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Night Mayor or Nightmare?

Addressing Stakeholders Through Night-time Governance

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Abstract

This study examines the differing structures of night-time governance organisations observed in Western cities. The study notes that previous research lacks clarification as to the structural differences of night-time governance organisations and further lacks the inclusion of how stakeholders are addressed. Therefore, this study aims to clarify and identify how these different structures address the stakeholders in the night-time economy. The relevance of this paper stems from the growing recognition of the night-time economy and the modern means of governing the night. This is done through conducting 12 anonymous, semi-structured interviews with prominent figures of Western situated night-time governance organisations both inside and outside the government. The empirical material is then interpreted through the lens of stakeholder theory and the conceptualisations of power.

Thus this study presents the following findings: The night-time governance organisation categories pertaining to whether the organisation was government-affiliated or non-government affiliated showed the greatest differences. However, there are additional differences observed within these categories. Government-affiliated night-time governance organisations varied with bureaucratic positioning and the stakeholders they identified. Furthermore, non-government affiliated night-time governance organisations differ through organisational classification as industry-specific, non-industry-specific, civil organisations and government-owned entities. They further differentiated in which stakeholders they identify and address. It was found that the night-time governance organisation addressed stakeholders through mediation and representation techniques. The findings of this study have implications for both city administrations looking to establish or support night-time governance organisations and for night-time industry stakeholders looking for favourable market conditions.

Keywords: Night-time economy, Urban planning, Night-time governance, Night Mayor, Stakeholder Theory, Power Theory

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Definitions

Night-time economy (NTE): economic activities taking place at night (18:00-06:00)

Night-time governance: regulation, policy and mediation of the night-time economy

Night-time governance organisation (NTGO): a group of regulators, advocates or actors that are solely involved in governing the night-time economy.

Night-time governance structure: the components making up how the night-time governance organisation are organised.

Promoters: A word used to describe those that organise and promote events usually in nightclubs or music festivals.

Harm-reduction mindset: Harm-reduction is a strategy adapted that looks at an approach of minimising the damage done as opposed to restricting or completely banning.

Night-time Office: A group that works towards the city's night-time industry in collaboration with the night mayor or other similar organisations/individuals

Scene: A phrase used to describe the industry commonly used in nightlife referring to behaviour and creative expression.

Urban Governance: Refers to how urban areas are managed by the government and other stakeholders

Urban Tourism: Tourism activities that occur in urban areas such as a city.

Culture: A word used to describe the unity of thoughts and perceptions of a community, a combination of norms, customs, art, and way of living.

Nightlife Culture: Culture that concerns night-time communities.

Counter Culture: Refers to a culture that is formed against the general culture accepted by a community, with customs, norms, and values that oppose the existing culture.

District or borough: An administrative unit within a city that is managed by a local government.

Civil Organisation: Non-profit citizens' groups that function outside of government agencies or businesses.

Quasi-judicial Body: An administrative body or a private law entity that is given the authority to interpret law.

Abstinence: Refraining from engaging in something, usually alcohol or sex.

Advisory role: A role that routinely makes recommendations and provides assistance to individuals or organisations, particularly in relation to a specific topic or activity.

Gentrification: The shift that occurs in an urban area as a result of wealthier residents replacing current inhabitants or new developments entirely.

Anti-social behaviour: Type of behaviour that disrupts social order and violates others' rights.

Abbreviations

NGO: Non-government Organisation

NTGO: Night-time Governance Organisation

NTE: Night-time Economy

1 Introduction

The night has been an area of conflicting views throughout human history. Pre-civilisation society consisted of gruelling work during the day through hunting and gathering of food and resources (eds. Gohlin & Nowell, 2018). While the absence of light made these dangerous at night, this “free time” from work has made the night a time for music, dance, storytelling, and social interaction (eds. Gohlin & Nowell, 2018). As humanity progressed and industrialised civilisation came to be, the night continued to be a place of both social reconnections as well as potential danger from criminal activity (Bianchini, 1995). Catching up with friends over a pint or dancing to one’s local musician unfortunately have to share the time of day with increased muggings, assaults, and drug trafficking.

Regardless of the tension surrounding the night, cities around the globe have come to recognise the economic and cultural aspects of the night-time sector. For example, a 2018 executive report on London’s night-time economy (NTE) identified that 1.6 million Londoners work at night as well as 65% of Londoners regularly partake in nightlife activities (Greater London Authority, 2018). Additionally, many cities such as Sydney, Amsterdam, and New York are embracing the concept of a ‘24-hour’ economy (NSW Government, 2020; Neate, 2021; Office of Nightlife, 2021). This concept stems from the same idea identified by the Greater London Authority (2018) executive report that a city’s economy does not stop at nightfall. The economic recognition was additionally paired with the recognition of the cultural aspects nightlife provides for a city. An example of this is seen in Berlin, with the city government establishing nightclubs as cultural institutes as opposed to being places of entertainment grouped together with cinemas and casinos (Live Musik Kommission, 2021). This designation not only provides better market conditions for clubs by having lower taxation but highlights how the city government recognised the importance of nightlife dance venues for the ‘Berlin’ identity.

While this is the most prominent example of cultural recognition, many reports of a city's NTE identify the cultural importance nightlife has and how it can shape a city's identity (Laundry & Bianchini, 1995; Greater London Authority, 2018). The proceeding section provides background to night-time governance organisations (NTGO) and structures which is followed by an outline of the purpose of this study.

1.1 Background

The cultural and economic recognition of nightlife has been accompanied by the establishment of NTGOs. These organisations appear in the forms of night mayors, commissions and advocacy groups all with the intention of mediating between associated stakeholders within the NTE. The Berlin Club Commission was believed to be the first official NTGO, which started in 2001 (Seijas & Gelders, 2021). Shortly after, Amsterdam followed in 2003 with the first elected “night mayor”. Both of these organisations fall under a non-government organisation (NGO) status but have differing levels of focus. The Amsterdam night mayor is a part of a non-industry-specific NGO, focusing on the broader NTE while the Berlin Club Commission is an industry-specific NGO with a keen interest in nightclubs. Although there are differences in these NTGOs, both of these organisations attempt to enhance the city government's ability to promote a vibrant and safe nightlife.

As briefly demonstrated with examples from Amsterdam and Berlin, there are varying structures of night-time governance in terms of positioning, funding, stakeholders, and legal framework. Firstly, an NTGO can be positioned within or outside of a city government. While most of the night mayors outside of city governments are recognised and consult cities, the position of night mayor in Budapest for example is not recognised by the city and the Mayor of Budapest has stated “as far as I know, I am the only mayor of this city.” (Olt, Smith, Csizmady & Ivett Sziva, 2019). This reveals that even in the phrase “night mayor” there are several variations of what they are. Furthermore, NTGOs may handle potential conflicts among stakeholders differently or identify some stakeholders differently. For instance, there have been conflicting stakeholder views on the disputed party street of Langstrasse in Zurich (Cibin, 2018). While the Bar and Club Commission and the Night City Council believed it to be a great place for entertainment and “very liveable”, the local residents saw it as the

opposite. The Bar and Club Commission's purpose is to serve the bars, clubs and night-time event hosts while the Night City Council is there to serve those attending night-time recreation activities. Neither of these groups serve the local residents of Langstrasse which may be the reason their views differ from the residents.

A similar situation occurred in Budapest (Olt et al, 2019). While the so-called night mayor of Budapest believed that the venues in the "party quarter" should be allowed to have extended opening hours, the local residents argued for the venue to be shut down (Olt et al, 2019). Olt et al (2019) further note that the night mayor of Budapest is not actually a civic role and is funded by some of the more prominent bars and clubs in the party quarter thus his aims are to do what is best for his clients. The local residents have formed a political campaign as they believed their voices were not heard showing a lack of consideration from the overall governance groups and indicating a situation where a stakeholder is not addressed. Such a conflict among stakeholders could even raise the question of whether this false night mayor is a nightmare to the stakeholders in Budapest.

Cibin (2018) acknowledges the varying roles that some have defined as night mayors and how this may be misleading as their structures, purpose and position often vary. She thus groups them together under the term "Night Ambassadors" in her paper *Nightlife Neighborhood Conflicts in Zurich*. We note that within night-time governance there exists: Club Commissions, Bar Commissions, Club and Bar Commissions, Night Councils, Night-time advocacy groups, Night Managers and Night Time Economy Advisors to name a few. Appendix 1-4 shows all the different titles for the organisations around the world that have been identified by Seijas & Gelders (2021). It should be noted that of the 27 NTGOs located inside of governments, Seijas & Gelders's (2021) study only noted 8 of the associated positioning within the government.

While these organisations can vary, the grouping of them has been static. Recently, the paper by Seijas & Gelders, *Governing the night-time city: The rise of night time mayors as a new form of urban governance after dark* (2021), groups all NTGOs together regardless of their structures, from Club Commissions, Hospitality Alliances to Night Mayors inside and outside the government. This grouping can be seen as an oversimplification of this recent form of night governance and it is seen that this neglects the different processes of varying governance organisations. While some organisations can purely represent the economic

interests of night-time venues and operators, like in the example of the night mayor of Budapest (Olt et al, 2019), other organisations can consider the broader group of stakeholders within the NTE such as the Amsterdam night mayor (Seijas, 2020). This discrepancy in stakeholder focus could be considered by night-time operators looking for the most favourable market to conduct their business in. Moreover, with globalisation on the rise and more firms internationalising, further internationalisation within the nightlife industry is not a far-fetched idea. Therefore, understanding the governance structures, as well as the stakeholders addressed by these NTGOs, is important for businesses within the NTE looking to further internationalise their operations.

1.2 Aim and Objectives

The aim of this thesis is to investigate and clarify the differences in current NTGOs that exist in Western cities and how stakeholders are addressed by the varying structures. In order to achieve this aim, this paper will interview members of different NTGOs, both inside and outside of governments to identify structural differences and stakeholder involvement. Based on these aims and objectives, the research question is formulated as follows:

RQ1: “How do differing night-time governance structures address stakeholders?”

1.3 Research Purpose

The purpose of this research is to clarify the structural differences between NTGOs and demonstrate how they vary in addressing stakeholders. Through exploring the different structures that exist within NTGOs, this paper aims to clarify how the night can be governed and who governs it. This clarification of different structures currently used may be able to assist and inform city officials and industry stakeholders that are considering establishing NTGOs in their local contexts.

1.4 Delimitations

The delimitations of this paper are as follows. This paper examines only European and North American cities with established NTGOs. The literature used in this paper is centred around the Western world. This paper also excludes cities without established NTGOs as the focus of this paper pertains to these organisations' structures and not the structure of a city government which is also tasked with governing the NTE.

1.5 Outline of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into seven sections. Chapter 1 introduces the subject and the background and provides the problematisation, objectives, and research purpose. In Chapter 2 a thorough literature review is conducted, outlining the development of the NTE, and the subsequent night-time governance structures that emerged. Chapter 3 presents the methodology used and how the interviews were conducted, the motivation for why the qualitative analysis method was chosen, and the ethical considerations. In Chapter 4, the theoretical perspective that is used in our data analysis, stakeholder theory and power theory, is presented and connected to the topic of night-time governance. This occurs after our methodology as we use an inductive approach to identify applicable theory. In chapter 5, the data and the findings are presented and the thematic analysis of the data, with power, mediation, and representation as themes, is presented. In Chapter 6, the findings are discussed in relation to the theoretical background. Lastly, in Chapter 7, the main findings are summarised, and the practical implications and suggestions for future research are presented.

2 Literature Review

The literature review provides a thorough introduction to the literature that exists relating to the NTE. Starting with literature regarding the development of the NTE, the associated stakeholders, and the resulting negative externalities indicative of the NTE. Following this, is an overview of the formation of the modern night-time governance organisations on which this paper focuses.

2.1 The Development of the NTE

Through night-time governance research, scholars from varying disciplines have highlighted a historic shift in the deindustrialisation of Western cities (Harvey, 1989; Hall & Hubbard, 1996; Law, 1992; Judd & Fainstein, 1999). This shift is believed to allow for the rise of the NTE. This section will examine the historic shift within cities and explain how this shift established the night as an economic driver with associated negative externalities. In this section, the conditions as to why NTGOs came to exist in cities are formulated.

2.1.1 The Deindustrialisation of the West

In order to introduce the NTE, the deindustrialisation of Western cities is a crucial starting point. Perspectives from both urban governance as well as urban tourism discuss this shift in a postindustrial society. This shift is shown to be a large driver of many city government actions and shapes how cities redesigned themselves. Thus this is imperative in understanding the economic value of the NTE. The following sections explore the applicable findings from each study and how they relate to each other.

The theory of entrepreneurialism within city governments was seen as a large contribution to the field of urban governance studies (Harvey, 1989; Hall & Hubbard, 1996). This theory was

first developed by Harvey (1989) with the notion that U.S. and U.K. cities struggling with the loss of industrial production during the 1960s have moved towards a more proactive approach to encouraging economic development throughout the 1970s and 1980s. While Harvey (1989) argues this leads city governments to focus on attracting outside investment through private-public partnerships, Hall & Hubbard (1996) further note many of the initiatives governments are proposing are geared toward consumption, rather than production. Even though both Harvey (1989) and Hall & Hubbard (1996) article's perspectives are deeply critical of this entrepreneurial shift and the varying effects it may have on different socio-economic classes, there are further implications for this shift in the field of urban tourism.

The field of urban tourism aligns with the urban governance findings above. The term urban tourism was a quite recent development in the overall field of tourism, arising only at the end of the 20th century (Law, 1992). This is most likely due to the fact that this period of deindustrialisation in the West pushed city governments to seek economic development through outside investment; one of the means of outside investment was tourism. Law (1992) and Judd & Fainstein (1999) cite the loss of the inner-city manufacturing and the subsequent unemployment as a cause of city centres being left empty and void of economic activity. Redeveloping these spots into commercial as well as cultural areas was seen in many Western cities like Baltimore in the U.S. and London in the U.K. (Law, 1992). Judd and Fainstein (1999) focus on how redevelopment efforts are branded in places with a rich historic past such as Paris and Rome versus places with purely consumption-oriented models such as Las Vegas and Orlando. All of this culminates in the idea of a 'city image' which is written extensively by Holcomb (1999). He proposes the city can be seen as a product, and that this product should be marketed through unique offerings to the consumer who in this case was the tourist. Overall, the field of urban tourism has a large focus on how governments develop a city's offering and capitalise on established 'brands' of the city to attract outside investment through tourism.

This deindustrialisation being present among authors in both urban governance and urban tourism literature shows consistency of the impact that deindustrialisation has had on Western cities. The redefining role of a city government in boosting a city's economy through either broad external investment (Harvey, 1989; Hall & Hubbard 1996) or focused tourism investment (Law, 1992, Judd & Fainstien, 1999, Holcomb, 1999) provides the foundation for the acknowledgement and leveraging of the NTE. The following section will explore the

revitalisation of a city and how the night could be used as a medium for cultural consumption (Hae 2011; Eldridge & Nofre, 2018; Evans 2012).

2.1.2 Rise of the Night-Time Economy

The following section begins by showing how cities have changed from their industrial era towards a more service-based economy with culture as a driving factor. This is shown through the revitalisation of city centres that is done through the introduction of cultural spaces. The notion of the NTE and how cities have begun to interact with the night will then be examined. This section will then examine the aspects of the NTE that cities noticed were of value.

