Internal viewpoints in a governmental organization on two capacity development initiatives

SEBASTIAN SIVAM WADA | RISK MANAGEMENT AND SOCEITAL SAFTEY | LTH | LUND UNIVERSITY, SWEDEN|

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Sebastian Sivam Wada

Supervisor: Magnus Hagelsteen

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Author: Sebastian Sivam Wada

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Abstract
Capacity development in the field of disaster risk reduction is suggested by the Sendai Framework to be the primary tool for obtaining the goals of globally reduced disaster risk. However, ownership in capacity development initiative is often skewed towards the external organization. This thesis aims to understand the perceived success factors and challenges for the personnel in a governmental organization during implementation of two capacity development initiatives. Eight semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted with informants ranging from technician to unit director. Five success factors emerged when the results were analyzed. These were: soft skills, local context, accountability, commitment and continuity. Operative and strategic levels saw soft skills and continuity as success factors for establishing relationships with the local organization. Operative informants saw the local context as very important for success while strategic informants had poor acknowledgment of the local context. Strategic and operative informants had different perspectives on accountability where strategic informants felt accountable towards the donor and providing visible results. Operative informants felt more accountable towards the local organization. Operative and strategic informants saw the lack of commitment from the local organization as a challenge and responded with taking over responsibilities from the local organization. Any response made by the external organization during implementation should not create dependencies, because that will negatively affect local ownership. The external organization needs to consider, 1) Acknowledge the existence of different internal accountabilities. 2) Address internal communication and learning during implementation. 3) Value internal and external relationships. 4) Importance of local ownership.

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Finally a message to my late mother, Kyoko Wada, I kept my promise.

Content

Introduction

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is a guideline created during the United Nation's third world conference (UNDRR, 2019). Its content can shortly be descried as a guideline for the international development for disaster risk reduction from 2015 to 2030. The overarching goals for the guidelines are to invest in disaster risk reduction efforts in order to prevent or reduce the consequences of natural or man-made hazards (UNDRR, 2019). Capacity development in the field of disaster risk reduction is suggested by the Sendai Framework to be the primary tool for obtaining the goals of globally reduced disaster risk (UNDRR, 2019).

Capacity development process can be explained as a partnership initiative between a local organization and an external organization (Becker, 2014, pp. 208-242). The external organization possesses either knowledge, assets, or some other element which the local organization requires. Together the organizations conceptualize, plan and implement the initiative with an aim for local sustainable development (Becker & Abrahamsson, 2012). Capacity development in the field of disaster risk reduction aims to enable local organizational capacity to deal with the risk of hazards (Becker & Abrahamsson, 2012).

During the implementation phase the planned activities are executed to achieve the objectives. Initial assessment, planning and design is the foundation for implementation. During implementation project management needs to follow up and observe if the assumptions are true, relevant, and if the activities are done accordingly to its original design (Watson, 2010, p. 241). The verification processes are done through monitoring and evaluation (Watson, 2006, p. iv). Accountability in the initiative is suggested to be an important factor affecting monitoring and evaluating the initiative (Guijt, 2010, p. 279). In practice accountability in the capacity development initiative is often resolving upon delivering proof that the implementation lives up to its intended design in the monitoring and evaluation tools used in the initiative (Guijt, 2010, p. 277). But accountability can also be seen answerability towards the beneficiaries of initiative and to the mission as a whole (Guijt, 2010, p. 280). Accountability for the beneficiaries and the mission requires that learning takes place which enables the initiative to evolve existing plans or shift strategies if needed (Guijt, 2010, p. 279). In practice it is suggested that it is difficult to integrate these different accountabilities (Guijt, 2010, pp. 279-280). Learning is disabled when the accountability in the initiative is resolving solely on delivering results because information outside of the verification process such as insight in the local context is disregarded (Ebrahim, 2005, p. 80) (Guijt, 2010, pp. 279-280).

The external partner's role is to have a supportive (Becker, 2014, pp. 208-242). The challenge for the external organization is to avoid going outside of their supportive role as it would compete the emergence of local ownership (Becker, 2014, p. 229). SIDA defines ownership as follows: "*the exercise of control and self-determination over development activities*" (Schultz, et al., 2005, p. 23). Ownership is a voluntary process and cannot be forced (Hagelsteen & Becker, 2013, p. 5). Therefore measures taken in the initiative must not make the local organization dependent upon external aid (Hagelsteen & Becker, 2013, p. 5). Thus, an important factor is to respect the existing procedures and institutions to avoid creating parallel structures or alignment issues (Becker, 2014, p. 230). This is also implying that the local organization cannot be stripped away of its ownership during any part in the development process (Becker, 2014, p. 230). The challenge of ownership is that the external organization often directly or indirectly takes charge and thereby disables the opportunity for local ownership (Becker, 2014, p. 243). It is also suggested that the ownership and authorship in capacity

development initiative is often owned by the external organization and skewed towards the donors of the implementation (Becker, 2014, p. 230).

Effective implementation of a capacity development initiative is suggested to be dependent on the combination of specific technical expertise and soft skills of its participants (Acquaye-Baddoo, 2010, p. 66). It is suggested that soft skills are often not acknowledged which leads to unsustainable results (Becker, 2014, p. 243). Soft skills, also referred to as functional capacity (Armstrong, 2013, p. 82), addresses the surrounding context of the technical application. It is acknowledged that technical skills in itself is not viable in a complex system such as the capacity development initiative (Acquaye-Baddoo, 2010, p. 70). The ensemble of soft skills describes the skillset and mindset to establish relationships, to reflect upon the surrounding environment, and to find enabling factors for the contribution of successful implementation (Acquaye-Baddoo, 2010, p. 69). These skills are acquired through self-reflection and are context dependent which can make knowledge transfer difficult (Acquaye-Baddoo, 2010, pp. 69-70). Example of soft skills are, but not limited to, organizational relationships, power asymmetries, understanding culture, and the merging of different values and goals (McMahon, 2010, p. 80) . These aspects bridge technical expertise and local development (McMahon, 2010, p. 80). However, soft skills are in practice not as acknowledged compared to technical skills (Hagelsteen & Burke, 2016, p. 50). Effective implementation is dependent on the insights in the local context being communicated and used in decision making to make the initiative more responsive (Guijt, 2010, pp. 277-280,287,289)

There are very few academic articles concerning capacity development in the field of disaster risk reduction (Scott, et al., 2014, pp. 8-9). While the need for capacity development in the field of disaster risk reduction is acknowledged (UNDRR, 2019). There is not any cohesive or unified approach of best practice for capacity development initiatives (Scott, et al., 2014, pp. 8-9) (Hagelsteen & Becker, 2013, p. 5). Literature concerning best practice for capacity development in the field of disaster risk reduction is contained in nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations (Scott, et al., 2014, pp. 8-9). Thus, a thesis addressing capacity development in the field of disaster risk reduction might add scientific value.

