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Understanding climate justice vis-à-vis LDCs

A qualitative case study research exploring EUs fairness towards
LDCs in climate adaptation

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Abstract

This thesis encompasses a qualitative case study research on EUs fairness towards Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in climate adaptation. The thesis explores seven EU policy documents through the method of content analysis to explore whether and how the EUs external climate adaptation policy approach towards the group of LDCs can be seen as fair based on the theoretical framework of climate justice. The theoretical framework consists of the conceptions of justice as non-domination, impartiality and mutual recognition and its opposites, to determine whether and how the EU is fair towards LDCs in climate adaptation. The research finds that the EU can be seen as fair towards LDCs in EUs external climate adaptation policies. Justice as non-domination is expressed through the respect of LDCs' national autonomy and interests, and the recognition of LDCs in deliberations. Justice as impartiality is evident by emphasizing individuals' equal rights and liberties through financial support to LDCs to enhance their capacities to adapt to climate change. Justice as impartiality also illustrate the fairness towards LDCs through the importance of a solidarist international society of the EU supporting LDCs across borders. Finally, justice as mutual recognition portrays the recognition of LDCs' non-state actors in deliberations of climate adaptation and the recognition of different voices and contexts that differs between the EU and LDCs.

Keywords: Climate justice, European Union, Least Developed Countries, climate change adaptation, global political justice theory

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1. Introduction

More than 1,5 °C of global warming is going to jeopardize human life and the life in natural systems (IPCC, 2018, p.7). The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres recently stated that we must act now, as “it is now or never” to limit the global warming to 1,5 °C (United Nations, 2022). However, as the world lives now, we are on the way towards the double in global warming and not towards 1,5 °C as agreed in the Paris Agreement in 2015 (United Nations, 2022; United Nations, 2015, p.3).

Over the years, the European Union (EU) has developed several climate change commitments to meet the 1,5°C target of global warming and adapting to a changing climate. A prominent example is the European Green Deal (2019) which is EUs green-transition strategy aiming to achieve a resilient, climate neutral Europe by 2050 (European Commission, 2019, p.2). Further, the EU wishes to be and considers itself as a global leader of tackling climate change (European Commission, 2019, p.2, 20). The Global Climate Change Alliance Plus (GCCA+) initiative is an international commitment by the EU, which consists of EU-funded programs helping Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in adapting and increasing the resilience to climate change (GCCA+, n.d.). The group of LDCs are 46 low-income countries¹ with low human assets and highly vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks (United Nations, n.d. a). The economies in LDCs are deeply reliant on climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture and fisheries, which increases the risks of deteriorated food and water security, health, well-being, and the overall sustainable development in these communities (Adelman, 2016, p.35; United Nations Development Program, 2011). Due to poor economic and human resources, the impacts from climate change hit LDCs heavily and their vulnerability to climate change challenges the countries livelihood and survival. Hence, climate change adaptation (hereafter climate adaptation) is vital for LDCs survival. Climate adaptation aims to decrease risks of climate change and to adjust economic, social and ecological systems to expected climate change incidents (United Nations Climate Change, n.d.). Adapting to climate change seeks to reduce the vulnerability that climate change and environmental hazards can impose on human and natural systems (ibid).

As demonstrated through the GCCA+ initiative and the donation of €100 million to the Adaptation Fund where LDCs get financial support (European Commission, 2021a) the EU takes salient action on climate adaptation outside of the EU. Developed countries, such as the

¹ For an overview of the 46 LDCs in 2021, see Appendix Table 1.

EU, have historic responsibilities of contributing to the effects caused by climate change, and consequently, they also bear the greatest obligations for adaptation, mitigation and resilience in LDCs (Adelman, 2016, p.36). The most vulnerable communities such as LDCs have contributed the least to climate change but suffer disproportionately and unjustly from it (Saraswat and Kumar, 2015, p.67). Increasingly in the international political community and in academia, LDCs gain recognition in the climate change negotiations and decision-makings, however not sufficiently, especially in relation to the urgent need to adapt to climate change as it depends on their survival (United Nations, 2015, p.13; Adaptation Fund, 2021; Teng, 2019, p.258). Just as recognizing vulnerable countries and communities in climate change negotiations, the redistribution of resources from developed, rich countries to less developed, poorer countries, is also a matter of climate justice, that contribute to strengthen the capacity constraints which LDCs experience (Garschagen and Doshi, 2022, p.1). Many vulnerable communities and countries such as LDCs, seek climate justice to stay alive, through increasing their capabilities to adjust and be resilient to climate change (Teng, 2019, p.260).

Thus, it is interesting to investigate whether and how the EU takes a climate justice approach towards LDCs in EUs external climate adaptation commitments. Most EU external climate adaptation commitments are stated in their international and foreign policies. Foreign policies are guidelines that guide activities of one state in relation to another state (Britannica, n.d.). As such, the EU has guidelines for their climate adaptation actions in relation to the international community, which is interesting to analyze whether and how they are fair. For these reasons, this thesis investigates the fairness of the EUs climate change policies on climate adaptation towards LDCs.

1.1. The aim of the study

As stated in the Paris Agreement (United Nations, 2015) due to past emissions and the detrimental effects climate change has especially on vulnerable countries, developed states bear responsibilities for LDCs to mitigate, adapt and increase the resilience to climate change. Climate adaptation is a matter of justice for people in LDCs to live a safe, sustainable life. The EU therefore bear great responsibilities in including LDCs in climate adaptation and to support LDCs in their capabilities to adapt to climate change. As such, it is interesting to apply climate justice perspectives on EUs external climate adaptation policies towards LDCs.

The research is conducted through qualitative content analysis of EUs external climate adaptation policies. The theory of global political justice based on three concepts of justice; non-domination, impartiality and mutual recognition and its opposites of domination, partiality

and nonrecognition, acts as the theoretical climate justice tool and aims to illustrate whether and how justice is framed in the climate adaptation policies vis-à-vis LDCs.

1.2. Research question

Whether and how can the EUs external climate adaptation policy approach towards the group of LDCs be seen as fair based on the theoretical framework of climate justice?

1.3. Outline

Chapter two presents relevant concepts for the study which is followed by a review of previous research that addresses the complexities of climate justice. The third chapter introduces the theoretical framework by firstly exploring global political justice and introducing climate justice, and finally describing the global political justice theory in detail, followed by the analytical scheme of the thesis. The fourth chapter involves a discussion on methods and research design where sampling and empirical material is discussed. The fifth chapter concerns the results and analysis of the EUs external climate adaptation policy documents, which is followed by the sixth chapter which presents a discussion of the findings and recommendations for further research. This chapter also includes concluding remarks. Lastly, the reader finds the bibliography and appendix.

2. Setting the stage

This chapter includes a discussion on LDCs and climate adaptation and how it is perceived in the thesis. That is followed by a section that conceptualizes climate justice and how climate justice is understood in this dissertation. Following the two background sections to the thesis is a review of previous research on the field of climate justice in relation to the EU, LDCs and climate adaptation. The previous research is divided into a few categories to make sense of the existing research.

2.1. Understanding LDCs and climate adaptation

Taking a closer look at LDCs, the UN has dedicated the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, more specifically the Committee for Development Policy (CDP), to review, evaluate and make recommendations on the group of LDCs (United Nations, n.d. b). The LDCs are reviewed every three years by the CDP, and the CDP make recommendations to LDCs on the inclusion and graduation, based on three criteria:

- i) the country's gross national income (GNI) per capita;
- ii) ii) the country's position on the human assets index (HAI);
- iii) iii) the country's position on the economic and environmental vulnerability index (EVI) (United Nations, n.d. a).

Based on these criteria, the countries are eligible to enter or leave the group of LDCs if and when the countries meet the inclusion and graduation threshold criteria. To ensure that any country's graduation from the group of LDCs is sustainable, the graduation threshold criteria is higher than the inclusion threshold criteria (United Nations, n.d. b).

Importantly, several LDCs are also included in the Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) as illustrated in Table 2 in Appendix. In that regard, the OACPS is of relevance in this thesis as one of the policy documents is an Agreement between the EU and the OACPS discussing among other things the importance of climate adaptation for LDCs. As the criteria above expresses LDCs' vulnerability to economic, human and environmental shocks, it is clear that LDCs urgently need climate adaptation. As communities are dissimilar and not identical in its location, economic and technical resources and the status of human assets, there is not "one solution that fits all" (United Nations Climate Change, n.d.). Climate change negatively impacts all three criteria, the GNI, the HAI and the EVI. Climate change impacts LDCs economic activity, such as the agricultural production and fisheries, the human capital such as one's well-being, and climate change negatively impacts the environment such

as coastal areas where people live (United Nations Development Program, 2011). LDCs suffer “double injustices” as Adelman (2016, p.35) proposes. Adelman (2016, p.35) emphasizes that as climate change impedes sustainable development by exacerbating underdevelopment, it also hinders LDCs to develop adaptive capacities to reduce the risks of climate induced disasters.

Scientists have warned that a global warming of 1,5 °C compared to pre-industrial levels, will lead to more and intensive droughts, floods and heatwaves (IPCC, 2018, p.7). For many years, climate mitigation, which is to prevent and reduce the greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere and contributes to global warming, has been the priority in climate change negotiations (Gach, 2019, p.4-5). However, adaptation to climate change is increasingly becoming relevant due to the impacts that climate change causes on human and natural systems (Milhorange et al., 2022, p.183). The Paris Agreement stresses the need to adapt and reduce vulnerability to climate change, especially considering vulnerable populations’ urgency to adapt to climate change to survive (United Nations, 2015, p.3-4). Climate adaptation is the adjustment to a changing climate and to reduce the vulnerability of human and natural systems that climate change causes (UNDRR, 2020, p.8). Climate adaption in human systems aims to adjust to actual or anticipated climate change and its impacts, to moderate or avoid harm, whereas adaptation in natural systems seeks to adjust to climate change and its effects in which human intervention may facilitate this process of adjusting to climate change (IPCC, 2022, p.5; UNDRR, 2020, p.8). Adapting to climate change can contribute to several benefits such as the improvement of people’s food security, agricultural productivity, health and wellbeing, the conservation of biodiversity but also to reduce damages from climate change (IPCC, 2022, p.21). Climate adaptation thus contributes to sustainable development and is vital for human and natural systems to become resilient to climate change.

Adaptation to climate change involves many sectors of society but concentrates to a few of them, while being performed in small-scales and often involve planning but less actual implementation of adaptation measures (Milhorange et al., 2022, p.184-185; IPCC, 2022, p.21). Because climate adaption measures are often multi-sectoral with multiple targets, adaptation measures can enable interventions in one area or sector that can lead to increased vulnerability in another sector, geographical area or for other social groups (Milhorange et al., 2022, p.185). This “negative spill-over” that enables adaptation in one sector, location or for certain social groups, but causes vulnerability in other areas of society is characterized as maladaptation (Milhorange et al., 2022, p.185). However, despite maladaptation, climate

adaptation level up stakeholders' initiatives in tackling the impacts of climate change on human and natural systems.

Adjusting to a changing climate fall under the concept of resilience. Resilience can be defined as the abilities of social, economic and ecosystems to maintain its capacity, essential function and structure in times of coping with hazards, disasters or disturbance (IPCC, 2022, p.5). Resilience is that the social, economic and ecological systems reorganize and respond to disastrous events by maintaining the systems' capacities for adaptation, learning and transformation (IPCC, 2022, p.5). In this regard, climate adaptation is often discussed in relation to resilience as the overall goal with measures of coping and tackling climate change in human and natural systems is to be as resilient as possible to climate change. Hence, strategies of climate adaptation aim to strengthen societies' resilience, which is vital for a sustainable development (IPCC, 2022, p.5; UNDRR, 2020, p.8).

As resilience is the goal of the strategy of climate adaptation, it is an important element in climate adaptation strategies such as in EUs external climate adaptation policies. Therefore, when assessing EUs external climate adaptation policies, resilience will also be explored as adjusting to a changing climate is interconnected with resilience of any human and natural system (IPCC, 2022, p.5). In addition, climate adaptation is often discussed in tandem with resilience as adaptation in this context refers to bouncing back to its "original" state of function after any disturbance (IPCC, 2022, p.5). It is also known that climate adaptation actions and measures are complex and thus policy framing differs between different stakeholders and actors of policy-makings (Milhorance et al., 2022, p.185). In this regard, it is not unusual that resilience is mentioned in the same context as climate adaptation, as the concepts are interlinked and the knowledge about them differs.