Post-industrial cities were vastly different from their industrial era where cities prioritised production and distribution but now production and distribution took place away from the city centres (Landry & Bianchini, 1995). The spaces in the city centre that had become abandoned through deindustrialisation held little to no value and thus rent prices were either non-existent or low (Landry & Bianchini, 1995). This became attractive for those that could only afford spaces with little or no rent who at this time in Dublin were the creative class (Montgomery, 1995). In Dublin's Temple Bar area Montgomery (1995) notes that various different artists, book stores, restaurants and cafes and music venues moved into this previously abandoned area which accompanied by further investment into cultural activities in this space allowed Dublin's Temple Bar area to be a night-time destination commonly visited. Landry & Bianchini (1995) note that cities that recently did not see economic value in culture and entertainment now have it high up on their agenda. Cultural policy and culture centred events have been used by many countries (Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Netherlands, Germany, UK, and France) since the 1970s and 1980s as a tool to revitalise urban cities' night-time economies (Bianchini & Landry, 1995), coinciding with the shift mentioned in urban governance studies (Harvery, 1989). Cities now use their cultural capacity "explicitly" to increase tourism inflow for the now globalised concept of the "competitive city" where tourists have an easier means to travel globally than before (Evans, 2012). This led to the formation and recognition of the NTE.

The majority of late 20th century Western cities and researchers began to note a lacklustre interaction with the night. Citizens would work in the city centres only to leave after work and return the following day again for work (Bianchini & Landry, 1995). Nights did not yet hold

any value to cities or citizens other than rest. Nights were a temporal conduit between today's work and tomorrow's work. Bianchini & Landry (1995) note how this was a disservice to the citizens of this city beyond hours of leisure and entertainment as those working the classic 9-5 would have little or no time to shop. Extended hours of shopping would also mean extended hours of economic stimulation. Bianchini & Landry (1995) recall their first interaction with the term “night-time economy” from hearing Renato Nicolini, a Roman City Councillor, who was describing the success of night-time activities in Rome in the summer of 1979. Similarly, Montgomery (1995) used the term “evening economy” when describing the lack and need of activities for citizens of Dublin during the night. In 1994 the first conference for night-time research “24-Hour City ” conference took place in Manchester (Gwiazdzinski, 2015). The notion is now widely regarded by researchers, economists, urban planners, stakeholders, and politicians alike as the “night-time economy” (Hae, 2011; Eldridge & Nofre, 2018; Seijas, 2020; Seijas & Gelders, 2021;).

However, it is through this notion of the NTE and its investment, tourism, and cultural potential that cities begin to grasp the benefits of using the night (Landry & Bianchini, 1995; Montgomery, 1995). Milestone (2016) notes how new creative industries were developed in Manchester with the redevelopment of previous industrial zones that sparked the development of warehouses into new spaces for creatives and night-time activities. Not only was it cultural elements that revitalised urban spaces but nightlife culture became key in doing so (Hae 2011; Eldridge & Nofre, 2018; Evans 2012) Cities begin to grow the economy through the night, starting with entertainment that is known to bring people out at night that then spills over into various different industries and brings people to the city (Bianchini & Landry, 1995).

However, cities can continue to acknowledge and advertise their NTE through cultural means but without access to culture, what is there to advertise? Montgomery (1995) points out that cities can not just be used for the consumption of culture but also for the production of culture as, without the producer, the consumption cannot take place. This suggests that cities need to be aware that there are an array of stakeholders in the NTE, from producers, operators and consumers, and that cities' cultural policies should support all of these for a successful economy.

2.1.3 Negative Externalities

While the previous section establishes the benefits of a vibrant nightlife which then forms a vested government interest in the NTE, many points of conflict and negative externalities have been attributed to the night. The following section will examine the existing research linking negative externalities to the NTE in areas such as noise pollution and antisocial behaviour. In doing so, a clear need for intervention is established providing the foundation of governance explored in the next chapter.

General noise pollution is presented as an increasingly pressing issue for urban planners as cities' constant expansion and an increase in the population require building closer to motorways and industry. In the NTE, noise pollution stems from music from venues and chatter or anti-social behaviour on the streets surrounding night-time establishments. Attali (1985) sees noise as something contradictory in modern society, it is something that is celebrated and consumed but also something that is feared. This can be seen through how music might be the reason some attend certain venues; it can also be a reason why neighbours detest these venues. Music venues are reliant on their ability to play loud music, however, they have been subject to noise complaints which have been linked to the closure of music venues (Lottinga, Lewis, & Taylor, 2019). Increasing development in areas where recently only music venues existed see new residents affected by the noise of the pre-existing venues, this led to the “agent of change” policy in the UK and Australia whereby the cost of the change is on those that implement this change (Lottinga, Lewis, & Taylor, 2019). Of the several options to complain for local residents, one that stands out is the ability to “Complain to the police that the noise amounts to anti-social behaviour.” This is mostly attributable to noise caused by patrons outside the venue (Lottinga, Lewis, & Taylor, 2019). However, in this case, it is not the venue itself causing this noise but their patrons upon leaving the venue. Noise has caused sleeping issues for local residents and thus there have been formations of movements created to limit the opening hours of these venues to prevent late-night noise (Olt et al, 2019; Cibir, 2018). Examples of neighbours creating movements to restrict opening hours have been seen in Budapest (Olt et al, 2019) and in Zurich (Cibir, 2018). At the same time, stakeholders involved in the industry have been involved in the creation of NTGOs with many different purposes with a shared goal of the development of the night. This will be explored in the section “Night-time governance”. As music venues play a critical role in the

NTE, so is the ability to rest for neighbouring residents thus there is a clear conflict between these stakeholders that requires addressing.

Another link that has been established with nightlife is antisocial behaviour. Antisocial behaviour can be viewed as behaviour that disregards how one's action might affect others (Farrington, 2003). Within the NTE antisocial behaviour is commonly caused by excessive alcohol consumption resulting in excessive noise, unintentional injuries, violence, public urination, and risky sexual behaviour (Crawford & Flint, 2009; Calafat, Duch, Juan, Leckenby, 2012; Seijas & Gelders, 2021). With heightened tensions among residents and venues as mentioned above, the antisocial behaviour further increases local residents' unhappiness (Olt et al, 2019; Cibir, 2018). Furthermore, antisocial behaviour within a venue is almost detrimental to the consumers and the workers in the venue who experience or are involved in stopping it (Hobbs et al, 2003). While alcohol may be the main cause of antisocial behaviour, alcohol has been a vital economic factor in establishing night-time music venues (Homan, 2017; Walker 2002; Carah et al, 2021). Ker & Chinnock (2008) believed that although intervention tactics exist in many European venues it is not often that the staff follow them. They believe this could be general non-compliance or caused by stress factors in the working environment. Hughes et al (2014) found that although legislation exists in the UK that one may not serve alcohol to someone that is already visibly drunk, there were only a few occasions where the staff actually policed this. Thus the venue owners need to decide between increased profits at the expense of potential antisocial behaviour or policing their customers and controlling their consumption habits at the expense of profit.

Thus it is clear that some form of mediation is needed between night-time venues and the public. In most cases police are used as a controlling factor of the night, however, researchers believe that police are not funded well enough and do not have the means necessary to control the night (Hobbs et al, 2005). It is clear that there is thus a need for more focus or a change in how the night is governed. Issues like these can be linked with the creation of night-time mayors or advocacy groups. Cibir (2018) acknowledges that although the different advocacy groups may serve different stakeholders, they all advocate for further valuation of night-time culture and policy reform to reduce the negative externalities and conflicts of the night. The section that follows will explore the creation of advocacy groups and how the night is governed.

2.2 Night-Time Governance

As the previous chapter establishes the NTE and its positive and negative effects, this chapter focuses on the governance of the night. The proceeding sections will discuss the shift in these governing practices and how the introduction of the modern NTGOs present today attempts to balance diverse stakeholder needs.

2.2.1 Shifts and Tensions of Night-Time Governance

The shift in nightlife governance stems from the aforementioned shift in night-time economic perspectives. Chatterton (2002) notes that the move from industrial to post-industrial cities brought a new wave of dealing with the NTE. City governments are seen to cater to the commercial interests of the NTE (Chatterton, 2002; Chatterton & Holland, 2002). In line with the entrepreneurialism of city government theory (Harvey, 1992), cities like Glasgow, Leeds, and Manchester have seen more lenient licensing policies to promote investment in the NTE and transform their previous industrial images (Chatterton, 2002).

Regardless of these corporate interests, there is still tension within the NTE. Chatterton (2002) noted that motives for nightlife regulations in the U.S. and Europe stem from moral panic and control of deviant youth as well as possible ties to the Fordian regime of preservation of productivity within the working class. While the Fordian ties may be speculative, this notion of the contentious relationship between regulation and deregulation of the night-time is observed in New York by Hae (2009). While trying to preserve the city's attractiveness for global investment and deal with public complaints targeted at night-time operators, newly elected mayor Gulliani formed a task force to monitor and fine nightlife establishments, especially dance clubs on a weekly basis. Hae (2011) states that this task force was used to harass and was less concerned about compliance. Regardless of motive, the tension is palpable between balancing the NTE and the negative effects associated with it.

While efforts have been made to alleviate this tension, there are still observable difficulties. Van Liempt (2015) compares the approaches of two different Dutch cities, Rotterdam and

Utrecht in their implementation of ‘Safe Nightlife Covenants’ which included collaborations among government officials, police, and night-time operators. In this study, it was revealed that these collaborations were dependent on the personal and political commitment which fluctuated between the two cities' governments (van Liempt, 2015). It is further stated that policies and collaborations can not be contained to broad objectives but rather be based on the complexities faced in local contexts. This need for local considerations is met through the varying governance forms seen today.

2.2.2 Modern Governance Structures

The modern approach to governing the NTE arises in differing circumstances as all cities are inherently different. According to Seijas (2020), Amsterdam, London, and New York all had different rationales for establishing distinct night-time governance. The formation of Amsterdam’s Night Mayor was first done independently through the formation of ‘The Nightwatch’. This was in response to tightening restrictions on the NTE as a whole (Seijas, 2020). It evolved over the years to then become the ‘Night Mayor’ position which led a board overseeing a night council (Seijas, 2020). After research had shown a rapid decrease in London’s music venues between 2005 and 2015, London’s first night mayor or as known in London as “Night Czar” was institutionalised in 2016 from a number of applications, through the Greater London Authority, a body headed by the mayor of London, (Seijas, 2020). The Night Czar further instituted the creation of the Night Time Commission to further consult the night mayor's office (Seijas, 2020). Although New York had two NTGOs, New York Nightlife Association and Legalise Dance NYC in the 1990s (Hae, 2011), Seijas (2020) notes the formation of city government groups, New York’s Office of Nightlife and Nightlife Advisory Board was done to recognise the positive impact the NTE had on the city overall. Nightlife was not just a nightmare for this city. This happened only after Paris, London, Amsterdam, and Berlin had established their own form of NTGOs. Regardless of the reason for establishing, all of the identified NTGOs above aim to mediate the differing needs of stakeholders within the NTE. However, there are varying structures to these NTGOs.

With many NTGOs emerging globally, there are differences in both titles and structures of these groups. Cibin (2018) acknowledges the varying roles that some have been defined as night mayors and how this may be misleading as their structures, purpose, and position often vary. She thus groups them all together under the term “Night Ambassadors”. Similarly to

London's Night Czar, Amsterdam's Night Mayor, and New York's Senior Executive Director of the NYC Office of Nightlife, Seijas (2020) groups these positions together as night mayors. Further research also by Seijas and Amsterdam's first night mayor, Mirik Gelders (Seijas & Gelders, 2021) group everything from club commissions, night-time advocacy groups, mayors in the government and mayors outside the government, all under the term night mayor. However, even within Seijas' (2020) research, we see Amsterdam, New York and London all have widely differing structures. The Night Czar in London is a full-time position under London's Art and Culture Department (Seijas, 2020). They lead the 24-hour London team consisting of 4 members of staff and report to London's Deputy Mayor and the Assistant Director for Culture and Creative Industries (Seijas, 2020). While still within the government, New York's Office of Nightlife is located directly under the mayor's office of Media and Entertainment and works in collaboration with the Nightlife Advisory Board, consisting of 14 representatives from the NTE. The Nightlife Advisory Board makes recommendations on different areas of concern and issues while the Office of Nightlife puts forward initiatives and programs (Seijas, 2020). However, both make separate reports to present recommendations to the mayor. Distinct from both London and New York, Amsterdam's night mayor is situated outside the government. Beginning as a completely independent group, in 2014 the position of night mayor or "nachtburgemeester" was instituted which included the creation of the Stichting N8BM A'DAM or night mayor foundation colloquially referred to in English texts (Seijas, 2020). The night mayor foundation is a non-profit independent organisation tasked to advise the local government on policy for the NTE. While the existing research on who governs the night provides information regarding structural details of night-life positions and organisations (Seijas, 2020; Seijas & Gelders, 2021; Cibin, 2018), the grouping of these positions under umbrella terms like night mayors and night ambassadors oversimplifies the complexity in between the different positions. Furthermore, there is a lack of address of who finances these groups, which stakeholders these groups advocate for and within what department of the government these groups are situated.

Cibin (2018) found that the Zurich Bar and Club commission would mainly focus on and advocate for bars and clubs as their main stakeholder, but the Night City Council would focus on broader stakeholders in the NTE. Cibin (2018) clearly concludes that due to the Night City Councils' structural difference in that the president does not have more voting power than the rest of its council it is classified as a council and not a mayor under Swiss constitutional

settings. Furthermore, the Bar and Club Commission finds its lobbying power in the vast number of its members which under the Swiss constitution gives them the right to speak to the city. It should be noted that neither the Bar and Club Commission nor the Night City Council receives public funding (Cibin 2018). Olt et al (2019) noted that the supposed night mayor of Budapest only advocated for the large venues in the city as they were his financiers and in some instances, smaller venues in the city noted that this night mayor was acting against them. This Budapest night mayor may be considered an industry-specific stakeholder however he only advocates for a small number of the stakeholders within the industry. This shows that even within NTGOs which supposedly support an industry there are still some stakeholders who are prioritised.

2.3 Chapter Summary

The section above presents the context in which the NTE was recognised by city governments and how modern ways of governing the night took form. The deindustrialisation of western cities had local governments rethinking how to attract investment (Harvey, 1989; Hall & Hubbard 1996; Law, 1992; Judd & Fainstien, 1999; Holcomb, 1999). The cultural and in turn the economic importance of the NTE began to shape the way cities' governments view these hours of the day as beneficial (Bianchini & Laundry, 1995; Montgomery, 1995). While the benefits were recognised, negative externalities such as alcohol-associated antisocial behaviour (Crawford & Flint, 2009; Calafat, Duch, Juan, Leckenby, 2012; Seijas & Gelders, 2021), noise pollution stemming from music venues (Lottinga, Lewis, & Taylor, 2019) cause conflicts between residents and the NTE businesses. Managing the conflicting stakeholder needs lead to a shift from historic ways of governing the night (Chatterton, 2002) to the modern NTGOs seen in major cities like New York, London, and Amsterdam (Seijas, 2020). While NTGOs exist to provide mediation and support for stakeholders with the NTE, there are various structural differences such as funding, government affiliation, and legal framework (Cibin, 2018; Seijas 2020; Seijas & Gelders, 2021; Olt et al, 2019).

