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Climate Security on the Global Arena

The role of Small Island Developing States in the global
climate security debate

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Abstract

In the last decades, the debate on climate change as a security threat has gained leverage. The topic has been debated in multiple international instances, such as the UN system. One of the most vulnerable groups to climate change are the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) due to their geography but also their developmental challenges. Because of this, they have been strong actors in the climate change debate. This thesis looks at their contribution to the global climate security debate by looking at how they are referring to four different discourses of climate security: national, human, international, and ecological security. This is done with a discourse analysis of statements made by the SIDS at UN Security Council and COP meetings. The aim is to see how the SIDS has contributed to framing climate change as a security threat, as this has implications for policies in the area. The findings of the study show that the discourses of national and human security are dominant in the statements by the SIDS, going against previous research arguing for the dominance of national security. It also finds that the SIDS are framing climate security broader and more widely compared to other actors.

Keywords: Climate security, Small Island Developing States, Securitization, United Nations, Discourse Analysis

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*Hanna Andersson
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List of abbreviations

AOSIS – Alliance of Small Island States

COP – Conference of the Parties

CS – Copenhagen School

GHG – Greenhouse Gas

IGO – Intergovernmental Organization

IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

NDC – Nationally Determined Contributions

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals

SIDS – Small Island Developing States

UN – United Nations

UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose and research question

Climate change is one of the biggest challenges facing the world today. In February 2022 the Working Group II of the sixth assessment report of the IPCC released their contribution to the upcoming full report, called “Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability” (2022), assessing the recent and future impacts of climate change. The results in the report are alarming. Since their latest report in 2014, changes in the physical climate system have become more prominent. We have seen increases in global temperatures, rising sea levels, and more extreme weather events to mention a few. This has had severe effects on natural and human systems, including degradation of ecosystems, reduced water, and food security, and human displacement and migration (IPCC 2022, p. 45). The scale and pace of changes in the environment that we are seeing now are unprecedented over many centuries, and many of the changes we are seeing are irreversible and are projected to increase in the coming decades (IPCC 2022, pp. 49-50).

The challenge that climate change is posing have led to a debate on if climate change should be defined as a security threat or not. The first time the term climate security was mentioned was in the Brundtland Commission report “Our Common Future” in 1987. Framing something as a security threat often legitimizes exceptional measures to be taken (Hayes 2012, p. 66). Some argue for its advantage as it puts the issue of climate change on top of the policy agenda (Oels 2012, p. 195), while others see how it could encourage military responses inconsistent with

what is seen as an effective solution (McDonald 2013, p. 44). Within the climate security debate, there are several different discourses framing the threat of climate change in different terms depending on whom they see as the referent object of security among other characteristics (Scott 2012, p. 221). These discourses are important, as the process of framing climate change as a security threat has policy implications on how to respond to the threat (Oels 2012, p. 190).

One group of countries that have been active in the international climate change debate is the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (see list of countries in Appendix 1). They are a group of 38 UN member states and 20 non-UN members located in the Caribbean, the Pacific, and the Atlantic, Indian Ocean and South China Sea (AIS) (UN 2022). 39 of the states are members of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) which represents the states in international climate negotiations (AOSIS 2022). They were recognized as a special case in environmental and developmental challenges at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, due to their unique social, economic, and environmental vulnerabilities. When it comes to climate change the SIDS is facing both fast-onset events, such as cyclones, and slow-onset events, such as sea-level rise (UN 2022A). These challenges are not only connected to development but also pose an existential threat to the SIDS (Ourbak & Magnan 2018).

In this thesis, I investigate how the SIDS have been active in the global climate security debate from 2015 to 2019. The aim is to see how the SIDS are framing climate change as a security threat in the UNSC and the UNFCCC, and what discourses that are dominant. A discourse analysis is performed, analyzing the four discourses of climate security chosen for this thesis: national security, human security, international security, and ecological security. Understanding which discourse that is dominant is important due to its influence on what policies and actions are seen as legitimate, which is important for future work within the climate change realm. As SIDS are some of the most vulnerable countries in the world when

it comes to climate change, it is interesting to see how they are framing climate change in security terms. The thesis also aims at emphasizing their role in the global climate change regime, as well as their extreme vulnerability to climate change.

The thesis answers the following question:

How has the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) contributed to framing climate change as a security threat?

1.2 Background

1.2.1 SIDS and their vulnerability to climate change

The vulnerability of the SIDS has been highlighted several times since its recognition as a special case of environmental and developmental challenges in 1992 by the UN (UN 2022A). The SIDS is a diverse group of countries located in tropical and subtropical climatic zones. They differ in terms of geography, culture, history, and socio-economic circumstances, but they share some development challenges and struggle with the same environmental problems. Their developmental challenges include their smallness, remoteness, and proneness to natural disasters which affect their ability to adapt to climate change. The environmental problems they face are many, including sea-level rise, increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather, and changes in precipitation patterns (Betzold 2015, p. 2). The SIDS are some of the least contributing countries to global GHG emissions, as they with their population of 65 million people contribute to less than 1% of the global emissions. Despite their small contribution to the GHG emissions, the SIDS will be among the earliest and most impacted countries when it comes to climate change, which means that they will suffer disproportionately (UN-OHRLLS 2015, pp. 6, 18).

The climate change effects that the SIDS are facing will affect their societies in different ways. One of the biggest challenges is the effects related to oceans, including sea-level rise, increased storm activity due to warmer oceans, and ocean acidification (Betzold 2015, p. 2). Sea-level rise is one of the effects that can already be seen in the SIDS, with higher sea levels leading to people being displaced in several countries (UN-OHRLLS 2015, p. 33). Some low-lying islands in Micronesia and the Solomon Islands have already been lost to the ocean (Thomas et al. 2020, p. 6), and more areas are at risk as 26% of the total land in the SIDS today is under five meters above sea level (World Bank 2021, p. 222). Increased storm activity will most likely affect important infrastructure as well as vital income sources such as agriculture. Tropical cyclones are already a big issue in the Caribbean, where 22 out of 29 Caribbean islands were affected by at least one category four or five cyclone in 2017 (IPCC 2022, p. 15-5). Together with ocean acidification, affecting fisheries and ocean fauna (Betzold 2015, p. 2), the degradation of land and oceans threatens food security in the communities. It will affect the availability of food, the ability to access food, and the ability to utilize food, which will be a huge challenge for the SIDS (Barnett 2011, p. 233-234).

The SIDS are not only facing challenges with the effects of climate change but also in how to adapt to it. Climate adaptation is defined as the adjustment to expected or already existing effects of climate change (Klöck & Nunn 2019, p. 199). Most adaptation strategies fall under either structural/physical or social adaptation. Structural or physical adaptation can be connected to changes in the built environment to protect the society, for example by building seawalls (Ratter et al. 2016, p. 117) or updating water storage facilities (Monnereau & Abraham 2013, p. 419). Social adaptation is more focused on behavioral changes in connection to climate change. It can be that households prepare for extreme weather events by preserving food and water, or more educational measures on a national level to raise awareness of climate change effects (Klöck & Nunn 2019, p. 205). These measures are something that many island communities are struggling with, as they lack funding and personnel to regulate this on a national level, which is important for

long-term adaptation and more adequately engineered measures. The SIDS has therefore been the target of many aid programs in terms of adaptation, but they usually focus on short-term funding. That, together with the lack of transparency between donors and recipients, has led to the failure of the programs as the effects of the intervention often disappear with the funding (Nunn & Kumar 2017, p. 253). To build resilient communities in the SIDS, it is therefore important for future aid programs to focus more on community-based approaches for more sustainable and long-term adaptation measures (Buggy & McNamara 2016, p. 272).

1.2.2 SIDS as an actor in climate change

The SIDS as a group has been very active in the climate change debate, especially in calling attention to their high vulnerability. They have had a leading role in advocating for more ambitious regulations to limit global warming within UNFCCC debates (Thomas et al. 2020, p. 2). The countries have been active both under the SIDS label, but also via the negotiation group AOSIS. The main purpose of the AOSIS is to defend the island states' interest in international negotiations, primarily under the UNFCCC, recognizing the vulnerabilities of both their territories and people. Over the years, the AOSIS has become one of the key players within the UNFCCC, leading to the SIDS countries gaining seats in various bodies of the UNFCCC (Betzold et al. 2012, p. 591-594). They have also been very ambitious in their contributions and strategies when it comes to mitigation and adaptation, despite their restricted capabilities and levels of economic development (Hoad 2015, p. 260). As the SIDS is seen as extremely vulnerable to climate change, the AOSIS has gained moral leverage within the climate change debate helping them to form partnerships with powerful groups and countries (e.g. the EU) (Betzold et al. 2012, p. 594).

How the AOSIS has had an important role can be illustrated by the campaign they have been leading since 2008 with the slogan “1,5°C to Stay Alive”. This was

one of the most important questions for the AOSIS leading up to the Paris Agreement (Benjamin & Thomas 2016, p. 122, 124). The question is critical for the survival of the SIDS, as sea-level rise largely depends on increases in the global temperature, connected to the thermal warming of the oceans. The 1,5°C limit was first put forward as a suggestion at the Copenhagen meeting in 2009, gaining recognition from over half of the UN members for the first time (Wong 2010, pp. 1-2). On request by the AOSIS, a Structured Expert Dialogue (SED) reviewed the question between 2013-2015, finding that there were several advantages with a temperature goal of 1,5°C instead of 2°C which was the mainly discussed limit. These efforts by the AOSIS, advocating for the limit for almost a decade, led to the successful mention of the 1,5°C limit in the Paris Agreement in 2015 (Benjamin & Thomas 2016, p. 124-126). Beyond this, they have also been an active player in the question of loss and damage since the 1990s, leading to the establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) in 2013 addressing the unequal impacts of climate change on developing countries (Calliari 2018, p. 726). The SIDS have also been active regionally in different groups such as the Pacific SIDS (PSIDS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (UN 2022A).

2 Previous research

In this chapter, the previous research in the field of climate security will be discussed. First, climate security as a concept is discussed, as the securitization of climate change is a debated topic within research. In this, the question of the securitization of climate change being successful or not is discussed, as well as some of the most debated issues in the field. Then, the research on the global discourse of climate security is investigated, especially in terms of which actors and instances were studied and the findings of the studies.

2.1 The debate on climate security

Since the first reference to climate change as a security threat in the 1987 Brundtland Commission report “Our Common Future”, a scholarly debate on the successful or unsuccessful framing of climate change as a security threat and if it should be framed as one has been active. The Copenhagen School (CS), which is seen as the founder of the securitization theory, is critical to the securitization of climate change. The securitization process is seen as successful when there is a perceived existential threat that requires extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 5). They emphasize that it is important to think about the problematic sides of applying a mindset of security to climate change, and weigh that against the possible advantages of increased attention and mobilization. The problems arise from the CS’s view on labeling something as a security threat, which brings with it a set of practices associated with war and emergencies, which is not always the appropriate response (ibid. p. 29). In their work, they observe attempts to securitize climate change within the environmental sector, but they argue that the measures

taken have not passed the border of ordinary politics or brought exceptional measures in line with the practices mentioned above and have therefore not been securitized (ibid. P. 91).

One scholar who goes against this old belief is Trombetta, who argues that there is evidence of a successful securitization of climate change. There are examples of where the threat of climate change has mobilized action, such as the Bali Roadmap for implementing the Kyoto protocol and the first UNSC debate on climate change and its security implications in 2007 (Trombetta 2008, p. 598). This has led to communicative action and social change, which Trombetta sees as a widening of the securitization framework with a move away from only extraordinary responses (Trombetta 2011, p. 142). Trombetta also warns of the danger of trying to show that something is not a security threat, as this can lead to the marginalization and minimization of urgent threats (ibid. P. 136).