The purpose for this thesis is to add scientific value by getting better understanding of the implementation stage of the capacity development process. The purpose is achieved by listening to the internal views within an external partnering organization and how it influences capacity development initiatives for DRR. The following research question is therefore asked:

What are the perceived success factors and challenges in a capacity development initiative for disaster risk reduction during implementation between the strategic and operative level in an external partner organization?

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency or its more common used Swedish abbreviation MSB (Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap) manages disaster risk reduction efforts internationally as well as in Sweden (Swedish National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2010, p. 10). One of these efforts is capacity development initiatives in the field of DRR. A compilation of nine capacity development initiatives that MSB undertook in the span of 2006-2013 suggests that MSB overlooks the softer skills in its capacity development process (Hagelsteen & Burke, 2016, p. 50).

Two of those initiatives were chosen for further study. One initiative was conducted in Mozambique, with lifespan from 2011 to 2014. The initiative was a cooperation between MSB and its sister agency in Mozambique, the National Institute of Disaster Management of Mozambique (INGC). The other

capacity development initiative was conducted in Botswana between MSB and its counterpart in Botswana, The National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) with a lifespan from 2009 to 2014.

Methodology

This chapter presents the used methodology. It is separated into three parts, 1) qualitative semi-structured interviews, 2) handling of data and analysis and 3) Limitations.

Qualitative semi-structured interviews

In order to answer the research question the gathering of perceived success factors and challenges had to be made. The interest for the individual experiences, perceived reality, and interactions with the environment describes the aims of a qualitative approach (Backman, 2006, p. 48). Due to the interest for individual experiences it was decided to not include reports and other documents in the gathering of data.

A qualitative semi-structured interview was set up in order to collect desired data. A qualitative semi-structured interview was appropriate when the informants were required to have freedom or explain information in its context (Bernard, 2006, p. 212). It was important that the informant felt that he or she had the freedom to express herself or himself freely within the boundaries of the questions. It was therefore important that the interviewer had discretion during the interview. The semi-structured interview gave the interviewer the chance to probe and look for deeper context bound data (Bernard, 2006, p. 212). Probing is the skill of implicitly asking for information. This could be done by asking the informant to make a reflection about a particular topic in the interview. When doing so he or she might shed light upon complex issues which might lay beyond the foresight of designing specific context bound set of questions, or a questionnaire (Bernard, 2006, pp. 217-218).

Interview guide

The interviews were built upon an interview guide with a predetermined set of questions which came in a particular order. The interview guide was made to give structure to the interviews and systematically incorporate the point of view for perceived success factors and challenges. It was tested once with no additional changes made after the test to validate the interview guide.

The interview guide had four stages, see table 1 or appendix. First, the informant got to introduce himself or herself, and how he or she got the opportunity to be involved in the initiative. Secondly, the informant then got to explain his or her role in the initiative. The third stage is focused on what the informant can recall being success factors and challenges and the reason why the informants recalls it as a challenge or a success. The fourth stage and final stage is focusing on what the informant perceived to be lacking in the project management, and what could benefit project success by addressing measures to enable success or mitigate challenges in the capacity development process.

Table 1 Summary of the interview guide

Stages	Question	Desired information
1	What is your background?	Background, Education, Carrier, Current occupation
2	What is your role in the capacity development initiative?	Perceived role in the initiative, Transition if staff rotation occurred
3	Can you recall three success factors and three challenges in the initiative?	Why was this a success factor? Examples? Relation between the success factor and the context of the initiative? Why was this a challenge? Examples? Relation between the challenge and the context of the initiative?
4	We now consider that I am about to have the exact same role as you in this initiative, could you give me some hard earned tips? If you had the ability to change anything in the project management, what would you suggest? Why would you like to change this?	Personal reflection and experience Suggestion for changing the setup of the initiative What is the suggestion addressing? Is the change realistic? If no, what is the obstacle?

Selection of initiatives and informants

MSB was chosen as the external governmental partnering organization as it manages disaster risk reduction efforts on national level in Sweden as well as internationally. During the period 2006-2013 nine capacity development initiatives for disaster risk reduction were conducted by MSB (Hagelsteen & Burke, 2016, p. 50). One of these nine initiatives were chosen for a closer study. When having a dialog with MSB it was communicated that a second initiative had to be included in the study as a prerequisite for participation. A MSB official also proposed the second initiative and finally two initiatives were selected out of the nine existing. One initiative was conducted in Mozambique, which lifespan was from 2011 until 2014. The initiative was a cooperation between MSB and its sister agency in Mozambique, the INGC (National Institute of Disaster Management of Mozambique). The second initiative was conducted in Botswana between 2009 and 2013. It was a capacity development initiative between MSB and its counterpart in Botswana, The National Disaster Management Office (NDMO).

The group of interest of the interview were personnel staffed under MSB for the initiative in Mozambique as well as in Botswana. The roles in this group ranges from technician, local team leader, strategic consultant, project manager, and unit director. The thesis makes a distinction from those who worked on the ground in the implementation area contra those who have been working outside of the implementation area. The informants who worked at the implementation area will from now on be

referred to as operative informants. Those informants who did not work at the implementation area will be referred to as strategic informants. This is done because the research question is about identifying if there are differences in the internal viewpoints in MSB regarding success factor and challenges.

In total eleven informants were identified for being suitable for interviews. Out of the eleven people, eight informants were interviewed. Three informants were contacted with no success. Four informants worked solely at strategic level. Three informants worked at solely at the operative level. One informant worked the majority of the time at operative level and a shorter period at the strategic level. This informant will be referred to as an operative informant or the informant who has had been working at both levels.

Personal meetings were conducted for five of the informants, three of the interviews were done over Skype. The lengths of the interviews were in average about 45 minutes, with the shortest being 30 minutes and the longest 1 hour and 15 minutes.

Handling of data and analysis

All interviews were recorded and then transcribed word by word. The data was then collected, categorized and analyzed. No direct reference to the name of the interviewee or initiatives were made in order to ensure anonymity. The only distinction made in the results was those informants working in the implementation area were categorized as operative and those working outside of the implementation area were categorized as strategic.