3 Methodology

In this chapter, the methodological approach used to gather data to answer the research question is described, starting with the research approach and the methods of data collection. This includes how the study was designed, how the theories were selected, and how they were applied to the data. After the data analysis, the validity and reliability are discussed before finally the limitations and ethical considerations are presented.

3.1 Research Approach

The study uses qualitative analysis in order to gain insights into the different structures and processes within NTGOs and how this might affect how they addressed stakeholders. This study used data from interviews conducted with current and former members of NTGOs in 12 cities. The study seeks to draw meaning from individuals or groups thus a qualitative phenomenological research approach was used (Cresswell, 2018).

3.2 Research Design

A research design comprises numerous components assembled together to address the research question of the paper (Bryman & Bell, 2011). This study will use a phenomenological research design as phenomenology pertains to the lived experiences of individuals about their experience of a phenomenon (Cresswell, 2018). This was chosen as we will study the lived experience of the informant's ordeals as members of NTGOs as all of the participants share this experience.

The researcher investigates the issue, and its value to individuals or organisations, and assigns it to a problem in qualitative research (Bryman & Bell, 2011). In qualitative research data is

obtained from informants with experience and know-how in the field of the identified research problem, this is done to gain insight into the informant's views of the problem (Marshall & Rossman, 2010). Thus the outcome will include the informants' views on the issues which the researchers will further analyse and explain (Creswell, 2018).

The choice to use a qualitative study over a quantitative one in this study was clear as we wanted an in-depth analysis from the informants and were not focused on making a generalisation. Previous research already identified that each structure differed and thus generalisations were not possible. Furthermore, there are limited NTGOs around the world and thus a quantitative study would be difficult as a large sample size would be difficult to obtain (Bryman & Bell, 2021).

The sample of this study makes use of the current professional experience the research group has had with night mayors and night-time organisations within Europe and the U.S. Through an internship at Vibelab, a night-time consultancy firm, one of the group members had attended several meetings with a majority of the interview informants and has provided consultancy to city officials on night-time governance. This gave us access to informants and led to contact via personal connections on LinkedIn, Whatsapp, Facebook Messenger, and email. For unintroduced interview informants, they were contacted through WhatsApp and email. The informants were selected based on their positions and knowledge of NTGOs in their cities.

Since the research question pertained to how different structures addressed stakeholders the interview questions were designed to address the structures of the organisations first. Through these questions, we wanted to gain knowledge of the informants' structure for further background as to how they addressed stakeholders. Once the structures of the informants NTGOs are explained the questions will then shift to questions surrounding the stakeholders of the NTGOs and how they address the different stakeholders that they have identified.

3.3 Data Collection Method

This paper makes use of primary data from a series of semi-structured interviews taking place on Google Meets between 9 May 2022 and 17 May 2022. The interview transcripts were

recorded in real-time using the software Tactiq. These interview transcripts were the only data used in the data analysis section. The semi-structured approach was chosen because this paper takes an inductive approach to data analysis. An inductive approach is used when the results of the data are not predefined (Creswell, 2009). This was done as the first questions surrounding structure had a predetermined criterion while the questions that followed pertained to the stakeholder interaction and balance and did not have predetermined data outcomes. This allowed for theories to be deduced inductively after the interviews were conducted.

The interviews were conducted by two researchers on each occasion. One researcher spoke to the informant and asked the series of questions as well as subsequent probing questions when needed, while the other researcher monitored the transcript for inaccuracies and highlighted sections of the transcript that answered the question. The consistent questions asked were related to the informant's organisation's position, procedures, and process in governing the NTE as well as engagement with different stakeholders.

The first three questions of the interview pertain to the structure of the informants' organisations and the roles they had within them. The informants were notified that these first questions would pertain to the structure of their organisation. This could have been answered through a survey, however, the benefit of this approach is that the informants would share information beyond just the structure of the position and thus data from these questions were further used in thematic analysis. These questions allowed us to identify the structures that the participants were a part of, this equating to the first part of the research question surrounding differing night-time governance structures.

Following the questions on structure, the informants were told that the questions that would now follow pertained to stakeholders. The questions that followed included questions on stakeholder identification as well as stakeholder balance. These were used to find and compare whom they identified as stakeholders as well as how they would interact with different stakeholders. Furthermore, questions about success or obstacles were asked to understand instances where they met the needs of the stakeholders they identified and restrictions that inhibit them from doing so.

12 interviews were conducted that comprised a mixture of different compositions of NTGOs around the Western countries. The interviews ranged in length from 24 minutes to 74 minutes,

with the majority being longer than 35 minutes. As the data we wanted to receive from these questions were not defined before conducting the research, we deemed semi-structured interviews to be the best fit.

Of these 12 informants, four sat inside the government as a night mayor, three sat outside the government as a night mayor, one was employed by an Industry Specific NGO, one was a part of a Night-time Research Group, and one was part of a civil organisation. The remaining two were unique in that they had previously served within the government, but moved to Industry Specific NGOs. This approach was used to determine the effect these structures have on the informant's view of stakeholders as well as how they balance the needs of the stakeholders. The semi-structured interview focuses on questions around structures and stakeholders.

3.4 Data Analysis

The research takes an inductive approach and further uses the data, processes of coding and a selection of final themes after coding to derive the theories for analysis. The first step of data analysis surrounded the identification of the differing structures. The first three questions surrounded the structure of the firms. Due to the nature of this data, we treated the data question by question in each interview in order to identify what the informant said about structure in the first 3 questions. It should be noted that the data acquired from the questions on structure went beyond the use of identifying the structure that exists as many informants made remarks to the questions that were further used in the thematic analysis.

This paper took a thematic approach to analyse the data in order to uncover a relevant theory after coding the data. After an initial broad coding, the codes were grouped and the broader themes of power, mediation, and representation were identified. The process began with analysing transcripts one by one and identifying the codes present in each. The codes were then transferred to a central document where they were grouped and the overarching themes were then identified. Within the theme of power, the data identified differ in ideas of structure, perception, and funding and thus subsections were created for each. These themes

were then analysed through the theory of power and stakeholder theory as examined in the literature review.

3.5 Reliability and Validity

Bryman & Bell (2011) state that the reliability of a study has to do with how replicable the study is. This section will begin with the issues with reliability and how this paper combatted them followed by the validity of the results.

In semi-structured interviews, there is a potential for data to appear from probing questions that are not asked to every respondent. This study asked probing questions that were consistent and only asked for more information on what the informant stated. This was done to ensure all the informants provided data for the same questions. However, an issue can be seen with the length of the interviews. The interviews ranged from 24 minutes to 74 minutes, due to some informants who were more engaged in the interview and included more detailed answers to questions. They did occasionally go beyond the line of questioning, however, we attempted to guide them back to the questions when they did so.

All the interviews were conducted by the same researcher to ensure consistency in the interaction with the informants and with how the questions were asked (Kumar, 2014). Furthermore, this researcher knew the most information on each informant. Thus they could ask the informant for more information if they knew the informant had not included information. However, the information known about the informants was not consistent, however, we conducted research on each informant and their organisation as much as possible from sources available on the internet. Furthermore, the researcher had previous personal and professional relations with several informants. To counteract the personal relationship issues, we remained formal throughout the interview and asked informants to further elaborate if they assumed previous knowledge due to the previous relationship.

The informants were allowed to select the time of the interview as we did not want interviews to be rushed; however, in two cases, the informants noted that they would only have 30 minutes for the interview. In these cases, we refrained from using ice breaker questions and sent the research brief days before in order to preserve time. Furthermore, due to informants

being allowed to select the times and the difference in time zones, two interviews took place at 21:00 for the research interviewer. Due to this being late in the evening the interviewer might not engage as much as in interviews that are done during the day due to tiredness (Kumar, 2014). However, on the days where this was the case we made sure to have as few other interviews on these days as possible and were well-rested.

The informants positioned inside the government can be seen to be experienced and knowledgeable in their field as all were elected or appointed on the merits of their knowledge and experience. Three of the informants from NGOs were elected to their position by vote while another two were previously part of a governmental group where they were elected or appointed. This gives credibility and reliability to their statements. The two other NGO informants were selected due to the success of their organisation and their knowledge of the organisations.

Many of the informants selected have a background in the night-time industry. While the backgrounds of these informants within the night-time industry can give the informants extensive knowledge within their respective industries, their backgrounds might lead to a bias of considering the needs of their previous industry stakeholders above other NTE stakeholders (Noble & Smith, 2015). To counteract this we asked the informants for the views of their organisation and not only their personal views.

From the researchers' perspective, two of the three researchers are active in the nightlife industry and thus may have a bias towards this stakeholder and the views this stakeholder might have of other stakeholders (Noble & Smith, 2015). However, the third researcher did not have a stake in the industry and proactively noted the other researchers' bias. For the most part, all the informants had been in their position for some time, however, one of the informants had only been in their position for 1 month. However, we deemed it relevant to have their new perspective on the role in this study.

It should be noted that all the interviews were conducted in English, however, English was not the first language of more than half of the participants. We did, however, try to rephrase and explain if ever there were any misunderstandings due to language.

3.6 Limitations

The limitations of this study stem from the time constraints, geographical variety, and the scope of the research group's own network. Due to the limited time in completing this research, we are unable to provide an equally distributed amount of the varying NTGOs. Additionally, the different legal systems of each of the sampled informants may affect how the informants are able to address their stakeholders. Finally, we are limited to the NTGOs found within the research group's immediate and adjacent networks. Furthermore, it has been stated that the field of night-time governance is understudied, this created difficulties in finding a diverse amount of research papers relevant to this study.

The research design does not account for specific local political, socio-economic, governance architecture and policy landscapes that exist in each location. These issues can have various implications for the structure and operations of the NTGOs from different laws and different bureaucratic implications. This was seen in the perception of the night and the differing views of the informants themselves.

3.7 Ethical Considerations

Bryman & Bell (2011) state that the identities of individuals need to remain confidential for a study to remain ethical. They further state that participants need to be made aware of this prior to the study and they need to be told how their data will be handled. The participants of this study were notified in writing as well as at the beginning of the interview that there is a software recording the transcript of the meeting, however, the transcript would never be publicly available and their names and factors that may identify them would be replaced with neutral terms. One participant did note concerns about sharing certain information and did often note they needed to be careful with what they said throughout the interview. To further preserve the anonymity of the participants and respect their views, this paper will be shared with the participant before publication for approval of anonymity. Although the informants were told that the transcripts would never be available publicly, they are yet to be informed whether this information will be stored or deleted following the completion of this research.

The process of anonymisation most commonly begins with retracting the names or other features of the participants in order to preserve their identity (Kolankiewicz, 2022). Due to the nature of the positions of the informants and their partnerships with their respective governments it was decided to keep the informants anonymous for this study.

The following steps have been taken to preserve anonymity in the analysis:

Firstly all the names of the informants have been changed to a corresponding alphabetisation such as “Informant A”, “Informant B” etc. Secondly, all pronouns of the informants have been edited to gender-neutral pronouns such as “they/them/their” to further preserve anonymity. Thirdly all the informant's city names have been removed and replaced with a letter that corresponds to the informant's letter. Furthermore, all mentions of “boroughs” or “districts” will be changed to “districts”. Other location-specific names or titles of NTGOs such as Night Czar, Night Economy Manager, etc. will be retracted and replaced with “night mayor”. The exact figures with regards to funding or size of office have been retracted. The organisations that represent a specific industry and are NTGOs will be referred to as “Industry Specific NTGOs” while organisations that predominantly conduct research will be referred to as “Research Groups”.

To further improve the anonymity of the informants this study identified the following changes that were needed to the transcripts: Firstly, all the informants' city names, as well as other cities mentioned by the informants, have been removed and replaced with a letter that corresponds to the informant's letter. Secondly, the mention of corporations by Informant C, which could indicate only a few regions in the world, has been changed to “Multi-National Hospitality Firms” to avoid links to the location of this city. Lastly, all mentions of boroughs or districts will be changed to “districts”. This has allowed the participants to be able to share more critically of their positions and avoid any fear of repercussions. This further improved the validity of the research.

Nespor (2000) and van den Hoonaard (2003) have questioned whether it is possible for informants to remain fully anonymous. Furthermore, Bryman & Bell (2011) note the difficulties of preserving anonymity when it comes to prominent figures or organisations where the information they share might distinguish them. The informants of this study may not have complete anonymity as many of the informants are prominent figures in their field

and they may have shared identical or similar views before. However, this study has taken all the possible methods and edits identified to preserve the anonymity of the informants when possible.

3.8 Chapter Summary

Through the use of qualitative analysis and critical grounded theory, we developed a semi-structured interview to gain insight into the structure of the informants' NTGOs as well as how they address stakeholders. Through the use of the researchers' network, a group of 12 informants was selected and interviewed online while the transcript was recorded to be further analysed. Through analysing the data thematically themes and theories were developed that were further applied to the data. The researchers made use of various techniques to ensure that the study would be replicable and that the results were valid. Furthermore, many steps were taken in order to preserve the anonymity of the informants in order to allow them to speak freely without repercussions.

4 Theoretical Perspective

This section presents stakeholder theory and power theory as theoretical perspectives for this paper's analysis. Firstly, the origins of stakeholder theory are described, followed by focused areas where stakeholder theory is used such as urban partnerships and in NGOs. Following this, the power theory section begins by addressing how power is discussed in previous night-time governance research. From this, applicable areas of power theory are used to frame previous researchers' use of power and outline the importance of power in the overall area of night-time governance. These theories were deduced from thematic analysis of the transcripts and will be further used to analyse the data.

4.1 Stakeholder Theory

The following chapter will introduce stakeholder theory, how it has been explored in urban governance, power differences of stakeholders, and how these will be applied to this research. This paper will look at urban partnerships and relate this to the NTGOs and structures in this study.

4.1.1 General Stakeholder theory

This section will begin by indicating the first uses of stakeholder theory, how it was defined as well as the connotation of the word itself. It will then show the use of stakeholder theory for the strategic management of firms and organisations. Finally, this section will show how different assemblages may be required to see stakeholders differently and thus provide an introduction to stakeholder theory in urban planning.

Various researchers have attempted to define stakeholders since the terms were first used by the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) in the 1960s (Freeman, 1984; Thompson, 1967; Bryson, 2004). Both Freeman and Thompson refer to stakeholders' abilities to affect organisations and how without them organisations would cease from existence (Freeman, 1984; Thompson,

1967). Bryson (2004), however, does not go as far as to connote an organisation ceasing to exist with his definition, however, he does share with Freeman (1984) and Thompson (1967) the idea of collaboration and coalition between several actors. Freeman (1984) further elaborates on the term stakeholder and how the word itself has connotations of “legitimacy”, as the act of “having a stake” could connote the meaning of legitimacy. Freeman (1984) believes that if management could see other actors as having a stake they would be treated as more legitimate and thus their needs would be further considered and addressed. This is why many link stakeholder theory to a more corporate social responsibility view than Friedman’s (1962) shareholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Taylor, 1971; Bryson, 2004). The creation of stakeholders and the definitions that elucidated them can be seen as the turning point from the previous shareholder view of management to the stakeholder view of management (Taylor, 1971). Thus to further examine stakeholder theory, the needs of stakeholders and the balance thereof, it is important to look at shareholder theory, the changing business world and what stakeholder theory means to a firm.

