



LUNDS
UNIVERSITET

Smart Power: Bridging Inconstancies in Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy

Ignacio Robaina

Acknowledgments

I would like to commence by express my deepest gratitude to Elsa Hedling for her counseling, inputs, and not least her patience. By generously providing her expertise and knowledge the writing process has been much less stressful and considerably more enriching. Lastly, I would like to thank two classmates, Linda and Daniel, for the late-night feedback sessions and their invaluable moral support.

Abstract

Feminist foreign policy initiatives have since they first appeared weathered criticism when put in relation to an active weapons export often to non-democratic states violating women's rights. This paper then examines the Swedish case by using argumentation analysis as method to test the moral commitments of Sweden's foreign policy initiative against recent arms deals. It was made to explore the possibility of the added 'feminist' being linked to alternative inducements. By introducing the concepts of hard, soft, and smart power, the analysis was then carried out in search of explanations for the investigated discrepancy. A tug-of-war model was developed based on all theory used to both help illustrate the investigated lacuna, but also the opposingly pulling forces of Sweden's foreign policy. The findings suggest that any inconsistencies relating the morally anchored commitments of Sweden's feminist foreign policy and their active weapons industry can be understood through the concept of *smart* power. Being a concept aimed at doing just that, combining soft and hard power resources to gap discrepancies in foreign policies, the concept helps us better understand why the moral obligations of Sweden's foreign policy will everlastingly apply conditionally.

Keywords: Global Politics, Feminist Foreign Policy, Arms export, Smart power, International relations

Antal ord: 9 746

Abbreviations

AERC – Armaments Export Review Committee

ATT – Arms Trade Treaty

CC – The Constitutional Committee

EU – European Union

EoC – Ethics of Care

FFP – Feminist Foreign Policy

FFPH – The Feminist Foreign Policy Handbook

FP – Foreign policy

IR – International Relations

ISP – Inspection for strategic Products

ICRW – International Center for Research on Women

KU – Konstitutions Utskottet

MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Swedish)

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty

SOU – Statens Offentliga Utredningar

UN – United Nations

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

WPS – Women Peace and Security

Table of Contents

1 Introduction	6
1.1 Research Problem and Aim	8
1.2 Relevance for the field	9
1.3 Previous Research.....	10
1.4 Research Question	12
2 Analytical Framework	13
2.1 Hard, Soft, and Smart Power	14
2.2 Ethics of Care in Foreign Policy.....	17
2.3 Operationalization	18
3 Method – Argumentation Analysis	19
4 Analysis	23
4.1 Claims.....	24
4.2 Grounds.....	28
4.3 Backings & Discussion	30
5 Conclusion	37
6 Bibliography	38
6.1 Reports & official Documents	41
6.2 Constitution.....	41
6.3 Interviews.....	43
6.4 Debate Articles	43
6.6 Press.....	43
Appendix 1 (Identification of theory in texts)	45
Appendix 2 (Data)	46
Appendix 3 (Deconstruction of Argument)	47
2.1 Government Communication 2019/20:17 – “Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy”	47
2.2 The export of military equipment, FFPH (2019:73-74)	48
2.3 Interview (Möte UD)	48
Appendix 4 (Empirical Findings)	50

1 Introduction

In recent years one of the major trends in global politics has been the increased promotion of pro-gender equality norms in foreign policy (FP). Gender equality has become a prominent issue alongside multilateralism, human rights, and liberal democracy in international relations (IR). In the year 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 was adopted, and as a result, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda was now part of the normative framework on peacebuilding. Today both national and international security is increasingly being linked to women's security (Aggestam & True, 2021:385–386), as studies have shown that a state's stability and peacefulness is closely correlated to levels of violence against women (see e.g., Hudson et al., 2012:3).

In light of this, in 2014, Sweden was the first-ever country to announce an explicitly feminist foreign policy (FFP). Since, a small but steadily growing sample of states (Canada, France, Luxemburg, Spain, Mexico, and Libya) have all adopted what each characterize as a FFP. There are significant differences between each country's agenda, although all are based on the above-mentioned treaties and similar international agreements focusing on the status of women (Thompson et al., 2021:1-2). This paper will solely focus on Sweden's agenda, which is organized around three Rs: Rights, Representation and Resources and its six external goals (some of which will be lifted throughout the analysis). This framework is then used by the government to analyze the conditions for women within a given context. According to the government the policy has already achieved significant results that are exemplified by the established network for women mediators, championing related issues within the UNSC, and campaigns for girl's and women's sexual and reproductive health and rights – to name a few (FFPH, 2019:6). But despite these achievement Sweden's FFP agenda has often received critique when put in relation to its weapons exports. During 2019 sales namely increased with around 40%, an upsurge that persisted 2020 and amounted to a total 16.3 billion SEK (1.6B\$) each year (Leuhusen, 2021). And 2021 was no exception, as the exports increased to approximately 20 billion SEK (2.0B\$), where almost 50 percent of all weapons exports went to non-democratic states (Svenskafreds, 2022). Considering both international and national regulations prohibit exports to non-democratic states violating women's rights (MFA¹, 2017:1-

¹ Henceforth: Ministry for Foreign Affairs. *In Swedish*, Utrikesdepartementet (UD).

2), reactions can be expected. And it is precisely this contradiction the study hopes to shed lights on. By introducing the three concepts of hard-, soft-, and smart power² a so-called ‘tug-of-war’-model³ was developed around them. Through these concepts, each respective ‘side’ of the paradox was categorized, with one side representing the soft power ‘pull’ being Sweden’s ‘brand’ as main form of attraction, and the right side the hard power in the form of Sweden’s weapons industry as main pulling force. The ‘feminist’ added to Sweden’s FP agenda was then analyzed through the lens of development and political-economic studies claiming ‘feminism’ as a concept has been coopted for neoliberal⁴ purposes. Therefore, the caring and ethical commitments of an explicitly feminism FP was tested to reveal potentially underlying reason for adding these, all to consequently test if Sweden’s FFP is a smart power initiative. Accordingly, a deconstruction through Toulmin’s 1959 model of the main argument(s) given by the Swedish state relating its arms exports and FFP was analyzed. Through this method, the ‘strength’ of each pulling force was empirically tested while simultaneously analyzing if the ethical undertakings of Sweden’s feminist FP apply conditionally or universally as portrayed. The results indicate that the hard power resources are indeed a much stronger pulling force, consequently, the ethical commitments seemingly apply conditionally, resulting in the study early suggesting feminism as ‘colonized’ (Rottenberg, 2018).

² Hard power are tangibles factors like force and money while soft power are intangibles like values, culture, institutions. For a detailed description of each see ‘Hard-, Soft, and Smart power’ under theory.

³ For an illustration of this model see ‘operationalization’

⁴ Being a concept often used in different contexts, for the aim of this paper the definition by Oxford Languages (2022) fits well: “(neoliberalism) favours policies that promote free-market capitalism, deregulation, and reduction in government spending”. Accessed at: <https://languages.oup.com/>.

1.1 Research Problem and Aim

The dichotomy investigated is thus the tensions of on the one hand Sweden as a progressive, peace-promoting nation with an idealistic FP, and on the other, Sweden as a weapons manufacturer and exporter to non-democratic states, many of which are infamously known for violating the most basic human rights, not least against women. This paradox is not unique for Sweden, as Canada has received attention for this very same reason (Thompson et al., 2021:21). France and Mexico have both weathered criticisms alike regarding their FFP; Macron in France for his military support for a dictator in Chad, and Mexico for its increasing cases of gender-based violence and the government's inability to reform, or even acknowledge femicide (Deslandes, 2020:1-3). As feminist policy initiatives become increasingly popular, similar paradoxes will inevitably be revealed and there is therefore a need to investigate this apparent nexus. Not only to understand the limitations of idealistic FP initiatives, but also to reveal the main problems and/or benefits surrounding it. This discrepancy may be hard to comprehend without further explaining as there is seemingly no logical connection between the two. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to shed light on this contradiction as FFP initiatives become increasingly popular, all in order to better understand the phenomenon as a whole. It should be noted that the aim of this paper is not to establish Sweden's FFP agenda as a smart power initiative, but rather spark exploration of the possibility of it being such, ergo encourage future research on both the idea itself, but also potential consequences for it. This will therefore be one of the major contributions of this study. Smart power, being such a young term intricately connected with foreign policy, and FFP being an almost equally old phenomenon, it deems relevant to test them against each other.

1.2 Relevance for the field

Testing FFP's against contemporary theories and methods is crucial to understand the concepts meaning, strengths, and weaknesses. By examining one of the most frequent critiques of FFP's this study contributes to additional rigor and understanding surrounding these initiatives, but in relation to power. Further, research on this matter offers a possibility to test and examine both ethical and feminist concerns of a states' security and foreign policies.

1.3 Previous Research

What exactly a FFP consists of remains contested, although all current FFP's are, as mentioned above, rooted in international agreements focusing on the status of women (Thompson et al., 2021:1-2). As these treaties are faintly a couple decades old, and FFP not even a decade, the literature that has emerged is naturally still limited and has largely focused on what a feminist approach to FP might or ought to look like. The International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) provides several overviews, last update from 2021 (Thompson, 2021), on what FFP has focused on so far in relation to each state's official policy documents, and what it should be addressing moving forward (ibid). On a similar vein Achilleos-Sarl (2018) challenges contemporary foreign policies using postcolonial feminist theory to demonstrate in which ways they are gendered, racialized, and sexualized while suggesting how these might be impugned. Aggestam et al. (2019), and Robinson (2021) theorize and argue for how a FFP should be centered around a feminist ethics of care (EoC). In contrast to this evolving research, this paper is less interested in the normative future of the policy agenda itself. Instead, it will focus on how including idealism in the FP agenda leads to clashes with state's so called national interests, and how these two often unconnectable subjects are contemporary political reality – not least in Sweden.