The findings were first categorized with the help of the interview guide. Similar key features were identified among the transcriptions to further categorize data. These key features from the findings were used inductively to generate a compound of theories. An inductive study uses the findings to generate a theory or hypothesis (Backman, 2006, p. 48). The generated theories are then discussed and reflected with relevant existing theory to either confirm, complement or further discuss the findings from the generated theories in the inductive approach (Backman, 2006, p. 48). From the interviews six topics were identified.

1. Understanding local context
2. Establishing trust in the local organization
3. Implementing with low local capacity
4. Continuity challenges
5. Work environment in the external organization
6. Internal challenges within MSB

Limitations

The thesis is only covering MSB as the external organization in the initiative in the timespan where the initiative is being implemented. But other organizations such as the local organization and the donor are also participants with data which could be of importance. Due to framing of the thesis, geographical and language restrictions this thesis is only concerned with the viewpoints of MSB.

The compiling by the author is also a factor of uncertainty as he can be subject to unconscious bias which could lead to misinterpreting the informant's message. The risk of such misunderstanding is mitigated somewhat by the fact that the informants not only states a fact he or she has perceived but also explains in what context he or she might have taken that experience from. In that sense it is less likely to misinterpret the message from the informant.

Results

The results are categorized into six categories, *Understanding local context, Establishing trust in the local organization, Implementing with low local capacity, Continuity challenges, Work environment,* and *Internal challenges within MSB.*

Understanding local context

All informants viewed the early implementation phase as crucial for the initiative, especially the establishment of personal relationships between operative staff and individuals in the local organization. Two operative informants said that the introduction to foreign cultures and environment was especially confusing.

The early stage was seen as an opportunity by three operative informants for establishing personal contact and friendship with personnel from the local organization. The three operative informants continued by saying that the established friendship enabled a deeper understanding of the local organization and its context which helped with implementation. One strategic informant said that it was crucial to get to meet MSB personnel at operative level as well as the individuals in the local organization in person as early and as soon as possible. The strategic informant argued to do so because of the fact that mail correspondence often lead to misunderstandings. According to the strategic informant face to face conversation were needed for understanding local context and for establishing personal contact with both the operative level and the local organization.

Conflict avoidance was a challenge in the local culture according to three operative and two strategic informants. The three operative informants said that they got to hear what they wanted to hear when communicating with individuals in the local organization but not how things were. This lead to misunderstandings and confusion. According to the two operative informants and two strategic informants gave examples where the local organization did not plan ahead, canceled meetings, and had an ad hoc approach towards the implementation. After a while into the implementation, when operative staff had established individual relationships with the local organization two operative informants started to understand a general feasibility to the project. The feasibility were descried by two operative informants as an understanding of local organizational commitment (or lack of commitment) towards the activities in the capacity development initiative. One of these two operative informants mentioned individuals in the local organization airing lack of commitment towards some activities in the capacity development initiative through implicit suggestions.

One strategic informant said that it was very important to meet the operative informants and local organization in person as soon and often as possible. The strategic informant continued by saying that it is impossible to lead the initiative being at headquarters because vital information about the local context is often misunderstood when communicated through reporting.

Establishing trust in the local organization

All informants mentioned aspects such as building a trusting relationship with the local organization, understanding local context and culture as important factors because of the cultural differences between the organizations. Two strategic and three operative informants explained that building trust was a key factor in understanding and influencing the local organization. All four operative informants meant trust was gained between the organizations through working alongside the local organization, showing commitment to the initiative, humbleness, understanding the local language, and having an open mind without prejudices. Two operative informants said that you needed to be continuously

working three to six months with the local organization before the individuals in the local organization started to show trust.

Two operative informants explained that trust emerged when individuals in the local organization started to open up, talked about feasibility and sensitive information, often through informal communication. The informal communication was perceived by the two operative informants as an asset which were obtained through friendship. Informal communication was perceived by the two operative informants as the pragmatic supplement for effective communication due to the rigid bureaucracy in the local organization. Two operative informants said that they implicitly got to know the priorities that the local organization were going to make long before they were proposed officially by the local organization. One operative informant continued by saying that the local organization is run top down where even small decisions have to be proven by the general director of the local organization. One strategic informant perceived the informal communication as negative and a result of limited acceptance in the local organization. The strategic informant meant that trust and access differed between individual openness and organizational openness where the latter was very challenging to reach. The strategic informant continued by explaining that informal communication was seen as a liability in the decision making because formalized dialog is a prerequisite for accountability. The informal communication according to the strategic informant could not be a basis for firm markers to get back to when explaining decisions taken and perceived risks. One operative informant commented upon the strategic view of the informal communication as an ungratefulness for the good relations the operative informant had established with the local organization.

Implementing with low local capacity

Three strategic and two operative informants felt that the initiative was successful given the challenges of low local capacity and cooperative difficulties. One operative and one strategic informant said that that it is a near impossible to achieve every goal set in the initiative due to the low local capacity of the local organization.

All four operative informants and three strategic informants mentioned reoccurring challenging periods with no local commitment which negatively affected the local organizational capacity. Two of these four operative informants continued by explaining that the lack of commitment was due to the fact that the individuals as well as the organization as a whole had to prioritize their own amends. As a response to the low capacity due to low commitment it was decided that the best thing to do was to ease the burden of the local organization in order for them to recommit. It was decided that operative personnel embedded in the local organization was to work together with the local organization helping them with their primary functions. Although helping the local organization was not originally in the initiative context. The ability for MSB personnel to have flexibility to do such a measure was seen a success at both levels in MSB as it not only enabled the local organization to recommit to the initiative but also increased trust between the organizations.

Three operative informants and one strategic informant told about responding to a natural hazard which negatively affected local organizational capacity. The capacity development initiative was therefore transformed into a humanitarian response effort to accommodate the local organization. Two of the three operative informants said that the dealing with the natural hazard was stressful but at the same time it created opened up new channels for the operative informants to interact with the local organization. One success during the humanitarian response effort mentioned by two operative informants that parts of the initiative were taken into field operation. It was perceived by these two operative informants that the humanitarian response enabled learning and interest from high ranking

officials in the local organization which later on lead to local ownership. One operative informant explicitly said that the local organization understood the end goals better because they got a direct feedback on the positive outcomes that the initiative aimed to provide. One strategic informant felt that the outcome in the humanitarian response effort as positive but out of context for the capacity development activities. According to the strategic informant the humanitarian response effort were taking recourses and time from the capacity development activities and which delayed progress. According to the strategic informant it would have been more beneficial to postpone the implementation and continue when the local organizational capacity returned to normal levels.