The strategic management of a firm or organisation plays a critical role in how a firm is organised and how it interacts with the world around it. Freeman’s (1984) *Strategic Management: A stakeholder approach* was the first to approach stakeholder theory as a strategy for the firm. It was often contrasted with its strategic predecessor shareholder theory which was initially coined by Milton Friedman in his 1962 publication *Capitalism and Freedom*. Milton Friedman believed that a firm’s main objective was to increase profits over everything else (Friedman, 1962). Contrary to Friedman (1962), stakeholder theory argued that the objectives of a firm should stem from finding a balance for the stakeholders of the firm (Ansoff, 1965; Freeman, 1984). The idea was to create a coalition with coupled goals, this was seen as the “dominant coalition view” (Ansoff, 1965; Freeman, 1984; Bryson, 2004). Stakeholder theorists believed that shareholder theory would not succeed as it neglected relations with stakeholders and stakeholder withdrawals could have a large effect on a business (Taylor, 1971; Freeman, 1984). However, in a study of non-profit organisations, Schubert & Willems (2020) note that although there is a need to satisfy all stakeholders, some of the stakeholders, generally those that give the organisation more funding, may hold more power in the organisation and are ultimately prioritised.

However, within stakeholder theory, there are some levels of difference in whom theorists considered to be stakeholders in the firm. The first school of thought from Rhenman (1968)

believed that stakeholders are only those that depend on the company and in turn that the company is dependent on. However, Freeman (1984) believes that Rhenman's (1968) view does not include government or adversarial groups as the company does not necessarily depend on them. The second view of stakeholders incorporates more general stakeholders such as customers, employees, the public, and society (Freeman, 1984). As many stakeholder theorists consider the perspective of stakeholder theory for a firm, this began the consideration of government and politics within stakeholder theory.

4.1.2 Stakeholder Theory and Urban Planning:

While the previous section discusses stakeholder theory from the lens of business or non-profits, this section will examine how the theory is used in urban planning. The research examined suggests that the interaction between these stakeholders is seminal in the accomplishment of the objectives of city planners. While this interaction can include conflict amongst stakeholders, there can be different approaches to addressing this conflict.

While stakeholder theory was originally centred around a single firm or organisation, the theory is used in urban planning where city partnerships and initiatives become the central 'firm' structure. This leads to a reliance on the interactions between these stakeholders in accomplishing the purpose of the partnership or initiative (Goatman, A., Le Feuvre, M., Medway, D., Ward, K., & Warnaby, K., 2015; Browne & Katsela, 2019). Goatman et al. (2015) sought to identify how stakeholders interacted under an urban partnership through qualitative research about a revitalisation initiative involving private, public, and voluntary actors in Manchester, U.K. The findings reveal stakeholder interactions had two types of influence: process enabling and process inhibiting. An example of process enabling was access to opportunities through which stakeholders formal interaction with each other allowed for funding to be secured. An example of process inhibiting was insularity where the projects of certain stakeholders were not linked to the greater partnership. These influences stemmed from both attitudes and behaviours between different stakeholders. Goatman et al. (2015) conclude with the notion that the sum of these influences can determine the overall success of the urban partnership's objectives. Similarly, Browne & Katsela (2019) note the importance of stakeholder interaction in the formation of city logistics initiatives in Sweden. While these logistics initiatives involved a more focused goal of transportation efficiency and

sustainability, private, public, and voluntary stakeholders were all represented in the initiative process. Through their qualitative study, Browne & Katsela (2019) found six criteria of stakeholder interaction including stakeholder diversity, stakeholder interests, and knowledge dissemination. The intensity of criteria was imperative in identifying and resolving conflicts as well as maintaining stakeholder commitment to the initiatives. While both researchers state the narrow geographic perspective of studies as a limitation, the similar findings between the studies highlight the importance of stakeholder interaction in an urban planning setting.

While each study states the importance of stakeholder interaction, there are diverging views on the role of conflict in the process. Browne & Katsela (2019) see conflict as something needing to be resolved and avoided through interaction, with more interaction leading to aligned motives and goals. This may be the case for a narrow initiative such as city logistics, but in the case of urban revitalisation, conflict can be much more complex (Goatman et al., 2015). Brand & Gaffinkins (2007) critique of planning theory asserts that a majority of city planning prioritises reaching a consensus and in doing so, produces legislation that is weak and noncommittal. Goatman et al. (2015) use this critique to conclude that a consensus among such varying stakeholders can be seen as unattainable and resolving each conflicting stakeholder relationship may only be a waste of time. Lampe (2001) believes that mediation can facilitate conflict resolution in a fashion that is cheaper and quicker than other conflict resolution methods. He further states that in a situation where the mediator does not hold decision-making power in the conflict but has knowledge in the fields of the stakeholders, the mediator should be successful in assisting the stakeholders to reach a reciprocated result to the conflict.

In conclusion, stakeholder theory exists as a strategic management strategy that seeks to balance the needs of the stakeholders and avoid conflict between stakeholders. Issues can arise with meeting the needs of these stakeholders if there are different degrees of power that one or more stakeholders might hold. Savage, Nix, Whitehead, & Blair (1991) believed that organisations would prioritise the stakeholders that ultimately had the most power. Power and theories surrounding power will be further examined in the section that follows.

4.2 Power Theory

Previous literature on night-time governance or NTE has indicated the importance of power (Chatterton & Holland, 2002, Van Liempt, 2015, Seijas, 2020). Chatterton and Holland (2002) discuss the shift in power from the traditional means of governing the night, through police and judiciary methods, to business and local state interests. In a Netherlands-focused study, Van Liempt (2015) found that unequal distributions of power in private-public partnerships affected relationships between the different working groups. Seijas (2020) agreed with these findings of Van Liempt (2015) and further concluded that while night-time organisations had access to specialised networks and capabilities, they lacked regulatory power. Seijas (2020) maintained that the creation of a permanent, independent city office for these organisations to have more influence on policy making and gain more collaborative access to other city departments.

While night-time governance research has not included direct links to power theory, the most applicable area of power theory for night-time research would be the expression of power in formal and informal mechanisms. Formal power stems from a title or position one holds which can assist in coercion through a bureaucratic positioning (Merton, 1957) or direct control of scarce or essential resources such as money (Pfeffer & Salanick, 1974). This can be seen in what Seijas (2020) proposes: power given through the creation of an office or positions is needed for effective night-time governance. However, Fleming & Spicer (2014) present a consensus among researchers that power largely works through informal mechanisms such as political connections (Alpin & Hegarty, 1980) and campaigning (Carty, 2001; Palazzo & Richter, 2005). Power of ideology is also presented as means of informal mechanisms. Fleming & Spicer (2014) state ideology of the government has the power to either enable or inhibit an organisation's goals. Lastly, Crane & Matten's (2012) study of Greenpeace, a global environmental campaigning network, revealed institutionalisation of the organisation gained legitimacy in the eyes of the government. However, credibility was lost in the eyes of activists who felt the organisation could not be as effective. While some authors noted the existence of formal authoritative power in the generation of night-time policy (Montgomery, 1995; Cibin, 2018; Seijas, 2020; Hae, 2011), there is little mention of how

informal mechanisms can provide the power to night-time policymakers or those wishing to influence them.

While power has been broadly described in night-time governance research, formal and informal mechanisms of power can be used to describe dynamics within night-time governance. The formal power of position (Merton, 1995) and the control of financial resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974) and the informal influence of ideology (Fleming & Spicer, 2014), political connections (Alpin & Hegarty, 1980), and campaigning (Carty, 2001; Palazzo & Richter, 2005) can shape how the night is governed. Lastly, Crane & Matten's (2015) view on institutionalisation providing legitimacy while simultaneously damaging credibility can provide perspective on why an NTGO may desire to remain independent from local government. These perspectives will be used in the analysis performed on the data gathered.

4.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter served as an introduction and exploration into the theoretical basis that was adopted based on the data from the semi-structured interviews. Stakeholder theory showed a link to power in that the views of Schubert & Willems (2020) show the stakeholders that funded the organisation the most had been considered more in the decisions of an organisation, this was somewhat contrary to stakeholder theory. Thus this paper will look at the power of finance and how it might influence stakeholder representation in the analysis.

The mediation capabilities of the NTGOs interviewed in this paper will be examined in the analysis through the use of Lampe's (2001) view of who a mediator should be. Lampe (2001) believed the mediator should be a neutral third party that has knowledge of the industry but no actual power to make changes. Furthermore, Lampe (2001) notes that mediation includes compromise for stakeholders, this study will examine how some NTGOs will mediate while others will not mediate or seek compromise but rather represent their stakeholders and look for the best possible outcomes.

Theories of power will be used to explain what types of power dynamics are observed amongst the informants interviewed. Merton's (1995) idea of bureaucratic positioning and the control of money described by Pfeffer & Salancik (1974) will show formal mechanisms of power in NTGOs. Crane & Matten's (2012) observation of institutionalisation will be used to show how NTGOs view institutionalising or the lack thereof. Lastly, political connections (Alpin & Hegarty, 1980), campaigning (Carty, 2001; Palazzo & Richter, 2005), and ideology (Fleming & Spicer, 2014) will be applied to explain how an NTGO's power is either limited or expanded due to these informal mechanisms.

5 Findings

This section is divided into three parts. The first will provide a contextualisation of night-time governance structures and the identified stakeholder groups of each informant. The second part presents three themes that emerged from the interviews: power, mediation, and representation. Lastly, we discuss the results of the findings including implications and further areas of research.

5.1 Contextualisation of Data

The following section will provide a contextualisation of the results of the thematic analysis. This includes the structures of the NTGOs divided into government-affiliated and non-government affiliated groups. The groups are then compared and the differences are shown between government-affiliated structures and non-government affiliated structures. Following this, tables are presented linking informants to their respective night-time governance structures and the stakeholders they identified. Data regarding stakeholder identification was based on informants' responses to the question “what stakeholders do you identify...?”. This information is important as the context of structure and stakeholders identified are key in understanding the information presented by the informants in the thematic analysis and in answering the research question.

5.1.1 Night-time Governance Structures

This section examines the variations in night-time governance structures observed through the interviews. It is divided into two sections: government-affiliated and non-government affiliated governance structures. The commonality between government-affiliated structures is the access to funding, with all of them being publicly funded. The non-government affiliated structures' commonality is simply that they are not directly integrated within the local

government system. However, we see that even with these overarching commonalities, there are variations in terms of legal classifications, support, and funding.

5.1.2 Government Affiliated Night-time Governance Structures

The following section will investigate the structural differences between the night mayors that are within the city government. The data is based on six of the interviews conducted and includes informants that identified that their position was within their city government. This section will examine wherein the government their position is and the support structures that are accessible to their organisation.

When examining the night-time governance structures within city government, the first distinction we see is the location of the position. City C's night mayor is only a role within a district-specific economic development department, while City J and City K have separate offices inside of culture departments. Similarly, City L's night mayor's office is inside the film and entertainment department. City I's night mayor has no department association and has their own office in city hall. Another role identified was in City A where a city councillor pushed the night-time agenda forward in city council meetings. It should be noted that City K's night mayor was the only role who noted being a part of a political party.

These roles differed even more with regard to their support systems. City J's night mayor was the head of an office with supporting staff focusing on the NTE in the city. Furthermore, City J had a previous night-time research group with multiple members set up to develop a plan specifically for the night mayor's office. City C's night mayor was in an office with multiple employees but was the only one specifically focusing on nightlife. City I, City K, and City L's night mayors were all the only employees within their respective offices and mentioned various collaborations with other departments and outside organisations. The city councillor from City A is part of a larger council who all have a single vote on all city issues. It should be noted that City A city councillor is not a night-time specific role and the focus on night-time related issues was limited in this role.

Although these NTGOs are all within city government, distinctions between being located within economy and culture offices as well as the amount of support in the given role show how diverse these government-affiliated groups can be. Table 1 summarises the information presented above. These differences will be explored more in the results of the thematic analysis section by comparing the effect of the structure on organisational affairs.

Table 1: Government Affiliated Governance Structures

City	Location of Position	Support Systems
City A	City Council	No Mention of Support Systems
City C	District-Specific Economic Department	Industry Specific NTGO
City I	Independent Office within City Hall	Night-time Board, Licensing Department, Planning Department
City J	Office within Cultural Department	Night-time Research Group, Night-time District Authorities
City K	Office within Cultural Department	Police Department, Culture Department
City L	Office within Film and Entertainment Department	Industry Specific NTGO

5.1.3 Non-Government Affiliated Night-time Governance Structures

The following section will investigate the differences between the NTGOs that are outside the city government. The data is based on 7 of the interviews conducted and includes informants that identified that their organisation was outside of the city government. This section will examine the classification of the informant’s organisation, how the organisations are funded and what other existing NTGOs exist in their city.

The first type of organisation observed was a non-industry specific NGO. City E and City B organisations are both NGOs with an elected board and they are focused on broad night-time

activities and issues. The second organisation type is an industry-specific NGO. City C has a hospitality-focused NGO which represents the interests of bars, clubs, restaurants, etc. Similarly, City H and City A have NGOs focused on night-time music venues in their city. The third type of organisation observed is a citizen's civil organisation. This can only be seen in City G where the NTGO consists of citizens that advocate for night-time issues. They have a board consisting of 5 people, but the board does not have an electoral process and the members are decided by its founders. The final organisation is unique in that it is a government-owned entity, however, it is not part of the government. This can only be seen in City D, which has a night mayor located under the cultural innovation section of this government-owned business which is focused on startups as well as cultural and social programs.

Three funding schemes for NTGOs outside of government were identified. These are public-funded, privately funded, and a combination of the two. City G is the only organisation fully funded by the government in this sample group. It receives funding from the city periodically and from the state government for a current project. The organisation in City H receives periodical funding from public sources such as the city government and the European Union as well as project-based funding from the city departments. Additionally, they receive private funding through membership fees. City E is similar in that it receives funding from its government periodically and from project-based work as well as from its private members; however, it does not receive funding from the European Union. City B funding comes publicly from both federal and local governments, in the form of project-based funding from the economic department and the health and safety department and periodical funding from the cultural department. City D is unique in that its night mayor is part of a company that generates revenue from property rentals as well as receives government funding. Finally, City C receives only revenue from its members who pay on a monthly or yearly basis. From the data, we see that the most frequently used funding is mixed between private and public.

While some of these organisations are the sole NTGO in their city, some have additional NTGOs inside and outside of the government. City E and City B's organisation only have an additional night council that assists and advises the organisation and provides the only advocacy for nightlife within their cities. Similarly, City A does not have any official organisations or positions but the informant noted that there was a city councillor that they work with who addresses the night in city hall. While City C and City G have a night mayor

that is part of the city government who both fall under the economic development department, City C’s night mayor was subject only to a certain district of the city, while the department in City G was not district specific. Additionally, City G has a district-specific night mayor in the city. In City H each political party has a political spokesperson tasked to address nightlife as well as other commissions focused on specific stakeholders in the NTE. Lastly, City D works with a club association, however, the association is not specific to City D and represents the greater region where this city is located. The interaction between the multiple governance groups in a city will be explored more in the results of the thematic analysis.