Closely connected to this dichotomy is the discussion around the term feminism, where scholars like Watkins (2018) argue that feminism today exists in different varieties that are thriving with good examples being #Metoo across the Occident, and #NiUnaMenos in Brazil and Argentina. Similarly, Escher and Miguascha (2014) contend that feminism continues to hold key sway as a critical force globally, although often surrounded by an unwanted pessimism. Feminist work on governance often highlights how the institutionalization of feminism has had positive benefits with feminists using political structures in new ways, much like the above-mentioned examples (Krook & Mackay, 2011 & Walby, 2011). Yet alongside this positive portrayal is a wealth of literature in feminist development and political-economy studies arguing that feminism has been coopted for not only economical ends but legitimization purposes as well. Critical scholars like Fraser (2013) and Mcrobbie (2009) have argued that the current wave of feminism has invested capitalism with a higher moral point and meaning while doing so in a version bent to a neoliberal state with economic interest at center. This view is often depicted in contemporary gender-focused economic policy, where women's economic

emancipation is rather used as an economic benefit, thus neglecting structural factors fueling gender inequalities. Roberts (2015) argues that it leads to the use of gender equality in an apolitical and ahistorical context which contributes to the legitimation of power, much in line with Prügl & True (2014), which note that public and private gender equality-centered initiatives often have ambiguous outcomes. This critique is often echoed in FFP discourse, as idealistic FP's often lack proper mechanisms to monitor progress (Thompson & Clement, 2019:5). Within the field of economic development policies scholars like Moeller (2018) and Calkin (2015) similarly highlight how international development and transnational business initiatives use a rhetoric that unifies the empowerment of women with neoliberal economic policies, while illustrating how this issue paradoxically enough contributes to gender inequality, all while the organizations and institutions gain legitimacy. In all, the literature on gender equality policies in contemporary business and development is at large critical on how feminism is enacted and thus, the debate on whether feminism is achieving a more equitable policymaking or being 'colonized' (Rottenberg, 2018) by neoliberal interests used to buttress economic concerns, is very much alive. This discussion has indeed motivated this study as it deems important to test this idea on FFP's - all to analyze whether FFP initiatives suffer from a similar 'colonization', and if so, potential motives behind it. Yet another important reason for investigating this connection is that there is surprisingly little research done on the matter. To the knowledge of the author, the relationship between feminism as 'colonized' in favor of soft power consequently making it a smart power initiative has yet to be tested and is therefore another major contribution to the field.

1.4 Research Question

The following question will thus be guiding this paper:

- (i) Can the inconsistency of having a FFP and an active weapons export be explained through the concept of smart power?

2 Analytical Framework

As described, the different forms of power are used as analytical tools and will be outlined in this section. Along with it, a chapter regarding EoC theory, a field of study that the ethically appealing aspects of Sweden's FP agenda seem to be inspired by. All will be examined to better understand the relationship and interplay between the paradox being investigated, ethics of care, feminism as 'colonized', and the three concepts of power.

2.1 Hard, Soft, and Smart Power

Power has meant different things to different thinkers; thus, several ideas of what power consists of coincide with one another, not least depending on context, and naturally different sub-categories co-exist in academia. Power, to the interest of this paper discussing FP, is therefore well aligned with (i) Dahl's (1957:203) view on it; "A has power over B to the extent to which he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do", but also (ii), Harsanyi's (1962:69) explanation as to why scholars use the term in such a way; "[...] one of the main purposes why social scientists use the concept of A's power over B is for the description of the *policy possibilities* open to A". Therefore, within this given context and the aim of this paper, three main forms of power become relevant: hard, soft, and the relatively new term smart power. But before exploring each the crucial intervening variable of 'power conversion', i.e., the ability of gaining realized power in the form of *behavioral* outcomes stemming from *resources* (Nye, 2013:563). It needs to be introduced to better understand the difference between behavioral and resource-based definitions of power – ultimately to better understand smart power.

As policymakers strive for predicting future outcomes for guidance, behavioral definitions of power become relevant as they judge it by outcome: either 'ex post' (after the fact) or 'ex ante' (before the fact). Policymakers frequently define power in terms of resources that can produce outcomes, thus implying that a state is only as powerful as its economic strength, population, military force, social stability, and territory (Nye, 2013:560-563). This definition has one obvious virtue: making power in relation to policy seem measurable, concrete, and predictable. In other words, it helps ex ante, but is sometimes wrong ex post. Consequently, this definition reveals the paradox of why those best endowed with power do not always achieve desired outcomes, as having power resources is by no mean a guarantee of success, as shown by the Vietnam war and Ukraine conflict. This is not to deny the importance of power resources, but the term power conversion helps bridge the dissonance between resource and behavioral definitions, as it considers the importance of strategy and diplomacy (Nye, 2013:563-564). Nonetheless policymakers often use the shorthand definition, as it can quickly be grasped and is measurable while providing a first approximation at possible outcomes. As long as this is the case, it is important make clear the imperfect relation between resource or behavior-based definitions of power, as e.g., when speaking about the rise of China (ibid), it is a resource-based

definition being used. But whether China in this example has the capacity to transform these into preferred outcomes will depend on context, and as mentioned before, the ability to convert resource into a preferred strategy producing outcomes. Power conversion strategies are therefore a critical component (often missed) relating means to ends. Combining hard and soft power resources within a context successfully is key to achieving so called smart power (Nye, 2013::563-565).

In light of this, the resources associated with hard power are tangibles like force and money, while the equivalent for soft power are intangible factors like values, culture, and perceived legitimacy of policies. This relationship is not always clear, as e.g., intangible resources like moral and patriotism inevitably affects the capacity to fight and win a conflict, and a threat to use force or impose sanctions are intangible but dimensions of hard power. Due to this reality, this paper will use the definitions of Nye (1990:166-167), the scholar accredited the term soft power. Firstly, he defined hard power as resources used for payment purposes and/or force, and some agenda-setting based on these. In the case of Sweden, the main source of hard power is its weapons industry. Soft power on the other hand, is agenda-setting regarded as legitimate by the target generating positive attraction and persuasion, in other words the ability to obtain preferred outcomes by affecting others through cooptive means of framing the agenda. Thus, soft power is defined in behavioral terms and rests heavily on three fundamental resources; the state's political values (when lived up to abroad and at home), its culture (in regions where it is attractive to the perceived target), and the states foreign policies (when others view these as having *moral* authority and are perceived as *legitimate*) (ibid). Put in relation to Sweden, its main form of soft power would be its perceived self-image of a humanitarian superpower combined with a strategy varying between non-alignment and neutrality (Simons & Manoilo, 2019:1-3). Instead of projecting interests, Sweden acts through values attempting to gain legitimacy in a system it would otherwise likely be a minor player. By “pushing above its weight” in the context of global affairs Sweden makes efforts to project soft power to increase likability and consequently its *foreign policy options* (ibid:2). Therefore, soft power is by no means a form of liberalism or idealism, but simply put a form of power designed to generate desired outcomes. And legitimacy, being an inevitable reality of power as shown by the Swedish case, becomes another competitive struggle which in turn either enhances or deprives actors of soft power. Given this, enhancing your soft power through power-converting strategies results (if successful) in higher legitimacy (Nye, 2013:567-569). Similarly,

credibility becomes both a source of soft power, and a crucial resource of it. Reputation accordingly becomes important, and political struggles over it are frequent, with a contemporary example being the Occident's depiction of the Corona virus as being manufactured in China. Narratives inevitably becomes the currency of soft power. This naturally leads to smart power, which according to Nye (2009:160-163) is the ability to successfully combine soft and hard power resources in different contexts therefore going to the heart of the problem with power conversion⁵. The first step towards achieving smart power is knowing the full range of power resources available to you and combining these in effective ways. An excellent example of a smart power conversion strategy would be how Norway, despite being a founding member of NATO with an establish arms trade has enhanced its attractiveness with legitimizing policies in peacemaking and development increasing its soft power.

It is important to note that structural forms of power are of course a central and unavoidable reality of the discussion around gender equality. But as this paper discusses power in relation to policymaking, seeking to explain the dissonance between Sweden's ideological FP in relation to its arms exports, they will not be at focus. That being said, structural forms of power are inevitably mentioned and are here synonymous with Galtung's (1969:170-171) concept of structural violence; a form of indirect violence that societal circumstance, societal structures, and institutions uphold – spurred by the uneven distribution of resources (and thus uneven distribution of power).

⁵ Nye importantly notes that not only states contest for these types of power, but also NGO: s etc. These will not be at focus in this paper discussing foreign policies, although being relevant.

2.2 Ethics of Care in Foreign Policy

As the discussion around soft power will be central, EoC needs to be introduced as the ethically appealing commitments of Sweden's FFP seem to stem from it. It is a normative moral theory founded in the natural human response to care. EoC defines 'good' as meeting the needs of others while preserving and enriching relationships by taking and local contexts into account. It is an ethical model which stresses the importance of response to the individual and therefore the moral agents are envisioned as interconnected, related, vulnerable, and dependent – although often in asymmetric ways relating resources and power (Pettersen, 2011:54-55). Care in the context of a normative value is connected to the idea of not inflicting harm, meeting the needs of others (and ourselves), and inevitably the promotion of the good (Sander-Staudt, IEP). Carol Gilligan (2011), most often attributed with the theory, defined it as an ethic “grounded in voices and relationships, the importance of everyone having a voice, [...] (while) directing our attention to the need for responsiveness in relationships”. And relationships are indeed at focus, and therefore do not view people as 'standing alone', but rather, stresses the importance of the context in which selfhood is gained and shaped (Gilligan, 1982:2-4). Minow (1990:15) further explained how 'difference' (between human beings) seen relationally means a shift from the distinctions between people, to a focus on the relationships within from which we notice/draw distinctions.

