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Animal Protection in the Anthropocene
*An idea analysis of the Swedish parliamentary debate on animal
protection between 2011 and 2021*

Nanna Friman
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Abstract

Increasing knowledge of animals' physical and emotional needs calls for a constant revision of how to best protect them through legislation – a contentious issue with two main perspectives: animal rights and animal welfarism. The two perspectives represent an anthropocentric and a post-anthropocentric ethical approach to animal protection, making the subject interesting also as a case of balancing human and non-human interests in politics. This study takes a closer look at how the animal rights and the animal welfarist perspectives can be seen in the Swedish parliamentary debate on animal protection. To investigate this, a mixed methods approach with a modified version of ideal type analysis and content analysis was used. The results show that both the animal welfarism and the animal rights perspectives could be seen in the Swedish parliamentary debate between 2011 and 2021. While no significant change in frequency of the use of the different perspectives over the studied time period could be identified, there were other changes in the debate relating to the use of rhetoric, roles of certain parties, and an increased attention to zoonotic disease prevention after 2020. Further studies are required to make generalizable conclusions regarding the presence of post-anthropocentric ethics in today's politics.

Key words: animal protection, animal welfarism, animal rights, idea analysis, debate

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ABBREVIATIONS

AR1	The Abolitionist Approach
AR2	The Citizenship Approach
AR3	The Capabilities Approach
AW1	The Christian Approach
AW2	The Contractarian Approach
AW3	The Utilitarian Approach
C	The Center Party (<i>Centerpartiet</i>)
FP	The Liberals (<i>Folkpartiet</i>)*
KD	The Christian Democrats (<i>Kristdemokraterna</i>)
L	The Liberals (<i>Liberalerna</i>)*
M	The Moderate Party (<i>Moderaterna</i>)
MP	The Green Party (<i>Miljöpartiet</i>)
S	The Social Democrats (<i>Socialdemokraterna</i>)
SD	The Sweden Democrats (<i>Sverigedemokraterna</i>)
V	The Left Party (<i>Vänsterpartiet</i>)

*The Liberals changed name in 2015 from Folkpartiet to Liberalerna, meaning that *FP* and *L* refer to the same party

1. Why study the debate on animal protection?

New scientific discoveries continue to indicate that many non-human species possess greater cognitive abilities and capacity for emotions than previously imagined, yet most modern democracies today continue to label non-human animals as property rather than individuals in legislation. With an increased awareness of animals' physical and emotional needs, comes a moral obligation to revise and improve the ways in which societies protect their well-being. However, the way in which legislation is supposed to play a part in that protection is a conflict-ridden issue. *Animal protection* is an question in which there are two main perspectives of how and as to why animals should be protected, namely: the *animal welfarist* perspective and the *animal rights* perspective (Vayr, 2017:821f.). Those adhering to the animal welfarist line of argumentation assumes anthropocentric reasons for protecting animals, whereas the animal rights advocates recognizes the intrinsic worth of non-human lives and thus builds on post-anthropocentric premises (ibid). The different perspectives on animal protection lead to disagreement on a range of concerns, e.g. whether or not non-humans should have legal rights.

The issue of balancing anthropocentric and post-anthropocentric ethics in politics is not limited to the case of animal protection. For one, humankind's incapability of taking joint action towards preventing further climate change has caused some researchers to argue that battling climate change is, in fact, an issue of ideology rather than science (Almiron & Tafalla, 2019:256; Lenart, 2020:97; Bielefeldt, 2021:515). Humankind appear to be in a collective *ideological denial* about both their role in creating and in facing the situation at hand, pushing some to call for a change from anthropocentric ethics to a non-speciesist world view (Almiron & Tafalla, 2019:256; Cooke, 2020:1168). While it might appear somewhat obvious to most that politics today remain predominantly anthropocentric in its nature, it is – based on the previously mentioned premises – relevant to investigate the degree to which politicians have actually embraced post-anthropocentric values. In other words, studying animal protection in politics is interesting not only in terms of understanding how the legal protection of non-humans is being morally defended and criticized, but also because whether or not there are already elements of non-speciesism present could help shine a light on how close humanity is to reconsider its previous course of action in relation to the other living organisms that share the planet.

Hence, this study aims to investigate to what degree the animal welfarist and the animal rights perspectives are present in the Swedish parliamentary debate on animal protection. When it comes to animal protection, Sweden is an interesting case to study for several reasons. First, Sweden is often put at the top of the lists ranking nations' animal protection (Animal Protection Index, 2020; Lundmark Hedman, Berg & Stéen, 2021:2901). Second, it has a long history of priding itself on its animal protection laws, given that a strong law protecting non-humans was implemented already back in 1988 (Sveriges Riksdag, n.d.). Finally, the Swedish animal protection law was updated in 2019 which indicates that animal protection is a topic on the political agenda (Sveriges Riksdag, 2018).

1.1 Aim and Research Question

The purpose of this study is to investigate how the animal welfarist and the animal rights perspectives on animal protection are represented in the present Swedish parliamentary debate, but also (if) how the debate has changed over the last ten years. To investigate this, a mixed methods approach consisting of a modified ideal type analysis and content analysis will be used; analyzing empirical material which consists of debates on animal protection that took place between 2011 and 2021 in the Swedish parliament. Hence, this study sets out to answer the following research questions:

1.1.1 Research Questions

How are the animal welfarist and the animal rights perspectives represented in the Swedish parliamentary debate on animal protection?

Has the debate changed between 2011 and 2021?

In this study, *animal protection* simply refers to the legal protection of non-human animals living in captivity, from the unnecessary harm directly or indirectly caused by humans. Animal protection can thus be seen as a tool of achieving good animal welfare with. For clarity, it should also be noted that ‘*animals*’ and ‘*non-humans*’ are used synonymously throughout the paper.

1.2 Previous Research

Since social science is a cumulative effort, based on the findings and conclusions of previous research, this section provides an overview of the two fields of literature within political science to which this study aims to contribute to (Esaïasson et al., 2017:20). One field is concerned with non-anthropocentric ethics in the Anthropocene, and the other is concerned with animal protection in a Swedish and European context.

1.2.1 Post-anthropocentrism in the Anthropocene

Post-anthropocentrism is a topic that is actively being discussed within political philosophy. Post-Anthropocentrism is being discussed in several contexts including the climate crisis, environmental protection, and animal welfare. Naess (1976), Leopold (1949) and Singer (1979) are often referred to as some of the initiators and important thinkers of the non-speciesist approach to ethics. Leopold (1949) developed an ethical framework concerning the relationship between humans and the land on which they live. Naess (1976) famously constructed an ecocentric philosophy he named *ecosophy*, in which nature has an intrinsic value. Singer (1979) developed and strongly promoted the non-speciesist concept. What they all have in common is finding flaws in the anthropocentric approach to ethics, and the need to find a more considerate and inclusive way of thinking.

The current discussion on non-speciesism and post-anthropocentrism both supports and criticizes the original philosophers on the topic, creating three main camps: those who agree with post-anthropocentrism as is, those who want to refine it, and those who refute the idea all together. Almiron and Tafalla (2019) take the side in favor of post-anthropocentrism due to the current state of the world in an Anthropocene context by using animal ethics to argue that there is indeed a need to move beyond environmental concerns when it comes to solving the climate crisis (ibid:264). To break the cycle of human disregard in climate change, Almiron and Tafalla propose that the suffering of animals should be highlighted when discussing the climate crisis, as it might evoke compassion in humans (ibid:265). Cooke (2020:1168) is another example of someone siding with the non-anthropocentric approach. She investigates the possible structure of what an ethically suitable frame for politics in the Anthropocene would look like. Cooke – much like Almiron and Tafalla (2019) – stresses the need for change in ethical considerations in politics due to the pressing issue of climate change.