Table 2: Non-Government Affiliated Governance Structures

City	Classification of Organisation	Funding Scheme	Additional Night-time Organisation Outside the Government	Additional Night-time Office Inside the Government
City A	Industry Specific NGO	No Funding	No Position	No Position
City B	Non-Industry Specific NGO	Public Funding	Night-time Board	No Position
City C	Industry Specific NGO	Private Funding	No Position	Night Mayor
City D	Government-Owned Entity	Mixed Funding	Industry Specific NGO	No Position
City E	Non-industry Specific NGO	Mixed Funding	Night-time Board	No Position
City G	Civil Organisation	Public Funding	No Position	Night Mayor
City H	Industry Specific NGO	Mixed Funding	Industry Specific NGO	Local Political Party Representatives

5.1.4 Stakeholders Identified

The following section presents how the differing night-time governance structures identified their stakeholders. The organisations are divided similarly to the previous section to better understand how the informants within different structures have identified their stakeholders. This section will include Table 3 and Table 4. Table 3 presents the government-affiliated night-time structures, the stakeholders identified and the position within the city government of the night-time governance structure. This can also influence how stakeholders are identified. Table 4 presents the Non-government affiliated night-time structures and includes the type of organisation as well as how they are funded as this aspect can have an influence on how they identify their stakeholders. This will further be examined in the mediation and representation section along with how these NTGOs addressed the examined stakeholders.

5.1.4.1. Government Affiliated Night-time Governance Structure
Stakeholder Identification

Table 3 demonstrates five different stakeholders identified for government-affiliated night-time governance structures. Informants A, F, I, and K have all identified the government, night-time industry, and residents as their stakeholders. Of these informants, Informant F and K are located in the culture department, Informant A is located in the city council, and Informant I is located in an independent office. Informant C, on the other hand, has identified similar stakeholders with the difference of the residents being limited to those in Informant C’s district. This could be seen as a result of Informant C being located in a District-Specific Economic Development Department in comparison to other informants who are not bound by districts. Informant J, in addition to city government departments and industry, has identified district authorities as a stakeholder which differs from the other six informants. Moreover, they have not identified residents as stakeholders which might suggest that while they are located within the culture department, which is also the case for two other informants, the structures of their governments can affect which stakeholders are served.

Table 3: Government Affiliated Night-time Governance Structures

Informant	Stakeholders Identified	Position within City Government
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Informant A	Government, Night-time Industry, Residents	City Council
Informant C	Government, Night-time Industry, Residents - In their district	District-Specific Economic Development Department
Informant F	Government, Night-time Industry, Residents	Culture Department
Informant I	Government, Night-time Industry, Residents	Independent Office
Informant J	City Government Departments, Night-time Industry, District Authorities	Culture Department
Informant K	Government, Night-time Industry, Residents	Culture Department
Informant L	Government, Night-time Industry, Residents	Film and Entertainment Department

5.1.4.2. Non-Government Affiliated Night-time Governance Structures Stakeholder Identification

Table 4 shows that the groups that only identified their members as the stakeholders were the groups that were either funded by their members or those that did not receive funding at all. This may be linked to how due to receiving financial compensation they represent these stakeholders that fund the organisation.

Table 4 illustrates four different types of organisations; NGOs, Industry Specific NGOs, Civil Organisations, and Government-owned entities. Informants A and H have stated their Members as their stakeholders. Their members include clubs and bars. While Informant A's organisation, an NGO, is not funded by any entities; Informant H, who is a member of an Industry Specific NGO, is funded by the government, the EU, and their members. Despite Informant H's funding from the EU and the government, however, Informant H does not count these entities as stakeholders. Informant C is another informant that has identified their members as the only stakeholders. In their case, the members consist of hospitality venues. This Industry Specific NGO, on the other hand, is funded by members and is the only organisation that has been interviewed for this study to receive their funding from their members only. Informant E has identified the city government, the night-time industry, and the city residents as their stakeholders. As an NGO, their funding comes from the government

and their stakeholders which could suggest that the funding they receive also comes from the residents, and the industry. Informant G is part of the only organisation that has identified city residents as their sole stakeholders, despite receiving their funding from the government. Although the government is the funder, they are not counted as a stakeholder. Informant D, part of another NGO, has identified the municipality, night-time industry, and the residents as their stakeholders. This entity is owned and funded by the government. Similarly, Informant B, has identified the municipality and the night-time industry among their stakeholders. However, contrary to Informant D’s organisation, this NGO that is funded by the government, has identified the consumers of the night as their third stakeholder rather than residents.

Table 4: Non-Government Affiliated Night-time Governance Structures

Informant	Stakeholders Identified:	Type of organisation	Source of Funding
Informant A	Members - Club and Bars	Industry Specific NGO	None
Informant B	Municipality, Night-time Industry, Consumers of the Night	Non-Industry Specific NGO	Government
Informant C	Members - Hospitality Venues	Industry Specific NGO	Members
Informant D	Municipality, Night-time Industry, residents	Government-owned Entity	Government
Informant E	City Government, Night-time Industry, City Residents	Non-Industry Specific NGO	Government & Stakeholder
Informant G	Citizens of the city	Civil	Government
Informant H	Members - Club and bars	Industry Specific NGO	Government, EU & Members

5.2 Thematic Results

The following section presents the results of the thematic analysis used to analyse the data of the 12 interviews that took place. The themes identified are power, mediation and representation. Through these themes, concepts of addressing stakeholders and the structures of these organisations will be explored.

5.2.1 Power

This section shows the different dimensions of power that emerged from the interviews with informants. The section is divided into power of organisational structure, power of finance and power of perception. The theories used have been developed previously and are now used as a lens to analyse the data.

5.2.1.1. Power of Organisational Structure

Structure can form a vital role in power or the lack of power for people trying to exercise change in a city. Some of the informants of this study find themselves in a position where they are not able to exert power for their desired outcome while some others have access to those who can exert power given their roles. This section will examine what the informants have said with regards to power connected to organisational structure in night-time governance both the limitations or benefits of their position that may create power dimensions.

Firstly, Informant F and Informant J discuss the lack of power due to the structure of their government institution as a whole. They both believe that the power in their cities resides in the districts rather than the central city government. These limitations described by Informant J and Informant F directly link to the formal power of bureaucratic positioning described by Merton (1957).

“It (licensing and opening hours) comes from central government... and it affects directly the districts. So we kind of sit in the middle and we have no decision powers.” (Informant J)

“There's unlike most other city governments. The city mayor has no power. The power in the city resides in the districts. The mayor's got the sort of a high level planning power, where you can write a plan. But you can't build very much and do very much, they have no influence on licensing.” (Informant F)

Informant J then notes the impact of this power residing in the districts which are able to choose their own policies on licensing based on the central government's laws.

“The districts in themselves, they are the ones who have the power. If you have a venue and you apply for a licence, they are the ones who have the power to tell you, yes or no based on their assessment of the situation because they have their own individual licensing teams. But then it has to fit into the framework of the central government.” (Informant J)

It should be noted that when asked about what the biggest obstacles are in the city that Informant J resides, they mentioned that licensing was the biggest issue. From a power dynamic perspective, this shows that the organisation is not able to influence what they believe to be the biggest issue in their city due to structural limitations.

In contrast, Informant E notes that they believe the mayor of their city to be the most important partner for them as the mayor had the power and could decide over opening hours and licensing unlike the situation in Informant F and Informant J's respective cities. Informant E also noted that the mayor was in charge of “public order and safety” and that these are topics that are essential in any conversation to change anything in night life, thus the mayor was a crucial partner.

“the mayor was the most important person to address, the mayor of the city governs the closing times of clubs, he's responsible for public order and safety. And that's why it is very important to have a good relationship with the mayor because he's governing a big part of course of what is, you know, implicated. So always if you want to change something in night life, it always comes down to a public order and safety topic. So, that's why the mayor was very important for us.” (Informant E)

Although Informant E sits outside the government, they have access to the mayor who has the power to change laws, noting that they meet with the mayor “three times a year”, relating to Alpin & Heagarty (1980) idea of political connections providing a source of power. While Informant F and Informant J had direct contact with the mayor of their cities, they did not express the importance of the relationship, possibly due to the lack of power from the mayor’s position.

While Informant C did not note the specifics of their relationship with the mayor, they do note the importance of government ties when starting their new position outside the government. Informant C believed that these governmental ties were important as the government holds the ability to make changes.

“I have to stay close to the government because they do hold the, you know, the wand that will or will not make certain changes.” (Informant C)

The notion of government ties is expanded by Informant G who believes that someone needs to be actually within the structure. This was due to Informant G’s organisation not being “inside the machine” and needing someone that had the power to act upon their plan in regards to licensing.

“There must be another force there, that federates the stakeholders inside the city: Urban planners, transport, police, districts. We don't know these people, we don't work inside the machine so... we need something, a position inside the machine that can do that. It is a bureau, it is an office..... We need somebody in this part of the structure to provide the structure plan so that the city can act upon this plan. We have some access to these different departments. I talked with people from the urban planning and we're just doing consultation or trying to lobby, we don't have that type of power.” (Informant G)

The governance structure Informant G mentioned needing inside of their local government proved to also lack power due to the department it was located in.

“So in terms of governance, it is not ideal. I think it has some limits. Let's say, even though the official title is the Noise and Night Commissioner, this person cannot recommend changing a noise law because it's not part of their department, it's part of the urban planning

department and not the economical services.” (Informant G)

This lack of power is further reiterated by Informant G when describing the process of obtaining a “special derogation to operate a venue for 24 hours non-stop with an alcohol licence”. In this instance, various different power levels are shown. Firstly it is shown how Informant G’s organisation is reliant on the power of the Economic Service Department who was their partner in leading this project. The Economic service department was then influenced by a negative recommendation from the police and emergency services. Informant G notes that the economic service department could not act against this negative recommendation, this shows the power that the police and emergency services held in this situation. Finally, Informant G notes how they then needed to go “higher up to the mayor to intervene”, The mayor thus had more power than the other departments. It was only through the mayor’s intervention that this derogation was obtained. They note how this “demonstrates the need... for a higher up structure... in the hierarchy of the city, we [they] can really make things move”.

“We've been working for four months, to get a special permit, special derogation to operate a venue for 24 hours non-stop with an alcohol licence. And this has been discussed for months and months, this was the game plan. But the economical Service department, which was leading this project at the end, just two hours away from the deadline to send this to get voted at the meeting of the District Council, the cops and the emergency services decided they didn't want to do this. Their recommendation was negative. The economic service department couldn't act against the negative recommendation of the police. So, what we had to do was go higher up to the mayor to intervene. So, this was then voted at the Executive Committee as a way to bypass this negative recommendation. So, you know I think this demonstrates the need when we have for a higher up structure and a structure is higher up in the hierarchy of the city, so we can really make things move. otherwise, we will be stopped at some point.”

(Informant G)

The points of Informant G connect back to the power of positioning in a bureaucratic institution like a local government (Merton, 1957). While Informant G believes it is necessary

to have a nightlife representative in “the machine”, the positioning of this representative is directly linked to the amount of power held.

A unique position that did have political power in this study was Informant A who was a city councillor. Informant A noted limited power as they could vote on topics in the city. In this political structure, Informant A explained they were further able to use this power when the mayor of the city came to them and said they needed their vote on a certain topic. In exchange, the mayor would commission a nightlife study in this city. Informant A indicated the moment as their “only... success” in their role which they were able to achieve due to a political trade-off where they were able to use their position of power to influence night-time governance.

“The only time I really had a success was, when I managed to get myself in a position where [the mayor] needed my vote, So and then suddenly there was money in the budget to do a nightlife study. But it was really only because they needed me.” (Informant A)

In the case of Informant A’s success, a transition of power is seen. Pfeffer & Salanick (1974) see money as one of the scarce resources that can be key to an organisation’s goal. While the mayor has power through budgetary control, Informant A has power through control of a separate scarce resource, their vote as a city councillor. This political trade-off shows an informal trade of power which stems from formal positioning.

Informant C noted that although they believed it was important to be “the advocate on the inside of City Hall” they had “no direct authority”. Furthermore, Informant C believes that some “nonsensical... bureaucracy” was restrictive to the tasks that they performed and that this bureaucracy slowed them down.

“I would have to go through a lot but that was really the job. I think, you know, the job was to be the advocate on the inside of City Hall and create meaningful reasons and justifications to do or not do something, but I had no direct authority... I could have gotten twice as much done if it wasn't for some of the nonsensical you know bureaucracy.” (Informant C)

This shows how due to their position in the hierarchy and power structure, Informant C had to navigate bureaucratic norms to fulfil their tasks. This idea is shared further by Informant F;

However, in their case, they noted that the “bureaucratic hurdle race... had to be gone for there to be a point of this [position]”.

A clear example of bureaucratic restriction can be seen with Informant I. When asked what obstacles Informant I faced, the informant expressed firstly that “the system itself is an obstacle”. They note that due to the legalities applied to certain government employees, they may not put in an objection to a building project that they believe might be damaging to night-time venues.

“The system itself is an obstacle... when developers want to put a building up next to a venue I can't put in a planning objection because I'm a council officer and it's a quasi-judicial process. It's a legal process... (Informant I)

This shows how this system limits them from exerting power where an NGO group might be able to object to this real estate development. From an NGO perspective, Informant G noted that due to receiving government funding, their organisation “migrated from activists to partners”. This meant that they could no longer be as critical of the government due to new collaboration with the government.

“we were activists to begin with so back then I could just show up at the questions period of the city council and ask tough questions in front of everyone and put politicians on the hot seat. But now that we have funding, of course, we have migrated from activists to partners.”(Informant G)

Informant B warns of the “danger” that is associated with being a part of a city government and how they intend on remaining independent.

“But I don't like to institutionalise our foundation group too much because we are very independent, and if you institutionalise too much, then you're also part of the city. And you should sometimes be in conflict with your city when the things are not beneficial for the night. Otherwise you can be eaten up and nothing. That's a danger and I understand that the night mayors who are part of an organisation like that also has benefits” (Informant B)

While Informat G still remains outside of city government and still has some level of power when it comes to “freedom of speech”, they further explained how the partnership with the city government changed how they interacted with the city. Whereas before Informant G had the power to be particularly vocal in discourse with politicians publicly, they now could not do this publicly as they were now partners with the city.

“So it's not the same anymore but I'm still not working for the city, you know. And so I still have some freedom of speech, you know. The media is looking at us and are asking us, how's it going with the city? But I just can't say, Well, I don't have the exact same freedom of speech I used to have before. Now I must put a little bit of white gloves on, you know, when I say things. So it's not like before when I could just go and say: “Well, it's been six years, you've done nothing. What are you doing?” You know, now it's like: “Well, you know, it's been six years. We hope we're gonna be able to have some things soon. I know they're working really hard on that” So, you know we're partners, but we're not, you know, I could still go out and say what I want, but at the same time, you don't want to throw your partner under the bus.”

(Informant G)

To summarise, the most prominent mechanism of power was formal, using Merton's (1957) idea of power stemming from positioning and titles. Informants G, C, and E, speaking from non-government affiliated NTGOs, noted the perceived power of government-affiliated positions. Informant J and F, speaking from a government-affiliated NTGO perspective, expanded this notion, noting certain positions having more power than others. The informal mechanism was used through the political connection of Informant E and their city mayor, aligning with Alpin & Hegarty (1980). The lack of formal power held by non-government NTGO groups seems to be balanced with the ability to freely criticise governmental action as Informat B notes. Informant G somewhat lost this ability when gaining partnership status with their local government. For night-time industry stakeholders, licensing, zoning, and other night-time-related policy directly stems from those with the power to shape policy. How much power a given NTGO can exert on policymakers either via informal political connection or formal positioning within local government is important to shaping those policies. Another formal dimension of power can be observed in the power of finance.

