

Contract enforcement in Russia and Ukraine

A case study of the difference in contract enforcement
between hybrid and authoritarian regimes

Hannes Oscarsson

Abstract

The purpose of this text is to, through a case study of Russia and Ukraine, analyze the relationship between levels of contract enforcement and regime type. The hypothesis is that authoritarian regimes in which incumbents' power is more safely secured will have a more robust and independent judiciary than hybrid regimes, which will have a positive effect on contract enforcement. The analysis is done through a mixture of quantitative method where ease of doing business' enforcing contracts measurement is paired with Varieties of democracies' Liberal Democracy Index, and qualitative method where theories from Maria Popova, Ketevan Bolkvadze, Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa are utilized. The primary theory applied is Popova's Strategic pressure theory.

The text's conclusion is that an overarching trend of higher levels of contract enforcement within authoritarian regimes compared to hybrid regimes can be observed. However, the quantitative analyses of the individual cases showed a positive correlation in which higher levels of democracy improves contract enforcement, even within the authoritarian regime - which opposes the stated hypothesis. Nevertheless, Russia has substantially more effective contract enforcement while also being very similar to Ukraine except for regime type. The qualitative analysis shows how there are differences in contract enforcement procedure within each respective judiciary and how Strategic pressure theory can help explain those. Still, this text lacks the substantial evidence to establish a clear causal link and therefore concludes by recommending future research.

Key words: Contract enforcement, Strategic pressure theory, Democratization, Judiciary Independence, Hybrid regime, Authoritarian Regime, Ukraine, Russia

Words: 9340

Table of contents

1	INTRODUCTION	1
1.1	PREVIOUS LITERATURE.....	1
1.2	THEORY	3
1.2.1	<i>Strategic pressure theory</i>	3
1.3	METHODS & MATERIAL.....	5
1.3.1	<i>Method</i>	5
1.3.2	<i>Material</i>	7
1.3.3	<i>Operationalization</i>	8
2	ANALYSIS	10
2.1	REGRESSION ANALYSIS.....	10
2.2	RUSSIA	13
2.3	UKRAINE.....	16
3	CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION	21
4	APPENDIX	23
5	REFERENCES	25

1 Introduction

What incentivizes incumbent politicians in emerging democracies to support the independence of the judiciary? In 2003 Tom Ginsburg answered this question by applying insurance theory and stated that when politicians are faced with significant political opposition, they will support the independence of courts as way of protecting their own rights and legacy (Ginsburg, 2003, 18). Maria Popova however argues that the complete opposite is true, and states that political fragmentation only increases the benefits of politicizing justice since it gives the incumbents more tools to control its opponents (Popova, 2012). In both of these contrasting answers political competition and its effects stand as central. How regime types affect the independence of the judiciary is therefore an interesting and salient question since there should be an observable difference between regimes that allow political competition and those that do not.

This thesis has as a goal to research how legal persons' ability to have contracts enforced differ between hybrid and authoritarian regimes. The hypothesis of the text is that authoritarian regimes in which incumbents' power is more safely secured will have a more robust and independent (in the sense of lacking external influence) judiciary system than hybrid regimes. This will in its turn prove to have a positive effect on legal persons' ability to enforce contracts. One of the reasons behind this can be hypothesized to be that the relative gains from an independent court system (such as increased stability in external investments) outweigh the gains from controlling the courts (stability in political power for the incumbent).

To do this I will utilize previous research conducted by Maria Popova (2012) and Ketevan Bolkvadze (2019) and the strategic pressure theory put forward in both of these texts. Earlier research about how courts and independent judiciaries are established in authoritarian regimes, such as Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa's (2008) anthology referenced below will also be used. The hope is that the utilization of earlier literature written on the subject will help anchor this thesis and also lend it some validity that it might miss. The text will be using the method of comparative case studies. Therefore, it will center around two cases, one being Russia used here as an example of an authoritarian regime, and another being Ukraine, an example of a hybrid regime. Already established indexes containing information about contract enforcement and levels of democracy will be used as the foundation of the analysis.

1.1 Previous literature

Maria Popova's book *Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies: A Study of Courts in Russia and Ukraine* (2012) sets its sights on analyzing how political pressure within emerging democracies can shape and transform judicial independence. Her findings are that the political pressure created by opposing political players in hybrid regimes has an adverse effect on judicial independence. When political incumbents find their hold on power threatened, they use the courts as tools to retain power. However, the book also discusses that justice is politicized within both regimes and states that further research into how political competition shapes institutions is important.

It's clear to see how her book relates to the thesis' original research question since the book not only analyzes the same two countries but also looks at judicial effectivity and how it differs depending on regime type. The call for further research also shows how salient the question is. This thesis will draw inspiration from Popova's research and try to focus on similar issues.

In her book Popova establishes her "strategic pressure theory", a theory that will be applied in this thesis as well. The theory focuses on the relationship between political competition and independent judiciary. It argues that expanded political competition only harms the independence of courts because it increases the benefits that weak incumbents can reap from a dependent and constrained judicial system.

Ketevan Bolkvadze's text *To Reform or to Retain? Politicians' Incentives to Clean Up Corrupt Courts in Hybrid Regimes* (2019) focuses on a similar topic by analyzing the effect of political heterogeneity on judicial corruption and external interference. She does this by performing a process tracing of court decisions in Moldova contra Georgia, two regimes she classifies as hybrid with differing levels of pluralism. In contrast to Popova's research, Bolkvadze focuses on corruption rather than politicization of courts.

Bolkvadze's findings are that political heterogeneity has an adverse effect on judicial corruption by showing that Georgia, a less political fragmented state, shows less signs of corruption than Moldova. Since political competition hinders one party or entity from obtaining substantial political clout it is seldom even possible for incumbents to properly enforce anti-corruption policies and reforms. Incumbents who feel safe in power can exercise control over the judiciary by implementing policies focused on combating corruption. By removing the abilities of their political competitors to influence court rulings through corruption they make it so that there is only one channel of influence left, politicization – in which only the incumbent and ruling party can act. In Bolkvadze's analysis of Georgia she shows that the anti-corruption reforms even create a system in which judges and courts are swayed to act favorably towards the incumbent without direct influence from the incumbent by making them dependent on the regime for salary and pension.

