) attacks, and the following passage exemplifies the magazine's attitude toward dying for the cause:

> On this occasion, we will not forget to commend the martyred "lone" knights of the Khilāfah who struck out against the kāfir and apostate enemies near them. These brave men were not content with merely hearing news about jihād battles […] They did not use the obstacles laid down by the kuffār on the path to hijrah as an excuse to abandon jihād against the enemies. They did not use a younger age or lack of training as an excuse to be mere bystanders. They sacrificed their souls in the noblest of deeds in pursuit of Allah's pleasure (*Dabiq 12* 2015, 3).

Dying in Islamic State's jihad against supposed 'apostates' and 'kuffār' (non-believers) is portrayed here as one the greatest and most noble actions a Muslim could take. Similarly, *The Great Replacement* also frames death as a likely and potentially necessary outcome of participation in Tarrant's white nationalist struggle. According to Tarrant, "Death is certain, you may die in service to some grand crusade or pass away in a hospice, either way you will die. What matters is your actions during the brief time between birth and death. " (Tarrant 2019, 66). Therefore, *The Great Replacement* informs its readers that they should "Accept death: as it is as certain as the setting of the sun at evenfall. Only when you embrace death and the only thing you will have left to fear is inaction" (Ibid.). While Tarrant's own embrace of martyrdom lacks the overt religious overtones that characterize it in *Dabiq*, both works of propaganda stress the virtue of dying a soldier's death in their respective global conflicts between 'good' and 'evil.'

Theme II: Insidious Threat

When they are not being depicted as enemy soldiers, many of those targeted in *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* are portrayed as either lurking threats masquerading as harmless members of the community or contemptible bystanders whose inaction puts them in the enemy camp. Both of these groups are presented as insidious threats to their respective communities.

Throughout its fifteen issues, *Dabiq* constructs a worldview in which Islamic State becomes nearly synonymous with the global Muslim community. Therefore, standing against Islamic State puts one into the camp of its enemies and the enemies of Islam. This is clearly expressed in the following quotation from the magazine's first issue:

> O Ummah of Islam, indeed the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present:
>
> The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and hypocrisy – the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, and the camp of the jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr, all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the jews (*Dabiq 1* 2014, 10).

According to *Dabiq*, rejecting Islamic State is akin to joining the 'camp of kufr' and rejecting Islam. Therefore, Muslims the magazine incites violence against are often referred to as 'rāfidah' (rejectors), 'kuffār' (non-believers), and 'murtaddīn' (apostates). These derogatory terms for Shia Muslims, non-Muslims, and former Muslims respectively are ubiquitous throughout the text and typically used to invalidate the Muslim identities of Islamic State's enemies:

> The person who calls himself a "Muslim" but unapologetically commits blatant kufr is not a munāfiq (hypocrite), as some mistakenly claim. Rather, he is a murtadd (apostate). The difference between nifāq (hypocrisy) and riddah is that a munāfiq conceals his kufr and openly manifests Islam, quickly apologizing if ever

> his cover is blown. The murtadd, on the other hand, openly commits his kufr after ascribing to Islam (*Dabiq 14* 2016, 8).

Arguments like this one are selectively used to present various Muslim groups as religious impostors. These communities are often presented as hopelessly deviant, such as in the following description of the Shu'aytāt, an Arab tribe massacred by Islamic State. "Upon entering the Shu'aytāt villages, the soldiers of the Islamic State found men hateful of the Sharī'ah, drowning in fāhishah, alcoholism, and drugs, some of them married to more than four wives!" (*Dabiq 3* 2014, 14). Through negative descriptions like this, Islamic State delegitimizes its enemies and justifies their slaughter. However, no Muslim group is as thoroughly condemned as the Shia.

Shia Muslims often bear the brunt of *Dabiq*'s animosity toward other Muslims. In the following passage quoting Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, they are thoroughly dehumanized, stripped of their faith, and presented as a lurking threat to the Muslim community:

> The Rāfidah are the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the scorpion of deception and malice, the prowling enemy, the deadly poison. We here wage a war at two levels. The first war is open and exposed with an aggressive enemy and clear kufr. The second war is a difficult and fierce one with a scheming enemy who dresses like a friend, shows approval, and calls to unity, while he conceals evil and plots day and night, after obtaining the heritage of all the Bātinī sects that had appeared throughout history, leaving a scar upon his face that the days cannot remove. The precise observer and wise scrutinizer realizes that Shiism is the immediate danger and real challenge (*Dabiq 13* 2016, 41).

Shia are depicted here as false Muslims who will always represent a serious danger to the Sunni believers in their midst. Even calls for Muslim unity and friendship between Sunni and Shia communities are presented as devious traps meant to ensnare the foolish. Shia are even portrayed as despising Islam, their own faith. "The Rāfidah hate Islam just as the Jews hate Christianity. They did not enter Islam longing for Allah or fearing Him, rather out of spite for the people of

Islam and so as to inflict harm upon them. Their prayers do not exceed their ears. Indeed, 'Alī ﷺ burned them alive and banished them to other lands" (*Dabiq 13* 2016, 33). This particular passage goes so far as to portray them as the enemies of Ali, one of their most cherished heroes.

As extreme as some of this rhetoric might seem, analogous levels of demonization can be found in Tarrant's manifesto, which frequently portrays many 'non-white' individuals as a similarly insidious threat. This is most explicitly laid out in *The Great Replacement*'s discussion of the difference between 'armed invaders' and 'unarmed invaders':

> If you were to kill sixty armed invaders having shown the will and the intent to bring harm to your nation and people, you would be hailed a hero, given your nations highest civilian honours, paraded before the media and the adoring public. But kill sixty unarmed invaders having shown the will and the intent to bring harm to your nation and people, and you will be considered a monster, dragged through the streets, ridiculed, attacked,your character assassinated in every way it can be and finally tried in court and imprisoned for the rest of your life.
>
> But here's the real kicker, the unarmed invader is far more dangerous to our people than the armed invader (Tarrant 2019, 53).

Here *The Great Replacement* uses the term 'invader' to highlight the supposed danger posed by the 'non-white' residents and citizens of 'white countries.' These individuals are presented as inauthentic members of the community who are insidiously working, consciously or otherwise, to undermine the countries in which they live. They are even portrayed as being more dangerous than a real military invasion. This extreme conception of the 'non-white' people living around him is rooted in Tarrant's view of what constitutes a nation. He seems to entirely reject the notion that nationality could ever be disconnected from race and culture.

As a result, *The Great Replacement* presents 'non-white' inhabitants as inherently threatening to 'white nations.' He blames them for the "thousands of European lives lost to terror attacks throughout European lands" (Ibid., 7), playing up the threat of terrorism 'non-white'

communities supposedly pose to their 'white' neighbors, and regularly highlights their supposed criminality in passages 'exposing' the "ongoing trend of rape and molestation perpetrated by these non-white scum" (Ibid., 40). However, these thoroughly frightening depictions of 'non-white' individuals pail in comparison to the following portrayal of 'non-white' children:

> Do not allow your enemies to grow unchecked
>
> When you discover a nest of vipers in your yard, do you spare the adolescents? Do you allow them to grow freely, openly, to one day bite you [*sic*] child as they play in their own yard? No. You burn the nest and kill the vipers, no matter their age (Ibid. 63).

The Great Replacement compares 'non-white' children to vipers in order to justify killing them, and this section of the text is eventually concluded with the phrase: "LEAVE NO VIPERS NEST UNBURNT" (Ibid.). Similarly to *Dabiq*, Tarrant vilifies an unambiguously harmless community through dehumanizing rhetoric in order to justify massive violence against them.

