



**LUNDS**  
UNIVERSITET

**EUHR-18 – Master Thesis**

**Master of Arts in European Studies**

**Spring 2022**

**Lund University**

***CULTURE AS SOFT POWER IN THE EU***  
**A Thematic Analysis of Creative Europe as A  
Tool of Soft Power to Increase Europeanness**

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## **Abstract**

In the following paper Creative Europe 2014-2020 becomes subject of study as a tool of soft power by using Thematic Analysis as the method to analyse three fundamental documents: the Regulation on Establishing Creative Europe, the Creative Europe Sub-programme 2014-2020 Guidelines and the Creative Europe 2014-2020 Mid-term Evaluation. The goal is studying how the program can help the development of the European identity among citizens of different Member States of the European Union by having artists working together and fostering a better understanding of each other's culture. Furthermore, consequences of investing in the cultural and creative sectors will be shown especially in the economic sector.

To do so, a review of the cultural sector in the EU is done by reviewing its evolution, as well as of Creative Europe and especially, the Culture Sub-programme. When it comes to the theoretical framework, key concepts needed to understand the Research and Analysis chapter are soft power and identity – regional and European identity in particular.

The main findings in this paper are in relation to the positive impact the EU might have on individual artists, by investing a bigger amount of money in the cultural and creative sectors than their own Member States; the provision of the so-called Creative Europe desks that guide applicants to the programme with specific answers to their questions, rather than having to ask the Commission; and the integration of refugees into the programme after the 2015 crisis. Nevertheless, not only Member States from the Union are welcome to participate in the programme: candidate countries and third countries are welcome to participate as partners, thus affecting indirectly to these organisations by having them to work under European Union rules. The economic sector is also involved in the development of the paper, given the positive outcome from investing in the cultural and creative sectors is spilled over the labour market.

**Keywords:** European Union, Creative Europe, cultural and creative sectors, Europeanness, European identity, soft power.

### **Abbreviations**

EU: European Union

MS: Member States

TA: Thematic Analysis

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# 1. Introduction

The role of culture has proved in the recent past to be worthy of investment and dedication on behalf of the European Union. That is why the cultural programme Creative Europe is ongoing: to provide artists with the funding they need to make a living out of their artistic creations.

The following paper is intended to study the use of culture in the European Union as a tool of soft power to raise awareness of the European identity in the Member States of the Union, especially through the use of economic incentives provided to artists under the program of Creative Europe, which, eventually, focuses on the European added value that the projects proposed might have, and what they have to bring to a closer and more united EU.

Creative Europe is a cultural programme funded by the European Union, aiming to provide funds to European artistic organisations and individual artists to develop their works of art, which can be classified in three fields: Culture, MEDIA and a cross-sectoral branch that includes both previous fields. The cultural program Creative Europe was officially born in 2014; however, its roots lie in the 1990s: “Kaleidoscope”, “Raphael” and “Ariane” are the base for what would continue as Culture 2000 and, later, as Creative Europe. The reason why this program is active has been discussed in the past as well as the meaning behind it, since the projects awarded the grant must “raise awareness of common history and values, and reinforce a sense of belonging to a common European space”.<sup>1</sup> Some scholars trace the origins of the reason back to the conception of the European Union and the need to create the sense of unification and harmony between the Member States. After all, Jean Monnet himself declared the following on the creation of the European Union: “If we were to do it all over again, we would start with culture”.<sup>2</sup>

Throughout the paper, there are several questions that are answered in order to develop the analysis and discussion; these are as follows: How is culture treated in the EU? How did Creative Europe come to life? What is soft power? How is it used by the EU? Has creative Europe served as a tool of soft power? If so, when and in what way? Nonetheless, the main

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<sup>1</sup> Tuuli Lähdesmäki, “EU Cultural Policy: Europe from Above,” in *Europe from Below: Notions of Europe and the European among Participants in EU Cultural Initiatives* (Brill, 2021), 54.

<sup>2</sup> Monica Sassatelli, “The Arts, the State, and the EU: Cultural Policy in the Making of Europe,” *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Anthropology* 51, no. 1 (2007).



research question in which the focus has been placed in the paper is: How is the European identity sustained by Creative Europe?

These topics and questions will be reviewed, analysed and discussed, as well as the linkage of the cultural sector with other fields of importance within the EU. To do so, Thematic Analysis has been the method chosen to study the words and sentences highlighted when coding the texts with the purpose of classifying them in: positive and negative outcomes of the programme, what can be interpreted as European added value or identity enhancer, and the link of culture to other sectors, such as economy.

### **1.1 Thesis structure**

The paper starts with a Contextual Background which includes the evolution of cultural policy implementation in the European Union through the passing of Treaties as well as the cultural programmes – particularly Creative Europe and the cultural strand. These will be sustained by authors such as Kandyla, who stated that it was in 2007 when culture was finally taken into account in policy making. This chapter is aimed at introducing the reader to the topics which will be dealt with during the paper and to provide a summary of the history of the culture policy area in the European Union.

Further on, in the Theoretical Framework, a study in soft power theories is carried out, explaining the concept developed by Joseph Nye, its differences with hard power issues and the occasions in which it is used, as well as the means. Moreover, a section will be included about the use the EU does of soft power. The subchapter on identity will review identity theories, the different sorts of identity and, including Rosenberg's theory of the self-concept, the four key sources of identity characterization are added in order to introduce the "us" and "them" dichotomy and the differentiation among the collective, national and regional identities, which takes inspiration from Paasi's conceptions on identity. Regional identities are developed in a different section with the concept of European identity and how it might be perceived by the general public.

The chapter around methodology presents the method of Thematic Analysis, used to study the materials –primary sources downloaded from the European Union website. The understanding of this method was conducted by following Braun and Clarke's *Thematic Analysis: A Practical Guide to Understanding and Doing*.

Chapter 5, Research and Analysis, is the heart of the paper. Once the main concepts and theories have been introduced in the Contextual Background and in the Theoretical

Framework, three official documents are presented: The Regulation on Creative Europe 2014-2020, Creative Europe 2014-2020 Budget Guidelines and the Midterm evaluation, done in 2018. These are analysed in terms of European identity enhancement and European added value; and how the cultural sector is related to other sectors, such as the economic and the job market, in these documents. That is to say, Creative Europe is going to be analysed as a tool of soft power in the EU by analysing how it seeks to disseminate the idea of Europeanness through culture. Over and above, the period of 2014-2020 is the one of focus given the completion of this block, leaving the current one –2021-2027– for future studies.

It should be noted that throughout the paper, the terms “European Union”, “EU” and “Union” will be used interchangeably to avoid repetition.

## 2. Contextual Background: Culture and Creative Europe

### 2.1 Culture in the EU

While some people would describe culture as the “values, motives and ethical rules that are part of a social system”, others would say culture is the “set of institutions by which people live”.<sup>3</sup> In sociology one can find two definitions of culture, the first one being a Marxist concept of culture as a “function of class power and the functionalist notion of culture as a system of cohesion”. In this definition, culture is reduced to “ideology or false consciousness”, and it is the elites who move it through the state. The second use derives from anthropology, representing culture as a “unified system of meaning”, in both political and societal terms.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the definition that is interesting for this paper is the following:

Culture is a broad concept that includes various activities (e.g. crafts, arts and audiovisual) in different economic sectors (e.g. manufacturing, services and communications). In this special report, “cultural sites” means the physical infrastructure where Europeans can experience culture. We distinguish between heritage sites (ancient historical sites), and new cultural infrastructure (new buildings used to foster art, music, theatre, etc.).<sup>5</sup>

Although the European Union was born out of a product of culture, the relation that it has maintained with culture has always been complex, as Horáková states, for it has not always been considered an important field in policymaking. Since the early days of the EU, cultural policy has been interconnected with European identity building. By appealing to roots, identity and shared values – such as democracy, equality, rule of law and human rights<sup>6</sup>—, the EU has sought its restoring and integration, especially during the challenges that had to be face during the 2000s.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Hannah Horáková, “Europe and Culture: Anthropological Perspectives on the Process of European Integration,” *Anthropological Journal of European Cultures* 18, no. 2 (2009): 11, <https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/43234493>.

