

# Enforced Kumbaya

The effects of United Nations Peacekeeping operations on the  
signing of local peace agreements

Zakarias Dahlberg

# Abstract

This paper looks at whether an implementation of a UN operation in a civil conflict effects the signing of local peace agreements. It is limited to the Africa and Middle East regions. The theory applied, and tested, is the Liberal Peace Theory. To test the question a new dataset is constructed by merging disparate datasets and data into one. The UCDP dataset on violent conflicts, and the PA-X local peace agreements dataset is used. They are complemented with data on GDP per capita from the Gapminder Organisation, and UN peacekeeping missions. A fixed effects regression model is applied on the constructed panel-dataset. Control variables include time-fixed effects, country-specific effects, and a time-varying country specific variable (GDP per capita). Several sensitivity analyses are also applied, including a logistic regression (to test for similar results). Likewise, three time-periods for the UN are tested: year of deployment, three years of deployment, and entire mission. The paper finds a positive relationship between the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation and the signing of local peace agreements. No such relationship is found within one or three years of UN operation. The effects remain when conducting the analysis separately by region.

*Key words:* United Nations, peacekeeping, local, peace agreements, panel data regressions

Words: 9820

# Table of contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	Problem and Statement of Aim .....	1
1.2	Outline of study .....	3
1.2.1	Unintended effects.....	3
1.2.2	Civil Conflicts .....	3
1.2.3	Time period of study .....	3
1.2.4	Method .....	4
1.2.5	Reflection on causal mechanism .....	4
<b>2</b>	<b>Previous research.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Concepts.....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Liberal peace theory .....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Data sources.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Data construction.....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Method .....</b>	<b>14</b>
7.1	Regression models.....	14
7.2	Fixed-effects model.....	15
7.3	Heterogeneity analysis .....	16
<b>8</b>	<b>Statistics .....</b>	<b>17</b>
8.1	Descriptive statistics.....	17
8.2	Regression results.....	18
8.3	Results for the heterogeneity analysis .....	21
<b>9</b>	<b>Discussion and conclusion .....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>References.....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>Appendix: .....</b>	<b>26</b>

# 1 Introduction

The peacekeeping operations at the United Nations has since their first deployment in the Middle East, in 1948, been one of the primary tools at the UN's disposal. Furthermore, they have been a reoccurring, institutional player in the arena of international politics, working on cessating conflict and mediating peace. In the beginning and throughout the Cold War, missions nonetheless remained small in scale and objectives. The two objectives of suppressing violence and encouraging negotiation between institutional actors (such as states and rebel groups), remained priority (Encyclopedia Britannica 2021, "Peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building"; United Nations 2021, "OUR HISTORY"). In tandem missions remained small in scale (military personnel serving in the UN came from a handful of countries and were to be used strictly in defense) relative to contemporary missions (Hultman et. al, 2019: 11-13). After the Cold War the width and size of the UN operations grew significantly. The number of UN operations also grew quickly. Mission objectives widened from being limited to retaining ceasefires and helping stabilize the political situation, to becoming complex operations with a plethora of objectives (Encyclopedia Britannica 2021, "Peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building"; United Nations 2021, "OUR HISTORY").

## 1.1 Problem and Statement of Aim

As the United Nations Peacekeeping operations (henceforth UNPKO) grew in purpose, and its foray into new social, economic, and political areas, it has been followed by research on the organization and the effects of its work. Historically, and still largely today, the focus of UNPKO has been on national politics (for definition of this and local politics, see the concepts section). For example, peace agreements on a national level have been given attention (Wallenstein, 2015 263-266). This attention on national politics has long been reflected in academic works, as well. It was not until around 15 years ago that this focus shifted towards peacebuilding at a local level (Séverine, 2014a). Since then, a large share of literature on the local level of peacebuilding has been written, even earning the name of a "local turn" in peacebuilding research (Autesserre, 2014a; Autesserre, 2017). This is expanded on in the "previous research" section below. In short, this work has made contributions to two broader questions. One is the focus on unintended effects of UNPKOs, and the other on the relationship between local and national politics (Séverine, 2017: 117-8). This study aims to complement this genre of peace and conflict studies by examining the effects on local peace

agreements, an area largely overseen in the earlier literature. The connection to unintended effects is described later in the introduction. The main findings of the research on national and local politics indicate that they are at least somewhat distinct from one another. Therefore, a consensus has started to rise that the national focus of the UN peacekeeping missions needs to be complemented with a focus on local peacebuilding. Research is not fully saturated yet, because some uncertainty remains to the workings at the local level. One such thing is whether peace trickles down from the top (Autesserre, 2017).

The aim of this study is to examine how national UN peacekeeping operations affect local peace agreements. More specifically, the question is to look at the mere presence of a UN operation nationally that leads to agreements in local peace negotiations. This will be done in the regions of the Middle East and Africa, between the years 1990-2020. The Research Question is then, as follows:

- Does the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations increase the signing of local peace agreements in African and Middle Eastern civil conflicts, between 1990-2020?

The effects of UNPKOs are externally relevant to study. For one, as mentioned, the UNPKO has been a long-standing institutional actor. Furthermore, in contemporary international politics its size makes it an influential tool in the geographic areas where it operates.

This paper will make three contributions to the literature. The first contribution is to fill a hole in the scientific literature. The paper will look at the question of whether UN operations lead to peace in violent conflicts at a local level. As far as I know, the question at hand remains unanswered in the scientific literature. Costalli (2014) argues that this does not occur on a municipal (and therefore, local) level. More recently, both Hultman et. al (2019) and Ruggeri et. al (2017) show that UNPKOs decrease levels of armed conflicts at the local level. Neither looks at the effects on peace agreements. The internal relevancy of this study is intended come by illuminating this uncertainty in scientific research, of whether peace at a national level is reflected locally, or whether they are distinct from one another.

The second contribution of this study is to use the PA-X dataset from the University of Edinburgh. One main reason the effects on local peace agreements have not been studied is lack of good data on such agreements. The PA-X dataset is fairly new and was first published in 2019 (Bell and Badanjak, 2019). Their data collection efforts have enabled studies such as this one.

Lastly, the third contribution is to construct a new dataset that did not previously exist. The previously mentioned PA-X data is not sufficient to directly answer the question of interest in this paper. Resolving the research question required me to combine and merge different datasets and data. The PA-X dataset will be paired up with the Armed Conflicts dataset from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which covers all armed conflicts globally. All UNPKOs were also added, as well as GDP per capita data from the Gapminder organization.