Finally, those attempting to remain outside of the conflicts depicted in *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* are often themselves depicted as hypocritical fence-sitters who must be destroyed. *Dabiq* goes so far as to quote George W. Bush when condemning those trying to stand in the 'fading grayzone' between good and evil: "Anyone who says otherwise now should review his faith before death suddenly takes him while he stands with one foot in the trench of the crusaders and the other in the trench of the hypocrites whilst claiming he is in the grayzone! The mujāhid knows no grayzone. As the liar Bush truthfully said, 'Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists'" (*Dabiq 4* 2014, 43). This passage is one of many clearly highlighting *Dabiq*'s stance on those calling for compromise. Likewise, *The Great Replacement* calls for "exaggerating all societal conflicts and attacking or even assassinating weak or less radical leaders/influencers on either side of social conflicts" (Tarrant 2019, 77). Any non-radical is a potential target. Therefore, regardless of how inoffensive they might be, those not championing *Dabiq* or *The Great Replacement*'s worldviews are often depicted as enemies to be eliminated.

Theme III: Corrupt and Traitorous Elite

While *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* might frequently rail against crusaders and invaders respectively, they reserve some of their harshest rhetoric for those they paint as corrupt and traitorous elites. These individuals are often heads of state or wealthy businessmen whom the texts depict as working tirelessly against the interests of their own communities. Therefore, violence against them is portrayed as both necessary and praiseworthy.

Dabiq frequently calls for the toppling of the 'tawāghīt' (idolatrous tyrants), a term it typically uses to refer to the ruling elite of Muslim-majority countries, who are presented as corrupt, despotic enemies of the community. This narrative is conveyed by way of repeated reference to horrific crimes such as "the killing of women and children in the public squares and on the streets at the hands of the soldiers and policemen of the tawāghīt without their killers paying a price for their actions" (*Dabiq 6* 2014, 54). Given the nature of their portrayal, it should come as little surprise that passages calling for total war against the tawāghīt and their supporters are commonplace throughout the magazine: "You must strike the soldiers, patrons, and troops of the tawāghīt. Strike their police, security, and intelligence members, as well as their treacherous agents" (*Dabiq 4* 2014, 9). In fact, *Dabiq* often presents violent struggle against them as obligatory, such as in the following statement congratulating Islamic State insurgents following their successful sabotage of a pipeline in Sinai. "Congratulations to you, O men. Congratulations to you for you have carried out the obligation of jihād against the tawāghīt of Egypt" (*Dabiq 5* 2014, 30). However, corruption and cruelty are not the only criticized elements of tawāghīt rule.

Dabiq also condemns the notion of constitutional rule along with anyone who would support it. In the following passage, the magazine decries both democratic and authoritarian states for their secular systems of law, insinuating that supporters of constitutional rule are not real Muslims: "The constitutions of the various apostate governments claiming to be Muslim are authorities of law competing with Allah's Sharī'ah. Thus, they are tawāghīt that are to be despised, rejected, and fought. It is obligatory to pronounce takfīr upon those who rule by and support these constitutions. Yet, the leaders of the Ikhwān instead describe their deep respect for constitutional democratic rule" (*Dabiq 14* 2016, 34). Here the editors specifically call out the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwān) for championing a form of constitutional democracy. *Dabiq*

presents the Sharia (Islamic law) as the only legitimate form of legislation and its violent imposition as the only way to wash away the corruption and oppression plaguing the MENA region. The tawāghīt are presented as the chief obstacle to that occurring.

In a similar manner, *The Great Replacement* portrays financial elites as having betrayed those they were supposed to protect: "For too long those who have profited the most from the importation of cheap labour have gone unpunished. The economic elites who line their pockets with the profit received from our own ethnic replacement. [...] They will soon realize there are repercussions to being a [*sic*] race traitors. [...] KILL YOUR LOCAL ANTI-WHITE CEO" (Tarrant 2019, 58). In its aggressive calls for violence against business owners who employ immigrant workers, this excerpt exemplifies the violent statements Tarrant frequently directs at 'traitors' who supposedly "deserve a traitors [*sic*] death" (Ibid., 71). While such incitement to violence is usually directed at economic elites, numerous elected representatives and democracy itself are also condemned in *The Great Replacement*.

Tarrant's contempt for democracy is most succinctly expressed in one section of his manifesto titled "There is no democratic Solution" (Ibid., 69) in which he outlines his own views on democracy: "Democracy is mob rule and the mob itself is ruled by our own enemies. The global and corporate ran press controls them, the education system (long since fallen to the long march through the institutions committed by the marxists) controls them, the state (long since heavily lost to its corporate backers) controls them and the anti-white media machine controls them" (Ibid.). Tarrant views democracy as fundamentally compromised and representative government as being puppeteered by 'anti-white' corporations and Marxists. Perhaps as a result, *The Great Replacement* regularly calls for violence against elected officials it deems 'anti-white':

> TATP packages strapped to drones, an EFP in a motorcycle [*sic*] saddle bags, convoy ambush rammings with cement trucks. Any method that gives these traitors their sure reward is viable and should be encouraged. Where there is a will, there is a way. Merkel, the mother of all things anti-white and anti-germanic, is top of the list. Few have done more to damage and racially cleanse Europe of its people (Tarrant 2019, 5).

While *The Great Replacement* singles out Angela Merkel, the current chancellor of Germany, as particularly deserving of a violent death in this passage, other supposedly 'anti-white' politicians are portrayed in a similar light throughout the text.

Finally, both texts express utter hatred and contempt for the educators and media figures which they assert are responsible for indoctrinating people in service to the elites they hold responsible for so many social ills. The following passage of *Dabiq* makes this point clear:

> Children attending the schools of the kuffār are first introduced to the kufrī concept of nationalism, whereby they are required to stand for the national anthem, and in places such as America, pledge allegiance to some national symbol such as the flag, or recite nationalistic slogans, or pledge allegiance to a tāghūt king or president, as is the case with the lands ruled by murtadd nationalist tawāghīt. The point is to indoctrinate them into the system as early as possible by beating into their heads that their loyalty, first and foremost, is to the nation or to their race, not to the people of Islam, not to their religion, not even to Allah! (*Dabiq 12* 2015, 34)

Dabiq frames public education, particularly in nominally secular countries such as the United States, as pure indoctrination which serves to weaken the identity and faith of Muslim children who undergo it. A negative conception of education and media is also expressed in *The Great Replacement*, which describes how "[t]he media of the world will be used against you, the education system of the rulers will be used against you" (Tarrant 2019, 69). This, like the previous passage from *Dabiq*, paints both global media and national education systems as tools of the world's political and financial elites. Both works of propaganda portray educators and journalists as enemies to be confronted; just another arm of the corrupt and traitorous elites they regularly call for violence against. However, the many similarities between how *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* depict those they incite violence against should not distract from significant differences between the texts.

Theme IV: God's Enemies

In *Dabiq*, numerous communities are deemed unworthy of life, respect, or both based on Islamic State's interpretation of Sharia law. Unlike *The Great Replacement*, *Dabiq* frequently justifies 'lawful bloodshed' using select hadith and translated ayahs from the Quran. This religious framework often leads to Islamic State's enemies being portrayed as enemies of God.