2.2. Conceptualizing climate justice

Climate justice refers to recognize and protect the rights of vulnerable individuals and societies impacted by climate change, and the allocation of burdens and benefits of climate change (Saraswat and Kumar, 2016, p.67-68). A considerable amount of climate justice literature focuses on the distributive aspect of justice, which refers to how burdens and benefits are allocated, or put simply; it is the fair distribution of the world's resources (Macdonald and Ronzoni, 2012, p.521; Eriksen, 2016, p.1). The Paris Agreement states that developed countries shall financially support mitigation and adaptation to developing countries (United Nations, 2015, p.13). As such, the distributive aspect of justice can imply the distribution of

opportunities, material resources, political- and civil rights (Mikalsen 2012 in Eriksen, 2016, p.25) between rich and poor states, but also between communities and individuals.

However, a question that arises is what a fair distribution of benefits and burdens would entail in a context of climate change? Simon Caney (2014, p.125) refers to the principles of *Burden-Sharing Justice* that take three different approaches to the responsibilities of the problems that climate change can impose on humans, ecosystems, biodiversity and future generations. The “polluter pays principle” (PPP) refers to those who have and still pollute greenhouse gas emissions should pay for the consequences this entails (ibid, p.132, 146). This principle is often related to international settings of climate change negotiations in which developed states bear responsibilities in paying for its pollution in which developing states often experience the consequences of these actions, such as warmer climate and an increase in natural disasters (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.14). This principle highlights states’ historical emissions and raises the issue of paying for past emissions as well.

A second distributive justice issue refers to the “ability to pay principle” (APP) which indicates those who have the capabilities to pay for the consequences of climate change should do that to those who suffer the most from it (Caney, 2014, p.142). In other words, it refers to the burdens of climate change should be borne by actors which have the abilities to pay for it, such as developing countries paying for mitigation and adaptation efforts (Caney, 2014, p.142). Interestingly, this principle overlooks states and other actors’ historical emissions in which PPP highlights. The third distributive justice principle is the “beneficiary pays principle” (BPP) which emphasizes that those who benefit from pollution should pay for its consequences (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.15). This principle is closely related to the APP because those actors who benefited from pollution are also most likely to have the abilities to pay. The BPP indicates that states with the abilities to pay for climate change, are obliged to support LDCs in their efforts for mitigation and adaptation (Adelman, 2016, p.37). This principle recognizes past emitters and problematizes that earlier generations who enjoyed economic prosperity cannot pay for their benefits, however it requires that present generations pay for the benefits of climate change (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.15). In turn, APP and BPP relates to burdens of adaptation, in which the burdens of adaptation can be distributed according to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (Adelman, 2016, p.36).

Importantly, for a fair distribution to take place, an institution must be in place that protects basic human rights (Eriksen, 2016, p.2). In this instance, it is also relevant to consider the

fairness of negotiations and decision-making processes, namely procedural justice. Procedural justice focuses on the fairness in the decision-making processes. It is about incorporating different viewpoints in negotiations and policy makings, and especially including those identities that are particularly affected by the issue at stake (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.48; Holland, 2017, p.394). It does not only adhere to states' involvement in decision-makings but acknowledges the importance of other actors of society in these procedures (Holland, 2017, p.394). Contextualizing climate change from a procedural justice aspect can indicate how to look at political power structures in climate change negotiations and policy makings, such as who decides and participates in the decision-makings (Holland, 2017, p.394; IPCC, 2022, p.5). The procedural justice approach emphasizes the recognition, voices, participation and the unequal economic and political power structures in policies and agreements (Holland, 2017, p.394). Thus, procedural justice is similar to recognitional justice which refers to that individuals, groups and communities are recognized and acknowledged, and to fairly recognize individuals' values, cultures and contexts (Preston and Carr, 2018, p.310).

As such, EUs external climate adaptation policies involve the procedural justice approach in terms of recognizing the (un)equal economic and political power of LDCs and non-state actors in policies, and the importance of their participation in climate adaptation decision-makings. Procedural justice in this thesis cannot be utilized as a climate justice perspective to analyze which actors are present in the decision-making processes of the policies, as that counts for only EU institutions due to the selected material which is EUs external climate adaptation policies. However, it can be argued that procedural justice is to some extent evident in one policy document used in this thesis, namely the Partnership Agreement between the EU, its Member States and the OACPS in which many LDCs are included. In the decision-making of that Agreement, actors from both the EU and the OACPS were included however it is difficult to define whether representatives from all LDCs in the OACPS were included in the negotiations or only the chief negotiators from the EU and the chief negotiator from the OACPS who spoke for all countries in the OACPS (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p. 4-6). Hence, this thesis focuses on the contents of the policies, and dismisses the analysis of the policies' contexts in which they are produced, as the EU is the author of all policy documents, and the contents reveal more about EUs fairness towards LDCs in climate adaptation than the contexts' of the documents do. As such, procedural climate justice has some limitations in this thesis, however, it is viewed as a perspective that recognizes the importance of voices and actors in negotiations and decision-makings.

As Brandstedt and Brülde (2019, p.788) point out, climate justice is on the one hand about the fair procedures of climate policy makings, and on the other hand about the fair distribution of responsibilities and resources. Thus, to thoroughly understand the fairness in EUs climate adaptation policies towards LDCs, it is important to include the distributive aspect in relation to the procedural aspect of climate justice. The distributional justice aspect is utilized in terms of evaluating the abilities of beneficiaries, that is the EU, in supporting LDCs in their climate adaptation, and the fairness in distributing rights, political responsibilities and various resources.

2.3. Previous research

The research in this section of the thesis is collected from LUBsearch which is Lund Universities Library database to access peer-reviewed resources. The search words used to find previous research relevant to the field of study were: “least developed countries” AND “climate justice”, but also “least developed countries” AND “climate justice” AND “climate adaptation”. Other keywords were also utilized such as “the EU” AND “global climate justice”. Another database used for finding research was www.globus.uio.no which is a research page on EUs contributions to global justice, a research project funded by the EUs Horizon 2020 Program which has a scientific advisory board of international scholars within the field of global justice (ARENA Center for European Studies University of Oslo, 2018). Further, all research material in this subchapter is peer-reviewed. For clarifications, the book by Von Lucke et al. (2021) is peer reviewed in the sense that the book is reviewed by a scholar named Israel Solorio (2021) and Solorio has written a short book review that is peer reviewed. In addition, as the majority of Von Lucke et al.’s (2021) work is identical to the research article by Von Lucke (2021) which is peer reviewed according to LUBsearch, the scientific and research community can legitimize the findings in Von Lucke et al.’s (2021) book.

2.3.1. Climate adaptation finance

A lot of previous research is conducted on the fairness of climate adaptation finance. For instance, McGinn and Isenhour (2021) address that the Adaptation Fund under the UNFCCC raises concerns of justice. The authors use justice-based norms of distributive, procedural, compensatory and liberal framings of justice to explore the continuation of the Adaptation Fund (ibid, p.385). They find that developing countries strive to keep the Adaptation Fund alive to receive support from it and as such, developing countries defend procedural and distributional justice in terms of keeping their places in the Adaptation Board and the fund also ensures country-owned projects which promotes participation, inclusion and recognition in governance

(ibid, p.391). McGinn and Isenhour (2021) conclude that the global climate regime shifts towards liberal norms and developing countries seek procedural justice in the Adaptation Fund to get distributional justice of financial support from developed countries (ibid, p.393). Similar research on justice in climate adaptation finance between 1992-2018, shows that adaptation finance is primarily influenced by neoliberal norms of justice (Khan et al., 2019, p.265). Voluntary commitments, private and market-based solutions are signs of neoliberal justice (ibid, p.265). The 25+ years of adaptation finance evaluated by Khan et al. (2019, p.265) shows that the climate negotiations in the UNFCCC demonstrate uncertainty in addressing distributional, procedural, recognitional and compensatory justice, and the negotiations are dominated by developed countries' self-interests expressed in liberal justice norms.

Dugasa Fite (2018, p.110) provides another perspective to the concerns of distributive justice as she argues that developed countries have responsibility for paying for the costs of climate change, such as providing support to LDCs for climate adaptation. She also discusses that the current climate regime is insufficient in the distributive aspects of justice such as how emission reductions are not sufficient in tackling climate change, carbon funds are limited which means that developed countries suffer from meeting the set targets for emission reductions (ibid, p.106). Finally and most importantly, the international climate regime lacks in providing tools and measures to overcome the permanent structural global inequality (ibid, p.107). This research shows that developed countries must assist developing countries and LDCs in numerous aspects of climate adaptation: such as massive financial support, improve the scientific and research capacities, develop research institutes to collect information on climate change, reduce certain subsidies that lead to maladaptation, and finally to empower the countries and their communities by letting developing countries and LDCs to determine on climate adaptation strategies and use their indigenous knowledge to tailor their climate adaptation (ibid, p.108).

2.3.2. Just climate negotiations

Holler et al. (2020, p.2) explore stakeholder participation in 50 LDCs country-driven National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs) to investigate if the plannings of NAPAs enable stakeholder influence in the adaptation processes that can lead to transformational adaptation. NAPA processes aim to identify urgent climate adaptation actions within countries and thus intra-country stakeholders preferably collaborate to develop the NAPAs (ibid, p.5). Stakeholder participation in planning processes, that is procedural justice, increases the will and efforts to adapt to climate change (ibid, p.3). Holler et al. (2020, p.3-4) state that external

instead of local, internal stakeholders, may drive climate adaptation agenda which does not consider different groups' vulnerabilities, contexts and needs. The participation of experts in these settings can thus be problematic as it can develop solutions that do not fit the actual problem at stake (ibid, p.4). The authors find that there is limited stakeholder influence in NAPAs in LDCs and thus have failed to achieve transformational adaptation with multiple stakeholders involved (ibid, p.2). Efforts have been made to include more stakeholders in the plannings of NAPAs however they had minimal influence in the planning, particularly in the problem formulations and determining what to prioritize in the field of climate adaptation action (ibid, p.12). Low stakeholder participation in NAPAs resulted in criticized procedural justice in which local knowledge and experience of vulnerable communities were not addressed in the NAPAs (ibid, p.12).

Kortetmäki (2016, p.320) explores the injustices in COP negotiations by applying a multidimensional justice theory. Kortetmäki (2016, p.322) utilizes what she calls a "broad" view of justice as the multidimensional theory by using Nancy Fraser's framework on justice which consists of three intertwined dimensions of justice, namely distribution, recognition and representation. Two dimensions of "broad" justice are applied in Kortetmäki's research, that is representation and recognition, to explore how the "broad" view of justice can help to understand the unfairness in the COP negotiations from 2013 and 2014 (ibid, p.321-322). Representation refers to the political aspects of participation in the negotiations and recognition is understood in terms of individuals' equal respect of social and cultural issues (ibid., p.322). Kortetmäki (2016, p.322) argues that distributional justice is insufficient to explain the injustices in climate negotiations and she further states that distributional injustices in the COP negotiations can be better understood if recognitional and representational justice is explored and understood in the negotiations.

Kortetmäki (2016, p.324) argues that one of the injustices in COP negotiations is that the participation in COP is mainly state-related and thus lacks the representation of other actors in society. The author also argues that the negotiations show signs of misrecognition, that is when cultural heritages and places are not acknowledged in climate negotiations (ibid., p.327). For instance, the COP negotiations did not address that communities that are at risk of losing their homes due to climate change, might be forced to migrate (ibid., p.327). The COP negotiations address distributional justice by providing economic support to the vulnerable communities, however, Kortetmäki argues that cultural heritage and places have "value that is incalculable in monetary terms" and thus becomes a form of misrecognition of the culture and places in

these communities (ibid., p.327). She specifically refers to indigenous communities' representation and recognition in climate negotiations and that their perspectives become disrespected and dominated by economic discussions of distributional justice (ibid., p.328). Women's representation and recognition is also discussed as they appear as invisible in the climate negotiations. As such, Kortetmäki states that empowering women in the negotiations is crucial from a representational perspective of increasing their inclusion, and from a recognitional justice perspective enhancing their "capacities and culture that make the inclusion effective" (ibid., p.330).

Kortetmäki (2016, p.331-332) finds that all dimensions of "broad" justice are important to address the injustices in COP negotiations, where she especially emphasizes representation and recognition justice as crucial to tackle the injustices of participation of all and the social and cultural challenges that climate change entails.

2.3.3. The EUs climate strategies and global political justice theory

Franziskus von Lucke, Thomas Diez, Solveig Aamodt and Bettina Ahrens wrote a book in 2021 called *The EU and Global Climate Justice – Normative Power Caught in Normative Battles*. They are part of the research project called GLOBUS that critically examines the EUs contribution to global justice (ARENA Center for European Studies University of Oslo, n.d.). In the same year 2021, one of the researchers, Franziskus von Lucke published a research article called *Principled pragmatism in climate policy? The EU and changing practices of climate justice* (2021) which analyzes EUs contribution to climate justice by exploring EUs climate strategy over time, and it also analyzes the extent to which the EU has influenced international climate change negotiations towards a just approach. The same analysis is conducted in Von Lucke et al. (2021) however they elaborate on certain elements related to global climate justice such as climate change security and the link to justice and analyzing the perspectives of non-EU actors of EUs justice approach to the global climate regime (ibid, p.33, 55-73, 74-93).