## 1.2 Outline of study

### 1.2.1 Unintended effects

I argue that the local peace negotiations in this study can be included in this category of unintended effects of UN operations. UNPKO involvement in local conflicts is very much limited. It is not until recently that UN peacekeeping include work in local contexts and conflicts whatsoever. It was not until recently that local perspective started appearing in their goals, and even then, it has remained a peripheral focus (Tom O'Bryan et. al., 2017: 17). Treating local grievances as “beyond the scope of a UN peace operation” (Tom O'Bryan et. al., 2017: 17) is still the norm. Furthermore, Autesserre argues that de facto involvement and presence in the local is limited to brief, sporadic visits with blue helmets (2021: 84). Additionally, as will be expanded on in the data section of this paper peace agreements where international actors have played a direct part have been excluded from the study. The direct involvement and corroboration of the UN, in the making of local peace agreements, can therefore be argued to have some independence.

### 1.2.2 Civil Conflicts

UNPKOs are (or have the potential to be) active in many different types of armed conflicts, including inter-state violence (also known as wars), intra-state violent conflict (colloquially, civil wars), and genocides. This study will focus on UNPKOs involvement in civil conflicts. In contemporary international politics civil conflicts are the most commonly occurring type of warfare. Civil war occurs within states, mainly over territorial or governmental control. Additionally, civil wars have also increased the most out of the different types of violent conflict (Hultman et. al, 2019: 4-6).

### 1.2.3 Time period of study

The PA-X dataset only stretches as far back as 1990, but I argue it is a minute problem. The intricacies of the Cold War, that ended just the year before, largely prohibited the commencement of new UN Peacekeeping operations. Between March 1978 and May 1988 no new missions were started. 5 started in the period between 1988 and 1990 (United Nations 2021, “OUR HISTORY”). Furthermore, as previously mentioned, with the end of the Cold War, UNPKO went through large reforms and were greatly expanded. The missions of the past thus vary greatly from those included in this study. As a sensitivity analysis, the UNPKOs

will be tested at three different timespans. This is the time within which they can have an effect on the peace agreements. The timespans used in this study are 1 year (the year of deployment for UN operations); 3 years (a total of three years of presence), and total missions. The last part looks at the presence of a UN missions' effect on local peace.

#### 1.2.4 Method

The method used in this study is a linear fixed effects regression model. In addition to the inclusion of time-fixeds and country-specific fixed effects the model is complemented by a time-varying country specific variable (GDP per capita). The estimation of a logit model is added as a sensitivity analysis. Lastly, a separate analysis for the two regions is done.

#### 1.2.5 Reflection on causal mechanism

This paper does not test for a causal mechanism. Nonetheless, this section will first outline a reasoning regarding a theoretical mechanism, followed by an explanation to its absence in the following section. This is my argumentation for the theoretical mechanism: UN operations successfully manage to quench violent conflicts. The alternative to use violent means to resolve a conflict is removed or hardened, in essence making it more costly. Costs here does not refer solely to hard-lined monetary reasoning (although it could be included), but all factors included in a self-judged cost-benefit analysis (like for example physical harm and temporal costs). Alternative pathways to resolve the conflict, which might otherwise have been considered too costly, now become more desirable. Furthermore, included in this, it is possible that the introduction of UN operations offers the necessary stability to make it doable.

The causal mechanism is not tested for in this study due to time, resource, and space limitations. At the start of the paper the resources needed for testing causal mechanisms were unavailable. Focus on the paper was then placed elsewhere. There are quantitative methods available for testing causal mechanisms. Similarly, it is not rare that quantitative methods are complemented with process-tracing, an intensive and qualitative technique, to explore causal mechanisms. The author of this study thinks both are viable techniques for testing for causality. Given that the results of this study are positive, building on this paper in the future with tests for causal mechanisms is a good idea.

## 2 Previous research

Both the effects of UN Peacekeeping at the national level and the local level have been studied. Autesserre (2014) argues that in the last 15 years a ‘local turn’ in research has arisen. These results have at times been contradictory to one another. UN peacekeeping has been shown to be able to decrease violent conflicts and maintain negative peace. In some areas it has also contributed to economic development and institutional improvements, such as levels of democracy and security (Autesserre 2017, p115). Contradictory, studies looking at the effects of top-down peace (for definitions, see concepts section) operations on local peacebuilding efforts have often produced counterintuitive and disheartening results. In some areas top-down peace operations have been shown to increase human rights violations (Branch, 2011), sexual abuse and gender disparities (Simm, 2013) and violence (Autesserre 2014b; Martin 2014). Likewise, in some areas, it has worsened the quality of democracy (Englund, 2006; Heathershaw, 2009) and local economies (Bøås and Jennings in progress). The same goes for homicide rates (Di Salvatore, 2019). Studies looking at success stories in local peacebuilding have either been methodologically problematic or yielded diverging and contradictory results (Autessere 2017, p119). Directly related to the research question at hand the following studies have been done. It is possible that UN peacekeeping interventions fail to decrease levels of municipal violence (Costalli, 2014). Similarly, local security and authority have not increased by UNPKOs (Mvukiyehe and Samii, 2010). The friction found between the effects of UN peacekeeping on a national and a local level has resulted in the growth of a consensus that both local and national peacebuilding efforts are necessary to succeed.



### 3 Concepts

Overall, for the concepts, I opted to follow in the footsteps of giants, when deciding on the definitions. In other words, I used the definitions that are commonly used by other researchers (Teorell & Svensson, 2007: 40) The definitions included in this section are 1) Negative and Positive peace, 2) Armed Conflict and Peace agreement, 3) Local and national peace.

Firstly, negative, and positive peace. Galtung (1969, p183) differentiates between the two different conceptions of peace. Negative peace is the absence of violent conflict. That is, violence directed towards individuals. Positive peace is the absence of structural violence, or put differently, social justice. Peacekeeping, in its conceptual form, can here be associated more so with the former type of peace. The purpose is to suppress violent conflict and thus enact negative peace. Peacebuilding, conversely, can be associated more so with the positive conception of peace as ridding or transforming a community of structural violence.