Jakobsen (2017) criticizes both anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism for being too reductionist. He presents alternative ethical approaches which he calls *critical realist non-anthropism* and *anti-reductionism*. Jakobsen argues that non-anthropocentrism in its current state is nothing more but a badly disguised form of anthropocentrism. Both approaches are too ‘*simplistic*’ to fully grasp the complexity of what Jakobsen calls eco-philosophical and ethical concerns (ibid:188). His main argument is that both non-anthropocentrism and anthropocentrism is founded on scientific research that is based on specific understandings of phenomena in sociology, ecology or biology, depending on what is being discussed (ibid). Lenart (2020) also offers criticism of post-anthropocentric thought, specifically those developed by Naess and Leopold. Lenart claims that both philosophies are not only post-anthropocentric, but actually *anti-anthropocentric* which is too uncompromising. Furthermore, Lenart argues that the holistic intrinsic value both Naess and Leopold has bestowed upon nature or ecosystems in their respective philosophies, comes at the price of individual virtue (ibid:116). As a counter proposal he creates a less radical – i.e. closer to anthropocentrism– philosophy in which nature is given an objective value based in humanity’s will to endure or appreciate nature.

Bielefeldt (2021:517) argues that human dignity should indeed be distinguished from the inherent value of non-humans. While Bielefeldt agrees that traditional anthropocentric interests might fail to meet the requirements for solving the climate crisis, the concept of *human rights* should not be cast aside as a result. According to Bielefeldt the key to solving the climate crisis lies not in completely refuting anthropocentrism as such, but rather to raise awareness of the fragile interconnectedness of all things living on this planet (ibid:537).

It is perhaps not surprising that such a philosophical subject has primarily been studied through very theory-based, argumentative, and normative studies. The present study aims to add to the discussion on ethics in the Anthropocene by empirically investigating how these perspectives can be seen in real politics today. While the present study won’t provide new philosophical arguments for either ‘camp’ in the field, it could help shine a light on how pragmatic and realistic the integration of post-anthropocentrism in politics is which could help future studies develop their own argumentation on the topic. Since one case study alone is hardly enough to

describe how the integration of these philosophical and ethical approaches look across the world, future studies could investigate other cases – both different countries and topics regarding post-anthropocentrism – to add to the empirical comprehension.

1.2.2 Animal Protection in Sweden and the EU

Sweden implemented its first animal protection law in 1944 which was replaced by a new one in 1988 (Utredningen om översyn av djurskyddslagstiftningens utformning och innehåll, 2011:173). The apparatus surrounding animal protection has since then gone through some important organizational changes. When the Swedish government shifted in 2006, the animal protection authority was disbanded and the responsibility of animal protection was moved to the Swedish Board of Agriculture (*Jordbruksverket*). In 2011, the government released a report following an investigation of the Swedish animal protection legislation, but it wasn't until 2019 that a new animal protection law replaced the one from 1988, and it was done so by a different government (ibid; Sveriges Riksdag, 2018). Another important mark in the Swedish animal protection history was of course the joining of the EU. Swedish animal protection has undeniably been affected by EU guidelines and regulations. Moving on to the previous research on this topic, it thus would be a mistake not to include a European perspective. Studies concerning Swedish animal protection have in general taken quite different approaches to the topic where some are focused on the actual quality and impact of the legislation itself on animal welfare and some on the discourse around it. This leads to a not completely coherent field of research where the studies do not always have a clear connection to one another.

It is hard not to stumble upon the name Per-Anders Svärd when researching Swedish animal protection in political science. Svärd (2013) studied the parliamentary debates in Sweden on slaughter between 1887 and 1937, showing how alternative ways of slaughter executed by minorities in Sweden were heavily criticized. Svärd used Bacchi's '*What's the problem represented to be*' discourse analysis to show how the guilt and problem associated with slaughter and meat consumption were pushed onto other groups in society; such as the indigenous population or the Jewish community (ibid:79). Putting the blame on minorities helped the Swedes shield themselves from viewing themselves as those who torture or kill animals. In other words, *othering* is a means of separating the cruel reality of slaughter from the Swedish identity. The othering led to a type of animal protection nationalism that Svärd means traces of can still be seen today, but directed towards other minorities such as the Muslim community (ibid:80).

Other studies focused on how well the animal protection actually protects the welfare of animals in Sweden. Lundmark Hedman, Berg and Stéen (2021) decided to analyze both proposed and implemented changes of the Swedish animal protection laws regarding pigs, cattle and horses between 1988 and 2019. The three authors found that the animal welfare of the concerned animals had increased during the studied time period, but that some requirements had been lowered in order to cater to human interests (ibid:2909). Interestingly, they suggest that the new Animal Welfare Act implemented in 2019 showcases a shift from an animal welfarist perspective to viewing animals as having intrinsic worth, but have difficulty pinpointing what

the practical implications of this will actually be (ibid:2908). This issue is tackled in a study by Sowery (2018). Sowery points out that animals gaining the EU constitutional title of *sentient beings* and the need to be protected as such, presents a paradox in which animals are being increasingly used for the benefit of humans but are increasingly thought of as being morally owed protection by humans (ibid:56). The same treaty that portrays animals as sentient beings also refer to them as agricultural products (ibid:98). Sowery concludes that in practice, most EU measures concerned with animal protection still centers around animals as being goods and products. She wonders whether the status as sentient beings has any real meaning and argues that formal legal change will not be enough to improve the life standards of animals within the EU due to – among other things – the issues regarding enforcing the laws (ibid:98f).

Finally, there is also a part of the field of literature on animal protection within the EU which mainly focus on the various areas of application of the laws; such as food safety, fish welfare, transportation of animals, and animal testing (Gonciarov & Coman, 2015; Giménez-Candela, Saraiva & Bauer, 2020; Meriggi, 2020). Szymańska (2021), for example studied animal protection in regards to the EU development strategy (the European Green Deal), finding that it sets new boundaries regarding the human treatment of non-human animals which most likely will lead to an increased quality in terms of food safety and animal welfare (ibid:246).

Similar to Svärd's (2013) study, the present study deals with the political discussion surrounding the laws rather than the actual laws and implications themselves. The present study aims to fill in a gap of the literature on Swedish animal protection regarding the presence of animal welfarism and animal rights in the parliamentary debate during the last decade by applying a mixed methods approach. The present study will thus provide more in-depth understanding of how the protection of non-humans are being ethically and morally discussed in Sweden today. Additionally, the present study could add dimension to Sowery's (2018) discussion on how animals are being viewed in legislation by adding how they are being viewed by the legislature.

2. Methodology

2.1 Design, case selection and fundamental assumptions

This is a primarily *descriptive idea analysis* with elements of both qualitative and quantitative method, that examines the presence of animal welfarism and animal rights in a parliamentary debate (Beckman, 2007:48; Vedung, 2018:201). Though this study can hardly be categorized as theory testing, Sweden has been chosen to study due to it being a ‘most likely case’ for incorporating elements of both perspectives in a parliamentary debate (George & Bennett, 2005:121). In other words, if there are no elements of post-anthropocentrism in the case of Swedish politics, it is also unlikely that they are present elsewhere. With that being said, this study recognizes the limitations in terms of generalizations that can be made based on its results which is why further studies involving other cases are encouraged. Additionally, the aspiration of making generalizable conclusions is not the primary aim of interpretivist studies such as this one.