Both Von Lucke (2021) and Von Lucke et al. (2021) utilize Erik O. Eriksen's (2016) global political justice theory which is based on the three conceptions of justice: non-dominance, impartiality and mutual recognition. Importantly, the global political justice theory is developed by Eriksen (2016) through an EU funded Horizon 2020 research project called GLOBUS (Eriksen, 2016). Von Lucke et al. (2021, p.2) describe the theoretical concepts where non-domination in short refers to protecting the sovereignty of states, impartiality is referred to global rights of all such as states and individuals, and mutual recognition is described as the

justice of different social actors through inclusion in decision-makings and the recognition of different voices and interests. The theory is utilized to explore EUs influence on international climate negotiations over time by looking at 56 EU documents through qualitative content analysis in Von Lucke et al.'s (2021, p.33) work and through a discourse analysis in Von Lucke's (2021, p.3) work from 1988 until 2019. In addition, the authors performed 15 (14 interviews were stated in Von Lucke (2021)) semi-standardized expert interviews with EU officials and representatives from NGOs and think tanks (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.33).

Exploring EUs role in international climate negotiations, the authors mainly look at the procedural aspects of justice in their research, to understand the political negotiations of actors involved, the unequal distribution of power and the diversity of different political contexts in which various identities emerge (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.16). However, they emphasize that substantive justice, such as the distributional justice concerns of climate justice for distributing climate responsibilities, was also focused on as it overlaps with principles discussed in the existing debate on climate justice (ibid, p.118; Von Lucke, 2021, p.2).

Von Lucke (2021) and Von Lucke et al. (2021) found that the EUs climate change strategy on international negotiations from 1988 until 2019 have been influenced by justice as impartiality, non-domination and mutual recognition, however to different degrees. The authors present that there has been a gradual decrease in arguments connected to justice as impartiality but an increase in arguments linked to non-dominance and mutual recognition (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.33; Von Lucke, 2021, p.4). Their data also shows that justice as impartiality is the most prominent justice perspective over time in EUs climate change strategies in international negotiations (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.33; Von Lucke, 2021, p.4). The authors illustrate impartiality was strongly favored by the EU up until the Paris Agreement in 2015 by focusing on binding agreements, multilateralism and scientific consensus in shaping the international order, especially in the UNFCCC and negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.53, 118-119; Von Lucke, 2021, p.6). However, the failure of COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009 showed that the impartial approach did not work and as the EU wanted to maintain its international influence in the international climate regime, it changed its approach to incorporating different points of views, which the authors classify as justice as mutual recognition and procedural aspects of justice appeared (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.48).

After 2015, more focus was put on justice as mutual recognition and non-domination in terms of listening to the most affected by climate change, recognizing non-state actors in negotiations

and agreements, recognizing the difference between the Global South and Global North in terms of responsibilities and capabilities, and the role of the state in national contributions to tackle climate change (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.53-54, 118-119; Von Lucke, 2021, p.6). Regarding mutual recognition, Von Lucke et al (2021, p.123) argue that the voices of non-state actors such as NGOs in international climate change negotiations are limited in terms of their participation and influence, while states are the main actors in the climate regime. To strengthen mutual recognition, the authors claim that reforms of the negotiation procedures is necessary to incorporate the voices and participation of non-state actors (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.123).

In terms of non-domination, the authors present that the EU support developing countries and LDCs in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) by recognizing the needs of others (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.48-49; Von Lucke, 2021, p.7). It is further elaborated on NDCs and their connection to justice as non-domination as NDCs are state initiated, voluntary contributions which do not undermine the sovereignty of states (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.48). NDCs are bottom-up commitments in terms of the states themselves determining their commitments to tackle climate change in which the civil society are allowed to review the NDCs which in this case points towards justice as mutual recognition as of integrating other perspectives than states (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.48; Von Lucke, 2021, p.7). However, as the perspectives from non-state actors such as indigenous groups, minorities and other vulnerable groups in society are not integrated in the NDCs, the NDCs point more towards justice as non-domination (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.50; Von Lucke, 2021, p.7). From this example, the authors demonstrate that elements of justice in this case mutual recognition and non-domination can be evident in the same climate change commitments, such as NDCs.

Von Lucke et al. (2021, p.59) discuss the relationship between climate change, security and justice in which they analyze the securitization of climate change from the perspectives of impartiality, non-domination and mutual recognition. They elaborate on how securitizing moves from the EU can imply specific perspectives of justice, that is, whose justice is defined (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.59). Consequently, the authors conclude that the securitization debate in the late 1990s and early 2000s was characterized by justice as impartiality as the EU articulated climate change concerns for all humanity, whereas after the early 2000s, the focus shifted to the effects of climate change on vulnerable populations, connecting more to justice as non-domination and mutual recognition (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.72-73). Hence, the

securitization debate in relation to climate change and justice further explore the development of EUs climate change strategies over the years in international settings.

In their concluding segments, Von Lucke et al. (2021) and Von Lucke (2021) argue that the arguments linked to justice as impartiality remain in EUs climate change strategies while arguments linked to mutual recognition and non-dominance gain greater importance, however to a lesser extent compared to justice as impartiality (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.119; Von Lucke, 2021, p.8). In the book, the authors discuss why it is so that arguments linked to justice as impartiality remain high while for instance non-dominance is significantly less evident. That is because promoting statist approaches to climate change negotiations would undermine the existence of the EU which is built on international institutions and it would also erode the world order of international law which the EU attempts to create (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.119). By including more non-domination arguments in EUs climate change policies would weaken the very idea in which the EU is built upon (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.119). As such, justice as impartiality is the core of the EU by promoting international institutions, top-down binding agreements and the multilateral approach to tackle climate change.

2.4. The position of this thesis in previous research

As demonstrated, some scholars have started to explore climate justice between developed countries and LDCs. Specifically, Von Lucke et al. (2021) and Von Lucke (2021) have used the global political justice theory in their research to identify the fairness of EUs climate strategies at large and what the EU has contributed with to the global climate regime. Other research shows that LDCs strive for procedural and distributional justice in climate negotiations, however, there is a research gap in identifying whether and how the EU is fair towards LDCs in climate adaptation. As such, this thesis fills a research gap by using the global political justice theory to explore the fairness in EUs external climate adaptation policies towards the group of LDCs. As such, this thesis contributes to broaden the research scope on climate justice by introducing a theory that considers multiple aspects of climate justice. The thesis also adds to existing research on climate justice by demonstrating what climate justice can look like in the world of policies.

3. Theoretical Framework

This chapter includes a discussion on procedural and distributional justice in relation to global political justice. Then, the theory of global political justice is put in a context of climate justice and how the theory is intended to be used to answer the aim and research question. Lastly, the theory is explained and how it results in an analytical scheme useful for identifying whether and how the EU is fair vis-à-vis LDCs in climate adaptation.

3.1. What is justice and global political justice?

Justice is a widely accepted topic for political philosophical theory in which political theorists have elaborated on the concept from different points of view (Rawls 1999; Walzer 1983). However, until this day, there is no consensus on a definition of *justice* and the conceptualization differs depending on the context and the perceiver's perception of the world (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.91; Eriksen, 2016, p.2; Brown, 1997, p.273). Rawls (1999) talks about two principles of justice. The first principle concerns that all people have the same rights to a system of fundamental freedoms such as the political freedom to expression, thought and to vote (ibid, p.76-77). The second principle concerns to address social and economic inequalities in societies to every individual's benefit and positions of power must be available to everyone to allocate responsibility (ibid, p.76-77). Thus, the second principle of a just society that Rawls (1999) proposes, addresses distributional justice between individuals. Importantly, the distribution of wealth and incomes do not necessarily aspire to be equal, however, the distributional justice must be fair in terms of proving to be beneficial for all. Additionally, Rawls (1999, p.78) states that the second principle of the distribution of income and wealth, and power, must be consistent with the ideas in the first principle of fundamental rights and the equality of possibilities to all individuals.

The political philosopher Walzer (1983) complements Rawls (1999) ideas of distributive justice. Walzer (1983) distinguishes between simple and complex equality of distributive justice. With simple equality, Walzer (1983, p.18) refers to the equal exchange of social goods in society between individuals, such as when one individual has one pen and another individual also has one pen, then equality is achieved between the two individuals. Complex equality is explained in terms of equality through social goods in different spheres of society. For instance, equality is when a person enjoying a social good in one sphere, for instance an individual being elected as a local government representative and thus hinders other individuals for claiming that political role, however, does not hinder the other individuals who did not become elected as local government representative to claim social goods in other spheres of society, such as

obtaining medical care (ibid, p.19). Hence, complex equality is similar to Rawls (1971) arguments for the second principle of distributive justice in terms of the distribution of income and wealth does not necessarily to be equal, but beneficial for all.

Fraser (1996, p.3) also discusses distributional justice in terms of emphasizing the need for redistribution in society to achieve justice, that is to justly distribute goods and resources between individuals, but also between the Global North and Global South. Fraser (1996, p.5) explains that the redistributive aspect of justice is insufficient in exploring justice. She states that distribution is increasingly complemented by “the politics of recognition” (ibid, p.3) which seeks to identify and recognize differences between individuals and communities, in terms of gender, ethnicity, race and minorities (ibid, p.3). As such, social justice encompasses not only justice as redistribution of goods and resources in society but also recognition of all people (ibid, p.4). Fraser (1996, p.26) lifts a third concept of justice which she refers to as “parity of participation”, and it includes social interactions in society that allow for all to participate in interactions. By uniting the three perspectives to justice, Fraser argues that only then we can “meet the requirement of justice for all” (ibid, p.67).

Global political justice is inspired by discussions of justice in the past, by illustrating some of the fundamental principles to justice perceived by great political thinkers of our time. In a globalized world, states are increasingly dependent of each other (Brown, 2008, p.626). Thus, the relationship between the domestic and international politics is strong (Caney, 2005, p.10). Brown (1997, p.291) argues that many theorists of justice view the world as the principles of justice are not limited to one territorial state but rather transcends national borders into the cosmopolitan sphere of justice. Cosmopolitans thus attempt to see what is good in life, being open-minded and learning from other cultures and traditions than the culture and traditions adopted within the state (Caney, 2005, p.6). Global justice therefore emphasizes to treat all individuals with equal respect irrespective of national belonging (Brown, 2008, p.627).

Simon Caney (2005, p.5) illustrates an interesting view on cosmopolitanism by highlighting thoughts from the theorists and philosophers Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. Beitz and Pogge distinguish between “moral” and “institutional”/ “legal” cosmopolitanism (Caney, 2005, p.5). The “moral” cosmopolitanism are the core features of cosmopolitanism, which is the worth of individuals, equality of all, and obligations that are binding to all (ibid., p.4). The “moral” cosmopolitanism is completed with “institutional” cosmopolitanism and recognizes the existence of global political institutions (ibid, p.5). The EU is an example of an institution

which adopts cosmopolitan principles of justice by creating common values and laws within the union which are also globally promoted (Eriksen, 2016, p.2). Caney (2005, p.5) argues that the distinction between the two doctrines of “moral” and “institutional” cosmopolitanism is crucial. This is because all cosmopolitans agree with “moral” cosmopolitanism of equality for all, the worth of individuals and that everyone has duties, and they are binding to all. However, the “institutional” cosmopolitanism of global political institutions is critiqued by some cosmopolitans. Concluding, global political justice acknowledges other agents than states and seeks to define justice between individuals, political institutions and supranational institutions such as the EU (Brown, 2008, p.632; Caney, 2005, p.3). Global political justice explores relationships beyond the state, which is further discussed below.

3.2. Climate justice as global political justice theory

As the EU strives to be a global leader for tackling climate change (European Commission, 2019, p.3, 20), the EU contributes to complex new forms of power through its external policies of climate adaptation. These external development policies transcend national borders and populations in LDCs become affected by EUs external climate adaptation policies.