And as briefly mentioned initially, many feminist EoC advocates argue that modern FFP initiatives should be more inspired by this caring approach. They contend that inherent in the idea of current FFP is a normative re-orientation framework based on the broader western-liberal cosmopolitan norms of peace and global justice (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016:23). This framing is argued to ultimately be contra productive, as it reproduces the binary adversarial logics of 'outside' and 'inside'. Consequently, it upholds the current world order fueled by the power relations deeply intertwined with global capitalism and neo-colonialism, a racist logic, and of course patriarchy (Robinson, 2021:21-22). Now, although not being at focus, this critique is relevant as it goes well in line with the possibility of Sweden's FFP drawing inspiration from EoC *mainly* for appealing purposes. But EoC is also important as this paper is investigating feminism as colonized. And as Sweden seemingly links this caring approach/theory to feminism, the moral commitments of EoC will be tested against empirical cases. All in search for possible clues of alternative motives fueling Sweden's FFP initiative.

2.3 Operationalization

The following section is designed to better illustrate how the investigated paradox relates to the above-mentioned concepts and theories. To facilitate, the so-called tug-of-war-model was developed by the author to better demonstrate the relationship.

Sweden's 'tug of war'-paradox

← Soft power	<i>Gap examined</i> Smart power?	Hard Power →
The Swedish 'brand'	← Feminism care ethics 'colonized' as 'pulling force'? ⁶	Weapons export industry (+ NATO?) ⁷

The left side represents Sweden's main source of soft power, its national brand as a humanitarian superpower, and the right its opposite, a weapons industry generating hard power. The context under which this model operates is based on Sweden's hard power resources evidently growing as shown initially, and the assumption that such a situation ultimately will damage Sweden's soft power branding. The concepts of soft and hard power are therefore used in line with Nye's definition to better categorize and present each side for what they actually are, attempts to gain one or another type of power, resulting in legitimacy and credibility. Smart power, being a closely related concept, shall therefore be used to explain the investigated inconsistency, Sweden as a humanitarian superpower with a FFP versus an arms export to countries violating what the agenda set out to solve. What is suspected, then, is that the feminism linked with EoC in Sweden's FP is there for attraction purposes instead of moral ones, resulting in a colonization of the term. Therefore, a deconstruction of the Swedish state's argument/defense for the investigated paradox will be conducted in search of evidence suggesting a connection between the FFP being fueled by smart power motives – consequently explaining our paradox.

⁶ To see how these theories are identified in the deconstructed argument, see Appendix 1.

⁷ In light of recent global events Sweden might be joining NATO (Government of Sweden. 2022). As this would inevitably have consequences for the outcome of this paper it will be discussed below, yet only briefly due to current uncertainty surrounding it.

3 Method – Argumentation Analysis

The method used in this paper stems from the logic that an argument is only as good as the reasoning behind it. As globalization and technological advancements made our world intricately connected, political argument and reasoning is today far-reaching, as anyone with a smartphone and Wi-Fi connection can access any available information. This fact alone should encourage the challenging of contemporary political discourse, not least when there is an obvious discrepancy between what is said and what is actually experienced, as in the case of Sweden.

Stephen Toulmin presented in his book, *The Uses of Arguments* (1958), a tool for analyzing how to measure the strength of an argument, otherwise known as its validity, by deconstructing it. This method proved exceedingly effective for analyzing social research on arguments presented in public debates by offering a comprehensive view of the structure influencing the development of a debate. Thus, this method measures the soundness of a discursive text to document the how the statement is structured within its context (Liakopoulos, 2011:1-4). Toulmin further developed his 1958 model by introducing the notion of ‘argument fields’ suggesting that certain aspects of arguments do not alter regardless of context, while other are field-dependent. As e.g., politics, law, and art have different standards for constructing, developing, and understanding arguments, it is imperative to account for context as the ‘contextualization’ of an argument is connected to the formal validity of it (Toulmin et al., 1979). According to Toulmin, (1958), the argument parts consist of the claim(s), warrant(s), backing(s), rebuttal(s), and data (supporting claim). But the definition of each naturally vary, as the method is context-based, thus the researcher needs to account for both the environment in which the research is taking place (political setting in this case), and the means used to uncover the argument (policy documents, political debates, interviews, and official statements). As this study is conducting a qualitative case study on a strictly formal practice (politics), it is in the best interest of the actors involved to have a structured argumentation layout. This in turn allows a less controversial approach to the issue of defining the context-based terms in Toulmin’s model. As the public debate on the Swedish weapon export industry in relation to their FFP involves IR, large financial gains, while including ideological components, it can be assumed that the actors involved use reliable backing for their claims while being careful in expressing/articulating/debating the subject. This way, the strongest critiques against

Toulmin's model can be avoided, as he received criticism for precisely the generality and subjectivity of the tool (van Eemeren et al., 2014), and the inconsistency of the definitions (Hampe, 1992). In other words, Toulmin solved these problems by taking context into consideration, hence, the formal validity if the researched topic provides the structure through which the identification of components of the argument become clear. Therefore, the definitions used in this paper will be set in the context of a formalized public debate relying on facts that in turn serve as support for legal decision-making. Each part of the argument can be described as followed (Liakopoulos, 2011:4-11):

Claim – The presented (structured) argument or conclusion preceded based on the Grounds. There might be numerous claims in a unit of analysis, but this paper is solely interested in the *central* claims being part of the argumentation structure.

Grounds (Evidence) – The 'because' part of the argument that supports/proves the claim. It is the reasoning that links the claim to the support and is often the confirmation of the claim, i.e., the factual information supporting the claim.

Warrant – Underlying assumptions and principles (that we do not question) to the argument that often asks/answers underlying questions. This part often uses words like 'fair' and 'justice' to bridge gap between support and claim. It is the reasoning connecting the grounds and the claim, is often implicit, and based on shared values (e.g., liberal democratic values).

Backing – Backing support for the warrants and assumptions that are being made.

Rebuttal – The 'even though' part of the claim. It is a recognition or response to the opposing side of the argument and is often either refuted/proven wrong, compromised or modified to meet half-way (or disclaim it), or simply acknowledge. This is one of the most important parts of the argument, as it shows that the writer is aware of what counterarguments the opposition might use.

Qualifiers – Words that express the degree of certainty behind the evidence provided. Example of words used are probably, could, often, or possibly.

This paper will thus use argumentation analysis to deconstruct the *overall* argument given by the Swedish state and its representatives – all in order to see if it holds in relation to empirical cases. Also, this method is excellent as fundamental pillars of Sweden’s FFP are tested against empirical cases, which in turn might help reveal possible hard power motives involved, all imperative for testing the idea of feminism as colonized. But most importantly, the chosen method reveals *how* the investigated discrepancy continuously occur, despite EU and international guidelines prohibiting export, while revealing the pulling forces of Sweden’s hard and soft power. For these reasons argumentation analysis is used, despite being an older method. Thus, numerous policy/report/legal document as well as interviews were examined and will be used throughout the analysis⁸. The actual deconstruction was carried out on two official documents and one interview. What is important to note though, is that what dictated the number of texts deconstructed was the argument itself in relation to how often the claims/grounds/backings were repeated (i.e., three separate texts were identified that together capture the whole argument except one claim that was exemplified by an additional source).

Consequently, the handbook of Sweden’s FFP (FFPH) will often be referred to for several reasons. First, it is by far the most extensive official governmental document covering most if not all aspects of Sweden’s FFP. Additionally, many different ministers are interviewed throughout it, and their answers presented. Their voices presented in an official document consequently reflects the government’s position, making them excellent firsthand sources. In light of these, the sections discussing Sweden’s arms industry in relation to its FFP will be deconstructed. Mainly because it fits well with the chosen method as the creators of the document only gain from formally and clearly constructing the arguments, while strictly relying on facts.

The Government communication 2019/20:17 is another document used as it is the official document outlining Sweden’s FFP strategy. Therefore, the section addressing Sweden’s arms export in relation to the FFP is deconstructed for the same reasons as above, and consequently often referred to.

As the above two are the only official documents addressing the investigated issue, interviews were further used. Mainly because ministers sometimes, but seldomly, get asked about the investigated paradox. Margot Wallström was in 2020 asked about the dichotomy of a FFP and

⁸ See appendix 2 for a complete list of documents used.

an active weapons industry, and being the foreign minister launching Sweden's FFP, it deems fit to use, not least because she is often interviewed in the FFPH. These three are faintly samples but represent well the overall argument as the main claims, backings and grounds are almost all mentioned in the three. But, to convince the audience that it represents the whole argument additional sources will frequently be referred to. To view the deconstruction, see appendix 3. The empirical findings are then summarized and presented under appendix 4.

4 Analysis

In order for the analysis to follow in a coherent and structured manner it will be divided into the three main parts of the argument itself: claims, grounds and backings. Since the warrants, rebuttals, and qualifiers solely strengthens/weakens arguments, they will continuously be used the same fashion, to highlight certain aspects of the text or elucidate their absence. The first half of the analysis will deconstruct the argument of the Swedish state to see how well they hold against empirical cases, while explaining how the weapons industry continuously grow to non-democratic states despite international regulations prohibiting it. The other half tests the connection between FFP and the neoliberal ‘colonization’ of feminism, but also the concept of smart power towards the chosen empirical case, the Swedish state, and its feminist foreign policy. As mentioned before, numerous arms deals will be used throughout the analysis as empirical cases.

4.1 Claims

The two main arguments found in all three texts discussing a FFP in relation to Sweden's weapons export are the following:

- (i)⁹ Under a FFP, Sweden **attaches great importance** [...] counteracting gender-based and sexual violence around the world, in both conflict and peacetime, and (ii)¹⁰ [ISP] **(Strict)** controls [is] exercised over the export of military equipment from Sweden.