Furthermore, this study is based on an anti-foundationalist, constructivist ontology – treating the world as something that is socially constructed by social actors and therefore cannot be separated from our knowledge of it (Bryman, 2016:28; Marsh, Ercan & Furlong, 2018:179). The epistemological approach thus becomes interpretivism; an approach which is more focused on understanding phenomenon rather than explaining them (Bryman, 2016:26). Hence, this study accepts the assumption that words and, subsequently, statements carry with them meaning that when being studied requires methodological approaches different than the positivistic ones found in natural scientific method (ibid). The elements of quantitative methods used in this study builds on the findings from the qualitative analysis, meaning that the mixed methods approach does not inherently contradict the epistemological standpoint made above.

2.2 A mixed methods approach

This study uses a mixed methods approach to answer its research questions. The first research question demands a tool for categorizing and distinguishing the two perspectives on animal protection from one another, consequently the chosen method for this study is a modified version of *ideal type analysis*. Ideal types can be thought of as making up heuristic templates which help isolate signs of certain phenomena in the empirical material – in this case the presence of animal rights- or animal welfare ethics (Bergström & Svärd, 2018:148f). However, animal welfarism and animal rights are two very broad perspectives, multifaceted with different views on how to best interpret them. Hence, setting up two main ideal types would not adequately capture the many nuances of the theories. That is why this study uses a modified version of the method where several smaller ideal types, focused on the various branches within the two main perspectives will be set up. It should be noted that the different branches within the same perspectives are not always mutually exclusive on all points relevant to include in the overview of their tenets, but the term ideal type will be used nonetheless. The first step in constructing the ideal types is going through both theories on animal protection and systematically account for their tenets. The second step will be selecting the criteria on which

the ideal types are to be formed. Finally, the constructed ideal types of animal welfarism and animal rights will be applied as an analytical framework to the empirical material.

To answer the second research question, i.e. how the presence of the different perspectives on animal protection has changed over time, this study includes elements of quantitative content analysis (Beckman, 2007:42). It is usually the frequency of certain terms in large amounts of data that is being measured through content analysis (Esaiasson et al., 2017:198f). In this study, the frequency of the different ideal types will be measured, but the frequency will be presented in terms of how many speakers per debate that uttered statements related to the respective ideal types on animal protection. The unit of analysis is statements, meaning that one speaker could potentially present ideas from several different ideal types within the same address to parliament. The whole methodological process can be seen in *figure 1* below. Due to the theory review being necessary to carry out before the construction of the ideal types, the operationalization section can be found at the end of the theory chapter instead of here.



Figure 1: Overview of the methodological process of the present study

The material studied in this study consist of six parliamentary debates that took place in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2019, 2020 and 2021; amounting to a total of 9 hours and 55 min analyzed debates. All debates except the one in 2011 had already been transcribed, hence the 2011 debate was transcribed by the author of this paper. All parliamentary parties participated in the debate, including: the Social Democrats (S), the Moderate Party (M), the Sweden Democrats (SD), the Liberals (L/FP), the Center Party (C), the Green Party (MP), the Left Party (V), and the Christian Democrats (KD). All the analyzed material was published in Swedish, thus the quotes presented in the analysis and result has been translated into English by the author of this paper. The debates were published on the official website of the Swedish parliament.

2.3 Scope

While the study is more *idea-* than *actor* focused, and the aim is not to label particular parties or politicians as being anthropocentric or not in their ethical argumentation, the study does take into consideration the party affiliation of speakers in order to not miss potentially interesting patterns in the results (Beckman, 2007:17). Similarly, in order to provide a more holistic overview of the debate no political parties have been singled out. Furthermore, this study has a longitudinal perspective in that it studies whether there has occurred any change in the way the two perspectives on animal protection can be seen in the debate. The timespan 2011-2021 was chosen as the study is focused on how the *current* debate on animal protection is incorporating the animal rights and animal welfarist perspectives. Due to time restrictions and word count limitations, the study would not be able to include all years between 2011 and 2021 in its scope without sacrificing the quality and depth of the analysis. The period 2019-2021 was chosen as it represents the time after the implementation of the new Swedish animal protection law of

2019, and in order to put equal emphasis on the beginning of the studied period, the three subsequent years after the investigation and suggestions of improvements to the animal protection law was published in 2011 (i.e. 2011-2013) will also be studied. This selection will allow for a comparison to be made of how the debate in the beginning and end of the decade looked like. Finally, it should be noted that as a primarily qualitative study with only one person interpreting and translating the results, this study has a potentially low inter researcher reliability. This issue has however been combated through an attempt at remaining as transparent as possible throughout the methodological steps and analysis; but it is nevertheless an issue that somewhat remains.

3. Theories on animal protection

As Sowery (2018) points out, both animal rights and animal welfarism recognize non-human sentience but draw different conclusions as to what that should mean in practice when it comes to animal protection. In other words, both the animal welfarism and animal rights perspectives aim to protect animals – it is the reasons as to why the animal needs to be protected and the consequent cause of action that differs between them. This chapter provides an overview of the most prominent and central theories and their corresponding arguments on the two perspectives on animal protection as interpreted by the author of this paper.

3.1 Animal Welfarism

Animal welfarism is built on anthropocentric values of viewing the significance of animals in relation to human wants and needs. Animal welfarism thus refutes the idea of intrinsic worth, but accepts that animals ought to be protected nonetheless. Humans are inherently separated from non-human animals in a superior way due to our higher cognitive functions and ability to reason (Vayr, 2017:822). The premise of human superiority allows animal welfarists to form conclusions such as: it is right to use animals, but that this right also leads to obligations to protect them from *unnecessary* suffering (Vayr, 2017:823). Donaldson and Kymlicka describe welfarism as ‘the *humane use* of animals by humans’ (2011:11). This section contains three common ways of justifying animal welfarism: contractarianism, Christianity, and utilitarianism.

3.1.1 The Contractarian Approach

Kant (1930:239f) holds that humans cannot be thought to have any direct moral duties toward animals. Animals’ lack of self-consciousness is reason enough to see them purely as ‘means to an end’, with that end being the wants and needs of humanity. That animals cannot be seen as their own end does not however mean that humans ought to treat them cruelly according to Kant. Instead, he argues that the good treatment of animals is an ‘*indirect duty towards mankind*’ since the way humans treat animals will spill over to the treatment of other humans (ibid:241). Rawls (1971:448f) is another contractarian who – although very briefly – touches upon the ethical treatment of animals. In his famous work *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls is hesitant to extend the duties of justice to animals since they cannot be said to inhabit a sense of justice. In contrast to Kant, Rawls does however go on to argue that there are certain duties towards animals. Due to their ability to experience both pain and pleasure, it would be morally wrong to mistreat non-humans. Consequently, Rawls suggest that the duties towards animals are founded in ‘*compassion and humanity*’ (ibid).

3.1.2 The Christian Approach

One advocator of the Christian approach is Matthew Scully (2011). Scully describes human affection for animals in terms of domination, claiming that the love animals evoke in humans is similar to that of the love between ‘*the strong and the vulnerable*’ (ibid:16). Consequently,

he argues that being kind towards animals is a *'duty of human charity'*. Humans ought to care about animals as they carry the *'unmistakable mark'* of God, just as humans (ibid:19). This should not however be interpreted as them being equals to humans. Indeed, believing that a divine power has created man in his image helps justify why humans have a superior role and consequent ability to dominate animals. Scully underscores this point by stating that animals' purpose differs from humans' but that it should not be forgotten that animals too were created by God and that their godly intended happiness should not be so easily destroyed by humans (ibid). In other words, the worth of animals from this position derives from their supposed divine creation; but the divine creation is also what allows humans a morally justified dominion over them.