This research will serve as a foundation for the thesis since it focuses on a similar research question. Much like how Bolkvadze builds upon previous research done by e.g. Maria Popova by shifting the focus from politicization to corruption it is my goal to once again shift the focus to the enforcement of contracts. By anchoring the thesis in research done by both Popova and

Bolkvadze it will lend some legitimacy to my analysis since the subject matter can be seen as too complex for an undergraduate level thesis.

In Ginsburg and Moustafa's anthology *Rule by Law – The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes* (2008) they, with their co-authors, analyze the dynamics of judicial politics in non-democracies. Here they discuss how one of the courts' primary uses in authoritarian regimes is to legitimize the government. The rule of law's normative power has grown over time and can in the modern world create a mandate for the incumbent (2008, 5-7). An effective and independent court system is also almost always popular among the populace as well, lending grassroots support to the regime. But, as Ginsburg and Moustafa discuss, for this to happen the courts have to have a certain degree of autonomy and freedom (2008, 6).

Moustafa and Ginsburg do come to somewhat separate conclusion from Popova and Bolkvadze when they argue that one of the primary factors behind how regimes act when faced with judiciary reform is not political competition but rather elite fragmentation (2008, 8). What Moustafa and Ginsburg asserts is that the judiciary can be used as a tool to create cohesion within the political elite. In democratic systems a political divide is often explicit and seen in the cleavage between parties, but this does not mean that a similar divide cannot be seen in fully authoritarian regimes – just not as explicitly. When the political elite's cooperation is hindered by a divide, in both democracies and authoritarian regimes, an empowerment of the judiciary is a viable solution.

This conclusion stands in a slight contrast with Bolkvadze's, however Ginsburg and Moustafa are very clear that for this to happen a very particular configuration of challenges have to appear. Political fragmentation is therefore not the silver bullet.

1.2 Theory

1.2.1 Strategic pressure theory

Strategic pressure theory as presented in Maria Popova's (2012) book posits that political fragmentation and opposition has an adverse effect on the independence of courts. This is because it establishes clear and strong incentives for incumbents to control and interfere in court systems. When ruling politicians face realistic risks of losing powers, they will balance in an attempt to gain a strategic advantage over their opponents and thus try to politicize courts (Popova, 2012, 43). Not only will they be incentivized to control or affect cases and decisions directly linked with themselves but the stronger the threat of loss of power the more the incumbent will try to influence all cases related to themselves and their opponent(s) (Popova, 2012, 40). As political opposition grows stronger so does the advantage of controlling the judiciary which creates an adverse relationship

between the two variables. In the meantime, strong incumbents who face relatively little opposition feel secure in their power and view direct influence over court cases and decisions as too risky compared to its benefits.

In her text Maria Popova establishes three distinct mechanisms she sees as the driving force behind the theory of strategic pressure. The first mechanism is “Intense political competition dramatically increases the benefits that incumbents in emerging democracies can derive from pressuring the courts and as a result creates a strong incentive for incumbents to pressure the judiciary”. This mechanism is already discussed in the previous paragraph, but the overarching idea is that when incumbents are strategically weak and lack political clout they use all subservient institutions, including courts, as instruments for their political campaigns. Popova uses the example of the Putin regime and how they, instead of fighting registration cases in court, through the legislative branch changed the entire registration system (Popova, 2012, 38.)

The second mechanism is: “In emerging democracies, political competition does not increase the costs associated with pressuring the courts”. Popova agrees that in a highly competitive landscape the politicians may lack the clout needed for passing legislation that dismantles the independence of the courts, but she also states that actual attempts of pressuring courts seldom look like that. Through the means of ad-hoc channels the executive branch can often apply pressure on the courts without going through the legislative branch (Popova, 2012, 39). Popova uses the example of harassing judges through the police and tax authority who often respond directly to the incumbent. In this mechanism Bolkvadze’s critique of the theory can be brought in since it specifically focuses on how political pluralism creates incentives for politicians to keep corruption as a channel of influence open and to focus on the ad-hoc channels (Bolkvadze, 2019, 4).

This leads into the third mechanism: “In emerging democracies, political competition produces a politicization of justice effect”. Intense political competition increases what cases could be considered politically important, once again expanding the width of the incumbents need for control over the judiciary. Politically weak incumbents therefore feel a need to involve themselves in most cases not only those they have a stake in but also that their political opponent might have a stake in (Popova, 2012, 40).

In her text she presupposes that the strategic pressure theory cannot be applied on fully authoritarian states and that researchers in those cases should rather look at theories focusing on describing specifically those regimes (Popova, 2012, 42). It is my opinion that the strategic pressure theory can still be applied to regimes such as Russia when stood in contrast with hybrid regimes because the theory’s focus on political fragmentation is strengthened when compared with states lacking in pluralism.

What I want to do in this text is to apply the strategic pressure theory and specifically focus on one aspect of judicial independence, contract enforcement. The idea is that the text can not only test but also help expand the theory by seeing if the same pattern of high political competition and high levels of politicization of courts can be seen when only focusing on the smaller case of enforcement of contracts. My expectation is that a legal person’s ability to enforce their contract

will follow the same trend as general levels of politicization when regimes become hybrid regimes. The reason for this expectation is a deduction based on Popova's third mechanism. Since political competition produces a politicization effect and increases what is politically salient simple contract enforcement cases should also be affected within hybrid regimes. In Popova's introduction she specifically mentions how previous theories about judicial independence often focus on contract enforcement but how theories with such small focus cannot be applied to all states since what is politically salient might differ from case to case (Popova, 2012, 7). It is my opinion that while this may be true testing contract enforcement is one of the strongest ways to prove whether Popova's third mechanism holds any weight, since contract enforcement is often related to business conflicts – something that in a fully democratic or authoritarian regime should not be considered politically salient since it is removed from the realm of political power according to Popova.

1.3 Methods & Material

1.3.1 Method

This thesis will use the comparative case study method as its primary mode of analysis and utilize Ukraine and Russia as cases of hybrid and authoritarian regimes respectively. I've chosen this method since I have previous experience of using it in my B-thesis, it is also specifically well suited for comparing different regimes. Comparative case studies with few cases, such as this thesis, is also less labor intensive than most other methods. This bachelor thesis will be written under a relatively short time span by one person and my finite time was therefore something that had been considered when choosing a method.