Global political justice theory concerns how to fairly manage power and conflict in a political structure (Macdonald and Ronzoni, 2012, p.521). Consequently, power between and among states, between individuals and other non-state actors can result in different levels of dominance, which means that certain actors exert arbitrary power over others. A global political justice theory based on the concepts of justice as non-domination, impartiality and mutual recognition is useful in identifying fairness between and among actors. The global political justice theory of justice as non-domination, impartiality and mutual recognition is developed by Erik O. Eriksen (2016) in a context assessing EUs external policies. The theory is a collection of different perspectives of justices in which Eriksen (2016) has concretized and termed through the concepts of non-domination, impartiality and mutual recognition. Thus, the theory is utilized to explore whether and how justice is framed in EUs external climate adaptation policies. Importantly, the opposites of non-dominance, impartiality and mutual recognition are also taken into consideration in the analysis of the fairness of EUs climate adaptation policies. The opposites (domination, partiality and nonrecognition) are not the main focus in Eriksen’s (2016) theory, however domination, partiality and nonrecognition are developed in this thesis and included in the theoretical framework to explore whether and how the EU is fair towards LDCs in climate adaptation. The opposites provide a critical perspective

to explore the fairness towards LDCs in climate adaptation. In that sense, Eriksen's theory has been further developed to fit the research in this thesis.

The threefold conception of justice is advantageous in the sense that justice is not defined from a single conception, but the theory rather identifies different and important concerns of justice (Eriksen, 2016, p.4). The theory relates to climate justice approaches such as distributional justice and procedural justice. Justice as non-domination, impartiality and mutual recognition provide different perspectives of climate justice in EUs external climate adaptation policies vis-à-vis LDCs. In that sense, the three perspectives of justice can be seen as complementary to each other as it covers a broad justice perspective in the light of climate justice.

3.2.1. Non-domination and domination in the light of climate justice

The first concept in the global political justice theory concerns justice as non-domination, which focuses on citizens' freedom, the freedom from dominance and freedom from arbitrary interference (Eriksen, 2016, p.8). Domination is when a person lacks freedom where someone else interferes arbitrarily in his/her life choices without considering his/her legitimate interests (ibid, p.8). Domination can occur in situations that lack procedures of justification or participation, and thus is a matter of intrusion and disrespects sovereignty and individual interests (ibid, p.8). Non-domination is thus the extent to which individuals are protected from interventions (ibid, p.9). As such, non-domination deals with the power of individuals and non-state actors, but also the power of states. Therefore, states can be the dominating agent towards individuals, non-state actors and other states (ibid, p.9). In this way, for states and its institutions, non-domination and non-interference are crucial political values that should be highly prioritized to achieve a just, free, democratic society (ibid, p.9). Importantly, states can also be subjected to the power of other states, but also of international bodies (ibid, p.10). However, international bodies can be instruments to foster critical dialogues and discussions between states and they can be a forum for establishing a global order which address a universal understanding of states' sovereignty and how to tackle global challenges such as climate change (ibid, p.10). Despite the importance of international bodies to foster dialogues between states, justice as non-domination recognizes that justice within states is more strongly emphasized than justice beyond states' borders (ibid, p.11).

Furthermore, Eriksen (2016) shortly illustrates EUs foreign policy in line with justice as non-domination. The EU foreign policy would intend to do no harm to other states and individuals, and the EU would support other states and individuals from a beneficiary duty perspective (ibid, p.12). In addition, the EU would be criticizing the act of interference in other states',

discriminating their sovereignty and autonomy (ibid, p.12). As such, the EU would seek fair terms of cooperation with states outside of the EU (ibid, p.12). Providing this context of EUs external policy, justice as non-domination can be illustrated through distributional justice in terms of the fair distribution of resources and responsibilities between and among states but also individuals in which states and individuals maintain their freedom and sovereignty. Additionally, justice as non-domination can also be connected to procedural justice in which actors participate equally in negotiations. Non-domination also highlights to maintain the sovereignty of states and ensure fair terms of cooperation with states, which relate to procedural justice.

According to Von Lucke et al. (2021, p.17), justice as non-domination in a climate change context primarily refers to the rights of states in international affairs where states can both cause and work against injustices. Values of non-domination can strengthen the support for the international norms of sovereignty and non-interference in other states' national affairs (ibid, p.18). Justice as non-domination assesses the uneven distribution of power among states, and between states and non-state actors such as individuals and the civil society (ibid, p.20). Political instruments are used to balance the domination in the society, to respect the sovereignty and interests of states and introducing measures that increase the capabilities of weaker states (ibid, p.22). To reduce the domination among and between states and non-state actors, non-binding and voluntary agreements are favored, that allow individual states to define their own climate commitments and ambitions (ibid, p.22).

Understanding Eriksen's (2016) justice as non-domination and Von Lucke et al. (2021) application in a climate change context, it is important to relate the elements of non-domination and domination that Eriksen (2016) conceptualizes to indicators of non-dominance and dominance to identify non-domination and domination in the material. The indicators are inspired by Von Lucke et al. (2021), however the indicators for non-domination and domination are developed in this thesis to explore climate adaptation in LDCs. Relating to national sovereignty, freedom from interference and respect of national interests and ambitions, indicators are developed such as the states' individual autonomy in terms of NDCs and NAPs. NDCs are decided in the Paris Agreement in which all states communicate actions for lowering emissions but also for climate adaptation (United Nations, n.d. c) They are non-binding and voluntary. Another element concerns the importance of international bodies, such as the EU to foster deliberation and dialogues, and this is expressed in indicators through the EU strengthens LDCs through state coalitions and promoting an equal say and participation in negotiations.

Relating the elements of domination to indicators, the rule without justifications, interventions and the disrespect of national interests and sovereignty are connected to indicators expressed as the EU controls LDCs national affairs, no recognition of the importance of participation or deliberation with LDCs and non-state actors in negotiations. The last two indicators can also be linked to the element of lacking participation in negotiations. For a coherent view of elements and indicators, see Table 3 below.

3.2.2. Impartiality and partiality in the light of climate justice

In Eriksen's view (2016, p.13), impartiality calls for the value of equality. It refers to justice as an agreement that is accepted by all points of view and the decision-makers of the agreement are rational people who do not take the agreement into their own advantages (ibid, p.13). This view of justice as impartiality relates well to Rawls (1999, p.187) idea of impartiality in which decisions have been taken based on putting one's own interests and values aside while being open to other perspectives, to create a just outcome for all. Partiality relates to dominance which is when agreements are based on one's own interests and values, and when interferences in other peoples' freedom promote one's own freedom (Eriksen, 2016, p.14). Without authorities or public institutions that act on laws, individuals' freedom relies on arbitrariness from a private judgement, in which dominance might occur. This means that individuals are "subjected to arbitrary decisions rather than legal norms reflecting the idea of equal freedom" (ibid, p.15). According to Eriksen (2016, p.14), justice as impartiality thus considers everyone's universal right to freedom in which interferences in other's freedom is only accepted if it secures independence and freedom of all interacting parties (ibid, p.14). Therefore, impartiality views justice as embracing authorities and institutions that respect individuals' freedom by considering different interests, values and norms (ibid, p.14).

Furthermore, in a globalized world, the global context of cooperation in terms of migration, trade and climate change develop justice relations between states as the interactions are intense and affect individuals' autonomy (Eriksen, 2016, p.16). In that case, globalization creates justice relations in a global setting in which the beneficiaries' obligations generate specific duties to perform on a global level (ibid, p.16). Therefore, distributive justice is not only applicable nationally but also in the global context where social and economic cooperation between states and regions involve obligations and duties between states (ibid, p.16). Relating to climate justice aspects, justice as impartiality can be illustrated through distributive justice in terms of allocating resources, rights and responsibilities between states but also individuals.

Procedural justice considers which actors participate in the decision-makings in international negotiations and agreements.

Eriksen (2016) describes how the EU foreign policies would look like in line with justice as impartiality. A foreign policy under the perspective of impartiality would mean to comply an international order characterized by the cosmopolitan law of all individuals that have the same human rights and obligations. The foreign policies would promote supranational institutions in which global duties are enforced by global institutions and its implementing agencies can allocate competences, responsibilities and resources under cosmopolitan law. As such, the EU foreign policy would secure fair terms of cooperation between actors in which institutions have the responsibilities to advocate for universal human rights in political, economic and social aspects, and support humanitarian interventions necessary to uphold these rights. (Eriksen, 2016, p.16).

Von Lucke et al. (2021, p. 23) put impartiality in relation to climate change. Justice as impartiality considers the universal fundamental human rights values transcending national borders to create a cosmopolitan society of individuals with equal rights (ibid, p.18). The focus is not only on the global injustices of states, but also of individuals that suffer from economic challenges, poor living conditions and political standing that are vulnerable to climate change (ibid, p.23). Therefore, from the perspective of impartiality, addressing and taking action on human needs and their security is of utmost importance to fight injustices (ibid, p.24). It is further emphasized to create a “solidarist” international society in which states bear responsibilities beyond their own borders (ibid, p.24). Multilateral negotiations are favored and supranational solutions to issues of climate change are worked for based on scientific consensus on climate change challenges and solutions (ibid, p.24). Von Lucke et al. (2021, p.24) argue that the perspective of justice as impartiality favors legally binding agreements that are determined top-down, and the agreements include measures intended for sanctioning states and/or individuals who break the agreement or negotiation.

The elements of impartiality and partiality addressed by Eriksen (2016) are put in relation to indicators to locate justice as impartiality and possibly injustice as partiality in the material. The indicators are inspired by Von Lucke et al. (2021) climate change application, however, in this thesis, the indicators are specified to climate adaptation and LDCs. As the elements of impartiality concern equal rights and liberties, recognizing different interests, values and norms, and the obligations and duties of the beneficiary to perform on the global arena,

indicators developed to match the elements are the equal rules and rights for all and recognizing human security to individuals in LDCs, such as the security to live in a safe livelihood in adapting to climate change. Other indicators that connect to the elements are the existence of universal solutions/principles such as the principles of distributional justice (the PPP, BPP and APP) and the Adaptation Fund which is a universal solution in terms of financially supporting all LDCs, despite their different adaptation challenges. Other elements include to promote an international order and implementing a solidarist international society where states take responsibilities across borders. Hence, indicators that match these elements are the emphasis on international climate adaptation governance such as the Paris Agreement, and to strengthen multilateralism between the EU and LDCs. Finally, the elements of partiality addressing different ideas of human rights and no equal human rights and liberties, are illustrated in indicators such as the emphasis on neglecting international governance in climate adaptation and dismissing the consensus on universal human rights for all, including LDCs. For a coherent view of elements and indicators, see Table 3 below.

3.2.3. Mutual recognition and nonrecognition in the light of climate justice

Justice as mutual recognition refers to extending human rights beyond borders and the prerequisites for rights to function is that individuals respect their own rights and use them in a responsible way (Eriksen, 2016, p.20). As such, injustices of individuals can arise from the ordinary life such as people's cultural stereotypes of other groups of people and individuals (ibid, p.19). The lack of recognition, which is the nonrecognition of individuals or groups of people, is when an institution fails to respect citizens as equals and not providing all individuals their right to be involved or participate in deliberations (ibid, p.19). Dominance over other individuals occur when certain individuals are overrepresented in a political setting, when different hierarchies in society determine which social groups gets to do what and when certain groups of people in society does not get the possibility to influence decision-makings that concern them (ibid, p.19). Therefore, justice as mutual recognition stresses the need for recognition and deliberation with all individuals as to give individuals a voice (ibid, p.19). Justice as mutual recognition stresses that justice is achieved only when all affected individuals are heard and thus participating in decision-makings and negotiations (ibid, p.19).

Eriksen (2016, p.20) puts justice as mutual recognition in relation to EUs foreign policies. Eriksen addresses that the EU would seek to ensure reciprocity in the establishment of cooperation between different social actors and to perform dialogues with affected parties (ibid, p.20). The dialogues with the affected individuals or groups are important for the EU to

determine what is the right or most fair in different contexts as all contexts and circumstances are unique (ibid, p.20). The EU would attempt to seek fair terms of cooperation in its foreign policy, to be just in the perspective of mutual recognition (ibid, p.20). As such, justice as mutual recognition illustrates the fair inclusion of affected parties and that the parties have access to democratic and political decision-making processes. Procedural justice is reflected in justice as mutual recognition as it highlights the fairness of decision-making processes, negotiations and other forms of democratic procedures. Distributional justice is also relevant in this conception of justice to allocate responsibilities between different actors regarding their respective capabilities, due to actors' different contexts, voices and identities.

Von Lucke et al. (2021, p.19-20 and 25-28) address justice as mutual recognition in relation to climate change. Von Lucke et al. (2021, p.25) stress that justice as mutual recognition is the recognition of differences in terms of raising awareness of “different voices, identities and contexts” in the development of climate policies. Justice as mutual recognition also refers to detecting injustice and misrecognition towards non-state actors such as civil society groups, indigenous peoples and other minorities (ibid, p.26). States or individuals are thus not the primary concern of justice as there is an emphasis on the involvement of affected actors by climate change in deliberations and climate change negotiations (ibid, p.25). Justice as mutual recognition thus stresses that all relevant actors' voices are heard in climate change negotiations.