Another scenario of low local capacity was retold by one operative informant revealed at an early stage of the implementation. The local organization did not follow up with their allocation of personnel for activities in the capacity development initiative. As a result these capacity development activities had to be scaled down, reworked or simply cut according to the operative informant. This was seen as necessary from one operative and one strategic informant. In hindsight two operative and two strategic informants wished that they pushed the local organization to commit to their promises more.

Continuity challenges

All four strategic informants mentioned a success factor being the ability for operative MSB-personnel working continuously with the local organization. According to the strategic informants the continuous presence was needed for operative MSB personnel to establish and maintain good working relations with the local organization. All operative informants mentioned that personal reflections, pathos, pragmatism, commitment, and not getting frustrated was necessary for a longer continuous stay in the initiative. At the local level one operative informant credited the strategic level for rehiring personnel that has been involved in the initiative for certain short term jobs which created a continuity in relationships between the organizations as well as within MSB.

All informants mentioned that the local organization lacked human resources for upholding their part in the initiative. Two operative informants and three strategic informants said the lack of human rescores was experienced through a general lack of preparedness and commitment for the activities in the capacity development initiative. The two operative informants discussed the lack of preparedness in the local organization that local organizational staff were often out of office due to other amends, overlapping schedules and postponing meetings and activities. When local commitment was low flexibility and adaptiveness was perceived by all four operative informants to be a necessary for keeping continuity for running the initiative.

Three strategic and three operative informants mentioned staff rotation in MSB as a challenge for the continuity in the implementation. Two operative informants explicitly mentioned that when such staff rotation occurred at the operative level relationships with the local organization, trust, and tacit knowledge were lost. Three operative informants said rotation of personnel at the strategic level made the internal cooperation more challenging. Two operative informants explained that the project managers had little coherence in managing the initiative. The two operative informants continued by saying that discontinuity negatively affected relationships internally between the operative and strategic levels of MSB as well as between MSB and the local organization. One strategic informant, being a replacer recalled a feeling of picking up loose ends. In hindsight the strategic informant expressed some regrets for not having communicated more with the person leaving the initiative.

A topic which was discussed by all informants was the degree of ownership after the initiative. Three operative and two strategic informants felt that the initiative did not ensure that progress is

incorporated into the local organization. Two operative informants felt that the closure of implementation was poorly done and doubted that the local organization could continue to maintain progress after the ending of the initiative. The closure according to the two operative informants was too hastily composed without guaranteeing the longevity of the progress made in the implementation.

Work environment in the external organization

All informants at the operative level identified themselves as bridging the gap between MSB and the cooperating organization. One operative informant explained that friendship between MSB personnel at operative level is of importance for establishing and maintaining effective teamwork. The operative informant explained that working in a different culture with a handful of colleagues who also are going to be your contacts off duty is challenging without friendship

Two operative informants perceived their role to represent MSB and to some degree the local organization when communicating internally with the strategic level. The two operative informants expressed it to be challenging to manage different expectations from the strategical level in MSB and the local organization. One operative informant described the situation as squeezing a cube into a round hole. The second informant said it was manageable, but stressful at times to lower the expectations from the strategical informants and at the same time push the local organization to commit to the initiative.

Three strategic informant felt accountable to the results of the activities in the initiative. The strategic informants described themselves to be the one in control of initiative, steering towards results, accountability, and supporting the operative team in the initiative. One strategic informants acknowledged the importance of cooperation between MSB and the local organization as well as the internal cooperation between operative and strategic the levels of MSB. Two strategic informants said that it is challenging to get sufficient information about the local situation and sending adequate support while being at headquarters. The two strategic informants also perceived that strategic influence over the initiative decreased the over time. This was perceived by the two strategic informants to be a consequence of the close personal relationships between the operative informants and personnel in the local organizational.

Internal challenges within MSB

At the strategic level two informants were managing several initiatives at the same time. One strategic informant continued by expressing having a pressuring work load when managing several initiatives. The strategic informant also mentioned stress before making decisions because the ability to discuss the initiative and getting feedback with other strategic colleagues was limited. The strategic informant also expressed a lack of systematic learning at strategic level. The strategic informant continued by saying that there was a strategic bias towards prestige in MSB which often lead to too ambitious statements in the project documents as well as a general reluctance of confessing for oneself when or if you need help.

Two strategic informants and one operative informant perceived the diffuse roles and responsibilities in the internal levels in MSB. These two strategic informants mentioned the importance of having a unified approach in capacity development initiatives. The operative informant did not feel supported by the strategic level. Instead the operative informant felt questioned and micromanaged by the strategic informants in MSB. One operative informant who had also worked at strategic level mentioned the importance of internal teamwork in MSB. The main challenge for internal teamwork to

work in MSB was according to the informant to have a will to understand the internal viewpoints and personal challenges within the different levels of MSB.

Three operative informants suggested that the project manager of initiative could have been embedded at operative level. These three operative informant wished this because they expressed it could have mitigated the challenge to weigh in insight from the local context into the decision making process. One operative informant felt that the initiative was too occupied with the activities and that a reevaluation of the activities would have benefited the initiative.

Two operative informants and the informant who had work at both levels perceived that the strategic level did not seem to be interested in the local context and was too focused on project documentation. The friction between the levels ultimately led to staff rotation at the operative level according to one operative informant. The operative informant added that the management seemed to have little field experience and wished for trainees at operative level for individuals who were going to be working at strategic level.

One strategic informant perceived that a challenge during the implementation was that some operative staff were technically capable but when the initiative started their abilities could not be put into the action due to lack of local absorptive capacity which lead to standstills. The strategic informant continued by suggesting that scaling down MSB personnel into a smaller group at the operative level with a more thorough management to be a solution for adapting to the standstills. The strategic informant also suggested short time contracts for operative personnel in MSB in order for flexibility in the management to hire more suited personnel if deemed necessary.

Another suggestion from one strategic informant was to have a reoccurring board meeting with representatives from all levels of implementation in MSB. The idea according to the strategic informant was to enable direct communication between different layers of the initiative to give voice to all levels of the personnel thus giving a better feedback loop into the decision making process.