I will primarily be basing this thesis on quantitative analysis of two datasets, one that measures levels of democracy and another that measures enforcement of contracts. With the help of these two datasets, I will construct a series of graphs and regression analysis to investigate how the two variables correlate and if it can be observed that regime-type has an effect on contract enforcement. To do this I will be using the statistical program SPSS. These quantitative analyses will be paired with a more qualitative discussion about the difference within each case study and what could have affected the different scores. My goal is that this combination of usage of quantitative datasets and qualitative analyses will give a deeper understanding of the subject.

The reason that Ukraine and Russia were chosen as cases for this text was because of their similar design. As shown by the theory of most similar system (MSS) by choosing cases that are as similar as possible in all regards except the variable in focus (in our case regime type) we can try to control for other dependent factors (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, 226).

The two states, by both being a part of the Soviet Union, share a similar soviet heritage in the construction of their institutions. According to Ukrainian political scientist Kuzio, their political systems, semi-presidential with two houses, both draw inspiration from the same source, as does their political culture (Kuzio, 2005, 171). The Ukrainian court system consists of three levels since 2016. The district courts, handling first order cases, is the first instance of contract enforcement and civil law. There are certain commercial district courts which have jurisdiction over disputes between commercial entities. These courts do not deal with commercial cases alone however and the general district courts share the workload. The second level, court of appeals, handles both criminal and civil appeals. Since the reform in 2016 previously specific commercial courts focused on dealing with civil and commercial appeals were removed and integrated in a unified court of appeals (Bilak & Vorozhbyt, 2016). Ukraine also has a supreme court focusing on cassation, a constitutional court which overlooks the actions of political actors and checks for breaches of the constitution and a high anti-corruption court which handles all corruption cases. There was, previous to the 2016 reform, a high commercial court which dealt with all appeals of commercial cases (Bilak & Vorozhbyt, 2016).

The Russian judicial system shares a lot of similarities with Ukraine. One major difference is that the first instance courts have a harder split between commercial and general jurisdiction. They're split into courts of general jurisdiction and the state commercial (arbitrazh) courts. Most, if not all, commercial contract enforcement and litigation is done through the arbitrazh courts. However, cases in which one part is not a commercial entity are often brought to the courts of general jurisdiction (Bekeschenko & Lysenko, 2021). Much like the Ukrainian system the Russian judiciary is separated into three (effectively four) levels with the aforementioned district courts being the first instance. However, Russia being a federation has their second level being the supreme courts of republics, oblasts, and federal cities. According to Kuzio (2005) they nonetheless effectively serve the same purpose as the Ukrainian court of appeals. At a semi-third level exists federal cassation courts which handle first instance of cassation. Finally, Russia much like Ukraine has a supreme court which performs judicial and cassation reviews. (Bekeschenko & Lysenko, 2021).

Ukraine and Russia's judiciary are therefore designed in very similar way. The two countries share, as previously mentioned, a very similar political design as well. Russia and Ukraine both have a semi-presidential system in which legislative power is split between two houses (Kuzio, 2005, 171). Russia, being a federation does however differ from Ukraine by sharing power with its republics, krais, oblasts and federal cities. In practice however these political subdivisions do not play an important part in the legislative procedure due to the president's strong executive power. This leads us to the one area, politically, where the two states differ. Russia has seen a clear centralization and expansion of the president's power since the 90s, something that has gone so far so that the country is often classified as an authoritarian state with the legislative houses merely rubber-stamping legislation. Ukraine however has clear political competition, and the executive power is not as strong as in Russia. This text has chosen these two

countries as case studies so that in theory, any serious difference in legal persons' ability to enforce contracts should be related to the one variable in which the two states differ, level of liberal democracy.

A criticism that can be made against this text's choice of case studies is that they've been chosen based on already acquired knowledge of the dependent variable (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, 224). Since this text is based on previous research by both Popova and Bolkvadze it is known that Ukraine and Russia have a shown difference in judicial independence. Here this text would argue, much like Teorell and Svensson (2007) that when dealing with case studies in which few cases are utilized the strategic and researched choice of cases is more important than choosing only those cases in which the dependent variable is unknown. Furthermore, by basing this text on Popova and Bolkvadze I cannot help but know the value of the dependent variable. Previous research greatly improves my thesis validity by giving my bachelor thesis the academic clout that it might otherwise lack.

1.3.2 Material

Quality of Government (QoG) Standard Dataset 2021 (Teorell et al., 2021)

For the quantitative parts of this text, I will be using the two different measurements taken from the QoG Standard Dataset, one focused on measuring liberal democracy and another on enforcement of contracts. This compilation of datasets was primarily chosen for its ease of use since it combines quantitative studies done by other organizations such as the two cited below, Varieties of democracy (V-dem) and the World Bank Group. It was my plan from the beginning to use those two datasets, QoG just so happened to have both measurements in one dataset.

V-dem dataset v10 (Coppedge et al., 2020)

As discussed in the theory section strategic pressure theory is heavily dependent on the classification of levels of democracy. To help this and to also grant some validity to the classification of Ukraine and Russia as hybrid and authoritarian regimes respectively I will be utilizing Varieties of Democracy's V-dem Liberal Democracy Index which measures the level of liberal democracy in most countries in the world with 0 being fully authoritarian and 1 being a fully liberal democracy. V-dem describes the index as measuring the liberal principle of democracy and emphasizing the importance of protecting individual and minority rights from the tyranny of the majority. The index judges the quality of the democracy by the constraints and limits applied on the government. The index looks at things such as protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, and independent judiciary and checks and balances that constrain executive authority. According to the Index Russia is classified as more authoritarian with 0,09 while Ukraine has a score of 0,29.

One downside of using V-dem is that it considers the rule of law. This means that when comparing the ability to enforce contracts with the level of

liberal democracy there is a problem of overlapping measurements. However, it is not my opinion that this could have a substantial negative effect on the text's validity, but it is something for the reader to keep in mind.

