

# A Party for “All” Workers?

Why the Social Democratic Workers Party of Sweden Leave  
the Crowdworkers Hanging

# Abstract

The Social Democratic Workers Party of Sweden portrays itself as a party for all workers. However, with the precarious situation of the newly emerged crowdworkers the status quo, in terms of letting the unions handle it, is not enough of a solution, which is puzzling. Or in other words, it is not seen as a strong enough action. Therefore, three hypotheses on why the Social Democratic Workers Party of Sweden has not acted strongly on the issue of the crowdworkers are deduced. This is to establish a causal relationship with one of the hypotheses and why there has not been a strong reaction (the dependent and known variable). H1 and H2 treat the level of intra-party democracy as a possible explanation, while H3 focuses on the influence of the policy professionals. This case-centered study, carrying elements of process tracing, is conducted with semi-structured interviews where the respondents are high-ranked members of the Social Democratic Workers Party of Sweden and the unions. The interviews establish a causal relation between H1 and Y. In more qualitative terms, hypothesis one (sufficient intra-party democracy) explains the absence of a strong reaction and forming a strong guideline.

*Keywords:* SAP, Intra-Party Democracy, Policy Professionals, Crowdwork

*Words:* 9 715

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# 1 Introduction

The Social Democrat Party of Sweden (henceforth SAP<sup>1</sup>) has been the biggest party in every election since the introduction of full democracy in 1921 and they have left their mark on Swedish politics and society. SAP has ties to the unions, and historically they are sprung out of the unions. Therefore, it is puzzling how they are handling the emerging phenomenon of crowdworkers. Crowdfunding is an umbrella term for taking a small part in the gig-economy and often is seen as a part of crowdsourcing. The crowdworkers that I refer to are what Weidenstedt et al. (2020, p. 18) refer to as “unqualified gig-work” which we know as the workers of Uber eats or Wolt.

Just to underline the importance of this issue for the crowdworkers, it must be pointed out that if they are seen as self-employed, they are responsible for paying into their pension funds. When they are sick, they do not have the full benefit of an employee who is the employer has the responsibility to compensate a big part of the salary (Westregård 2020, pp. 75). Also, the crowdworkers situation is even more precarious based on that, as self-employed are not protected by a collective agreement that grants even fewer perks social security and salary-wise (compared to Osterbrink & Alpar 2021, p. 138).

SAP frames itself as a party for the working class. Foodora, a company that has been seen as one of the biggest providers of “gigs” for crowdworkers has signed a collective agreement with the union Transportarbetareförbundet which grants their workers the status of employees. All rights that come the status of an employee and having certain pay guaranteed follows the signing of the agreement (Bengtsson 2021; Transportarbetareförbundet 2021). One would assume that the SAP is acting and tries to regulate the labor market so the crowdworkers are not endangered of becoming a new, precarious class (Standing 2016). However, they do not. What is puzzling it that there is a gap between reality and how it is expected to be (Bjereld et al. 1999). It needs to be stressed that I focus on the guidelines decided on in within the SAP, not the policy output of the government.

## 1.1 Aim and Research Question

The puzzle itself guides this study and the following theories presented and the semi-structured interviews (as method) are mere a tool that answers the puzzle (Vedung 1977, pp. 31; Esaiasson et al. 2017, pp. 26). The puzzle itself is what

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<sup>1</sup> Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti.

legitimizes the research, not the theory or methodology (Bjereld et al. 1999; Lundquist 1993, pp. 58). The SAP calls itself a worker's party<sup>2</sup>. Historically, they have sprung out of the labor unions and are closely related to the biggest central union in Sweden, Landsorganisationen (henceforth LO). One may think that the SAP is very involved in putting policies forward to intervene with companies and labor market processes that are suboptimal for large groups of the workforce. It seems not to be the case that SAP reacts strongly, which is puzzling. With that said my puzzle is why the SAP does not act more than just putting forward a status quo solution in their party guidelines, based on the internal democracy within SAP. Therefore, my research question asks:

*Why has the Social Democratic Workers Party of Sweden not acted strongly on the issues of the crowdworkers?*

## 1.2 Methodology and Disposition

King et al. (1994, p. 15) stress the importance of internal and external relevance for the research question. By putting out my research question I also made an ontological claim that intra-party democracy is possible to study (Lowndes et al. 2018, pp. 7). Three hypotheses are deduced based on the theoretical framework (H1, H2, and H3). Then the hypotheses are tested to establish a causal relationship that makes this study carry elements of process tracing. The interview scheme (the questions) is constructed to fit the three hypotheses, strengthen, weaken, and establish a causal relationship. This chapter gives a backdrop to what constitutes a crowdworker and their situation. It provides insight into change within the SAP historically, and a brief overview of the current state of research on parties' decision making and what is a strong reaction in this case. Chapter 2 treats the methodological choices and delimitation made. Furthermore it gives insights on the theories of intra-party democracy and policy professionals, which in the prolonging gives the three hypotheses constructed by connecting the theories to potential decision-making within the SAP. The results and discussion are found in chapter 4. The last chapter provides a concluding summary of the discussion and ideas for further research.

## 1.3 The Crowdworker in the Gig-Economy

Crowdworking, as a phenomenon, has grown immensely during the last years, and it will continue to grow in the future (Kuba 2016, pp. 79; Westregård 2020, p. 153; Osterbrink & Alpar 2021). And since most people are unfamiliar with the

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<sup>2</sup> Arbetareparti in Swedish.

phenomenon connected to the gig-economy such as crowdwork I will explain what it is and the current degree of control of the sector. By control, I mean the extent to which the salaries, working conditions, and social regulation are restrained so that it holds up to specific standards put out by the legislation. These “courier partners” (terminology used by Wolt) are not employees in the typical sense. Also, the legislation itself protects employees, not self-employed which the platform companies tend to label the crowdworkers as (Westregård 2020, pp. 145). Since there is no legal definition of an employee, crowdworkers are described as self-employed by the platform companies. Taxation wise it is not as big of a benefit, financially, for the platform companies as one might think. However, they get out of the employers responsibility<sup>3</sup> (ibid.).

To further clarify how crowdworking works, customer A orders a pizza on platform C, from restaurant B. The contract exists between A and B through the platform provided by C. The crowdworker, (here D) delivers the pizza from A to B. For this service, both providing an app that connects the workers with the tasks and for letting the customer A order from B through C's platform therefore C gets a small amount of money from B. D delivers and gets paid by C. D gets the isolating bag and the jacket from the platform C (with some companies the Crowdworkers have to buy them themselves) and have to use their own phone, bike, and/or moped. Anyhow D is not employed by C.