While various ayahs from a variety of Quranic surahs are employed to legitimize Islamic State's violence throughout *Dabiq*, one of them in particular is regularly used to justify the killing of supposed kuffār:

> {They swear by Allah that they did not say [anything] while they had said the word of kufr and committed kufr after their Islam and planned that which they were not to attain. And they were not resentful except [for the fact] that Allah and His Messenger had enriched them of His bounty. So if they repent, it is better for them; but if they turn away, Allah will punish them with a painful punishment in this world and the Hereafter. And there will not be for them on earth any protector or helper} [At-Tawbah: 74] (*Dabiq 8* 2015, 52).

This translation of At-Tawbah-74 is repeatedly cited throughout *Dabiq* in order to portray those the magazine calls for violence against as the enemies of God. It is generally presented devoid of context, and it is used in almost every conceivable situation in which the slaughter of one or more individuals needs to be religiously justified. However, the killing of 'kuffār' is not the only violence justified in this way.

Dabiq also defends sexual slavery on the grounds that the Yazidi women Islamic State kidnapped and enslaved were 'devil-worshippers.' In one chilling passage, it is remarked that: "one should remember that enslaving the families of the kuffār and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Sharī'ah that if one were to deny or mock, he would be denying or mocking the verses of the Qur'ān and the narrations of the Prophet (sallallāhu 'alayhi wa sallam), and thereby apostatizing from Islam" (*Dabiq 4* 2014, 17). According to *Dabiq*, opposing Islamic State's stance on sexual slavery and rape is a rejection of

Islam itself. This is simply one of many instances in which violence is justified through a twisted interpretation of Islamic law.

One of the most striking examples of this legalistic view of morality can be found in the final issue of *Dabiq*. The following passage clearly lays out the level of respect, kindness, and humanity that should be afforded the enemies of God in the eyes of *Dabiq*'s editors:

> The clear difference between Muslims and the corrupt and deviant Jews and Christians is that Muslims are not ashamed of abiding by the rules sent down from their Lord regarding war and enforcement of divine law. So if it were the Muslims, instead of the Crusaders, who had fought the Japanese and Vietnamese or invaded the lands of the Native Americans, there would have been no regrets in killing and enslaving those therein. And since those mujahidin would have done so bound by the Law, they would have been thorough and without some "politically correct" need to apologize years later. The Japanese, for example, would have been forcefully converted to Islam from their pagan ways – and if they stubbornly declined, perhaps another nuke would change their mind. The Vietnamese would likewise be offered Islam or beds of napalm. As for the Native Americans – after the slaughter of their men, those who would favor smallpox to surrendering to the Lord – then the Muslims would have taken their surviving women and children as slaves (*Dabiq 15* 2016, 80).

Horrific violence is hypothetically directed at a wide range of communities in this passage. However, the pattern surrounding these various calls for violence is the same. A community is not Muslim, therefore it deserves to suffer the most appaling treatment imaginable. Those targeted are portrayed as thoroughly unworthy of happiness or life on account of their religious beliefs, and while this selection from *Dabiq* is shocking, it also reflects how the magazine frequently depicts those it calls for violence against. However, this religious conceptualization of Islamic State's enemies is not mirrored by *The Great Replacement*.

Theme V: Demographic Challenge

Unlike *Dabiq*, *The Great Replacement* draws its title from a conspiracy theory which asserts that a cabal of global elites is attempting to replace 'white' people with 'non-white' people. Therefore, it should come as little surprise that Tarrant's manifesto frequently alludes to this "10000 ton boulder of demographic change" (Tarrant 2019, 81) and portrays those it calls for violence against as a demographic challenge to the 'white race':

> Mass immigration and the higher fertility rates of the immigrants themselves are causing this increase in population.
>
> We are experiencing an invasion on a level never seen before in history. Millions of people pouring across our borders, legally. Invited by the state and corporate entities to replace the White people who have failed to reproduce, failed to create the cheap labour, new consumers and tax base that the corporations and states need to thrive.
>
> This crisis of mass immigration and sub-replacement fertility is an assault on the European people that, if not combated, will ultimately result in the complete racial and cultural replacement of the European people (Ibid., 5).

Here *The Great Replacement* blends its aforementioned distrust of political and economic elites with the bogeyman of 'white genocide.' This theme permeates almost every section of the text. In fact, in the part of the manifesto which addresses why Tarrant chose to attack Muslims at Al Noor Mosque in particular, Tarrant argues that "[t]hey were an obvious,visible and large group of invaders, from a culture with higher fertility rates, higher social trust and strong, robust traditions that seek to occupy my peoples lands and ethnically replace my own people" (Ibid., 14). Tarrant's victims are depicted first and foremost as a group which sought to completely replace the 'white' community of New Zealand. This only further affirms the significance *The Great Replacement* ascribes to demographic replacement and its supposed facilitators.

Analysis

This chapter will discuss this thesis' findings pertaining to how *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* portray those they incite violence against in the context of existing theory and literature. The first section will examine extremist social categorization in *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* through the lens of Berger's formulation of social identity theory (2018). The second will assess what the language employed in those texts might say about the dehumanization theory conceptualized by Smith (2011). The third will explore the dynamic of 'reciprocal radicalization' within the context of how *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* relate to one another (Ebner 2017). Finally, the chapter will conclude by discussing this thesis' contributions to the literature, its place within the field of Middle Eastern Studies, and its potential utility in deradicalizing Salafi jihadists and militant white supremacists.

I. Us and Them: Social Categorization in *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement*

Dabiq and *The Great Replacement* are each replete with passages calling on members of their respective in-groups to violently antagonize various out-group communities. The ever-present and overtly hostile social divide between in-group and out-group found in both texts can be further understood through the lens of Berger's theory of extremist social categorization. Berger defined 'extremism' as "the belief that an in-group's success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile action against an out-group" (2018, 44). This notion cuts to the core of how *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* portray those they incite violence against. In the former, the world is divided into a zero-sum global struggle pitting Islamic State's Muslim elect against the rest of humanity. In the latter, 'non-white' immigrants and native-born citizens are presented as an existential threat to the 'white race.' In both cases, the interests of one 'legitimate' community are portrayed as inextricably bound up in the destruction of other 'illegitimate' ones (Ibid., 26). The extremist in-group, be it 'white people' or 'believers,' cannot be safe unless the out-group members in their midst are violently eliminated. While the nature of the threat might shift depending on the out-group being discussed, they could be anything from an invading army to a lurking danger within the community, violence is consistently presented as the only viable response to that threat. This, according to Berger (Ibid.), is what it means to be extremist.

However, the various out-groups targeted throughout *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* are not all depicted in the same way. While *Dabiq* might frequently portray non-Muslim men and women from Europe and North America as crusaders, fully complicit in the actions of their respective states due to their support for the heretical system of democracy, the Shia are often depicted in a remarkably different manner. Rather than a monolithic 'far' enemy, Shia Muslims are portrayed as a scheming 'near' enemy, haters of Islam seeking to bring the faith down from within (Stenersen 2018). In fact, the rhetoric surrounding the Shia is often more caustic and degrading than even that used to describe the crusaders. A similar phenomenon can be observed in *The Great Replacement*, which treats 'non-white' immigrants as an undifferentiated invading army much the same as *Dabiq*'s crusaders, while reserving some of its most scathing rhetoric for the native-born children of those immigrants and the individual politicians and businessmen who have supposedly sold out their 'white' communities or nations for personal profit.