<sup>4</sup> Gerald Delanty, “Redefining Political Culture in Europe Today: From Ideology to the Politics of Identity and Beyond,” in *Political Symbols, Symbolic Politics - European Identities in Transformation*, ed. Ulf Hedetoft (Hants GU11 3HR, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1998): 23

<sup>5</sup> European Court of Auditors, “EU Investments in Cultural Sites: A Topic That Deserves More Focus and Coordination” (Luxembourg: European Court of Auditors, 2020).

<sup>6</sup> European Union, “The EU Values - about - ECL V2,” ec.europa.eu, n.d., <https://ec.europa.eu/component-library/eu/about/eu-values/>

<sup>7</sup> Lähdesmäki, “EU Cultural Policy: Europe from Above”: 49.

From the 1970s to the early 1990s cultural action in the EU was developed according to each Member State's competences. In the 1980s, the European Community adopted solutions that involved and improved the condition of the mobility of artists and networking libraries, among others<sup>8</sup>. It was not until the Maastricht Treaty — or Treaty on the European Union—, 1992, that culture was incorporated as a field of action for European Policy.<sup>9</sup> Although it did not introduce new domains, it stated that the European Community would contribute to the “flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity at the same time, bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore”.<sup>10</sup>

The Treaty establishing the European Community (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997) served as a consolidation of the Maastricht Treaty and, in its Article 151, apart from the quotation included in the previous paragraph, it added four more paragraphs. The first additional one aimed at “encouraging cooperation between Member States” in the dissemination of culture and history, conservation of the European cultural heritage, “non-commercial cultural exchanges” and artistic creation, including the audiovisual sector. The second additional paragraph of Article 151 remarks the cooperation of Member States and third countries in the cultural sphere. The third one commands that the Community “shall take cultural aspects into account in its action” to promote the diversity within Member States. And finally, the fourth additional paragraph is directed to the Council, which must act unanimously to adopt incentive measures.<sup>11</sup>

The Treaty of Nice —which came into force in 2003— served as an amendment to the Treaty on the European Union, the treaties that established the European Communities and certain related acts. The main purpose of this treaty was reforming the institutional structure to facilitate the integration of potential member states to the European Union and soften the challenges that the enlargement would mean to the EU<sup>12</sup>. In this treaty, in Article one, paragraph eight, subparagraph six, culture is only mentioned seeing that the cultural and

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<sup>8</sup> Lähdesmäki, “EU Cultural Policy: Europe from Above”: 45.

<sup>9</sup> Sassatelli, “The Arts, the State, and the EU: Cultural Policy in the Making of Europe”: 28–41.

<sup>10</sup> European Union, “Treaty on the European Union,” Article 151, 1 § (1992), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT&from=EN>.

<sup>11</sup> European Union, “Treaty Establishing the European Community (Amsterdam Consolidated Version),” Article 151 § (1997), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:11997E151&from=EN>.

<sup>12</sup> European Union, “Treaty of Nice,” Treaty of Nice, n.d., <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/in-the-past/the-parliament-and-the-treaties/treaty-of-nice>.

audiovisual services, along with education, among others, would fall under the control of the “Community and its Member States”.<sup>13</sup>

Lastly, the Lisbon Treaty (2007) not only was inspired by “Europe’s cultural, religious, and humanistic legacies”<sup>14</sup>, but also included, for the first time, an explicit article about culture: Article 167, where all the cultural aspects were stated to be taken into consideration<sup>15</sup>. Culture, thus, became a policy area that the European Union is to support and must complement Member States’ actions. A European Cultural Area was finally established, and cooperation would be sought among Member States for the promotion of their cultures<sup>16</sup>. As Kandyla agrees, 2007 was the year when culture was taken into account in policy making and, the Cultural Agenda served as a union between culture, innovation and EU economic concerns —namely growth, competitiveness and social cohesion.<sup>17</sup>

In a later span of time, the work frame of 2015-2018 for Culture was focused on providing easy access to culture, cultural heritage and the cultural and creative sectors mainly, as well as the promotion of cultural diversity of the EU. The following workplan, 2019-2022, introduces three strategic objectives: the first one is to harness the power of culture as a tool of social cohesion while promoting cultural participation, artist mobility and heritage protection; the second one aims at fomenting jobs in the cultural and creative sectors nurturing arts in education and encouraging an innovation; and the third one aims to strengthen international culture relations “by making the most of the potential of culture to foster sustainable development and peace”. These three priorities lead the path to five others within the European cooperation policymaking, which are: sustainability in cultural heritage,

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<sup>13</sup> European Union, “TREATY of NICE - AMENDING the TREATY on EUROPEAN UNION, the TREATIES ESTABLISHING the EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES and CERTAIN RELATED ACTS,” March 10, 2001, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12001C/TXT&from=GA>.

<sup>14</sup> European Council, “Most Relevant Documents of the European Union Concerning Cultural Heritage,” Most relevant documents of the European Union concerning cultural heritage (European Union), accessed March 1, 2022, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/herein-system/european-union#:~:text=Lisbon%20Treaty&text=Preamble%3A%20the%20Treaty%20is%20inspired>.

<sup>15</sup> Cornelia Bruell, *Creative Europe 2014–2020 a New Programme – a New Cultural Policy as Well?*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin: Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations, 2013): 12.

<sup>16</sup> European Committee of the Regions, “CoR - Culture,” Europa.eu (European Union, 2022), <https://portal.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity/policyareas/Pages/Culture.aspx#:~:text=Under%20the%20Treaty%20of%20Lisbon.>

<sup>17</sup> Anna Kandyla, *Cultural Governance and the European Union: Protecting and Promoting Cultural Diversity in Europe*, ed. Evangelia Psychogiopoulou (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Cop, 2015): 49.

cohesion and well-being, an ecosystem that supports artists, gender equality and international cultural relations.<sup>18</sup>

In the following subchapter, the conception of the Creative Europe programme will be developed, as it is the main focus of the thesis.

## **2.2 Creative Europe**

Cultural programmes play a key role in the EU's identity-building agenda. They are used as a tool for integration, to define the EU and its sense as a community, and to bring the citizens closer to it. The goal of sharing a common European culture is included in the programmes' documents, and emphasising the European identity is a core element in integration.<sup>19</sup>

“Kaleidoscope”, “Ariane”, “Raphael”, “Culture 2000” and “Culture” are the different names that the cultural programs have received since 1996, whose goals have been promoting cultural exchange, artists' mobility and the creation of long-term networks.<sup>20</sup> The first three named ran until 1999 and focused on the performing and applied arts, literature and cultural heritage, respectively. They “highlighted the idea of Europe as a cultural community” and used culture as a central element to the shape European identity.<sup>21</sup> The budget invested was of 167 million euros, given culture was an “area common to the European people” and aimed at promoting the intercultural dialogue and at recognising culture as an economic factor as well as a “source of socioeconomic development”.<sup>22</sup>

During the 2000s new cultural initiatives were launched, such as the ECOC, “Europeana” or EHL. Yet, the first European Community framework programme came with “Culture 2000”, which was active from the 2000 to 2006 and merged “Kaleidoscope”, “Ariane” and “Raphael”.<sup>23</sup> With the arrival of “Culture 2000”, culture became a crucial element of European integration, as well as an economic factor and one of social integration. “Culture 2000” and “Culture” supported the cultural activities in the EU to continue the identity-building and EU integration, as well as to contribute to the intercultural dialogue. Finally, Creative Europe seeks enhancing the feeling of belonging<sup>24</sup>. The criteria to evaluate projects

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<sup>18</sup> Iossifidis, Dr. Miranda. “Mapping of EU Projects, Policies, Programmes, and Networks: A Policy Report to Support Cultural and Creative Spaces and Cities.” (Brussels: European Union, May 2020): 38-39.