3.1.3 The Utilitarian Approach

Utilitarianism is one of the most common philosophies referred to when trying to justify the animal welfarist perspective. It is the focus on the collective goods rather than individual interests that goes well along with animal welfarism (Gruen, 2017). A great example of this is the way meat consumption is justified; it would be morally justifiable to kill and consume the meat of an animal if it lived a good life and the alternative would be to let people – *humans* – go hungry or starve (ibid). The same logic can be applied for using animals for medical experiments. The focus of animal protection should thus be to ensure a good life quality of the animal while it lives, not to ensure that it gets to live through its full life expectancy. Hence, utilitarian philosophers such as Bentham argue that it is not immoral to end the lives of animals who neither possess the cognitive capabilities necessary to grasp that their life is about to cease, nor the interest to continue their existence (Nussbaum, 2006:359). Consequently, the breeding of new livestock does not present an ethical dilemma in itself for utilitarian philosophers, if said animals experienced a life even marginally worth living since the collective amount of life experienced can be seen as a *"positive good"* (ibid:345).

3.2 Animal Rights

The different branches of animal rights theories are numerous and vary in many aspects of their argumentation, there is however one fundamental assumption they all center around, namely: that animals experience a subjective existence which consequently means that humans ought to recognize them as subjects with intrinsic worth and inviolable rights rather than objects (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011:40). In this section, an overview of some of the most dominant theories are made; however, it should be noted that this short section can in no claim to represent all the different theories on animal rights.

3.2.1 The Abolitionist Approach

The abolitionist approach to animal protection – promoted by Francione (2007) among others – is one of the more radical ones. According to this view, if animal rights has to do with achieving an end to all exploitation of non-humans and consequently breaking them free from enslavement, then no interaction between humans and non-humans can be allowed (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011:48). With this reasoning follows the conclusion that no domesticated species

would be allowed to continue to exist since they cannot survive in the wild and are thus reliant on human dominion which is inherently bad in this view (ibid:77). Similarly, the abolitionist approach recognizes veganism as the only morally viable type of consumption (Francione, 2007:42). Abolitionist theory on animal rights tend to come with a strong skepticism and critique towards initiatives supporting small, incremental improvements of animal welfare standards; e.g. praising restaurant chains who've adopted higher standards of slaughter, since all this does is perpetuating the idea that slaughter can be legitimized in the first place (ibid:55).

3.2.2 The Citizenship Theory Approach

In contrast to animal abolitionists who claim that all interaction between man and animal must cease, Kymlicka and Donaldson (2011:49) explore how symbiotic, non-exploiting relationships between humans and non-humans can look. They make a case for granting domesticated animals with citizenships, wild animals with sovereignty, and denizenship to so called liminal animals (i.e. animals who have not been domesticated but who have adapted their lives to live among humans, e.g. rats or racoons) (ibid:19;210). Like other animal rights theorists, Donaldson and Kymlicka agrees that animals have inviolable rights which means that no individual's basic interests such as survival can be sacrificed in order to benefit others. These basic interests relates to the negative rights of not being owned, killed, kept within confinement, tortured or separated from the family (ibid:14).

In terms of citizenship for domesticated animals, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue for three different dimensions of citizenships: nationality (which prevents statelessness), popular sovereignty (from which a state's legitimacy is derived), and democratic political agency (2011:55f). Furthermore, they make a point that the focus of the meaning of citizenship too often land on the third dimension, which is why animals tend to not be considered capable of being seen as citizens; yet the argument that animals can't be citizens because they can't participate in democratic elections falls short since the same can be said about human children who nonetheless are granted the status of citizens (ibid:21). Additionally, Kymlicka and Donaldson do not agree with the assumption that animals could not in principle participate in democratic activities. On the contrary, they suggest developing scripts based on the expressions of domesticated animals to decipher what interests they have; an idea inspired by the interpretation of human individuals who suffer from limited communicational skills due to various reasons (ibid:60).

Wild animals, in contrast to the domesticated ones, belong to their own sovereign communities and consequently do not need the citizenship title according to Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011:61). Whereas traditional animal rights theorists have focused on preventing the harm caused by direct violence by humans such as hunting, Donaldson and Kymlicka also puts emphasis on other harmful human activities such as the destruction of habitats and inadvertent harms (ibid:205). When it comes to animals who live on human territory, in for example cities, but are not domesticated, Donaldson and Kymlicka underscores the need for a peaceful solution allowing for co-existence (2011:250). Their solution is thus making such animals denizens with the right to residency and with fewer rights and responsibilities than that of a citizen (ibid:241).

3.2.3 The Capabilities Approach

Martha Nussbaum (2006) applies her capabilities approach to the question of justice for animals, presenting a less absolutist view on animal rights than for example abolitionists. Her main argument builds around the idea that non-human animals, much like humans have the right to flourish and that certain capabilities need to be fulfilled in order for them to do so. That animals in today's society is denied a so called *dignified existence*, is in Nussbaum's own words 'a case of injustice' (ibid:326). Indeed, animals can be seen as active agents and subjects, who possess an intrinsic good and that they have a right to pursue that good unencumbered (ibid:337). Animals cannot and should not be seen merely as objects of compassion, but rather as individual creatures entitled to respect (ibid:351). Nussbaum further emphasizes that to mistreat animals is both unjust of humans, but also that it is unfair *to* the animals (ibid:337). Her whole idea is built around the wants and needs of the individual with arguments that claim no animal – human or non-human – should be considered as a means to the ends of someone else (ibid:351).

There appears, however, to be exceptions to the rule of focusing solely on the well-being and life fulfillment of all individuals in Nussbaum's view on animal protection. For one, the preservation of endangered species could be prioritized over the needs of individuals of other species – not to secure the flourishing of future generations, but because to be able to reproduce is required for the existing individuals to fulfill their capabilities (Nussbaum, 2006:358). Similarly, Nussbaum argues that humans ought not to stop interfering in nature; for example killing – though sterilizing is pointed out to be the preferred alternative if possible – bugs in order to protect important vegetation, or rats to stop them from spreading diseases to humans in city environments (ibid:371). Hence, the capabilities approach does borrow logic from utilitarianism in certain aspects. Additionally, Nussbaum's views on animal protection takes into consideration the level of sentience (ibid:360f). While the level of sentience does not correlate in any way to the worth of a creature, it does have an impact when it comes to the level of suffering and potential harm that an animal can be subjected to. Put differently, since a dolphin has more specific types of suffering than say a snail, it means that the dolphin has more capabilities that need to be fulfilled in order for it to flourish as an individual than the snail does.

The humans' role in making sure animals get to live a flourishing life simply refers to fulfill the negative duties towards animals, i.e. to make sure they have a habitat to live in, or that they don't go hungry or without medical treatment when under the care of humans (Nussbaum, 2006:373). At least this is all that can be morally demanded by humans according to Nussbaum. The rest is up to the individuals themselves.

3.3 Construction of the ideal types

After the theory review, the author of this paper identified six different criteria that highlighted the tenets of the respective views on animal protection – thus constructing the ideal types. The criteria and a brief explanation and motivation as to why they were chosen can be found in *table 1* below. In summation, the criteria were selected by the author as they represent important building blocks of the different perspectives on animal protection, and as they highlight the way in which the different views tend to differ – thus making the distinction between the ideal types clearer for the reader. The selected criteria was then applied to the different approaches belonging to animal welfarism and animal rights, creating six ideal types which can be found in *table 2* and *3* below.