Ease of Doing Business (World Bank Group, 2020)

Furthermore, this thesis will utilize the World Bank Groups's Ease of Doing Business dataset's measurement of enforcement of contracts. The indicator measures the time and cost needed for resolving a commercial dispute through a local first instance court. It also measures the quality of the judicial processes, through this evaluating whether each economy has adopted a series of good practices that promote quality and efficiency in the court system. The data is limited in time to 2019 meaning that the analysis will be chronologically restrained to that year as the final date.

One thing of importance to note is that after 2015 the methodology Ease of Doing Business uses changes as they also begin to measure sexist bias within the judiciary. This is done by looking at whether or not a woman's testimony holds the same weight as a man's. It is therefore important to note that when I in this text construct chronological time graphs, I will merge the two datasets, meaning that the datapoints from before 2015 will have been done without considering sexist discrimination and vice versa. This has a significant effect on this text's validity since it will not be clear if a change in value between 2014 and 2015 has been because of decreasing effectivity of enforcement of contracts or because of the change in methodology. Nonetheless, in the case of Russia there is no significant change in value between the years and it is therefore my opinion that the change in methodology has a limited effect in that case. In contrast however, in Ukraine there is a drastic change in the data between 2014 and 2015. Whether or not this is due to the new methodology, or the aftermath of the Euromaidan revolution and subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea is impossible for me to pinpoint due to the constraint of this thesis. In the analysis I will discuss this more in depth but this constraint on the validity is something I want the reader to consider.

1.3.3 Operationalization

Ability to enforce contract

To operationalize the concept of ability to enforce a contract I will borrow the world bank's definition used in their Ease of Doing Business dataset: "The time and cost for resolving a commercial dispute through a local first-instance court". I use this operationalization for two reasons, firstly I will be using Ease of Doing Business for my analysis and having the definitions match will help the text stay grounded and simple as well as improving the thesis validity. Secondly, the dataset is one of the largest when it comes to measuring ease of enforcement of contract and, by basing my operationalization in it, I anchor the text to an already accepted definition.

Hybrid and Authoritarian Regimes

A hybrid regime is in this thesis defined as a regime either stuck or in the process of transitioning towards democracy or authoritarianism. This text will, as discussed, utilize Varieties of Democracy's Liberal Democracy Index and while the index does not explicitly classify the states depending on their position on the scale (1-0) I find it sensible to view states laying between 0.8 and 0.2 as hybrid regimes and states between 0.2 and 0.0 as authoritarian. This is only based on the fact that hybrid regimes should, intuitively, find themselves in the middle of the scale, and authoritarians at the bottom. Popova also argues in her text that by naturally accepting the existence of a democratic-authoritarian spectrum rather than a dichotomy we can also view most regimes in between the two extremes as emerging democracies i.e., hybrid regimes (Popova, 2012, 42). A fairly strict definition of authoritarianism is also needed for the strategic pressure theory to fully function.

Legal person

This thesis will borrow its operationalization of the term legal person from the Ease of Doing Business dataset. The dataset primarily looks at instances in which there is a clear buyer and seller who can legally represent themselves in court. A legal person in the context of this text's research question is therefore an individual, business or entity that can inherit legal rights and stand to answer for obligations.


2 Analysis

Since the main focus of the text lays in analyzing the difference in a legal person's ability to enforce contracts that hybrid and authoritarian regimes create, the first goal of the analysis is to clearly analyze whether such a difference exists. As stated in the theory section it is my personal belief that Popova's findings when it comes to the correlation between regime strength and independence of judiciary can also be observed when looking at enforcement of contracts. Since hybrid regimes should create a politicization of even the smaller court cases, as Popova's third mechanism discusses (2012, 40), this should also have a detrimental effect on a legal person's ability to have a contract enforced. Primarily because even the smallest of contract enforcement cases can gain political salience.

I've chosen to run a regression analysis using the two aforementioned datasets on all available states (n=173), in the hope of trying to see if a correlation can be observed, something that can ground the analysis in an observable pattern.

2.1 Regression analysis

Figure 1:



The linear regression analysis was done through the program SPSS with Ease of Doing Business' Enforcement of Contract as the dependent variable and V-Dem's Liberal Democracy Index as independent. The table of the full regression analysis is found under Linear regression in the appendix. The linear regression analysis shows a small ($r^2=0.086$) but positive change when pairing the two variables together. This in general shows that a small percent of the change in enforcement of contracts correlates with heightened levels of liberal democracy. As previously discussed, this positive trend is not that surprising since fully liberal democracies on average have robust judiciaries that can effectively handle contract enforcement. This is primarily thanks to the judiciary and the court system's central role in liberal democracies as one of the key checks and balances (Ginsburg, *Judicial Review in New Democracies*, 2003, 182).


However, this percentage is, as said, very small and it cannot reliably establish a clear and decisive correlation between the two variables. This in turn slightly strengthens my hypothesis about how hybrid regimes should have observably worse levels of contract enforcement than fully authoritarian regimes since a strong positive correlation in the linear regression would imply low levels of contract enforcement within regimes scoring low on the Liberal democracy index. Even though the regression points towards a general difference between fully liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes' ability to enforce contracts effectively and fairly this in no way disproves the hypothesis I am acting on. Theoretically, acting on the fact that democracies have the observably strongest independent judiciaries and the presumption that hybrid regimes will have weaker courts than authoritarian regimes based on Popova's and Bolkvadze's findings, the relationship between democracy and independent judiciary should be U-shaped. The right wing of the U should be slightly higher than the left, since democratic regimes would perform better than authoritarian, who in turn would perform better than hybrid.

Zooming in on the two cases this text will focus on we can see that they act as fairly good examples of this text's hypothesis. Russia, laying within the authoritarian part of the range has fairly high level of contract enforcement. Ukraine, laying closer towards the middle as a hybrid regime in turn displays lower levels of contract enforcement. While Popova analyzed Russia during period of stronger democracy, her general observation of emerging democracies having a negative effect on judicial independence (Popova, 2012, 170) can to some extent be seen in contract enforcement as well. As discussed in the methodology section Ukraine and Russia are very similar countries in which the primary difference is level of democracy. The fact that there is an observable difference in contract enforcement while most other independent variables remain relatively similar gives us a good foundation to establish causality (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, 226). While I must be modest and admit that this text lacks the capabilities to establish clear causality, the aforementioned finding paired with Popova's and Bolkvadze's previous research gives the analyze a fair amount of validity.