By illustrating Eriksen's (2016) elements of justice as mutual recognition and nonrecognition and Von Lucke et al. (2021) application of mutual recognition in a climate change context, the elements of mutual recognition and nonrecognition are put in relation to indicators to connect the policy documents to the theory. Von Lucke et al.'s (2021) application of mutual recognition in a climate change context has inspired this thesis' indicators of climate adaptation in LDCs. Von Lucke et al. (2021, p.29,34) distinguish between two types of mutual recognition in a “weak” and “strong” variant. “Weak” mutual recognition focuses on differences between the Global North and Global South in terms of different voices, identities and/or contexts, whereas the focus is still on recognizing the importance of local levels by listening to others such as non-state actors (ibid, p.34). The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) is relevant and argues that all UN Member States have responsibilities in addressing environmental and climate issues, however, acknowledging that Member States have different capabilities and abilities to tackle the issues (UNFCCC, 1992, p.2). LDCs voices, identities and contexts reveal their respective capabilities in adapting to climate change, LDCs also have

different responsibilities than the EU in adapting to climate change. Thus, LDCs and the EU have common but different responsibilities in adapting to climate change.

“Strong” mutual recognition refers to that affected parties of climate change negotiations participate in decision-makings and negotiations, with a particular focus on including non-state actors (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.29). The “weak” and “strong” indicators of mutual recognition expressed by Von Lucke et al. (2021) inspired this thesis’ mutual recognition indicators and it is illustrated in the analytical scheme below. The “weak” mutual recognition application from Von Lucke et al. (2021) remains in this thesis but addressed in a climate adaptation context to LDCs. However, the “strong” mutual recognition perspective slightly changes to *recognizing the importance* of the involvement and participation of affected parties in decision-makings and negotiations. This is because of the sampled material does not focus on affected actors’ participation in creating the EU policies on climate adaptation, the focus is on recognizing the importance of non-state actors’ participation and deliberation in climate adaptation decision-makings and negotiations. The indicators of nonrecognition include to ignore differences between the EU and LDCs in climate adaptation, ignore affected actors in climate adaptation and also the lack of recognizing participation of non-state actors in negotiations. These indicators of nonrecognition relate to elements from nonrecognition by ignoring the differences between individuals and countries, and the lack of highlighting the importance of participation and influence in decision-makings.

3.2.4. Analytical scheme

For any research, it is important to have an operationalization method that measures what is intended to be measured stated in the aim and research question (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p.56). This concept is often related to another concept in research which is validity, and concerns that the research measures, identifies or observes what it is stated to measure (Mason, 2018, p.35). In the case of this thesis, the aim is to explore whether and how the EUs external climate adaptation policies towards LDCs are fair with the help from the global political justice theory. To measure fairness, the theory of global political justice is operationalized into an analytical framework. The global political justice theory can explain how justice is framed in climate adaptation policies through the three conceptions of justice: non-domination, impartiality and mutual recognition. Its opposites namely domination, partiality and nonrecognition, are added to the analytical scheme to provide a critical perspective to the EUs fairness towards LDCs in climate adaptation.

The analytical scheme is my own compilation however, it is inspired by Eriksen (2016) and Von Lucke et al. (2021). The analytical framework illustrates all three conceptions of justice and its opposites. The columns of “elements” refer to elements from each justice and injustice conception and the elements are short words or expressions that summarizes the conceptions of justice and its opposites, based on Eriksen’s (2016) illustrations of each conception of justice and its opposites. The columns of “indicators” refer to the elements of each conception of justice and its opposites but applied in a context of climate adaptation and LDCs. The indicators are inspired by Von Lucke et al. (2021, p.29) climate change context, however the indicators in this thesis are developed to specifically relate to climate adaptation and in relation to LDCs. The indicators aim to guide the selected material in order to classify the material as non-dominance, impartiality and/or mutual recognition and their opposites.

Table 3. Analytical scheme on climate justice in EUs external climate adaptation policies.

	Elements	Indicators
Non-dominance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - States maintain their sovereignty - Freedom from arbitrary interference - Respect of national and individual interests and ambitions - Importance of international bodies to foster deliberation and dialogues. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Individual autonomy (National Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), - Non-binding/voluntary solutions and agreements - The EU strengthens LDCs through bilateral/state coalitions - Equal say and participation of LDCs in climate adaptation agreements/negotiations.
Dominance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rule without justifications - State and individual harmful interventions - Disrespect of state and individual interests and sovereignty - Lack procedures of participation in agreements and negotiations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EU controls LDCs national affairs of climate adaptation - No recognition of importance of participation of LDCs in negotiations and agreements - No recognition of importance of deliberation with LDCs and non-state actors in climate adaptation negotiations.
	Elements	Indicators
Impartiality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cosmopolitanism (individuals’ equal basic rights and liberties) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Equal rules and rights for all individuals (human security for individuals in LDCs)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Different interests, values and norms are served = freedom - Obligations and duties of the beneficiary - Promoting an international order (authorities creating fair cooperation) - Solidarist international society (responsibilities and actions across borders) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Universal solutions/principles to climate adaptation challenges (the Adaptation Fund, PPP, BPP and APP) - International climate adaptation governance (Paris Agreement) - Strengthen multilateralism.
Partiality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Different conceptions of human rights and obligations - No universal human rights and liberties. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - International governance is neglected - No universal consensus on human rights and liberties.
	Elements	Indicators
Mutual recognition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recognizing differences of voices, identities and contexts (uniqueness) - Recognizing importance of deliberation and participation of relevant actors of society (especially non-state actors) in decision-makings - Respecting the rights of others. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Weak MR: Recognizing differences (between the EU and LDCs) (CBDR) - Weak MR: Recognizing importance of local levels in LDCs: strengthening non-state actors' communication and knowledge on climate adaptation - Strong MR: Recognizing participation, involvement and dialogues on climate adaptation with affected parties, such as women, youth and indigenous groups in LDCs.
Nonrecognition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fails in recognizing individuals, communities and groups' uniqueness - Ignorance of the importance of deliberation with affected actors in negotiations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not recognizing differences between the EU and LDCs - Ignorance of affected actors in LDCs in climate adaptation - No recognition of participation and/or involvement of non-state actors.

Importantly, the world is not just black or white, there are grey zones and that is the case of the theoretical framework. The different concepts of justice sometimes overlap or intertwine and

as such, it can be difficult to categorize the empirical material into the different concepts of justice. To shortly demonstrate how the concepts of justice can sometimes be illustrated at the same time in a statement, an example is provided from the empirical analysis below. For instance, the European Commission (2021b, p.18) states that dialogues are important means to increase the cooperation on climate adaptation and to understand climate adaptation challenges in third countries (such as LDCs). This statement is classified as justice as non-domination because dialogues are mentioned as a means to cooperate with LDCs, thus allows for hearing LDCs voices in climate adaptation challenges. The national autonomy is not threatened if the EU is open to listen to LDCs about their needs and challenges through dialogues. However, the statement can also be seen as justice as impartiality as cooperation, which is multilateralism, can mean that different interests and values are served, but also that the EU adopts a “solidarist” approach to the international society as cooperation means to take actions beyond borders.

4. Research design and method

This chapter discusses the methodology of the thesis. First, the research design of case study is introduced, followed by a subchapter about the method which is qualitative content analysis. The final subchapter involves a description of the sampling strategy and the empirical material.

4.1. Research design

Qualitative research often emphasizes the analysis of words rather than the quantification of collecting and analyzing data (Bryman, 2011, p.340). A common research design for qualitative methods is case study which concerns the holistic study of one or several cases. This thesis applies a case study research design to the case of EUs fairness towards LDCs in climate adaptation. The goal with a cases study is to collect great amount of data about the case and thus to perform an in-depth analysis on the case study (Ylikoski and Zahle, 2019, p.1). As such, case study research enables the researcher to thoroughly analyze a single case and thus to holistically understand the research problem (Mason, 2018, p.209). EUs fairness towards LDCs in climate adaptation is approached from three different justice perspectives, including its opposites, which allows for a holistic investigation on the phenomenon. Despite that case studies are common within academia/social sciences, case studies have some disadvantages as any other research design approach has. One disadvantage is that the generalizability is often low, as it is difficult to generalize the results because the results can be specific to the particular case and thus not be able to make a wider claim based on the results (Mason, 2018, p.35). Consequently, this thesis experiences some generalizability challenges however, as Yin (2014, p.21) proposes, case studies can be generalized to the theory utilized in the research and not to populations, countries or universes studied. Hence, the theory of global political justice theory can be applicable in other cases to explore justice.

4.2. Method

The research method for this thesis is a qualitative content analysis. Qualitative content analysis is the analysis of texts in its parts, entirety and context (Esaïasson et al., 2012, p.210). Bryman (2011, p.505-506) explains that a qualitative content analysis often includes certain steps that identify the research method which this thesis follows. Firstly, a research problem must be identified to understand what shall be researched (ibid, p.505). In this thesis, the research problem is due to political power structures and different capabilities and responsibilities, it is interesting to investigate whether and how the EU is fair towards LDCs in climate adaptation. In the next step, the researcher must identify which text documents to analyze and identify the contexts of these documents (ibid, p.506). Based on strategic sampling strategies, certain

documents have been chosen and this is described below in 4.3 “Sampling strategy and empirical material”.

The next step of a qualitative content analysis according to Bryman (2011, p.506), is to generate categories and underlying themes to the categories, which acts as the analytical scheme for the research. Interestingly, quantitative content analysis often have categories and themes pre-defined before data analysis, however, this can also be the case in a qualitative content analysis but with the possibility of identifying new themes during the analysis (ibid, p.506). Thus, it is important in a qualitative content analysis to be open to new potential themes which can be identified from the text material. As this thesis’ analytical scheme, categories are named “elements” and constitute justice as non-dominance, impartiality and mutual recognition and their opposites, and themes to the categories have been identified which are called “indicators” in this thesis as demonstrated in the analytical scheme above. The elements and indicators are pre-defined in the thesis before conducting the analysis of the results.

Lastly, the analytical scheme is applied to the documents to process and generate data (Bryman, 2011, p.506) and indicators act as guidelines to find relevant data in the documents to relate back to the research question. It is important, especially in qualitative research, to apply an interpretivist lens to the text material to make sense of the analytical scheme in the documents. In a discussion of the research method’s reliability, that is how to ensure the accuracy of the research (Mason, 2018, p.35), this research applies to the established method of qualitative content analysis and follows the steps taken to conduct a qualitative content analysis. In this sense, the analysis of the material through the analytical scheme provides this thesis with reliable processes of analysis.

Importantly, to further maintain a high reliability in the thesis, it is crucial to be transparent. In this regard, the section of results and analysis include some citations from the material which are interpreted according to the analytical scheme. Therefore, by including citations from the material, the research is transparent which increases the thesis’ reliability. Regarding the transparency in the analysis, when the EU policies state “partner countries”, “vulnerable countries”, “the most vulnerable”, “developing” and/or “developing countries”, that equals with LDCs in this thesis to provide an inclusive and truthful picture of the justice in EUs climate adaptation policies towards LDCs. Many partner countries to the EU are Member States in the OACPS which constitute 79 Member States (OACPS, n.d.) and out of the 79 Member States, 38 Member States are also characterized as LDCs, which can be seen in Appendix Table 2.

Finally, in qualitative research it is crucial to be objective to produce a reliable analysis and conclusions. However, it is important to be aware of the reflexivity in qualitative research, that is the position of the researcher and how interactions with the research field and material are reflected by her own values (Vromen, 2018, p.245). In that sense, background knowledge and values of the researcher might influence interpretations made throughout the thesis.

In previous research on climate justice in EU strategies in which Von Lucke et al. (2021) present, qualitative content analysis of 56 EU strategies and interviews are used in Von Lucke et al. (2021) to find out the frequency of impartiality, non-dominance and mutual recognition in selected EU strategies of climate change. Von Lucke et al. (2021) analyze EU climate strategies which generated interesting results and because this thesis also analyzes EU documents, however with a specific focus on climate adaptation towards LDCs, a qualitative content analysis can generate interesting results too. Additionally, as qualitative content analysis analyzes relatively small amounts of text material in-depth (Krippendorff, 2013, p.23), it is thus suitable in this thesis to utilize qualitative content analysis as seven text documents are used to analyze the fairness in EUs external climate adaptation policies towards LDCs.