Discussion

When analyzing the results, it was realized that operative and strategic informants often perceived successes and challenges differently. The identified reason to why this occurred was that the strategic and operative informants had different roles, responsibilities, and worked in different environments. These different viewpoints also lead to consequences such as internal conflict and staff leaving the initiative prematurely. There a need to make a statement that the research question did not anticipate the complexity of the results. The discussion will go beyond answering the research question. What the discussion will aim to provide is a reflection about the differences and the similarities of the perceived success factors and challenges and its outcomes. Five themes emerged from the results based on the interviews with the strategic and operative informants. These themes are visualized in figure 1 and were soft skills, local context, accountability, commitment and continuity.

Figure 1. The five identified themes

The discussion will reflect upon each of the five identified themes, see figure 1. Each category will start with discussing existing similarities if there any. The discussion then presents the differences in the viewpoints between strategic and operative informants if there are any. Examples of consequences in the initiative linked to the theme are then presented and discussed. Finally, a summary containing table with conclusive remarks of the identified perceived success factors and challenges with its consequences is presented

Soft skills

Both operative and strategical informants viewed soft skills as a success factor in the cooperation between operative level of MSB and the local organizations. But the use of soft skills seems to be lacking internally between operative and strategical level of MSB.

Operative view – Soft skills

All operative personnel perceived the establishment and maintenance of relationships with individuals in the local organization as a major success factor. These personal relationships helped the operative informants to understand and adapt to the local context and culture. The relationships were seen by the all four operative informants as a vital part of making implementation feasible. Some examples of soft skills the operative informants mentioned to be important for establishing relationships were showing commitment to the initiative, humbleness, understanding the local language, and having an open mind without prejudices. Approaches that acknowledges personal values, constructive mindset and local knowledge leads to friendship (Girgis, 2007, pp. 357-358). A general success factor for bridging cultural differences is to establish relationships with the local organization (Acquaye-Baddoo, 2010, p. 74).

Reaching a level of trust is discussed by two operative informants as when the individual in the local organization opened up, discussed feasibility, and important but sensitive information. It is important that there is time to develop personal relationships because it is a requirement for the organizations find each other's point of view (McMahon, 2010, p. 89). Two operative informants estimated it to take three to six months of continuous cooperation before such trust was established with the local organization. The reason to why it takes time is because these individuals and organizations stem from different cultures, have different values, goals and responsibilities (Baccarani, 1999, p. 30). Good relationships and trust between the operative informants and local organization helped the operative informant to understand and adapt to the cultural conflict avoidance in the local organization. As trust was established between the local organization and the operative informants it became easier for the operative informant to understand and communicate with the local organization.

Two operative informants discussed the challenge of communicating expectations between the local organization and the strategic part of MSB. The two operative informants saw themselves as bridging expectations between the local organization and the strategic level of MSB. The balancing of expectations in the internal dialog of was seen as stressful and challenging according to these two operative informants. To merge ideas, establish relationships, and a will for understanding local context are all aspects of important soft skills (Acquaye-Baddoo, 2010, pp. 69,72). These softer aspects seem to be lacking in the internal dialog between the operative and strategic level within MSB. The internal dialog between strategic and operative informants were seen as difficult and stressful by the two operative informants. One operative informant described the internal dialog with the strategic level when mediating expectations as "pushing a big cube into a tiny round hole". The challenge of good relationships and dialog internally in MSB was explicitly mentioned by one informant who had worked at both levels as being a challenge. The informant continued by explaining that the challenge consisted in the inability for strategic informants to understand the point of view of the operative informants and vice versa.

Strategic view – Soft skills

All four strategic informants also viewed the soft skills of the operative informants as a success factor for the cooperation with the local organization. But only one of the four strategic informants mentioned having to work with building relationships with individuals in the local organization and

the operative informants. None of the four strategic informants referred to any internal difficulties in the internal dialog but two strategic informants mentioned a challenge of the operative informants having diffuse roles and responsibilities. According to these two strategical informants the diffuse roles and responsibilities in the operative level lead to strategical informants losing influence over the initiative. One contributing factor according to these two strategic informants was the close relationships between the operative informants and the local organization.

A summary of the perceptive views of soft skills is visualized in table 2.

Table 2. Summarized views of Soft skills

Operative view	Strategic view	Consequence
Soft skills enable close cooperation and relationships with local organization	Soft skills enable operative cooperation with local organization	Difficulties in the internal dialog in MSB. Lack of softs skills internally in MSB

The challenge for MSB seems to be connected to establishing good internal relationships. Overlapping boundaries and relationships might challenge a good relationship between strategic and operative informants. It is important for external and local organizations find each other's point of view (McMahon, 2010, p. 89) and perhaps it is equally important to have the same approach in the internal teamwork of MSB. What also seem to be a factor is that the close relationships between operative informants and the local organization negatively affected cooperation between operative informants and strategic informant.

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Local context

There are few similarities in the perceived views of the local context.

Operative informants – Local context

All four operative informants mentioned the importance of the local context for understanding the local organization the implementation. Three operative informants also meant that the local insight were difficult to communicate to the strategic informants. The three operative informants continued by saying that the strategic informants seemed unwilling or have few opportunities to bring information about the local context into their decision making process. Two operative informants and the informant who had work at both levels perceived the strategic level had too much focus on project documentation. The two strategic informants continued by saying that that the strategic decision making was not interested in the local context, and that the strategic personnel had inadequate operative experience. Three operative informants suggested to have a strategic project manager to be closer to the local context. Having a strategic manager at operative level would according to the operative informants give a better opportunity for understanding the local context. The proposal of a strategic representative at operative level seems desirable but perhaps not realistic considering the fact that the strategic informants in MSB seems to manage several initiatives at the same time. But there findings in the results show other instances where local context were used in the decision making process at the strategic level. The transfer and use local context into decision making at strategic level is therefore not dependent on strategic personnel staying continuously at the implementation area. Instead it seems to depend on the strategic personnel's own perception of whether local insight and knowledge is of use or not.

Strategic informants- Local context

Only one strategic informant mentioned the importance of the local context and urged to get to meet the operative informants and local organization in person as soon and often as possible. The strategic informant continued by saying that it is impossible to lead the initiative being at headquarters because vital information is often misunderstood if not communicated face to face.

In contrast to moving the strategic personnel to the operative level one strategic informant suggested to lower the number of operative staff and use short term contracts to increase the strategic ability to quickly swap operative personnel when it was deemed to be necessary. Regarding the amount of time it takes to establish trust and relationships with the local organization it does not seem that this strategic idea has acknowledged the complexity, the time required and the value of the relationships. The insight of how knowledge of local context is dependent upon the relationship between the local organization and the operative informants is not acknowledged in this suggestion. Operative staff possesses the most know-how in regards to real work in the implementation (Ebrahim, 2005, p. 75). The strategic suggestion aims to take control is coherent with the warnings of the chase for idealized thinking. Idealized thinking is the perception of having all the answers which harms the ability to learn and listen which increases the risk for trapping the initiative in its pre-designed activities rather than responding to reality (Guijt, 2010, pp. 285-286).