When it comes to how crowdworkers are in the unions (organization)<sup>4</sup> there are no statistics. The Co-determination in the Workplace Act is not applicable for self-employed (1 § SFS 1976:580). Only Foodora has a collective agreement so the number of organization is almost non-existent. Looking other irregular employment, staffing companies, the organizational degree is only 2 % (Palm 2018, pp. 61). For comparison only 55 % of all employees working within Transportation and storage are organized, and if we only look at those with short time contracts, the number is even lower at 35 % (Larsson 2020, pp. 10). This also implies that the Swedish model<sup>5</sup> is not working for crowdworkers. Since there are no collective agreements, the unions cannot ensure good working conditions. The government in Sweden (regardless of political color) delegates almost all labor law regulation to the unions and the employers' organizations (Glavå & Hansson 2020).

There is no general statistic on the heritage of those who work as “courier partners”, however there is an aspect of social migration. In Weidenstedt et al. where 85 % of the crowdworkers identified<sup>6</sup> as non-Swedish citizens, 50% came from Asia and 25 % respectively from Europe and Africa (Weidenstedt et al. 2020, pp. 37). Interestingly, according to Weidenstedt et al. 67 % of the “courier partners” hold a college degree (ibid.). The unions should be interested in equalizing conditions between native and non-native workers so that the wages are not

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<sup>3</sup> Arbetsgivaransvar in Swedish.

<sup>4</sup> Authors translation, anslutningsgrad in Swedish.

<sup>5</sup> The Swedish Model refers to the dualistic system of labor market regulation in Sweden. The unions and the employers' organisations have the informal power to decide things like condition and salary in the collective agreements and they even have a say in when the government draft laws on the field of labor law.

<sup>6</sup> The reason I use identify is that Weidenstedt et al. not investigates legal citizenship.



undercut by foreign workers (Boräng et al. 2020, pp. 559). Of course, there may be a motive of solidarity among workers in the unions' interest of getting the crowdworkers to organize, but there is also the perspective of self-interest. The unions do not want their members to be outcompeted by the crowdworkers. In this case, strong unions will lead to better conditions for the crowdworkers but not in the short term (Boräng et al. 2020, pp. 560)<sup>7</sup>.

## 1.4 The Social Democratic Workers Party of Sweden and Landsorganisationen

The ideology of the SAP preconditions that one, to take part in the democratic sphere, is equal to others (both socially and economically) (Wennerhag & Gustavsson 2010, pp. 24; Rothstein 1996; Svensson 1994; Tilton 1990). In 1889, when the SAP was formed, the unions were active in the founding of the party, the party that should provide political leverage to politicians from the working class (Landsorganisationen 2012, pp. 2). LO has influenced Swedish politics during the last century, less now than up until 1991 when the LO members were forced to become members of the SAP, but LO still has a considerable influence over the SAP and the Swedish labor market (ibid.) This has to do with the decrease of members the SAP experienced after 1991. However, even though barely half of LOs members are in the SAP today they still influence the SAP through union-political collaboration (Landsorganisationen 2012, pp. 3).

LO aims to continue financing the SAP and intends to strengthen its collaboration with the SAP (Landsorganisationen 2012, pp. 13). However, as Gideonsson (2020) points out, their relationship could be better. Also, as Landsorganisationen (2012) stresses LO is working with recruitment to gain influence over the SAP. This is visible to the bare eye in that former prime minister Stefan Löfven (SAP) was president of the union IF Metall and the current minister of business, industry, and innovation Karl-Petter Thorwaldsson (SAP) was the president of LO.

## 1.5 Previous Research: Intra-Party Democracy and Policy Professionals

The subject of intra-party democracy is not as well researched as other fields of democracy (partly due to that there, historically, have been some disputes on the relevance of these kinds of studies) (Sartori 1976, pp. 71). Also, a brief parenthesis

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<sup>7</sup> In relation to false self-employed, however the diagrams in Boräng et al. are based on migrants as employees.

must be made for the different party systems and there is almost consensus among scholars that the parties have gone from the mass party to cartel parties (Katz & Mair 1995; Hagevi 2014, pp. 8; Loxbo 2009). These organizational changes in the parties have led to the parties' professionalization (Hagevi 2014). Recent scholars argue that there has been no decline in intra-party democracy (Poguntke & Scarrow 2020; Loxbo 2009; Allern & Pedersen 2007). Ceron (2017) shows that party culture (e.g. how the party is organized) is essential for how democratic it is this gives hand that the professionalization of the party has not necessarily meant less (internal) democracy. With all this said most recent scholars seem to believe that intra-party democracy has not declined during the last 25 years (Allern & Pedersen 2007; Loxbo 2009, pp. 23).

Hecló first developed the concept of policy professionals in 1978. According to Hecló, the policy professionals are neither politicians, traditional autocrats or meritocratically elected (Hecló 1978). In a Swedish context, Garsten et al. 2015 are problematizing the democratic aspect of the growing influence of policy professionals. One might ask why to focus so much on the development of these two theories in the previous research chapter, and that is because of this study, where both the political elites (Garstens et al. terminology and the non-elected elites) are in focus in a decision-making policy context. Therefore, I claim this study to be internally relevant (it contributes to the field) since it puts hypotheses from both theories up against each other to explain the absence of strong political action. With that said, the current state of research on these two theories makes up a large part of the theoretical framework chapter, so I repeat myself to a certain extent.

## 1.6 Act Strongly?

As noted, when I explained what is puzzling to me, the SAP “only” decide to act on the subject of crowdworkers by maintaining the status quo. What does it mean to act? And what do I refer to when I state there has been an absence of strong reactions and strong policies that are supposed to solve the issues of the crowdworkers. There have been a few motions, both internally within the SAP to the congresses<sup>8</sup> and motions to the parliament. Still, none of those few documents have suggested a straightforward solution (motion. 2018/19:1152).

The only solution put forward is of a status quo character, but since we see that companies like Foodora find ways to skip on the regulations in the collective agreements. For example, they let many of their workers have contracts with affiliated companies without collective agreements. The precarious status of the crowdworkers heritages too their legal status and therefor lack of collective agreements, among other things. SAP could decide to work for that the government defines what is an employee and therein include the crowdworkers. This is what I describe as a strong solution, the SAP would decide in the guidelines that they strive

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<sup>8</sup> The annual general assembly of the SAP, kongress in Swedish.

for defining what is an employee by law and therein include crowdworkers. The unions themselves ask for this solution. The SAP should change the guidelines, to strive for, hindering companies like Wolt from defining their workers as self-employed and refusing to take on responsibility (interviewee 6<sup>9</sup>; 8<sup>10</sup>). That would potentially be a silver bullet to the issues regarding the status of the crowdworkers and the rights connected to it. Also, this is used to indicate a strong decision, the strong decision as the SAP doing what is working and beneficial for the workers.