Having established a small but positive linear regression between liberal democracy and contract enforcement we can combine this with a quadratic

regression analysis of the same variables. This analysis is done primarily to add to what the linear has shown by observing if the aforementioned U-shaped relation between judicial independence and democracy also can be observed when analyzing contract enforcement.

Figure 2:



Running the quadratic regression analysis gives us not only a stronger r^2 , showing a better correlation between the two variables but it also gives us the U-shape previously discussed. The quadratic regression also lowers the standard error from 13.2 to 12.7, which still is far from satisfactory but shows how quadratic fits the data better than linear. The table of the full regression analysis is found under Quadratic regression in the appendix. The general trend is that the lowest areas of contract enforcement can be found in between fully authoritarian and fully democratic regimes (around the 0.4 mark). We can also see that as previously hypothesized the highest levels can be found closer to full democracy and the second highest around full authoritarian.

This not only helps build upon the previous linear analysis, but it also shows a clear similarity in which contract enforcement also follows the same trend Popova and Bolkvadze discuss where judicial independence is negatively affected by the political competition that characterizes hybrid regimes. This is, according to me, evidence that contract enforcement to some extent fits into the strategic pressure theory.

However, the quadratic regression is far from strong enough to fully explain the difference in levels of contract enforcement. 0.16 shows that a deeper analysis of the subject is needed to truly analyze whether or not there is a significant difference in contract enforcement between hybrid and authoritarian regimes.


2.2 Russia

Having established a slight correlation between hybrid states and lower levels of contract enforcement we can now move the analysis towards the first case study, Russia. As discussed, Russia will in this text be used as an example of a fully authoritarian state and by analyzing how regime type has affected the levels of contract enforcement we can try to see if the variables within Russia have moved in a way that supports the hypothesis.

Simply looking at the data we can see that Russia currently has a score of 72 on the Enforcing contracts measurement. This is above Ukraine's current score of 62, which helps support the hypothesis since, as established, Russia is an authoritarian regime and Ukraine a hybrid regime. However, what would help shine more light on the discussion is to look at how the two variables have changed over a timespan. This could help us analyze how the variables correlate and if there is any general trend in the movements.

A chronological line graph with dual y-axis has been constructed in an attempt to plot Enforcing contracts and the Liberal democracy index over time. Improved levels of enforcing contracts as liberal democracy declines would help give some legitimacy to this text's hypothesis.

Figure 3:



Before the analysis, an important point from a validity perspective is how the dual y-axis graph design can skew results visually. Since the two variables are constructed with different numeric ranges (0-100 & 0.00-1.00) the two axes show each line's corresponding values. However, the two lines would not lay as close if put on one axis which can visually exaggerate changes in value. This graph also helps visually disguise the fact that Russia's level of Enforcing contracts is comparatively a lot higher than its liberal democracy score. For the sake of

transparency, the appendix contains the same line graph but in which both y-axes go from 0-100 and 0-1 respectively. But since I want to use the graph to look for corresponding movements in the lines rather than correlation in value, I find the graph design useful enough to justify the usage.

By looking at the line graph we can see that during the given years (2013-2019) neither variable has shown any significant change in value as Enforcing contracts changes from 75 to 72 and the Liberal democracy index moves from 0.127 to 0.99. This is visually a lot clearer when viewing Figure 1.1 in the appendix. This leaves us with less to analyze as it would be easier to see a correlation if larger movements would've happened. What can be seen however is slight correlation in the negative change in the Liberal democracy index and a negative change in the Enforcing contracts data.

If we now also combine this with a linear regression analysis of enforcing contracts and the liberal democracy index over time, we can see that the r^2 is 0.457, which is fairly high and shows a positive correlation between the two variables. In this case the findings and the fairly strong correlation shows that the hypothesis of a negative correlation cannot be found in the case of Russia. This can also be seen in the graph, that as the liberal democracy index has declined, enforcing contracts has not improved. However, the standard error of estimate shows how the analysis needs to be combined with further research.

Russia Linear Regression Model

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.676 ^a	.457	.349	.993

a. Predictors: (Constant), Liberal democracy index

The graph and this regression analysis only covers a six-year period which makes it significantly harder to draw any real conclusions. This is solely due to there being a lack of data over time about Russia's levels of contract enforcement in the Ease of doing Business dataset. It is my opinion that while this severely limits the quantitative parts of the Russian case, the dataset's comprehensive analysis of most world countries as well as it's longer timespan for Ukraine makes it still the most suitable material for this thesis. The goal of this text is also not to establish a clear and significant negative correlation between the two variables but rather to act as a springboard for future research and to see if whether enforcement of contracts would follow the same pattern as judicial independence that the strategic pressure theory establishes. The smaller timespan, if anything, shows that further research in which more comprehensive data is gathered is needed.

Observing the previous quantitative analysis from the perspective of Popova's strategic pressure theory we can expand on our discussion. She frequently brings up timeframes as essential for the theory in that political competition gives incumbents shorter time horizons and vice versa (Popova, 2012, 169). This combined with the fact that judicial reform and institutional change requires a fair

amount of time to draft pass and implement, even within authoritarian regimes (Ginsburg, *Judicial Review in New Democracies*, 2003, 99), would theoretically mean that while levels of democracy can affect enforcement of contracts it should lag behind slightly.

Strategic pressure theory's second mechanism "In emerging democracies, political competition does not increase the costs associated with pressuring the courts" also shows how judicial reform that can affect the levels of contract enforcement do not necessarily have to focus on objective structural change (Popova, 2012, 168). As Bolkvadze (2019, 10) discusses normative change within the legal profession and sphere is often of equal importance as institutional reform. If we assume that contract enforcement follows the same trend as judicial independence and corruption, then once again due to slower movements of normative change the lag mechanic put on contract enforcement should be even larger. As Russia in 2019 moved past the 0.1 mark on the Liberal democracy and without a doubt found itself in neighborhood of the fully authoritarian regimes research into how this has affected contract enforcement in a couple of years would be of significant interest for this area of research and is a subject of future research.