A suggestion made by another strategic informant was to establish a reoccurring internal board meeting with representatives from both levels MSB. The suggestion aims to enable strategic personnel to express their concern about the initiative and for the operative personnel to more extensively explain the context in which they are operating in. The suggestion is not trying to empower either operative or strategic level. Reoccurring board meetings seem to have a potential of airing out frustration between the operative and strategic levels and perhaps also synergize ideas. The solution is

in accordance with the notion of taking concern for different viewpoints in a cooperation (Becker, 2014, pp. 235-239). The suggestion has a potential to mitigate the transfer of local context and to avoid exclusion (Ebrahim, 2005, pp. 74-75) and therefore encourage organizational learning (Ebrahim, 2005, p. 79). It might also decrease the structural rigidness initiative if it enables a systematic rational explanation of the local context (Earl, et al., 2001, p. 10).

A summary of the perceptive views of soft skills is visualized in table 3.

Table 3 Summarized views of Local context

Operative view	Strategic view	Consequence
Important for success Difficult to transfer to strategical level	Poor acknowledgement	Strategic and operative suggestions for enhancing internal communication

Successful decision making in a capacity development initiative is dependent upon the local insight giving context to the empirical data in the activities of the initiative (Earl, et al., 2001, p. 10). Exclusion in the evaluation process is a common outcome when aspects are perceived to be outside of the framework (Ebrahim, 2005, pp. 74-75).

Accountability

The informants from the strategic and operative levels felt accountable to different parts of the initiative. Partiality is the result of the personal investment, and proximity to, certain aspects in the initiative (McMahon, 2010, pp. 84-85) which might explain the reason to why these two groups have different takes on personal accountability in the initiative. The strategic and operative informants are working in different environments might be a factor to the different takes on personal accountabilities.

Operative informants-Accountability

All four operative informants felt accountable for the establishment and maintenance of personal relationship with the local organization. Operative informants felt accountable to the local organization, or rather the relationships and cooperation with individuals in the local organization. The operative desire to understand and perform with the local organization is a desire which lies in the proximity to performance that requires organizational learning (Bryce & Crawford, 2002, p. 364).

Strategic informants-Accountability

Three strategic informants expressed accountability toward the results. Some accountability downwards were also given such as providing with adequate support to the operative staff of MSB. Being accountable for managing results implies transparency which requires documentation (Bryce & Crawford, 2002, p. 364). A strategic challenge was to get sufficient information from the operative level for transparent reporting.

One example of when these two sets of accountabilities clashed can be seen when the local organization started to conduct informal communication with the operative level of MSB. The operative informants meant that the informal communication was a result of good personal relationships and trust. The informal communication was seen by operative personnel as a successful pragmatic supplement to the official communication. According to the operative informants the standard of procedures of the official communication were bureaucratic and ineffective. At the same time the informal communication was perceived to be negative at strategic level. At the strategic level it was perceived that the informal communication was hurting transparency as decisions could not be backtracked to any official communication. Rigid accountability disables the initiative to digest new information and learn from its observations (Guijt, 2010, pp. 278-279). At the same time, it is suggested that an essential part of the capacity development success is to have accountability measures that enables learning (Guijt, 2010, p. 289). Informal information might contain vital information about how the local organization operates because local organizations often works informally to some degree (Armstrong, 2013, p. 80). It is suggested that the urge for transparency and formality could lead to an exclusion the fundamental but informal and less accessible information. The exclusion leads losing an opportunity for learning how the local organization operates (Armstrong, 2013, p. 80).

A second example of diverging accountabilities was when a natural hazard struck the implementation area. The initiative was transformed into a humanitarian response effort in order to aid the local organization. Some parts of initiative were integrated in the response effort. Two operative informants felt that the humanitarian response was a success because of it gave an opportunity for learning. During the response effort the two operative informants felt a better understanding of the needs and the motivation of the local organization. One operative and one strategic informant saw success because the local organization recognized the necessity of the activities in the capacity development initiative during the humanitarian response effort. The strategic informant said that while the outcome of humanitarian response was positive it did not contribute towards the capacity development initiative as it was outside of the project context. The strategic informant continued by suggesting that instead of

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the humanitarian response it might have been better to pause the initiative during the hazardous event. Operative informants saw success in learning and opportunity for integrating the response with some parts of the activities. The strategic informant saw humanitarian response to be a detour as it did not directly contribute towards the results. There seems to be a rigidness in the strategic accountability. Rigid accountability requirements negatively affect flexibility in the initiative (Guijt, 2010, p. 280) and encourages a short term result based organizational mindset (Ebrahim, 2005, p. 82). It is suggested that best practice is to pool resources rather than disengage when the local organization is dealing with hazardous events (Lopez & Theisohn, 2003, p. 51). If the external organization disengages with cooperation during hazardous events the local organization is risking the trust built between the organizations (Lopez & Theisohn, 2003, p. 52).

A summary of the perceptive views of soft skills is visualized in table 4.

Table 4. Summarized views of Accountability

Operative view	Strategic view	Consequence
Accountable to the local organization	Accountable to the donor (reporting)	Clashes between operative and strategic level

As seen in these two examples above MSB need to acknowledge that there are different perceptive viewpoints in its organization. Without acknowledging different perceptive viewpoints there is a risk that internal clashes occur. The exclusion of operative level local insight in the evaluation process is suggested in literature to come from the strategic perception that operative staff do not have the relevant knowledge or that the strategic personnel are themselves feeling hesitant to go outside of their role and responsibilities (Ebrahim, 2005, pp. 74-75).

Commitment

All four operative and three strategic personnel in MSB were having similar views when discussing the challenge of low commitment in the local organization. Operative and strategic informants gave several examples of low commitment in the initiatives. Some of the many examples were canceling meetings, not committing to the activities in the initiative and poor allocation of resources to the initiative Operative and strategic informants also expressed that the initiatives were too ambitious when considering the fluctuation of the local capacity, but this was realized during implementation. These factors led to standstills in the initiative. These observations can be interpreted to lack of local ownership. Remembering that local ownership definition being the local organization having the control and self-determination of its development (Schultz, et al., 2005, p. 23). Yet neither strategic nor operational informants explicitly talked about local ownership when discussing the observations of low commitment in the initiative.