Another scholar, Corry takes a more risk-based approach to security. He discusses the trend of security being more and more about prevention of risks, looking at future scenarios, and managing risks rather than handling acute threats (Corry 2012, p. 236). Appeals to security in this case do not have to lead to emergency measures and military action. Instead, climate change poses challenges broadly to both normal and security politics (ibid. p. 238). Within the work discussing risks of climate change there are different views on whether this should be seen as a part of securitization or as a new framework. Corry believes that it should stand on its own (ibid. p. 237), while scholars like Brauch (2009) and Trombetta (2008) include risk politics in their understanding of securitization.

Today it is generally acknowledged that from the mid-2000s we have seen a securitization of climate change. One of the developments that have led to this is the rise of connecting climate change to resilience, according to Boas & Rothe. In their view, the rise of resilience has opened the climate security discourse to a range of new actors and promoted ideas of self-capacity, empowerment, and reflexivity (Boas & Rothe 2016, p. 629). Another scholar, Detraz, sees it as a part of the bigger trend from the late 1990s to securitize non-traditional security threats. She argues

for its importance by highlighting it as a way of attracting attention to the issue of climate change and the needed resources for accurate responses (Detraz 2011, p. 115). However, Detraz warns about other less desirable consequences of linking an issue to security. She argues that there are different perspectives on climate security as a concept, leading to different referent objects being at focus. One concern is that human security often is raised in combination with state security, which evidence shows leads to human vulnerability being put as a lower priority and the state becomes the main referent object of security (ibid. pp. 115-116).

Another issue brought up by Detraz is the importance of how we understand climate security, as this has implications for policymaking (Detraz 2011, p. 115). Another scholar that discusses this is Floyd, who argues that the range of understandings of climate security has led to ideational fragmentation in the area. She brings up the example of the UNSC 2007 meeting where she argues that three different frames of climate security were present: climate change as a source of violent conflict, as a threat to national security, and as a threat to the individual. The outcome of the meeting was that no consensus could be reached, which she argues is the result of different actors and organizations having different ideas about the nature of climate security (Floyd 2008, p. 63; Floyd 2015, pp. 127, 137). Overall, Floyd takes a skeptical standpoint towards the securitization of climate change, seeing it as a double-edged sword. It raises awareness of the pressing issue of climate change, but it can also affect the most vulnerable populations negatively. For example, the global north's growing demand for biofuel as a way of responding to climate change is having adverse effects on food security in the global south (Floyd 2008 p. 62-63).

My thesis sees climate change as widely securitized while keeping some of its issues in mind. I also argue for the broadening of the scope of security as a concept with new non-traditional measures being taken. Some of the issues with climate security, such as perspectives being prioritized and ideational fragmentation, are discussed with the result later in the thesis.

2.2 The discourse on climate security at the international level

Research on international organizations and climate security is seen as a relatively young research field. The existing studies have enhanced the understanding of how and why organizations respond to climate security threats. However, there is still a lot of work to be done to design effective global governance and solutions in response to the threat of climate change (Dellmuth et al. 2018, p. 9). Looking into some of the existing studies several interesting trends can be observed. One study looking at intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and climate security is the one from Dellmuth et al in 2018. They argue that since the issue of climate change is a transnational one, states and other organizations are increasingly depending on IGOs in the field of climate security. By looking at different instances referring to climate security, they find that there has been no coherent securitization of climate change across IGOs (Dellmuth et al. 2018, p. 4). They dig deeper into how the UNSC resolutions and debates are dealing with the issue and find that their responses to climate security vary in terms of how broadly or narrowly it is defined. They also find that there is most evidence of state security in the discourse from the IGOs (ibid. pp. 4, 6). They do not refer to any specific implications of these findings but argue that there is more research needed to understand for example what policy implications this development has (ibid. p. 9).

Another study conducted by Smith et al. argues for the advancement of climate security in the discourse of the UNSC. There is increasing support for more adequate climate risk assessment within the UNSC and several members of the UNSC have raised the issue at other forums (Smith et al. 2019, p. 1). They argue that there has been a shift away from the previous view on discussing climate security, which in the early 2000s was seen as controversial. Instead, the current trend since 2017 is that the number of resolutions including language on climate security has multiplied. This development towards including climate change issues in the UNSC also confirms the growing view of the UNSC's role in preventing a

crisis from happening (ibid. pp. 12-13). Another scholar looking at the role of the UNFCCC, the EU, and the UNSC is Odeyemi. He argues, based on an analysis of speech acts from the three institutions, that two aspects of climate security seem to be central in the debates held by the institutions. The two elements are climate conflict and climate change as a threat multiplier. While the findings in his article are very limited, he argues for the importance of understanding the debate by the UNFCCC, the EU, and the UNSC as they are heavily influential in how the climate security debate will develop (Odeyemi 2020, p. 443, 450).

One scholar looking deeper into the work of the UNSC is Hardt. In her 2020 policy brief, based on the work of the project “Climate Change in the UNSC”, she analyses the work of the council from 2007 until 2020 looking at how the 15 member states of the council approach the climate-security nexus. One of the key findings is that all 15 members acknowledge that there is a climate-security nexus (Hardt 2020, p. 2). She also mentions a result concerning the SIDS, as the Dominican Republic and St Vincent and the Grenadines have been members of the UNSC over the period. The finding is that all the member states except the Dominican Republic and St Vincent and the Grenadines acknowledge the link to the traditional security approach, focusing on national and international security connected to violent conflict and military responses. (ibid. p. 3). In her 2021 article, she argues that evidence shows how new interpretations of security are being largely ignored in the UNSC. Her analysis is made on the 2020 joint statement by 10 UNSC member states in an initiative to address climate-related security risks (Hardt 2021, p. 6). One example is how the existential threat climate change is posing to humanity and future generations has been ignored. The analysis shows that the vulnerabilities of people are brought up in relation to future conflict, but not as a direct impact of climate change (ibid. p. 9). This shows an institutional gap within the UN system as other instances recognize the existential security threats while the UNSC, the only institution with the mandate to deal with security issues, remains largely ignorant (ibid. p. 13).

My thesis builds on these previous findings on climate security within IGOs, especially within the UNSC and UNFCCC, looking at a particular group of countries in the SIDS and their influence. In comparison to the work above, my thesis takes a broader stand on security as it includes four different understandings of security. It contributes to the relatively young field of research, where more is needed to be done to understand how climate change is being framed as a security threat.

3 Theoretical framework

This chapter will explore the theory of climate security. As climate security is a broad concept and can have many different implications, the specific framework that will be used for this thesis will be explained. First, the broader theory of securitization will be discussed, as climate security is based on the process of framing something as a threat to security. Second, the broader understanding of climate security will be discussed before going into the four types of climate security that will be used in this thesis: national security, human security, international security, and ecological security.

3.1 Securitization

The concept of climate security is grounded in the broader theory of securitization. Securitization can be explained as the active process of framing an issue as a security threat, which also sets in motion policies and actions to handle this issue (Dalby 2009, p. 47). The theory is based on constructivist and poststructuralist thinking, seeing security as a socially constructed phenomenon created by discourses of security. This is a broadening of the perspective on security compared to the traditional realist approach. In the realist definition, the state is the referent of security, and it is to be achieved via the threat of or use of violence. In the theory of securitization, various issues can be developed into a security threat if it is successfully constructed as it (Trombetta 2008, pp. 587-588). The process of securitization involves two main actors, a securitizing actor and an audience. The securitizing actor claims that a referent object is facing an existential threat requiring a reaction outside of normal politics. The audience needs to agree that

there is a threat, and that the referent is of such importance that special measures can be taken. When this is done the issue shifts from the realm of normal politics into the one of security, legitimizing urgent and exceptional actions (Hayes 2012, p. 66).

The securitization theory is said to have been established in the 1980s by the so-called Copenhagen School (CS) (Balzacq et al. 2016, p. 496). They claim that the politics of security is a part of a speech act, creating a situation where there is a perceived existential threat requiring extraordinary action (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 5). They pose three conditions that increase the chances of successful securitization. The first looks at if the speech act connects to the discourse of security as a concept, for example by posing it as an existential threat. The second one states the importance of the social capacity and authority of the securitizing actor. The third one highlights external objects, for example military objects, that are generally seen as threatening, and the role they play in the securitizing process (Hayes 2012, p. 66). Securitizing an issue can sometimes be problematic, as security is about survival and emergency. Framing it in this way allows for measures that break otherwise binding rules and can move away from the realm of democratic governance. Labeling something as a security threat can therefore have problematic consequences. This is something that needs to be weight in the decision of securitizing an issue (Trombetta 2008, pp. 588-589).

3.2 Climate security

Connecting climate change to the theory of securitization, climate security can be seen as the threat posed by climate change to states, societies, and individuals. These threats can be both directly and indirectly caused by climate change (Dellmuth et al 2018, p. 3). Rather than being concerned with the security of the climate itself, it suggests a concern for the security of all human enterprises.

A prerequisite of that security is stable climatic conditions and the maintenance of that stability. It can also be seen as the way to secure an achieved level of civilization, or the people and societies that depend on it (Trombetta 2008, p. 595). The threats associated with climate change are for example natural disasters, destabilizing effects of regional population movements, and future conflicts over resources (Odeyemi 2020, p. 443). Within the field of security, there is a range of different perspectives, which focuses on securitizing different objects. It is often referred to as different discourses of security. Detraz chooses to define two different discourses of climate security, environmental conflict, and environmental security. The environmental conflict discourse is linked to more traditional security concerns, connecting climate change to a general concern for state security, while the environmental security discourse is more linked to the negative effects of climate change on human beings (Detraz 2011, p. 106). Another scholar, Floyd, defines three discourses on climate security: climate change as a source of violent conflict, climate change as a threat to national security, and climate change as a threat to the individual (Floyd 2015, p. 123).

The framework that will be used for this study will be built on an article by McDonald (2013), arguing for four different discourses of climate security: national, human, international, and ecological security. He identifies these four discourses by looking at four main aspects of the process, presented as four questions. These questions are how is the referent object conceptualized (whose security?), how is the threat defined, who are the key agent(s) of security (who is responding to the threat?), and what responses are fit to deal with the threat (McDonald 2013, p. 43). By asking these questions he identifies some of the main characteristics of each discourse, making them easier to point out and compare to each other. In the following sections, each of the four discourses will be presented based on the four questions asked by McDonald. The characteristics for each discourse will be partly built on McDonald's work but also to a large extent on other existing research.

3.2.1 National security

The first discourse is connected to the realist view on security, having the nation-state as the referent object for security (Trombetta 2008, p. 587). In national security the preservation of sovereignty and territory is central, and the state is often threatened by an external force. The source of national security is multifaceted, and it includes instances such as military force and different forms of statecraft, such as crisis management and diplomacy (Walt 1991, p. 213). The discourse of climate change as a national security threat builds upon this view and some of the earliest research was on the relationship between climate change and armed conflict. Kaplan states in his article from 1991 that the environment is the national security issue of the first part of the 21st century. He explains how climate change will lead to water depletion, deforestation and soil erosions, and rising sea levels, only to mention a few. This will lead to mass migration which in turn will incite group conflicts (Kaplan 1994). The climate conflict track is also supported by Homer-Dixon, who focuses on how scarcities will affect violent conflicts in the future. He states that in the coming decades, we will see an increase of scarcities in resources such as water, agricultural land, and depletion of fishery resources. This in turn will both work as a threat multiplier for already existing conflicts, aggravating the tensions present or even inducing conflict. This will lead to conflict both on a national and international level (Homer-Dixon 1994, pp. 5-6), posing a threat to national security (McDonald 2013, p. 45).