Secondly, armed conflict and peace agreements will be defined. The operationalizations of these concepts are armed conflicts, defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (UCDP 2020, “UCDP Definitions”), and the signing of local peace agreements, found in the PA-X dataset. The operationalized definition of peace agreements I borrow from the PA-X to be “formal, publicly-available documents, produced after discussion with conflict protagonists and mutually agreed to by some or all of them, addressing conflict with a view to ending it” (Bell et. al, 2021), where conflict protagonists mean “state actors and non-state actors who are involved in violent conflict, or their associated political representatives” (Bell et. al, 2021)

Lastly, local and national peace will be defined. O’Bryan et. al (2017) borrows the Stimson center’s definition of local conflict as “[involving] violence or the risk of violence centered at the subnational level” (Stimson center (2017), cited in O’Bryan et. al, 2017), and adds that “involvement from state actors” (O’Bryan et. al 2017), both including governments and organized armed groups, is limited or non-existent. As is conflict individual to individual. Autesserre (2017:116) has a similar definition of local conflict as “at the level of the individual, the family, the clan, the district, the province, and the ethnic group when it is not a national level one.” Both definitions emphasize the sub-national level, as opposing the national level. Autesserre’s definition is broader for what is included in the sub-national than O’Bryan et al, however. I opted for the O’Bryan definition because it is more nominally distinct, and less conceptually stretched (Teorell & Svensson, 2007: 38).

Related to local and national levels of analysis, are the concepts top-down and bottom-up peace. It refers to process by which peace is built and is often considered in tandem with national and local levels. Top-down relates to national sphere and is made from the elites and ruling parties, and trickles down to the rest of society (Autesserre, 2021: 69-93). Bottom-up, related to the local sphere and is the antithesis of the top-down perspective. Peace is built from the bottom-up, by engaging with communities and towns, and private families and individuals, too. The idea is that if it gains scale, peace built from the bottom-up will have more consensus behind it and thus be more stable (Autesserre, 2021: 69-93).

## 4 Liberal peace theory

The liberal peace theory is an amalgamation of the theories liberalism, idealism and realism. Specifically liberal peace theory (henceforth LPT) it is a result of these three foundational theories views on peace. Idealism and liberalism are occasionally used synonymously with liberalism in IR theory. Partly because they are so very similar and are variations of the same philosophical framework. The grounding thoughts of idealist thinking about the international system includes internationalism and interdependence, pacifism – both as a means and end – and self-determination. Ideas about a universal political structure, such as a world government also arose within this framework (Richmond, 2020: 30f). The liberalist framework can be summed up by combining the ideas of influential philosophers. In comparison to idealism, liberalism is more weighted towards intra-state relations. Richmond (2020) summarizes the liberal framework as follows:

This idealist agenda drew on and reflected early liberal thinking of which there emerged three main strands. Locke focused on individualism and Bentham on utilitarianism: Adam Smith provided the foundations for the arguments for free trade and pacifism; and Kant developed a Republican internationalism (Richmond, 2020: 31).

Also included, but not mentioned here, is John Stuart Mill's argument for the necessity of a legitimate "Leviathan", chosen by the people (Richmond, 2020: 34). These two strands of thought - idealism and liberalism - were then merged. The result is a theory both geared towards the national and international level of analysis, which insisted on a possibility of creating peace. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century these conceptions were supplemented by the practical implementation of liberal internationalism and liberal institutionalism (Richmond, 2020: 32). Lastly, a by-product of the necessity to create peace raises an issue in liberal thought. An incongruity exists with having to *create* peace, supposing that the starting point is war. Peace then can only be built on (exist in relation to) war which risk undermining the arguments for peace's' independent, self-reliant existence (Richmond, 2020: 32).

Diametrically opposed to liberalism and idealism is realism, and its near-complete rejection of (the possibility of) peace. Within the realist framework three dimensions of peace exist. The most limited version of realist peace extends only to the confines of the sovereign states, for a short time-period. That does not extend to inter-state relationships (Richmond, 2020: 54f). The underlying argumentation for this is the primacy of the state and their self-defined interests (Richmond, 2020: 52). The more extended versions of peace are not adjusted much principally, but rather in the reach of power. In the most extensive version of realist peace is the so-called "victors' peace", only one power remains, to rule

hierarchically over everyone (Richmond, 2020: 65-68). Between these two extremes lies “the hegemonic peace”, which is where one state exerts power over other states, but not all states in the system. The actors outside the sphere of influence, in the hegemonic peace, ensure that the insecurity in the international system remains, so say realists (Richmond, 2020: 66-67). It is this last middle ground that conjoins realist and liberal conceptions of peace (Richmond, 2020: 68).

Liberal peace theory can be considered a modification of the aforementioned theories, to appease each of their criticisms. For liberalism and idealism, the normative ideals of the individual, and their self-determination, remains. The latter has been extended to the nation-state, however. In so doing, the universalism of liberalism has been delimited, more in favor of the realist communitarianism. Efforts to build democratic and liberal (as in protecting individual rights) organizations also remains a priority. Democratization attempts is one such phenomenon resulting from LPT. Furthermore, the liberal dilemma of creating peace, along with the realist idea of primacy of the state has also blended. The result is policy of liberal expansionism enforced by a nation-state, creating a liberal hegemony (Richmond, 2020: 43 & 46). This can both be considered a material and epistemological enforcement. It means that the spread of liberalism both can be considered as imperial and liberating, simultaneously. The harshest form of critique against the liberal peace theory is that colonialism of empires-past remains within the liberal peace theory guise – a far step away from the goal of anti-colonial idealists of times past. Supporters of LPT, argue that it is a method of creating liberal-democratic governments and institutions.

The liberal peace theory is not only a set of principles and strands of thinking, but also reflected in institutions and real-life phenomena. The most pertinent to this paper is the United Nations. Much of the idealist and liberal framework is reflected at various parts all throughout the UN, not the least in the UN Charter. The UN Charter is the collection of rules and regulations the UN is run by. The resulting work, such as the UN peacekeeping operations, is therefore the body of the liberal peace theory. The ideas, if not directly related to the charter, are also reconstructed directly in the creation and work of the UNPKO (and other UN institutions). (Richmond, 2020: 43). Specifically, the strand of LPT thought regarding the construction of peace, and hegemonic enforcement of liberal values are related to the UNPKO. Richmond argues that the UNPKO became a tool used by hegemonic powers such as the US to spread liberalism (Richmond, 2020: 43).

## 5 Data sources

I constructed a new dataset to answer the question in this paper. No pre-existing dataset exist that includes all aspects of interest for the study. In large the construction process consisted of merging and combining different data sources into a new one. That process will be expanded on, and more thoroughly described in the next section. Before that, an overview of the data sources used in this study to create my dataset will be described. The contents and structure of the datasets will be included, along with their respective methodologies. To answer the research question, I needed as a core three types of data. I needed data on where UN missions and local peace agreements existed, and did not exist, so that comparison was possible. United Nations has a complete data source on where their UNPKOs were located. The PA-X database has data on where local peace agreements were signed. Finally, the UCDP dataset on armed conflict is used to make comparisons. It means it both have units of analysis overlapping with the UN and PA-X data, and additional datapoints as well. Moreover, as a control GDP per capita was included. The GDP per capita from the Gapminder organization serves as the data source for that variable.