These two main claims can, as a matter of fact in themselves represent the paradox investigated. On the one hand, we are presented with claim (i), an exceedingly appealing ethical and moral undertaking which highly reflects Sweden's own self-image and has much resonance with an ethics of care approach to a FP (which will be further investigated below). Most likely few would oppose such an initiative, at least in the Occident, as it is heavily alluding to our underlying assumptions of international human rights and global justice – as shown by the warrants. The potential for such an initiative to be a transformative and critical alternative to realpolitik might be high as suggested by the rapidly increasing trend of ethically anchored foreign policies.

On the other hand, claim (ii) argues that Sweden indeed imposes strict controls over all military equipment being exported – all to achieve claim (i). This can of course be contrasted to the fact that some of Sweden's most lucrative arms-trade-partners are till this day not admitting women as equal to men as shown by the governments own data (see e.g., MFA, 2018 & 2019). Accordingly, the two central claims in many ways represent the investigated paradox at hand – a highly appealing ideological foreign policy versus a particularly lucrative weapons export to states actively opposing the very things the FFP initiative sets out to achieve. What is rather peculiar though, is that two qualifiers are used before *both* claims. One is used to strengthen argument (ii), the other rather weakening argument (i). The central claim from the Swedish government is that it 'attaches great importance' to the commitment of countering gender-based and sexual violence. Thanks to the added qualifier, the strength of the commitment becomes questionable. Thus, to attach great importance to something here, leaves room for manoeuvring. And as the second claim, which is in turn is supposed to strengthen or prove the

⁹ See e.g.: Gov. Com. 2019/20:17

¹⁰ See e.g.: Gov. Com. 2018/19:114

first uses the qualifier of ‘strict’, it is by no means a far-fetched conclusion that these two should, at least in theory, mutually reinforce each other. But what is important to note is that the investigated contradiction is never delineated, never defended, or even acknowledged in the documents outlining the FP itself – not a single rebuttal is used. This can be interpreted as either the arguments lacking credibility, or the government of Sweden simply not admitting that there is a discrepancy to begin with. The *only* time the contradiction is actually addressed is when politicians are directly asked about it, and the standard answer is:

(iii) “There is no contradiction [as I see it] between a responsible and strict exports control and a feminist foreign policy.” (Wallström, 2020)

So, even when asked about the dilemma, politicians seemingly give similar answers as in the policy documents themselves. It is important to note as Sweden claims to (ii) ‘continuously strengthening [ISP’s]’¹¹ expertise/competence’. But again, by a pure glance at Sweden’s arms sales history the statement can be questioned. It therefore seems as if the qualifier ‘strict’ along with the ISP claim are used to convince the audience that rigours tests are the general rule of thumb for exports. Seemingly, claims (ii) and (iii) are used to assure the audience how strict the controls of weapons exports are, while the main claim (i) still leaves room for the Swedish state to abstain from fulfilling it.

Yet, another main claim repeatedly given by the state defending its weapons industry in general becomes questionable in light of recent world events:

(v) In order for Sweden to maintain its neutrality and non-alignment policy a weapons industry is vital for greater independence.

But as Sweden recently applied for NATO membership (Government of Sweden, 2022), the argument naturally loses credibility, again hinting how strong Sweden’s hard power pull is. As this process is on-going at writing moment it will not get further attention here, although the implications for this paper are important. An over 200-year-old FP being abandoned in a matter

¹¹ *In Swedish*, Inspektionen för Strategiska Produkter – the government agency “work[ing] with control and compliance of defence material and dual-use products”, and therefore also the authority approving/denying exports of arms. For further information see: <https://www.government.se/government-agencies/inspectorate-of-strategic-products-isp/>.

of months (Knutson, 2022), undoubtedly portray how strong Sweden's hard power resources actually are. This leaves us with the final claim that although only being mentioned often nonetheless deserves attention.

Despite not being a dominant argument in the debate concerning weapons exports and an ideologically anchored foreign policy, it is important as it relies on the three fundamental pillars of Sweden's FFP:

- (iv) "By championing a FFP, the Swedish Government works systematically with achieving results that strengthen women's and girls' rights, representation, and resources" (FFPH, 2019:73-74)¹²

What Sweden's three Rs generally are achieving remains to see, but put in relation to the arms industry as is the case, the validity of such an argument can be questioned by three empirical cases – one for each R. The 'Representation' of women (in decision-making processes) might be the simplest to critique with the help of the Saudi Arabian arms deal. By exporting weapons to a state that systematically and by law deny women's rights (MFA, 2019:1-2), it inevitably legitimizes this form of oppression – thus undermining one of the very cornerstones of Sweden's FFP. The 'Rights' can be analysed through the Filipino arms deal of 2018 – passed through two years after Duterte was elected. Contradictory enough, the Foreign Ministry released a report by the end of 2018 that in the very first page establishes that the human rights in the Philippines drastically deteriorated since Duterte came to power (MFA, 2018:1). By exporting weapons to a state openly opposing the most fundamental human rights, the second pillar is consequently undermined. That leaves the final R, 'Resources' (and how they are distributed). During 2021 Pakistan (continued) importing Swedish weapons, a country that the foreign ministry in a 2018 report estimated that only 48 percent of women are literate – compared to 70 percent among men, and nearly half of the children are hampered in growth due to malnutrition (MFA, 2018:1-2). By authorizing sales to a country that does not consider gender in resource distribution, it is undoubtedly counterproductive to the third and final R.

¹² This argument is often repeated throughout the entire handbook of FFP. It deserves extra attention now given the context as it is used relational to 'The export of military equipment' (FFPH, 2019:73).

This does not mean that conditions for women in these states are not improving, but a reasonable supposition would be that the conditions for women are drastically worse than for men, and considering the most recent data presented by the foreign ministry, the improvement for women is seemingly going slow. That in turn leads to another somewhat uncomfortable reality, the three Rs Sweden supposedly systematically works towards exclude women in the receiving states of arms imports. That does not mean that Sweden is *not* systematically working towards women's rights through other means and channels, but to argue that they are having much success becomes hard considering the government's own data.

This argument was also important to address as it displays how strong this hard power resource is indeed 'pulling'. Despite both the government openly acknowledging through the foreign ministry's reports the faults in many of receiving states of Swedish arms, and international regulations forbidding it, the topic is not even up for debate in Swedish politics – thus further revealing the tremendous interests behind. How this continuously befalls deserves investigating and will be addressed in the 'grounds' section as it is, inevitably, directly connected to international regulations.

4.2 Grounds

There are only two grounds given, i.e., (hard) evidence supporting/confirming Sweden's main claims. Despite being surprisingly few, both rely on heavy pieces of legislation:

- (i)¹³ Sweden applying article 7.4 of the ATT, (ii)¹⁴ (Govt Bill 2017/18:23) came into force in 2018, resulting in stricter regulations (regarding export controls of military equipment).

In order to further analyze the grounds, better understanding is needed on how these two are evidently being bypassed – year after year. In 2012, the Armaments Export Review Committee (AERC)¹⁵ was appointed with the task of investigating future exports of Swedish armaments. Its purpose was to tighten export controls, mainly towards non-democratic states (MFA, 2012: 01). In 2015, the inquiry was completed, and the committee proposed several amendments, the most notable being the addition of a special ‘democracy criteria’ (SOU, 2015: 72). Because of the AERC inquiry and the latest international obligations regarding the export of munitions, the government decided in 2017 to submit a bill to the parliament with a proposal for “stricter rules for arms exports” (MFA, 2017:1). Subsequently, in April 2018, a consolidation through the above-mentioned proposition was made of the EU's common positions (2008/944/CFSP), the UN Arms Trade Treaty (Articles 6–7), and the national guidelines (DS, 2018: 16). But despite being guided by international laws prohibiting arms sales to non-democratic countries, Sweden's not only continues, but as shown above increases towards e.g., Saudi Arabia. To understand the variance at hand, the concept of ‘consequential delivery’¹⁶ needs to be further investigated. The notion is frequently used in both the parliament's and the Government's work, but also in the general weapons exports debate and has been the subject of assessment and discussion on numerous occasions. As early as the 1990s, the Constitutional Committee (CC)¹⁷ stated in a closer examination of the concept that it “[...] tends to slip in meaning over time, whereby the content and application change” (SOU, 1999:38,12), but also that there were numerous problems associated with the concept (SOU, 1999:38). The AERC inquiry, in turn, found that a corresponding/similar concept was lacking in both the EU's common positions *and* the ATT, which led to AERC only having the Swedish guidelines to comply with regarding

¹³ See e.g.: Ds 2013:74

¹⁴ See e.g.: Morgan Johansson, 2019.

¹⁵ *In Swedish*: Krigsmaterielexportöversynskommittén (KEX).

¹⁶ *In Swedish*: Följdleverans klausul

¹⁷ *In Swedish*: Konstitutions Utskottet (KU)

consequential deliveries. The inquiry thus tried to clarify the notion through practice development with the following definition:

"[...] Subsequent deliveries should, as the Government proposes, include spare parts for previously delivered munitions, special ammunition for previously delivered munitions and other deliveries that are directly related to previously granted permits." (2017/8: UU9)

This definition turned out to be problematic for several reasons, but mainly because CC established that since 1986 there has been an outlook that whole and new weapon systems can be included in the concept of consequential delivery under specific conditions (KU, 1996/1997: KU25). In the final report of the AERC inquiry, it was stated that these are still fully acceptable circumstances for sequential deliveries, but several other situations were also established as satisfactory. Perhaps the most problematic one in relation to the democracy criterion is that "[...] a delivery that is related to previously granted export, and where it appears *unreasonable* not to grant a permit" is seen as acceptable (2017/18:UU9:4). But also that previously undertaken 'delivery security guarantees' from the Swedish state is of such fundamental importance that they should not be broken before a trial by the government (ibid). 'Related material' is also included in sequential delivery situations, and there has also never been a distant time limit for when sequential deliveries can take place, something AERC did not consider possible to introduce for practical reasons (SOU, 2015:72 (1)). In other words, there are several occasions where the international guidelines can be circumvented by Sweden's national ones, thus revealing the mechanisms fueling the investigated dichotomy. And considering how frequently the consequential delivery clause evidently is being used, it again emphasizes the forces behind Sweden's hard power. This contradiction, being empirically undeniable, can of course damage the reputation of any state, not least in the Swedish case, as its main source of soft power is its reputation. The backings further need investigating to fully understand the importance of above information, and a discussion to draw potential assumptions.