4.3. Sampling strategy and empirical material

For any research, it is crucial to have a sampling strategy which decides how and what data shall be collected. The sampling strategy for this thesis is a purposive sampling strategy in which the sampling process was based on non-randomization where the researcher chooses data in a strategic manner of carefully choosing data that is relevant for the research questions (Bryman, 2011, p.350). This type of sampling is connected to the goal of the research and consequently the units of analysis are chosen based on a criterion linked to the research questions and aim (Bryman, 2011, p.351). A type of purposive sampling is snowball sampling. This sampling process is often used in qualitative research and aims to choose relevant units of analysis which can be used to find other relevant units of analysis (Creswell, 2015, p.76-77). The purposive sampling strategy with the snowball sampling process are applicable in this research as the research aims to investigate primary source documents produced by political actors such as the EU (Vromen, 2018, p.249), namely EU climate adaptation policies in which LDCs are associated with. The data is very specific and narrow as climate adaptation is a subcategory or a field within climate change, thus the sampling has proved to be restricted to a limited set of data available.

When limiting the set of data to EU policy documents associated with LDCs and climate adaptation, the next step of the purposive sampling strategy was to find the policy documents.

The EU Commission homepage was useful as a first step to find data on EU climate adaptation connected to LDCs. The commission's page called "Climate Action" was relevant in this case as it provided links to strategies, targets and international cooperation all related to climate change and some parts were specifically related to climate adaptation. Documents concerning the action of climate change were overviewed to look for search words such as international cooperation, climate adaptation and least developed countries (LDCs). These search words became the criteria for the purposive sampling whether the documents were relevant or not.

When searching for relevant documents according to the thesis' aim and research questions, the process of snowball sampling was applied as one European Commission webpage led to another webpage where relevant material according to the search criteria could be useful. On some European Commission webpages, there were sections called "Related Links" which were useful to find other relevant documents on climate adaptation related to LDCs. Further, on the European Commission's homepage there is a tab called "Aid, Development cooperation and fundamental rights" and on that page there is a tab called "International Partnerships" which led to a webpage that explained EUs development policy in which further information about the relationship between the EU and OACPS was found. A relevant bilateral agreement according to the search criteria of purposive sampling was found on this webpage which will be further described below.

Throughout the data collection process, the data found was often very minimal in the sense that only few paragraphs were only relevant in the documents, according to the search criteria of the purposive sampling strategy. In this regard, there was a need to find more data within the single case that is studied. Consequently, the webpages of the European Parliament were also investigated to look for resolutions relating to climate adaptation and LDCs. The documents found were resolutions for the annual Conference of the Parties (COP) held by the UNFCCC where global actors attend.

The sampling strategy and process led to the thesis' discussion on empirical data. The chosen empirical material for the study of the fairness in EUs external climate adaptation policies towards LDCs consists of seven text documents made by the EU bodies in which one document made bilaterally by the EU and the OACPS. The empirical material consists of EU documents from year 2016 to 2021. The reason for choosing documents from this five-year period is because the documents that fulfilled the search criteria of the purposive sampling strategy were found within this period of time and seven documents are suitable to perform an in-depth

analysis about in a master's dissertation. The EU policy documents in this thesis is a collective name of one strategy, several resolutions and one Partnership Agreement that put forward guiding political commitments. The strategy and resolutions are not legally binding however the Partnership Agreement is binding under international law only when national governments have approved the agreement nationally (The EU and the OACPS, 2021, p.1). Hence, the political strategy, resolutions and the Partnership Agreement are ideal documents for analysis of the fairness of climate adaptation towards LDCs as the documents reveal political commitments which guide EU activities of climate adaptation towards LDCs. Additionally, the empirical material consisting of EU external documents within the field of climate change are collected from EUs institutions. Importantly, the EU is a reliable source of information which in relevant instances, refer to scientific research on climate change and climate adaptation.

The political strategy analyzed is *the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change (2021)* (European Commission, 2021b). This strategy addresses political priorities for EU Member States, for the EU as a regional organization, and puts forward international and global priorities on climate change and specifically climate adaptation. Regarding the resolutions, the European Parliament has annually put forward resolutions for the COP meetings. Within the EU, resolutions are decisions that express political activities and commitments (European Council, 2020). The resolutions to COP meetings are the EUs political priorities and plans for tackling climate change. The resolutions for COP meetings that this thesis analyzes are from COP22 in 2016 (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2016/2814, 2016), COP23 in 2017 (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2017/2620, 2017), COP24 in 2018 (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2018/2598, 2018), COP25 in 2019 (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2019/2712, 2019) and COP26 in 2021 (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2021/2667, 2021). As notable, a COP meeting in 2020 is missing. COP26 was originally planned to take place in 2020, however the COP Bureau decided to postpone COP26 to November 2021 due to the Covid-19 pandemic (United Nations Climate Change, 2020). The last policy document for analysis is the *2021 Partnership Agreement between [European Union/The European Union and its Member States], of the one part, and members of the Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part* (The EU and the OACPS, 2021). The Agreement between the EU and the OACPS is initialed by the EU chief negotiator Jutta Urpilainen and the OACPS chief negotiator Robert Dussey on 15th April 2021 (European Commission, 2021c). The Agreement sets out priorities, commitments and areas of

cooperation in many fields of development, where one of them is regarding climate change and adapting to climate change.

5. Results and analysis

This chapter includes an analysis of the policies' contents in relation to the conceptions of justice non-domination, impartiality and mutual recognition and their opposites. The documents analyzed are the 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021 European Parliament COP resolutions, the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change (2021) and the Partnership Agreement between [European Union/The European Union and its Member States], of the one part, and members of the Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part.

5.1. Justice as non-domination and injustice as domination

The European Commission expresses that dialogues are important for cooperation purposes on climate adaptation, but also for the EU to learn about climate adaptation from international partners: “dialogue with partner countries should aim at increasing cooperation on climate change adaptation, achieving a better understanding of adaptation challenges in third countries and promoting climate change adaptation action and good practices” (European Commission, 2021b, p.18). Cooperation through dialogues is therefore a fruitful measure to reciprocally learn from each other, to gain a better understanding of the challenges that climate change pose on vulnerable communities such as LDCs and how to develop and provide effective actions of climate adaptation. Dialogues are important as they allow all actors to voice their opinions, interests and ambitions in which LDCs can participate in international constellations and state their national interests and ambitions for climate adaptation. Justice as non-domination is portrayed by emphasizing on dialogues that enable parties to voice their opinions and national interests. Cooperation on climate adaptation aims to recognize the respective parties' capabilities, hence respecting national circumstances as the EU wishes to achieve an improved understanding of the climate adaptation challenges in LDCs. Importantly, justice as impartiality can also be illustrated in this statement by the EU as cooperation involves in this case transnational actions in which the EU takes actions beyond its borders.

Further, the EU recognizes that the UNFCCC can better integrate and involve vulnerable countries, such as LDCs, in UNFCCC negotiations and decision-making processes (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2021/2667, 2021, p.127). The European Parliament further acknowledges that the EU can enhance its “engagement with vulnerable countries' delegates” (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2021/2667, 2021, p.127). The EU thus emphasizes procedural justice in terms of the need for all countries to have an equal say in negotiations and decision-making processes and the EU also recognizes that vulnerable countries as LDCs are

not fairly treated in UNFCCC decision-making processes. This statement by the EU can be seen as justice as non-dominance because the EU attempts to strengthen LDCs political power in international climate negotiations by alleviating power inequalities and acknowledging the fact that the EU can better engage with vulnerable countries, but also that LDCs voices and participation is too low to meet their needs of climate adaptation.

Recurring in the policy documents is the focus on NAPs and NDCs. The NAPs and NDCs are unique to each country however, the EU offers to support partner countries such as LDCs to increase resources, prioritize adaptation action and increase the effectiveness of climate adaptation (European Commission, 2021b, p.19). NAPs and NDCs can thus act as measures for collaboration between the EU and LDCs (European Commission, 2021b, p.18-19). The support that the EU offers to enhance national adaptation strategies and actions in LDCs is from the perspective of non-domination an attempt to prevent LDCs from harmful actions or inactions of powerful states in climate adaptation. As previous research states, the NDCs are voluntary and state-based which does not undermine states' sovereignty and hence relate to justice as non-domination (Von Lucke et al., 2021, p.48). Thus, by increasing LDCs capabilities in national climate adaptation, LDCs become more powerful in the sense that LDCs can increase climate adaptation action and be seen as equals to more powerful states. However, it is important to recognize that the support from the EU can be of a dominating character if the EU intervenes in LDCs national adaptation actions and other outcomes with any requirements that the LDCs cannot say no to because they are in a vulnerable position in need of climate adaptation. Finally, Von Lucke et al. (2021, p.48) also point out that NDCs can relate to justice as mutual recognition by recognizing that non-state actors can be involved in NDCs, however non-state actors are not recognized in the statements by the European Commission and thus is not classified as justice as mutual recognition.

There is an emphasis on “developing adaptation plans in line with national priorities and vulnerabilities” (European Commission, 2021b, p.19) which indicates that the LDCs maintain their national autonomy in terms of recognizing LDCs national interests and ambitions, which is an element of non-domination. By supporting LDCs with different resources to increase the effectiveness of climate adaptation, the EU strengthens LDCs' self-determination to manage their adaptation to climate change. As such, elements of non-domination are prevalent as coalitions between the LDCs and the EU strengthens LDCs autonomy and limits EU's domination over LDCs. The European Parliament states that Parties to the UNFCCC should increase their efforts on NDCs for them to be compatible with the goals set in the Paris

Agreement (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2021/2667, 2021, p.126). The EU expresses a dominating element in this statement by urging all states to take further ambitions on their NDCs because the NDCs need to be enhanced to ensure the NDCs are compatible with the goals set in the Paris Agreement. In this regard, the EU rather intervenes in other countries' national affairs of climate adaptation and can be interpreted to be dominating towards other states, such as LDCs that have low resources and capacities to adapt and thus formulate NDCs that might not match LDCs ambitions.

In the Partnership Agreement, it is stated that the Parties shall formulate and accelerate efforts to adapt to climate change by developing and implementing ambitious NAPs and NDCs, and to integrate adaptation into relevant sectors of society (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.102, 155). Consequently, justice as non-domination is evident in this case as the EU and the ACP states have agreed that the parties, including LDCs, shall develop their own national contributions and adaptation plans, that are in line with national ambitions. As stated previously, the NAPs and NDCs are voluntary and thus not binding commitments, which further support justice as non-domination. As the EU and the OACPS state that the Parties shall develop their own national plans and strategies to climate adaptation, the Parties, including the LDCs, maintain their national sovereignty as there is no interference in their national affairs of climate adaptation.

Additionally, it is emphasized to promote climate adaptation policies and plans into regional policies and policy dialogues in which cooperation is crucial to promote climate adaptation action (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.133). From the perspective of justice as non-domination, policy dialogues provide parties the opportunities to express their concerns, challenges and solutions to climate adaptation, where national interests, capacities and values can be expressed. However, the regional perspective can challenge the autonomy of the state in which regional policies and policy dialogues are not bilateral cooperation but rather embraces a multilateral setting, and this can be problematic for LDCs in terms of ensuring LDCs' voices are heard in regional affairs, thus limiting the procedural justice of a fair hearing. Regional policy dialogues can thus produce the risk of domination if certain states neglect deliberations with LDCs in negotiations. Importantly, the multilateral regional cooperation are also perspectives of portraying justice as impartiality in terms of states are seen as one body under regional and international agreements.

5.2. Justice as impartiality and injustice as partiality

The EU emphasizes that climate adaptation challenges are often local and specific to a certain geographical area and sector, but the solutions on how to adapt to climate change are often applicable across borders to a transnational scale (European Commission, 2021b, p.4). Local challenges to climate adaptation can thus have universal solutions that can work beyond EUs borders as well. It is further stressed that the importance of climate adaptation will be raised as an international issue in which multilateralism is crucial to ensure that climate adaptation is addressed in international negotiations of the UNFCCC (European Commission, 2021b, p.21). From the perspective of justice as impartiality, the European Commission highlights that multilateralism is important in UNFCCC negotiations to address climate adaptation in international negotiations. In that sense, multilateralism enables different actors in UNFCCC to address climate adaptation which can identify different states' values and interests of climate change and thus to provide different actors' perspectives of the challenges and solutions to climate adaptation.

Furthermore, EUs international action on climate adaptation becomes an issue of international cooperation, migration, security and trade of resources (European Commission, 2021b, p.17-18). It is stated that the EU will specifically promote climate adaptation in LDCs "through a humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach to reach the most exposed, vulnerable, conflict-prone or marginalized communities, leaving no one and no place behind." (European Commission, 2021b, p.18). These commitments relate to justice as impartiality because as climate adaptation seeks to reduce the vulnerabilities of climate change on human systems which can concern questions of security, health and well-being, impartiality addresses the equal rights of all individuals to a secure livelihood regardless of geographical position, community, state of economy or government. In this perspective, all communities have the right to a secure livelihood which the EU addresses by emphasizing the equal rights to adaptation in communities that are prone to conflicts, vulnerability and marginalization (European Commission, 2021b, p.18).