The discourse of national security has been advanced over the years by representatives of state institutions and the policies they have put forward on national security. Countries like the US and Australia have made key security statements on climate change, embracing the idea that climate change should be considered a national security threat (McDonald 2013, p. 45). In 2009, the Australian Department of Defense stated that the demographic changes, population movements, and environmental and resource pressures will pose a threat to national security, increasing the risk of conflict, political instability and mass migration

flows (Department of Defense, Australia 2009). Climate-induced migration is seen as a national security threat not only for the country they are leaving but also as something that will put pressure on receiving states (Scott 2012, p. 222). For some countries, sea-level rise poses a substantial threat to the security over territory, for example for the SIDS who are facing an existential threat as a result of this (Barnett 2003, p. 9).

There is not only an external dimension to this threat of climate change but also an internal one in upholding state legitimacy and governance of the territory. Factors that can affect the legitimacy of the state are the management of environmental disasters, human health, and economic challenges. If we look closer at the economic challenges, climate change can eradicate people's livelihoods, aggravate inequalities, and destroy important infrastructure (Barnett 2003, p. 9). These challenges will pose a threat to all countries, but especially those who are already struggling socially, economically, and politically (Scott 2013, p. 222). For these challenges, the military response that is more recognized for the external threats is not as recognized. Instead, mitigation and adaptation strategies to climate change are seen as important. One way of doing this is by taking actions to reduce the risk of climate disasters and develop its response to them (McDonald 2013, p. 45).

3.2.2 Human security

The currently most influential discourse within the academic literature is the one on climate change as a threat to human security. It is defined as the capacity of people and communities to manage stress to their needs, rights, and values (Oels 2012 p. 188). The discourse was initiated by the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report. Their definition of human security recognized the role of climate change as a threat to security, defined as human life and dignity (UNDP 1994, p. 22). The human security debate is also largely connected to the vulnerability concept.

Vulnerability has been proven to be a characteristic of all human systems, and external stress exposes these vulnerabilities rather than causing them. Such external stresses can for example be extreme weather events. To reach human security, you need to possess the capacity to overcome these vulnerabilities and to be ready to respond to environmental challenges (Brklacich et al. 2010, pp. 36-37).

O'Brien and Barnett identify five key roles of human security. First, it turns away from the classical view that security only applies to states, and the concept originates from the critique of the national security discourse. Second, it highlights how drivers of vulnerability to climate change often derive from political, social, economic, and cultural processes, making environmental change largely a social problem with environmental characteristics. Third, human security sees the power of individuals and groups as agents, contesting systems of their everyday lives to battle environmental change. Fourth, identifying environmental change as a human security threat elevates the importance of the issue and puts it on top of the policy agenda. Fifth and last, the concept of human security binds together multiple disciplines. It brings together security, development, and environmental change, making the different policy instances cooperate in making common policies (O'Brien & Barnett 2013, pp. 375-376).

The strategies that are suggested to face this threat to human security are many. As in the internal national security dimension, adaptation and mitigation are two responses that are discussed. Adaptation measures are taken to reduce vulnerability to expected or observed changes due to environmental factors. It can be initiated on all levels, from changes in household-level practices to national-level policy adjustments. The capacity to adapt is affected by interacting social, economic, political, and environmental factors (Brown & McLeman 2009, p. 294). This can be connected to the concept of sustainable development which is central in the human security discourse. Building a sustainable world enhances the adaptive capacity to impacts of climate change, and simultaneously tackles already existing vulnerabilities (Oels 2012, p. 185). Mitigation strategies focus on overthrowing the

existing inequalities between groups, allowing vulnerable communities to take control over the responses to the threats they are facing (McDonald 2013 p. 46).

Due to the broadness of vulnerabilities and the processes that it is intertwined with, the field is open to a range of actors being agents of security. The strategies mentioned above of adaptation and mitigation are both focused on building resilient communities in facing climate change. These processes promote ideas of empowerment, self-capacity, and learning, which appeal to several actors. It involves both more traditional state actors, development policy actors, humanitarian actors such as NGOs, and representatives of the climate change community (Boas & Rothe 2016, p. 629). This is also in line with the cosmopolitan norms that are associated with the human security discourse, challenging the statist view of politics. Instead, it focuses on the universality of human rights and moral obligations in response to climate change (McDonald 2013, p. 47).

3.2.3 International security

The third discourse is on climate change as an international security threat. The discourse often focuses on the threat to the existing global order and the status quo, e.g. the norms and rules of the international society. It also puts a strong emphasis on the importance of international cooperation in the response to climate change. This discourse is situated in many ways between national and human security. The similarity with national security is the emphasis on keeping stability and the status quo, and with human security the need for an international response is the common determinant (McDonald 2013, p. 47). How the international system is threatened is largely connected to the overall security of states, which is, in turn, posing a threat to peace and international security. It is largely connected to the discussion on climate-induced conflict, connecting it to issues such as food shortages and rising sea levels (Garcia 2010, p. 288).

The origins of the international security discourse are influential international reports, conferences, and debates on environmental change. The initial report of influence is said to be the UNFCCC from 1992 which binds 196 parties to the efforts trying to stop climate change. In article 2, the convention states that the parties should contribute to stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, consolidating it at a level that does not compromise the stability of the climatic system (Garcia 2012, p. 272). However, one of the problems with international efforts trying to manage international climate security is the ineffectiveness of international institutions. Today, we can see how national interest often is prioritized over the efforts of international institutions, which is also true in climate change where nations are trying to minimize their costs of climate change. The future effectiveness of international institutions as agents of security relies on the big parties' willingness to expand and enforce international mandates in climate change management (Depledge & Feakin 2012, pp. 73-74).

3.2.4 Ecological security

The last discourse to be explored is ecological security, which has not reached a prominent position in debates regarding climate change. The discourse focuses on the imbalanced relationship between human beings and the environment, and the need to change this relationship into a balanced one. It also concerns the political, social, and economic structures that uphold this system of imbalance (McDonald 2013, p. 48). The rise of this discourse is connected to the alarming projections initiated mainly by the publication of the book *The Limits to Growth* by Meadows et al. published in 1972. The book sparked discussions on the limits of the planet, stating that if the growth trends continue in the way that they have the limits will be reached within the next hundred years. They emphasize population growth, industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion (Meadows et al. 1972, pp. 23-24). This projection has over time paved the way for a broader view of security. Ecological security rests on empirical observations and predictions

for the foreseeable future. It does not put as much emphasis on resource scarcity as Meadows et al. but sees infectious diseases, conflicts, starvation, and environmental disasters as the causes of ecological insecurity (Pirages & Cousins 2005, pp. 3-4).

Pirages and Cousins present four interrelated equilibriums that ecological security rests upon:

1. Between human populations living at higher consumption levels and the ability of nature to provide resources and services
2. Between human populations and pathogenic microorganisms
3. Between human populations and those of other plant and animal species
4. Among human populations

When any of these equilibriums are disrupted by changes in nature or human behavior, ecological insecurity increases. Ecological security, therefore, relies on preserving these four balances between the nature and human population (Pirages & Cousins 2005, p. 4).

The challenge in this discourse is to point out which actors that are capable to provide security and what the political response to the threat should be. When it comes to actors, there is a theme within literature on ecological security arguing for that the capacity of people to change their consciousness of the connection between ecological security and social, political, and social structures. Responses are also less connected to more traditional mitigation and adaptation strategies and focus more on structures embedded in our society that we take for granted. Global climate change is embedded in cultural practices, political economy, and norms of the international society, which needs to change if we are to reach ecological security (McDonald 2013, pp. 48-49).

4 Methodology

The methodology chapter explains the methodological tools used to explore the question of how SIDS is contributing to framing climate change as a security threat. It explains the research design of the study, arguing for why a case study approach has been applied and its strengths and weaknesses. After that, the method of discourse analysis is explained and how it was used will be specified. With the method, an analytical framework based on the four discourses on climate security that was used to analyze the chosen material will be presented. Lastly, the scope of the study will be defined and the material to be used are determined.

4.1 Research design

This study uses a case study approach to analyze how the SIDS has contributed to framing climate change as a security threat. The choice of conducting a case study is motivated by its advantage of allowing the researcher to intensively examine one case (Halperin & Heath 2012, p. 205). A case study is an in-depth analysis that allows the researcher to explore a case from multiple perspectives, and it is used to define what is to be studied (Simons 2009, p. 21). The case of SIDS was chosen due to its recognition as a special case for environment and development at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. They are facing unique vulnerabilities to climate change due to their remoter geography, reliance on biodiversity, and the threat of slow-onset events such as sea-level rise (UN 2022). The case study design allows for an in-depth study of different factors and their complex interactions (Ragin 1992, p. 5), in this case, the understanding of climate security by the SIDS and how the different

perspectives interact. However, some comparative elements are also included in the analysis of the case. The analysis also includes some non-SIDS actors to be able to see the role of the SIDS in the international discourse more clearly. As the focus is still on the in-depth analysis of the SIDS, it is still to be considered a case study. The result of this study could however influence future comparative studies of different groups within the climate security debate.

While conducting a case study it is important to consider the characteristics of internal and external validity. Internal validity is concerned with the importance of saying something important and interesting about the case that is being studied, while external validity is focused on the generalizability of the study (Halperin & Heath 2012, p. 205). In this study, the aim is to shed light on the environmental threats facing the SIDS and highlight their specific vulnerability to climate change, and also how they are important actors in communicating this on a global level. This will be one of the main strengths of the thesis. In internal validity, it is also important to have a clear research framework to ensure the validity of the result (Gibbert et al. 2008, p. 1466). Therefore, an analytical framework based on the four discourses of climate security is built to guide the research and increase its validity. When it comes to external validity, using a single case always makes the generalizability of the study often suffer, as well as the risk of researcher's bias increasing (Denscombe 2014, p. 331). This study will aim at generalizing the results by connecting them to the wider debate on climate security, making the analytical framework usable in other similar contexts. It should also be stated that research concerned with social phenomena is often committed to social values, and therefore sensitive to biases (Halperin & Heath 2012, p. 57). For example, it is influenced by the researcher's expectations for the result, and by her preconceptions on the topic, and her background. It is therefore not possible to state that the research is free from biases, but actions will be taken to try to reduce the biases with the analytical framework.

The method used in this study is discourse analysis, which was conducted on documents from the UNSC and COP meetings. Discourse analysis is a qualitative type of analysis, looking at the relation of a text to its context. By doing this, it also explores how discourses give meaning and legitimacy to social practices and institutions (Halperin & Heath 2012, p. 309; Heller 2001, p. 254). An analytical framework will be built on the base of the theoretical framework outlined above, establishing ways to explore the discourse used by the SIDS framing climate change as a security threat. How the method will be used and exactly what material will be analyzed will be explained further below.

4.2 Discourse analysis

A discourse can be defined as the general idea of how language is structured in different patterns that people follow when they take part in different realms of social life, one example being the “political discourse” (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p. 1). The elements that make up a discourse are present in the language, latent meanings of language, and conventions that can be found in written, oral and visual material, often referred to as text (Halperin & Heath 2012, p. 309). It can also be defined as the things that make up the social world, which intends that social reality cannot exist without discourses (Phillips & Hardy 2011). This is connected to the idea that discourses do not reflect the social world neutrally, they actively create and shape it. Discourse analysis is then the analysis of this phenomenon, analyzing different patterns of language to see how it makes up the social world around us (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p. 1). The use of discourse analysis in this study allows me to see how the SIDS as an actor are framing climate change as a security threat, the language they use to explain it, and what implication that has on our understanding of the threat that climate change is posing to our world. Here, the understanding that multiple discourses can exist at the same time, competing to be the dominant understanding in society (Hajer 1995), will be applied. It allows for

an analysis of the four different climate security discourses outlined above, and how they are playing different roles within the overall debate.