To get a better understanding of why Russia has such a comparatively high level of contract enforcement it could be beneficial to look at what legal scholars argue when it comes to the Russian judiciary and how it compares to Popova's strategic pressure theory. Richard Terrill argues in his book "World Criminal Justice Systems: A Comparative Survey" (2009, 431) that the most effective part of the Russian judiciary are the arbitrazh courts. The courts were, when the book was written, infamous for their high levels of corruption and incompetence but when specifically dealing with contract disputes between businesses they were very potent (Terrill, 2009, 432). According to Terrill this is primarily due to the design and structure of the arbitrazh courts where a completely separate procedural code that allows for larger predeliberation is used. This structure also separates the arbitrazh courts from the general judiciary and gives judges larger room for acting on presedence (Terrill, 2009, 431).

This is in a sense a perfect example of strategic pressure theory's third mechanism: "In emerging democracies, political competition produces a politicization of justice effect" (Popova, 2012, 40). As Russia has moved towards stronger authoritarian rule - and thusly less political competition - contract enforcement and business-related cases have been separated from the general judiciary, effectively enlarging the distance from politics and the arbitrazh. Since the Russian regime lacks any real competition trials not relating directly to the political system have low political salience. If we bring in Ginsburg and Moustafa's (2008, 9) discussion about how the rule of law can lend legitimacy to modern regimes we can see how the arbitrazh courts can be beneficial for the Russian regime. By separating contract- from criminal cases the regime can create an effective and autonomous judiciary for cases with low political salience.

What is interesting to note here and of importance for the general validity of the text is that it can be argued that businesses in Russia are pre-selected (Szakonyi, 2018). The general economic climate of the Russian businesses is

often predetermined by the state and regime. This can and will have an effect on this analysis since the businesses actively taking part in contract enforcement cases have, before becoming businesses, gone through a series of regulatory assessments in which they have been vetted by the government (Szakonyi, 2018, 9). This means that many of the larger contract enforcement cases are where both parties very existence is guaranteed and/or an effect of the regime's choices.

The Enforcing contracts dataset focuses on larger contract cases which means that its data is primarily taken from business related cases. Looking at how contract enforcement cases in which one litigant is civilian and not a business can therefore lead to a complementary analysis in which the pre-selected business variable is removed. While this text, due to the constrain set around its assignment, does not have the resource to focus on this it is something I think future research should be done on. A great example of how this is of importance is the fact that Russia has almost in parallel with its move towards authoritarianism also seen a rapid change in court's ruling in favor of citizens who sue the state due to failures of reaching contractual obligations (Popova, 2012, 166). Here we can be reminded of how Ginsburg and Moustafa (2008, 6) talk about how for the judiciary to be able to legitimize the regime it has to periodically rule against the interests of the regime. Russia's authoritarian regime therefore gives it the ability to not politicize contract enforcement cases and therefore also be able to accept failure in such trails without fear of political competitors taking advantage, which in turn legitimizes the authoritarian regime.

Wrapping things up, Russia can be seen as good example of how contract enforcement is stronger in authoritarian regimes and how contract enforcement follows the same pattern as judicial independence in the strategic pressure theory, but at the same time with the data given it is hard to clearly establish causality.


2.3 Ukraine

Having analyzed Russia, we can now begin to look at how the level of liberal democracy and enforcement of contracts has changed in Ukraine, an example of a hybrid regime.

In the earlier constructed scatter plots (Figure 1 & 2) where we looked at the general worldwide trend of contract enforcement and liberal democracy, we could see that Ukraine was positioned in the earlier mentioned range of levels of liberal democracy that constitute hybrid regimes. We could also observe that Ukraine, as the hypothesis would presume, had lower levels of contract enforcement than Russia.

Once again, we can begin the analysis by creating a dual y-axis line graph that plots the change in the two variables over time. According to the hypothesis of this text we should see the levels of enforcement of contracts at their lowest as the value of the liberal democracy index moves towards the middle of the range and at their highest as the index moves towards the lower values.

Figure 4:



In the analysis of Figure 3 I discussed the visual downsides of displaying data in a dual y-axis line graph and specifically how adjusted ranges on y-axes can create visual illusions in the data displayed. Just as with Figure 3 a version of Figure 4 can be found in the appendix where the ranges on the y-axes have not been tweaked.

Analyzing the graph, what is especially interesting is the change in Ukrainian liberal democracy where it moves close to the bottom fifth of the liberal democracy index scale and subsequently observes a significant decrease in levels of enforcement of contracts, specifically around 2015. This is in direct contrast with this text's hypothesis that would presume that decreasing democracy levels should improve the enforcing contracts.

As discussed earlier in the methodology section it is, specifically in this case, very important to note the change in methodology that occurred between 2014 and 2015 for the Enforcing contract measurement. As can be observed there's a drastic difference between 2014's and 2015's measurement which could point towards the change in methodology having a substantial effect. However, in 2014 Ukraine went through a series of societal changes starting with the maidan revolution and the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovich and culminating in the Russian invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

Pinpointing which of the change in methodology or the events have had the largest effect is beyond the capabilities of this text, but two important points can be made. Firstly, we can see clear upwards trend of the Enforcing contract measurement starting the year after, which could point to the change in methodology not having such a substantial effect. If the methodology alone affected the measurement, then it should theoretically remain on the same level after the change. Secondly, we can see how Enforcing contracts to some extent follows the Liberal democracy index, with both measurements zeniths and nadirs happening during roughly the same period. It is my opinion that while this lowers the credibility of this analysis it is also one of the few measurements of enforcement of contracts available with such a large number of cases. Meaning

that removing the Enforcing contracts measurement would harm the analysis more than it would benefit it. In layman's terms: it is the best I've got.

Having discussed this, we can return to the previous discourse about the lowest levels of enforcing contracts coinciding with the lowest levels of liberal democracy. Why does the hypothesis not fit into the case of Ukraine? Well, when looking at my analysis of Russia it could be that the level of enforcement of contracts lags behind the level of liberal democracy because of how structural and normative changes can take time to be established (Ginsburg, *Judicial Review in New Democracies*, 2003, 99). With that in mind it could be argued that the dip in enforcement of contracts in 2015 is an effect of the high levels of democracy in 2007, and that the subsequent improvement in 2019 is because of the low levels of democracy in 2015-2017. While this theory would help strengthen the hypothesis there is very little real data to support it and is at this point merely guesses which, once again, require more research.