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<sup>9</sup> Member of Parliament.

<sup>10</sup> Ombudsman Transportarbetareförbundet.

## 2 Methodology

### 2.1 Case Selection and Fundamental Assumptions

What is the case? The puzzle is why there has been no strong reaction on the issue of crowdworkers. That also means that this is not a general case of non-decision. The political science case is to explain why the worker's party has not acted strongly on this issue, based on internal democracy. This also motivates my choice of the SAP as the traditional worker's party (as explained in chapter 1). It also means the study is rather case-centred (Esaiasson et al. 2017) in that the explanation of the case is in focus rather than the theories and the theoretical framework (Blatter & Haverland 2012, pp. 196; Levy 2008, pp. 4).

This paper cannot overlook the ontological and epistemological scope since every hypothesis is a statement on how reality is constituted, or in ontological terms, is there a "real world"? (Marsh et al. 2018, pp. 178). Without becoming too theoretical I argue that even if there is a "reality" independently of us (Marsh et al. 2018, p. 186). How the world is constituted is tightly connected to how is possible to gain knowledge of the world (epistemology). As I adhere to critical realism I argue that even if there is a world independently of our knowledge our glasses (viewpoint and interpretations matter) (ibid; Vromen 2018, pp. 247).

### 2.2 Research Design

Empirically the methodology consists of constructing three hypotheses to establish a causal relationship between the independent variable (a hypotheses) and the dependent variable (there has been no strong action). The hypotheses are constructed based on the theoretical framework where the major research on the field has been reviewed. Once almost articles cross-reference to one another I argue deep understanding of the theories has been formed. The hypotheses share the same dependent variable and vary on the independent one, which means that several hypotheses could explain an event together. This is dealt with by that H1 is opposite of H2, if H1 is correct H2 is false and the other way around (King et al. 1994, pp. 107). H2s relation to H3 is trickier, they are not mutually exclusive since is H3 is correct H2 is partly right to since H3 deals with the issue of flawed representation which is a part of H2. But this relationship does not go the other way around, H2 can prove correct even if H3 is not. King et al. argues that theories that are

contradicting each other that are building on the same theory are false (1994, pp. 105) however my theories build upon a theoretical framework rather than a single theory, it discusses several theories on the field of intra-party democracy. Therefore I argue the hypotheses are very well falsifiable. The hypotheses (who tell what the independent variable could be) are constructed with care of the dependent variable in mind (ibid.). The only issue is that I cannot measure the strength of the relation, but since H1 and H2 are mutually exclusive I can exclude covariation between them.

Looking backward and explaining why it did not happen a form of process tracing (George & Bennet 2005; Esaiasson et al. 2017). We have the dependent variable, then this thesis finds the independent ones and connects them, finds the casual relationship (Esaiasson et al. 2017, pp. 128). This goes well together with the ambitions to test the hypotheses/theory testing,  $H(X) \rightarrow Y$ , in this study since the value of the dependent variable is already known (ibid.). It needs to be pointed out that this thesis explains why something has not happened. The material for the hypothesis construction and explaining the theoretical framework was statistics, reports, academic journals, and academic books (peer reviewed).

## 2.3 Interviews

The interviews are classified as so-called informant interviews, where the aim of the interviews is the perception of how it is working within SAP and how LO/think-thanks affect them, rather than official rules on representation, accountability, and so on (Esaiasson et al. 2017, pp. 168).

With small-n studies like this one, there are drawbacks to random selection of interviewees. Since I do not claim that this study is developing any theories or that the results are possible to generalize, there is also no need for random sampling (selection of the interviews) (Vromen 2018, pp. 247). That is why I use strategic selection even if there is a risk that it is biased (King et al. 1994, pp. 128). The interviewees are selected since they are high-ranked (which means that they are full-time employed and elected politicians) and have insight in the events. Representatives for the unions and a think-tank are also selected. This is a form of selection on the independent variable (King et al. 1994, pp. 137) since they are chosen because of their insight on intra-party democracy and so forth. Even though it seems odd to include interviewees who are not members of the SAP, and therefore do not share the same dependent variable, it is beneficial that they present understanding the independent one.

So, in practice the selection of interviewees consisted of 50 emails that were composed and sent to members of parliament and majors (deputy majors), not all of them since that would be too many people to contact but a random selection within those groups. This random selection was not made to make it generalizable rather than out of practical reasons. Not all interviewees were from the same district and therefore both politicians from major and minor cities/municipalities have been selected. Out of these 50 potential interviewees only 7 answered and only 6

participants in interviews. Also two ombudsmen from Transportarbetareförbundet were interviewed based on their membership in LO and their closeness to SAP to see how well LO and Transportarbetareförbundet is represented towards the SAP. Limiting my sampling to Transportarbetareförbundet is based on the definition of crowdworkers as “courier partner”.

Last, but not least Sara Pelling has been interviewed as the head of the think-tank Arena Idé. She was chosen since LO finances the think-tank and amongst other things deals with the issue of crowdworking. The reason I mention her name is both out of practical reasons, the head and think-tank financed by LO does not make it very anonymous but also since it is beneficial for the legitimacy of this thesis. However, all the other interviewees are anonymous based on the organization’s importance, not the individual interviewees themselves. There is no personal relationship between me, the author, and the interviewees, also they are politicians first and foremost, not experts on questions of intra-party democracy (see Esaiasson et al. 2017, pp. 268). When it comes to semi-structured interviews developing an interview guide is of essential value. Noteworthy is that the construction of the interview guide is that it is constructed with answering the hypotheses in mind (DeJonckheere & Vaughn 2019, pp. 5) which the complete interview guide in the appendix shows. All interviews were conducted via Microsoft Teams. The interviewees were not allowed to see the guide beforehand to avoid them preparing answers ahead that were not spontaneous. And, to avoid answers that are too guided by the questions use open questions that change in the exact wording to fit each interviewee (Esaiasson et al. 2017, pp. 267). Also, all interviews were conducted in Swedish, and the quotes are translations by the author of this thesis.