The first data source is the Uppsala Conflict Data Program from Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research (Gleditsch et. al, 2002; Petterson et. al, 2019). It has comprehensive data on armed conflicts globally. Petterson et. al, (2019) write:

Its definition of armed conflict has become the global standard of how conflicts are systematically defined and studied. UCDP produces high-quality data, which are systematically collected, have global coverage, are comparable across cases and countries, and have long time series which are updated annually (Petterson et. al, 2019).

The data contains the location of the conflict (both as an id and country) and the participating sides. The type of incompatibility and conflict, as well, along with the year of conflict and start/end dates. Also, different types of geographic categorizations (other than the already mentioned country) also exist. Lastly, the intensity of the conflict and the precision of the data is included (Gleditsch et. al, 2002). I am using version 21.1 of the dataset.

The UCDP Armed Conflict dataset is intended to be used as the data source containing all datapoints, from UN to PA-X to comparisons. This is used as an indirect indicator on peace negotiations, going off the logic that where there is armed conflict there are bound to be counterforces working towards peace. Data on all peace negotiations, failed and successful, would have been preferable, but in its absence, this is an attempt to make do.

The second data source is called PA-X, and is a database from the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. It has data on peace agreements generally. Crucially for

this study it also has data on local peace agreements specifically. It was first published in 2019 and was last updated in 2021. Both the peace agreements themselves, as well as information about them is included in the PA-X. In total the local PA-X dataset includes 124 agreements (Bell & Badanjak, 2019; Bell et. al, 2021).

The PA-X database can be specified according to three general categories, that all include several sub-categories. The first category is “Agreement” within which the sub-categories region, country/entity, conflict nature, agreement name exist. The first two are geographic categorizations. Conflict nature can either be specified as in accordance with the UCDP definition for armed conflict (25 battle related deaths) or not. Agreement name is used when a specific contract is sought after (Bell et. al, 2021). The second category is “Local Agreement Properties” and includes process type, participant type, mediator type and nature and name of locale. Participant and mediator type is most important here and indicates whether the actors in the peace agreement belong to the following group: central state, regional state, local state, local armed group, domestic religious organization or leader, local community, or civilian group, international or transnational actor, and lastly a category for other (Bell et. al, 2021). Lastly, the category “Agreement Content” exist. Sub-categories consist of category and type of issue addressed by the agreements, on different levels of specification. Specific agreement text can also be searched for (Bell et al. 2019; & Bell et. al. 2021).

The database includes written peace agreements and is therefore not exhaustive to all peace agreements reached on a local level. That means the results are at risk of underestimating the effect of local peace (Bell et. al 2019). There is a theoretical loss of units of analysis for local peace. I argue that the analysis is still fruitful because the correlation goes in the correct direction and any results the paper finds can only be expected to be stronger.

The independent variable is UNPKOs. The data for it comes from a comprehensive list of UN peacekeeping operations since its inception in 1945. It includes the geographic location and active years (started & ended/ongoing) of the different UN missions (United Nations 2022, “WHERE WE OPERATE”). The GDP per capita control variable comes from the Gapminder organization, which collects and organizes data on several social metrics, from economics, to politics, to health (Gapminder 2022, “About”).

## 6 Data construction

The following section will describe how I constructed the dataset used in this paper. The construction of the dataset can be categorized into three parts. First, the data sources were collected and edited individually. Second, the data sources were combined into a dataset. Third, a final revision was conducted in the statistical program Stata.

In the first part I collected the data from the various sources. Afterwards, each data source was edited individually. Firstly, I organized the PA-X dataset. The data was collected based on geographic location and exact date. Afterwards, each date was turned into a yearly value. Any duplicates of units with the same location and year were removed, so that only one remained. Lastly, one unit row containing information from Yugoslavia, and therefore Europe was removed. This was done because the focus of the paper has been narrowed down to only include locations on the African continent, and specifically the regions of the Middle East and Africa. The motivation behind this focus is that all other units in the PA-X dataset are from those regions. The reason PA-X includes no data from any other region is unspecified but could possibly be explained by a lack of data on - i.e. not being exhaustive of - all peace agreements.

Collecting the data for the UNPKO was the least strenuous process. First the location and years of the United Nations Peacekeeping operations were collected dating back to their inception in 1945. Afterwards, all operations commenced prior to 1990 were removed. Only those that starting after 1990 were kept. The reason is that the PA-X dataset reaches back to 1990. To look at the effects of peacekeeping operations on local peace agreements, only UNPKOs around that time is relevant to look at.

The UCDP dataset went through most changes. In a first step I removed all armed conflicts occurring before 1990, to match with the PA-X dataset. PA-X is limited to peace agreements reached from 1990 to present day. Conflicts in the UCDP dataset could have commenced prior to 1990 but had to still be ongoing to be included. Secondly, I removed the regions Europe, Asia, and Americas so that only the Middle East and Africa remained. This was done because the PA-X dataset is almost entirely constructed of peace agreements from those regions. The UCDP dataset has a column for regions within it already. Deciding which countries to remove was therefore made using that preexisting region categorization.

Next, I removed all duplicates in each year and country. Duplications occurred for two reasons. Either one country will have several conflicts (i.e., different counterparts) in the same year, or they will have different types of incompatibility. As for conflicts: the Israeli state, for example, can conflict with both Hamas (over Palestine) and Hezbollah (over Southern Lebanon) in one year, thus creating a

duplicate. Incompatibility refers to “the stated (in writing or verbally) general incompatible positions (UCDP 2020, “UCDP Definitions”). An incompatibility can be over territory, government, or both. The latter is a later addition to the UCDP dataset. Originally, it was a dichotomous variable of either territory or government. They often coexist in one year and country. Principally (I argue), which of the duplicates are removed should not matter in this study, since neither the counterpart nor the type of incompatibility will be relevant in the study. Solely the mere existence of an armed conflict is of interest. The armed conflict as an indicator of peace is not dependent on either variable. Nonetheless, as a rule the conflicts with fewer units within a country were removed.