These distinctions fit within Berger's division of the enemy out-group and the ineligible in-group (2018, 56-64). In this case, 'crusaders' and 'invaders' constitute enemy out-groups which were never part of the in-groups championed by *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* respectively. However, Shia and other Muslims (especially those who support the tawāghīt) who engage in supposedly heretical practices, reject Islamic State, or both could be seen as Islamic State's ineligible in-group or "members of the eligible in-group [who] reject the extremist movement" (Ibid., 63). *The Great Replacement*'s traitorous capitalists, devious Marxists, and native-born children of immigrants might also fall into this category. It should be noted that the ineligible in-groups mentioned above are usually portrayed as 'insidious threats' or 'corrupt and traitorous elites,' while the enemy out-groups are most often depicted as 'enemy combatants in a global war.' Berger theorized that "[a]ttitudes toward the ineligible in-group can be more hostile and violent than toward a more distinct out-group, due to the ineligible's 'betrayal'" (Ibid., 63-64). This can also be observed in the rhetoric of both texts surrounding 'traitors' and 'rāfidah.' However, a work of propaganda which labels a targeted out-group as 'rāfidah' or 'kuffār' could reasonably be assumed to have a strikingly different worldview from one that targets 'traitors' and 'invaders.' This distinction is rooted in how *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* actually divide the world into in-groups and out-groups, 'us' and 'them.'

Perhaps the most obvious difference between *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* is also related to how the two texts define and depict their out-groups. *Dabiq* generally constructs its in-group and out-groups on the basis of religious affiliation. Therefore, the degrading and dehumanizing depictions it employs tend to be religious in nature. The magazine also frequently portrays those out-groups as enemies of God. On the other hand, *The Great Replacement* divides the world on the basis of its vague amalgamation of race, ethnicity, and culture. It therefore favors secular terminology and frequently emphasizes an ethnocultural rather than religious rivalry. This follows Berger's claim that extremist groups typically emphasize a singular identity that differs from group to group (2018, 61-62). Therefore, while out-group communities are stripped of their humanity in both *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement*, the actual terminology and rhetoric employed vary significantly. That dehumanization will be further explored in the context of Smith's conceptualization of the relationship between dehumanization and violence (2011).

II. A New 'Dehumanization'

Smith defined dehumanization as "the act of conceiving of people as subhuman creatures rather than as human beings" (2011, 26). This does occur in both texts. In *Dabiq*, Shia Muslims are called snakes and scorpions, while allies of the crusaders are referred to as dogs. In *The Great Replacement*, the children of immigrants are vipers which threaten white children. These instances of dehumanizing language, employed to justify the murder of fellow Muslims and neighboring children, align almost perfectly with Smith's conception of dehumanization as a tool for facilitating violence in "situations where we want to harm a group of people, but are restrained by inhibitions against harming them" (Ibid., 264). However, the vast majority of the demeaning and degrading language found in both texts does not explicitly dehumanize. As mentioned previously, *Dabiq* typically refers to those it calls for violence against with religiously loaded terms such as 'rāfidah,' 'kuffār,' or 'crusaders.' *The Great Replacement* generally employs equally derisive secular terminology such as 'invader' or 'traitor.' While this aligns with Smith's assertion that dehumanization's "content in any given case is culturally determined" (Ibid., 265), these terms do not explicitly reject the humanity of those they refer to.

However, in many other ways, the demeaning and degrading terms employed throughout both works of propaganda fit well within Smith's theory of dehumanization. He argued that "dehumanized people are shorn of their individuality […] [and] typically thought of as fungible, as parts of an undifferentiated mass" (Ibid., 89). This can be observed in *The Great Replacement*'s hordes of invaders being ferried ashore to conquer or *Dabiq*'s faceless armies of modern crusaders at war with Islam. Smith also posited that dehumanization is "a prelude and accompaniment to extreme violence" (Ibid., 13). These terms also regularly accompany incitements to violence in both texts. This distinction between how Smith envisioned the dehumanizing language that would accompany calls for or actual violence and the degrading language most commonly found throughout *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* indicates Smith's understanding of the relationship between dehumanization and violence might extend to a broader definition of dehumanization than the one he employs in *Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others* (Ibid., 26).

However, it could also signify that some of the demeaning terms employed throughout *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* are just as effective as dehumanizing ones at facilitating violence. As was argued by Richter, Markus, and Tait (2018), descriptors such as 'rāfidah' or 'Muslim invader' may be just as likely to disgust the texts' target audiences and incite violence as 'scorpions' or 'vipers' would. This would constitute a new variety of dehumanization, one which plays on unique ideological prejudices rather than universal human ones. Regardless of whether or not this is the case, both texts fall firmly within the long and well-recorded tradition of incendiary propaganda which employs degrading rhetoric in order to incite violence (Kelman 1973; Staub 1989; Haslam and Loughnan 2014). However, if explicitly dehumanizing language is being abandoned by extremists in favor of political or religious terminology, it says nothing good about the evolving worldviews of those that propaganda is aimed at.

III. 'Reciprocal Radicalization' in Action

The prevalence of some of the demeaning terminology discussed above may also be related to "reciprocal radicalization," an idea discussed by Ebner (2017) in her book on extremism. Ebner (Ibid.) argued that "far-right and Islamist extremist narratives […] complement and amplify each other, leading to a bizarre form of interdependency between the two. Far-right and Islamist extremists succeed in penetrating each other's echo chambers because their messages are mutually useful" (197). While the editors of *Dabiq* and Brenton Tarrant almost certainly never interacted with one another, the interplay between Salafi jihadist and militant white supremacist circles observed by Ebner (Ibid.) is on full display throughout both texts.

Just as *Dabiq* routinely dredges up the memory of the Crusades in order to paint its non-Muslim enemies as modern-day crusaders, *The Great Replacement* quotes Pope Urban II's speech launching those Crusades in an attempt to mobilize his Christian readers against their Muslim neighbors. In a similar fashion, Tarrant's manifesto details the supposedly overwhelming amount of terrorist violence and rape commited by non-white immigrants, while *Dabiq* employs select ayahs and hadith in order to justify suicide terrorism and the sexual enslavement of non-Muslims. Each text regularly highlights transgressions against its in-group that the other

actively calls for. These narratives only amplify and enhance one another as they provide evidence of the monstrous nature the writers ascribe to those they call for violence against.

In light of the tendency to portray out-groups in ways that "may shift toward fiction and become more toxic, aggressively highlighting negative data points and ignoring or rebutting positive data points" attributed to extremists by Berger (2018, 57), *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* could themselves serve as negative data points par excellence within other extremist propaganda. If one of the central goals of a text is to encourage its reader to give up their lives fighting a thoroughly despicable enemy, perhaps even playing into Lankford's (2013, 21-39) notion that suicide terrorism is often a product of suicidal individuals pursuing a heroic death, such an aim can only be advanced when those behind the imagined enemy lines celebrate the crimes they are being accused of. This likely contributes to a dyadic variety of the "Islamization of radicalism" observed by Roy (2017, 41), simultaneously shaping the radicalism of two distinct camps of extremists. However, the toxic interplay of the narratives in *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* may present a new avenue for deradicalization as well.

IV. Contributions to the Field: Deradicalization and Beyond

Before its conclusion, it will be necessary to discuss this thesis' contributions to the literature, its utility in deradicalizing extremists, and its place within the field of Middle Eastern Studies. First and foremost, this piece of research has generated a new, comparative understanding of how *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* portray the individuals and communities they incite violence against. It has illuminated the extent to which those depictions cut across ideological boundaries, revealing that the portrayal of targeted communities in *Dabiq* is often similar to that found in the *The Great Replacement*. However, this research also serves as a window into the narratives employed by characteristic Salafi jihadist and militant white supremacist works of propaganda. Understanding how like-minded extremist ideologues think could play a crucial role in preventing further violence.