Something that is more substantial and can add to the analysis is how the judiciary has changed throughout this period by looking at different reforms and legislation passed. In 2016 the Ukrainian parliament passed one of the largest and substantial reforms of their judiciary. This reform aimed to simplify the judiciary and its associated institutions. In the hopes of removing unnecessary and gratuitous systems within the courts the regime hoped to minimize corruption. One of the main ways this reform impacted the judiciary, and its institutions was to change the judiciary from a four-tiered system to a three-tiered system (Contact Ukraine, 2016). This substantial reform happened, as the data shows, during a period where Ukrainian democracy scored close to the 0.2 mark on the Liberal democracy index, which theoretically should lend support to the strategic pressure theory. The reform however, happened during a period in which the Ukrainian parliament was fairly politically heterogenous. The coalition created after the maidan revolution held a majority but consisted of multiple ideologically differing parties (Staufenberg, 2015). This seems to counteract strategic pressure theory's presumptions as well as Bolkvadze view on political homogeneity being the genesis of corruption reform in hybrid regimes (Bolkvadze, 2019).

However, while the reform was large in its ambition according to a paper published by the Ukrainian civic organization DeJure Foundation the reforms of 2016 did not go far enough in establishing judicial independence (Democratic Justice Reform, 2021). The main reason why, according to the DeJure Foundation, was the political elite's fear of losing control over the courts, something that supports strategic pressure theory. The primary problem was that the reforms did not uproot the corruption present in the judiciary. Nevertheless, the institutional changes brought forth by the reform did heavily limit politicization since it removed most political entry ways. This lends strength to Bolkvadze argument that instable regimes profit from corruption remaining within the judiciary (2019).

The lower commercial courts focusing on contract enforcement were also affected as the number of judges with a negative review by the public integrity council who grade incoming judges on their professional ethics and integrity was 27% with most of the judges showing a clear discrepancy between their declared

income and personal assets (Anti-corruption action center, 2017). The reform tried to lower corruption by automatically assigning judges to contract enforcement cases, therefore removing the ability for judges to pick cases where they could have a personal stake. This was fairly effective according to the Ease of doing business report, however the reform did not put any limits on how often judges could adjourn and for what reasons (World Bank Group, 2020). The common tactic is therefore to prolong the hearings for an unlimited time.

An earlier example of this can be seen in Popova's (2012, 130) text where she brings up how a person, in the text referred to as S.K., who was running for a local office had his business-related contract case completely stalled. S.K.'s ability to run for office depended on that contract dispute as it affected his ability to disclose his properties. The moment the deadline for registering to run for office passed his case was brought up and quickly resolved (Popova, 2012, 130). This perfectly ties into the third mechanism and shows how even simple contract enforcement cases become affected by politicization. This stands in contrast with our analysis of Russia in which the arbitrazh courts characterized how business-related cases were of low political salience. While this example is before the reform, the tools to perform such a tactic still exists. This could be argued shows how while on paper the Ukrainian parliament tried passing judicial reform, they failed to actually have a substantial effect on the levels of corruption and judicial independence, just as the strategic pressure theory would predict. This also shows that the corruption that existed after the reform was present within the judiciary focused on contract enforcement.

However, the Ease of doing business report that bases itself on the same dataset as Enforcing contracts discussed how in 2019 Ukraine implemented a more streamlined process for small claims contract enforcement in which contract enforcement cases involving smaller sums required less paperwork and administration (World Bank Group, 2019). Pre-trial conferences between the litigants were also implemented. What is interesting to note here is how, as Ukraine has moved more towards political pluralism and competition, the smaller contract enforcement cases have become more effective and judicially sound according to the data set and the report. Popova's strategic pressure theory as well as this text's hypothesis would theoretically argue the opposite.

If we, just as was done in the Russia analysis, bring in a simple linear regression analysis we can see that once again a positive correlation can be seen in the r^2 . The very high standard error also stands out and shows once again how a larger sample would greatly improve the validity of this text's conclusions. This text's hypothesis would presume that as the liberal democracy index declined enforcement of contract would improve, once again creating a negative correlation. However, here we run into a problem with the chosen method. The hypothesis of this text is that fully authoritarian regimes should on average observe higher levels of contract enforcement than hybrid regimes. Ukraine's movement towards authoritarianism should therefore be carefully separated from Ukraine being authoritarian as movement to and from democracy and authoritarianism is the very characteristic of a hybrid regime. Here we could once again open up for future research as it would be interesting to see how contract

enforcement changes when a regime moves from authoritarian to hybrid on the Liberal democracy index or vice versa.

Ukraine Linear Regression Model

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.527 ^a	.278	.230	3.197

a. Predictors: (Constant), Liberal democracy index

What can be important for the general validity of the analysis is the effect that external contract enforcement tools and measurements can have. In an older study done by Johnson et Al (2001) where they looked at the difference in contract enforcement between Russia and Ukraine, they noticed a clear contrast in the amount of non-judicial contract enforcement in the two countries. In Ukraine trade associations arbitration process was ranked by businesses as being more reliable than courts and in Russia “relational contracting” meant that a majority of disputes were solved without the involvement of third parties. This is important to note since it means that while this text looks at specifically how regime-types can affect the levels of contract enforcement, the methodology chosen has the problem of not fully encompassing contract enforcement tools that reside outside of the judiciary.

3 Conclusion & Discussion

To conclude we can begin to summarize the previous analysis. We started off by running a linear and quadratic analysis of the two variables looking for a trend on the global level. The quadratic regression analysis showed a stronger r^2 and a u-shaped regression line which is an indication of hybrid regimes performing worse than regimes on either extreme. This gave some validity to my hypothesis that authoritarian regimes will perform better than hybrids. However, the r^2 was far from significant enough to prove this without a doubt. In the scatter plots constructed we could also observe that Russia performed significantly better than Ukraine on the Enforcing contract measurement, scoring at 72 while Ukraine was on 62.

We then therefore continued the analysis by focusing on Russia and Ukraine independently and looking at how the two variables have transformed over time. In both Russia and Ukraine, the constructed line graphs did not support this text's hypothesis as they showed a not so strong but still existent positive correlation. However, as discussed, the time period used to analyze was far from ideal and future research in which a longer timespan can be used would be very beneficial and academically interesting.