## 2.4 Delimitations

I do not study to what extent intra-party democracy is predominant or whether the policy professionals have more or less influence today than they a certain number of years ago. With that said there is no object of comparison, either for different parties or different times. A delimitation in this case is not a weakness, since a case study does not mean that it must be a comparative study (George & Bennett 2005, pp. 40). Instead it is in line with the study’s aim to explain certain events and not change over time. I risk under or overstating the casual mechanism strength between the variables (George & Bennet 2005, p. 53), so I cannot put numbers on the explanatory power. The left- or right-wing perspective is not very predominant, however when talking to all the interviewees they did not feel that the SAP is fragmented in a left- or right-wing (at least as pointed out by media).

All three hypotheses are very actor-centered because institutional explanations are not dominant. For example, the party activists or the policy professionals are a kind of policy entrepreneur in the Multiple Streams Framework (henceforth MFS) (Kingdon 1984) is also actor-centred. Traditional institutionalist explanations could be the Swedish model and the tradition of keeping up the status quo, which is not the focus of this thesis but goes into a possible explanation of H1. I choose not to

interview any part-time politicians since, even if many of them have been active for a long time, they do not possess the documented experience as a high-ranked full-time politician does. Also seeking votes is not a significant discussion. Still, I take this ambition into account when constructing the hypotheses since the core aim of a party today is to get votes and without popular policies, they will not get any votes. But it is more an external explanation of the party's behavior, and the focus of this thesis is the internal process of why there has been done nothing. With this delimitation I argue that the risk of an unknown, intermediate variable, is non present.

# 3 Theoretical framework

## 3.1 Intra-party Democracy

Many scholars have shed light on potentially declining intra-party democracy (Katz & Mair 1995, p. 21; Poguntke & Scarrow 2020, p. 326). Intra-party democracy is interlinked with representative democracy (compare Teorell 1998; Katz & Mair 1995 to Poguntke & Scarrow 2020; Scarrow 2005). Today there seems to be consensus on that intra-party democracy is connected to how parties organize (Loxbo 2009; Allern & Pedersen 2007; Ceron 2017; Poguntke & Scarrow 2020). There is however no consensus on if a strong organizational culture within the party affects the party's intra-party democracy (Ceron 2017, pp. 7; Flemming 2020)

The thesis of diminishing intra-party democracy is typical within this field and connected to the notion that the types of parties that exist have changed (Poguntke & Scarrow 2020, pp. 326; Michels 1915). "The iron law of oligarchy" states that every organization/party becomes less internally democratic over time (Michels 1915, pp. 320). Michels stresses that as the organization grows the need for bureaucracy and administration within the organization or party arises (Michels 1915, pp. 305). Those who gain power in the organization develop oligarchic tendencies (ibid.). Michels gives the example (among others) of strong nepotism when new leaders are nominated or elected (Michels 1915, pp. 75).

Teorell's dissertation shows that he cannot confirm that Michels theory (Teorell 1998). Often oligarchical elements are put up against democracy, however not as a dichotomy where an organization is either one or the other (Teorell 1998, pp. 26). An issue that is discussed in the literature on intra-party democracy is that of defining democracy. Some scholars even state that there is no use in measuring intra-party democracy since it cannot be determined (Sartori 1976, pp. 71; Teorell 1998, pp. 26). Teorell however, shows that it is possible to conduct studies on intra-party democracy (Teorell 1998, p. 27).

Intra-party democracy is a hard-to-understand concept, and operationalization is needed (Toshkov 2018, pp. 227). I understand intra-party democracy as representation and accountability. Which terms I further operationalize with that representation refers to how well members are represented and then put this up against the influence of other groups. The focus of representation is if it is tilted too elites or activists or evenly spread within the party. Officially it is one person, one vote but to measure representation I use elites, who are the top politicians, such as the board of the party or the party leader. And activists who are operationalized as party members with a different opinion than the majority of the party, often a small



group that is very active and makes their voices heard<sup>11</sup>. Activists are thus seen as undemocratic because they tend to push the party into a political direction that majority of the party voters do not cohere with (Teorell 1999, p. 267; Hirschman 1970, p. 70). Hirschman's concepts of "voice" and "exit" may correspond some with intra-party democracy whereas "voice" is present in a solid intra-party democratic environment and is complemented by the concept of "exit" (ibid.).

Accountability is a mechanism of determining who is accountable for specific policies afterward and that these policymakers can face consequences thereafter on how they voted on the congress (Garsten et al. 2015, pp. 127; Teorell 1998; Dahl 1989). I account for both the formal and informal ways of holding the representatives accountable.

## 3.2 Hypothesis One: Sufficient Intra-Party Democracy

As pointed out one does not state that the theory of the "iron law of oligarchy" still holds up. And it is unproven that most parties have become more oligarchical over the last years. However, one cannot assume them (the parties) to have become more oligarchical does not exclude that possibility (Laxbo 2009). One step further in my reasoning on intra-party democracy states that if most scholars point to that the SAP (and other parties) have not become less internally democratic. In some cases, almost the opposite seems true I must question whether the absence of action (the non-reacting on the issue) can be viewed as an outburst of democracy. The party program of the SAP does not deal with the problem. Stressing on a status quo solution, is still a decision and a reaction to the matter (Svärd 1982, p. 120). Therefore, ignoring a political issue must not always be a non-decision since the requirement that is put up for a non-decision/ignoring of a political issue is that the elites within the party are profiting from it (ibid.). And not acting on a problem more than putting forward a status quo solution does not seem beneficial for current party members.

However, the SAP wants a labor market with secure employment (Socialdemokraterna 2021, p. 11), so the internal democracy has spoken to formulate guidelines. Therefore, thesis one is straightforward in that everything is working as it should within the party and the reason the SAP does not act forcefully upon the issue of crowdworkers that the internal democracy is working and that this is the will of the members.

*H1: The reason SAP has not acted strongly on the issue of the crowdworkers is sufficient intra-party democracy.*

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<sup>11</sup> My understanding of an activist does not hold a negative connotation.

### 3.3 Hypothesis Two: Insufficient Intra-Party Democracy

Even if many scholars have disproven Michels thesis of “the iron law of oligarchy” I still think this is a suitable hypothesis (with slight modification). My reasoning goes in line with; the party activists gain more influence if the internal democracy is stronger (Teorell 1999), and this tends to sway the party away from the voters so that the party becomes less internally democratic after some time. However, this all builds on the assumption that the activists have different political standpoints than the other party members and the voters. There has been a declining number of party members in the case of the SAP which possibly indicates that sure voters, who at the same time are party members, choose to make use of their “exit” option. The decline numbers may suggest that the former party members are unhappy and feel less represented by the policies put forward by the elites, or that the elites have gained more influence. Still, the understanding of “voice” and “exit” gives a hint that if the realization of “voice” is impossible or very hard to do (e.g. not internally democratic) the only option is to leave the party, (e.g. “exit”).