Richter, Markus, and Tait (2018), along with numerous governments around the world (Adams 2019; Delcker 2020), have presented censorship of extremist messaging as a viable means of preventing further radicalization and violence. However, given the ease with which

information travels in the twenty-first century and the skill exhibited by many contemporary extremists in spreading their messages online, censorship will almost assuredly not stem the current tide of violence. As such, deradicalizing Salafi jihadists and militant white supremacists will likely continue to be an important part of the fight against violent extremism. If, as several scholars of deradicalization have already posited (Briggs and Feve 2014; Doosje et al. 2016), the deradicalization of violent extremists requires thoroughly understanding and confronting their worldviews, any insights into how *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* depict the communities they victimize will be important in formulating counter-narratives to those extremist ideas. Furthermore, such counter-narratives might have an even greater impact if they can highlight numerous similarities between how the extremists and their most reviled enemies see the world, exposing the poisonous nature of their own views. In any case, breaking down extremist depictions of the communities they hate and often seek to kill will likely be a critical part of the deradicalization process. Therefore, this thesis' findings will ideally be helpful to anyone seeking to understand how extremists like Brenton Tarrant and the editors of *Dabiq* justify their violence against vulnerable communities.

This directly relates to this research's situation within the field of Middle Eastern Studies. While a study on how *Dabiq* portrays those it incites violence against would unambiguously fall within the field, this thesis examines both *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement*, a manifesto written outside of the MENA region. However, the violence justified in *The Great Replacement* was also carried out against vulnerable Muslims, many of whom were immigrants from Syria and Egypt (Mahmud 2019). It would not be hyperbole to describe the Christchurch shooting as one of the most infamous examples of Islamophobic terrorism in the past decade. Militant white supremacists like Tarrant present a very real threat to Middle Eastern immigrants living outside of the MENA region, and the comparative analysis of propaganda published by both a terrorist organization that caused millions to flee Iraq and Syria as well as an individual terrorist who went on to kill many such refugees in their new home should fall well within the scope of Middle Eastern Studies. In fact, it is an excellent example of the diverse applicability of the field, which does not have to be restricted by the notions of exceptionalism and exoticism criticized by Edward Said (1978) or ghettoized to prevent cross-pollination beyond its academic borders.

Conclusion

The author of this thesis set out to both discover and compare how the Salafi jihadist magazine *Dabiq* and the militant white supremacist manifesto *The Great Replacement* portray the individuals and communities they incite violence against. Through a comparative qualitative content analysis of the texts, he determined that both works of propaganda depict their respective human targets as soldiers in a global war, insidious threats to their communities, and traitorous elites out for themselves. These similarities indicate an intriguing overlap between how the authors of those extremist texts chose to portray the communities they terrorized. However, the depictions found within those texts are far from identical. *Dabiq* frequently invokes God and Islamic law, while *The Great Replacement* emphasizes a demographic threat to the 'white race.' In spite of this, the depictions employed by extremist texts as ideologically disparate as *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement* are frequently eerily similar. While no grand assertions can be made about Salafi jihadists and militant white supremacists as a whole from the results of this content analysis, it does indicate the need for more inclusive and trans-ideological studies examining contemporary extremism.

Given the novelty of this investigation and the potential utility of its content for understanding how extremists from disparate ideological and national backgrounds justify their violence against certain communities, its contribution to the existing literature on contemporary extremism should be clear. Furthermore, this study's exploration of phenomena directly pertaining to communities from the MENA region places it firmly within the field of Middle Eastern Studies without letting that distinction dictate the scope of its inquiry. Ideally, this research will be of use to anyone seeking to better understand contemporary extremism, explore the worldviews found within *Dabiq* and *The Great Replacement*, or construct counter-narratives with the intention of deradicalizing extremists and preventing further violence.

Ideas for Further Research

One of the greatest shortcomings of this study is its inability to extrapolate its findings to Salafi jihadists and militant white supremacists as a whole. While this is the nature of almost any qualitative content analysis, future research employing a greater body of Salafi jihadist and militant white supremacist texts would be invaluable in understanding how the ideas of those extremist communities relate to one another. This is especially true regarding militant white supremacist texts, many of which are not directly relevant to the field of Middle Eastern Studies. While Brenton Tarrant is responsible for a significant amount of misery in New Zealand's immigrant Muslim community, he is an individual whose writing alone can support little research beyond descriptive content analyses such as this one.

However, not all research needs to inclusively explore extremism from a variety of ideological backgrounds. Future in-depth research on singular extremist narratives such as Tarrant's notion of a coming 'white genocide' or the way in which Islamic law and Quranic passages are selectively used throughout *Dabiq* could provide the information necessary for the construction of deeply persuasive counter-narratives. Any research that can provide a greater understanding of how new, niche, or underground extremist narratives are understood by their proponents could potentially save many lives.

References

Books and Journal Articles

Abdelrahim, Yasser Abuelmakarem A. 2019. "Visual Analysis of ISIS Discourse Strategies and Types in *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* Online Magazines." *Visual Communication Quarterly* 26 (2): 63-78. doi:10.1080/15551393.2019.1586546.

Atwan, Abdel Bari. 2015. *Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.

Babbie, Earl. 2010. *The Practice of Social Research*, 12th ed. Wadsworth: Cengage Learning.

Berger, J. M. 2018. *Extremism*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Berman, Paul. 2003. *Terror and Liberalism*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Breton, Albert, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe. 2002. *Political Extremism and Rationality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Byman, Daniel. 2015. *Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Callahan, Kathe, Melvin J. Dubnick, and Dorothy Olshfski. 2006. "War Narratives: Framing Our Understanding of the War on Terror." *Public Administration Review* 66 (4): 554-568. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00616.x.

Camus, Renaud. 2011. *Le Grand Remplacement: Introduction au Remplacisme Global*. Plieux: Chez L'Auteur.

Carley, Kathleen. 1993. "Coding Choices for Textual Analysis: A Comparison of Content Analysis and Map Analysis." *Sociological Methodology* 23: 75-126. doi:10.2307/271007.

Charron, Austin, and Alexander C. Diener. 2015. "Political Geography, New Regionalism, and Rescaling Identity." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 35 (2): 13-20. doi:10.1353/sais.2015.0024.

Charters, David A. 2007. "Something Old, Something New…? Al Qaeda, Jihadism, and Fascism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19 (1): 65-93. doi:10.1080/09546550601054832.

Cissel, Margaret. 2012. "Media Framing: A Comparative Content Analysis on Mainstream and Alternative News Coverage of Occupy Wall Street." *The Elon Journal of Undergraduate Research in Communications* 3 (1): 67-77. https://studylib.net/doc/8361788/media-framing---elon-university.

Colas, Brandon. 2017. "What Does *Dabiq* Do? ISIS Hermeneutics and Organizational Fractures within *Dabiq* Magazine." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40 (3): 173-190. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2016.1184062.

Doosje, Bertjan, Fathali M. Moghaddam, Arie W. Kruglanski, Arjan de Wolf, Liesbeth Mann, and Allard R. Feddes. 2016. "Terrorism, Radicalization, and De-Radicalization." *Current Opinion in Psychology* 11: 79-84. doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2016.06.008.