<sup>19</sup> Lähdesmäki, “EU Cultural Policy: Europe from Above”: 50-51.

<sup>20</sup> Bruell, *Creative Europe 2014–2020 a New Programme*: 12.

<sup>21</sup> Lähdesmäki: “EU Cultural Policy: Europe from Above”: 51.

<sup>22</sup> Kandyla, *Cultural Governance and the European Union*: 50.

<sup>23</sup> Lähdesmäki, “EU Cultural Policy: Europe from Above”: 48.

<sup>24</sup> Lähdesmäki, “EU Cultural Policy: Europe from Above”: 51.

are the “culture added value”, the “socioeconomic impact” and the “European added value”.<sup>25</sup>

The negotiations for Creative Europe began in 2010, when the mid-evaluations were being carried out for “Culture” and MEDIA 2007. The proposal was submitted by the Commission to the Parliament and EU Council in 2011 with the intention of supporting the cultural and creative sectors in the period of 2014-2020 and unifying “Culture”, MEDIA and MEDIA Mundus<sup>26</sup>. In April 2012 the Parliament expressed their intention to ensure EU support to foster the “competitiveness of the cultural and creative industries”. At the end of the same year, a report was adopted with amendments to the Commission’s proposal; nevertheless, given the lengthy decision-making process of the trilogue, the negotiations did not finish until the end of 2013.<sup>27</sup>

Finally, in 2014 Creative Europe came into life, with the purpose of reinforcing the “contribution of the cultural and creative sectors to Europe’s broader economic and socio-political objectives”. What characterises Creative Europe is that it addresses cultural and creative sectors without excluding the audiovisual area and brings together the previous sub-programmes. This was a merger that the Commission justified by exposing the common problems the sector is exposed to, such as digitalisation and difficulties in financing. Hence, Creative Europe makes a link between the Cultural Agenda and the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy<sup>28</sup>. In exchange, it is necessary to admit that the audiovisual sector faces different problems regarding stakeholders and business models.<sup>29</sup>

### **2.2.1 The Culture Strand**

Culture is one of the areas of Creative Europe, whose focus of support is centred in “the establishment of networks, cooperative projects and the ‘impact-broadening activities of organisations’”.<sup>30</sup>

The program Creative Europe 2007-2013 included in “Culture” a promotion of cross-border mobility, transnational circulation, intercultural dialogue and European citizenship; which can be thought through as an early implementation to forward the idea of European identity. The programme “Culture” was funded a budget of 400 million euros, and its purpose was

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<sup>25</sup> Sassatelli, “The Arts, the State, and the EU: Cultural Policy in the Making of Europe”: 28–41

<sup>26</sup> Bruell, *Creative Europe 2014–2020 a New Programme*: 10.

<sup>27</sup> Kandyla, *Cultural Governance and the European Union*: 54.

<sup>28</sup> Kandyla, *Cultural Governance and the European Union*: 53.

<sup>29</sup> Kandyla, *Cultural Governance and the European Union*: 55.

<sup>30</sup> Bruell, *Creative Europe 2014–2020 a New Programme*: 14.

enhancing the cultural area that Europeans share through lateral cooperation while encouraging a common European citizenship.<sup>31</sup>

From 2014 onwards, “Culture” was included into Creative Europe as “the Culture strand”, supporting architecture, design, literature, music, performing arts and cultural heritage projects. This strand aims at helping artists to find new opportunities in the EU, promoting artistic creation and support this content also outside Europe, as well as stimulating the “digital and environmental transition of the European Culture and Creative Sectors”. Within this area of Creative Europe, one can find European Cooperation Projects, European Platforms, European networks, circulation of European literary works, and a platform that pushes mobility for artists and professionals and pan-European cultural entities.<sup>32</sup>

The European Cooperation projects are destined to support projects that involve cultural and creative organisations from different countries —even if they are not part of the EU. The funding is open for application to three types of projects: the small-scale cooperation projects, which include minimum three partners from three different countries; medium scale projects including at least five partners from five different countries; and the large-scale cooperation projects, which need at least ten partners from ten different countries. One condition applicable to all projects is that they must not last more than forty-eight months.<sup>33</sup>

The European networks is aimed at helping the cultural and creative sectors to prosper and generate jobs. It supports networks by connecting different professional organisations, spreading information that can help the sector, and providing training for professionals.<sup>34</sup>

And finally, in order to support European platforms, Creative Europe provides funding to platforms that help creators spreading their work and improving their visibility and contribute to a development of the audience.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Kandyla, *Cultural Governance and the European Union*: 51.

<sup>32</sup> European Commission, “Creative Europe CULTURE Strand | Culture and Creativity,” culture.ec.europa.eu (European Union), accessed March 3, 2022, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/creative-europe-culture-strand>.

<sup>33</sup> European Commission, “European Cooperation Projects | Culture and Creativity,” culture.ec.europa.eu (European Union), accessed March 3, 2022, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/culture-strand/european-cooperation-projects>.

<sup>34</sup> European Commission, “European Networks | Culture and Creativity,” culture.ec.europa.eu (European Union), accessed March 3, 2022, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/culture-strand/european-networks>.

<sup>35</sup> European Commission, “European Platforms | Culture and Creativity,” culture.ec.europa.eu (European Union), accessed March 3, 2022, <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/culture-strand/european-platforms>.



All in all, it has been proved that in the span 2014-2020, the Cultural Strand enhanced a capacity of building new models, adaptation to digitalisation and international careers, and transnational circulation of literature, events, exhibitions and audience groups.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Bruell, *Creative Europe 2014–2020 a New Programme*: 17-18.

### 3. Theoretical framework

#### 3.1 Soft power

The term power has many definitions, but one of them, according to the Cambridge dictionary, is the “ability to control people and events” or “a person, organisation or country that has control over others, often because of wealth, importance, or great military strength”.<sup>37</sup> In Joseph Nye’s words —the American political scientist and former Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs—, power is “the ability to do things and control others, to get others to do what they otherwise would not”.<sup>38</sup>

In order to evaluate power in post-Cold War times, one must identify which instruments serve as power-balancing of strategies necessary for a new policy. There are five main trends that have helped the diffusion of power, namely economic independence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, technology and the changing political issues.<sup>39</sup> With the changing nature of international politics, intangible forms of power —national cohesion, universalistic culture— became relevant. Therefore, power went from “capital-rich” to “information-rich”.<sup>40</sup>

Power, both in cultural and public diplomacy, can be differentiated in hard and soft power. The former is related to hard law, to the “power of coercion or economic inducement”;<sup>41</sup> whereas the latter is defined as, according to Nye, “the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own”.<sup>42</sup> Chitty, however, uses the following definition for soft power: “Cultural artefact that represents a body of thought that is associated with resources invested in attraction-power as well as with strategies for using such resources to further actors’ interest”.<sup>43</sup>

The term “soft power” was first coined by Nye and aimed at “enhancing the cultural influence of the United States, so that its role in global affairs can be even more

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<sup>37</sup> Cambridge Dictionary, “Power,” in *Cambridge Dictionary*, n.d., <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/power>.

<sup>38</sup> Joseph Nye, “Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy* 80 (1990): 154.

<sup>39</sup> Nye, “Soft Power”: 160.

<sup>40</sup> Nye, “Soft Power”: 164.

<sup>41</sup> Naren Chitty, “SOFT POWER, CIVIC VIRTUE and WORLD POLITICS (SECTION OVERVIEW),” in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power* (711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017: Routledge, 2017): 13.

<sup>42</sup> Joseph Nye, “Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy* 80 (1990): 168.