The number of citizens being members of a party have declined from roughly 15% of the population in 1984 to about 5% in 2014 (Statistikmyndigheten 2018). In certain groups, based on age and gender the decline has been even more pronounced but spread across all ages and genders. SAP has lost over 500 000 members (Erlingsson et al. 2016, p. 172). This is also to be seen in class voting which has plummeted immensely during the last 60 years (University of Gothenburg 2018:14). It implies that the voters do not stick to a party that they “belong” to base on their social-economic status or class. One could say the voters have become more volatile.

Another fact that needs to be stressed is that the SAP has strong links with the unions, especially LO and their fellow organizations. Until the 90s, every LO member was forced member of the SAP. Today a financial part of the membership fee, for those who choose to be members of LO goes to the SAP. Even if the financial aid to SAP from LO has decreased over the last decade most of the members of LO do not want to finance the electoral campaigns of the SAP (Dahlin 2021; Frisk 2021). This year (2022) is an election to be held in Sweden and LO has given SAP 30 million Swedish crowns (Berggren 2022) to strengthen their electoral campaign. And even if I earlier discussed democracy concerning accountability, it is important from where the SAP gets the money. To quote Berthold Brecht, “*food comes first, then morality*”<sup>12</sup> which I think is in place in this case. With that said, thesis two states if the reason for the weak status quo solution to the issue of crowdworkers put forward by the SAP is that the party itself is undemocratic.

*H2: The reason SAP has not acted strongly on the issue of the crowdworkers is insufficient intra-party democracy.*

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<sup>12</sup> ”Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral” in German, Brechts first language.

## 3.4 Policy Professionals

During the last decade, we have started to see the policy professionals more and more, and we have begun to reflect upon their influence on policy. Hagevi (2014) connects this to the economic structure and that parties are financed by tax money to various degrees, depending on their size. Policy Professionals refer to a group of non-politicians, often well educated, that work within the administration on different political levels or within think-tanks that design the policy (Garsten 2015, pp. 40). To clarify, according to Svallfors et al. policy professionals are non-elected bureaucrats and experts who often work as advisors to the politicians. Still, since the politicians do not always have the same high education or only work with a topic for a small amount of time, they have to trust their advisors to formulate the right policies (ibid; Selling & Svallfors 2019, pp. 5).

The MSF pictures three parallel streams and when they cross there opens a “window of opportunity” (Kingdon 1984). On each of the three streams are actors, called the policy entrepreneur, political entrepreneur, and problem broker (ibid; Knaggård 2015). According to Garsten et al. the policy professionals participate in each of the three streams as those actors (Garsten et al. 2015, pp. 56). But the crucial role of the policy professional in this case can be seen as that of the policy entrepreneur (who also is the main actor in Kingdon’s original version of the framework) (ibid.; Kingdon 1984). This linkage between Garsten et al. to Kingdon’s influential theory of the policy process shows that the role of the policy professional cannot be undermined. I argue that the policy professionals not only are an instrument to design the correct implementation for the policies (Lindvall 2009, pp. 726), but they are also framing the issues (see reasoning about Kingdom above).

The policy professionals affect the democracy itself in that that they construct the policies that should be put up by the elected politicians, in short, the policy professionals have the political power. This is an issue itself connected to the Swedish constitution which in the opening statement goes “All public power in Sweden proceeds from the people”<sup>13</sup>. Garsten et al. connect legitimacy in the democracy to the option to hold the policymakers accountable for their policies (2015, p. 179). Therefore, the policy professionals are a sign that the parties are getting more professionalized (Garsten et al. 2015, p. 227).

In this thesis, policy professionals are operationalized as non-elected individuals who work closely with politicians as secretaries, administrators, and public servants who make political decisions independently. They control the decisions, set the agenda or make the decisions themselves. However, they separate from politicians by not being elected, and from other administrators by making executive decisions (setting the agenda could be a way). While regular public servants just implement (sometimes tweak the course of implementation) of something that a politician already decided.

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<sup>13</sup> Official translation by Regeringskansliet.

### 3.5 Hypothesis Three: Influence of the Policy Professionals

In Sweden, the line for when they entered politics can be said to be in 1953 as Olof Palme was employed as an advisor to the current prime minister at that time Tage Erlander (Garsten et al. 2015, pp. 23). According to Garsten et al. there were about 2500 policy professionals in Sweden in 2015. The voters often demand politicians to know everything about every policy and that the politicians always must stay in touch with the voters over social media, all this responsibility for the politicians might have increased the number of policy professionals today. But this is just my estimate based on Garsten et al. and the number 7 years ago. But then this comes as no surprise since many policy professionals see themselves as politicians (Garsten et al. 2015, pp. 85). However not all policy professionals become politicians or even have that ambition, they choose the career of an expert instead.

I also need to stress that the absence of a strong decision might be the work of the policy professionals as they can frame certain issues in specific ways and choose what to bring up. Therefore, even if they have no formal power, they can be said to have power over the agenda, they can set the agenda (Lukes 1974). This hypothesis may at first glance seem as closely related to the second thesis but that is only partly the case. Of course, one might argue that it affects intra-party democracy if non-elected elements, e.g. the policy professionals gain influence and that is not false. But the difference in H2 is that the deciding factor (the actor) in this case is non-elected. This hypothesis is that the policy professionals are the reason that the issue of crowdworkers has not been strongly reacted to by the party.

*H3: The reason SAP has not acted strongly on the issue of the crowdworkers is the influence of policy professionals.*

## 4 Result and Discussion

### 4.1 Hypothesis One: Sufficient Intra-Party Democracy

As stated in the theoretical chapter intra-party democracy is operationalized by participation and the option of holding the politicians responsible for their actions within the party. If the intra-party democracy would be considered sufficient, members and different interest groups (right- or left-wing or organizations within the SAP) are represented equal to their size in the decision-making. The interview material gives slightly different opinions how the intra-party democracy is working. However, these differences are relatively small and all together all interviewees bring up that they think the party is internally democratic. The issue of crowdworking has been on the agenda, both locally and on the national congress (interviewee 1<sup>14</sup>;3<sup>15</sup>), as motions drive the congresses (Socialdemokraterna 2021).

Speaking of representation, it has to do with both influence of elites and activist. The elites, in this case the leadership, of the party or the board are arguably not more influential than before even if there have been some changes in the velocity (interviewee 3) on how fast decisions are made. It may seem like the elites are getting stronger within the party, but this seems not to be the case.