The EU and the ACP countries stress in the Partnership Agreement that all financial support and investments are to be consistent with the obligations and rights stated in the Paris Agreement (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.47, 59). As a reminder, it is stated in the Paris Agreement that developed countries shall financially support mitigation and adaptation to developing countries (United Nations, 2015, p.13). As such, developed countries as the EU Member States and the EU are obligated to provide financial assistance to developing countries

to assist them in adapting to climate change. Justice as impartiality is expressed in terms of firstly acknowledging distributional justice through the “ability to pay principle” by referring to the obligations and rights in the Paris Agreement, such as developed countries to financially support climate adaptation in developing countries. This means that the EU and ACP countries are aware of the abilities of the EU as developed countries, to financially support LDCs in their climate adaptation. Secondly, the statement is also a matter of justice as impartiality by calling on the obligations and rights put forward in multilateral climate governance, that is the Paris Agreement. The statements made indicate on justice as impartiality as the multilateral approach of the Paris Agreement is referred to as the international order in which the developed countries will financially support climate adaptation in LDCs.

The EU continues to emphasize that international climate finance must scale up to provide for climate adaptation in LDCs and that the EU will support partner countries to access climate finance through for instance the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund, international development banks and collaborate with private sectors (European Commission, 2021b, p.20; The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.156). It is also stated that the EU and its Member States will commit to provide significant increases to climate finance to provide for mitigation and adaptation to climate change (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2021/2667, 2021, p.133; European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2019/2712, 2019, p.38; European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2016/2814, 2016, p.54). Through these statements, the EU is positive to provide support for climate adaptation in LDCs and in that sense, the EU states to have the abilities to pay for the effects of climate change on vulnerable countries such as LDCs. In that case, distributional justice in terms of APP is shown from a perspective of justice as impartiality. The EU thus aims to take action across borders to help LDCs in their climate adaptation by providing climate finance.

The EU also recognizes the importance of the Adaptation Fund for LDCs (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2019/2712, 2019, p.38; European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2018/2598, 2018, p.38). From the perspective of impartiality, universal solutions to climate adaptation in LDCs are recognized by mentioning the importance of financial assistance to LDCs from the Adaptation Fund. Previous research supports the importance of the Adaptation Fund and argues that the Fund is important for LDCs as they receive financial support from it and keep their places in the Adaptation Board (McGinn and Isenhour, 2021, p.391). Consequently, from the perspective of impartiality, the Adaptation Fund symbolizes the equal rights and rules for all, in which all countries in need of financial support shall receive it, but also that countries

affected by the fund such as LDCs participate in the Fund and influence the guidelines and conditions of it.

In the Partnership Agreement between the EU and the OACPS, it is addressed that climate change is a security threat to the most vulnerable countries, such as LDCs, and that the Parties shall act on climate change as a security threat by enhancing climate adaptation (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.48, 102, 134, 172). It is further stressed that it is necessary to address the needs of displaced individuals due to climate change and natural hazards by adopting climate adaptation strategies at all levels, including inter-regionally (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.53). These statements indicate that the EU makes justice as impartiality claims of the equal rights of all individuals to live in a secure livelihood and thus the importance of climate adaptation to ensure that individuals in LDCs can live in a safe environment.

Furthermore, the European Parliament addresses that resilient infrastructure in developing countries, such as LDCs, will support LDCs to withstand the effects of natural disasters and hazards and thus resilient infrastructures will help LDCs in adapting to climate change (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2019/2712, 2019, p.45). It is also emphasized by the European Parliament that there is a need to increase international climate finance to developing countries to reduce deforestation (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2017/2620, 2017, p.78; European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2016/2814, 2016, p.50) and to develop support for forest adaptation (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.167). The international support in terms of finance and infrastructure strengthen communities and individuals in LDCs to enjoy their rights and liberties of safe livelihoods. Justice as impartiality is visible in this context as the EU shows solidarity with LDCs by recognizing the urgency of climate adaptation and the EUs responsibilities in providing finance and infrastructure support beyond EUs borders to LDCs.

Importantly, there were no statements in the policies that could be seen as partial claims by the EU according to the analytical scheme. However and interestingly, as partiality and domination are quite interlinked as explained in the chapter discussing the theoretical framework of impartiality, some impartiality statements such as the fair distribution of international climate finance to LDCs can be linked to domination in terms of the lack in expressing how the finance will look like for LDCs, such as whether LDCs have a say in where the money is going to which adaptation efforts, or receiving climate finance on what terms. In such cases, there can be infringements on the national autonomy and the EU rules without justification in international climate finance for climate adaptation. Finally, as no such statements on

international climate finance to LDCs were made by the EU, it is not possible to draw such conclusions that the EU is dominating LDCs in international climate finance, however, it is an interesting analysis to make.

5.3. Justice as mutual recognition and injustice as nonrecognition

In a COP resolution from the European Parliament, the Parliament acknowledges the failures of developed countries in taking the responsibilities for reducing the GHG emissions, while exacerbating the scale and costs for LDCs in adapting to climate change (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2018/2598, 2018, p.34). The EU thus recognizes the major responsibilities developed countries have in tackling climate change but also to support climate adaptation in LDCs, hence referring to distributional justice, which relates to justice as mutual recognition in terms of recognizing the differences in climate adaptation capabilities between the EU and the LDCs. From another COP resolution, the European Parliament notes that LDCs are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and also calls on the EU and its Member States to “step up adaptation action” to follow the commitments agreed upon in the Paris Agreement (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2021/2667, 2021, p.129). The European Parliament thus once again recognizes the responsibilities the EU and its Member States must support LDCs in their vulnerability to climate change and also identifies differences between the EU and LDCs in tackling climate change.

It is also stressed that developing countries, in particular LDCs, are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change however have the least adaptive capabilities and resources (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2019/2712, 2019, p.45). LDCs have insufficient resources to be able to prepare and adapt to climate change (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2017/2620, 2017, p.71; European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2016/2814, 2016, p.47). It is emphasized that LDCs have contributed the least to climate change (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2017/2620, 2017, p.78; European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2016/2814, 2016, p.53) and that the burdens of climate change will continue to be on countries of the Global South and that the Global North have contributed to the climate crisis significantly more than countries of the Global South have (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2019/2712, 2019, p.33). The Parties to the Negotiated Agreement agree to focus climate adaptation in LDCs (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.47) and the Parties agree to consider the vulnerability of LDCs and “...their efforts to adapt” (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.44) and to “ensure inclusive and equitable outcomes to build the resilience of the most vulnerable” (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.48).

It is clear from these examples that the EU recognizes differences between the EU and LDCs in terms of resources, capabilities to adapt and LDCs low contributions to the climate crisis compared to developed countries' contributions. Distributional justice in this context expresses the allocation of resources and capabilities between the EU and LDCs, where it is clear that the burdens of climate change is on the Global South. "Weak" mutual recognition is thus evident in this context as differences between LDCs and the EU are expressed in terms of different statuses of vulnerability, resources, abilities and capabilities to adapt, and finally the contribution to the climate crisis. There is a difference in voices between the EU and LDCs because the EU has more resources to adapt, more economic tools to increase adaptation to climate change and thus EUs voices are higher than those of LDCs. The examples illustrate that the EU uses its voice to acknowledge the differences between the EU and LDCs, in order to support LDCs in their climate adaptation, thus CBDR is expressed in the mentioned examples as there is a recognition of different voices in climate adaptation governance.

Furthermore, the EU stresses to ensure that climate finance reach the most vulnerable countries and communities to assist unlocking finance and other resources that are necessary for climate adaptation in LDCs (European Commission, 2021b, p.18, 20; European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2021/2667, 2021, p.129, 133). It is further stressed to commit to inclusive climate finance which focuses on protecting the poorest and the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.134). These statements indicate on justice as mutual recognition as the EU recognizes that the most vulnerable countries and communities to climate change are LDCs and thus the EU differs between countries that have financial resources to adapt to climate change and the countries and communities which lack important, financial resources to climate adaptation. In that sense, CBDR is also present in this context as there is a recognition of different voices, identities and contexts in international climate finance in which LDCs and their communities have difficulties in accessing the important finance for adapting to climate change.

The EU stresses that the civil society and private sectors have important roles in influencing climate adaptation (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2019/2712, 2019, p.40). Furthermore, the state governments are not the only entities important to develop and implement climate adaptation actions and strategies, but also local authorities and local governments play an important role in climate adaptation. The EU focuses to support locally led climate adaptation that reaches vulnerable populations (European Commission, 2021, p.19; European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2018/2598, 2018, p.44) and as local governments are

close to populations, they are appropriate entities to develop climate adaptation strategies (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2021/2667, 2021, p.130). By recognizing the importance of local authorities and local governance structures in climate adaptation actions and strategies, “strong” mutual recognition is illustrated as the EU emphasizes that all actors of society, especially local authorities and local governments in LDCs, have a voice and a crucial role in formulating and participating in climate adaptation actions and strategies. Thus, procedural justice is evident in this context and as such, from the perspective of justice as mutual recognition, non-state actors are recognized as important to influence and participate in decision-makings of climate adaptation in LDCs and while showing careful respect for the rights of all groups of people.

It is further emphasized that there is a need to strengthen the coordination between different governance structures and stakeholders of climate adaptation in order to achieve a sustainable development (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.47; European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2018/2598, 2018, p.39). The EU and the OACPS recognize “weak” mutual recognition the importance of non-state stakeholders in climate adaptation which is a distinct element of mutual recognition and procedural justice. Holler et al. (2020, p.12) find in their research that there is low stakeholder participation in the formulation of NAPAs in LDCs. The EU and the LDCs in the ACP states address the problem of low participation of different stakeholders by emphasizing the importance of stakeholders in climate adaptation for a sustainable development. The EU and the LDCs thus illustrate a problem with procedural justice which however is attempted to be improved from the perspective of justice as mutual recognition by recognizing non-state actors in deliberations of climate adaptation.

The Global Covenant of Mayors is an important forum which the EU aims to strengthen (European Commission, 2021b, p.9). The EU seeks to assist local and regional authorities globally by providing them technical assistance for developing and implementing local adaptation strategies and plans (European Commission, 2021b, p.9). The Global Covenant of Mayors is a global initiative of climate and energy that brings together voluntary initiatives from cities and local governments to progressively become climate resilient (Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, n.d). As such, the global initiative on climate and energy action locally, exist in the regions in which LDCs are geographically located. In this way, the EU is recognizing the global need to adapt to climate change and the importance of assistance to cities which as non-state actors, to help them in their adaptation plans and strategies. “Weak” mutual recognition is portrayed in terms of recognizing the importance of local level actors in

climate adaptation governance. As such, justice as mutual recognition is illustrated here as the EU recognizes the importance of deliberating with relevant non-state actors such as cities and local government in climate governance.

Furthermore, it is emphasized to promote youth participation in environmental action such as in climate adaptation programs (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.149, 179). In that sense, the EU and the OACPS recognize that more youth participation and representation in climate adaptation action is important, thus illustrating “strong” mutual recognition. However, the Partnership Agreement does not state why more youth participation should be promoted, for instance to deliberate more with youths. Finally, by including more youths in climate adaptation actions such as programs, climate adaptation becomes more inclusive and thus fair by recognizing and promoting participation of youths in climate adaptation and justice as mutual recognition is illustrated.

Additionally, it is stressed to ensure the participation of indigenous peoples in matters that concern them (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.140). It is also acknowledged that the Parties shall ensure to take traditional knowledge and concerns of local communities into account in consultative processes (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.140). Further, there is a paragraph in the Agreement called “Environment, natural resources management and climate change” in which it is stated that the Parties “shall promote the constructive engagement of local authorities, civil society and the private sector, and respect for the rights of all, including indigenous peoples as set out in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and local communities” (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.97). These excerpts from the Partnership Agreement highlight the importance of indigenous peoples, their knowledge and engagement in climate change related contexts however, the context of climate adaptation lacks. It is stated in a COP resolution that “according to the fifth assessment report of the IPCC, indigenous, local and traditional forms of knowledge are a major resource for adapting to climate change” (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2021/2667, 2021, p.140) and the European Parliament “regrets that indigenous knowledge is not being effectively used” (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2021/2667, 2021, p.140). Thus, indigenous people in LDCs are not specifically mentioned in this instance but only the importance of indigenous peoples’ knowledge for adapting to climate change, and the European Parliament recognizes that indigenous knowledge is not used sufficiently. The statements in the Partnership Agreement and in the COP resolution illustrate that indigenous people become recognized however differently in terms of lacking the contexts of LDCs, and in some instances lacking the contexts of climate

adaptation. Consequently, the extracts from the material cannot fully categorize as justice as mutual recognition because certain contexts are missing. Similarly, the extracts cannot either categorize as nonrecognition because certain elements still count as justice as mutual recognition. This is an interesting finding and portrays how a theory sometimes clashes with events in the real world, and the importance of the researcher to be transparent and objective about the realities of the case studied.