4.3 Backings & Discussion

The purpose of a backing is to strengthen any grounds/claims or underlying assumptions. The backings found when deconstructing the arguments were the following:

(i)¹⁸ the democratic status of the receiving state (**shall be considered**), (ii)¹⁹ that serious hardships for people including women and children or members of minority groups (needs to be **taken into account**), (iii)²⁰ impact of the export on fair and sustainable development (need to **be considered**), (iv)¹ export will affect the situation for men and boys and for women and girls (**can be considered**), (v)²¹ (**An overall assessment**) will be carried out.

Backings do not necessarily contain factually based information but can do depending on context. When analyzing the identified backings, all reference/refer to the grounds (as they should) but are seemingly always connected to a qualifier instead of facts. This does not necessarily have to be a negative aspect considering they all (again) allude to our underlying assumptions of universal rights – indeed an ethical, caring, and soft predilection to the given claims (and the FP as a whole). The main contradiction making these backings challenging to accept as strengthening the argument instead of weakening it is the fact that all qualifiers are used to demote the commitment of actually fulfilling each norm. Put in relation to what has been indicated so far, the way qualifiers are used regarding backings well align with how the state uses the national guidelines to bypass international regulations – solely striving for fulfillment of each commitment when they do not contravene state interest(s). In other words, the hard power seemingly ‘activates’ each qualifier, consequently voiding the commitment to each backing within that given context (i.e., an important enough arms deal (hard power) voids the commitment to the ethical undertakings (soft power)). And keeping this closely at mind, it then becomes alarming how the state openly equivalates gender-equality with state interests as shown in several documents, e.g.:

“One starting point is that gender equality is an objective in itself, but it is also essential for achieving the Government’s other overall objectives, such as peace, security, and sustainable development” (FFPH, 2019:9).

¹⁸ See e.g.: Ann Linde, 2020 (26 august).

¹⁹ See e.g.: Gov. Com. 2019/20:17

²⁰ See e.g.: FFP handbook, 2019.

²¹ See e.g.: Sofia Damm, 2017.

Gender-equality is thus equalled to economic interest in general, which can be further shown by the six external objectives of Sweden's FFP: #5 'Economic rights and empowerment' (FFPH, 2019:19), further strengthening the connection. And as statements like "When women participate in the labour market their economic empowerment increases, and a society's economic growth increases." (FFPH, 2019:27) are frequently used, the connection between the empowerment of women with a clearly western neoliberal policy becomes apparent (Moeller, 2018 & Calkin, 2015). This in turn suggests that at least certain aspect of the 'feminism' in Sweden's FFP have been 'colonized' in accordance with Rottenberg's (2018) ideas.

And it is now that the EoC becomes relevant for the Swedish case. When reading the proposition or handbook outlining Sweden's FFP it becomes clear how Sweden promotes – just like ethics of care – the good as meeting the needs of others through the highly appealing ethical and caring features. It is mostly the normative aspects relating the response to the (dependent) individual, i.e., the woman in our case, most often presented as in need. This relationship – the (global) woman in need and the Swedish state as savior – is already seen shortly after the introduction of the FFPH (2019):

“While a few seek to restrict the rights of half of the world’s population, we represent a global movement for the empowerment of women and girls [...]" (pp13)

“Women and girls around the world are still subject to discrimination and subordination [...]. Swedish development cooperation should help counter these forces.” (pp15)

This depiction of women is also visible in their 6 external objectives:

Swedish foreign service shall contribute to women's and girls':

1 – “*Full* enjoyment of human rights”

#2 – “*Freedom* from physical, psychological, and sexual violence” (pp19)

When further analyzing this connection, the definition given by Gilligan (2011), accredited EoC theory, was used. According to her, ethics of care stresses “the importance of everyone having a voice” (ibid:1). This type of rhetoric can likewise be seen throughout the handbook:

”The feminist foreign policy has also strengthened the *voice* [...]” (pp101)

” [...] by giving them (women and girls’) a stronger *voice* in the home and in society.” (pp90)

”[...] ensure that all *voices* and perspectives are heard.” (pp99)

The FFP initiative is seemingly also appealing to the relationship aspect of EoC theory. One gets the feeling that it attempts to promote women as not ‘standing alone’:

“[...] feminist foreign policy is seen as another step in showing that the *whole of society* [...] (pp71)

And again, among the six external objectives:

#4 – “Political participation and influence in *all areas of society*” (pp19)

All considered, it seems as if Sweden’s FFP is rather inspired by the theory than actually committed to it, only adopting the caring and ethical features of it. By placing the woman as in need, and Swedish FFP as the savior, while only fulfilling these commitments when *not* conflicting with neoliberal interest such as the arms industry, Sweden shows how the commitments are conditional. Therefore, Sweden’s feminist care ethics have suggestibly been colonized. And accordingly, it is one of the strongest arguments for Sweden’s FFP agenda being fueled by alternative interests.

Now, let us re-introduce Nye’s (2013) intervening variable of power conversion, only this time in relation to the Swedish case. It can be concluded that the FP of Sweden indeed has ethical and caring undertakings attempting to entice soft power resources in the form of attraction to Sweden as a ‘brand’, legitimacy as a gender-equal and peace promoting nation, consequently gaining credibility at international institutions like the UN. On the other, an arms export generating hard power resources in the shape of attraction to foreign investors, legitimacy to further expand this resource, thus gaining credibility as a reliable technologically advanced and innovative state. But since the hard power is evidently pulling harder due to neoliberal interests trumping any EoC commitment, there is a need to bridge the dissonance between Sweden’s soft and hard power attraction. What is suggested then, is that the feminist EoC added to

Sweden's FP agenda is equivalent to a smart initiative gapping the bridge between these two opposingly pulling forces where one is seemingly 'winning'. By adding caring feminist approaches and therefore re-framing the agendas very essence, an additional and exceedingly strong pulling force is added to the soft power 'side' in the presented 'tug-of-war'. Now, both soft and hard power resources are being combined to further establish the Swedish brand as reformist (thus further reinforcing Sweden's self-image) while circumventing (or at least alleviating) the unavoidable negative effects from Sweden's main hard power resource. Simply put, the only way Sweden can potentially maintain and further expand its hard power being such a small nation, constantly associated with its own soft power national branding, without losing credibility/authority, might be bridging the gap through a smart initiative. As all positive aspects of the Swedish 'brand' become more preeminent by adding caring feminism in front of (or in the name of) them, while the weapons industry and any other possible negative associations with the Swedish 'brand' end up in the background.

If Sweden's FFP indicates a smart power initiative, it could potentially have consequences for the field of study as a whole and therefore additional research was done on the topic. Nowhere in the documents investigated are there any direct references to smart power, and the concept is never admittedly being used nor addressed in any way, much like the investigated paradox. But what is noticeable though, is that throughout Sweden's FFPH the initiative is sometimes depicted as 'smart', most often when discussing *why* investing in gender-equality is good in relation to Sweden's FP goals:

“It is [...] socially *smart* to invest in women's economic empowerment” (pp:27)

“However, it is also a *smart* practical policy” (pp55)

“Investing in equality is *smart*.”, & “As well as being *smart* and right, gender equality is also good for the economy.” (pp85)

This final quote deserves extra attention as it connects a potential smart power initiative, with feminism *and* economic interests. This again aligns with the idea of feminism being colonizing for neoliberal interests, while suggesting a smart power initiative as fueling motive. And the connection between gender-equality as being smart and even lucrative once again strengthen

that idea. Yet, another indication of Sweden's FFP being a smart power initiative was identified when researching. Margot Wallström, the former foreign minister accredited with launching the initiative (Moss, 2020), also mentioned it – only this time in relation to the other two main forms of power being put against each other:

“Sweden's feminist foreign policy is neither ‘*soft*’ nor ‘*hard*’. It is ‘*smart*’ and entails the way [...]” (Wallström, 2016)

Further, that same year, Wallström argued in an article about FFP in relation to peacebuilding for Svenska Dagbladet that:

“Strengthened empowerment for women and girls is a real example of *smart* politics, which bridges the gap between ‘*hard*’ and ‘*soft*’ security [...]” (Wallström, 2016).

The final example once again deserves extra attention as Wallström uses the empowerment of women and girls, i.e., the ethical and caring aspects of the FFP as *one* example of Swedish “smart politics”. But considered that gender-equality norms permeate Sweden's *whole* governmental structure by law and on “all levels and all fields” (S2016/01917/JÄM, S2016/04472/JÄM), it is surely not *one* example of what the government considers “smart politics”, it is rather a sample of it. An equally important matter that deserves acknowledging is how “smart politics” by Wallström is used relationally to its theoretically associated concepts of soft/hard (power). And as “smart politics” is by Wallström claimed to “bridge the gap between hard and soft [...]”, it undoubtedly shows how “smart politics” is used in a way that highly correlates with Nye's idea of “smart power” – thus the connection can further be strengthened. But if Sweden's FFP initiative was explicitly intended as ‘smart’ is of course hard to establish; but considering how frequently the word ‘smart’ is used in relation to the policy, it deems hard to conclude that it is *not*. And considering that Sweden's current foreign minister, Ann Linde, still refers to the policy as ‘smart’, indeed suggests some sort of internal consensus or at least knowledge on the matter:

“A feminist perspective is needed [...], women have to be included [...], it is the right and *smart* thing to do.” (Linde, 2020)

Referring to the policy as ‘smart’ is therefore seemingly a historically reoccurring matter regardless of what government is in power. Yet another matter (maybe) worth noticing is the fact that the word ‘smart’ is repeatedly being used and not synonyms such as intelligent. This of course by no means establishes the policy as smart, but the overall evidence is convincing enough for this paper to consequently assume it is. What this paper then suggests, is that since feminist EoC is used to elevate the legitimacy and credibility of the Swedish state to maintain/improve its image – all while continuing and expanding its weapons industry, feminism has indeed been colonized. Consequently, it seems as if by colonizing feminism and using it as a power conversion strategy the Swedish government undoubtedly created, intentionally or not, a soft power initiative. Therefore, this paper will henceforth discuss its potential consequences for the field.