In the second part of the data construction, I merged the different data sources into one dataset. I did it by adding two columns to the outermost right of the UCDP data. The first new column was of UNPKO interventions, and the second of PA-X. If a UN intervention was deployed or existed at a UCDP data point a 1 was added, otherwise 0. Same goes for PA-X. The focus in this step was matching the points with one another. I excluded the times when UN operations existed when armed conflict did not from the analysis. No such case existed for PA-X but would have otherwise received equal treatment. Some difficulties arose in this process. A few nation-states were named differently in different dataset. Côte d'Ivoire and Ivory Coast is one such example. I chose the UCDP name variant. Lastly, a dilemma arose about what to do when a UN intervention quenched armed conflicts. I chose to exclude them, although, regardless of decision, it concerned so few data points, that any effect would have been miniscule.

In the third, and last part, I edited the data again in the statistical program Stata. Inter-state conflicts, that were still in the data, were removed, to keep the focus on civil conflicts. This also helped solve an issue with the data. For inter-state conflicts the individual datapoints consisted of both participating country's name. This would have caused friction with the name-country unit of analysis



## 7 Method

Before describing the specific method used some relevant information will be described. The unit of analysis is country-year. The time period for the analysis spans across the period 1990-2020. The two geographical regions of focus in the study are the Middle East and Africa. The reason for this concentration is that the PA-X dataset of local peace agreements is mostly made up of units from those two regions. The UCDP dataset spans the entire globe, but only Africa and the Middle East are included, since they are the only relevant regions. Lastly, I will check whether the introduction of a UN operation will have an effect over different time periods. Worded differently, the duration of a UN operation within which an effect can be expected will be allowed to vary. The different lengths of time allowed will be 1 year, 3 years and the whole duration. For 1 year it will test whether a UN operation would be significantly related to PA-X within the year of deployment. Same goes for the three-year test. If an operation exists for less than 3 years, all existing (i.e., 1 or 2) will be included. Lastly, when looking at the complete existence of a UN operation, it is more so *the presence* of a UN operation that is looked at. With increased time for allowed impact, the expectation of a relationship increases.

### 7.1 Regression models

The analysis is done by estimating the relationship between UN missions and local peace agreements. In quantitative methods, when studying relationships between variables a regression is conducted. A large plethora of regressions are available. The two types particularly suited for this study, since it has a discrete dependent variable, is the linear regression model (a linear probability model) and the logistic regression (logit) model. Both are frequently used in studies like this one, even though they differ from one another (as does their specific uses). Therefore, a deliberation of the pros and cons of each model along with which is applied is available below.

Typically, the logit is formally more correct when the dependent variable is binary (Allison, 2011: 28). In this study the dependent variable is a binary variable measuring the presence (1) or absence (0) of local peace agreements. Therefore, in at first glance logits would be more applicable. Additionally, dependent variables with scales below interval are typically described as one of the weaknesses of linear regression model, further enhancing the argument for using the logit. The reason linear regression is described as a poor match is the risk that the coefficient, in this case indicating a probability, would be higher than

1 (Teorell & Svensson, 2007: 160). That is problematic because it is mathematically impossible. Despite this there are advantages to using linear regressions even if the data is nominal. For one, linear regressions are generally more conservative. Primarily however, their results are easier to interpret. If the results of the linear regression are within the 0 to 1 range of probability, they are easier to deal with (Angrist & Pischke, 2009: 81-83). Therefore, in this study the linear regression will be used and showcased in the results. The logit will still be used as a sensitivity check to see if they are similar. This is made to increase the scrutiny of the relationship, and thus the certainty of results. If the two methods are similar that is an indicator of a more reliable relationship, and vice versa. The results of the logit are available in the appendix.

The linear regression is a statistical process for estimating the linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The relationship is found by finding the line that best fit the data (Angrist & Pischke, 2014:56; Teorell & Svensson, 2007: 165-6). In this paper finding that line is done by applying the ordinary least square (OLS) method. OLS chooses the parameters by minimizing the sum of the squares between the observed dependent variable and the predicted independent variable. This is known as the principle of least squares (Angrist & Pischke, 2014:58-59). The relationship between the variables is stronger the smaller the variation is. Amongst other things the output of the linear regression is the strength of the relationship – how well the line fits the data – and how big that effect is (Angrist & Pischke, 2014:56-8; Teorell & Svensson, 2007: 142-3). For the complete mathematical expression of the regression see the fixed effects section below.

Simply running a bivariate linear regression to get at a causal effect is however insufficient in this study. In a randomized controlled trial, or certain natural experiments, running the linear regression is sufficient. In those cases, randomization guarantees that all differences outside those tested are averaged out (Angrist & Pischke, 2014: 1-32). Since the deployment of UN operations are not randomly allocated, that is not the case for this paper. That might cause an omitted variable bias (OVB) bias in the estimation of the effects of a UN operation. OVB occurs when a variable that influences the estimation is left out of the statistical model. Specifically, the problem occurs when an independent variable is left out that is correlated with both the outcome variable and the independent variable of main interest (Angrist & Pischke, 2014: 70-77 & 90-93). For this study it would be a variable that is correlated with both local peace agreements and UNPKOs. To minimize the problem with OVB, a fixed effects model will be applied. OVB can also occur for time-varying covariates. To control for one such possible left out variable, a GDP per capita control will be applied.

## 7.2 Fixed-effects model

To account for the risk of omitted variable bias (OVB) in the data, a fixed-effects model will be applied. This is possible since I have panel data (time-series of data

within each country). Fixed-effect models minimize OVB by controlling for unobserved variables that are constant over time, within each unit (in my case, countries) (Angrist & Pischke 2009: 221-7). This can, for example, be country-specific cultures and institutions that might affect both the dependent and the independent variables under study. An alternative to the fixed effects models is a random effects model. However, since the random effects model builds on stronger assumptions, the fixed effects model will be used (Angrist & Pischke 2009: 223). In this case, since this study is a panel data analysis (longitudinal observations for each country) the fixed effects model will look at changes over time *within* a country (Angrist & Pischke 2009: 221-7). This is the basic linear fixed effect regression model:

$$PAX_{it} = \mu_t + \beta UN_{it} + \gamma GDP_{it} + FE_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where  $\mu_t$  is the y-intercept for each time period (time dummies that control for everything that is constant within a year over the different units).  $\beta$  and  $\gamma$  are the coefficients for *UN* operations and *GDP/Capita*. The subscript  $i$  indicates each individual unit (country) in the sample.  $FE_i$  is the combined effect of all variables that are constant over time within each country  $i$ . In other words, it is what the fixed effect accounts for.  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is the remaining error term. The parameter of main interest for this study is hence  $\beta$ . The fixed-effects model deals with variables that do vary between units but that are constant over time within each country. It does not account for country-specific variables that vary over time, however. To control for a time-varying variable that might further ameliorate any omitted variable bias I have added GDP per capita for each country and year as a control variable.