Interestingly, in two COP resolutions there is an emphasis on increasing the coherence of the rights of women and the participation of women in climate adaptation negotiations shall be ensured (European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2016/2814, 2016, p.50; European Parliament Resolution (EP) 2017/2620, 2017, p.75). Supporting with previous research, Kortetmäki (2016, p.330) emphasizes that women's participation and recognition in climate negotiations are crucial to increase their inclusion and enhance their capacities and culture. Thus, justice as mutual recognition can be visible in this context of increasing their participation in negotiations and hence strengthening their procedural justice of enhancing their capacities and representation. However, just as LDCs were absent in the context of indigenous people above, that is the same case in this analysis of justice as mutual recognition. Thus, justice as mutual recognition cannot be fully illustrated because the context of LDCs is absent in the statement of strengthening women's participation in climate negotiations.

Finally, the EU and the OACPS state that the Parties "shall work towards building women's resilience to climate change impacts and shall sustain their livelihoods in agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture, and cultural industries" (The EU and OACPS, 2021, p.179). "Weak" mutual recognition addresses the importance of the local level in climate adaptation, thus illustrating justice as mutual recognition by recognizing different perspectives, voices and contexts of individuals. The Parties recognize the voices of women, illustrate the contexts of women's vulnerability to climate change and provide the perspective of increasing women's resilience to climate change in order for women to sustain their livelihoods. However, it is not stated that in order to increase women's resilience to climate change, deliberative processes of procedural justice with women are needed to ensure a fair and inclusive resilience building of women's livelihood.

6. Discussion and concluding remarks

This chapter includes a discussion on the analysis above. The last subchapter involves concluding remarks and recommendations for further research.

6.1. Discussion

From the analysis above, it is clear that all concepts of justice from the global political justice theory are evident in EUs external climate adaptation policies. Regarding justice as non-domination, the EU is fair towards LDCs in climate adaptation by emphasizing the weight of dialogues, cooperation and inclusion of LDCs in negotiations. Hence, the EU recognizes LDCs' voices and national interests and thus relate to justice as non-domination but also procedural justice by recognizing the importance of LDCs' presence in negotiations and decision-makings. Further, in line with justice as non-domination, NAPs and NDCs are stated to be supported by the EU to enhance LDCs in their climate adaptation capabilities. There is an emphasis on supporting LDCs in their NAPs which should be in line with LDCs national priorities. Consequently, the EU strengthens LDCs national autonomy and respect LDCs national interests and ambitions, through recognizing LDCs' national priorities and capacities, thus supporting LDCs in enhancing their capacities to climate adaptation.

However, just as the EU expresses fairness towards LDCs as mentioned above, the EU also expresses some dominating elements such as urging all states to the UNFCCC to implement NDCs that meet the goals in the Paris Agreement, and this can be interpreted as dominating towards LDCs. LDCs might not have the capacities to increase the efforts in their NDCs as resources might lack and thus in a certain sense disrespecting LDCs national self-determination. Finally, subchapter 5.1. also demonstrates that the different conceptions of justice in global political justice theory might overlap and become illustrated in the same contexts. When the EU addresses the importance of regional cooperation, it can on the one hand be characterized as justice as non-domination in terms of cooperation opens up for deliberation on an international level, but also relating to justice as impartiality by seeing states as equal under international agreements.

Discussing justice as impartiality, the EU is fair towards LDCs by primarily recognizing the equal rights and liberties of all. For instance, the access to climate finance resources through the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Alliance, relates to distributive justice by allocating finance to those who need it the most for climate adaptation such as LDCs. Equal rights and liberties for all is also addressed by the EU from a security perspective in terms of emphasizing the right to adaptation in vulnerable areas, the rights of displaced individuals to

protection from climate change and the right to adopt adaptation strategies at all levels. It is also addressed to support infrastructure to adapt to climate change, hence recognizing the rights of all to be protected from the impacts of climate change and the right to climate adaptation. Thus, the EU shows justice as impartiality towards LDCs by ensuring that LDCs enjoy equal rights to fight climate change where the EU takes responsibility beyond its own borders by supporting LDCs. Finally, the EU expressed no statements that relate to partiality but rather to dominance.

Justice as mutual recognition is also illustrated in EUs external climate adaptation policies. Hence, the EU is fair towards LDCs in climate adaptation by primarily addressing the differences between the different Parties and thus their different capabilities and responsibilities in adapting to climate change. The LDCs different contexts and voices are emphasized and there is also an emphasis on the importance of deliberation and participation of non-state actors in negotiations, hence relating to procedural justice. The analysis of the importance and participation of non-state actors such as indigenous people and women in climate adaptation were dubious in the sense that the statements by the EU could not be characterized as mutual recognition or nonrecognition as the statements lacked certain important contexts that made it difficult to characterize as neither or. However, those findings show that the EU recognizes the importance of women and indigenous people in climate change negotiations, which is positive in the sense that previous research (Kortetmäki, 2016) states that women are often underrepresented in such settings. Hence, the EU recognizes the problem of underrepresentation of women in climate adaptation negotiations.

This research demonstrates that justice as non-domination, impartiality and mutual recognition are addressed in EUs external climate adaptation policies. Similarly, that is also the case in Von Lucke et al. (2021) and Von Lucke (2021) where the global climate regime is also illustrated as just from the conceptions of non-domination, impartiality and mutual recognition. Importantly, Von Lucke et al. (2021) and Von Lucke (2021) explore EUs fairness from 1988 to 2019. The research in this thesis explores fairness in EUs policies from 2016 to 2021 and thus adds to existing research by analyzing EU recently published EU policies, in which the three conceptions of justice proved to be evident. As stated previously, this thesis finds that the EU is somewhat dominating towards LDCs in climate adaptation and justice as mutual recognition towards women and indigenous people is dubious. Arguably, this finding challenges Von Lucke et al. (2021) and Von Lucke's (2021) research by integrating

perspectives of domination, partiality and nonrecognition in this field of research, and thus provides a critical approach to determine justice.

A potential weakness of the thesis is that the elements in global political justice theory were sometimes difficult to distinguish and thus a statement could be interpreted from not just one justice concept but relate to multiple concepts of justice, such as identifying non-domination and mutual recognition in the same statement. However, this challenge reflects the reality we live in, as often in research challenges emerge when translating theories into reality. Hence, the reality reflects different truths depending on how one perceives it. At the same time, the strength of the thesis is that different perspectives of justice are utilized to explore justice from the perspectives of states, individuals and vulnerable groups such as indigenous peoples and women. In that sense, the thesis can be seen as inclusive in its justice approach, by also identifying distributional justice and procedural justice.

6.2. Conclusions and recommendations for further research

As a reminder, the research question in this thesis is: *whether and how can EUs external climate adaptation policy approach towards the group of LDCs be seen as fair based on the theoretical framework of climate justice?*

As the analysis and discussion clearly demonstrated, it can be determined that the EU can be seen as fair towards LDCs in EUs external climate adaptation policies in regard to the theoretical framework of climate justice. The EU is fair towards LDCs based on that climate justice is illustrated from the point of view of states, individuals and communities, hence providing a comprehensive understanding of justice towards LDCs in climate adaptation. Despite that certain statements by the EU were of a dominating character towards LDCs in climate adaptation, slightly undermining the freedom of LDCs and thus indicate on injustice, the analysis is in its entirety characterized by justice as non-domination, impartiality and mutual recognition which illustrate climate justice in climate adaptation vis-à-vis LDCs.

Distributional justice is evident in most statements by the EU and thus illustrate climate justice towards LDCs in climate adaptation in terms of the fair allocation of resources, finance and responsibilities. Procedural justice demonstrates the recognition of the importance of LDCs in climate change negotiations and decision-makings both internationally, nationally and locally. Concluding, distributional justice and procedural justice has proven to be well integrated in the theoretical climate justice framework and has elevated the research in terms of connecting it to previous research on the field.

To conclude, justice as non-domination portrays climate justice towards LDCs by respecting LDCs national autonomy and interests in statements concerning the recognition of LDCs in negotiations, the weight of climate adaptation cooperation with LDCs and LDCs' national self-determination in NAPs and NDCs. Climate justice towards LDCs through justice as impartiality is illustrated in regard to the equal rights and liberties of all people, such as the EU providing financial support to LDCs in climate adaptation, and the recognition of the equal rights of all to a secure livelihood, promoting freedom to all individuals. The EU takes responsibilities across borders to financially support LDCs in which the international solidarity is prominent in justice as impartiality. Lastly, climate justice towards LDCs through mutual recognition is illustrated to recognize differences between the EU and LDCs in terms of different contexts, voices and identities. Finally, it is also recognized the importance of non-state actors to participate in negotiations and their knowledge is also addressed by the EU as crucial for climate adaptation.

Finally, climate justice vis-à-vis LDCs in climate adaptation can be further explored by investigating the procedural aspect of climate justice more in depth than what has been done in this thesis, by analyzing negotiations between the EU and LDCs, for instance in the UNFCCC. Importantly, despite that this thesis provides an in-depth analysis of EU external policies of climate adaptation vis-à-vis LDCs, the policies do not highlight the fairness in the outcomes of the policies, that is, what is being done to adapt to a changing climate. Thus, the transformation from policies to actual actions in the field of climate adaptation in LDCs can be interesting to do further research on. Finally, it can also be interesting to conduct research on the global political justice theory and apply it to other global political issues.

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Appendix

Table 1. List of all 46 LDCs in 2021.

Country	Year of inclusion	Country	Year of inclusion
Afghanistan	1971	Madagascar	1991
Angola	1994	Malawi	1971
Bangladesh	1975	Mali	1971
Benin	1971	Mauritania	1986
Bhutan	1971	Mozambique	1988
Burkina Faso	1971	Myanmar	1987
Burundi	1971	Nepal	1971
Cambodia	1991	Niger	1971
Central African Republic	1975	Rwanda	1971
Chad	1971	São Tomé and Príncipe	1982
Comoros	1977	Senegal	2000
Democratic Republic of Congo	1991	Sierra Leone	1982
Djibouti	1982	Solomon Islands	1991
Eritrea	1994	Somalia	1971
Ethiopia	1971	South Sudan	2012
Gambia	1975	Sudan	1971
Guinea	1971	Timor-Leste	2003
Guinea-Bissau	1981	Togo	1982
Haiti	1971	Tuvalu	1986
Kiribati	1986	Uganda	1971
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1971	United Republic of Tanzania	1971
Lesotho	1971	Yemen	1971
Liberia	1990	Zambia	1991

Source: United Nations Committee for Development Policy, 2021. *List of Least Developed Countries (as of 24 November 2021)*. [pdf] United Nations Department of Economic and

Social Affairs. Available at: < <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/lpcs-at-a-glance.html> > [Accessed: 2022-04-05].

Table 2. The table shows that out of 79 Member States in the OACPS, 38 are classified as LDCs.

Member States of the OACPS	Member States in the OACPS that are classified as LDCs
Angola	x
Antigua and Barbuda	
Belize	
Bahamas	
Barbados	
Benin	x
Botswana	
Burkina Faso	x
Burundi	x
Cameroon	
Cape Verde	
Comoros	x
Central African Republic	x
Chad	x
Congo (Brazzaville)	x
Congo (Kinshasa)	x
Cook Islands	
Côte d'Ivoire	
Cuba	
Djibouti	x
Dominica	
Dominican Republic	
Eritrea	x
Eswatini	

Ethiopia	x
Fiji	
Gabon	
Gambia	x
Ghana	
Grenada	
Republic of Guinea	x
Guinea-Bissau	x
Equatorial Guinea	
Guyana	
Haiti	x
Jamaica	
Kenya	
Kiribati	x
Lesotho	x
Liberia	x
Madagascar	x
Malawi	x
Mali	x
Marshall Islands	
Mauritania	x
Mauritius	
Micronesia	
Mozambique	x
Namibia	
Nauru	
Niger	x
Nigeria	
Niue	
Palau	
Papua New Guinea	
Rwanda	x

St. Kitts and Nevis	
St. Lucia	
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	
Solomon Islands	x
Samoa	
São Tomé and Príncipe	x
Senegal	x
Seychelles	
Sierra Leone	x
Somalia	x
South Africa	
Sudan	x
Suriname	
Tanzania	x
Timor Leste	x
Togo	x
Tonga	
Trinidad and Tobago	
Tuvalu	x
Uganda	x
Vanuatu	
Zambia	x
Zimbabwe	