An example of how MSB responded to low local organizational commitment was that one strategic informant decided to embed operative staff into the local organization to work alongside the local organization. The response was an indirect takeover of responsibilities from the local organization. It was seen by both operative and strategical informants as a successful way of addressing the underlying root of low local commitment. It was perceived by two strategic and one operative informants as a pragmatic, flexible and successful approach towards enabling the local organization to recommit to initiative. Neither the strategic nor the operative part of MSB discussed the risk of creating dependencies between the local organization and MSB during project takeover. Solving commitment issues by talking over responsibilities from the local organization is not according to literature a sound idea as it could bring dependencies which would negatively affect the emergence of local ownership (Hagelsteen & Becker, 2013, p. 5). The lack of acknowledging local ownership both by strategic and operative informants can be identified by their observations on low local commitment and the response to solving the issue. Any response which creates local organizational dependencies on the external organization negatively influences the emergence of local ownership (Hagelsteen & Becker, 2013, p. 5) (Schultz, et al., 2005, p. 6). One reason why external takeover is happening might be rooted in a will in the external organization to produce visible results (Hagelsteen & Burke, 2016, p. 50). Common outcomes when the local organization is under stress is that the external organization either takes over or unties with cooperation due to its desire to exercise damage control (Lopez & Theisohn, 2003, p. 51). The observations made by both strategic and operative informants shows several examples of the local organization not committing to the initiative.

A second example of responding to the perceived lack of preparedness and commitment in the local organization found in was to scale down the activities. Scale downs were also made because some activities were too ambitious and in some cases it was realized that the implementation plan just was not realistic. It was seen as a pragmatic and successful response by both the strategic and operative informants. The scale down could be seen as aligning the project towards the local needs. In this aspect scale down might be a good measure as the adjustment was means to make the project viable. The lower working load opened up for the local organization to commit to the project. There is an issue with linking scale downs with being a success. A conclusion from such a statement would be that adapting to existing conditions is about lowering ambition. The need for scaling down is an acknowledgement that the current approach is not viable. But to promote scale down as a successful measure might give into organizational timidity where ambition, organizational learning, and flexibility is consumed by a mindset of implementing reachable but toothless goals due to desire of successful results (Guijt, 2010, p. 280). Scaling down might be easier to conduct rather than reevaluate the situation. But what could be more productive is to go outside the existing initiate framework to

find alternative approaches. But when quick fixes are suggested to be successful then there is risk that ambition and flexibility is replaced by quick fixes and low ambition (Ebrahim, 2005, p. 82).

A summary of the perceptive views of soft skills is visualized in table 5.

Table 5. Summarized views of Commitment

Operative view	Strategic view	Consequence
Low local capacity due to lack of human resources	Low local capacity due to lack of human resources	External takeover
No insight in local ownership	No insight in local ownership	Scaling down the initiative

Project takeover and scale downs could be seen as quick fix measures used to address the gap between the anticipated capacity and the actual capacity in the local organization. It is a suggested that quick fixes are a symptom of either rigid accountability (Guijt, 2010, p. 280) or a short term organizational mindset (Ebrahim, 2005, p. 82). MSB must acknowledge the prerequisites for local ownership. If local ownership is not acknowledged then there is a risk that responses made by MSB creates dependencies between the local organization and MSB. These dependencies will negatively influence the emergence of local ownership (Hagelsteen & Becker, 2013, p. 5) (Schultz, et al., 2005, p. 6).

Continuity

Operative and strategic informants saw continuity as being a success factor as it was a prerequisite for the establishment of relationship and trust with the local organization. Two operative informants estimated the time to understand and communicate with the local organization to be three to six months of continuous cooperation. However, staff rotations were seen by three operative and three strategic informants as major challenge as it undermined the continuity in the implementation. Staff rotation occurred both at strategic and operative level. Operative and strategic informants felt that staff rotation at operative level negatively affected effectiveness and ambition in both the operative personnel as well as in the local organization.

Operative informants- Continuity

When staff rotation occurred at the strategic level operative informants expressed that there were little coherence in the management of the initiative. Loss of local insight and knowledge was also experienced when as staff turnover happened operative level by operative informants. Staff rotation at the operative level also severed ties with the local organization due to loss of the relationships between the local organization and the operative informant who left. Personal relationships cannot be institutionalized as it is dependent upon the individual. Staff rotation at operative level do not only lead to a loss of knowledge but also valuable ties with the local organization. A suggestion to lower these types of negative outcomes in the initiative is to view the relationships as an investment in terms of time and resources (IFRC, 2010, pp. 49-50). When operative informants estimate the time for establishment of trust to be three to six months of continuous presence then it becomes clear that these relationships are valuable and costly to replace.

The only direct explanation for leaving the initiative prematurely was given by an operative informant who left the initiative. According to the operative informant the clash of accountabilities was fueling conflict between the operative and strategic levels of MSB. Two operative informant felt excluded from giving input to the decision making process. The observed difficulties for internal communication and the exclusion of local context has already been discussed. But these themes seemed also to have affected staff rotation at operative level. Reluctance for management to go outside their boundary role or that the strategic staff are perceiving that operative staff are lacking relevant knowledge are reasons for exclusion for operative staff knowledge (Ebrahim, 2005, pp. 74-75) which in this case lead to staff rotation.

Strategic informants-Continuity

Strategic informants did not comment on why staff rotation happened at strategic level, although staff rotations occurred at strategic level. There might be several reasons for an individual to leave the project. One obvious fact is that these initiatives lasts several years, which will bring uncertainty for the continuous commitment of its personnel. A perceived challenge which might contribute towards staff rotation is stress. Stressful work environment was mentioned at strategic level One strategic informant mentioned that the workload could consist of managing several projects at the same time. One factor to lower the probability for staff rotations is to increase working conditions (IFRC, 2010, p. 49).

One strategic informant felt in hindsight a need for a longer overlapping period with the personnel who was leaving the project. Bringing information from individuals into the organization is a suggested mitigating factor for when staff rotation occurs. Active organizational learning will make the initiative less dependent on the individual (IFRC, 2015, p. 49) (Guijt, 2010, p. 282). It seems to be a challenge for MSB to actively plan for or institutionalize information in preparation for an eventual

staff turnover regarding the actual outcomes from the staff rotations that occurred. One strategic informant felt that systematic learning is lacking in MSB. Without organizational learning the initiative will be trapped in pursuing ideals and have a deaf ear towards those who promotes change (Guijt, 2010, pp. 280,289).