The method of discourse analysis is based on the theory of social constructionism and is interested in the effects of language. It is interested in the constructive effects of how a phenomenon is created, reified, and taken for granted as a part of the social reality (Phillips & Hardy 2011). Social constructionism is a critical approach that states that the knowledge we have of the social world should not be treated as objective truth. Physical objects exist, but they gain meaning through discursive practices. With this, we should focus on the link between knowledge and social processes, and how our views of the world are products of social interactions between people, and how social action is affected by this (Burr 1995, pp. 3-4). Discourse analysis is also closely connected to Foucault's post-structuralist thinking on power and discourses. The way we use different discourses is embedded in sets of power relations that are supported by institutions in society (governments, schools, etc.), and this forms the social reality around us (Foucault 1979, p. 62; Halperin & Heath 2012, p. 312). In this study, a poststructuralist approach to discourse analysis will be used, which will be explained more in detail below. It has been chosen over one of the other more influential strands of discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis. The motivation behind the decision is the focus on unequal power relations between groups in critical discourse analysis and how discourses legitimize these (van Dijk 2015), which will not be the focus of this study.

In this study, the discursive process of securitization will be analyzed. The focus will be to see how the climate security discourses contribute to the knowledge of security issues, and how this knowledge is created within the international society. For this study, the poststructuralist discourse theory by Laclau and Mouffe will be used. Their theory introduces several important concepts within discourse analysis. The process of structuring a relation between elements creating discourse is in their theory called articulation. All signs within a discourse they refer to as

moments and their meanings are fixed through their differences from one another. All moments are ordered around nodal points, which is a privileged sign which gives the other signs meaning through their relationship. The moments and nodal points create a net of understanding and exclude other possible meanings of the sign (Laclau & Mouffe 1985, p. 105; Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, pp. 26-27). For the discourse analysis to be conducted in this study, the nodal point will be climate security and its four different discourses connected to it. Each of the discourses will be defined by moments giving them their meaning, by for example establishing the agents of security. However, it is important to note that discourses are temporary closures of meanings, and their existence is always the target of the struggle of what the structure of moments should look like (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p. 29). The goal of this study is to determine what discourse that has been dominant in the climate security discussions by the SIDS in a determined period, and this might not reflect how the discourse will look like in the coming years.

4.2.1 Analytical framework

To analyze the material based on the theory outlined above, it needs to be operationalized into observable variables. It is a way of showing that the concepts can be identified, observed, or measured in the way that the researcher says is possible. Operationalization is closely associated with the concept of validity. Showing that you are observing, identifying, or measuring what you say you are doing, increases the validity of the research (Mason 2018, p. 35). For this study, an analytical framework has been developed out of the theory of climate security. As outlined above, four discourses of climate security will be used in this study. These four discourses, national, human, international, and ecological security, will be operationalized independently with the four questions. This is done to be able to distinguish between the four discourses in order to see which one/ones that are dominant within the climate security debate.

The analytical framework is based on the four questions outlined by McDonald in his article from 2013, which have been used above in the section on the theoretical framework to define the four types of climate security discourses. They have been modified for this study to more clearly be able to identify the different discourses. The questions are as follows:

- How is the referent object of security conceptualized (who is threatened)?
- How is the threat defined (how is it threatening the security of the referent object)?
- Who are the key agents of security (who is responsible for/able to respond to the threat)?
- What responses are suggested to deal with the threat, and what means are to be used?

These questions identify characteristics of each of the four discourses in climate security, which allows me to point out them in the material. The responses to each of the questions are presented in the table below.

Table 1: Analytical framework

Question	National security	Human security	International security	Ecological security
How is the referent object of security conceptualized (who is threatened)?	-nation-state -the sovereignty of the state -the geographical territory of the state -state legitimacy	-the threat to human life and dignity -the capacity of people and communities to manage stress to their needs, rights, and values	-existing global order and status quo -norms and rules of international society	-the relationship between human beings and the environment
How is the threat defined (how is it threatening)	-threat by an external force -climate-induced migration due to for example sea-	-climate change exposes vulnerabilities in human systems	-overall security of states, posing a threat to peace and international security	-imbalances lead to infectious diseases, conflicts, starvation, and

the security of the referent object?)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> level rise putting pressure on states -group conflict due to mass migration -climate-induced conflict due to resource scarcity -environmental disasters put pressure on crisis management -climate change aggravating economic and health challenges 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -political, social, economic, and cultural processes as drivers of vulnerabilities, making them sensitive to climate change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -climate-induced conflicts due to resource scarcity and group tensions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> environmental disasters -consumption levels at higher levels than the nature can provide resources for -imbalances between human beings and the environment, upheld by economic, social, and political structures
Who are the key agents (who is responsible for/able to respond to the threat?)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -nation-state 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -individuals and communities as agents -a broad range of state, development, humanitarian, and climate change actors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -international cooperation between different agents -effective international institutions and mandates 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -capacity of people to change their consciousness of connections between ecological security and economic, social, and political structures
What responses are fit for dealing with the threat, and what means are to be used?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -military force -statecraft, for example crisis management and diplomacy -mitigation and adaptation strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -adaption on all levels, from household to national -sustainable development -mitigation, overthrowing existing inequalities to build resilient communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -global efforts to stop climate change, for example by stabilizing green gas concentrations -international conventions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -changes in cultural practices, political economy, and norms of the international society -change of social, economic, and political structures in society

		-promoting empowerment, self-capacity, and learning		
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The framework outlined above guides the discourse analysis of the chosen material. However, even if there is an established framework of analysis it is important to be reflexive and be open to unexpected answers to these questions. This, together with the researcher positioning herself as subjective and not being influenced by preconceptions of the result, increases the validity as well as the reliability of the results (Bergström & Ekström 2018, p. 294).

4.3 Scope and material

Within qualitative research when a small number of cases are selected, it is rarely a good idea to resort to a random selection of observations when choosing our material. Instead, an intentional selection should be made to be able to reach our research objectives. This implies that we know some of the relevant variables in advance and can choose material based on the categories of the explanatory variables (King et al. 1994, p. 139). Therefore, a strategic sample will be made to find a relevant range of material to be able to answer the research question. The focus will be to enable cross-contextual comparisons and will help to build a well-grounded argument (Mason 2018, p. 58).

To answer the research question, I need to look at how the SIDS as actors have built a discourse of climate security in their different statements on the global

level. Therefore, I have chosen to look at official statements made by the individual states within the SIDS in international meetings under the UNSC and UNFCCC, and joint statements made on behalf of the group of SIDS by AOSIS and other regional groups. The individual statements will be limited to those countries within the SIDS who are members of the UN, as they are the countries that mainly participate in meetings within the UN system. To be able to see the influence that the SIDS has over the discourse, I will also look at some other influential countries in the climate change and security debate. I have chosen the five permanent members of the security council (Russia, the UK, the US, France, and China), also called the P5 as they are present in all debates within the UNSC and are also some of the most influential actors within the security debate. It also allows me to compare the discourse of the SIDS to a group of countries that are diverse and often have different opinions on questions of security. As their statements were not available in all meetings of the COP, I also chose to include the statements by the EU in the analysis as an actor representing the view of a large group of countries. As they were also present at all UNSC meetings chosen, I could analyze their statements in the two instances. These actors, the P5 and the EU, will be mentioned as the non-SIDS actors in the analysis and their statements will be seen as made on behalf of the group.

The material that has been chosen is derived from the official records of the UNSC-meetings and the high-level segment statements made at COP meetings, which are global climate change conferences under the mandate of the UNFCCC. The choice is motivated by the instances being some of the most influential ones within the security and climate domain respectively. The temporal limitation of the material has been set to 2015-2019, as the climate security debate is an up-to-date important one, constantly changing and being discussed. The intention was to include the year 2020 in the analysis as well, but as no documents from the UNSC in the premises described below were found and no COP meeting was held during the year, both due to the covid-19 pandemic, I chose to exclude the year from the analysis and focus on the five previous consecutive years. The selection of UNSC

documents have been based on the following premises: are the SIDS present at the meeting, are the debate on international security, and are there any reference to climate change? Out of this, ten meeting protocols have been chosen for analysis (see section 8.1) in which only the relevant actors' statements will be analyzed. From the five COP meetings that were held during the period (COP21, COP22, COP23, COP24, and COP25), all statements available at the official website from the meeting have been collected, and according to the limitation on the actors decided above (see section 8.1). The choice of two instances for material allows me to see a bigger part of the discourse on security.

Regarding the material, there are some existing limitations in connection to what materials were accessible. For the COP meetings, not all countries' statements or joint statements by the AOSIS were available. This was the case both for SIDS and non-SIDS actors. Exactly which countries' statements that were used each year can be found in section 8.1. Therefore, there will be no weight put on individual actors' performances. The focus will rather be on the SIDS and non-SIDS as groups, looking at their collective reference to climate security. A limitation was also found concerning the non-SIDS statements made at the COP21 meeting. No statements were found by any of the P5 countries, which is the case for the COP24 meeting as well. However, for the COP21 meeting, the material was complemented with statements made by the countries at the leaders' event, which was only held at the COP21 meeting out of the meetings analyzed here. The choice was made to get a better view of the non-SIDS discourse on climate security, as the leaders are still representatives of the country's discourse.

5 Empirical analysis

The following section presents the results of the discourse analysis made on the selected documents from the UNSC and the COP meetings over the period 2015-2019. The analysis will be divided into two sub-chapters, one that deals with the years 2015-2016 and one for 2017-2019. The division was made to be able to make comparisons over time, but also for practical reasons as the two periods deal with an even amount of material. The analysis will be structured according to the analytical framework, with sections on national, human, international, and ecological security. The references made to the meetings will be structured in the following way. For the UNSC meetings, the reference will be made to the meeting number of the report used (for example, UNSC8334 refers to the report of meeting number 8334) and also to the country from which the statement in the meeting came from to make its source clear. For the COP meetings, a similar model will be used with the meeting number and the country that made the statement (for example, COP22 Tonga). A more exact list of the documents used, including which countries' statements are included and what year the different meetings refer to, can be found under section 8.1.

5.1 2015-2016

In this part of the analysis, five meetings of the UNSC (7389, 7499, 7561, 7621, 7818) will be analyzed as well as statements made during the COP21 and COP22. While climate change was the main topic at the COP meetings, the UNSC meetings did have some different focuses. The UNSC meetings number 7389, 7561, and 7621 focused more on traditional peace and security challenges, such as the

root causes of conflicts, and the respect and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, while the meetings number 7499 and 7818 focused on water, peace and security and challenges facing the SIDS where climate change was a central aspect. Whether or not this had any implications for the result will be discussed below. It is also interesting to note that not all statements refer to climate change as a security threat, but rather as a challenge. This was mostly present in the statements made by non-SIDS actors, where Russia even stated that putting questions about climate change on the security agenda is dangerous as it can lead to a military focus in the climate change debate (UNSC 7818 p. 21).