5.2.2 Power of Finance

This section includes quotes relating to the power of finances. This ranges from the overall influence money has in the world to the individual effects felt by informants regarding a lack of funding. Many informants representing an NGO noted that finances were major obstacles to their organisation. Finance being a key source of power, aligns with Pfeffer & Salanick (1974) idea that power can be derived from the ability to control a key resource such as money. The control of money will be presented first broadly, looking at control of money in a market and narrowing to the focus on the control of money within organisations.

Informant H believed that their organisation might lose “relevance because [they’re] not changing anything”. They link this to the fact that they do not have money and that “money is power and we don’t have that much money as the others that want to change things”. They believe that their organisation is not succeeding as they do not have power “in a capitalistic society”

“Another obstacles could be also to be that we are not succeeding, you know, that the city that we are living in a capitalistic society and things are changing, and we only have certain powers and people could think that we are playing with a system being not strong enough which then loses relevance because we're not changing anything. You know, of course that is also an obstacle because, you know, money is power and we don't have that much money as others that want to change things.” (Informant H)

The idea of money holding power is further shared by Informant C who noted how large corporations who are the “bigger providers” and who provide “the biggest checks” are prioritised by local business associations. These large groups are considered more by the local associations over the smaller businesses whom the informant believes to be “an afterthought”.

“They[other advocacy groups] have looked over because their money and their time of course, goes to the biggest reasons, the biggest providers, the biggest pick, the biggest checks, which is, of course, [Multinational Hospitality Firms], and, etc. So the small business guy has remained to just be an afterthought” (Informant C)

Similarly when Informant A began work for a hospitality association representing small businesses, they saw the “huge lobbying power” an existing association had with the

government and how this affected Informant A's association involvement.

"Yeah, one thing that happened with the pandemic is that there already is a restaurant association in my country, but it's the big chains and it's restaurants and hotels. So it has all, like Ibis and Radisson in this huge lobby. It has huge lobbying power And when the pandemic came, they were obviously talking to government very closely... We were hardly ever invited."

(Informant A)

Financial power can also be seen in how an NTGO is funded. When Informant C was positioned inside the local government, they noted the "cushy budget" compared to other NTGOs.

"However, because the position was there, it had a very cushy budget. Like I could actually spend money... They [other night-time governance officials] have had to go and find money and go and really get money, right? I had not to say, I had unlimited money. I had to, of course, you know, do my job and make a case for what we're spending it on. But nonetheless, there was money reserved, like a lot of money like where it's a very healthy budget in my part of the world over here where I can use that for programs and initiatives." (Informant C)

In contrast, Informant B noted finances when asked what their main obstacles were. While their NTGO had the right assemblage, the issue was that these people had to work voluntarily. This was a limitation for their organisation as the people working there had to work other jobs to finance themselves and could not work full time at the organisation.

"Well it's mainly financial actually because we have motivated people that would really like to make this their full-time job if they could and we've been lobbying for so long... We are in good contact with the right people, we have good connections with the media, we have good connections with the bars and the artists and all that, that's already there. It's now mainly needing money." (Informant B)

While Informant G did not mention finances as an obstacle, they do mention the power of finances. When trying to collaborate with the department of culture the department acknowledged and agreed with the work of the informant's organisation. However, the culture service department told the informant to "go to economic development, they have the money

we don't". This demonstrates that the power to implement these changes the informant was suggesting lies more with the department that had the money.

"We talk a lot about culture. That's basically our main point. So I mean, it's just weird, you know, when I first started talking with the city maybe four years ago, I met with the cultural services and they basically said, Good job, like what you're saying, we've been saying the same for two, three years. But go to economic development, they have the money we don't. So you know, they'll be able to act on it." (Informant G)

To conclude, formal power is notably seen with the control of money. While Informant H implicates the overall capitalistic society, Informant A and C note that compared to the organisations they represent, multinational hospitality firms have more lobbying power with local government. In terms of organisational funding, Informant C while being within local government notes a large budget to be used while the main obstacle of Informant B's non-government affiliated NTGO was a lack of funding. The last dimension of power is perception.

5.2.2.1. Power of Perception

This section will include quotes that relate to perception and the power it can have on an NTGO. Perception can be connected to an overall ideology described by Fleming & Spicer (2014) which can have power over organisations. These perceptions of the night by government officials as well as wider society have informal influence over those attempting to govern it. While government-affiliated and non-government affiliated NTGOs note different influences this perception has on their organisation, shifting this perception is an important aspect of all NTGOs.

Informant B notes that the NTE or even the night was barely included in their city's development plan for the inner city in 2015. They note that the plan only included the word night on a few occasions and when it was mentioned it was in relation to "problems in the night and didn't show... the potential [the night] has". At this point, the informant's city had a night mayor but it seems that the city still did not have its own plan for the night.

“even in the inner City report about the development of the inner city in, let's say 2015. The word nights was mentioned, maybe two times. And it's like the main report on how to develop the city in the coming four years when there's new local cabinets, you know, and then night was only mentioned when there's some problems in the night and didn't show, like the potential it has.” (Informant B)

Informant C notes how it is often viewed that the “late night breeds problems” and that in the late night people “partake in... drugs and sex and alcohol and prostitution” but they note that these are not just things that happen in the night but they exist in the day too.

“I've seen again from the entrepreneur experience then, how to deal with a lot of taboo, kind of mentality and some even, you know, negative, lots of negative perception on both just, you know, alcohol, and alcohol breeds problems and late night breeds problems and people are coming to, you know, be partake in drug and drugs and sex and alcohol and prostitution and all of those things that do exist but they don't just exist in the night and they don't just exist in the day.” (Informant C)

Informant F includes the example of how restaurants might be attracting mice to areas of the city but one does not see the city closing restaurants due to this. This can be a similar sentiment to Informant C's views that these taboo topics are also happening in the daytime but one does not see governments restricting the daytime. Informant F further notes that there are topics in the NTE that should not be contentious. Informant F believes that arguments about whether young people “should be able to dance at night”, whether there should be “counter-culture” or “whether electronic dance music should be allowed to exist” are not topics that can be contentious. They believe that if anyone were to think of these as contentious they may be “imbued with prejudice”. They further note how the way authorities often view the night is generally negative.

“When it comes to the night-time economy, you can't have a serious argument about whether young people should be able to dance at night or whether we should have a counter culture or whether electronic dance music should be allowed to exist, I'll die to support it. You know, these aren't contentious topics. So when we're in this, and anyone who's having an argument about this just hasn't thought about it deeply enough or is imbued with prejudice... You know, we wouldn't start abolishing our restaurants because occasionally they attract mice, you

know, you wouldn't do that. And I just feel the same way about the night... I felt that my contribution to that was to make sure people understood the importance and work through how it is that we can resolve the issues that seem to face authorities when they think about it because there's a kind of knee jerk reaction. Even the word night time economy produces a knee jerk, like sort of, you know, syphilis or scrocular or something.” (Informant F)

This negative association local authorities have with the NTE described by Informant F has been a focal point for other informants, trying to change the way the night-time is perceived by the government as well as the public in their cities. Informant G further noted that before the existence of night-time governance structures in their city the night was governed by the police and the emergency services and then the night was seen as problematic with the lack of regard for the positives it might bring. While the police and emergency services took a prohibitive approach to the night the night could be seen as a nightmare for stakeholders alike.

“It was just a very prohibitive approach to the night in many ways. It was up to the cops and the emergency services to run the night. That's basically the only governance you could find. The night was seen as a problematic time. The night was always seen as a problem instead of seeing a positive impact of the night.” (Informant G)

Informant G further shares the idea that the elected officials do not understand the night as they noted the elected officials “don’t use the night. They don’t go out at night”. Thus Informant G believed that their non-government affiliated night-time governance structure was fundamental to advising the city. They further noted that the decisions made on governing the night by the government may include “prejudices”.

“I think it's fundamental for a city to have this type of organisation because otherwise, you're leaving everything into the hands of the elected officials and the machine and they're not usually ones that understand the night very well. They govern the night but they don't use the night. They don't go out at night. So a lot of these governance decisions are based upon intuition or prejudices, you know.” (Informant G)

While the example above shows a lack of understanding of nightlife, in the case of Informant D, their local government acknowledged that it had a lack of understanding and thus created the cultural innovation office that eventually created the role of night mayor.

The (political) party who runs the cultural part of the city administration is from a conservative party and they are not open-minded for modern ways like nightlife development and things like this. So the city created the cultural innovation office to push projects, like night mayor forward.” (Informant D)

As Informant D was not directly subject to their local government’s view of the night, the opposite can be seen from Informant K and F being located within the local government. When speaking about increasing hours that venues would be allowed to be open and hence sell alcohol, Informant K notes that the topic is political and that many other politicians are afraid to discuss the topics around drugs and alcohol.

“I don't see a reason why it shouldn't be accepted. It's very political and the only reason why it, perhaps couldn't be accepted is the fact that no other politician apart from myself, has the braveness to do anything that involves alcohol or drugs.” (Informant K)

On similar grounds, Informant F noted that when they were writing a report for their city they were told that they could not write about drug testing which they saw as an important aspect. Informant F resigned from their position as they felt they were not provided with the autonomy they needed and were inhibited from writing about topics they believed needed to be included in the report.

“But I didn't write that report because I wasn't prepared to get involved in a project which didn't give autonomy to the writer... I wanted to talk about drug testing but... I was told ‘I couldn't talk about it.’” (Informant F)

While Informant K and F were subject to the informal power of the local government’s perception, Informant B notes that due to their organisation being non-government affiliated, they had freedom as to what approach they would like to take. When they had a discussion

with students from a fraternity on the topic of drugs, they took a harm reduction approach whereas when the municipality took an abstinence approach to the use of alcohol.

“At the biggest student fraternity we did the information day about responsible drug use and the students were super surprised that we weren't judging them if they would use drugs. We said, like guys, if you do this, just make sure that you know what you're doing. So you don't end up in the hospital and they were like so surprised that we had this approach because when they had an alcohol information session that was done by the municipality, it just told them how dangerous alcohol is and that they shouldn't do it, and of course, they keep on drinking they are students, you know. So we really saw that our approach works better and we also want to do this for bar staff so that we can make training for them to spot and solve the behaviour. How to see what kind of drugs people have used when they are going bad or that kind of stuff” (Informant B)

While Informant B could take a different approach from the local government, Informant A felt it was important to change the view of NTE in the eyes of local government. When asked to describe a success story they had, Informant A pointed to a solidarity protest initiated by their NGO which they felt painted a more “positive” picture of night-time operators and consumers for both the public and local government. Informant A further states the positive optics that the protest provided were the reason that the government was open to negotiations over the COVID pandemic policies facing night-time operators.

“It was the biggest hit. I think that we had where we showed the wider public and wider society that there are bar owners and club owners and clubbers that have a conscience and they're not just hedonists, and they're not just in it for the drugs. And actually, they're a social movement. And, also a really positive one because all they're doing is dancing and having a picnic, there were kids walking around, playing, you know, there were some bubbles, like the whole works... I think the most meaningful, the most visible success was when we actually did what we said we were going to do all along, which is social campaigns to improve the reputation of the nightlife industry and people who go to clubs... It just forces them [conservative politicians] to engage with at least the idea that maybe they didn't really know anything about those people... I think that helped us in the negotiations about the pandemic because after that, a new government came in and they were talking to us and listening to us

and we were more respectable. And I'm sure that a tiny part of that was because the economy minister came to our rave, looked at the crowd and said, 'This is the event of the year.' Then they become economy minister. So then they're deciding literally subsidies for our industry.

So this is definitely the biggest and best thing I did... ” (Informant A)

Another way to change the perception of local government is to engage directly with them. Informant G notes that due to the change in their organisation's classification the way they were perceived changed. Initially, Informant G's organisation had no legal entity but then it became an NGO in the form of a civil organisation. They note that the government then began engaging with them as they had “much greater credibility” in the eyes of the government.

“Once we made ourselves a nonprofit organisation made up as a civil organisation, they wanted to chat with us. you know, so we had much more, much greater credibility.”

(Informant G)

Crane & Matten (2012) note that while institutionalisation can lead an organisation to have more legitimacy, as in the case of Informant G, it can also lead to a view that the organisation is then less effective. This can be seen in the case of Informant H. They note that due to their organisation becoming “too prominent and too visible” they believed that newer “upcoming promoters” would not join their organisation and they would “lose touch base”. They acknowledge that the stakeholders they represent are generally part of a culture that “lives in the underground” and thus might not want to join such a formal organisation. They equate this to being in a “sandwich[ed] position between legal structures and informal nightlife” which they believe a balance is necessary to resolve.

“ I think another risk is that you lose touch base with the real like upcoming promoters because they maybe think you're a certain like a closed circle and not approachable, so you have to always be in touch with upcoming newcomers and involve them to be you know to be relevant. I think there is, of course, an obstacle of being too prominent and too visible.

Because we are still a culture that that also lives in the underground, or in let's say, grey zones when it comes to legal system because the things that happen in the scene are not fully legal, Yeah, and you're kind of in a in a sandwich position between legal structures and informal nightlife and need to balance this.” (Informant H)

To conclude, the informal power of governmental ideology described by Fleming & Spicer (2014) was seen in several local government's negative sentiments of the night hindering positions within and outside of the government. NTGOs within the government expressed that their views on contentious or taboo topics had to be withheld while those outside could take their own approaches and speak freely. The protest conducted by Informant A, while not directly aimed at changing the government's perceptions, could be seen as a form of informal campaigning described by Carty (2001) and Palazzo & Richter (2005). The informal nature of perception differs from the formal powers observed with organisational structure and finance. The perception of the night can not be instantly changed as more formal powers can; rather it requires long-term dedication by NTGOs as well as the night-time stakeholders.

5.2.2.2. Theme of Power Summary

Varying degrees of power were presented through dimensions of organisational structure, finance and perception. The formal power of organisational structure and finance represented clear areas of power for NTGOs. In terms of organisational structure, the power of a government-affiliated NTGO is reported to be directly linked to formal positioning and title. The power of finance demonstrated that in both firms being represented and NTGOs themselves, the formal control of money correlated to the power that could be exerted. Lastly, the informal power of perception stemmed from the negative perceptions of the night and associated activities held by government officials. Government-affiliated NTGOs felt direct pressure from these perceptions on certain issues while non-government affiliated NTGOs have discretion to freely address issues. However, the perception of the night was still a focal point of non-government affiliated NTGOs as this affected how a policy may be shaped for the NTE. The varying powers presented by informants can affect the way stakeholders are addressed: either through mediation or representation. Mediation seemed to be a tactic of NTGOs without power in their organisational structure such as government-affiliated NTGOs while representation can be an expression of financial power by stakeholder funded NTGOs.