Evaluation Criteria	Motivation
<i>Source of animals' worth</i>	Whether or not an animal is considered to possess an intrinsic worth or not will help show how anthropocentric or post-anthropocentric the view on animal protection is.
<i>Consequence of sentience</i>	Does it matter how high cognitive abilities a species has when it comes to protecting it and/or its individuals? This point shines a light on discrimination of certain species.
<i>The relationship between humans and non-humans</i>	Refers to both the interaction between humans and non-humans – should it be allowed even? –, but also to how humankind positions itself in relation to animals. In other words: what is and should the relationship be between humans and animals?
<i>Individual vs. collective focus</i>	How accepted is it to sacrifice one individual for the benefit of many? This is an important distinction that shows whether the aim of protecting animals should be to preserve species in general or is the goal to end suffering for each individual?
<i>Willingness to compromise</i>	Shows how absolutist the view on animal protection is. Can any compromise be made to improve the lives of animals today or does such compromises come at too high a cost according to the perspectives?
<i>Foundation of animal protection</i>	Could be considered similar to criteria number one, but goes a bit more in dept to examine and highlight why it is that animals ought to be protected by humans. This point could be considered a fundamental part of the core argument of the respective view.

Table 1 Overview of the selected criteria on which the ideal types will be based and the motivation/explanation behind them

	The Christian Approach	The Contractarian Approach	The Utilitarian Approach
Source of animals' worth	God given worth through divine creation	Means to an end (humanity)	Add to collective value of life experience
Consequence of sentience	Irrelevant.	Human sentience superior to animals → humans can enter social contracts → should have rights. No animals possess sentience high enough to reach that threshold.	The higher sentience of an animal, the higher the capability of experiencing both pain and pleasure → relevant when considering moral use of animals.
The relationship between humans and non-humans	Mankind has dominion over animals and can in no way be considered equals.	Human use of animals accepted, but should be characterized by compassion	Okay for humans to use animals so long as the animals' lives are marginally worth living
Focus on individuals vs. collective	Varies; each individual stems from divine creation, but humanity as a collective has the right to dominion over the animal kingdom	More focus on the collective (i.e. the benefit of humanity)	Focus on the collective. Individual sacrifice for the greater good encouraged
Willingness to compromise	Low tolerance; animals cannot be granted with rights such as humans have.	Medium tolerant: expresses no absolute terms for the treatment of animals simply that it should be humane. However would not be willing to grant rights to animals on the basis that they do not possess the cognitive abilities	Low tolerance; not willing to sacrifice the greater good for the protection of individual rights of animals
Foundation of animal protection	The Godly intended happiness for animals need to be protected by their superiors (humans)	Animal protection as an indirect duty towards humanity – treatment of animals is mirrored in the treatment of fellow humans	Animal protection as a means of achieving the highest possible good for the highest amount of lives

Table 2 Three ideal types of animal welfarism based on their tenets

	The Abolitionist Approach	Citizenship Approach	Capabilities Approach
Source of animals' worth	Intrinsic Worth	Intrinsic Worth	Intrinsic Worth
Consequence of sentience	Irrelevant, all animals – and humans – are equal regardless of their level of sentience	Harder to interpret the interests of animals with lower sentience but does not affect worth	Higher sentience requires more advanced capabilities to be fulfilled to achieve individual flourishing
The relationship between humans and non-humans	Humans and animals are equals. To prevent harm, no interaction between the two can be accepted. Domesticated species are by definition enslaved and should thus be eradicated	Categorizes animals due to their human relationships: wild, domesticated and liminal. Animals are given different rights depending on the group to which they belong. Symbiotic interactions encouraged.	Humans are only morally expected to fulfil the negative rights of wild animals, but they have an extended responsibility in ensuring the flourishing of domesticated animals
Focus on individuals vs. collective	Focus on individuals	Focus on individuals	Focus on individuals
Willingness to compromise	Very low tolerance of compromise. Absolutist.	Not absolutist, unwilling to violate the rights of certain animals for others; but do talk about restricting the populations of liminal animals	Willing to violate individual rights e.g. by killing disease spreading rodents to protect humans
Foundation of animal protection	Animals have intrinsic worth that need to be protected from all human intervention	Animals have inviolable rights that cannot in any morally right way be sacrificed for the benefit of others	Animals are subjects, justice is owed <i>to</i> them, they have a right to flourish

Table 3 Three ideal types of animal rights based on their tenets

3.4 Operationalization

Now that the analytical framework has been established, the practical process of how to apply it to the empirical material needs to be accounted for. The aim of the operationalization is to make elements of animal welfarism and animal rights in the Swedish parliamentary debate measurable, starting with the modified ideal type analysis. To achieve a high validity of the results, it is imperative that the operationalization matches the theoretical definitions of the studied phenomena (Esaiasson et al., 2017:57). That is why an overview of the coding process has been presented in *figure 2*. The figure shows the steps leading to a statement being categorized as one of the constructed ideal types. If the statement was not related to any of the answers to question 2 in the coding process, the statement was not categorized as any of the ideal types. The different ideal types of animal welfarism and animal rights will be referred to abbreviations as following throughout the rest of the paper: The Christian approach (AW1), the contractarian approach (AW2), the utilitarian approach (AW3), the abolitionist approach (AR1), the citizenship approach (AR2), and the capabilities approach (AR3).




Figure 2 Map over the coding process

4. The Swedish parliamentary debate on animal protection

Summary of the debates

In the 2011 debate, the discussion mainly circled around a potential ban on castrating young male piglets without anesthesia, the conditions under which minks live in the fur industry, the closing of the ministry of animal protection, and the re-organization which moved animal inspections from the municipalities to the regions. There was also brief mentions of the consensus around a formal ban of using animals for sexual purposes, and for implementing higher standards for transporting animals to slaughter. The year after, 2012, focused more on the protection of animals being used for scientific purposes, i.e. animal testing. The mink farms were once again brought up to discussion with the opposition (S, V, and MP) anxious of implementing stricter rules to secure the welfare of the minks. There was also a lively debate around the permitted slaughter of animals without anesthesia within the EU; and whether or not the issue of non-anesthetized slaughter is more or less related to criticism towards certain religions such as Islam and Judaism. The debate in 2013 took place without any representatives from the Sweden Democrats participating. The opposition parties (S, MP, and V) were questioning why there was not a proposal for a new animal protection law yet despite the investigation and report with suggestions having been ready since 2011. Other issues that were brought up were once again the mink farms, but also the use of antibiotics in the food industry.

Jumping forward six years to 2019, the debate was held to discuss the decision to vote about plans for new stables for animals having to be pre-approved by the county boards (*länsstyrelserna*). There were also re-occurring statements about the importance of keeping the use of antibiotics in animal production as low as possible, and that Sweden are good at doing that. The 2020 debate on animal protection was heavily influenced by the corona pandemic which had recently broken out. Mentions of how much strain the pandemic had put on both Swedish farmers and the Swedish society in general were frequent; and so were criticism of other nations' lack of acceptable animal protection – particularly China. There were also talks of ethical animal testing, use of antibiotics in the food industry, and the grazing requirements for cows. The Left Party did not participate in the 2020 debate. The final debate that was analyzed, namely the 2021 debate focused on animal protection in the context of being able to prevent new pandemic outbreaks. A debate around the illegal imports of dogs to Sweden also took place, and the shortage of veterinarians and veterinary nurses in Sweden.