### 7.3 Heterogeneity analysis

A heterogeneity analysis for the two regions included (Africa and Middle East) is also added to the study. Heterogeneity studies are conducted when variability within the data can be expected. In this study, I argue that such variability might exist between the two regions, Africa and Middle East, since they are culturally, economically and politically, largely distinct from one another. In practice making a heterogeneity analysis entails remaking the study like before, but with each region (in this case) separated.

## 8 Statistics

### 8.1 Descriptive statistics

In the period between 1990 and 2020, the period under study in this paper, there have been a total of 53 UN operations globally. The sample of operations used in the countries analyzed in this paper tally to 30 operations, 56.6% of the total number of operations. In the original PA-X data, there were a total of 124 local peace agreements. After constructing the dataset to be used for the current analysis, 53 local peace agreements remained (42.7% of all local peace agreements). The total number of observations in the study is 530. That is the total number of violent conflicts in the dataset after the construction was completed. The original UCDP dataset includes 2506 observations. 21.9% of all UCDP observations remain. In the total number of UCDP observations all 5 regions are included, whilst in the final dataset only Africa and Middle East remains.

Table 01: Descriptive statistics for the dataset:

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
UN1	530	.054717	.2276418	0	1
UN3	530	.1377358	.3449481	0	1
UNtot	530	.1924528	.3945992	0	1
PAX	530	.1	.3002834	0	1

Descriptive statistics for the dependent and main independent variables in the final dataset are provide in Table 01. From the table, it can be noted that there were 19.2% total UN operations (UNtot) and 10% of local peace agreements (PA-X) in the sample. UN operations with at least a 3-year presence (UN3) constituted 13.8% of the total operations, whereas the same number for the 1-year presence (UN1) was 0.55%. Min and max just indicate that each variable is binary, either 0 or 1.

Next these variables will be looked at more closely. In table 02-04 the allocation of all observations over the different variables can be seen. Each table shows for a different length of UN presence. The lengths of UN presence are, total mission, three-year presence, one-year presence, respectively.

Table 02: Observations for PA-X and complete UN mission

UNO all	PA-X		Total
	0	1	
0	400	28	428
1	77	25	102
Total	477	53	530

Table 02 shows the observations for the variables for the complete UN operation. For complete UN presence (i.e., entire operations) there were in total 102 UN operations, 25 of which overlapped with a PA-X. For PA-X there were in total 53 operations. 28 did not overlap with UN operations.

Table 03: Observations for PA-X and within 3 years of UN deployment:

UNO 3	PA-X		Total
	0	1	
0	417	40	457
1	60	13	73
Total	477	53	530

Table 03 shows the observations when UN operation can have an effect within 3 years of deployment. For three years of effect of UN operation (t=3), there were in total 73 UN operations. 60 did not overlap with PA-X, whereas 13 did. Out of a total of 53 PA-X observations that means 40 did not overlap with UN operations.

Table 04: Observations for PA-X and year of UN deployment:

UNO 1	PA-X		Total
	0	1	
0	452	49	501
1	25	4	29
Total	477	53	530

Following are the results for table 04. There were 29 UN missions in total when only year of deployment (t=1) was considered. 4 overlapped with PA-X, 25 did not. The remaining 49 (out of 53 total PA-X operations) did not overlap with UN operations.

## 8.2 Regression results

In this section the results of the regressions will be presented. The results are presented in three tables, all showing the relationship between UN operations and local peace agreements. For each table the same variables and checks are included. Each table is for a different length in the existence of a UN operation. The first table shows the results for the year of deployment of the UN operation. The second table shows the results for three years of UN deployment. Those three years are from when the mission is first deployed and two years forward in time. If a UN mission lasts fewer than three years, only those (1-2) years of activity are counted. Lastly, table three shows the results for the entirety of the UN stay.

Worded differently, it tests whether a local peace arises when the UN is present. Linear regression was used in the results of all three tables. The results for the logit were also created, they largely matched the results of the linear regression, so in order for the interpretation to be easy the linear regression is described. The results of the logit are available in the appendix.

Table 05: Linear regression after 1 year of UN intervention

	No controls	Y/Capita	Fixed Effect	FE, Y/Capita
UNO 1	0.103 (0.0575)	0.0778 (0.0573)	0.00615 (0.0516)	0.0148 (0.0516)
Income per person		-0.00000564*** (0.00000164)		-0.0000145* (0.00000727)
Time dummies	Yes ( $\mu_t$ )	Yes ( $\mu_t$ )	Yes ( $\mu_t$ )	Yes ( $\mu_t$ )
Observations	530	530	530	530

FE = Fixed Effects Y/Capita = Income per person Standard Error within parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 05 shows the results of the linear regression between UN missions and local peace agreements, within the year of UN deployment. The number horizontal to UNO 1 is the coefficients, and the bracketed numbers are the standard errors. The leftmost column of the table shows the regression without any controls. The second column shows the linear regression with the control of income per person (or GDP per capita). The third and fourth columns both assign the fixed effects model to the regression. The fourth column also includes the time-varying coefficient, GDP/Capita, again. Statistical significance is shown by an asterisk next to the results. 1 asterisk indicates a p-value below 0.05, 2 asterisks a p-value lower than 0.01, and three asterisks a p-value below 0.01. Across the board, the results for t=1 (UN1) are not statistically significant.

The coefficients for the fixed effects model are negative, indicating that the probability of signing a local peace agreement, after the deployment of a UN operation would *decrease*. My interpretation however is that these results cannot be trusted, and do not accurately show the estimated effects. This is because, for one, as mentioned, they are not statistically significant. They are also rather small, hovering around zero. I think the results are more probably an effect of a small number of observations and chance, than any negative relationship between the variables in the first year. Overall, the results indicate that there are no immediate effects of an UN deployment. As will be seen in the following table, the same results are true for the intermediate timespan, as well.