5.1.1 National security

It can be determined that the national security discourse is present in both the UNSC and the COP documents. Concerning the four questions in the analytical framework, national security is present in all four aspects. The nation-state is referred to as the referent object of security in multiple ways in the documents. For example, it is seen as a threat to the existence of nations in both UNSC meetings (e.g. 7499 Fiji p. 35; 7389 Papua New Guinea p. 76) and in the statements from the COP meetings (e.g. COP21 Tonga p. 2; COP22 Mashall Islands p. 1). References are also made to the threat to the territory and sovereignty of nations, e.g. in UNSC 7621 where it is stated by the Maldives that “...ultimately, our territory and even our sovereignty need greater and more serious attention (p. 74). Similar statements can be seen at the COP meetings, where one example is the statement made by Tuvalu saying that “This is important to Tuvalu and other low-lying small island developing states to safeguard their survival from increased sea-level, and other severe impacts of climate change” (COP 21, p. 2).

The definition of the threat can also be connected to the national security discourse. One interesting finding is the references made to climate change as a threat multiplier or even an initial cause of conflict. References to this are mainly

made by the non-SIDS actor, even if a few examples can be found in the SIDS statements. In the statement by Timor-Leste at the UNSC 7499 meetings, it is stated that climate change works as a threat multiplier that can exacerbate tension and lead to conflict (p. 44). Similar references can be found in other statements by the SIDS, but the focus rather lies on the effects of climate change and environmental disasters on the nation's institutions, and the issue of displacement. One example is in the statement of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines at COP22, saying that "...between 2010 and today, loss and damage from natural disasters amounts to some 40% of our country's GDP" (p. 2). These references are often coupled with ones that can be connected to the human security discourse, which will be presented in section 5.1.2.

The nation-state as a key agent of security is present in both the UNSC and COP meetings, but maybe most clearly in the COP meetings. This can be illustrated in connection to what responses are seen as appropriate for the threat, which are mostly mitigation and adaptation measures. The more traditional national security means, military force, and statecraft are not present in the SIDS discourse. If we look at COP21 and COP22, mitigation and adaptation strategies are mentioned in most statements that see climate change as a threat. A lot of references are made to the National Determined Contributions (NDCs), which are national climate action plans with mitigation and adaptation efforts to be made under the framework of the Paris Agreement (UN 2022B). One example can be found in the COP22 statement of Tonga, stating that "...Tonga is committed in ensuring rapid progression at the national level that will empower and enable our efforts to implement the necessary actions towards achieving our NDC targets" (p. 3). References to mitigation and adaptation can also be a part of the human security discourse. However, in the quote presented above as well as in many other statements (e.g. COP21 Antigua and Barbuda p. 4; COP22 St. Kitts and Nevis p. 2), the reference is made to national plans which connect to the national security discourse. Within the UNSC documents, references are made to mitigation and adaptation efforts as well (e.g.

UNSC 7499 Jamaica p. 7, Singapore p. 55) but more weight is put on international effort on climate change which will be elaborated on further in section 5.1.3

One interesting trend that can be seen in the non-SIDS statements about national security is how it is not as present as all four questions are not covered. In both the UNSC and COP meetings, the P5 is making references to national security, especially concerning how resource scarcity can lead to conflict. One example is the statements by the US at the UNSC 7818 and COP21, wherein the COP 21 meeting they stated that “Political disruptions that trigger new conflict, and even more floods of desperate peoples seeking the sanctuary of nations not their own” (p. 1). This can be connected to the overall trend of higher presence of national security within the UNSC in the question of referent object but is not mentioned that much in the COP meetings. However, the trend is the other way around when we look at responses to climate change, where the national security discourse is more dominant in the COP meetings than in the UNSC ones (e.g. COP21 EU, p. 2).

5.1.2 Human security

While analyzing the chosen documents, it was clear that the human security discourse was present in many ways throughout the statements. Looking at the first question of the analytical framework of the referent object, there are multiple examples of where the SIDS statements make direct references to human security (e.g. UNSC 7499 Dominican Republic p. 64). One example where climate change is framed as a threat to human life is in the COP22 statement by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It states the following: “Last week there was another such extreme weather event causing immense damage and loss of life. The poor are the most adversely affected” (pp. 2-3). There are also references made to different aspects of human security, such as threats posed to food and water security (e.g. UNSC7621 the Maldives, p. 74). Another aspect of human security is the capacity of people to manage stress to their needs, rights, and values, which can be connected to their

ability to provide for their own life and the lives of their families. In that, the loss of livelihood is a threat to human security, which is stated on multiple occasions throughout the meetings (e.g. UNSC 7499 Antigua and Barbuda p. 31; COP21 Tonga p. 3).

In defining climate change as a security threat, the human security discourse plays an important role. In both the UNSC and COP meetings, the focus is on vulnerabilities to climate change and social, economic, and cultural processes as drivers of these vulnerabilities. One way in which this can be exemplified is by references to sustainable development (e.g. UNSC 7499 Jamaica p. 7; COP22 Belize p. 2), one of them being from a statement made by Papua New Guinea at UNSC 7389: "...the need to address the serious adverse impacts of climate change. This issue has been raised by the Pacific small island developing states in the context of threats to their sustainable development" (p. 76). However, the clearest way that the human security discourse is visible is in references to vulnerabilities and the processes that are exposing those to climate change. In the COP meetings, there are many examples of statements where references are made to this (e.g. COP21 AOSIS p. 1; COP22 St. Kitts and Nevis, p. 2). One good example is the statement from COP21 made by Timor-Leste, where they connect vulnerability to the financial, technological, and human capacities to adapt to climate change. These impacts then lead to famine, human displacement, and poverty (p. 2). Further examples can be found in the UNSC 7818 statement by the Maldives where the issue of pollution of waters affects the water security of communities (p. 71).

Within the human security discourse, the security agent is very broadly identified over a range of different system levels. The main difference compared to the national security discourse is the focus on individuals and communities as agents of change. References to these types of actors are not widely present in the UNSC and COP statements. A few examples can be found, like the COP21 statement made by Suriname, where it can be argued that individuals are seen as important actors as they emphasize building human capacity to be able to respond

to climate change (p. 2). However, human security also applies to state, development, humanitarian, and climate change actors as key agents of security (Boas & Rothe 2016, p. 629). In that sense, the references made to national actors in section 5.1.1 can be seen as a part of human security as well, but there are also examples where non-state actors are mentioned. A lot of emphases are put on international climate actors, such as the UNFCCC (e.g. UNSC 7621 Maldives p. 75; COP21 Dominica, p. 3). Other important actors are also emphasized in the COP22 statement by Tonga, arguing that “Civil society, academia, and private sectors must play their roles in ensuring genuine accountability by state actors...” (p. 4).

The last question posed is about the proposed actions towards the threat of climate change. As mentioned in section 5.1.1, national security and human security share the view that adaptation and mitigation efforts are important strategies. While national security focuses on national efforts, human security focuses on adaptation at all levels. It was established above that most references to adaptation and mitigation were made at the national level, which shows that human security is present in the debate but maybe not as emphasized as national security in that matter. However, references towards other important aspects of human security are made, for example promoting self-capacity and enhancing resilience in communities. One example of this is the statement made by Fiji at the UNSC 7499 meeting, where they argue that there is a need for both human and institutional capacity to deal with the threat that climate change is posing to the SIDS (p. 35). Several examples can be found on this in the COP statements as well (e.g. COP21 Suriname p. 2; COP22 St. Kitts and Nevis p. 2), and also examples of where equality in building resilient communities is emphasized (e.g. COP21 Tonga p. 3).

References connected to human security are made by the non-SIDS actors as well. For example, the US emphasizes the issue of poverty as an important part of the responses to climate change (COP21, p. 3). A statement made by the CAN at COP22 also shows this, as they state that “extreme weather events are increasingly

frequent and the most vulnerable are already suffering devastating impacts of climate change” (p. 1). There are also references to the referent object of human security, as the statement by Russia at the UNSC 7499 meeting states that climate change is threatening their way of life (p. 19). However, none of the non-SIDS statements are clearly defining any key agents in line with the human security discourse which implies that they are not present in all aspects as the SIDS countries are.

5.1.3 International security

Compared to the presence of national and human security discourse, the international security discourse is not as prominent in the statements made by the SIDS. The biggest difference is that the discourse is not present if we look at the first question of the analytical framework, which asks how the referent object of security is conceptualized. Within the international security discourse, the referent object is the existing global order, also referred to as the status quo, and the norms and rules of the international society. In the documents, the threat is sometimes defined as a threat to the entire global community (e.g. UNSC 7499 Kiribati p. 29) and that it is damaging to the whole world and humanity (e.g. COP21 Dominica p. 2). Even though these references have a connection to internationalism, it does not fit within the chosen international security framework on climate change. The threat of climate change is defined as an international security threat, as there are references made to climate-induced conflicts and an overarching threat to international peace and security. This can be connected to the statements presented in the national security section above on climate-induced conflicts, which confirms the presence of the international security discourse as the overall security of states is important for international security as well. One specific example of where international security is the focus is the following made by the Maldives at UNSC 7389: “... we recognize the nature of climate change to be a threat multiplier, with

the potential to aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security (p. 77).

International actors and mandates for cooperation are referred to in multiple ways at both the UNSC and COP meetings. Within the UNSC documents, the SIDS emphasizes the role of the UNSC as an actor in climate security which is not present in the COP statements. One example is in the statement by Palau at UNSC 7561, where they state that the UNSC mandate should be adjusted to include the fight against climate change and the work towards Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (p. 71). However, most emphases in both types of documents are put on the international cooperation under the UNFCCC and the COP meetings under its framework as important agents in responding to climate change. There are several examples where its importance is exemplified by the SIDS (e.g. COP22 AOSIS p. 2; UNSC 7499 p. 34), which can be illustrated by the following quote from the statement by Vanuatu at the COP21: “We also need a strong compliance mechanism capable of ensuring that we respect the commitments we have made in the UNFCCC, so that we don’t get further off track and lose more human lives” (p. 3).

Maybe the clearest way in which the UNFCCCs importance can be illustrated is by the mentioning of the Paris Agreement, which is situated under the UNFCCC convention. Its importance is highlighted by almost all SIDS in their different statements. As the Paris Agreement was initiated at the COP21 meeting, there is a difference in how it is framed during the meetings that took place in 2015 and the ones in 2016. In the statements from 2015, there is a lot of emphasis put on what important aspects should be included in the agreement. The AOSIS statement argues for the importance of ambitious and legally binding commitments at an international level (e.g. COP21 AOSIS p. 2), and Jamaica focuses on the importance of the agreement to reduce GHG emissions and restrict global temperature rise to 1,5°C (e.g. COP21 Jamaica p. 3). In the 2016 statements, the focus is more on upholding the international agreement that was decided upon (e.g.

COP22 Mashall Islands, p. 1; UNSC 7621 Maldives, p. 74). The SIDS also sees other international conventions and frameworks as important for climate security, such as the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (COP22 Jamaica, p. 6) and the SAMOA pathway (UNSC Barbados p. 33).

For the non-SIDS statements, a similar trend can be found, even if there are fewer references found. When it comes to the definition of the threat, no reference to the aspects in the analytical framework can be found. However, similarly to the SIDS statements, references to climate change as a threat to international peace and security is present (e.g. UNSC7499 France, p. 22). When it comes to the questions of key agents and responses, the emphasis in the few references that were made to climate security lies on the UNFCCC and the agreements under its mandate. For example, the US referred to the UNFCCC meeting on the Paris agreement (UNSC7499 US, p. 25).