4.1 Elements of animal rights and animal welfarism

Table 4 provides an overview of the amount of speakers for each analyzed debate which expressed statements, thoughts, or arguments in line with the various ideal types of animal rights and animal welfarism. The number of speakers is presented in the table for transparency reasons, as the amount of speakers varied in the debates. The result shows that all ideal types were identified in the debates on animal protection, but with different frequency. In other words, the politicians incorporated both anthropocentric and post-anthropocentric ethics in their statements. The AW1 and AR2 were the two least common ideal types on animal protection to be identified in these debates. The AW3 was the most common way of arguing for animal protection in five out of the six debates. Similarly, as *table 6* shows, all parties used AW3 reasoning at one point in the studied time period. Something that was a dominant trend in all debates was that many of the speakers did not consistently stick to one of the ideal types when addressing the parliament. In fact, not only did the motivations and statements vary in which ideal type the speakers got closest to between different debates, but also within the same debate. One great example of this is when Marlène Lund Kopparklint (M) said that Sweden is in need of a *Vision Zero goal* to put an end to ‘the suffering of animals in general’, – a statement compatible with the animal rights ideal types – only to continue in the next sentence of stating that it’s the *unnecessary* suffering of animals needs to be prevented which would be more aligned with animal welfarism ideal types (Sveriges Riksdag, 2021). Looking at *table 6*, M and S showed most variation in their reasoning in the analyzed debates. The parties that only stuck to one ideal type when reasoning about animal protection were C, KD, and SD, who all used AW3. That is not to say that C, KD, and SD coherently used AW3 throughout their reasoning; on the contrary, a lot of the statements in the debate did not adhere to any of the ideal types. This leads to another observation about the debates.

The parties to which the speakers belonged to can be seen in *table 5*, highlighting an unexpected result, namely that there were cases of speakers who did not use reasonings connected to any of the six ideal types *at all*. One of the speakers that did not adhere to any of the ideal type was Ulrika Heie (C) in the 2019, 2020 and 2021 debates. The other speaker was Irene Oskarsson (KD) in the 2011 debate. Both Heie and Oskarsson took on the line of argumentation that it is the Swedish farmers that need to be protected, meaning that the focus was shifted from the welfare of animals to the competitiveness of Swedish animal products on the market. In relation to this angle of the issue, Heie and Oskarsson either promoted no additional regulations in favor of a higher standard of animal protection to be implemented, or argued for a loosening of current regulations to ease the burden on Swedish farmers. Important to note is that other participants also spoke of the importance of caring for Swedish farmers, but they also included the welfare of the animals in their arguments unlike Heie and Oskarsson; examples of this will be shown in the analysis below. Similarly, there were also instances where things other than animal protection was being brought up for discussion despite the debate topic, e.g. the important work of healthcare professionals during the corona pandemic (Sveriges Riksdag, 2020). Since it would not be possible to present the analysis of all the debates in its entirety, examples of statements being categorized as adhering to the different ideal types, and a motivation as to why

will be presented in the following section. An overview of these statements in their original form can be found in *appendix 1*.

Year	AW1	AW2	AW3	AR1	AR2	AR3
2021	2/8	2/8	6/8	0/8	0/8	3/8
2020	0/7	1/7	5/7	0/7	2/7	1/7
2019	0/8	0/8	5/8	1/8	0/8	3/8
2013	1/7	0/7	6/7	0/7	1/7	0/7
2012	0/9	0/9	6/9	0/9	0/9	3/9
2011	0/10	1/10	4/10	0/10	0/10	5/10

Table 4 x out of y speakers per parliamentary debate in Sweden that expressed statements adhering to the six different ideal types on animal protection; i.e. 2 out of 8 speakers used AW1 reasonings in the 2021 debate

Year	AW1	AW2	AW3	AR1	AR2	AR3
2021	(M) (L)	(L) (MP)	(SD) (V) (KD) (L) (S) (MP)			(V) (M) (MP)
2020*		(L)	(M) (SD) (KD) (S) (L)		(M) (MP)	(S)
2019			(M) (SD) (KD) (L) (S)	(S)		(S) (V) (MP)
2013**	(M)		(V) (S) (M) (FP) (C) (KD)		(MP)	
2012			(S) (M) (FP) (C) (KD) (SD)			(S) (MP) (V)
2011		(S)	(M) (FP) (C) (SD)			(Sx2) (MPx2) (V)

Table 5 The party affiliation of speakers who expressed reasonings adhering to the six different ideal types of animal protection philosophy in the Swedish parliament between 2011 and 2021

*V did not participate, ** SD did not participate

	AW1	AW2	AW3	AR1	AR2	AR3
C	-	-	Yes	-	-	-
KD	-	-	Yes	-	-	-
L	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	-	-
M	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes	Yes
MP	-	-	Yes	-	Yes	Yes
S	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes
SD	-	-	Yes	-	-	-
V	-	-	Yes	-	-	Yes

Table 6 Shows what ideal types on animal protection the Swedish parliamentary parties used in debates that took place between 2011-2013 and 2019-2021

2011

The 2011 debate showed signs of both the animal welfarism and animal rights perspectives. Sara Karlsson (S) argued that the mistreatment of animals often is connected to social issues with the responsible owner (Sveriges Riksdag, 2011). This was brought up in the context of the animal welfare inspections being moved from the municipality to the regional level, thus losing part of its cooperation with the social authority. The statement can be seen as approaching AW2 reasoning since the treatment of animals is argued to be strongly connected to the treatment of people in AW2 – similar to what Karlsson is saying. Another animal welfarist element in the debate could be seen in the statement from Åsa Coenraads (M) (ibid). Coenraads stated that one cannot simply ban the castration of male piglets without considering the effects it would have on the Swedish pig production. Coenraads' statement can be interpreted as her being willing to let piglets suffer so that the industry – which is providing jobs for farmers and meat for consumers – may continue to exist; which is quite in line with AW3, a perspective which is willing to let individuals suffer for the benefit of the collective. The animal rights perspective was also present in the debate of 2011. The AR3 ideal type focuses a lot on the flourishing of the individual, which a statement by Jens Holm's (V) regarding minks relates to (ibid). Holm spoke of the right of the minks to be able to behave and live out their instincts like they would in the wild – being able to climb, swim, hunt, and move around; which could all be interpreted as needs having to be fulfilled for the minks to be able to flourish in accordance to AR3.

2012

An example of AW3 in the 2012 debate is a statement by Anita Brodén (FP). Brodén stated that the use of animals for scientific testing is many times necessary in order to save human lives and to spare humans of suffering (Sveriges Riksdag, 2012). In other words, Brodén states that the suffering of some animals can be justified through the benefit it has for humanity in general which is accordance to AW3, but that testing on animals should be refined, replaced and reduced (the 3 Rs of animal testing) to prevent unnecessary suffering of animals as well. The AR3 ideal type was spotted three times in the 2012 debate. Helena Leander (MP) was one of the politicians who used AR3 reasoning in her statements (ibid). Leander raises the issue of the animals not being able to speak for themselves and that they consequently depend on the humans participating in the debate being able to see them as 'individuals, with their own feelings, interests and needs'. Leander further points out that animals don't make the choice themselves to die in the name of providing humanity with fur, meat or milk; but that this is something which humans have decided for them. The animal rights ideal types all have in common the focus on individualism which Leander includes in her statement, but AR3 has a particularly strong focus on the flourishing of each individual. Hence, when Leander mentions the feelings, interests and needs of the animals, the statements approaches the AR3 ideal type somewhat more than the AR1 or AR2.