5.2.3 Mediation

The following chapter will discuss the use of mediation of stakeholders from the NTGOs and how structure applies to mediation. For the use of this paper, the term mediation is defined as a process of dispute resolution in which the needs of all or most stakeholders are balanced. Lampe (2001) showed how a mediator should be a neutral third party that has knowledge of the industry but no actual power to make changes. In the case of the NTGOs, we see this done through connecting various stakeholders to initiate conversations. This paper shows how in instances where the NTGOs lacked power, these groups acted as mediators as they were unable to do anything but they could liaise with the stakeholders and occasionally connect them with those that have the power.

A commonly contested area of the night, noise, was brought up by various of the informants. This was brought up in the case of Informant J when asked about stakeholder needs. This was an issue where the neighbours of a venue were affected by the negative externality of the venue that was noise and thus a conflict between the stakeholders that were the venue and the local residents needed addressing. Informant J notes that they try to “produce an environment where people can talk” they further mention “dialogue” and “voices”. This shows an attempt of the balance of stakeholders through mediation.

“So for example things like noise complaints which is a big hit and we try to engage with the residents through the districts and we try to bring in the venues. So mostly what we do is try to convince people to have conversations and try to, you know, like produce an environment where people can talk, where there’s a dialogue, where you know, decisions can be made. So we always try to be as balanced as we can and to bring as many different voices as possible...” (Informant J)

Continuing on this line of questioning, Informant I notes the lack of ability to resolve an issue relating to the loss of licensing of a particular venue and note that they were only able to “listen” to all the stakeholders.

“... while we couldn't do anything to solve this issue and we listen to the venue, we listen to the community, we met, we listen to the venue, we listen to the organiser of the party, which I like to separate stakeholder and the community, and we met with all three parties and we put

the organiser in touch with somebody else, that could help them find a suitable venue for the party.” (Informant J)

Following the same theme of stakeholder balance, mediation between residents and private business operators through conversation is also described by Informant L as the main form of balancing stakeholder needs. They describe themselves as “a communicator” with both sides, residents and business, needing support. This is another instance of a government-affiliated NTGO that makes use of a mediation strategy.

“I’m a communicator. So I feel like it’s always around having a conversation about what’s reasonable, and what is fair and equitable. I think a lot of times, we look at the equity piece a lot as of late. And I think it is, there has to be places for both in terms of support on either side. So I really believe it boils down to having a line of open communication and not ignoring the issues because it’s the same things that we hear about, you know, it’s the residents versus the businesses versus, you know, at the end of the day it’s a it’s an issue of civility.” (Informant L)

In response to the same question about balancing stakeholder needs, Informant K similarly indicates “dialogue” as the only way they can balance stakeholder needs. Similar to Informant L, Informant K sees themselves as “a translator” between the different stakeholders. Furthermore, they make use of the word “dialogue” as did Informant J.

“Only through a dialogue.... I see my position as a translator between all those different groups of people” (Informant K)

While similar to the Informants above in terms of communicating with “everybody”, Informant I notes a “data-led approach” when balancing stakeholder needs. By finding similarities in themes between the different groups and prioritising what “floats to the top”, they ensure that their approach is “designed by a broad group of people” and their own biases are not included.

“I try to do it through a really informed data-led approach. Well, when I say a data-led approach, I ask questions, I ask the same questions of everybody, and then the common themes that float to the top. Those are the, those are the priorities that I take. So I try and do it so that it’s been like, designed by a broader group of people. And it’s not just me going, ‘we

should do this, we should get more jungle. You know, like we want bigger sound systems.' it's not done by that." (Informant I)

The informants above all spoke from the perspective of a government-affiliated NTGO position. From a non-industry specific NGO perspective, Informant B similarly notes communication as a means of balancing stakeholder needs; however, differences can be seen in the informal setting these conversations can take place and the independence Informant B has in terms of identifying issues.

"Talking a lot with them [stakeholders] and drinking lots of beer with them [stakeholders]... I like to solve problems and not myself because I'm not so creative, but I always know someone that can... So I'm constantly the matchmaker between the problem solvers, and keeping an eye open. And also together with my night council that feeds me with information, trends, stuff happening, to ensure that we stay on top as much as we can." (Informant B)

The majority of the informants that mention the use of mediation were those that were part of a government-affiliated NTGO while the other is from a non-industry-specific NTGO. There were no mentions of mediation or sentiment of mediation shared by the Industry Specific NTGOs. The views of industry-specific NTGOs will be largely addressed in representation. The use of mediation is an often-used practice in addressing stakeholders by NTGOs. It should be noted that placing these groups in a position without power may be deliberate in order to create an NTGO only capable of mediation.

5.2.4 Representation

This paper uses the term representation as a term denoting the meaning of supporting specific stakeholders as opposed to mediating and creating conversations between all the stakeholders. This section will include views of the informants surrounding the issues and benefits of funding, area of focus, structure, and politics. Finally, an analysis will be made as to how these pertain to the informant's representation of stakeholders.

Multiple informants noted the inability to represent stakeholders due to their role being too broad or a lack of finance. Informant A was faced with the issue that their role was not

focused enough as they were part of a city council that would need to deal with all issues of the city. They note that “some of them [the issues] have nothing to do with nightlife at all”. They saw this as a limitation as they were “distracted with time” and could not directly focus on the issue of the NTE. A case like this shows that a member of a city council might not be able to fully represent stakeholders as they are not able to set the agenda of their council often on issues that pertain to stakeholders in the NTE.

“you're not really supposed to only talk about one group in society, and every council meeting there's like 70 votes on all sorts of things, some of them have nothing to do with nightlife at all, like sewage or kindergartens, you know. So you have to know about those things. You have to spend time on those things and you can't just vote blind. And so in that sense, you're kind of distracted with time.” (Informant A)

When speaking about whom they believe their stakeholders to be, Informant B notes that they believe prostitutes are within an area that should be their stakeholders as they noted night-time workers as stakeholders. However, they mention that they do not represent or focus on prostitutes as they lack enough funding for the “other things that we want to do”. This shows how they do not prioritise this stakeholder due to a lack of funds. In this case, we see an NTGO being limited in whom they can represent due to a lack of power of finance.

“there's even prostitutes, though we'd like to, we don't focus on that because we don't even have funding for all the other things that we want to do.” (Informant B)

Around the same theme of funding informant H notes that they are often caught trying to deliver on projects that they have been funded for and that they are thus “losing the big picture”. They further note that in these projects they are “only serving the organisation that is hiring... or funding this”. In this instance, this NTGO is dependent on the funding from these projects but they note that sometimes they are not able to represent the stakeholders they have identified as they are stuck completing projects that finance the NTGO. This is a unique case where funding leads to the representation of other stakeholders but a neglect of the stakeholders that the NTGO aims to represent.

“I think obstacles are too much focusing on delivering on certain projects that we are funded for and not having the big picture. Losing the big picture, because you're easily in, you know,

a project and you're delivering here, but you're only serving the organisation that is hiring for this or funding you.” (Informant H)

In a similar function, it can be found that when an NTGO is funded by the stakeholders themselves and left to choose their own agenda, they might serve a specific group of stakeholders. This can be seen with Informant H from an industry-specific NTGO who states that their stakeholders are “night-time professionals in general”. These are also the stakeholders that are members of the NTGO and pay a membership fee.

“people that are our members mostly but also beyond that. So we are also in conversation with any you know, promoter or person that is somehow professional in the music club context and also bar owners that do music events or beyond just running a bar, it's very broad but let's say night-time professionals in general.” (Informant H)

When addressing an issue with noise complaints with neighbours Informant H states that they would see this issue from a “one-sided” perspective as they are “representing nightlife” and they, therefore, do not need to balance the needs of the residents as these are not their stakeholders. This shows an instance of an industry-specific NTGO that does not take into account the needs of residents and will not play the role of the mediator. Informant H goes on to say that they would rather give the issue to a neutral organisation as they do not believe they can balance the needs of the residents while they are in conflict with the informants' stakeholders.

“Okay. so, I think we're seeing it as a bit one-sided. When it comes to the kind of a conversation we would have with neighbours because we are representing nightlife and why should we then be balancing this or even if we would try to it would not be very authentic.”
(Informant H)

“So I think some things that we don't do we rather give to neutral organisations or, you know, mediators that have no stakes anywhere.” (Informant H)

Continuing on this issue Informant H notes that their NTGO often “look at a broader interest of the scene” and are not always focused “on one specific venue”. In effect, the operational side of the venue is up to the venue to control and the industry-specific NTGO of Informant H is focused on long-term changes that can support the whole industry as opposed to focusing on helping specific venues one by one. This NTGO has a proactive approach and advocates

for the nightlife venues of their city as a representative of the venues, however, this does not mean they assist every venue with issues they are faced with.

“I think we balance definitely in the way we are articulating things. We want to be very pragmatic and solution focused. And we are not just there to protest, that's not our role. (...) things that are maybe too focused on one specific venue and it's not really concerning. We look at a broader interest of the scene. We also would probably then say it's not our job. It's the job of that certain venue to take care of this. We are, maybe more into the mid and long-term changes and structures that you want to change and not in the short term. But of course, there are the closing of individual clubs that we then focus on, because they have had an effect on the whole scene if we would just leave it, like it is. So we're of course, supporting individual venues but to a certain extent It's also their job especially when it comes to the operational side of a venue, then we are not interfering.” (Informant H)

The case of being an industry-specific NTGO and only considering the needs of the organisation's stakeholders is seen differently among industry-specific NTGOs. In the case of Informant C, who was initially part of a government-affiliated NTGO but now transitioned to an industry-specific NTGO they note it was “smart” for them to understand the residents' needs when lobbying the government. This shows a similar sentiment to Informant I who used healthcare workers on the agenda to speak to the government but in the case of Informant C, they note the needs of residents when speaking to the government. This is not necessarily a compromise of their stakeholders but more use of previous knowledge of being a mediator in order to find mutual ground to represent their clients. In certain instances, we found that informants have to compromise their representation due to the need for political buy-in. Informant I notes that although they represent nightclubs, they believe the ministers do not care about nightclubs. However, Informant I notes that they know ministers care about healthcare workers working at night and thus Informant I uses this to further their agenda and includes healthcare workers in their lobbying in order to get “political leeway”.

“But I mean, now I represent the hospitality entrepreneur and it's not my job anymore. It's smart, it's smart for me to know what residents want, right? but I don't represent them.”
(Informant C)

“I'm like Yeah I do represent clubs but if I'm going to a minister talking about clubs they don't

care about nightclubs, you know, but they do care about healthcare workers. That work in the morning or night and what works for them will work for us. So you can kind of like, shoehorn it in within the umbrella of the interest of the person that's got that political leeway.”

(Informant I)

“I think that without political buy-in, it's really difficult to get any of this stuff done.”

(Informant I)

Informant F summarises the ability the government has to represent its stakeholders in the NTE. They note that there has almost always been conflict between “young people's desire to socialise and dance at night and residents desire to sleep”. They note how one way in solving this is that the “polluter” who in this case would be the nightclubs or venues where these young people go would be closed. However, they note this as a short-term fix as this desire will continue and they will continue to find somewhere else. Thus Informant F believes cities need to be proactive in their approach, they need to look at how they design buildings and collaborate with construction companies and urban planners. They need to support “noise insulating” projects for nightclubs, they need to “get more street marshals out there” and they need to speak to those attending the night and remind them of the residents. Informant F believes that a district saying they do not have space for dance or music in their district is not acceptable as they would not say the same to more real estate or more retail. Informant F believes that through long-term planning and making provisions for where future venues will be then and only then can we meet all the needs of the stakeholders.

“When looking at the gentrification of places like [name retracted] and [name retracted] and others, there were great conflicts between young people's desire to socialise and dance at night and residents desire to sleep. And so, one way of looking at a solution to that is they will shut the nightclub, then, I mean, they're the ones making the noise so the Polluter pays. Another is to say, Well, we need to re-address how we design new housing and where we put it and you know, how we air-condition it and how we orient the bedrooms and how thick the glazing is. Another might be to say we should be noise-insulating, the nightclubs and finding a fund for that. Another might be to say, we need to get more street marshals out there. Another might be to say, listen, customers have a fantastic time in the club just when you get home pretend like you're creeping past your little sister's bedroom, you're not clattering past

and pissing on her door. Treat the neighbours the same way. The other might be to say, Listen, this district cannot handle late-night dance. Maybe, but if that's the case you'd never say this district can't handle more housing. This district can't handle more retail. Work out then, where your kids are gonna dance, make provisions. Where's that going to be? Maybe it's gonna be where there's a railway depot that is no longer to be used. Maybe there's an old office building on the edge of the ring road. You've got to think about this. You've got to plan strategically for it. So my thinking was, as long as you take a thorough sort of plan-led approach to the whole thing, then every need can be met.” (Informant F)

The informants express various different ways of representing their stakeholders in the NTE. Informant H, through their industry-specific NTGO acknowledges that their organisation does not consider the needs of the residents of the city as they do not fall into the focus of the objectives of the organisation. While other industry-specific NTGOs use the needs of the residents for lobbying. Finances showed varying ways in which NTGOs represented their stakeholders, NTGOs that were industry-specific would often represent those that financed them. Sometimes this was the stakeholders that they chose to represent while other times it was in instances where these stakeholders financed them for a specific project. This shows that finances can generally lead an NTGO to represent whoever finances them. This is similar to the work of Schubert & Willems (2020) whose study showed that stakeholders that financed the most would thus be prioritised. While these NTGOs do not always represent each individual nightclub and support their individual issues, they generally support the greater industry.

5.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter presented the findings of the data beginning with a contextualisation of the data. First, the broad categories of government-affiliated and non-government affiliated NTGOs are used to compare and contrast the different structures within the categories. The results are displayed in Table 1 and Table 2. Following this, stakeholder identification was presented. Building upon these different structures observed, the stakeholders identified by each informant were compared and contrasted with each other. This was done using the same two

categories of government-affiliated and non-government affiliated NTGOs. These results are presented in Tables 3 and 4.

After the contextualisation, the thematic results are presented in sections corresponding to the three themes identified: power, mediation, and representation. Firstly, the section of power included subsections of organisational structure, finance, and perception. Formal power mechanisms were predominantly present in organisational structure and finance while informal power mechanisms were present in power of perception. Another section included the theme of mediation which included instances where informants played the role of mediator in their NTGOs. This was connected to the idea of power through organisational structure, as mediation was mostly used by government-affiliated NTGOs with titles or positions that held no formal power in terms of policy decisions. The last section presented the theme of representation. In this section, in contrast to mediation, informants discuss cases where their NTGO directly represented a certain group of stakeholders. Stemming from the power of finance, NTGOs financed by certain stakeholders, either for long-term representation or short-term projects, were the stakeholders prioritised by the NTGO. This was typically seen in non-government affiliated NTGOs. The proceeding chapter will discuss how the findings assist in achieving this paper's aims and answering the research question.

6 Discussion

This chapter will now discuss the results of the findings by addressing how the aims, objectives, and the research question of our study were answered. Following the results, the practical implications of our research will be discussed. Finally, the areas where further research can be conducted are presented.

6.1 Addressing Research Aims, Objectives, and Question

The aim of this study was to provide clarity on the differences in structure observed in current NTGOs that exist and answer the research question “how do differing night-time governance structures address stakeholders?”. To achieve the goal of the research and answer the research question, this paper firstly identified the structure of the NTGOs and the stakeholders that they represent. Through doing so we were able to identify how these structures might have a role in the address of stakeholders of the NTGOs. Consequently, the use of power theory and stakeholder theory were used to analyse the themes identified in the interviews. Through the use of these theories, techniques of mediation and representation to address stakeholders were discovered. In the section that follows, the findings of this paper will be discussed in order to achieve the aims and objectives of the paper and answer the research question.