Ebner, Julia. 2017. *The Rage: The Vicious Circle of Islamist and Far-Right Extremism*. London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd.

Eddington, Sean M. 2018. "The Communicative Constitution of Hate Organizations Online: A Semantic Network Analysis of 'Make America Great Again.'" *Social Media + Society* 4 (3): 1-12. doi:10.1177/2056305118790763.

Forman, Jane, and Laura Damschroder. 2008. “Qualitative Content Analysis.” In *Empirical Methods for Bioethics: A Primer (Advances in Bioethics, Vol. 11)*, edited by Liva Jacoby and Laura A. Siminoff, 39-62. Jordan Hill, Oxford: Elsevier Ltd.

Frissen, Thomas, Erkan Toguslu, Pieter Van Ostaeyen, and Leen d’Haenens. 2018. “Capitalizing on the Koran to Fuel Online Violent Radicalization: A Taxonomy of Koranic References in ISIS’s *Dabiq*.” *Telematics and Informatics* 35 (2): 491-503. doi:10.1016/j.tele.2018.01.008.

Ganor, Boaz. 2002. “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” *Police Practice and Research* 3 (4): 287-304. doi:10.1080/1561426022000032060.

Gardiner, Steven L. 2005. “White Nationalism Revisited: Demographic Dystopia and White Identity Politics.” *Journal of Hate Studies* 4 (1): 59-87. doi:10.33972/jhs.33.

Gelvin, James L. 2016. *The Modern Middle East: A History*. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gillborn, David. 2006. “Rethinking White Supremacy: Who Counts in ‘WhiteWorld.’” *Ethnicities* 6 (3): 318-340. doi:10.1177/1468796806068323.

Glaeser, Edward L., Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, and Jesse M. Shapiro. 2005. “Strategic Extremism: Why Republicans and Democrats Divide on Religious Values.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120 (4): 1283-1330. https://www-jstor-org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/stable/25098772.

Guba, Egon G., and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 1994. “Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research.” In *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 105-117. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

Hage, Ghassan. 2000. *White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society*. New York: Routledge.

Haslam, Nick. 2006. “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review.” *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 10 (3): 252-264. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_4.

Haslam, Nick, and Steve Loughnan. 2014. “Dehumanization and Infrahumanization.” *Annual Review of Psychology* 65: 399-423. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115045.

Heitmeyer, Wilhelm. 1995. *Rechtsextremistische Orientierungen bei Jugendlichen: Empirische Ergebnisse und Erklärungsmuster einer Untersuchung zur Politischen Sozialisation*. 5th ed. Weinheim and München: Juventa.

Hemmingsen, Ann-Sophie. 2011. “Salafi Jihadism: Relying on Fieldwork to Study Unorganized and Clandestine Phenomena.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34 (7): 1201-1215. doi:10.1080/01419870.2011.568628.

Hong, Jae W., Aydin Muderrisoglu, and George M. Zinkhan. 1987. “Cultural Differences and Advertising Expression: A Comparative Content Analysis of Japanese and U.S. Magazine Advertising.” *Journal of Advertising* 16 (1): 55-68. doi:10.1080/00913367.1987.10673061.

Hsieh, Hsiu-Fang, and Sarah E. Shannon. 2005. “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis.” *Qualitative Health Research* 15 (9): 1277-1288. doi:10.1177/1049732305276687.

Ingram, Haroro J. 2017. “An Analysis of *Inspire* and *Dabiq*: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State’s Propaganda War.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40 (5): 357-375. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2016.1212551.

Jackson, Carolyn, and Nigel Sherriff. 2013. "A Qualitative Approach to Intergroup Relations: Exploring the Applicability of the Social Identity Approach to 'Messy' School Contexts." *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 10 (3): 259-273. doi:10.1080/14780887.2011.616620.

Jacoby, Tim. 2019. "Islam and the Islamic State's Magazine, Dabiq." *Politics and Religion* 12 (1): 32-54. doi:10.1017/S1755048318000561.

Jikeli, Günther. 2015. "Anti-Semitism within the Extreme Right and Islamists' Circles." In *Being Jewish in 21st Century Germany*, edited by Olaf Glöckner and Haim Fireberg, 188-207. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Kadri, Sadakat. 2012. *Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia to the Streets of the Modern Muslim World*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Kelman, Herbert C. 1973. "Violence without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers." *Journal of Social Issues* 29 (4): 25-61. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1973.tb00102.x.

Koch, Ariel. 2017. "The New Crusaders: Contemporary Extreme Right Symbolism and Rhetoric." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 11 (5): 13-24. https://www-jstor-org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/stable/26297928.

Koehler, Daniel. 2017. *Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism*. New York: Routledge.

Kondracki, Nancy L., and Nancy S. Wellman. 2002. "Content Analysis: Review of Methods and Their Applications in Nutrition Education." *Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior* 34 (4): 224-230. doi:10.1016/S1499-4046(06)60097-3.

Kruglanski, Arie W., Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. Bélanger, Anna Sheveland, Malkanthi Hetiarachchi, and Rohan Gunaratna. 2014. "The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism." *Advances in Political Psychology* 35 (1): 69-93. doi:10.1111/pops.12163.

Lakomy, Miron. 2019. "*Danse Macabre*: Gore Images in the Islamic State's 'Dabiq' Magazine as a Propaganda Device." *International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs* 21 (2): 143-161. doi:10.1080/23800992.2019.1649138.

Lankford, Adam. 2013. *The Myth of Martyrdom: What Really Drives Suicide Bombers, Rampage Shooters, and Other Self-Destructive Killers*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Laqueur, Walter, and Christopher Wall. 2018. *The Future of Terrorism: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Alt Right*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books.

Larsson, Stieg. (2011) 2014. *The Expo Files*. Translated by Laurie Thompson. New York: MacLehose Press.

Lorde, Audre. 1984. *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches*. Freedom, CA: The Crossing Press.

Macnair, Logan, and Richard Frank. 2018. "Changes and Stabilities in the Language of Islamic State Magazines: A Sentiment Analysis." *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 11 (2): 109-120. doi:10.1080/17467586.2018.1470660.

Maher, Shiraz. 2016. *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mahood, Samantha, and Halim Rane. 2017. "Islamist Narratives in ISIS Recruitment Propaganda." *Journal of International Communication* 23 (1): 15-35. doi:10.1080/13216597.2016.1263231.

Morris, Travis. 2014. “Networking Vehement Frames: Neo-Nazi and Violent Jihadi Demagoguery.” *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 6 (3): 163-182. doi:10.1080/19434472.2014.922602.

Moses, Anthony Dirk. 2019. “‘White Genocide’ and the Ethics of Public Analysis.” *Journal of Genocide Research* 21 (2): 201-213. doi:10.1080/14623528.2019.1599493.

Nasr, Vali. 2006. *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.

Noble, Helen, and Joanna Smith. 2015. “Issues of Validity and Reliability in Qualitative Research.” *Evidence Based Nursing* 18 (2): 34-35. doi:10.1136/eb-2015-102054.

Obaidi, Milan, Jonas R. Kunst, Nour Kteily, Lotte Thomsen, and James Sidanius. 2018. “Living Under Threat: Mutual Threat Perception Drives Anti-Muslim and Anti-Western Hostility in the Age of Terrorism.” *European Journal of Social Psychology* 48 (5): 567-584. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2362.

Osman, Tarek. 2013. *Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to the Muslim Brotherhood*. Rev. ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Qutb, Sayyid. (1964) 2013. *Milestones*. Translated by Saeed International. New Delhi: Saeed International.