<sup>43</sup> Chitty, “Introduction,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*: 2.

significant”.<sup>44</sup> The pillars of soft power lie on industrial civilisation— especially on western industrial civilisation. As a metaphor, it can be compared to the Trojan horse, given it is used by the West to attract people with ideologies and political values, mostly to influence emerging economies —normally located in the East.<sup>45</sup> Within public diplomacy, soft power is used to raise public participation in the nation by developing people’s trust, as well as the alliances for the country, and thus, generating power.<sup>46</sup>

The three basic resources within a country to exercise soft power are culture, political values and foreign policies.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, the symbols that a nation attributes as their own are also tools of soft power, such is a flag or an anthem.<sup>48</sup> a flag is a symbol with political connotations that carries emotional power, they encompass people who share political, religious or ethnic aspects. Nevertheless, they only serve their function when the entity they represent is legitimate.<sup>49</sup>

Nye, as cited in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*, sees soft power as an omnipresent power influenced by human interaction.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, he gives a name to those who are affected by this soft power in any way: the agents are those who exercise the soft power, while the targets are those influenced by the soft power messages.<sup>51</sup>

In high politics —security and sovereignty matters—, soft power is popular among policy supporters but rejected by those who are sceptic of the policies. On the other hand, in low politics —culture, education, health and sport—, soft power is used to convince policy opponents to support the policies given the information is available to the general public and open to be debated.<sup>52</sup>

Soft power can also be divided in active and passive. When it is active, it can be found under mobility, media and cultural forms and thanks to the cultural sector, tourism or electronic networked media, this type of soft power is resourced to other channels. Contrary, passive soft power has either intangible sources related to heritage —knowledge, behaviour or

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<sup>44</sup> Robin Brown, “Introduction,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*, ed. Naren Chitty et al. (711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017: Routledge, 2017): 57

<sup>45</sup> Brown, “Introduction,”: 57.

<sup>46</sup> Chitty, “SOFT POWER, CIVIC VIRTUE and WORLD POLITICS”): 19

<sup>47</sup> Chitty, “SOFT POWER, CIVIC VIRTUE and WORLD POLITICS”): 20.

<sup>48</sup> Chitty, “SOFT POWER, CIVIC VIRTUE and WORLD POLITICS”): 23.

<sup>49</sup> Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Some Questions about Flags,” in *Flag, Nation and Symbolism in Europe and America*, ed. Richard Jenkins (270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016: Routledge, 2007): 1–5.

<sup>50</sup> Chitty, “SOFT POWER, CIVIC VIRTUE and WORLD POLITICS”): 10.

<sup>51</sup> Chitty, “Introduction”): 20.

<sup>52</sup> Chitty, “Introduction”): 18.

history— or to tangible sources —that may also be connected to heritage—, like books, museums, or archaeological sites.<sup>53</sup>

After all, soft power is as important as hard power. If a state manages to make it seem legitimate, others will follow their petitions. If their culture is attractive, the others will follow as well.<sup>54</sup>

### **3.1.1 Soft Power in the EU**

In 1912 Lamprecht, the German historian, realised that Germany could be influential in the world if it had a good diplomatic, cultural, educational and economic strategy, rather than military.<sup>55</sup> After 1945, not only Germany, but also France became models in terms of pushing cultural powers seeing the strong connection between language, culture, science, diplomacy and power.<sup>56</sup>

EU external relations policies normally correspond to values and principles underlying the integration process, thus representing a sort of constitution. This sort of constitution is formed by basic principles, which include peace, democracy, human rights; it conceptualised ideas such as social market economy, single freedom and security and justice among others; and procedural and rule-based norms, like good governance and institution-building. Along with this, the EU is forming around itself a normative power that can shape what is seen to be normal within international relations by the force of ideas.<sup>57</sup>

The ability that the EU has to diffuse their norms, and therefore, deciding what is “normal” in international politics, is “decisive for the impact of the EU’s normative ‘soft’ power”. This normative character is crucial when it comes to legitimising EU’s soft power, which can only be effective if it is communicated to both internal and external audiences. Therefore, EU’s strong point in normative power comes by its “ability to shape other actors’ perceptions of the appropriate cognitive content of international politics”.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Chitty, “Introduction”: 25-26.

<sup>54</sup> Nye, “Soft Power,”: 167.

<sup>55</sup> Brown, “ALTERNATIVES to SOFT POWER - Influence in French and German External Cultural Action” in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*, ed. Naren Chitty et al. (711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017: Routledge, 2017): 39.

<sup>56</sup> Brown, “ALTERNATIVES to SOFT POWER”: 41-42.

<sup>57</sup> Anna Michalski, “EU as a Soft Power: The Force of Persuasion” in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y 10010: Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 126.

<sup>58</sup> Michalski, “EU as a Soft Power: The Force of Persuasion”: 127.

Nevertheless, soft power alone is not enough: one needs to know how to use this tool in order for it to be effective. According to Tom Fletcher –British diplomat and former HM Ambassador to Lebanon— one must engage and build trust with those they want to influence. He acknowledges that British values are easier to be promoted by artists, sportspeople and business rather than Ministers or diplomats. But in order to use soft power in a smart way, a (national) story, knowing how to tell it and the ability to use the available tools are three important ideas.<sup>59</sup> In that way, as previously mentioned, a flag or an anthem can also be tools of soft power, and the European flag is not less. The European flag is composed by 12 gold stars and a blue background which symbolise the unity and identity of Europe. It was the Council of Europe the institute that chose the design back in 1955, given they are in charge of defending human rights and promote European culture.<sup>60</sup>

Therefore, we can argue that the European Union does use the flag order to gather all the Member States' citizens effectively under one group given politics today is mostly centred around struggles over culture.<sup>61</sup>

### 3.2 Identity

Identity is the “shared representation of a collective self as reflected in public debate, political symbols, collective memories, and elite competition for power”; it is the “nested component of the more general self-structures” while referring to social positions found outside the self which are “available to be ascertained, enacted and potentially internalized”.<sup>62</sup> In psychological terms, identity is the “permanence of the experience of the self”.

The concept of identity became a major term in the 1980s, especially in the West, where the discourse emerged rapidly seeing that there was an argument which outlined that the world was being forced to individualization.<sup>63</sup> Identity is revealed through social practices and shaped simultaneously by social structures and national contexts.<sup>64</sup> The drawback with

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<sup>59</sup> Tom Fletcher, “How to Become a Soft Power Superpower,” *Soft Power*, September 15, 2017, <https://softpower30.com/become-soft-power-superpower/>.

<sup>60</sup> European Union, “European Flag,” [european-union.europa.eu](http://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/symbols/european-flag_en) (European Union, n.d.), [https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/symbols/european-flag\\_en](https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/symbols/european-flag_en).

<sup>61</sup> Delanty, “Redefining Political Culture in Europe Today”: 39.

<sup>62</sup> Timothy J. Owens, Dawn T. Robinson, and Lynn Smith-Lovin, “Three Faces of Identity,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 36, no. 1 (June 2010): 477–99, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134725>.

<sup>63</sup> Anssi Paasi, “Region and Place: Regional Identity in Question,” *Progress in Human Geography* 27, no. 4 (August 2003): 475, <https://doi.org/10.1191/0309132503ph439pr>.