Table 06: Linear regression after 3 years of UN intervention

	No controls	Y/Capita	Fixed Effect	FE, Y/Capita
UNO 3	0.134*** (0.0380)	0.111** (0.0385)	0.0590 (0.0379)	0.0633 (0.0378)
Income per person		-0.00000497** (0.00000165)		-0.0000150* (0.00000723)
Time dummies	Yes ( $\mu_t$ )	Yes ( $\mu_t$ )	Yes ( $\mu_t$ )	Yes ( $\mu_t$ )
Observations	530	530	530	530

FE = Fixed Effects Y/Capita = Income per person Standard Error within parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

In table 06 the results of the linear regression when UN deployment lasted for three or less years. Same as above, the first two columns of the table show the results without fixed effects. Also like before, the second column adds the GDP/capita control. The last two columns are structured the same, with the inclusion of the fixed effect model. In this table the results of the first column, without any controls is statistically significant. That significance disappears however when controls are applied. Here the GDP/capita control (which is more lenient, compared to the fixed effect) is sufficient to remove that significance. The overall conclusion from these results is that no significant effect can be found in the intermediate run, similarly to the short run since the significance disappears with the addition of controls.

Table 07: Linear regression for complete UN missions

	No controls	Y/Capita	Fixed Effect	FE, Y/Capita
UNO all	0.179*** (0.0317)	0.159*** (0.0329)	0.0777* (0.0386)	0.0773* (0.0385)
Income per person		-0.00000368* (0.00000166)		-0.0000142* (0.00000721)
Time dummies	Yes ( $\mu_t$ )	Yes ( $\mu_t$ )	Yes ( $\mu_t$ )	Yes ( $\mu_t$ )
Observations	530	530	530	530

FE = Fixed Effects Y/Capita = Income per person Standard Error within parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Finally, the entire duration of the UN operation is examined. In Table 07, the entire duration of the UN operation is tested for. The structure of Table 07 is the same as previously. Other than that, there is some difference here however, to the results with the previous time periods. The results are significant at least at the 1% significance level ( $p < 0.01$ ) for both the uncontrolled regression and with the inclusion of the income control. Furthermore, the statistical significance remains still after applying the fixed effects *and* income controls, however with some more uncertainty in the estimates (with a p-value of 0.05 or lower).

In the most trustworthy specification, the model with both country-specific fixed effects and a time-varying variable, a deployment of a UN operation increases the probability that a local peace agreement will be signed by 8.4 percentage points. This can be compared with the mean number of local peace agreements, which is 10%. The effect must be considered large.

### 8.3 Results for the heterogeneity analysis

Since the results in the analysis above were only relevant for total UN missions (UNO all), only they were tested for in the heterogeneity analysis. The results of this analysis can be seen in table 08 below, showing Africa and Middle East, respectively.

Table 08: Heterogeneity analysis for region

	Africa	Middle East
UNO all	0.0716 (0.0416)	0.512* (0.249)
Income per person	-0.0000223 (0.0000193)	-0.0000190 (0.0000115)
Time dummies	Yes ( $\mu_t$ )	Yes ( $\mu_t$ )
Observations	389	141

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Africa is the first column in Table 08. 389 observations remain after the division into regions. The statistical significance disappears for  $p$ -value  $< 0.05$ . The estimated coefficient for Africa is 0.0716. The  $p$ -value  $< 0.086$ . I would argue that is still a strong result. For one, the  $p$ -value is still not very high, but also the point estimation for Africa does not change by much. For the Middle East the results are a bit different. The second column in Table 08 has the results for the Middle East. After the regional re-organization, 141 observations remain in total for the Middle East. The effect on the UN operations remains significant at a  $p$ -value below 00.5%. The estimated coefficient is 0.512. In sum, it can be said that the effect of UN operations on local peace agreements seem to be limited to Africa.



## 9 Discussion and conclusion

The results show that the existence of a UN operation in civil conflicts increases the probability of the signing of peace agreements at a local level. This is the case in the regions Africa and the Middle East, where the relationship is most solid in Middle East. For both a strong relationship remains even after the heterogeneity analysis. The fixed effects model, the yearly dummies, time-varying control for GDP and the region-specific estimation lends support to a causal interpretation of the results. However, since some cautiousness is good, since there could be some unspecified time-varying covariate yet to be accounted for.

In the shorter-term, within one and three years of UN intervention no significant effect is found. Similar to  $t=all$  - the presence of a UN operation - the surface level results are accurate. No effect in the short-term of the deployment of a UN operation can be found. One factor that could be contributing to the difficulty in saying anything definitive about the results in the shorter timespans is the lack of datapoints. Since the PA-X dataset is underrepresented, there could in actuality be an effect that does not show in this dataset. Additional data could make the result significant. This is especially the case for  $t=3$ , where the p-value is not far off the significance level. Simultaneously, the fact that UN presence gave significant results, as is the case with the UN presence, is noteworthy. Since it is likely underestimated. Any additions to the PA-X dataset would only increase the effects in the results.

If the Liberal Peace theory (LPT) is accepted as the primary driver in all things UN peacekeeping operations, these results would help strengthen the theory. This could either mean that the strengthening of liberal-democratic norms and institutions are strengthened. It could also be interpreted as a successful imperial policy, if the LPT and its ripples are considered hegemonic expansionism. Since no causal mechanism is tested for, I would flag against such an interpretation. Most likely there are more complex drives at work. To the results benefit, abject rejection is, conversely, neither supported. Instead, this study will limit itself to conclude that there seems to be some support for the relationship between the presence of a UN mission and the signing of local peace agreements.

Moving forward, in the future, a couple of things can be done. Relating directly to this study and its design, a general and political time-varying control could be added. Two examples of such are a State Fragility Index or a Democracy index. Similarly, a spatial-varying control consisting of geo-located data on UN troops (see for instance Cil et. al, 2020). Furthermore, UN troop size could be used instead of a binary absence-missing column, as is the case in this study. This would control for variance within the dependent variable.

Various improvements to the data could be next on the to-do list. One improvement could be to use a larger sample than is available in the PA-X

dataset. If the analysis can be extended beyond solely peace agreements, to peacebuilding more generally, the Peace Insight dataset, could be used. It is compiled by the Peace Direct organization and includes a list of local 1869 organizations working on peacebuilding. Like the PA-X dataset it is relatively new. It was not used in this study because it would require more time to compile than was available for this paper. Constructing that would allow a study on the effects of UN operations of peacebuilding organizations. Both temporal and geo-located data can, to my understanding, be included in such a dataset. Adding data before and after a UN operation and see if their deployment affected variation could be interesting. In any future study using a dataset where the universe is all peace processes in the world would be a dream, but to my knowledge no such dataset exists. This study still needs to be extended to other regions of the world outside of Africa and the Middle East.