Raivola, Reijo. 1985. “What is Comparison? Methodological and Philosophical Considerations.” *Comparative Education Review* 29 (3): 362-274. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1188494.

Richter, Elihu D., Dror Kris Markus, and Casey Tait. 2018. “Incitement, Genocide, Genocidal Terror, and the Upstream Role of Indoctrination: Can Epidemiologic Models Predict and Prevent?” *Health Reviews* 39 (30): 1-22. doi:10.1186/s40985-018-0106-7.

Rippl, Susanne, and Christian Seipel. 1999. “Gender Differences in Right Wing Extremism: Intergroup Validity of a Second-Order Construct.” *Social Psychology Quarterly* 62 (4): 381-393. doi:10.2307/2695835.

Roscoe, Paul. 2007. “Intelligence, Coalitional Killing, and the Antecedents of War.” *American Anthropologist* 109 (3): 485-495. doi:10.1525/AA.2007.109.3.485.

Roy, Olivier. 2017. *Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State*. Translated by Cynthia Schoch. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Said, Edward W. 1978. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Smith, David Livingstone. 2011. *Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Staub, Ervin. 1989. *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stenersen, Anne. 2018. “Jihadism After the ‘Caliphate’: Towards a New Typology.” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*: 1-22. doi:10.1080/13530194.2018.1552118.

Stepchenkova, Svetlana, and Fangzi Zhan. 2013. “Visual Destination Images of Peru: Comparative Content Analysis of DMO and User-Generated Photography.” *Tourism Management* 36 (3): 590-601. doi:10.1016/j.tourman.2012.08.006.

Tajfel, Henri, M. J. Billig, R. P. Bundy, and Claude Flament. 1971. “Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior.” *European Journal of Social Psychology* 1 (2): 149-178. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420010202.

Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. 1979. “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.” In *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, edited by William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel, 33-47. Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing.

Thomas, David R. 2006. “A General Inductive Approach for Analyzing Qualitative Evaluation Data.” *American Journal of Evaluation* 27 (2): 237-246. doi:10.1177/1098214005283748.

Van De Mieroop, Dorien. 2015. “Social Identity Theory and the Discursive Analysis of Collective Identities in Narratives.” In *The Handbook of Narrative Analysis*, edited by Anna De Fina and Alexandra Georgakopoulou, 408-428. West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Weber, Ron. 2004. “Editor’s Comments: The Rhetoric of Positivism Versus Interpretivism: A Personal View.” *MIS Quarterly* 28 (1): iii-xii. doi:10.2307/25148621.

Weinberg, Leonard, and Eliot Assoudeh. 2018. “Political Violence and the Radical Right.” In *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, edited by Jens Rydgren, 412-432. New York: Oxford University Press.

Welch, Tyler. 2018. “Theology, Heroism, Justice, and Fear: An Analysis of ISIS Propaganda Magazines *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*.” *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 11 (3): 186-198. doi:10.1080/17467586.2018.1517943.

Winkler, Carol, Kareem El Damanhoury, Aaron Dicker, and Anthony F. Lemieux. 2019a. “The Medium is Terrorism: Transformation of the About to Die Trope in *Dabiq*.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 31 (2): 224-243. doi:10.1080/09546553.2016.1211526.

———. 2019b. “Images of Death and Dying in ISIS Media: A Comparison of English and Arabic Print Publications.” *Media, War & Conflict* 12 (3): 248-262. doi:10.1177/1750635217746200.

Önnerfors, Andreas. 2017. “Between Breivik and PEGIDA: The Absence of Ideologues and Leaders on the Contemporary European Far Right.” *Patterns of Prejudice* 51 (2): 159-175. doi:10.1080/0031322X.2017.1302642.

Reports and Other Documents

Baffa, Richard C., Nathan Vest, Wing Yi Chan, and Abby Fanlo. 2019. *Defining and Understanding the Next Generation of Salafi-Jihadis*. RAND Corporation: Perspective. Available from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE300/PE341/RAND_PE341.pdf.

Berger, J. M. 2016. *Nazis vs. ISIS on Twitter: A Comparative Study of White Nationalist and ISIS Online Social Media Networks*. George Washington University: Program on Extremism. Available from https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/Nazis%20v.%20ISIS.pdf.

Bin Laden, Osama. 1996. *Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holiest Sites*. Translated by The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Available from https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2013/10/Declaration-of-Jihad-against-the-Americans-Occupying-the-Land-of-the-Two-Holiest-Sites-Translation.pdf.

Briggs, Rachel, and Sebastien Feve. 2014. *Policy Briefing: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online*. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Available from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Countering%20the%20Appeal%20of%20Extremism%20Online_1.pdf.

Council on American-Islamic Relations. 2013. *Legislating Fear: Islamophobia and Its Impact in the United States*. Available from http://www.islamophobia.org/images/pdf/Legislating_Fear_FINAL.pdf.

Davey, Jacob, and Julia Ebner. 2019. *'The Great Replacement': The Violent Consequences of Mainstreamed Extremism*. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Available from https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/the-great-replacement-the-violent-consequences-of-mainstreamed-extremism/.

El-Badawy, Emma, Milo Comerford, and Peter Welby. 2015. *Inside the Jihadi Mind: Understanding Ideology and Propaganda*. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. Available from https://institute.global/sites/default/files/inline-files/IGC_Inside%20Jihadi%20Mind_18.08.17.pdf.

Ware, Jacob. 2020. *Testament to Murder: The Violent Far-Right's Increasing Use of Terrorist Manifestos*. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague. doi:10.97812345/2020.4.2.

Newspaper Articles

Adams, Richard. 2019. "UK's Prevent Strategy 'Biggest Threat to Free Speech on Campus.'" *The Guardian*. June 26. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jun/27/uks-prevent-strategy-biggest-threat-to-free-speech-on-campus (accessed November 7, 2020).

Connolly, Kate. 2020. "German Suspect in Deadly Halle Synagogue Attack Blames Refugees." *The Guardian*. July 21. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/21/german-man-goes-on-trial-for-deadly-halle-synagogue-shooting-stephan-balliet.html (accessed July 25, 2020).

Dearden, Lizzie. 2019. "Stephan Balliet: The 'Loser' Neo-Nazi Suspected of Deadly Attack on German Synagogue." *The Independent*. October 10. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/german-synagogue-shooting-halle-attack-latest-stephan-balliet-suspect-neo-nazi-a9150451.html (accessed July 25, 2020).

Delcker, Janosch. 2020. "German Hate Speech Crackdown Sparks Censorship Fears." *Politico*. February 21. https://www.politico.eu/article/amid-rise-in-extremism-german-hate-speech-crackdown-sparks-censorship-fears/ (accessed November 7, 2020).

Harmon, Amy. 2018. "Why White Supremacists Are Chugging Milk (and Why Geneticists Are Alarmed)." *The New York Times*. October 17. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/us/white-supremacists-science-dna.html (accessed January 20, 2020).

Mahmud, Faisal. 2019. "New Zealand Mosque Attack: Who Were the Victims?" *Al Jazeera*. March 22. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/22/new-zealand-mosque-attack-who-were-the-victims.html (accessed February 12, 2020).

Martinez, Aaron. 2020. "Suspect Faces New Federal Charges in El Paso Walmart Mass Shooting." *El Paso Times*. July 9. https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/crime/2020/07/09/patrick-crusius-faces-new-federal-charges-el-paso-shooting/3286985001/ (accessed July 20, 2020).