5.1.4 Ecological security

Out of the four discourses chosen for this analysis, ecological security can be least connected to the understanding of climate security of the SIDS. It is hard to find references from SIDS to any of the four questions within the material. Concerning the first question on the referent object, which is vaguely defined in the analytical framework in the first place, there are no references made within neither the UNSC nor COP meetings to the relationship between human beings and the environment in the sense of being the referent object. The same trend can be seen with the key agents of security, which in ecological security is seen as the capacity of people to change their consciousness regarding climate change. There are a few references made to this, one example being the statement by Jamaica at COP21, which states as follows: “In Jamaica, we have adopted the slogan 'With climate change ...we must change', a call for change in behavior by the man in the street, businesses and the political directorate to facilitate a reduction in greenhouse gas

emissions and a more resilient society” (p. 4). This shows that there is a presence of the ecological security discourse at the global level, even if it has a vague presence.

Looking at the questions on the definition and responses to the threat, a bit more presence of ecological security can be found. In the UNSC 7499 meeting, Fiji made a statement on overexploitation which can be connected to an imbalance in the relationship between human beings and the environment. They argue that the overexploitation of ocean resources is a threat to the sustainable development of marine resources, affecting the livelihoods and incomes of SIDS (p. 35). The reference to overexploitation can be a sign of imbalance in the relationship, and therefore also seen as a part of the ecological security discourse. What is very present in the statements is the mentioning of the results of this imbalance in the relationship. Threats such as deadly typhoons and cyclones (e.g. COP21 AOSIS p. 1), increasing cases of vector-borne diseases (e.g. COP22 Jamaica p. 3), and climate change’s effect on conflicts (e.g. UNSC 7818 Palau p. 52). Since it is not directly connected to the imbalance, it is not a clear case of the ecological security discourse and can rather be connected to the other discourses. For example, in the statement mentioned above by the AOSIS on typhoons and cyclones, it is rather connected to human security as a threat to human lives (p. 1). For the question on responses, there are a few examples where references are made to aspects of ecological security. For example, a statement by Fiji at UNSC 7499 emphasizes the importance to address the issue of sustainable energy and move away from fossil fuels.

It can be determined that ecological security is present in the climate security understanding of the SIDS, even if its overall is small as the other discourses seem more prominent in the debate. The same can be said about the statements by the non-SIDS actors. There are no direct references made to ecological security by either the countries or NGOs in the COP or UNSC meetings. What can be identified is the same trend that was seen in the SIDS statements on the definition of the threat,

where references were made to the consequences of the imbalanced relationship but not to the imbalance itself. One example is the statement by the US at UNSC 7499, where they emphasize the increasing severity of storms and droughts but rather connect it to consequences on peoples' health and livelihoods (p. 25).

5.1.5 Concluding remarks

Some interesting conclusions can be made from the analysis of the material from 2015 and 2016. One thing that can be concluded is that all the four discourses on climate security are present in the statements made by the SIDS. However, the different discourses are present in different ways throughout the four questions. While national and human security very much is present in all four, it seems to be dominant in terms of the referent object and definition of the threat. International security is not as prominent as the other two in general but concerning responses to the threat and key agents the international discourse seems to be one of the most referred one. A lot of references are made to the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC as a decisive body, which can be connected to the international mandates on climate change and the big international actors. It is also interesting to note that the statements are rarely only connected to one of the discourses, but rather used in different aspects. Sometimes the threat is defined in both national and human security terms, but the proposed responses are more connected to international security. Another trend is that the references to different discourses differ a bit between the UNSC and the COPs. Regarding the national security discourse, the nation-state as the referent object is more present in the overall discourse in the UNSC. However, if we look at the COP meetings it is more present in the COP when looking at responses to climate change. In the COP meetings, human security instead seems to be dominant as the referent object. This is an interesting finding, as it can be a result of under what instance it is discussed and what questions are usually discussed at the meetings.

The importance of the SIDS can also be illustrated in another way compared to the chosen non-SIDS actors. We could see above how the non-SIDS actors also made references to climate security, but one big difference is in the type of meeting they are making the references in. All references made by non-SIDS actors are connected to meetings where the topic is connected to climate change. At the COP meetings, climate change is always the main topic, but at UNSC meetings it differs a bit. Two of the meetings analyzed here (UNSC7499 and UNSC7818) are connected to climate change, as one is on the security implications of the SIDS and one on water, peace, and security. In the other meetings where the topic was not climate change, no references were made to climate security by the non-SIDS actors, but it was made by the SIDS actors. Even if not a lot of SIDS actors were present at the UNSC meetings, their importance in lifting climate security was clear compared to the other actors.

5.2 2017-2019

In this second part of the analysis, the remaining documents from the years 2017, 2018, and 2019 will be analyzed. Five meetings of the UNSC will be analyzed: 7857, 8144, 8307, 8334, and 8451. Out of the five meetings, two are directly discussing climate change-related security (8307 and 8451) while the other three are on more general security questions (7857, 8144, 8334). Furthermore, statements made by the SIDS and the chosen non-SIDS actors from the COP23, COP24, and COP25 meetings will be analyzed. Before the analysis, some general comments can be made to the material. One recurring trend from the first round of analysis is that not all statements made references to climate change as a security threat. For example, in the COP25 statement by the US the focus lies on how to enhance resilience, mitigate climate change impacts and prepare for climate disasters but is not connected to climate change as a threat (COP25 US, p. 1). In

this section, a preliminary comparison will be made to the first part of the analysis to highlight the differing results.

5.2.1 National security

First, it can be determined that the national security discourse is present in all four aspects of security and both the UNSC and COP statements, even if how it is present differs a bit. Concerning the first question on the referent object of security, references can be found in both the UNSC and COP statements. There are references made to loss of territory (e.g. UNSC7857 Papua New Guinea p. 64; UNSC8451 Belize p. 78), threats to sovereignty and autonomy (e.g. COP23 Tonga p. 3; COP 24 Bahamas p. 2), but no reference made to state legitimacy. Regarding loss of territory, there are also statements made that can be more indirectly connected to the aspect. Even if the words are not mentioned, in some of the statements it is stated that countries are threatened by submergence (e.g. COP25 Solomon Islands p. 1) and countries that are disappearing due to climate change (e.g. COP23 Dominica p. 4). References are also made to the nation, the state, or the country as the directly threatened object. One example of this can be found in the UNSC8451 statement by Barbados, where they state the following: “...a delicate balance now threatened by climate change. That threat, which is posed to all countries, developed and developing alike, cannot go unanswered...” (p. 45). There are also references made to climate change as an existential threat to states (e.g. COP25 Singapore p. 2).

These findings are similar to the results of the first part of the analysis. However, if we look at the second question there are some differences. In the analysis of 2015-2016, few references were made to conflicts by the SIDS actors. However, while looking at the 2017-2019 documents there are several statements made that mention climate-induced conflicts or climate change as a threat multiplier within the UNSC meetings. In UNSC7857, references are made to climate change as an aggravating force or a threat multiplier by both Micronesia (p. 61) and the

Marshall Islands (p. 105). References to conflict can be found in multiple statements as well (e.g. 8334 Fiji p. 73; UNSC8451 Dominican Republic p. 24). In UNSC8451, the statement made by Trinidad and Tobago explains how these two aspects are connected and also defines how climate change affects these aspects: “As a threat multiplier, climate change applies additional stress on limited resources, social and economic pressures and the adaptive capacity of our fragile ecosystems, all of which can lead to scarcity, population displacement and conflict” (p. 62). This also connects to the issue of climate-induced migration which can be found in other statements as well, for example in the UNSC8334 by Fiji (p. 74). As in the first round of analysis, some statements can be found relating to state functions, such as the economy which can be exemplified by the COP23 statement by Dominica. They state that due to storms, over 224% of GDP was wiped out which substantially affects the economic sector of the country (pp. 2-3).

Looking at the third and fourth questions, we can see some very different results between the types of meetings. Within the UNSC meetings, there are hardly any references made to the state as an agent of climate change, and no clear examples of where responses to climate change can be connected to national security. In the COP meetings, there is more presence of the national security discourse but in neither of the statements, there are references to military responses or more traditional national security responses. What can be found are references made to NDCs, which was the case in the first part of the analysis as well, reflecting the work on adaptation and mitigation by countries. References to NDCs are made at all three COP meetings held during the period (e.g. COP23 Samoa p. 2; COP24 Bahamas p. 5; COP25 Tonga p. 4) and seems to be one of the most stated responses to climate insecurity. There are also other measures taken on the national level connected to mitigation and adaptation strategies, which can be exemplified by the COP23 statement by Singapore. They state how the country will have a carbon tax from 2019 aiming at promoting emission reductions and low-carbon technologies (p. 3).

Lastly, looking at the statements made by the non-SIDS actors there is a presence of national security in the UNSC statements but hardly any in the COP ones. In the UNSC, there are references made to the first two questions of the analytical framework. When it comes to the referent object, references to climate change as an existential threat are made by the UK at the UNSC8451, relating to how the SIDS is under an existential threat by climate change (p. 14). There are also references made to how it can lead to migration, conflict, and instability (e.g. 8307 UK p. 11; 8451 EU p. 44), which can be exemplified by the statement by France at UNSC8144 relating the issues to the SIDS: “For small island developing States and coastal countries, their very survival is at stake. Their submersion, linked to ocean rise, would also lead to massive migratory waves that are particularly destabilizing for the security of these regions” (p. 12). Regarding the COP meetings, a statement was made on national strategies to clean growth by the UK at COP23 which can be related to both responses to climate change and the state as an actor. Apart from that, no clear reference to national security was found within the COP statements.

5.2.2 Human security

As in the first round of analysis, the human security discourse is widely present in the statements from both the UNSC and COP meetings. Looking at the referent object, there are many references made to the different aspects of human security. There are references made to the threat that climate change is posing to human life and health (e.g. UNSC8451 Dominican Republic p. 24, Mauritius p. 83) and also references to the existential threat climate change is posing to vulnerable groups (e.g. COP23 Mauritius p. 2). In connection to the loss of lives, there are several statements made connecting to events that already have taken lives, for example, the following stated by Samoa at COP25: “Tornadoes, bushfires, earthquakes, flooding, droughts – all have resulted in countless loss of lives and untold suffering and sets back for years the development of some countries” (p. 1).

There are also many references made to the loss of livelihoods (e.g. UNSC8307 Maldives p. 26; COP24 Tonga p. 3) which affects peoples' ability to manage their lives.

The question of the referent object is also highly connected to the question of the definition of the threat, which in human security is how climate change events expose vulnerabilities in human systems in different aspects. References directly made to vulnerabilities are present in both instances (e.g. COP25 Tonga p. 3; UNSC8451 Haiti p. 29) but also indirect ones that capture how the vulnerabilities can lead to issues such as food and water insecurity. One specific example is the COP25 statement by St Lucia, where they connect climate change to economic vulnerabilities. The tourist industry is a big economic source for many countries, including St Lucia, which is highly affected by coral bleaching, as well as the fishing industry is threatened by warming seas driving away species from their waters affecting the whole economic sector (COP25 St Lucia p. 2). Another statement made by Nauru at UNSC8451 makes references to the food system as vulnerable due to climate change's impact on food production (UNSC8451 Nauru p. 61). There are more examples of where food and water insecurity are directly referenced but not explained (e.g. UNSC7857 Papua New Guinea p. 64; COP24 Mauritius p. 3). To take one last example, references are also made to sustainable development progress being setback by climate change (e.g. UNSC8334 Fiji p. 73; COP24 Tonga p. 3).