*“Decisions must be made faster which can speak against that. When I became a member there were counseling within the party, we met ten times, and then the results were sent in, but I am not sure this changed the decisions themselves... But it may have changed a feeling of participation.”* (interviewee 3)

Interesting above is that this gives by hand that only the representation of members is well functioning. This is also pointed out but several other interviewees who say that how to handle the issue of crowdworkers does not divide the party (interviewee 1;3;4<sup>16</sup>;5<sup>17</sup>) and this leads to a *“sense of participation”* (interviewee 3). During the last couple of years, the fragmentation within the SAP has decreased, the party has gotten closer together the last governmental term (interviewee 4).

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<sup>14</sup> Mayor.

<sup>15</sup> Member of Parliament.

<sup>16</sup> Mayor.

<sup>17</sup> Deputy Mayor.

Activist in the party could according to interviewee 5 be Social Democrats for Faith and Solidarity however they do not specifically work for issues related to the gig-economy. Interviewee 5 also points out it is more in the media they get attention, rather than within the party themselves (interviewee 4;5). The same goes for the youth organization, the Swedish Social Democratic Youth League, but they are still to characterize as “*no activists*” (interviewee 5).

When talking about left- and right-wing and organizations within the social democracy like the Reformists, (a left-wing of and less liberal group) (interviewee 7<sup>18</sup>), come to mind. Interviewee 7 is a member of the Reformists and argues that the debate/“*creative environment*” (ibid.) is beneficial for the SAP and stresses that it is not an “*undemocratic element*” (ibid.) as media sometimes portrays it. If it becomes clear that an ombud has not voted the way the party decided beforehand, the party can get that member to quit through a council of trustees (ibid.). This guarantees that the members are represented by members that follow the decided political guidelines beforehand so that the members can feel secure about that their representative acts in the way they expected.

*“The council of trustees handle issues related to if a representative has an deviating opinion towards the public... they need to shut up and press the buttons or stay home and let a substitute have their spot”* (interviewee 7)

The districts choose the congresses ombudsmen to represent them in handling the motions. They are expected to have a particular standpoint beforehand based on their ideological background in the party (interviewee 4) and afterwards there are mechanisms in place to hold them accountable.

*“The congress representatives go to each workers municipality and explain what decision has been made... To be honest the interest to seek the information is not there”* (interviewee 1).

There are structures for accountability where the individual members get to know how their representative voted and what happened on the congress. They can then choose not to reelect that person as their ombudsman. Interviewee 3 gives insight in that the decision-making process of the SAP has become more transparent for the individual members. This can be due to media coverage and social media, where one can get in touch with their representative relatively easy to how it was 30 years ago. Thus, the members can hold the representatives to the congress (where the policies the parties stives for are made) responsible. “*Once the decision was made one had greater knowledge.*” (Interviewee 3). This both implies a that the degree of accountability is satisfying. At the same time, it seems like the media coverage has made it even easier for the members to hold the representatives accountable for their decisions. However, there is a difference in formal accountability structures and how it is used (interviewee 6).

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<sup>18</sup> Deputy Mayor.

## 4.2 Hypothesis Two: Insufficient Intra-Party Democracy

The intra-party democracy is seen as insufficient if factors as representation and accountability are not predominant. *“The one with the most information has the most power”* (interviewee 1) which goes hand in hand with those decisions made much faster nowadays. A recent example is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (henceforth NATO) debate where there is a congress decision on that the SAP is against Sweden joining the NATO. Still, the prime minister of Sweden (SAP) announces that the SAP favors accession (interviewee 7). There are *“very few that push the question”* (ibid.) when it comes to that I stated earlier that the issue of crowdworking was on the agenda. There are different arenas, and the problem is *“more on the agenda in the parliament committee”*<sup>19</sup> (interviewee 6). Media discusses that SAP is fragmented. According to all the interviews this is due to media logic rather than a divided party. The party leadership in this case is seen as an elite but if it is that the power, they have, derives from the members through trust that interviewee 5 this is not an direct sign for insufficient intra-party democracy.

*“Maybe the SAP has become more coordinated after the crisis years with Sahlin and Juholt... more top-down... “Trust in the party leadership amongst the members is strong”* (interviewee 5)

An aspect that has been pointed out (on participation/representativeness) when constructing the hypotheses is the influence of LO on SAP. As said before they are sprung out of the same movement, but they are not the same thing and many of LOs members are not members of SAP, it goes so far that Transportarbetareförbundet says *“vote red”* (interviewee 2<sup>20</sup>) instead of *“vote SAP”* (ibid.). The different unions represented in LO have different degrees of cooperation with the SAP (interviewee 2). LO pays for the election campaign of the SAP. Still, Transportarbetareförbundet also has their campaign to lift the issues and raise *“our workers”* questions *“rather than promote a party”* (ibid; interviewee 8). In line with the above, *“To impact and to cooperate are two totally different things”* (interviewee 2; 3). This means that just because LO stands close with SAP it does not mean that affection goes both ways.

*“We affect through inviting political representatives and have meetings with the and talk about the problems in our industry... We try to speak to all parties except the Sweden Democrats... but the impact maybe goes the wrong direction... But we do not let the party change our opinion since we believe that we are supposed to influence the party, but that differs within LO”* (interviewee 2)

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<sup>19</sup> Arbetsmarknadsutskottet in Swedish.

<sup>20</sup> Ombudsman transportarbetareförbundet.

As the quote above shows, the unions do not get anything for their money. They do not buy any decisions or agenda setting in the party, that would be “*corruption*” (interviewee 6 on financing concerning impacting decisions). According to a high-ranked SAP representative, the unions may feel that the party impacts their work and their issues, but that is not the case. “*It is totally fine that LO has demands...*” (interviewee 4) is a common opinion, however that does not mean that the SAP listens to the demands or changes their decision or puts different subjects on the agenda. But the unions try to affect the SAP from within. “*Our members are encouraged to take on political positions for SAP*” (interviewee 3) and “*encourage them to be political*” (interviewee 8). But as stated above, the SAP does not see themselves as a prolonging of the unions.

*“We are very careful to get involved on issues that belong to the unions, that is their responsibility... we like to have a dialog in those matters with those who have competence which often is LO”* (interviewee 6)

Related to the unions influence on the SAP is the think-tank Arena Idé, in the sense that they are not bound to a specific party, but they are financed by “*the three largest trade unions in the trade union confederation LO*” (Pelling 2022) and are taking on a “*workers perspective*” (ibid.). However, they are “*independent from our financiers in their day-to-day work*” (ibid.). Also, they “*can be slightly more radical*” (ibid.) in the context of the ideological ideas and solutions. Arena Idé stresses policies that benefit the unions. Transportarbetareförbundet believe that the SAP needs to act on this issue (or at least make a congress guideline that they will work in this direction). The unions seem to rely on SAP to regulate certain matters as seen below.