<sup>64</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, and Peter J. Katzenstein, *European Identity*. ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

identities, however, is that these may create the concept of the “other” rather than uniting people.<sup>65</sup>

Thus, identity is a concept that is regularly associated with regions and places. The term has become an important one in understanding how globalization can strengthen cultural differences. Identity discourses are mainstream in Europe, where the Member States seek to reinforce the identity of their regions. Most cultural traditions draw a line between “us” and the “Other”, especially in European tradition; those who are the “us” are normally a stronger voice. Narratives of identities are an “act of power” and linked with boundaries and exclusion.<sup>66</sup>

According to Rosenberg’s theory of the self-concept, there are four key sources of identity characterization, which are: “personal or individual identity, role-based identity, category-based identity, and group membership-based identity”. Personal identity is the basis for the rest of identities one has; role-based identity is the social position one occupies in the social structure; and category-based and group membership-based identity depend mainly on how one sees oneself in comparison to the others. Identities can be founded on what is perceived as socially meaningful or on an actual social group.<sup>67</sup>

It has been studied that the identities to which people relate more easily are to socio-territorial identities, which are related to nations —“groups living with the boundaries of the state”—, ethnic groups —“groups speaking and common language and culturally united, although there might be class, religious and political differences among them”—, sub-state regional groups —“a group that regards themselves as a sub-group of a nation”—, other sub-state minority groups, trans-state regional groups —“neighbouring states may have territories at their boundaries with mixed population”—, or to super-state regional groups —“groups with supranational identity”.<sup>68</sup>

In this paper, nevertheless, the relevant division of identities is in terms of collective identities, national identities and regional identities. Collective identities include a sense of

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<https://www.cambridge-org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/core/books/european-identity/8670CD4167E7A9F83DF7A6BA2DA59EC6>.

<sup>65</sup> Checkel and Katzenstein, “The Politization of European Identities,” in *European Identities*, 8.

<sup>66</sup> Anssi Paasi, “Europe as a Social Process and Discourse - Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identity” *European Urban and Regional Studies* 8, no. 1 (2001): 19-20, <https://doi.org/10.1177/096977640100800102>

<sup>67</sup> Owens et. al, “Three Faces of Identity”: 477–99.

<sup>68</sup> Kenneth Keulman and Katalin Agnes Koós, *European Identity: Its Feasibility and Desirability* (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2014): 31-33.

unity, of “us” being one group. This collective identity is composed by four factors: the identification of the group, the feeling about this group and other groups, the satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the group and the systemic blame, meaning “crediting failure to succeed to individual failings or to institutionalised inequity.”<sup>69</sup> Definitions of collective identity include a notion of “identification with shared features along with a recognition of shared opportunities and constraints afforded by those features”. Collective identities include a sense of ‘we-ness’, a feeling of attachment to the group that is necessary to produce a collective identity. Following Heise’s assertions, when people share an identity, it is easier for them to feel empathy for one another. In order to build this collective identity, according to Taylor and Whittier, there are three elements that contribute to it: “the creation of social boundaries, the development and recognition of social criteria that account for a group’s structural position, and negotiations of intergroup and intragroup meanings”.<sup>70</sup>

Then again, national identity is the “historic territory or homeland; common myths and historical memories” as well as common rights, public culture and/or economy. From a functionalist point of view, one can assume that national identity gets people together in a community, giving them meaning and purpose.<sup>71</sup> In Paasi’s words, national identity is not real given the different states share an umbrella of elements used to point out what differentiates themselves. It is through the use of social narratives that people make sense of the world and constitute their own identities. This is a political action used to distribute the social power in society distributed. Moreover, the author affirms that national narratives are just sets of “verbal, symbolic or behavioral acts that may create temporal and spatial continuities and demarcations” and can contribute to the finding of memory and meaning, developing the concept of “we”.<sup>72</sup>

Nevertheless, when speaking of nationalism, it is important to mention Billig and his concept of banal nationalism, which considers that the national identity is made up and reinforced by the symbols that are found in everyday life, displayed by the nations and the media for us to embrace our so-spoken national identity.<sup>73</sup> Agreeing with Billig, Paasi maintains that

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<sup>69</sup> Keulman and Koós, *European Identity: Its Feasibility and Desirability*: 29.

<sup>70</sup> Owens, et. al, “Three Faces of Identity”: 477–99.

<sup>71</sup> David Mccrone and Frank Bechhofer, *Understanding National Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 9-10, <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781316178928>

<sup>72</sup> Anssi Paasi, “Nationalizing Everyday Life: Individual and Collective Identities as Practice and Discourse...” *Geography Research Forum* (1999): 11.

<sup>73</sup> Mccrone and Bechhofer, *Understanding National Identity*: 16.

national identity is an expression of collective memory, thus being found mainly in national celebrations, parades or speeches.<sup>74</sup>

There are some markers to national identity, such as our “birth-place, accent, ancestry and place of residence”, or skin colour –which is a sensitive one. Another marker is the “criteria people use to make judgements of their own national identity and that of others”, which emerged from elitist groups. Consequently, we can understand that national identity is a social characteristic with markers included, which were developed by people: while for some people national identity is a “fixed badge” we all carry, for some others, there are different concepts more important than national identity, for instance social class, gender, religion or ethnicity. Therefore, national identity is merely relevant when “mobilized by politicians or other cultural entrepreneurs”.<sup>75</sup>

Once collective and national identities have been briefly described, given the limited space of this paper and the preferred focus on the analysis, regional identities will be discussed in the following subchapter together with the idea of European identity.

### **3.2.1 Regional and European Identity**

Territorial transformations happened heavily after the 1970s with the rise of a “new Europe”, based on relations between national economies and the international market. The emergence of the EU meant a powerful movement in the age of globalization. Questions like “What is Europe” or “what is identity” have frequently been posed, leading to simplifications of what Europe is, reducing it to space and culture. The origin of European identity takes place in the 1990s, when it is attempted to define who belongs to it and who does not.<sup>76</sup>

Regional identity is key in seeing regions as social and/or political spaces; however, it is not easy to see how this affects collective actions and/or politics.<sup>77</sup> According to Paasi, it is “an interpretation of the process through which a region becomes institutionalised, a process consisting of the production of territorial boundaries, symbolism and institutions”. This regional identification implies the existence of cultural and political-economic contexts. Political ideologies do not produce identification, but culture and history do.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Paasi, “Nationalizing Everyday Life”: 12.

<sup>75</sup> Mccrone and Bechhofer, *Understanding National Identity*, 29-43.

<sup>76</sup> Paasi, “Europe as a Social Process and Discourse”: 7.

<sup>77</sup> Anssi Paasi, “Region and Place: Regional Identity in Question” *Progress in Human Geography* 27, no. 4 (August 2003): 477, <https://doi.org/10.1191/0309132503ph439pr>.

<sup>78</sup> Paasi, “Region and Place: Regional Identity in Question”: 478.



In terms of economic structure, Europe is highly regionalized. Regions have become important in the debates of Europe. Scott, included in Paasi's article "Europe as a Social Process and Discourse - Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identity", distinguished four types of spaces: "global, plurinational, national and regional", being the regions what make the whole system work. A region is the "meeting point of various concepts of space": It is not either a "passive medium in which social action takes place", nor an autonomous identity. Regions are fundamental tools of power in governance, economy and culture.<sup>79</sup>

Habermas, as cited by Fliegstein, argues that European identity is born during the Enlightenment. Reason and rationality are concepts that should guide people's interactions, and therefore, being a European citizen is about "trying to settle differences peaceably with respect for differences and other's opinions".<sup>80</sup> Habermas is the main exponent of European political identity; he provided a post-nationalist context that suggested "constitutional patriotism" as the basis for political identity at a European level. This is sustained on a cosmopolitan understanding of the principles that underlie European polity.<sup>81</sup> And although, in this case, the phenomenon of othering does not take place and everyone is included in this European point of view, the reality is different: two important facts in European Union history such as Enlargement and integration do affect the building of a European identity and sense of belonging since the "old" members of the EU seem to refuse the weaves of workers coming from Eastern European member states.<sup>82</sup>

The first driving force of the European concept was creating a common market so that Europeans could trade and cooperate, pulling away from fighting each other in wars. By doing so, it was easier to get to know people from different nationalities and thus, people started learning a second language for both work and leisure. The production of European media has also helped to this expansion and Europeanisation.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Paasi, "Europe as a Social Process and Discourse": 15-16.