In the two questions above, a lot of similarities can be found with the first round of analysis. However, in the third question on key agents of security, there are more references made to individuals and communities as important actors in climate change. While it is only mentioned a few times in the UNSC statements, with the statement at UNSC8451 by Belize mentioning the inclusion of women, youth, and Indigenous groups in the work, it is more present in the COP statements. There are references made to building resilience in communities and populations helping them to combat climate change effects (e.g. COP23 Vanuatu p. 3; COP24 Jamaica p. 5). References are also made to other non-state actors to a greater extent than in

the first round. There are measures taken such as building partnerships with the private sector (e.g. COP23 Mauritius p. 6), as well as the mentioning of civil society and academia as important actors in driving change (e.g. COP25 Tonga p. 5). One statement that highlights the importance of having a broad range of actors is the COP25 statement by St Lucia, which states the following: “There is no doubt that we need all stakeholders to join in the efforts to stem climate change and to build resilience. Indigenous communities; NGOs; the private sector; youth; women’s groups... We need all hands on deck as we combat climate change and its multi-negative effects” (p. 3).

On the last question on responses to climate change, there are similar references made as in the first round of analysis, except that there is a trend towards more references on resilience and capacity building within the UNSC meetings. There are references made to resilience building directly on multiple occasions (e.g. UNSC8307 Trinidad and Tobago p. 27; UNSC8451 Trinidad and Tobago p. 63), but also statements that relate to it indirectly such as strengthening infrastructure (e.g. UNSC8451 Haiti p. 29) and capacity building (e.g. UNSC8451 Belize p. 79). This can also be connected to adaptation and mitigation efforts, even if there are no direct references made to it. There are more connections made to adaptation and mitigation within the COP meetings, where the focus lies on all levels of society rather than only on the national level. One example of where the emphasis in adaptation efforts is put on people is in the COP23 statement by Vanuatu, which emphasizes innovative adaptation strategies that strengthen the traditional knowledge and practices of the country’s people (p. 3). A focus on capacity building and resilience can be found here as well (e.g. COP24 Jamaica p. 5; COP25 Belize p. 4). One trend that was also partly found in the first round of analysis was references to equality, which is present in the second round as well. For example, there are references made to fair and just development (e.g. COP23 Nauru p. 2).

Compared to the first round of analysis, there are more references made to human security by the non-SIDS actors in both instances. There are references to all four aspects of human security, which was not the case in the first round.

References are made to people and communities as the referent object (e.g. UNSC8307 UK p. 11) and in how climate change is defined. For example, the statement at UNSC8307 by the US brings up the case of SIDS and their vulnerability to climate change, mentioning threats to their sustainable development and their limited infrastructure (p. 13). There are also references made to non-state actors (e.g. COP25 EU p. 2) and communities (e.g. UNSC8451 p. 20) as key agents of security, as well as the importance to include a range of actors in the work (e.g. UNSC8451 UK p. 14). Lastly, there are also references made to the fourth question on building resilience (UNSC8307 UK p. 11) and pursuing sustainable development (e.g. UNSC8451 China p. 15).

5.2.3 International security

As discovered in the first round of analysis, there is less presence of international security within the statements compared to the national and human security discourse. There are no direct references made to the referent object in line with the characteristics of the international security discourse, even if there are statements mentioning climate change as a threat to international peace and security (e.g. UNSC8307 Nauru p. 25). In defining the threat there is more presence of the international security discourse, but only in the UNSC statements and not at all in the COP statements. However, compared to the previous two discourses there is still little presence as only a few aspects of international security are covered. The most focus lies on conflict, which can be illustrated by what was found under section 5.2.1 on national security. One difference here is that there are references that are directly focusing on the international threat of these conflicts, which can be exemplified with the following:” ...while supporting communities in mediating climate and ocean-stress induced conflicts and therefore stopping them from spilling over into open intra- and inter-State conflicts” (UNSC Fiji p. 74).

International security is important in terms of the key agents of climate security. Within the UNSC, there are a lot of references made to the UN system as

important in the fight against climate change (e.g. UNSC8334 Fiji p. 74; UNSC8451 Tuvalu p. 80). As in the first round of analysis, emphasis is put on the UNFCCC in both types of statements (e.g. UNSC8307 Maldives p. 26; COP25 Singapore p. 1). One difference that can be found is the emphasis on the UNSC in the second round of analysis, which can be exemplified by the following statement: “Such a threat can only be properly addressed through greater cooperation, global leadership, and shared responsibilities. The Security Council is therefore the appropriate platform to address this threat to the security and prosperity of the globe” (UNSC8451 Mauritius p. 83). However, there seems to be an ongoing debate within the SIDS on whether the UNSC is the appropriate body, or if a permanent position of a special representative on climate and security should be established instead (e.g. UNSC7857 Micronesia p. 61; UNSC8144 Tuvalu p. 64; COP23 Nauru p. 2).

The discussion on different international bodies being responsible for climate security can also be connected to the response to climate change, as both the UN as a whole and the UNFCCC have mandates to work on global efforts on climate change. As in the first round of analysis, the Paris agreement is one of these important global efforts made to face climate change (e.g. COP23 Tonga pp. 1-2; UNSC Dominican Republic p. 24). As was seen before, emphasis is also put on other international conventions such as the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (e.g. UNSC8397 Maldives p. 26), the SDGs (e.g. COP25 Tonga p. 4), and on global efforts such as the Talanoa Dialogue (COP24 Mauritius p. 8) which is a global dialogue on the implementation of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2022).

Similar trends were found in the non-SIDS as in the SIDS ones, with more emphasis put on international actors as agents and international cooperation and conventions as important means than on the referent object and in defining the threat. There are similar references made to a threat towards international peace and security (e.g. UNSC8451 UK p. 13), but as stated above it does not fit within this analytical framework. However, there are a few references made to how climate

change can affect the overall stability of states (e.g. UNSC8144 France p. 11) which can also be connected to the references made to climate-induced conflict in the national security discourse in section 5.2.1. Looking at the references to key agents and responses, there are similar references made by the non-SIDS as the ones presented above. One difference is that there are no references made to appointing a special representative on climate and security but rather emphasize the role of the UN system (e.g. UNSC8451 US p. 21). A lot of emphases are put on the Paris Agreement and its implementation (e.g. UNSC8307 France p. 14). In the COP meetings, this is the only aspect of international security that is present in the statements, with references to the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and damage (COP25 EU p. 2) apart from reference to the Paris Agreement.

5.2.4 Ecological security

As in the first round of analysis, the presence of ecological security is hard to find in any of the statements made by both the SIDS and the non-SIDS. There is one direct reference made to environmental security in the UNSC8451 statement by Nauru (p. 60) but there is no further explanation of how the threat is characterized. For the question on the referent object of security, there are a few references to the relationship between the human and natural system being out of balance, also here in a statement by Nauru at UNSC8307 (p. 25). When turning to the definition of the threat, this aspect seems to be the most present one out of the four in the UNSC meetings. There are references made to the climate being near its tipping point (e.g. UNSC8144 Tuvalu p. 64) and how ecosystems are threatened (e.g. UNSC8307 Trinidad and Tobago p. 28) which can be connected to the system being imbalanced. As in the first round of analysis, most of these references in the statements can also be connected to other discourses of security. One example is how Fiji in their UNSC8451 statement refers to how climate change has changed our natural world, explaining the consequences of that and then connecting to how it is threatening the economy and societies of the country (p. 31). With this, it can

also be seen as a way of defining the threat of climate change to human security, as vulnerabilities are made visible due to its effects.

Looking at the key agent and response aspects there is no presence of it in the UNSC meetings, but it is the only way it is present at the COP meetings even if only a few references were made. In the COP24 statement by St. Lucia, the following was stated: “As policymakers, businesspersons, managers, consumers, individuals, we must change the way we think, move around, design and build, earn and consume, if we are serious about making a difference” (p. 3). This reference can be connected to the consciousness of people as agents and a way of responding to climate change. This way is also the only clear way in which ecological security is present in the discourse by the non-SIDS actors, which can be exemplified by the statement by the EU at COP25. They state how economic actors, consumers, and citizens are the ones in power to change the consumption and production patterns in our society (p. 2). This confirms the trend of the first round of analysis of ecological security being the least influential one out of the four discourses.

5.2.5 Concluding remarks

As was discovered in the first round of analysis, the national and human security discourses seem to be dominant within the climate security debate in the UNSC and COP meetings. However, one difference can be found within the human security discourse with more emphasis put on individuals and communities as key agents of security. This bigger role of human security could be noticed in the statements by the non-SIDS actors as well, as they in the first round was limited to the referent object and definition of the threat. Looking at international and ecological security, their role in the debate is similar when compared to the first round of analysis as well. One interesting shift in the discourse on international security that could mainly be seen in the UNSC meetings is in responses to climate change as well as actors. In the first round, most emphasis was put on the UNFCCC mandate and the Paris Agreement under it. In the second round, the most common

reference within the UNSC meetings was to a special representative on climate and security.

One interesting finding is that the non-SIDS actors seem to be more active in framing climate change as a security threat within the UNSC meetings that do not have climate change as the main topic. In the first round of analysis, the SIDS were the only actors referring to climate security of the ones analyzed, but here we see a shift towards some more references by the non-SIDS actors as well. What can also be noted is that within all UNSC meetings is the mentioning of SIDS in the statements by the non-SIDS actors. When mentioning the issue of climate security, the SIDS is used as an example of an extraordinary vulnerable group and as a group to focus on.

An aspect that is present in many of the SIDS statements that do not fit within the analytical framework used here is the references made to aid and other types of assistance to vulnerable countries as a way of reaching security. There are references made to this in both UNSC and COP meetings, stating that there is a need for financial support and transferring of technology to the SIDS for them to be able to cope with climate change (UNSC 8451 Belize p. 78; COP23 St Lucia, p. 3). This is related to the human security discourse in the question of responses, where they push for more capacity building and empowerment of communities and individuals. However, it is not mentioned in the discourse how this will be reached and therefore cannot be seen as a reference to human security.

6 Discussion

6.1 The result in relation to the analytical framework

As could be determined in the previous section the four climate security discourses are present within the SIDS statements. What is interesting to note is that two of the discourses, the national and human security discourse, are present in all four aspects of how it is framed as a security threat in both periods. There was also presence of international security mainly within the key agent and response section with international responses and conventions, as well as references made to climate-induced conflict as a way of defining the threat. The ecological security discourse was largely ignored within the discourse, with a few references made. This is true for both the 2015-2016 and the 2017-2019 period. The active role of the SIDS in the climate security debate can be connected to their overall important role in advocating for climate change, especially within the UNFCCC (Thomas et al. 2020, p. 2).

As the result above shows some overlapping in the different discourses, the purpose of having these different classifications within climate security can be questioned. What can be seen is that the national and human security discourses overlap in the sections on key agents and responses, with both seeing the state as an agent and adaptation and mitigation being important responses. The main difference is that human security is a broader discourse, seeing a range of actors as important within climate security. In the response section, both discourses have different aspects that they find important. Looking at the international security

discourse, overlapping can be found in the key agent section with human security as well, as most actors fit within human security. However, ecological security's importance within the debate can be questioned as there are few references made to it in the first place, but also that most references can be connected to other discourses. For example, when mentioning extreme weather events, it is connected to a threat to human lives. It can also be argued that the way it is framing that individuals' perceptions have to change can be connected to how human security sees individuals as important. What can be derived from this is that these categories are artificial and do not reflect what reality looks like. Some aspects are not covered within these four discourses, for example how aid is seen as an important response to climate insecurity. Maybe there is a need to refine the different discourses making them easier to grasp in relation to each other? Or are they unnecessary to have as they are overlapping, and is it better to have one big discourse where more aspects are included?