*If we have companies like this (Foodora<sup>21</sup>) that are doing everything to work around the this (the Swedish model and the labor protection act<sup>22</sup>) there will be problems and then the legislator needs to step in, according to us, and regulate this”* (interviewee 8)

Interviewee 1 points out that the “*accountability happens at district level*” means that the members themselves may not have the insight to hold politicians responsible for their actions. This, concerning the statement that the individual members are not interested in holding their congress representatives accountable, implies issues in the intra-party democracy. The accountability aspect is only granted formally but in practice does not exist to the same extent as expected. However, as stressed above there are formal structures in place to hold the representatives accountable and it is a part of representative democracy that once they are elected, they are secure and besides there is a “*far-reaching trust*” (interviewee 7). Which indicates that there are mechanisms for holding one accountable and therefore somewhat weakens this hypothesis.

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<sup>21</sup> Authors comment.

<sup>22</sup> Authors comment.



### 4.3 Hypothesis Three: Influence of the Policy Professionals

What traces of the policy professionals do the interviews uncover? The representation as a part of intra-party democracy gets somewhat affected in this section. It shows if the policy professionals set the agenda or influence the decision. Since the congresses are driven by motions (interviewee 1; 3) I interpret this as a sign that the policy professionals do not have the power over the agenda (Lukes 1974). *“I make decisions based of the guidelines and the public servants implement it in practice”* (interviewee 4) and *“guidelines do I decide myself”* (interviewee 5) gives by hand that the motions to the congress are guidelines deriving from the elected politicians themselves. Indeed, one might argue that every member is allowed to write a motion and a policy professional may be member of a party in their non-working time and therefore could compose motions, however, this is a stretch.

The politicians in practice sometimes collaborated with the Municipal Chief Executive and the politics sometimes comes in second. *“I often seek advice from the Municipal Chief Executive”* (interviewee 4), which could imply that the Municipal Chief Executive is a policy professional. But this reasoning is semi-relevance and difference between the party SAP and the government needs to be stressed again. I do not talk about the governmental policy output and the decisions made there. Policy professionals are not common in the decision-making within the SAP, both in parliament and on local level. Also, the number of administrative, non-elected, staff (they are not policy professionals) has shrunk since SAP lost votes. However, on local level there is an increase relative the general decrees of the party members, *“it is about the same”* (interviewee 7). As stated above, the non-elected ombuds and experts who work closely with the politicians on the local level mostly work with external communication.

*“In the last couple of years, it is so easy to get in touch with us, if we would not have all the ombudsmen and secretaries, I would not do anything else than talking to the citizens... I am an educated social worker, but we have rules in against working with those issues where you are an expert because the ideology will not stand in the foreground”* (interviewee 7)

The non-elected ombudsman (public servants/administrators) and experts who work closely with the politicians on the local level mostly work with external communication. Also, these public servants etc. are just carrying out what the politicians already decided (interviewee 1; 4; 6). Also, politicians cannot be responsible for policies within their educated profession, because of the risk of becoming a professional. My interpretation is that this is a countermeasure to prevent elected politicians from becoming too pragmatic and losing the ideological perspective. But of course, the secretaries and public servants draft ideas but they are subjected to change by the politicians. Even if there are held *“regular meetings*

*with other representatives and ombudsmen*” (interviewee 4) that does not mean that the public servants affect the issues notably. Concerning the work of the public servants within the party itself and not only before the congresses they showed no signs of any policy professionals affecting the agenda setting. Therefor the general influence on the politics of the SAP by public servants etc. has been discussed to see what influence that group has over the politicians. Accountability is not discussed concerning policy professionals because they are not elected. I discuss much about other administrative staff to show that that is the only groups that come close to being defined as policy professionals but are not. This absence of policy professionals weakens H3.

## 4.4 Discussion

Why does the SAP leave the crowdworkers hanging? Or put in other words, why does the SAP not act strongly? It is a bold title for this essay, but it is what is to be answered in this chapter. Chapter 4.1-4.3 above has shown elements of confirmation and disconfirmation of all the three hypotheses. Before discussing the concrete relation of the hypotheses to one another, I must make a statement beforehand so there will be no confusion. All the interviewees state that the SAP is internally democratic (without me having that as a question), which leads me to conclude that the party may be internally democratic. But also, the high-ranked officials for the SAP may be biased. Even if some of them bring forward opinions against participation/representation, all say there will be no democratic insufficiencies. However, a caveat is that the interviewees are biased and do not talk badly of their party.

There are implications that H1 has the most explanatory power, or in other words holds up the best. I will discuss it parallel to H2 that does not hold up. This has to do with that the elites and activistic groups does not have any more significant influence than they otherwise would in a representative democracy, tied to the sheer size of respective group. No implications where to be found that elites more power than before. The members delegate authority with a high level of trust in their leadership and elites. Also, the SAP fragmentation is merely a construction by the media rather than something real. I am not arguing that there is no fragmentation between different groups (left- and right-wing) within the SAP. However, the media blows up this divide to make it seem way more significant than it is.

I argue it to be too big of a stretch to say that I found any proof that the unions have the third face of power, control over the thought, (Lukes 1974) over the SAP. Apart from the absence of direct influence from the unions there is financing. And some of the high-ranked SAP representatives does not mean that the LO and Transportarbetareförbundet have influence. LO has an own agenda, but there are LO representatives in the SAP so a crossover in opinions is due to the overlap of representatives. The LO congress decides on guidelines open to anyone and think-tanks like Arena Idé publish reports, articles and books on matters that concern the workers (“workers perspective”). Therefore, SAP representatives can read and take

inspiration from the solutions published by the think-tank. This does, however, not mean that I can claim a causal relationship between the financing of a think-tank that publishes a paper to affect the SAPs decisions on a guideline.

The unions finance a think-tank (primarily acting independent) to publish articles that are non-mandatory for politicians of SAP to read. So, the short answer here is no, the unions do not control the agenda, or the thought of/in the SAP. And by agenda, I mean within the party on the congresses. I cannot make claims on what is happening on local level everywhere. Also, there might be an unwillingness to admit influence for the SAP representatives, but that is just a side note. They (SAP and LO) coexist in a symbiosis where they mostly share the same opinion. LO helps the SAP to understand the situation of the workers and SAP is the political force that has governmental power (at the times of this being written).