<sup>80</sup> Neil Fliegstein, *Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 140. <https://ebookcentral--proquest--com.uma.debiblio.com/lib/bibliotecauma-ebooks/reader.action?docID=415282&ppg=1>

<sup>81</sup> Dario Castiglione, "Political Identity" in *European Identity*, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 39. <https://www-cambridge-org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/core/books/european-identity/8670CD4167E7A9F83DF7A6BA2DA59EC6>.

<sup>82</sup> Castiglione, "Political Identity": 37.

<sup>83</sup> Fliegstein, *Euroclash*, 3.

Following social sciences trends, identity is a construct of relations with the exterior world, being Europe no exception to this.<sup>84</sup> In this way, European identity becomes a political project cultivated by various elites, national or supranational ones.<sup>85</sup> It is people who are involved in economic, social and political matters who develop routines of interaction and see themselves involved in the European project, and thus, have an inclination to travel to other countries and interact with other societies. According to Fligstein, blue-collar workers are less likely to work in a field that takes them to other countries than white-collar workers. In the same way that older people will travel less and be less willing to learn languages than young people.<sup>86</sup>

European identity formation is not simple given the democracy issues and lack of legitimacy interfering in the relationship between identity and institutions: the Euroskeptics deny the legitimisation of European identity; and on the other hand, those who support integration associate normative ideals to it.<sup>87</sup>

Before World War II there were already European relations based on a “realist model that emphasised a “world of anarchic states locked in battle over territory””.<sup>88</sup> Modern conceptions of European identity have been formed mostly during wars and revolutions, especially after Europe has experienced and interpreted these events.<sup>89</sup> Nevertheless, with the enlargements, the EU constitutional process and the resurgence of religion, European identity became politicised.<sup>90</sup> Political identities assume the role of “sustaining citizens’ allegiance and loyalty to their political community”. Nonetheless, the European identity is weaker –and therefore, less controversial— than nationalist identities since it has a less emotional appeal, and, therefore, a smaller mobilising force. This is partly by the democratic deficit taking place in the European Union. Europe, which is seen as an economic integration area rather

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<sup>84</sup> Adam Burgess, “European Identity and the Challenge from South and East” in *Political Symbols, Symbolic Politics - European Identities in Transformation*, ed. Ulf Hedetoft (Hants GU11 3HR, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1998), 209.

<sup>85</sup> Checkel and Katzenstein, *European Identity*, 3.

<sup>86</sup> Fligstein, *Euroclash*, 16.

<sup>87</sup> Keulman and Koós, *European Identity: Its Feasibility and Desirability*: 168.

<sup>88</sup> Fligstein, *Euroclash*, 6.

<sup>89</sup> Holly Case, “Being European: East and West” in *European Identities*, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 111. <https://www-cambridge-org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/core/books/european-identity/8670CD4167E7A9F83DF7A6BA2DA59EC6>.

<sup>90</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Politization of European Identities” in *European Identities*, 11.

than a common geographical area, needs states to retrocede and thus achieve a continental unity and identity.<sup>91</sup>

Together with these previous facts, there are also subgroups of trust and identification among Member States: the countries in northern Europe have a stronger feeling of reliability to one another than to the southern countries; simultaneously, the “old” members trust each other more than they trust the countries that joined the EU from 2004 on and potential members. This shows that similarity of moral and political values weighs more than language, religion and artistic similarities.<sup>92</sup> Moreover, those citizens who were involved in the European integration would see at themselves and at their neighbours in a different but better way. Those who did not will continue seeing the nation as main force and will find the necessity of defending themselves against external forces.<sup>93</sup>

For some Member States, the regions are “instruments of state power ‘from above’” but have no cultural relevance. Conversely, other Member States, regard regions as being cultural entities that are reflected in cultural institutions. In Germany, Austria, Spain, Italy or Belgium, regions are powerful. In Finland, however, they are not.<sup>94</sup> European identity, in this line, is an issue that is growing controversial across Europe and within the Member States but looking for this common identity is a way of establishing a “common ground for overcoming political differences”.<sup>95</sup> The fact that Europe lacks internal characteristics that generate a strong feeling of collective identity means that one source for this relies on internal actors.<sup>96</sup>

The identity-building character of the EU is clearly shown in Creative Europe, since it is destined to “contribute actively to the development of a European identity from the grass roots”. However, it is not that simple: the common identity can create boundaries among Member States, given their heritages and history can widely differ.<sup>97</sup> In that sense, being European may have different meanings in different Member States of the EU: for Germany it is a way of redeeming themselves from WWII, while in Spain is a form of being modern.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Anssi Paasi, “Europe as a Social Process and Discourse - Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identity” *European Urban and Regional Studies* 8, no. 1 (2001): 21, <https://doi.org/10.1177/096977640100800102>

<sup>92</sup> Keulman and Koós, *European Identity: Its Feasibility and Desirability*, 165.

<sup>93</sup> Fligstein, *Euroclash*, 124.

<sup>94</sup> Paasi, “Europe as a Social Process and Discourse”: 15.

<sup>95</sup> Dario Castiglione, “Political Identity”, 34.

<sup>96</sup> Checkel and Katzenstein, “Conclusion - European Identity in Context” in *European Identity*.

<sup>97</sup> Lähdesmäki, “EU Cultural Policy: Europe from Above”: 53.

<sup>98</sup> Fligstein, *Euroclash*, 138.



## 4. Methodology

To conduct this thesis the materials used for the analysis of the main questions posed in the introduction are the guidelines for the Creative Europe 2014-2020 and documents issued by the European Parliament or the Commission. These materials will be analysed and presented in the Analysis, found in Chapter five. The methodology that was considered the most appropriate for this analysis, and therefore, chosen, has been Thematic Analysis.

Thematic Analysis is a method for “developing, analysing and interpreting patterns across a qualitative dataset; and, consequently, it involves qualitative analysis. This method requires coding in order to develop the themes that will be subject of analysis and it is used in social,<sup>99</sup> behavioural and applied sciences.<sup>100</sup>

The purpose of TA is developing patterns of meanings that can address a research question.<sup>101</sup> As Braun and Clarke suggest on page twenty-six of *Thematic Analysis: A Practical Guide to Understanding and Doing*, a good starting point to start the research is proposing a key research question, which, in this case is the following: How is the European Union using Creative Europe to accentuate the notion of European identity?

In order to perform a Thematic Analysis on the materials, six steps must be followed: firstly, the researcher must get acquainted with the materials; coding comes in second place; next, one must start a theme generation and then develop the theme, which will be later reviewed; in fifth place, the theme will be refined, defined and named; and finally, the researcher will start writing.<sup>102</sup>

Following this scheme, I will use coding to study the sources and use the following colours to highlight the idea of European identity enhancement: yellow to remark the objectives of the programme, green to mark the positive aspects of Creative Europe; colour blue to mark when soft power is implemented to enhance Europeanness; red will be used to mark unexpected or negative outcomes and pink for the extracts in which sectors other than culture—namely economy—are the focus. Coding is a process common to many forms of qualitative

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<sup>99</sup> Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, *THEMATIC ANALYSIS: A Practical Guide to Understanding and Doing*, (S.L.: Sage Publications, 2021), 4.

<sup>100</sup> The University of Auckland, “Understanding TA | Thematic Analysis,” [www.thematicanalysis.net](http://www.thematicanalysis.net), n.d., <https://www.thematicanalysis.net/understanding-ta/>.