The above results can of course not be generalized outside of Sweden, i.e., by no means has it been established that all governments in a similar situation as Sweden, such as Canada and France, are using feminism in their FP as a smart power strategy. It is outside of the scope of this paper to further make the connection and is surely cause for future research. But *if* smart power can be connected to other FFP initiatives, any normative discussion criticizing the hard power resources of a state (in relation to their FFP) becomes irrelevant, as it is, per definition, impossible to have a smart power initiative *without* the hard power components (Nye, 2009:161). As a matter of fact, hard power is such an integral part of any smart power undertaking, that any discussions around how current FFP should be more EoC-inspired as suggested by e.g., Robinson (2021) becomes somewhat inconsequential. It is of course hard to argue that it should *not* be as such, as it would solve current inconsistencies. But, as the end goal of any smart power initiative is to bridge gaps between hard and soft power, any ethical FP initiative fueled by smart power motives is simply not interested in this worldview as it is not in any way beneficial. Thus, critiquing a state with a ‘smart’ FFP and an active weapons industry becomes hard. Although this might sound contradictory, hard power is not only an inevitable reality of *any* smart power initiative, but also a crucial component and a direct precondition for qualifying as such. And therefore, Sweden’s ‘ethical’ undertakings inevitably cannot apply to everyone despite claiming so as the main reason for being added are attraction to the Swedish ‘brand’ and economic interests.

Further building on this thought, the utility of the concept of soft power can for several reasons be questioned in light of these results. As globalization unquestionably made the world intricately connected it seems relevant to ask the question if it is ever possible to achieve a purely 'soft' FP initiative. A virtuously 'hard' initiative is still possible as shown by any great power, Russia being the latest example. But how a foreign policy initiative could purely be of 'soft' character becomes hard to imagine. This discussion is unfortunately out of the scope for this paper, but indeed deserves future research.

5 Conclusion

When analyzing the Swedish government's argument defending an active weapons industry several things became evident. The main points in relation to the aim of this paper, is how it clearly portrayed how the investigated paradox is legally maintained. Importantly, it also showed how Sweden's ethical commitments apply conditionally, thus indicating how strong Sweden's hard power pull actually is in relation to its soft power. And consequently, at early stage indicating a colonization of feminism. With this basis, further research showed how gender-equality is equvalated economic interests regarding Sweden's FFP, in turn suggesting a similar phenomenon as noted in political-economic and development studies where feminism has been colonized for legitimization, credibility, and economic purposes. According to this paper, this is the main argument for Sweden's FFP being a smart power initiative, aimed at bridging the investigated discrepancy. Therefore, Sweden's FFP agenda should not be seen as a normative, ethical, and caring policy; it should be seen for what it is actually intended for – an initiative launched to further gain credibility and legitimacy through soft power in the global arena, all while bridging gaps and inconsistencies in Sweden's FP. For this reason alone, the ethical commitments of Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy will forevermore apply conditionally, as the initiative itself builds on *maintaining* hard power, while not *losing* soft.

6 Bibliography

Achilleos-Sarl, Columbia. 2018. *Reconceptualizing Foreign Policy as Gendered, Sexualized, and Racialized: Towards a Postcolonial Feminist Foreign Policy (Analysis)*. *Journal of International Women's Studies*, 19:34-49.

Aggeestam, Karin., & Annika Bergman-Rosamond. 2016. *Swedish FFP in the Making: Ethics, Politics, and Gender*. *Ethics and International Affairs*, 30, (3): 323–34.

Aggeestam, Karin., Annika Bergman-Rosamond., & Annika, Kronsell. 2019. *Theorising Feminist Foreign Policy*. *International Relations*, 33, (3): 323–34.

Aggestam, Karin., & True, Jacqui. 2021. *Political Leadership and Gendered Multilevel Games in Foreign Policy*. *International Affairs*, 97, (2): 385–404.

Dahl, Robert. 1957. *The Concept of Power*. *Behav. Sci.*, 201–215.

Deslandes, Ann. 2020. *Checking in on Mexico's Feminist Foreign Policy*. *Foreign Policy*.

Fraser, Nancy. 2013. *Fortunes of Feminism: From a State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis*. Verso, London.

Galtung, Johan. 1969. *Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), pp. 167–191.

Gilligan, Carol. 1982. *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Gilligan, Carol., & Snider, Naomi. 2017. *The loss of pleasure or why are we still talking about Oedipus?* *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, 53 (2): 173–195.

Hampe, Dale. 1992. *The Toulmin Model and the Syllogisms*. *Readings in Argumentation*, Berlin.

Hudson, Valerie., Ballif-Spanvill, Bonnie., Caprioli, Mary., & Emmett, Chad. 2012. *Sex and World Peace*. Columbia University Press, New York.

Khon, Margaret. 2013. *Postcolonialism and Global Justice*. *Journal of Global Ethics*, 9(2), pp. 187–200.

- Krook, Mona., & Mackay. 2011. *Gender, Politics, and Institutions: Towards a Feminist Institutionalism*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Liakopoulos, Miltos. 2011. *Argumentation Analysis in Qualitative Researching with Text, Image, and Sound*. SAGE Publications: SAGE Researchmethods.
- McRobbie, Angela. 2009. *The Aftermath of Feminism: Gender, Culture, and Social Change*. Sage Publications, London.
- Minow, Martha. 1990. *Making all the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law*. Cornell University Press.
- Nye, Joseph. 1990. *Soft Power*. *Foreign Policy*, 80, pp. 153–171.
- Nye, Joseph. 2009. *Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power*. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88 (4), pp. 160–165.
- Nye, Joseph. 2013. *Hard, Soft and Smart Power*. In: Cooper, Andrew., Herine, Jorge., & Thakur, Ramesh. 2013. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*. Oxford university Press, UK.
- Pettersen, Tove. 2011. *The Ethics of Care: Normative Structures and Empirical Implications*. *Health Care Analysis*, 19(1): 51-64.
- Roberts, Adrienne. 2015. *The political Economy of 'Transnational Business Feminism' Problematizing the Corporate-led Gender Equality Agenda*. *Internaitonal Feminist Journal of Politics*, 17: 209-231.
- Robinson, Fiona. 2021. *Feminist Foreign Policy as Ethical Foreign Policy? A Care Ethics Perspective*. *Journal of International Political Theory*, 17(1), 20–37.
- Rottenberg, Catherine. 2018. *The Rise of Neoliberal Feminism*. Oxford University Press, New York.
- Sander-Staudt, Maureen. IEP. *Care Ethics*. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed (20/5-2022) at: <https://iep.utm.edu/care-ethics/>.
- Simons, Greg., & Manoilo, Andrey. 2019. *Sweden's self-percieved global role: Promises and contradictions*. *Research in Globalization*, vol. 1(1).
- Thompson, Lyric., & Rache, Clement. 2019. *Defining Feminist Foreign Policy*. International Center for Research on Women (ICRW), 2019.

Thompson, Lyric., Ahmed, Spogmay., & Khokhar, Tanya. 2021. *Defining Feminist Foreign Policy: A 2021 Update*. International Center for Research on Women (ICRW), 2021.

Toulmin, Stephen. 1958. *The Uses of Arguments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Toulmin, Stephen., Rieke, Richard., & Janik, Allan. 1979. *An Introduction to Reasoning*. Macmillan: New York.

Van Eemeren, Frans., Garssen, Bart., Krabbe, Erik., Francisca , Snoeck., & Verheij. 2014. *Handbook of Argumentation Theory*. Springer Reference, England.

Walby, Sylvia. 2011. *The Future of Feminism*. Cambridge: policy Press.

Watkins, Sylvia. 2018. *Which Feminisms?*. New Left Review, Januari – Februari: 5–76.

6.1 Reports & official Documents

FFPH, 2019. *Handbook: Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy*. Accessed (5/5-2022) at: <https://www.government.se/492c36/contentassets/fc115607a4ad4bca913cd8d11c2339dc/handbook---swedens-feminist-foreign-policy---english.pdf>.

Government of Sweden. 2022. *Regeringen har fattat beslut om att Sverige ska ansöka om medlemskap i Nato*. Accessed (22/5-2022) at: <https://www.regeringen.se/artiklar/2022/05/regeringen-har-idag-fattat-beslut-om-att-sverige-ska-ansoka-om-medlemskap-i-nato/>.

MFA. 2018. *Filippinerna – Mänskliga rättigheter, demokrati och rättsstatens principer: situationen per den 31 december 2018*. Accessed (13/5-2022) at: <https://www.regeringen.se/4a6333/contentassets/295c45ce5fbc414090b4f84d36df70d5/filippinerna---manskliga-rattigheter-demokrati-och-rattsstatens-principer-2019.pdf>.

MFA. 2018. *Indien – Mänskliga rättigheter, demokrati och rättsstatens principer: situationen per den 31 december 2018*. Accessed (13/5-2022) at: <https://www.regeringen.se/4a71a4/contentassets/8a6f037a44404ceabed8bb41eb49767f/indien---manskliga-rattigheter-demokrati-och-rattsstatens-principer-2019.pdf>.