2013

In the 2013 debate, Åsa Coenraads (M) mentioned that the hunting tradition in Sweden is something that has been going on for a long time and that the Moderate party would like to protect (Sveriges Riksdag, 2013). The AW1 ideal type is centered around Christian religious values on animal protection, and while tradition might not inherently be considered neither Christian nor religious; what AW1 has in common with Coenraads statement is that they both are founded in a historical context. Similarly, the tradition to hunt goes quite well along with the AW1 idea of a god given right for humans to dominate other species. There were also elements of AW3 in the 2013 debate, one example being when Inger Fredriksson (C) spoke of the importance to secure equal opportunities for the Swedish food producers so that they may defend the Swedish production, while at the same time try to raise the standards for animals around the world. To raise the standards for animals abroad in order to even out the competition between producers in and outside of Sweden can be seen as an AW3 justification – since it aims to secure the best possible outcome for all, i.e. the highest collective good. There were also signs of animal rights ideal types in the 2013 debate. Helena Leander (MP) began her address by saying that animals tend not to be prioritized by politicians since they represent a group that cannot vote and consequently don't win votes for politicians when being prioritized. Just like Leander, the AR2 approach is critical to animals being overlooked due to not being able to participate in elections. Similarly, Leander expresses regret over the animals not being a group with voting rights that would catch the attention of politicians, and the AR2 reasoning clearly states that animals' interests can and should be interpreted into political opinions.

2019

The AW3 ideal type of animal protection has no issue with raising animals for the sole purpose of killing it for food if the life the animal has is marginally good. An example of someone who argued along these lines is Yasmine Eriksson (SD), who made a statement in the 2019 debate against the rule that cows who live outside all year round are required to have access to a shed in which they can escape the weather as it is an expensive demand for the farmers (Sveriges Riksdag, 2019). Eriksson stated that the cost is too high and that the animals can survive living outside without access to weather protection by a shed; i.e. while the shed might be nice for the cows, it isn't a necessity as the cows' lives will still be marginally good and thus presents no ethical dilemma. The 2019 debate also contained the only statement found to adhering to the AR1 ideal type in this analysis. The statement came from Magnus Manhammar (S) who spoke about the animal industry in harsh terms (ibid). By quoting the large quantities of animals being killed and consumed by humans every day, Manhammar claimed to be sure that future generations will look back at the current treatment of animals with horror. Manhammar further stated that it is both awful and unsustainable, the amount of animals that humanity kills every day, and that the work for the rights of animals needs to be strengthened and continue on a daily basis. As was presented in the theory chapter, the AR1 ideal type is the least compromising of the animal rights perspectives. It calls for a total ban of killing animals for human purposes and while this is not explicitly spoken by Manhammar, the same type of rhetoric found in the AR1 ideal type is certainly present in his reasoning in this particular case. Elisabeth Falkhaven (MP)

also used animal rights reasoning, but one closer to the AR3 ideal type (ibid). Falkhaven pointed out that it was not long ago that it wasn't widely accepted that animals had the ability to communicate, simply because they don't communicate with human languages. However, recent scientific discoveries have confirmed what Falkhaven says she, like many other pet owners, already knew: animals have feelings. Further, Falkhaven stated that having the best animal protection in the world does not necessarily mean that it is good enough. The emphasis on animals emotional need that Falkhaven speaks of is most prominent in the AR3 ideal type which focuses on flourishing. When it comes to domesticated animals, the AR3 ideal type points out that humans possibly do have more obligations than simply fulfilling the negative rights of animals, which Falkhaven's statements could be interpreted as hinting at.

2020

As has been made clear at this point, AW2 connects the treatment of animals to the treatment of people. Joar Forssell (L) used this way of reasoning when he talked about animal testing (Sveriges Riksdag, 2020). Forssell argued that if one can measure how civilized a society is by how they treat their animals, than one should also be able to measure how uncivilized a society is by how they mistreat their animals. Forssell further stated that in order for the Swedish society to improve, the development of alternative methods to animal testing is essential. One example of the AW3 ideal type's presence in the debate can be demonstrated through Marlène Lund Kopparklint's (M) statement about the use of antibiotics in animal production; the high standards of animal protection in Sweden means healthier animals and consequently a lesser need for antibiotics in food production which is good because the risk of Methicillin-resistant bacteria of developing and spreading to humans (ibid). A high standard of animal protection is thus good for the benefits it brings to both humans and animals – resulting in a higher, collective good. Mats Berglund (MP) argued along the lines of AR2 when he talked about the process of receiving ethical approval for animal testing (ibid). Berglund brought up that while the researchers have the right to appeal against decisions not allowing them to carry out a certain experiment, animals do not have the right to appeal. In fact, Berglund suggests that animals should be seen as the counterpart interest wise when approvals of experiments are being ethically considered and that they should have a representative or agent in these cases. Rights like these go well in hand with the citizenship approach to animal protection. Finally, the 2020 debate also showed elements of AR3. Magnus Manhammar (S) said that the requirement to let cows graze outside during the summer is important for a number of reasons: it makes their hooves healthier, their wellness in general improves and it is also very good for their mental health to live according to their natural behavior (ibid). In other words, the grazing requirement should stay according to Manhammar because it allows cows to flourish.

2021

The debate from 2021 contained elements from all ideal types except AR1 and AR2. Nina Lundström (L) argued from a historical perspective; stating that humans have always kept animals for their wool or the food, and that this brings with it a responsibility for their well-being (Sveriges Riksdag, 2021). The AW1 ideal type is primarily centered around Christian

values, but it is also the ideal type on animal protection with the strongest connection to historical arguments, i.e. humans has had the right to dominate over animals since their creation and should thus be allowed to continue to do so, which Lundström's statement agrees with in the sense that her argument is also built around the continuation of keeping animals as has been done for ages. Maria Gardfjell (MP) stated that since animals and humans share the same world, one needs to work more from a one health perspective to increase the health of both animals and the people (ibid). Connecting the health of animals and people in such a way could be interpreted as both AW2 and AW3, but the emphasis of the effect the welfare of animals have on humans led to this particular statement as being categorized as AW2 in this analysis. Signs of the AW3 ideal type could be seen in Magnus Oscarsson's (KD) speech about the illegal import of dogs to Sweden. Illegally imported dogs present an issue for two main reasons according to Oscarsson: first, the conditions under which these dogs are being brought up and transported is an issue of animal cruelty, and second, the unvaccinated dogs risk bringing with them dangerous pathogens, such as rabies, that might spread in Sweden (ibid). Hence, putting an end to the phenomenon of dogs being illegally brought into Sweden thus presents gains for humans and animals alike which does have strong similarities to the utilitarian argument of striving towards achieving the best outcome for the largest amount of lives. Finally, elements of the AR3 ideal type were also identified in the 2021 debate, for example by Elin Segerlind (V). Segerlind spoke out against animals being confined to small cages, bringing up hens as an example (ibid). Segerlind stressed that the right animals have to be able to move around freely and to be able to act out natural behaviors which are important for their wellness, is impossible to achieve when keeping animals in cages. Segerlind states that there is nothing natural about an animal being kept in a cage. Respecting animals and their needs is a very central concept in the AR3 ideal type, and so is the duty of humans in ensuring that animals do get the opportunity to live a flourishing life. Both these tenets can be seen in Segerlind's statements.

4.2 Changes in the debate

As *table 3* and *4* show, there was no significant change recorded in the presence of any ideal type of the animal rights or animal welfarist perspectives. That is not to say that nothing changed in the debate over the studied time period. One example of something that appeared different when comparing the two time blocks was the rhetoric used by S and MP. The tone in their rhetoric did not appear as *harsh* in the later debates compared to the earlier ones. This could for example be seen in the discussion around mink farms. One possible explanation for this could be S and MP's shift from being in opposition to gaining government; thus going from criticizing to defending legislation. In 2021 S and MP had been in government for over one terms of office, yet the mink farms that they so heavily criticized in the earlier debates continue to exist to this day. Another possible explanation is that different politicians spoke in the respective blocks because they include two separate terms of office. Only speculations around what caused the change in the rhetoric of S and MP can be done here, further studies are needed to secure a certain answer.

Another prominent change was how the focus on hygiene, food safety, and the prevention of zoonotic diseases became a lot more dominant in the 2020 and 2021 debates, which took place

during the corona pandemic. While the overuse of antibiotics in the food production industry was on the agenda in the earlier debates as well, the pandemic appears to have had the effect of amplifying the need of preventing Methicillin resistant bacteria from forming.