<sup>101</sup> The University of Auckland, “Understanding TA | Thematic Analysis,”

<sup>102</sup> Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, *THEMATIC ANALYSIS*, 6.

research where the code is the smallest unit of study, which later becomes a theme. In TA, coding is used to reduce the data content and focus on singular ideas.<sup>103</sup>

Nevertheless, Thematic Analysis has an umbrella of approaches: reflexive TA, codebook TA and coding reliability TA. Personally, I have considered reflexive TA as the approach to follow on this paper. Reflexive Thematic Analysis the most flexible approach, meaning it can be used to address different questions, such as people's experiences and practices, social processes that influence certain phenomena, rules that govern human practices and/or the construction of meaning. The manner that reflexive TA will be approached is inductive, considering the development of the code and theme are "directed by the content of the data"; but also in a constructionist way, for the analysis is going to be focused on exploring the "reality produced within the data".<sup>104</sup>

In previous researches such as Rozanova's doctoral thesis –*The Strategic Employment of Culture as a Resource of Soft Power. Analysis of the EU's Creative Europe Sub-Programme Culture as a resource for internal soft power*—what is studied is the role of culture in relation to soft power. As reflected in the title, it is the branch of Culture what is under the focus of discussion, coming to the conclusion that "cultural assets, communication mechanisms, narratives, and audiences" must be used in order to execute a strategic employment of culture. The findings show that the EU is able to use culture for power-related purposes but, on the other hand, is unable to explore the full potential of culture as a resource for soft power.<sup>105</sup>

Similarly, Schuster presents the image of the EU threatened by the COVID-19 pandemic and suggests an "innovative cultural strategy" to deal with the challenge. In the paper, policy recommendations are proposed to promote transnational cooperation and thus, spread EU cultural values to reinforce soft power. What is mainly advised is the creation of public-private partnerships to support these transnational initiatives and the reconsidering of soft power as the union of the economic and cultural sector. The recommendations the author makes are increasing the focus of Creative Europe of transnational cultural cooperation; increasing incentives for co-funding from private entities; and increasing visibility among

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<sup>103</sup> Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, *THEMATIC ANALYSIS*, 52.

<sup>104</sup> The University of Auckland, "Understanding TA | Thematic Analysis"

<sup>105</sup> Ekaterina Rozanova, "The Strategic Employment of Culture as a Resource of Soft Power. Analysis of the EU's Creative Europe Sub-Programme Culture as a Resource for Internal Soft Power" research.gold.ac.uk, (March 31, 2021), <https://research.gold.ac.uk/id/eprint/29973/>.

cooperation with third actors. All in all, the author confirms the importance of culture in the dissemination of European values and increasing soft power.<sup>106</sup>

Regarding the studying of the materials used for this paper, the reason why the 2014-2020 timeframe has been chosen as the period of analysis is because the year 2014 was the moment when the programme was officially named Creative Europe, and given we are in 2022 it is possible to find materials to study the period as a whole. The period of 2007-2013 was discarded due to the fact that the cultural fund was distributed under the title of Culture and only involved the cultural strand. Besides, considering it is a distant period, gathering the materials for the development of the research questions would not have been easy – in fact, in a first attempt of investigating how Europeaness was pushed during the economic crisis of 2008, the software Wayback Machine was used to attempt finding documents and only two were found. Finally, the period 2021-2027 was casted away in view of that we are only on the second year on the timeframe, and it is not possible to study this span of time as a whole.

Qualitative research will be conducted in the next chapter in order to analyse the concepts of European identity, Europeaness, integration and their relation to the soft power imposed by the European Union through cultural funding to European artists.

That being said, Thematic Analysis will be used to study how the concept of European citizenship is enhanced and used as a tool of soft power in the European Union.

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<sup>106</sup> Bella Schuster, “CORPORATE STIMULUS for EUROPEAN CROSS-BORDER CULTURAL INITIATIVES: An Integrated, Intersectoral Cultural Approach to Strengthen EU Soft Power” (2020), [https://www.iedonline.eu/download/geopolitics-values/22-Schuster\\_Corporate\\_stimulus\\_for\\_European\\_cross-border\\_cultural\\_initiatives\\_FINAL.pdf](https://www.iedonline.eu/download/geopolitics-values/22-Schuster_Corporate_stimulus_for_European_cross-border_cultural_initiatives_FINAL.pdf).

## **5. Research and Analysis**

Creative Europe is the cultural program supported by the European Union to foment networking, off-border artistic collaboration and mobility of artists. As it has been stated previously, culture had not been a priority of the EU until the Maastricht Treaty, and even so it was the Lisbon Treaty the document that introduced the policy area on Culture. Creative Europe gathers the 2007-2013 Culture, MEDIA and MEDIA Mundus into one; besides adding three independent sub-programs: Culture backs literature, translation and cooperation projects; MEDIA supports the audiovisual and media sectors; and the Cross-sectoral strand gives cultural and creative organisations the chance to financing.<sup>107</sup>

One question we should pose ourselves is: is the EU funding Creative Europe artistic projects because of their artistic potential, is it because they enhance European citizenship, or is it because the economic component behind the projects?

When paying attention to the must-have of each cultural project in order to be funded by the Commission, the guidelines slightly vary with every block of time (2007-2013, 2014-2020, 2021-2027); nevertheless, what does not change are the overall objectives and the importance of the European meaning behind every project. That is to say, whatever artists create, has to be linked to Europe in an artistic way, and has to be relevant for the European future regarding a sense of community.

In the following subchapters, an analysis of Creative Europe used as a cultural, Europeanness enhancer and economic soft power will be carried out.

### **5.1 Creative Europe**

#### **5.1.1 Regulation on Establishing the Creative Europe Programme**

On the 20<sup>th</sup> December 2013, the European Parliament and the Council released in the Official Journal of the European Union the regulation establishing the Creative Europe Programme as a resolution to promote the “European agenda for culture in a globalising world” through the support of the cultural and creative sectors, while nurturing the European cultural diversity.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> European Parliament and Anna Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020). European Implementation Assessment (Update)” (Brussels: European Union, 2018): 12.

<sup>108</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013 of the EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT and of the COUNCIL of 11 December 2013 Establishing the Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020) and Repealing Decisions No 1718/2006/EC, No 1855/2006/EC and No 1041/2009/EC,” *Official Journal of the European Union*, (December 20, 2013).



Creative Europe was first denominated a pilot project that “supports the creative industries at policy level”. So these industries would be sustained economically by the EU, studying different possibilities of innovation and resulting on policy development.<sup>109</sup>

The objectives of the regulation and, therefore, of the programme are to “guard, develop and promote European cultural and linguistic diversity, to promote Europe’s cultural heritage and to strengthen the competitiveness of the European cultural and creative sectors”,<sup>110</sup> which are constantly recorded in all the official documents regarding the programme. Moreover, the programme includes specific objectives, such as supporting these two sectors both transnationally and internationally, as well as promoting the circulation of creative works and artists.

On Article two, the cultural and creative sectors are defined as the industries that are based on “cultural values and/or artistic and other creative expressions, whether those activities are market- or non-market-oriented”, including the “development, the dissemination and the preservation of goods and services which embody cultural, artistic or other create expressions”.<sup>111</sup>

Regarding the Culture Sub-programme, the priority is the support through the provision of skills and competences to the parts involved so as to strengthen the cultural and creative sectors, “including encouraging adaptation to digital technologies” and reinforcing the organisations via networking. An interesting objective to point out is the development of the audience to improve the access to these European works. In order to achieve these objectives, the support measures imposed include transnational cooperation projects and activities that foster the breakthrough of emerging talents.<sup>112</sup> With a view to develop these projects, a budget of EUR 1,462,724,000 was destined to the programme, divided as follows: 56% for the MEDIA Sub-programme, 31% for the Culture Strand and 13% for the Cross-sectoral.<sup>113</sup>

This document, furthermore, includes the element that is subject of study in the paper: the element of Europeanness and the European Added Value.

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<sup>109</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 222.

<sup>110</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 225.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 228.

<sup>113</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 233.