A summary of the perceptive views of soft skills is visualized in table 6.

Table 6. Summarized views of Continuity

Operative view	Strategic view	Consequence
Continuity is essential	Continuity is essential	Staff rotation at operative level lead to loss of relationships and insight
Staff rotation is a challenge	Staff rotation is a challenge	Staff rotation at operative level due to exclusion and internal conflict
Staff rotation due to exclusion and internal conflict	Stressful working conditions	Staff rotation at strategic level lead to incoherence in management

The exclusion of operative input to the decision making process has been seen as a contributing factor for staff rotation. Organizational learning is needed to decrease exclusion in MSB. The board meeting discussed in the section Local context and knowledge transfer might fill this role, or at least be a part of the solution. Decreased staff rotations might contribute towards a more continuous external organization. There might be a need to look further into reasons why staff rotations occur at strategic level. One factor that was discussed was stressful working conditions at strategic level. A recommendation for further research would be to further investigate the divergent accountabilities, and the organizational culture in MSB to find a way to promote organizational learning during implementation.

Conclusion

International capacity development initiative in the field of disaster risk reduction aims to enable higher independency governmental organizations to deal with the risks of natural hazards. Capacity development can in its simplest form be explained as a partnership initiative between a local organization and an external organization. MSB is one of many external organizations in international development community in the field of disaster risk reduction. A compilation of nine capacity development initiatives that MSB undertook in the span of 2006-2013 suggests that MSB overlooks the softer skills in its capacity development process. The purpose for this thesis is to better understand the internal views within an external governmental partnering organization and how it influences capacity development initiatives in the field of disaster risk reduction. The thesis intends to meet that purpose by answering the following research question: What are the perceived success factors and challenges in a capacity development initiative for disaster risk reduction during implementation between the strategic and operative level in an external partner organization?

Five success factors were identified in the results based on the eight semi-structured interviews with strategic and operative informants from MSB. These five themes were perceived by operative and strategic informants to be success factors with corresponding challenges: 1) soft skills, 2) local context, 3) accountability, 4) commitment and 5) continuity.

Soft skills were perceived to be a success factor because it enables the operative parts of MSB to establish trusting relationships with the local organization. All informants expressed a success factor being the establishment of good relationships between operative informants and individuals in the local organization. At the same time the establishment of good working relations does not seem to be a priority in the internal cooperation between the strategic and operative levels. As it is important to establish close relationship between MSB and the local organizations it is equally important to establish good relations internally in MSB.

Operative informants perceived the understanding of the local context as success factor. At the same time operative personnel perceived that strategic informants were unwilling or had few opportunities to use the local context in the decision making process. A suggestion to ease the transfer the knowledge of the local context from operative to strategic level is to install a board meeting with representatives from all members of the MSB implementation group. When doing so it might open up opportunities for the operative informants to contribute with knowledge about the local context.

The strategic informant generally felt accountable to project documentation and results while the operative informant felt accountable to the local organization. These different accountabilities lead to clashes between operative and strategic levels. One example would be the use of informal communication between operative informants and the local organization. Operative informants saw the informal communication as success and a result of the good relationship and trust between organizations. The strategic perceived the informal communication as a challenge as informal communication negatively affected transparency. The different accountabilities resulted in internal conflict between strategic and operative level. There is a rigidness in the strategic accountability that can lead to inflexibility in the initiative. The inflexibility in the strategic accountability could disable opportunities for learning, encourage a short term thinking, and destroy relationships.

Operative and strategic informants felt that commitment from the local organizations were essential for the implementation as local participation is a premise for the implementation. However, both operative and strategic informants mentioned the challenge of reoccurring lack of commitment in the

local organization. One response to the lack of commitment was an indirect takeover. Operative and strategic informants saw the takeover to be successful as it addressed the challenge of low local commitment. Neither operative nor strategic informants were concerned with taking responsibility from the local organization. Another response to the low commitment and preparedness was the strategic decision to scale down the capacity development activities. The scale down was seen as a success by both strategic and operative informants. Linking project takeover and scale downs to success is concerning as it seems to lean towards quick fix measures. An organization using quick fixes may have rigid accountability or a short term organizational mindset.

Staff rotations occurred in MSB at strategic and operative level. Discontinuity due to staff rotation was seen by both strategic and operative informants as a challenge. Staff rotation lead to loss of knowledge and relationships at local level and incoherence in management at strategic level. Staff rotation at operative levels was due to the clash of accountabilities and feeling excluded from giving input to the decision making process.

As a final note there are four conclusive recommendations coming from the discussion which addresses the overarching issues within the five themes in the discussion. 1) MSB must acknowledge that different accountabilities exists internally in MSB. Without acknowledging the different viewpoints there is a risk of clashes internally in MSB. 2) MSB must actively address internal communication and learning during implementation. Without addressing internal communication and learning during implementation the initiatives risks exclusion of useful local context in its decision making process. 3) MSB must understand the value of relationships internally in MSB and between organizations. Because internal communication relies upon good personal relationships between individuals. It is also suggested that these relationships take a long time to be established. MSB must see relationships internally and between organizations as a prerequisite for communication and learning. If MSB does not acknowledge the value of personal relationships there is a risk for staff rotation in MSB. 4) MSB must acknowledge the importance of local ownership. Any response made by MSB during implementation cannot create dependencies between the local organization and MSB. Dependencies between MSB and the local organization will negatively affect the prospect of local ownership.

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Appendix – Interview guide

Stage 1 Introduction

→ Name, background, who are you?

- Education
- Earlier carrier

→Describe your current position/job

Stage 2

→**I want you to describe your role in the initiative.**

- When did you start? When did you leave? (How was the transition handled?)

Stage 3

→**Can you name three success-factors/ prerequisites for success?**

Why is this success factor? Elaborate, can you exemplify? Can you put this in the context of the initiative?

→**Can you name three challenges you experienced while working with this initiative?**

Why is this a challenge? Elaborate, can you exemplify, can you put this in the context of the initiative?

Stage 4

→**We now believe that I am about to have the exact same role as you in this initiative, could you give me some hard earned tips?**

Again, elaborate, why is this a hard earned tip? In what way can this tip help?

→**If you had the ability to change anything in the project management, what would you suggest?**

Why would you like to change this? What is the suggestion addressing? Is the change realistic? If no, what is the obstacle?

→**Is there anything else you want to add? Do you have any questions for me?**

END