MFA. 2018. *Pakistan – Mänskliga rättigheter, demokrati och rättsstatens principer: situationen per den 31 december 2018*. Accessed (7/5-2022) at: <https://www.regeringen.se/4a7196/contentassets/13db4d512c224541a53907125d4c846a/pakistan---manskliga-rattigheter-demokrati-och-rattsstatens-principer-2019.pdf>.

MFA. 2019. *Förenade Arabemiraten – Mänskliga rättigheter, demokrati och rättsstatens principer: situationen per den 30 juni 2019*. Accessed (13/5-2022) at: <https://www.regeringen.se/4a538a/contentassets/e472d294b8da476cb3d4b01e77ab698a/forenade-arabemiraten--manskliga-rattigheter-demokrati-och-rattsstatens-principer-situationen-per-den-30-juni-20192.pdf>.

MFA. 2019. *Saudiarabien – Mänskliga rättigheter, demokrati och rättsstatens principer: situationen per den 30 juni 2019*. Accessed (13/5-2022) at: <https://www.regeringen.se/4a55c2/contentassets/073cdefd6b3341788bfc0409f8d65b0b/saudi-arabien--manskliga-rattigheter-demokrati-och-rattsstatens-principer-situationen-per-den-30-juni-20192.pdf>.

6.2 Constitution

2008/944/CFSP (EU Council Common Position) of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment *OJ L 335, 13.12.2008*.

Accessed (23/5-2022) at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008E0944&from=EN>.

2017/18:UU9. *Ökade krav vid export av krigsmateriel (UU9)*. Utrikesdepartementet, Stockholm. Accessed at: <https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/604D3D2F-9FBB-477D-BBB6-1A9E0B3C2008>.

2017/18:23. *Skärpt exportkontroll av krigsmateriel*. Accessed (22/5-2022) at: <https://www.regeringen.se/4aa7ef/contentassets/fb5a7177eb9c4be2ac8ba998f32c67bd/Prop-2017-18-23.pdf>.

2018/19:114. *Strategisk exportkontroll 2018 – krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden*. Accessed (22/5-2022) at: <https://www.regeringen.se/4a738a/contentassets/c185d27dda92499092c3914ccf3f9849/strategisk-exportkontroll--krigsmateriel-och-produkter-med-dubbla-anvandningsomraden-skr.-201819114-.pdf>.

DS 2013:74. *Sveriges tillträde till vapenhandelsfördraget Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)*. Accessed (22/5-2022) at: <https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/974791CD-1CAD-4CEF-83AE-60E801756A54>.

DS 2018:16. *Konsolidering av nationella och internationella riktlinjer för exportkontroll av krigsmateriel*. Utrikesdepartementet, Stockholm. Accessed (23/5-2022) at: <https://www.regeringen.se/49c516/contentassets/903342e8ce7e4e3096fab094abc61312/konsolidering-av-nationella-riktlinjer-ds-2018-16.pdf>.

2019/20:17. *Sveriges Feministiska utrikespolitik*. Accessed at: <https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/7779363C-82D8-4716-B80E-40D1F56028CA>.

KU, 1996/1997:KU25. *KU granskningsärende*. Konstitutionsutskottet, Stockholm. Accessed (23/5-2022) at: <http://www.sou.gov.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/a8576528.pdf> (Bilaga 1-3).

S2016/01917/JÄM, S2016/04472/JÄM. *Jämställdhetsintegrering i Regeringskansliet 2016-2020*. Accessed (17/5-2022) at: <https://www.regeringen.se/4a0c6a/globalassets/regeringen/dokument/socialdepartementet/jamstallldhet/jamstallldhetsintegrering-i-regeringskansliet-20162020.pdf>.

SFS 2018:1903, [Elektronisk] 1 kap. §1. Accessed (4/5-2022) at: <https://svenskfattningssamling.se/sites/default/files/sfs/2018-11/SFS2018-1903.pdf>.

SOU, 1999:38. *Följdleveranser i samband med export av krigsmateriel*. Utrikesdepartementet, Stockholm. Accessed (23/5-2022) at: <https://lagen.nu/sou/1999:38#sid4-text>.

SOU 2015:72. *Skärpt exportkontroll av krigsmateriel*. Utrikesdepartementet, Stockholm. Accessed (23/5-2022) at: <https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2015/06/sou-201572/>.

UD 2012:01. *Översyn av exportkontrollen av krigsmateriel*. Utrikesdepartementet, Stockholm. Accessed (23/5-2022) at: <http://www.sou.gov.se/kex/>.

UN Arms Trades Treaty. 2013. Accessed (4/5-2022) at: https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/att/att_e.pdf.

6.3 Interviews

Linde, Ann. 2022. Feminism och jämställdhet i fokus när utrikesminister Ann Linde träffar Melinda Gates i Stockholm, 2 maj. Accessed (17/5-2022) at: <https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2022/05/feminism-och-jamstalldhet-i-fokus-nar-utrikesminister-ann-linde-traffar-melinda-gates-i-stockholm-2-maj/>.

Linde, Ann. 2020 (26th august). Exporten och den Feministiska utrikespolitiken. Accessed (22/5-2022) at: <https://www.svenskafreds.se/upptack/vapenexport/vapenexporten-och-den-feministiska-utrikespolitiken/>.

6.4 Debate Articles

Wallström, 2016. *Två år med feministisk utrikespolitik*. Accessed (17/5-2022) in: <https://manskligsakerhet.se/2016/10/06/tva-ar-med-feministisk-utrikespolitik/>.

Wallström, 2016. Wallström: *Kvinnor behövs som en hållbar fred*. Accessed (17/5-2022) at: <https://www.svd.se/a/0aKM/wallstrom-kvinnorna-behovs-for-en-hallbar-fred>.

6.6 Press

Baker, Sinéad. 2018. *The full timeline of Canada and Saudi Arabia's feud over jailed human rights activists*. Accessed (7/5-2022) at: <https://www.businessinsider.com/timeline-of-canada-saudi-arabia-diplomatic-feud-over-human-rights-2018-8?r=US&IR=T>.

Damm, Sofia. 2017. *Äntligen skärps reglerna för vapenkontroll*. Accessed (22/5-2022) at: <https://kristdemokraterna.se/skarpta-regler-vapenexport/>.

Gilligan, Carol. 2011. *Interview on June 21st, 2011*. Ethics of Care. Accessed (20/5-2020) at: <https://ethicsofcare.org/carol-gilligan/>.

Leuhusen, *Caroline*. 2021. *Över 20 procent av vapenexporten till stridande i Jemenkriget 2020*. Svenska Freds, Stockholm. Accessed (4/5-2022) at: <https://www.svenskafreds.se/upptack/nedrustning/over-20-procent-av-vapenexporten-till-stridande-i-jemenkriget-2020/>.

Johansson, *Morgan*. 2019. *Export av krigsmateriel till stater som krigar i Jemen (svar)*. Accessed (22/5-2022) at: https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svar-parlamentsfraga/export-av-krigsmateriel-till-stater-som-krigar-i_H612174.

Knutson, *Mats*. 2022. *Nu ligger vägen öppen för en Natoansökan*. Accessed (22/5-2022) at: <https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/nu-ligger-vagen-oppen-for-en-nato-ansokan>.

Svenska Freds (och skiljedomsföreningen). 2022. *Hur Många Länder Exporterar Sverige Vapen Till?*. Accessed (4/5 – 2022) at: <https://www.svenskafreds.se/kampanj/till-hur-manga-lander-exporterar-sverige-vapen/>.

Svenska Freds (och skiljedomsföreningen). 2022. *Pressmeddelande: Rekordstor vapenexport till diktaturer 2021*. Accessed (19/5 – 2022) at: <https://www.svenskafreds.se/upptack/vapenexport/pressmeddelande-rekordstor-vapenexport-till-diktaturer-2021/>.

Moss, *Sigrun*. 2020. *An introduction to Swedish feminist foreign policy*. Accessed (17/5-2022) at: <https://nordics.info/show/artikel/swedish-feminist-foreign-policy>.

Appendix 1 (Identification of theory in texts)

Identification of theory in texts, examples:

Theory/framework	How to identify	Part of argument suggesting connection to theory
<p><i>Feminism ‘colonized’ by neoliberal interests (Rottenberg, 2018).</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Empowerment of women - Economic policy - Ambiguous outcomes 	<p><u>Empowerment connected to economic motives</u></p> <p>(i) “2.3 Objective areas for Sweden’s feminist foreign policy (six long-term external objectives).” (5.) Economic rights and empowerment <i>(Handbook Swe FFP:19)</i></p> <p>(ii) “[...] gender equality is also good for the economy.” <i>(Handbook Swe FFP:85)</i></p> <p><u>Ambiguous outcomes</u></p> <p>“The policy has achieved significant results [...] We have campaigned for women’s and girls’ sexual and reproductive health and rights.” <i>(Handbook Swe FFP:85)</i></p>
<p><i>Feminist care ethics</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Feminism (as a western liberal from of global justice) contrasted to the ‘other’ 	<p><u>Indications it is a smart power move</u></p> <p>(i) “It is obvious that politics in Saudi Arabia are far from feminist politics” - Wallström <i>(Svenska Dagbladet 2015)</i></p> <p>(ii) “Sweden will continue to pursue this policy with full force all around the world.”- Wallström <i>(Handbook Swe FFP:11)</i></p>
<p><i>Smart Power</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy itself described as ‘smart’ 	<p><u>How it is framed</u></p> <p>(i) As well as being smart and right, gender equality is also good for the economy</p> <p>(ii) (A FFP) However, it’s also a smart practical policy.</p>

Appendix 2 (Data)

In order to comprehend the amounts of data processed for this paper a short list of constitutional documents, reports, interviews and policy documents will be presented. The main three documents deconstructed and used will top the list, followed by many others used to analyze the results:

- Handbook: Feminist Foreign Policy, 2019.
- 2019/20:17. *Sveriges Feministiska utrikespolitik.*
- *Utrikesförvaltningens handlingsplan för feministisk utrikespolitik 2019-2022*, 2021.
- 2008/944/CFSP (EU Council Common Position) of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment OJ L 335, 13.12.2008.
- 2017/18:UU9. *Ökade krav vid export av krigsmateriel (UU9)*. Utrikesdepartementet, Stockholm.
- 2017/18:23. *Skärpt exportkontroll av krigsmateriel.*
- 2018/19:114. *Strategisk exportkontroll 2018 – krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden.*
- DS 2013:74. *Sveriges tillträde till vapenhandelsfördraget Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)*.
- DS 2018:16. *Konsolidering av nationella och internationella riktlinjer för exportkontroll av krigsmateriel.*
- KU, 1996/1997:KU25. *KU granskningsärende.*
- S2016/01917/JÄM, S2016/04472/JÄM. *Jämställdhetsintegrering i Regeringskansliet 2016-2020.*
- SFS 2018:1903, [Elektronisk] 1 kap. §1.
- SOU, 1999:38. *Följdleveranser i samband med export av krigsmateriel.*
- SOU 2015:72. *Skärpt exportkontroll av krigsmateriel.*
- UD 2012:01. *Översyn av exportkontrollen av krigsmateriel.*
- UN Arms Trades Treaty. 2013.
- UD (Foreign Ministry). 2018. *Filippinerna – Mänskliga rättigheter, demokrati och rättsstatens principer: situationen per den 31 december 2018.*
- UD (Foreign Ministry). 2018. *Indien – Mänskliga rättigheter, demokrati och rättsstatens principer: situationen per den 31 december 2018.*
- UD (Foreign Ministry) 2018. *Pakistan – Mänskliga rättigheter, demokrati och rättsstatens principer: situationen per den 31 december 2018.*
- UD (Foreign Ministry). 2019. *Förenade Arabemiraten – Mänskliga rättigheter, demokrati och rättsstatens principer: situationen per den 30 juni 2019.*
- UD (Foreign Ministry). 2019. *Saudiarabien – Mänskliga rättigheter, demokrati och rättsstatens principer: situationen per den 30 juni 2019.*
- Wallström, 2016. *Två år med feministisk utrikespolitik.*
- Wallström, 2016. *Wallström: Kvinnor behövs som en hållbar fred.*

Appendix 3 (Deconstruction of Argument)

2.1 Government Communication 2019/20:17 – “Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy”

“Export control”

Under the feminist foreign policy, Sweden attaches great importance (Qualifier) to preventing and counteracting gender-based and sexual violence around the world, in both conflict and peacetime (Claim). One important aspect of this work is the strict control exercised over the export of military equipment from Sweden (Claim). This takes place, for example, through Sweden applying article 7.4 of the ATT (Grounds). The article was included in the treaty with the strong support of countries including Sweden, and requires States Parties to take into account (Qualifier) the risk of exported military equipment being used to commit – or facilitate – serious gender-based violence or serious violence against women and children (Backing). The Swedish Inspectorate of Strategic Products is continuously strengthening its expertise in order to apply article 7.4 of the ATT (Grounds) and include risks of gender-based violence in assessments (Backing) relating to human rights and international humanitarian rights (Warrant). The proposals in a bill on more stringent export controls of military equipment (Govt Bill 2017/18:23) came into force in 2018, resulting in stricter regulations (Grounds). The new regulations imply that the democratic status (Warrant) of the receiving country shall be a critical condition for assessing whether or not to grant an export license (Backing). There is a close connection here to respect for human rights and the principle that all citizens must be able to assert these rights on equal terms (Warrant). It implies, for example, that serious hardships for people including women and children or members of minority groups must be considered in the assessment (Backing). The assessment should also consider (Qualifier) the impact of the export on fair and sustainable development in the receiving country. This also means that whether the export will affect the situation for men and boys and for women and girls in significantly different ways (Backing) can also be considered (Qualifier).

2.2 The export of military equipment, FFPH (2019:73-74)

By championing a feminist foreign policy, the Swedish Government works systematically with achieving results that strengthen women's and girls' rights, representation, and resources(Claim). Sweden attaches great importance(Qualifier) to preventing and counteracting gender-based and sexual violence in conflict and in society generally(Claim). One important aspect of this work is the strict(Qualifier) control exercised over the export of military equipment from Sweden (Claim). This takes place, for example, through Sweden applying article 7.4 of the ATT (Grounds). The article was included in the treaty with the strong support of countries including Sweden, and requires state parties to take into account (Qualifier) the risk of exported materials being used for – or facilitating – serious gender-based violence or serious violence against women or children(Grounds).

Sweden has also worked to ensure(Qualifier) that the Inspectorate of Strategic Products has sufficient competence to be able to include gender equality aspects and risks of gender-based violence(Backing) in assessments relating to human rights and international humanitarian rights(Warrant), and to apply article 7.4 of the ATT(Grounds). As part of this work, a targeted skills development initiative for the inspectorate was arranged in 2016(Backing).

In addition, the Government submitted a bill to the Riksdag in October 2017, including proposals on further sharpening export controls on military equipment (Bill 2017/17:23) (Grounds). The legislative change came into force on 15 April 2018(Grounds). The new regulations imply that the democratic status (Warrant) of the receiving country shall be a central condition for assessing whether or not to grant permission(Backing). This assessment shall also take into account(Qualifier) whether the export could counteract equitable and sustainable development in the receiving country(Backing). An overall assessment(Qualifier) will be carried out(Backing).

2.3 Interview (Möte UD)

”Tack så mycket, den här frågan får jag ju hela tiden och jag ser som sagt var inte alls den på samma sätt som Svenska Freds. Faktum är att det är grundläggande att alla länder har rätt att försvara sig enligt FN-stadgan(Grounds) och det innebär att man har en rätt till ett militärt försvar och att man också då självständigt kan bestämma inriktning på

säkerhetspolitiken(Backing). Vi har en försvarsindustri och en krigsmaterielexport därför att det är nödvändigt för att vi ska kunna ha vår militära alliansfrihet(Claim) och därför så behövs exporten, ytterst för att vi ska kunna behålla vår försvarsförmåga och behålla möjligheten att själva välja att vi är militärt alliansfria(Backing). Det är en grundsats för mig.

Sedan är det så att exporten i sig är hårt reglerad(Grounds). Vi har ett regelverk som är bland de mest strikta i hela världen(Claim) och det finns ingen motsättning som jag ser det mellan en ansvarsfull och strikt exportkontroll och en feministisk utrikespolitik(Claim), eller vårt stöd till fredlig konfliktlösning eller vårt omfattande humanitära stöd. Centrala delar i det här regelverket är ju bland annat mottagarlandets demokratiska status och respekten för MR(Warrant) och huruvida en export motverkar en rättvis och hållbar utveckling i landet(Backing).

Därutöver har ju Sverige åtagit sig internationella skyldigheter(Backing) på det här området. EU:s gemensamma ståndpunkt om vapenexport och FN:s vapenhandelsfördrag(Grounds), som kallas för ATT innehåller bestämmelser som man måste beakta som handlar om MR(Qualifier) och risken för könsbaserat våld(Claim). Regeringen ligger också mycket stor vikt vid att förebygga och motverka könsbaserat och sexuellt våld i konflikter och i samhällen generellt(Claim). Vi hör till de länder som verkar för att det internationella ATT-arbetet uppmärksammar(Qualifier) just risken för könsbaserat våld(Claim). Förra årets krigsmaterielexport till länder i Mellanöstern, inklusive Saudiarabien och Förenade arabemiraten bestod bara av följdleveranser och så kallat övrig krigsmateriel(Grounds) och jag är oerhört stolt över mitt och Sveriges arbete i Jemen, vi är verkligen viktiga i det arbetet och det pågår just nu många saker. [...] Jag är mycket stolt över vårt arbete i Jemen och de olika parterna har stort förtroende för Sverige och inte minst kvinnor, jag har ju samlat kvinnor från Jemen vid olika tillfällen och tagit in kvinnor från Jemen och fått stort gehör för det.”²²

²² Accessed (23/5-2022) at: <https://www.svenskafreds.se/upptack/vapenexport/vapenexporten-och-den-feministiska-utrikespolitiken/>.

Appendix 4 (Empirical Findings)

Here the overall argument is presented and summarized from the three deconstructed texts.

Claims (the main arguments given for a FFP being equitable weapons exports):

(i) Under a FFP, Sweden (**attaches great importance**) [...] counteracting gender-based and sexual violence around the world, in both conflict and peacetime, (ii) [ISP] (**strict**) controls exercised over the export of military equipment from Sweden, (iii) There is no contradiction (as I see it) between a responsible and strict exports control and a feminist foreign policy, (iv) Swedish Government works systematically with achieving results that strengthen women's and girls' rights, representation, and resources, (v) In order for Sweden to maintain its neutrality and non-alignment policy a weapons industry is vital for greater independence.

Grounds (evidence supporting main claims):

(i) Sweden applying article 7.4 of the ATT, (ii) (Govt Bill 2017/18:23) came into force in 2018, resulting in stricter regulations (regarding export controls of military equipment).

Backings (support for above):

(i) the democratic status of the receiving state (**should be considered**), (ii) that serious hardships for people including women and children or members of minority groups (needs to be **taken into account**), (iii) impact of the export on fair and sustainable development (**should be considered**), (iv) export will affect the situation for men and boys and for women and girls (**can be considered**), (v) (**An overall assessment**) will be carried out.

Warrants (underlying assumptions and principles):

(i) human rights and international humanitarian rights, (ii) democratic status.

Qualifiers (degree of certainty behind the evidence provided)

3 – Claims, 0 – Grounds, 5 – Backings

Rebuttal

None