Lastly, some suggestions for other research questions adjacent to this paper. As already mentioned, replacing peace agreements with local peacebuilding organizations is one interesting study. Related to peace agreements, looking at peace agreements including gender to see if the effects are the same could be interesting. Inversing this study, it might also be interesting to study the effects of local peace agreements on UN peacekeeping operations. Do they matter for national peace processes? What happens to the peace agreements after completion of UN missions would also be interesting.

## 10 References

- Allison, Paul D., 2011. *Fixed Effects Regression Models*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Angrist, Joshua D.; Pischke, Jörn-Steffen. 2009. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics*. Princeton University Press
- Angrist, Joshua D.; Pischke, Jörn-Steffen. 2014. *Mastering 'Metrics*. Princeton University Press
- Autesserre, Séverine, 2014a. "Going Micro: Emerging and Future Peacebuilding Research", *International Peacekeeping* 21 (4): 492–500.
- Autesserre, Séverine, 2014b. *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Autesserre, Séverine, 2017. "International Peacebuilding Success", *International Studies Review* 19
- Autesserre, Séverine, 2021. *The Frontlines of Peace*. Oxford University Press
- Bell, Christine; Badanjak, Sanja, 2019. "Introducing PA-X: A new peace agreement database and dataset", *Journal of Peace Research*, 56 (3).
- Bell, Christine; Badanjak, Sanja; Beujouan, Juline; Forster, Robert; Epple, Tim; Jamar, Astrid; McNicholl, Kevin; Molloy, Sean; Nash, Kathryn; Pospisil, Jan; Wilson, Robert; Wise, Laura, 2021. *PA-X Codebook, Version 5*. Political Settlements Research Programme, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh. <https://www.peaceagreements.org/> (Accessed on: 11/10/21)
- Branch, Adam, 2011. *Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cil, Deniz; Fjelde, Hanna; Hultman, Lisa; Nilsson, Desirée, 2020. "Mapping blue helmets: Introducing the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) dataset", *Journal of Peace Research*, 57(2), 360–370.
- Costalli, Stefano, 2014. "Does Peacekeeping Work? A Disaggregated Analysis of Deployment and Violence Reduction in the Bosnian War." *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (2): 357–80.
- Di Salvatore, Jessica, 2019. "Peacekeepers against Criminal Violence—Unintended Effects of Peacekeeping Operations?", *American Journal of Political Science* 65 (4): 840-858.
- Encyclopedia Britannica, 2021. "Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace building" in *Encyclopedia Britannica*. available at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations/Peacekeeping-peacemaking-and-peace-building> (accessed 03/01/22)
- Englund, Harri, 2006. *Prisoners of Freedom: Human Rights and the African Poor*. Berkeley: University of California Press

- Gallo, Carol Jean; Vanholder, Pieter, 2015. "From the Ivory Tower to the Boots on the Ground: Conflict Transformation Theory and Peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo." (Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, Louisiana)
- Galtung, Johan, 1969. "Violence, Peace and, Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 167-191
- Gapminder organisation, 2022. "About", in Gapminder.org available at <https://www.gapminder.org/about/> (accessed 05/01/22)
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand, 2002. *Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset*. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5)
- Heathershaw, John, 2009. *Post-Conflict Tajikistan: The Politics of Peacebuilding and the Emergence of Legitimate Order*. London: Routledge
- Hultman, Lisa; Kathman, Jacob D.; Shannon, Megan, 2019. *Peacekeeping in the Midst of War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Martin, Mike, 2014. *An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978–2012*. London: Hurst.
- O'Bryan, Tom; Rendtorff-Smith, Sara; Donati, Marco, 2017. *The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Addressing Local Conflicts*. Report United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support: Policy, Evaluation and Training Division. Nairobi: UNON.
- Pettersson, Therese; Stina Högladh & Magnus Öberg, 2019. *Organized violence, 1989-2018 and peace agreements*. *Journal of Peace Research* 56(4)
- Pettersson, Therese, Shawn Davis, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högladh, Margareta Sollenberg & Magnus Öberg, 2021. "Organized violence 1989-2020, with a special emphasis on Syria", *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4).
- Richmond, Oliver P, 2020. *Peace in international relations*. 2. Ed. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Ruggeri, Andrea; Dorussen, Han; Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene, 2017. "Winning the peace locally", *International Organization* Vol. 71, No1
- Teorell, Jan; Svensson, Torsten, 2007. *Att fråga och att svara. Samhällsvetenskaplig metod*. Malmö: Liber. 296 s.
- United Nations, 2022. "OUR HISTORY" in United Nations Peacekeeping available at <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history> (accessed 03/01/22)
- United Nations, 2022. "WHERE WE OPERATE" in United Nations Peacekeeping available at <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history> (accessed 05/01/22)
- UCDP, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2020. "UCDP Definitions" in UCDP available at [https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#tocjump\\_893732458375963\\_8\\_23](https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#tocjump_893732458375963_8_23) (accessed 04/01/22)
- Wallensteen, Peter, 2015. *Understanding conflict resolution*. 4. Ed. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications

# 1 Appendix:

Below are the results for the logit for 1 year, 3 years and total mission, respectively.

## Logit for 1 year of UN missions

	No controls	Y/Capita	Fixed Effect	FE, Y/Capita
PA-X				
UNO 1	1.709* (0.726)	1.373 (0.733)	0.272 (0.900)	0.328 (0.883)
Income per person		-0.000141** (0.0000451)		-0.000463 (0.000266)
Constant	-2.037*** (0.614)	-1.510* (0.634)		
Observations	339	339	190	190

FE = Fixed Effects Y/Capita = Income per person

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## Logit for 3 years of UN missions

	No controls	Y/Capita	Fixed Effect	FE, Y/Capita
PA-X				
UNO 3	1.833*** (0.482)	1.545** (0.488)	1.240 (0.788)	1.108 (0.783)
Income per person		-0.000134** (0.0000458)		-0.000425 (0.000271)
Constant	-2.037*** (0.614)	-1.531* (0.635)		
Observations	339	339	190	190

FE = Fixed Effects Y/Capita = Income per person

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Logit for complete UN missions is on the following page.

Logit for complete UN missions

	No controls	Y/Capita	Fixed Effect	FE, Y/Capita
PA-X				
UNO all	1.786*** (0.348)	1.417*** (0.364)	1.600 (1.021)	2.022 (1.070)
Income per person		-0.000101* (0.0000442)		-0.000572* (0.000284)
Constant	-2.595*** (0.660)	-2.095** (0.679)		
Observations	339	339	190	190

FE = Fixed Effects Y/Capita = Income per person

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$