6.1.1 Summary of Findings

With regards to the structures of the NTGOs identified we observed differences between and within the government-affiliated NTGOs and the non-government affiliated NTGOs. Within government-affiliated NTGOs we found that the sample included 5 different locations of positions within the city government. These were: District-Specific Economic Department, Cultural Department, Film and Entertainment Department, City Hall, and City Council.

Three of these coincided with existing positions within the government identified by Seijas &

Gelders (2021) while two of them were not identified by Seijas & Gelders (2021). Furthermore, these groups varied in terms of existing NTGOs in their city external to their organisation. Within non-government affiliated NTGOs we found that the sample had four classifications of the organisations. These were industry-specific NGOs, a Civil Organisation, non-industry-specific NGOs, and government-owned entities. These non-government affiliated NTGOs further varied in terms of funding with some receiving public funding, others receiving funding from the public and private sector, and one NTGO receiving no funding whatsoever. These classifications within the category of non-government affiliated NTGOs were not explored in previous research however, Cibin (2019) notes the industry-specificity of the Bar and Club Commission in her study. These groups further noted the existence of additional NTGOs inside and outside of the government within their city. This shows clear differences in the government-affiliated structures and the non-government-affiliated structures as well as differences within each NTGO category.

In terms of the stakeholders identified, the government-affiliated NTGOs further varied in the stakeholders that they identified. While four of them noted the same stakeholders, the other three noted different assemblages of stakeholders. Furthermore, all of the government-affiliated NTGOs note the night-time industry and the government as their stakeholders; however, one NTGO that was district-specific noted that they only represent the night-time industry in their district.

The non-government affiliated NTGOs varied in stakeholder identification more than the government-affiliated NTGOs. In the instance where there were industry-specific NTGOs it was noted that these NTGOs represent their members. In two of the three industry-specific NTGOs the members were also a source of funding. For informant C they were the only source of funding. The non-industry-specific NTGOs varied with the stakeholders identified. While both mention the municipality or government and the night-time industry, one mentions residents while the other only mentions the consumers of the night.

Power was observed in three different classifications: power of organisational structure, power of finance, and power of perception. Power of organisational structure varied between NTGOs. Informants I, J and F noted a lack of power due to positioning linking to the formal power of bureaucratic positioning of their respective government-affiliated NTGO. It should be noted that the geographical areas sampled had different local government hierarchies; In

certain cities, power was held within localised districts while in other instances noted the mayor holding this power. A non-government affiliated NTGO could circumvent a lack of formal bureaucratic positioning through informal political connections. Informant E notes the importance of having a connection with their city mayor who is responsible for public order and safety. Likewise, Informant G noted an instance of their city mayor accepting a new licensing model previously objected to by police and safety departments.

The power of finance was observed through various aspects by informants. Informants H, A, and C note the power those with more money wield. While Informant H describes a broad capitalist society view, both Informant A and Informant C noted that the formation of their industry-specific NTGOs was in response to large firms in their respective cities overshadowing local industry voices. In terms of organisational funding, Informant B notes funding as their main obstacle.

Lastly, power of perception was experienced in the informal mechanism of ideology, with the government's negative view of the night restricting government-affiliated NTGOs and non-government affiliated NTGOs striving to shift this negative view. Informant A noted that essentially their NTGO existed purely to improve public perception of the stakeholders of this organisation, relating to the findings of Seijas & Gelders (2021) regarding changing perception. This was for the stakeholders to show the public as well as the government that the NTE stakeholders were not just associated with the perceived negative externalities. Both Informant F and G note that the government mostly perceives the night as negative, while Informant G goes as far as to say that they believe that this is due to the government not using the night themselves. While Informant B notes that their city only sees the issues with the night and does not note its potential.

One way that NTGOs addressed stakeholders was through the use of mediation. Through this, the NTGOs connected all stakeholders in the NTE that needed addressing. The NTGOs connected those without power to those with the power to make a change. This was most commonly done by the government-affiliated NTGOs as seen by informants J, L, I and K. However this was also used by informant B who was from a non-government affiliated NTGO. This showed that in the absence of power many NTGOs would use their position and network to act as a mediator between the stakeholders of the NTE. This coincided with how

Lampe (2001) believed mediation would arise and this showed similar practical uses of mediation this time from the perspectives of the NTGOs.

Another way the NTGOs addressed stakeholders was through direct representation. This was seen through the use of industry-specific NGTOs that had a selective group of stakeholders. In Informant H's case, their organisation only represents night-time music venues; however, they note that this does not mean that they assist all these venues with any need. They advocate and lobby for long-term reform in order to support these venues' futures. This was similar to what was seen by Olt et al (2019) in Budapest where the night mayor was a representative of a few nightclubs and only advocated for the needs of these specific stakeholders. Similarly, Informant D's organisation represents broader hospitality firms which go beyond night-time music venues to include restaurants and bars as well. While Informant D and Informant H both are involved in lobbying the local government for their selective group of stakeholders, both have contrasting views on residential consideration. Informant D takes the residents' perspective into account as they believe it would prove beneficial to include them in the conversation with the local government. Informant H, however, believes considering the perspective of the resident would comprise the overall effectiveness of their position in representing night-time music venues.

The city administration plays a vital role in the governance of the NTE. While some of the informants are directly part of the administration, others note the importance of a relationship with the administration due to the power this relationship can bring. Informant B notes that they value their ability to be in conflict with the city administration as they are a non-government affiliated NTGO. However, Informant G notes that initially they had this ability to be in conflict with the city, due to their newfound partnership with their city and receiving funding from the city they can no longer engage in conflict with the city. In the case of Informant D, the government created this position as they realised that they were not knowledgeable on the NTE and thus needed this external stakeholder to provide knowledge and address the needs of the stakeholders of the NTE.

Some informants found certain issues such as the focus of their position, a lack of funding, a lack of prioritisation from the government, and an inability to object meant they were not able to address all their stakeholders fully. In this case of Informant A, they noted that due to their position pertaining to various different issues of the city they were unable to address the

stakeholders on the NTE fully. Although the results are different, Informant H also noted issues with finances, in their circumstance they needed finance and thus accepted projects from various different city departments however, this led them to neglect their identified stakeholders as they had to prioritise the projects that funded them. Informant B notes that due to a lack of funding they did not have the ability to represent all the stakeholders and had to prioritise certain stakeholders. Informant C also saw stakeholder prioritisation however, they were not the ones doing so but they saw that the government was prioritising the needs of the MNE hospitality firms much more than the smaller business'. Informant F and Informant I note a part of the structure and the fact that it was part of the government meant that they could not do certain things which they believed would be beneficial to stakeholders in the NTE. Finally, Informant G noted an overall lack of government ties.

6.2 Practical Implications

This research has implications for local governments that want to support the NTE within their city with an NTGO. This is done by showing the structures of NTGOs that exist and how they address stakeholders. With this information, they can best select an NTGO structure that could address the needs of the stakeholders they are looking to address. There are additional implications for those that are looking to develop new business in the NTE. Investors, managers, or solo operators, such as musical performers can understand which structures would support them. With a holistic understanding of the night-time business landscape, industry stakeholders can select a market with an existing NTGO that would address them sufficiently.

6.3 Future Research

For future research we recommend the inclusion of stakeholder perspectives with regards to how they feel the NTGOs have addressed their needs or balanced their needs. This could also further include more industry-specific NTGOs that this study did not include such as alliances specifically advocating for the needs of casinos, restaurants, and brothels. This could be

interesting as this study did not find the specific mention of these stakeholders often besides restaurants from one informant. Furthermore, the inclusion of night-time workers' perspectives such as bar staff, health care workers, sex workers, police, artists, and musicians and their perception of the NTGOs could be examined. Though the NTGOs mention they advocate for night-time workers or night-time professionals the specificity is not included and some of these specific workers might have different representation from the NTGOs. Schubert & Willems' (2020) research shows that stakeholder analysis should be inclusive of the stakeholders themselves to construct a model with multiple perceptions.

A further study on only government-affiliated NTGOs and the different reasons as to why they are positioned where they are positioned could prove very interesting. While this study found where they were positioned, it did not examine why they were positioned there. A study of this nature could show reasons as to why these organisations might have been positioned where they were positioned. These could be because those in power wanted an NTGO that would act as a mediator or they wanted an NTGO that could actually create new policy and reform.

7 Conclusion

The present study was designed to both clarify the structures of NTGOs and determine how different structures vary in addressing stakeholders. With interviews conducted with informants representing NTGOs, data was codified and themes emerged of power, mediation, and representation. Using theoretical perspectives from stakeholder theory and power theory, the results of this investigation show that all the NTGOs were unique in some structural aspects. However, in the way the NTGOs addressed stakeholders, our findings show that they all did so through mediation and or representation. The first step in addressing is stakeholder identification. In the instances of government-affiliated NTGOs, all informants noted a wide range of stakeholders they address. Informants from non-government affiliated NTGOs differed in stakeholder identification based on financing and objectives. Mediation in addressing stakeholders was observed from informants who identified a broad range of stakeholders including both government-affiliated NTGOs and non-industry-specific NTGOs. Representation in addressing stakeholders was noted from informants representing industry-specific NTGOs. While power theory can explain the formal and informal ways that power can be expressed by NTGOs, mediation is seen to develop when an NTGO lacks the power to act and thus all that can be done is connect stakeholders to those that can act.

This work contributes to existing knowledge of night-time governance by providing clarification on structures. While Seijans & Gelders (2021) indicate a difference between government-affiliated and non-government affiliated NTGOs, this further elaborates on the existing structures while including stakeholders of a dimension of differentiation. In light of this, the scope of this study was limited in terms of geography as the informants only came from Western cities while Seijas & Gelders (2021) took a global perspective. Further research could include more geographies as well as more information on how stakeholders believe they are addressed by the NTGOs. These aspects would help establish a greater degree of accuracy in this study.

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Appendix

Appendix 1: North American NTGOs adapted from Seijas & Gelders (2021, pp. 324)

North American NTGOs			
City:	Title	Inside or Outside of Government	Position inside Government
Austin, USA	Entertainment Services Manager	Inside	Not Mentioned
Bloomington, USA	After-Hours Ambassador	Inside	Not Mentioned
Detroit, USA	Night-Time Economy Ambassador	Inside	Not Mentioned
For Lauderdale, USA	Night-Time Economy Manager	Inside	Office of the City Manager
Iowa City, USA	Night Mayor	Outside	Downtown Association
Los Angeles, USA	Nightlife Alliance	Outside	Not Mentioned
New York, USA	Senior Executive Director	Inside	Office of Nightlife
Orlando, USA	Night-time Economy Manager	Inside	Downtown Development Board/ Community Redevelopment Agency
Pittsburgh, USA	Night-Time Economy Manager	Inside	Not Mentioned
Seattle, USA	Nightlife Business Advocate	Inside	Office of Film and Music
San Francisco, USA	Entertainment Commission	Inside	Not Mentioned

San Francisco, USA	Business Development Manager	Inside	Nightlife and Entertainment Sector of Office of Economic and Workforce Development
Washington DC, USA	Director	Inside	Mayor's Office of Nightlife and Culture
Toronto, Canada	Night Economy Ambassador	Inside	Not Mentioned

Appendix 2. Rest of World NTGOs adapted from Seijas & Gelders (2021, pp. 324)

Rest of World NTGOs			
City:	Title	Inside or Outside of Government	Position inside Government
Kazan, Russia	Night Mayor of Kazan	Outside	Not Mentioned
Sydney, Australia	Night-Time Economy Manager	Inside	Not Mentioned
Israel, Tel Aviv	Nightlife Business Manager	Inside	Not Mentioned
Tbilisi, Georgia	Night-Time Economy Strategy Manager	Inside	Not Mentioned
Tokyo, Japan	Night Ambassador	Outside	Chibuya City Tourism Association

Appendix 3 South American NTGOs adapted from Seijas & Gelders (2021, pp. 324)

South American NTGOs		
City:	Title	Inside or Outside of Government
Valparaiso, Chile	Nocturnal Delegate	Inside
Asuncion, Paraguay	Asociacion de la Movida Nocturna del Centro Historico de Asuncion	Outside
Cali, Colombia	Gerente del Noche	Inside
San Luis Potosi, Mexico	Alcaldia Nocturna	Outside

Appendix 4. European NTGOs adapted from Seijas & Gelders (2021, pp. 324)

European NTGOs		
City:	Title	Inside or Outside of Government
Madrid, Spain	NIX - Mesa de la Noche	Outside
Geneva, Switzerland	Grand Conseil de la Nuit	Outside
Zurich, Switzerland	Nachtstadtrat Zurich	Outside
Dublin, Ireland	Give us the Night	Outside
Aberdeen, United Kingdom	Evening and Night-Time Economy Manager	Inside
London, United Kingdom	Night Czar	Inside
Manchester, United Kingdom	Night-Time Economy Adviser	Inside
Paris, France	Maire de la Nuit	Inside
Toulouse, France	Association Toulouse Nocturne	Inside
Amsterdam, Netherlands	Nachburgemeester	Outside

Eindhoven, Netherlands	Nachburgemeeser	Outside
Groningen, Netherlands	Nachburgemeeser	Outside
Nijmegen, Netherlands	Nachburgemeeser	Outside
The Hague, Netherlands	Nachburgemeeser	Outside
Zwolle, Netherlands	Nachburgemeeser	Outside
Prague, Czech Republic	Nocni Starosta	Inside
Vilnius, Lituania	Night Mayor (Unofficial)	Outside
Budapest, Hungary	Night Mayor Budapest	Outside
Berlin, Germany	Clubcommission	Outside
Mannheim, Germany	Nachtburgermeister Mannheim	Outside

Appendix 5: Interview Questions

Can you tell us a bit about your role and organisation?

- If government role: what arm of the government are you located in?
- If non-government role: What is your relationship to the local government?
- How is it funded? Is it for profit?
- How is the agenda of the organisation selected? How is it monitored?
- Do you report to anyone?

How do you work within night-time governance?

- How do you decide what areas to work in?
- How is your work monitored? Do you report to anyone?

How many people work in your organisation? [Make this question more specific]

- Why are the others hired (are they office assistants or are they experts in certain areas to assist you)
- How are they hired?

Are there any night-time economy organisations or individuals you work closely with?

- Do you know why these organisations were started?

What is the role of the government in nighttime governance within your city?

- What do you think the role should be?

What is the overall objective of your organisation?

- How do you attempt to achieve these goals?

Issues & Stakeholders

Through your position who do you consider to be the stakeholders in the night-time economy?

- And then which of these stakeholders does your organisation represent?
- Why do you represent these stakeholders?

How do you balance the needs of these stakeholders that you represent?

- How do you gather information from stakeholders?
- Does your organisation have specific employees to cater for specific stakeholders?

Are there any success stories from your organisation you can share with us where you met the needs of all or most stakeholders involved?

- If not, whose needs were not met? Why not?

Have you experienced any obstacles when working in your position?

- Are there stakeholders that your organisation does not address?

How did your city address stakeholder needs before the formation of your organisation?