Finally, the role of SD in the debate changed between 2011 and 2021. The earlier debates included heated arguments among the parties in connection to SD's criticism of ritual slaughter, which some of the other parties tied to islamophobia. The later debates focused less on SD's ideology as a party, and more around actual animal protection issues. This change in focus actually allowed other parties to also bring up the issue of ritual slaughter – though with different terminology such as slaughter without anesthesia. The results from this study party confirms the observations of Svård's (2013) study regarding slaughter being discussed in terms of *othering* – however, in the later debates, SD, and other parties, did not only direct criticism towards ritual slaughter, but also chose to point out the suffering caused by using carbon dioxide to anesthetize pigs before slaughter in Sweden. In other words, while othering still occurs in the debate around slaughter, the debate on ethical slaughter appears to have become slightly more nuanced and self-reflecting in the last years.

5. Conclusions

This study set out to answer two research questions pertaining to how the animal rights and the animal welfarism perspectives on animal protection can be seen in the Swedish parliamentary debate, and in what way this has changed over the last decade. The results show that there was a clear presence of both the animal welfarist and animal rights perspective in Swedish politics between 2011 and 2021; with the utilitarianist approach being the most prominent, and the Christian and abolitionist approaches being the least occurring ones. The results thus confirm the presence of post-anthropocentrism in the parliamentary debate on animal protection in Sweden. Animal rights reasoning was most commonly used by V, S and MP; but also by M on occasion. Overall, speakers from most parties tended to include reasoning from different ideal types when speaking in front of parliament. Surprisingly, some speakers did not adhere to any of the perspectives, arguing in ways which could be interpreted as wanting less protection of the animals for the benefit of, for example, the competitiveness of Swedish farmers. In terms of change, no significant difference in the frequency of the use of either perspectives could be seen over the studied time period, but the debate did change in other noticeable ways such as: a change in rhetoric from certain parties, more focus on zoonotic diseases after the pandemic, and a different dynamic between SD and the other parties. Future studies aiming to gain a more in-depth understanding of the motivations behind politicians' statements regarding animal protection could benefit from conducting interviews. Similarly, further studies involving other cases than Sweden are needed to be able to make generalizable claims about how far politicians have come in accepting post-anthropocentric ethics.

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Appendix 1

	AW1	AW2	AW3	AR1	AR2	AR3
2021	Nina Lundström (L): Människan har i alla tider hållit djur, för maten eller för ullen. Med detta följer ett ansvar för djurens välfärd.	Maria Gardfjell (MP): Människor och djur delar samma värld. Vi behöver arbeta mer utifrån one health-begreppet för förbättrad djur- och folkhälsa.	Magnus Oscarsson (KD): Det (hundsmuggling) handlar om djurplågeri, men det handlar också om stora risker för att det kommer in sjukdomar i Sverige, till exempel den fruktade sjukdomen rabies.	-		Elin Segerlind (V): Men det är hönor i bur – i bur. Bara där borde vi förstå att detta (rätten för djur att röra sig obehindrat och utföra beteenden som är viktiga för deras välfärd) inte går att upprätthålla, oavsett om det är inredda burar eller inte. Det är djur i bur. Det finns inget naturligt med det.
2020	-	Joar Forssell (L): Om det är ett mått på civilisation hur väl man tar hand om sina djur är det också ganska bra mått på ocivilisation om man misshandlar eller på andra sätt plågar sina djur under onödiga djurförsök.	Marléne Lund Kopparklint (M): Det goda djurskyddet innebär att våra djur är friskare och får avsevärt mindre antibiotika jämfört med djuren i andra länder. Detta är viktigt. Överkonsumtion av antibiotika innebär en risk för att det bildas multiresistenta bakterier som kan överföras till oss människor.	-	Mats Berglund (MP): (Om djuretiskt provande av djurförsök) Sedan har vi försöksdjuren själva, som rimligtvis borde vara att anses som intressevärd motpart till de ansökande forskarna. De representerar inte heller som part med rätt att överklaga – i så fall naturligtvis via någon form av ombud.	Magnus Manhammar (S): Det (beteskravet) är bra för deras (kornas) klövar. Det är bra för deras juver. Det är bra för deras välmående generellt. Inte minst är det psykiskt bra för dem att de får leva enligt sitt naturliga beteende.
2019	-	-	Yasmine Eriksson (SD): För de nötproducenter som av olika anledningar inte kan eller vill ha ligghallar är det i dag både dyrt och krångligt trots att djuren i vissa fall klarar utevistelsen utan sådana.	Magnus Manhammar (S): I framtiden [...] är jag övertygad om att mänskligheten kommer att titta tillbaka på den perioden och undra vad vi	-	Elisabeth Falkhaven (MP): Tills för bara tiotal år sedan trodde vi inte ens att djuren kunde kommunicera, bara för att de inte kunde prata människospråk och vi inte

				höll på med. [...] Det är oerhörda siffror för hur många djur som mänskligheten dödar varje dag här i världen. Det är hemskt, och det är ohållbart. [...] Arbetet för djurens rättigheter måste stärkas och pågå varje dag.		förstod deras språk. När det gäller känslor, inte kan väl djur känna? Idag har forskningen genom uppfinningsrika forskare lyckats leda i bevis det mesta av det som många av oss som levt med och nära djuren länge har påstått. [...] Så trots att vi kanske är bland de bästa i världen på djurskydd behöver inte det betyda att vi är bra nog.
2013	Åsa Coenraads (M): I Sverige har jakten en lång tradition som vi moderater gärna vill värna om.	-	Inger Fredriksson (C): Vi måste se till att våra svenska livsmedelsproducenter får lika villkor så att de kan försvara vår svenska produktion samtidigt som Sverige måste försöka påverka omvärlden att ge djuren bättre villkor.	-	Helena Leander (MP): Om man som politiker vill vinna röster kan det vara en smart strategi att prioritera grupper som har rösträtt. Djuren är tyvärr inte en sådan grupp, vilket innebär att de tråkigt nog för dem, ofta blir bortprioriterade.	-
2012	-	-	Anita Brodén (FP): ... där det fortfarande inte finns alternativa testmetoder, utan djurförsök fortfarande används; är dessa djurförsök många gånger nödvändiga för att rädda människoliv och för att lindra mänskligt lidande.	-	-	Helena Leander (MP): Djuren kan inte själva föra sin talan här i dag. De är beroende av att vi kan se längre än till vårt egenintresse. De är beroende av att vi kan se djuren som de individer de är, med egna känslor, intressen och behov. De har

						inte själva valt att ge sitt liv för att ge oss kött, mjölk, päls eller vad det nu är människor begär av dem. Det är en makt som människor har tagit sig.
2011	-	Sara Karlsson (S): Ofta hänger ju vanvård av djur ihop med en social problematik hos djurhållaren eller djurägaren.	Åsa Coenraads (M): Vi i alliansen anser att vi måste komma bort från den obeprövade kastreringen, men vi vill inte göra det på ett sätt som riskerar att slå ut grisproduktionen i Sverige.	-	-	Jens Holm (V): Vi rödgröna vill ställa krav på att de här djuren ska ha rätt till ett naturligt beteende. De ska kunna röra sig. De ska kunna klättra, de ska kunna utföra sitt jaktbeteende. De ska kunna röra sig i vatten; som de kan göra i det naturliga.

Table I: The original quotes of the statements used as examples in the analysis chapter. Collected from parliamentary debates in Sweden years 2011, 2012, 2013, 2019, 2020 and 2021.