Pulpit & Pen. 2019. "Here's the El Paso Shooter's Full Manifesto: Read it Before You Believe the News." August 5. https://pulpitandpen.org/2019/08/05/heres-the-el-paso-shooters-full-manifesto-read-it-before-you-believe-the-news/ (accessed November 18, 2019).

Websites

"About Clarion Project | Clarion Project." 2019. Clarion Project. Accessed 3 December 2019. https://clarionproject.org/about-us/.

"Anti-Muslim." 2019. Southern Poverty Law Center. Accessed 3 December 2019. https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/anti-muslim.

Oxford English Dictionary. 2021. s.v. "propaganda." Accessed 25 March 2020. https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/propaganda.

Oxford English Dictionary. 2021. s.v. "violence." Accessed 29 December 2020. https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/violence.

Case Study Documents

Dabiq Issue 1. 2014. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Dabiq Issue 2. 2014. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Dabiq Issue 3. 2014. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Dabiq Issue 4. 2014. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Dabiq Issue 5. 2014. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Dabiq Issue 6. 2014. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Dabiq Issue 7. 2015. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Dabiq Issue 8. 2015. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Dabiq Issue 9. 2015. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Dabiq Issue 10. 2015. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Dabiq Issue 11. 2015. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Dabiq Issue 12. 2015. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Dabiq Issue 13. 2016. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Dabiq Issue 14. 2016. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Dabiq Issue 15. 2016. Available from https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/ (accessed November 1, 2019).

Tarrant, Brenton Harrison. 2019. *The Great Replacement*. Available from https://www.ilfoglio.it/userUpload/The_Great_Replacementconvertito.pdf (accessed November 1, 2019).

Appendix

Organizations and Communities Targeted in *Dabiq*

Abū Salīm Martyrs Brigade; Adulterers; Afghan Army/Government; Agents Spying for Israel/Russia; Ahlul-Kitāb; Ahrār-ash-Shām/"Islamic Front"; Aknāf Bayt al-Maqdis; Āl Salūl/Salūlī Front; Alawites; Allah's Enemies/Enemies of Allah; Allies of Shaytān; Americans; Ansār ash-Sharī'ah; Apostates/Apostate Forces/Apostate Imams/Apostate Rulers/Apostate Soldiers; Army of Fir'awn; Arrogant Camp; Asad's Soldiers; Asa'ib Ahlul-Haqq Militia; Athiests; Australians; Ba'athists/Ba'ath Party; Badr Militia; Bahā'ī; Bangladesh Border Guard; Banī al-Mustaliq; Banī Quraydhah; Bātinniyah; Belgians; Blasphemers; BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party); British; Bughāt; Byzantines; Canadians; Catholics; Children of Isrā'īl; Christians; Christian Girls; Citizens of Crusader Nations; Coalition/Coalition of the Cross; Communists; Copts; Counter-Religious Activism Officers; Cow Worshippers; Cross-Worshippers; Crusaders/Crusader Armies/Crusader Women/Crusader Children/Crusader Media/Citizens of Crusader Nations; Danes; Deserters; Devil Worshippers; Disbelievers/Disbelieving People; Disputers of Baghdadi's Legitimacy; Dogs; Drinkers of Alcohol; Drug Traffickers; Druze; Emiratis; Enemies of Islam; Europeans; False Claimants of Islam; Factions of Riddah; Families of the Kuffār; Forces/Legions/People/Soldiers of Kufr; French; FSA (Free Syrian Army); GNC (General National Congress); "Guards of Dimashq" 4th Division; Hawāzin; Heretics; Highway Robbers; Hindus; al-Hizb al-Islāmī; Hizb al-Lāt/Hizbul-Lāt; Houthis; Hypocrites; Idol Worshippers; Ikhwān/"Muslim Brotherhood"; Imāms of Kufr; Infidels; Innovators; "Islamists"; Ismā'īlīs/Ismā'īlliyah; Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh; Japanese; Jawlānī Front; Jaysh al-Islām; Jews; Jewish State; KAR-SAZ (Union of Association of Kurdish Employers); KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party); Khālid Hayyānī's Corp; Khawārij; KON-KURD (Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe); Kuffār/Kāfir/Kāfirīn/Kāfirah Women; Lashkar-e-Taiba; Libyan Dawn; Liwā' Shām ar-Rasūl; Liwā' Thuwwār ar-Raqqah; Madkhalī Murji'ah; Majlis Shūrā Darnah; Māriyah al-Qibtiyyah; Marxists; Merced Company; Missionaries; Mockers of the Messenger; Money Changers; Mongols; Mossad; Mubtadi'ah; Munāfiqīn; Murderers; Murtadd/Murtaddīn/Murtadd Soldiers; Mushrik/Mushrikīn; "Muslims"; National Security Officers; Nationalists; Native Americans;

Nusayrīs/Nusayriyyah/Nusayrī Regime; Opium Farmers; Oppressive Kings; Pagans; Pakistani Army/Government/Intelligence; Palace Scholars/"Scholars"; Panamanians; People of at-Tā'if; People of Bid'ah; People of Deviation and Misguidance; People/Nations of Shirk; Persians; Peshmerga; PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party); Police Forces/Police Officers/Security Forces; Proponents of Democracy; PYD (Democratic Union Party); Qadiyānī/Qādiyānniyah; Rāfidī/Rāfidah/Rawāfid; Rāfidī Mobilization; Rayhānah an-Nadriyyah; Regime Soldiers; Renegades; Romans; Rulers of al-Haramayah; Russians; Russian Intelligence Agents; Sabiyyah/Concubine; Safawīs/Safawīyyah/Safawī Army/Safawī Forces; Sahwah/Sahwāt; Satanists; Saudis; Secularists; Shabbīhah; Shāmiyyah Front; Sheep; Shia/Shiites; Shu'aytāt; Slave Girls/Female Slaves; SNC (Syrian National Coalition); So-Called "Islamists"; Sodomites; Spies; Sūfīs; Sunni Tribe, Party, or Assembly that Would Support the Crusaders; Supporters/Soldiers of the Tāwāghīt; SWAT Forces; Tāghūt/Tawāghīt; Taliban; Tatars; Tawā'if Mumtaniah; Those Who Refuse Muhammad; Traitors; Turkish/Turks; US (United States) Forces; Vietnamese; Westerners/Western Nations; Worst of the People; Yazidis/Yazīddiyah/Yazīdī Women; Yemenis; YPG (People's Protection Units); Zahrān 'Allūsh's Militia; Zanādiqah; Zāniyah; Zionists

<u>Organizations and Communities Targeted in *The Great Replacement*</u>

Africans; Anti-Whites; Anti-White CEOs; Antifa; Capitalists; Children of Invaders; Communists; Corporations/Corporate Press; Drug Dealers; Economic Elites; Egalitarians; Enemies of the Christian People; Enemies of Our Nations; Enemies of Our Race; Enemies of the Christian People; Families of Rapists; Foreign Scum; High Profile Enemies; Immigrants; Indians; Interlopers; Invaders/Unarmed Invaders; Islamic Nations/Occupiers; "Kebab"; Less Radical Leaders/Influencers; Marxists; Muslims; NGOs; Non-Europeans in European Lands; Occupying Force; Otago Muslim Association; Outsiders; Political Enemies; Rapists/Rapist Scum/Families of Rapists; Roaches; Roma; Saracens; Semites; State Enforcers; Traitors/Traitorous Politicians; Turkish/Turks; Vipers; Warlords