As shown, there are structures, both formal and informal routines after a congress explaining what has happened to the members. This makes me conclude that there is a high degree of accountability within SAP (strengthening H1). There are external mechanism for holding one accountable for their standpoints. However, this is not holding up on congresses since internal events within the party where they decide on their policies.

This also makes a natural transition to discuss H3. One might think the unions representatives have become like policy professionals, but that is not the case. The unions are their own organizations which have their own agenda to benefit their members. There is no one who claim that the officials from the unions are neutral and does not have a standpoint on issues related to crowdworkers. I also reason a lot about agenda setting concerning representation and the role of the policy professional. The interviews have shown that the policy professionals do not influence these decisions. It is not possible to point out any policy professionals in these questions of ideological shifts in the guidelines and that may be because policy professionals predominantly work within the departments/government and not internally in a party. Therefore, H3 has shown to be false.

As shown, some implications seem to disconfirm H2 or H3, and instead confirming H1. Hypotheses H1 and H2 exclude one another. H1 on the other hand, states that a strong decision has not been made because the intra-party democracy is working. To conclude, H1 establishes a causal relationship and answers the research question.

# 5 Concluding Remarks

## 5.1 Conclusion

To summarize this thesis and answer the research question I want to repeat that crowdworking is a new phenomenon that raises questions on how to guarantee these workers the same rights that employees have. Today it no longer is cap in hand, rather phone in hand. H1 did establish the best causal relationship. I mean that  $X(H1) \rightarrow Y$  where Y is why the SAP has not acted strongly on these issues. Some of the interviews gave hints that there were elements to H2 and H3 that were explained but did not hold up to establish causality. I have mentioned the Swedish model as a possible reason that H1 showed to establish a causal relationship. This has to do with the casual relationship and explanatory power of H1 and sufficient intra-party democracy means that there is nothing undemocratic with the decision not to act strongly, rather the members of the SAP does not see the need to act strongly. With this study I cannot answer why they have act strongly concerning H1 in the sense why they do not want to. Still, the historical explanation of strong belief in the unions work and the Swedish model may explain why H1 established a causal relationship with Y.

This essay explains the absence on strong reaction that was expected to happen, focusing on the internal democracy of the SAP. Once again, it must be stressed that H1 holds up in this state and gave a casual explanation. That however does not mean that this becomes a general explanation. It is rather a sociologist's approach to explain what is going on in the heads of the members and why H1 showed to hold up. Still, non then less it makes a starting point for further possible research members behavior in the organization, but as I said, that was not focus of this essay. With all of that said, and to clarify the research question; *Why has the Social Democratic Workers Party of Sweden not acted strongly on the issue of the crowdworkers?* Is answered by hypothesis 1,  $H1 \rightarrow Y$ .

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# Appendix

## Interview Guide SAP (Translated into English)

Has the question regarding the gig-economy come up on the agenda on congresses?

- And how the party shall act?
- Does the party work actively with a solution to the situation in the gig-economy?
- Are there any conflicts, internally, what should be done regarding the issues related to the gig-economy?

Does the board/leadership (elites within the party) influence on behalf of the members?

- On behalf of the districts?
- If yes, have this imbalance grown over the time you have been active?

Do certain active groups within the party have a lot of power even if they are relatively small (or set the agenda)?

- Such as Social Democrats for Faith and Solidarity?

How is your (SAP) relation to LO, especially with the financing of electoral campaigns?

- Does LO have an agenda different from the SAPs agenda in issues related to crowdworkers?
- Does the financing affect what the SAP strives for?

Are there any ways of holding one (the representatives) accountable internally within the party, and towards the SAP members?

- Formally or informal?

How do you feel about your decisions; do you have a lot of knowledge or rely on experts to make decisions?

- Do you feel secure in deciding yourself or do you often consult your advisors?

Have the relative number non-political experts (advisors etc.) grown the last couple of years?

## Interview Guide SAP (Original)

Har frågan om Gig-ekonomin kommit upp på kongresser?

- Hur partiet skall agera i frågan?
- Hur jobbar SAP med frågan om crowdworkers/gig?
- Finns det konflikter internt om vad som bör göras kring gig?

Har ledningen har fått större inflytande på bekostnad av medlemmarna under de åren du deltagit i partiet?

- Eller på bekostnad av distriktsstyrelserna och lokala grupper?
- Om ja, har denna fragmentering ökat under åren du varit med i partiet?

Har vissa väldigt aktiva grupper inom partiet får stort genomslag trots att de är relativt få (eller sätter de saker på dagordningen?)

- T.ex. socialdemokrater för tro och solidaritet?

Hur upplever du er relation till LO, särskilt med tanke på finansiering av valkampanjer?

- Har LO en agenda som avviker från SAPs agenda om hur man får bukt med problematiken rörande crowdworkers?
- Påverkar finansiering vad SAP jobbar mot?

Finns det något sätt för de att utkräva ansvar, internt inom partiet, och från medlemmar?

- Formellt eller informellt?

Hur ser det ut med dina uppdrag, hur mycket expertkunskap i området känner du dig trygg i att fatta beslut själv med de

- dvs. känner du dig trygg i att fatta politiska beslut själv eller känner du att du måste rådfråga din politiska sekreterare eller andra rådgivare och experter?

Upplever du att andelen experter (icke politiskt tillsatta) har ökat de senaste åren?

## Interview Guide Transportarbetareförbundet (Translated into English)

Has the question of crowdworkers and the gig-economy been discussed/been on the agenda on the union's congresses?

- How does LO act upon the matter?
- How does Transportarbetareförbundet act, are there differences?

How do you (the union) relate to SAP?

- Do you (the union) affect the party if you have different agendas?
- If that is the case, in which way (collaboration)?

SAPs election campaign partly gets financed by LO, do you demand anything in return?

- I mean if you (the union) expect the SAP to act in certain ways to benefit your members?

LO representatives have often become SAP politicians, do you (the union) have a part in how the SAP chooses their representatives?

## Interview Guide Transportarbetareförbundet (Original)

Har frågan om Gig-ekonomin kommit upp på kongresser?

- Hur LO skall agera i frågan?
- Hur ska Transportarbetareförbundet agera, finns det skillnader?

Hur förhåller ni er i relation till SAP?

- Om ni har olika agendor, påverkar ni då partiet?
- Om ja, i så fall hur påverkar ni partiet?

SAP finansieras ju delvis av LO, har ni krav på motprestation?

- Dvs. förväntar ni er att de skall agera på ett visst sätt som gagnar era medlemmar?

LO företrädare har ofta blivit SAP politiker, har ni någon del i hur SAP väljer sina företrädare?