With the case of Russia, we also analyzed what the regime was doing to perform so relatively high on the enforcing contracts scale, especially compared to Ukraine. The special business focused arbitrazh court system was pointed out as maybe being an important part of the puzzle. Applying both Ginsburg and Moustafa's analysis as well as Popova's strategic pressure theory we could hypothesize that the lack of political competition that the authoritarian system creates had allowed the Russian regime to make contract enforcement more autonomous and less politicized, improving effectivity.

In Ukraine we looked at what could be the reason behind their relatively low score on the enforcing contracts measurement. What we could see was also that the Ukrainian judges had no limit on reason for, or number of, adjournments - meaning that they could theoretically stall cases indefinitely. This coupled with the fact that there exists history of previous contract enforcement cases being used against politicians could theoretically show how the politically heterogenous environment within the hybrid regime has politicized contract enforcement.

In conclusion, we can see that there is a light correlation between regime type and levels of contract enforcement. The hypothesis of the text was that regimes strong in power (authoritarian) would have more effective and robust contract enforcement than weak ones (hybrid). We can see that the quadratic regression of the world's states shows that on average authoritarian regimes have more effective contract enforcement than hybrids. However, that correlation is not

incredibly strong, and we can therefore not come to any clear verdict from just that analysis.

Russia, being an example of an authoritarian state showed higher levels of contract enforcement than Ukraine. As we discussed, when analyzing both of these case studies individually we could however see that contract enforcement did not have a negative correlation with liberal democracy over time, showing that as the countries become more democratic their enforcement improved. While this might be understandable in the case of Ukraine, in Russia it actively goes against my hypothesis. As stated, the authoritarian state did nevertheless have more effective contract enforcement than the hybrid. The strategic pressure theory coupled with Ginsburg and Moustafa's analysis of the rule of law's legitimizing effect could to some extent explain this, but questions still remain. It is my opinion that the short time span of the individual quantitative analyses makes it hard to base any real conclusions on just them. The qualitative analyses and the application of the theories shows however that there is something to the hypothesis and the larger quadratic regression analysis of all the worlds countries shows a correlation between the two variables. While also looking at the difference between Ukraine and Russia, two very similar states except for regime type there is room to establish a light causal link. I therefore think that future research is needed in which a larger timespan can be analyzed as well as focusing on how the arbitrazh courts and the Ukrainian 2019 reforms has affected enforcement. In general, it is also my own reflection that a future study focusing on the same subject area should consider the use of surveys and interviews with individuals involved in contract enforcement in both cases. This is something I could not do due to language barriers and time constraints.

4 Appendix

Linear regression:

Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.294	.086	.081	13.205

The independent variable is Liberal democracy index.

Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Liberal democracy index	15.563	3.903	.294	3.987	.000
(Constant)	48.652	1.919		25.352	.000

Quadratic regression:

Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.401	.160	.150	12.696

The independent variable is Liberal democracy index.

Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Liberal democracy index	-43.695	15.896	-.825	-2.749	.007
Liberal democracy index ** 2	66.982	17.459	1.152	3.836	.000

(Constant)	57.208	2.895	19.763	.000
------------	--------	-------	--------	------

Figure 3.1:





Figure 4.1:



5 References

- Anti-corruption action center. (2017, July 17). Each Fourth Future Judge of the New Supreme Court Is Dubious. Retrieved from AntAC: <https://antac.org.ua/en/news/each-fourth-future-judge-of-the-new-supreme-court-is-dubious/>
- Atlantic Council. (2019, October 24). Is Ukraine's new judicial reform a step forward? Retrieved from AtlanticCouncil: atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/is-ukraines-new-judicial-reform-a-step-forward/
- Bekeschenko, E., & Lysenko, D. (2021, April 1). Litigation and enforcement in the Russian Federation: overview.
- Bilak, D., & Vorozhbyt, O. (2016, June 9). Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine passed: Ukraine takes a major step towards a European System of Justice . Ukraine.
- Bolkvadze, K. (2019). To Reform or to Retain? Politicians' Incentives to Clean Up Corrupt Courts in Hybrid Regimes. *Comparative Political Studies*, pp. 1-31.
- Contact Ukraine. (2016, October 13). Ukraine Judicial Reform. Retrieved from Contact Ukraine: <https://www.contactukraine.com/blog/ukraine-judicial-reform-2016>
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C., Lindberg, S., Teorell, J., Altman, D., . . . Ziblatt, D. (2020). V-dem [country-year/country-date] dataset v10. Göteborg: Varieties of Democracy.
- Democratic Justice Reform. (2021, November 22). Judicial reform in Ukraine: a short overview. Retrieved from DeJure: <http://en.dejure.foundation/library/judicial-reform-in-ukraine-what-has-changed-for-the-last-three-years>
- Ginsburg, T. (2003). *Judicial Review in New Democracies*. University of Illinois : Cambridge Press.
- Ginsburg, T., & Moustafa, T. (2008). Introduction: The Functions of Courts in Authoritarian Politics. In T. Ginsburg, & T. Moustafa, *Rule by law: The politics of courts in authoritarian regimes* (pp. 1-23). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kuzio, T. (2005, juni). Regime type and politics in Ukraine under Kuchma. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, pp. 167-190.
- Popova, M. (2012). *Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies: A Study of Courts in Russia and Ukraine*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Staufenberg, J. (2015, December 11). Ukraine parliament brawl: Man gives PM flowers then picks him up by his crotch. *Independent*.

- Szakonyi, D. (2018, January). Governing Business. Russian Political Economy Project, pp. 1-26.
- Teorell, J., & Svensson, T. (2007). Att fråga och att svara. Malmö: Liber AB.
- Teorell, J., Sundström, A., Homberg, S., Rothstein, B., Alvarado Pachon, N., & Mert Dali, C. (2021). THE QOG STANDARD DATASET 2021. Göteborg: The QoG Institute.
- Terrill, R. (2009). World Criminal Justice Systems: A Comparative Survey. New Providence: Matthew Bender & Company.
- World Bank Group. (2019). Enforcing contracts. Retrieved from Doing business: <https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploretopics/enforcing-contracts/reforms>
- World Bank Group. (2020). Doing Business 2020 Ukraine. Retrieved from Doing Business: <https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/u/ukraine/UKR.pdf>