I would argue for the importance of different discourses existing in the research on climate security with the result above. As can be seen from the analysis of the two time periods, there has been a shift towards more usage of the human security discourse, both by the SIDS and the non-SIDS from the 2015-2017 and the 2018-2019 period. This trend is something that could have been missed if we did not have the different discourses. Understanding these shifts and what is seen as most important also helps us form policies and action on climate security, as the understanding you have of climate security will determine what you see as a legitimate response. This is important for policymakers and other security actors to understand to be able to see the different strategic interests of countries and groups. It is also important to understand how the climate security debate changes and interacts with other aspects of society in connection to policymaking and what is seen as legitimate. In 2015 and 2016, emphasis was placed on the Paris Agreement, but in the later years, it shifted to the role of the UNSC in both instances. As the Paris Agreement was created in 2015, it is not surprising that it was dominating the debate then. In 2020, when no meetings were held connecting to climate security

was held, the Covid-19 pandemic was the top priority which then in turn could have made it harder for climate security to gain any prominence. This affects what types of policies can be made, and how well they are perceived.

6.2 The result in relation to the previous research

The framing of the SIDS on climate security can be seen as a confirmation of the successful securitization of climate change, as it has mobilized action such as the Paris Agreement and the Talanoa Dialogue. What can also be argued for with this is a development of the theory of securitization in relation to climate change. Corry (2011) argues for a shift in focus towards risks within security, leading to measures not related to military actions, emergency measures, or friend-enemy relations (2012, pp. 236-238). As more long-term actions are proposed in the statements, such as adaptation and mitigation strategies, and also a range of different actors it can be argued that we have moved away from emergency politics and the militarized view of security.

It is also interesting to discuss how the SIDS has influenced the overall debate on climate security. As discussed in the background section, the SIDS has been very influential in the climate change debate before. It is often said that this is connected to the moral leverage that the SIDS have in the climate change debate (Betzold et al. 2012, p. 594). One difference between the two time periods where that in the first round, no references were made to climate security by the non-SIDS actors outside of meetings relating to climate change in the UNSC, but several could be found in the 2017-2019 documents. The non-SIDS are also referring to all four aspects of human security in the second round, which they did not do in the first. Most of these references mentioned the SIDS in relation to climate security, both within the climate change meetings and the more general ones. Has the moral leverage of the SIDS as threatened by climate change, and the discourse that they

have been using, influenced these actors and led to them having a bigger role in the climate security debate? This is an interesting finding concerning the UNSC meetings. In the COP meetings, references are being made to the SIDS by non-SIDS as well, but they are also making references to different discourses of climate security without making references to them over both periods. This could be a sign of climate security being overall more present at the COP meetings compared to the UNSC ones.

Another interesting point is how national, human, and to some extent international security often is used in connection to each other. In most statements, at least two and often all three of the discourses are used and refer to different questions. For example, many times national security can be used to define the threat, while human security can be found in key agents. This can be connected to two issues brought up in the previous research section. The first is how Detraz finds that often when human security is brought up in relation to national security, national security is the one that seems to get prioritized (Detraz 2011, p. 115-116). As this pattern is seen in the statements by the SIDS as well, it could lead to the human security aspects brought up by the group being ignored. The question that could be asked here is whether groups should focus on one discourse at a time, or is it good to lift many aspects of climate security as it lifts the broadness of the threat? It is hard in this case to see if this leads to a prioritization of national security, as the documents here include individual statements by the countries and no joint statements or policies by the UNSC or the UNFCCC. The second aspect that can be connected to the use of multiple discourses at the same time is that it could be connected to the idea of ideational fragmentation in the area of climate security. This could in turn lead to no consensus being made on the area (Floyd 2008, p. 63; Floyd 2015, pp. 127, 137). This will in that case have effects on what policies are made on the climate change threat and how effective their implementation is.

The result of the analysis above also goes against the results in the previous studies on climate security within the UNSC and the UNFCCC. The article by Odeyemi argues that climate conflict and climate change as a threat multiplier are

central in the work of the UNFCCC and the UNSC (2020, pp. 443, 450), which can be connected to the national security discourse. Dellmuth et al. agree with this view, arguing for the state security discourse being dominant in the discourse of the UNSC, in this case in the UNSC resolutions (2018, pp. 4, 6). In the results above, it is clear that the human security discourse is as important or maybe even more important than the human security discourse and its role seems to have grown over the years. In the analysis of the documents from 2017 to 2019, more references were made to the key agents included in the human security framework in the SIDS statements. What is the difference between the study by Dellmuth et al. and this study is that they are analyzing both joint statements and agreements while this study looks at statements made by individual countries. Is it possible that the human security discourse is present in the discussions and then dismissed within the policies? To answer this question, more extensive research would need to be done comparing the discussions to different policies. In the scope of this study, it can only be determined that national and human security are both important in the framing of climate security by the SIDS. This also goes against the argument by Hardt on new interpretations being largely ignored in the UNSC (2021, p. 6). As the SIDS is actively framing climate change as a security threat, it cannot be said that the UNSC as a whole is ignoring new discourses on climate security.

For the results from the COP meetings, it is hard to make any big comparisons to previous research than what has been done in this section. As I did my literature review, it was hard to find any work discussing the climate security debate within the UNFCCC and the COP meetings. This shows that more research needs to be done in the area to be able to understand the different discourses used and what implications it has on the results and policies coming out of the meetings.

7 Conclusion

The research question that was asked for this thesis was:

How has the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) contributed to framing climate change as a security threat?

First, it can be determined that climate security is present in the statements of the SIDS at both the UNSC and the COP meetings. The SIDS refers to all four types of climate security used in this analysis: national security, human security, international security, and ecological security. However, the four discourses are not equivalent in their importance within the SIDS statements. The national and human security frameworks are present in all four aspects of security: the referent object, the definition of the threat, the key agents of security, and the responses to the threat. For the other two, international security is most important concerning key agents and responses to climate insecurity, while ecological security is largely ignored. It can be argued that the SIDS contributes to a broadening of the security concept, as more non-traditional and non-emergency responses are proposed.

It can also be determined that the SIDS plays an important role in framing climate change as a security threat compared to other actors. In comparison with the non-SIDS actors chosen for this analysis, the SIDS are making more and broader references to climate security as they connect to more aspects of security and all four discourses. They also refer to climate security in meetings where climate change is not the main topic. The SIDS are also used as an example in connection to references made to climate security by the non-SIDS actors, which shows their influence over the climate security debate. It is however hard to determine whether or not the SIDS has influenced non-SIDS actors in other aspects,

for example how non-SIDS are referring more to human security in the second round of analysis. Further research would be needed to determine that connection.

The result of the analysis of the SIDS statements goes against previous research on the area showing that national security is the dominant one within the UNSC and UNFCCC. In the statements by the SIDS, it is clear that human security is as important, if not more important, as the national security perspective. However, as the previous research has focused on policies and resolutions and not the actual debate, the results here cannot dismiss their findings. It is still interesting to note that even though human security is important in the climate security debate, it does not get the same recognition in policies coming out of the debates. Why this is the case needs to be further researched as this has important implications for the work on climate change and might lead to human security aspects being ignored to a larger extent than national security, increasing the vulnerability of the most exposed communities.

The thesis also confirms other trends on climate security found in previous research. There is evidence of ideational fragmentation in the area of climate change, as the four understandings of climate security used here are present in the statements, which could lead to problems in reaching a consensus on how to solve the problem. It is also clear here that the countries within the SIDS use multiple understandings of climate security in their statements. This often leads to national security being prioritized, which could partly be why the previous research has found domination of national security in resolutions on climate security.

To conclude, there is still a lot of research to be done in the area of climate security. We need to understand why there is a gap between the debate on climate security and the policies coming out of it, and what implications this has for the work towards reaching climate security. This study has also initiated future studies on other groups of countries in relation to climate security, and also future comparative studies between different actors. This is important to be able to grasp the totality of the climate security debate and how different actors influence it. However, in the realms of this study, it can be concluded that the SIDS are an

important group in the climate security discourse, lifting many aspects of climate security and manifesting their important role as strong advocates in the climate change debate.

8 References

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8.1 Material used for the analysis

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8.1.2 COP High level segment statements

COP21, collected 2022-03-02 at

<https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences/paris-climate-change-conference-november-2015/statements-and-resources/High-Level-Segment-statements-COP-21-CMP-11>

Statements by the following countries used:

Antigua and Barbuda	Belize	Dominica
Grenada	Gyana	Jamaica
Maldives	Seychelles	Solomon Islands
Singapore	Suriname	Timor-Leste
Tonga	Trinidad and Tobago	Tuvalu
Vanuatu	European Union	

Complements from the leaders event, COP21, collected 2022-03-02 at

<https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/past-conferences/paris-climate-change-conference-november-2015/statements-and-resources/statements-made-during-the-leaders-event>

Statements by the following countries used:

China	United States	United Kingdom
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COP22, collected 2022-03-02 at <https://unfccc.int/statements-made-during-joint-high-level-segment-of-cop-22/cmp-12/cma-1>

Statements by the following countries used:

Bahamas	Belize	Dominica
Grenada	Jamaica	Maldives
Marshall Islands	Micronesia	Nauru
Palau	St Kitts and Nevis	St Vincent and the Grenadines
Samoa	Singapore	Solomon Islands
Tonga	Timor-Leste	Vanuatu
United Kingdom	United States of America	China

COP23, collected 2022-03-02 at <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/conferences/un-climate-change-conference-november-2017/events-and-schedules/high-level-segment/high-level-segment-statements-of-cop23/cmp13/cma12>

Statements by the following countries used:

Antigua and Barbuda	Belize	Dominica
Guinea-Bissau	Jamaica	Kiribati
Mauritius	Nauru	Palau
St Lucia	Samoa	Singapore
Solomon Islands	Suriname	Tonga
Vanuatu	United Kingdom	United States of America
European Union		

COP24, collected 2022-03-02 at <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/conferences/katowice-climate-change-conference-december-2018/events-and-schedules/high-level-segment/high-level-segment-statements>

Statements by the following countries used:

Bahamas	Jamaica	Marshall Islands
Mauritius	Micronesia	St Lucia
Singapore	Solomon Islands	Tonga
European Union		

COP25, collected 2022-03-02 at <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/conferences/un-climate-change-conference-december-2019/speeches-and-statements-at-cop-25#statements-from-heads-of-state-and-government,-ministers-and-heads-of-delegations-at-resumed-high-level-segment>

Statements by the following countries used:

Belize	Belize (on behalf of AOSIS)	Fiji
Maldives	Marshall Islands	Mauritius
Papua New Guinea	Samoa	Solomon Islands
Suriname	St Lucia	Singapore
Tonga	United States of America	United Kingdom
European Union		

Appendix 1

List of Small Island Developing States

UN members

Antigua and Barbuda	Gyana	Singapore
Bahamas	Haiti	St. Kitts and Nevis
Bahrain	Jamaica	St. Lucia
Barbados	Kiribati	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Belize	Maldives	Seychelles
Cabo Verde	Marshall Islands	Solomon Islands
Comoros	Federated States of Micronesia	Suriname
Cuba	Mauritius	Timor-Leste
Dominica	Nauru	Tonga
Dominican Republic	Palau	Trinidad and Tobago
Fiji	Papua New Guinea	Tuvalu
Grenada	Samoa	Vanuatu
Guinea-Bissau	São Tomé and Príncipe	

Non-UN Members/Associate Members of the Regional Commissions

American Samoa	Cook Islands	New Caledonia
Anguilla	Curacao	Niue
Aruba	French Polynesia	Puerto Rico
Bermuda	Guadeloupe	Sint Marteen
British Virgin Islands	Guam	Turks and Caicos Islands
Cayman Islands	Martinique	U.S. Virgin Islands
Commonwealth of Northern Marianas	Monserrat	