### **5.1.2 Creative Europe Culture Sub-programme 2014-2020 Guidelines**

In this document the guidelines to apply for the fund are laid out, having as a target the project organisations considered to be cultural organisations, transnational challenges, activities that support the integration of refugees –after the 2015 migration crisis—, cooperation with cultural heritage organisations and cultural activities moving to different European regions.<sup>114</sup> These projects must be relevant to be considered for the fund.

Apart from the different priorities outlined previously, the document includes a series of questions involving the priorities selected, the plan to foster the work of artists, the innovation that comes with the project, the European added value, the impact of the project –short, medium and long-term— and the strategies to make the project sustainable.<sup>115</sup> The European added value is defined in the annex as the “value created by actions of individual Member States”, which may be created by factors such as legal certainty and/or greater effectiveness. This hallmark is applied to reflect the relevance of the EU both within its borders and internationally, and it is intended to bring consequences such as “promotion of best practices, economies of scale, networking, etc”.<sup>116</sup>

Creative Europe, as stated in the budget guideline of the 2014-2020 block, has two objectives: on the one hand it aims to “safeguard, develop and promote cultural and linguistic diversity and Europe's cultural heritage”; and, on the other hand, the objective is to “strengthen the competitiveness of the European cultural and creative sectors”. It is alleged in the document that the cultural sector reflects the pieces of which Europe is made of and connects the national borders, which is relevant in the hurdles that the integration process may pose. All in all, the program’s purpose is being able to face the “social and economic challenges the EU is facing” with the joint work of the Member States.<sup>117</sup>

### **5.1.3 Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020) – European implementation assessment**

The mid-term evaluation carried out in 2018 by the Commission studied the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, sustainability and the European added value of the projects that had been carried out until the date.

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<sup>114</sup> European Commission, “CREATIVE EUROPE. Culture Sub-Programme. SUPPORT for EUROPEAN COOPERATION PROJECTS” (2020): 9.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> European Commission, “CREATIVE EUROPE. Culture Sub-Programme”: 38.

<sup>117</sup> European Commission, “CREATIVE EUROPE. Culture Sub-Programme”: 4..

As in the two aforementioned documents, this one, likewise, includes the objectives of the programme –“safeguard and promote cultural and linguistic diversity and Europe’s cultural heritage”, and “to strengthen the competitiveness of the European cultural and creative sectors”. This document contains both positive feedback and notes from the European Parliament to the Commission to improve in the two years left of the 2014-2020 programme and in the following block: in that way, one favourable remark can be found on the first page, assessing the positive impact of the programme on European artists, especially to younger generations and on the digital single market.<sup>118</sup>

In the first four years of the programme, the budget has been distributed as follows: 56% out of €1.46 billion to the MEDIA Sub-programme, 31% to Culture and 13% to the Cross-sectoral strand.<sup>119</sup> More in depth, €179 million were spent in the Culture sub-programme between 2014 and 2016 – having a 64.3% invested in cooperation projects; 31.7% in networks and platforms and 7.4% in special actions.<sup>120</sup> Thanks to this budget, 292 cross-border cooperation projects were able to be accomplished, fifty-one pan-European networks offered a base for artists to develop their skills; 205 translations were done and twenty-three platforms served to foster the potential of the European cultural and artistic works.<sup>121</sup>

Regarding the relevance and EU added value there were positive evaluations since the Commission affirmed that the objectives of the projects were pertinent to EU policy priorities and there was a considerable focus on “transnational cooperation while building on national support programmes”, respectively. Moreover, one interesting point is the Commission’s remark about the unlikeliness of the projects’ development without the monetary aid from the European Union; particularly the new approach to be taken towards the digital shift.

In terms of effectiveness, the money injection served to create at least 3,000 jobs in 2,850 different cultural entities, proving fruitfulness of the fund to activate the sector. Nevertheless, the programme is not right enough to impact in a major scale in Europe due to the “huge size and range of the audiovisual and cultural sectors at European level” and the multiple areas

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<sup>118</sup> European Parliament and Anna Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020). European Implementation Assessment (Update)” (Brussels: European Union, 2018): 10, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/627127/EPRS\\_STU\(2018\)627127\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/627127/EPRS_STU(2018)627127_EN.pdf).

<sup>119</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 14.

<sup>120</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 21.

<sup>121</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 22.

that are covered. Lastly, in terms of sustainability what the Commission stated that the results could be proven with the continuation of the partnerships resulted from these projects.<sup>122</sup>

The relevant aspects of the document regarding this paper –European identity enhancement and the connection of the cultural and creative sectors to third sectors—will be discussed in the two next subchapters.

## **5.2 European Identity enhancement**

### **5.2.1 Regulation on Establishing the Creative Europe Programme**

Creative Europe starts to contribute to the European added value by triggering cross-border cooperation. Apart from the objectives that are under the Creative Europe Programme, this document also evaluates the intention of the programme and of the projects to the uniting of Europe as a region and as a population.

In first place it is necessary to say that the overall purpose of the Programme is already adding to the idea of Europeanness and European identity, for what is sought is sharing the different cultural values of the Member States to increase the understanding of each other's manners. Thus, “promoting Europe's cultural and linguistic diversity” is relevant not only to the cultural and creative sectors, but also for the general population. Besides, the Programme seeks to increase the visibility of those who make a living out of these sectors. As a means for this to happen, the European Union takes action as a single body.<sup>123</sup>

What the EU is specifically trying to do is creating a “cultural rich and highly independent cultural landscape, providing a voice for the different cultural traditions of Europe's heritage”; even if this diversification might difficult a smooth transnational circulation of the artists' works.<sup>124</sup> To achieve this, the EU understands that the creators need some type of assistance to put out their art, particularly the smaller and medium enterprises. For that reason, the EU decided to fund the artists' projects, to occupy the position of those Member States which do not invest enough in the cultural and creative landscape. On this note, according to the special report on EU Investments in Cultural Sites, the countries that invest the most in cultural services in 2017 were: Latvia –investing a 3% of the total governmental expenditure—, followed by Estonia and Hungary –each with a 2.6% of the whole government budget funded in culture; while the countries that invested the least were Italy,

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<sup>122</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 36, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/627127/EPRS\\_STU\(2018\)627127\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/627127/EPRS_STU(2018)627127_EN.pdf).

<sup>123</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 222.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

Portugal and Greece –investing a 0.6%, 0.5% and 0.3%, respectively. The average expenditure in all Member States on culture that same year was around a 1% of the general government expenditure, in line with the investment that the EU made. When it comes to the Euros spent per person, Luxembourg is the leader with 500€/person, followed by Denmark –more than 300€/person—and Sweden –almost 250€/person. Contrary, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria were the states that invested the least in culture per person –less than fifty euros.<sup>125</sup> Therefore, the Union is already creating a favourable viewpoint on the artists’ cognisance in comparison to the view they might have of their own countries and the aids to artists. The benefits can be shown by providing an example of what the UK is missing after Brexit: according to Dr. Faucher, the cultural sector is suffering from a loss of funding and reciprocity; it is especially the case of film cinemas, who cannot afford taking the risk on “smaller European films in a British market”. All in all, the cultural catalogue in the UK “will likely become less diverse”.<sup>126</sup>

The Creative Europe Programme is open to Member States of the European Union, to EFTA countries that have signed the EEA Agreement, to the Swiss Confederation and to third countries –covered by the Neighbourhood Policy. Hence, by having third countries participating in Creative Europe, they are also subject of the guidelines of the EU, exercising an indirect influence on them and, somehow, being beneficial to these artists, since they would also take advantage from the programme.<sup>127</sup>

Nevertheless, the influence of the EU aims to expand to other sectors attached, somehow, to the cultural and creative industries, such as education, employment, youth, citizenship and justice, research and innovation, among others.<sup>128</sup>

The EU also believes that, if it is them who fund and distribute the projects, it will be easier to disseminate them and influence “new and enlarged audiences”, as well as improving “access to cultural and creative works in the Union and beyond, with a particular focus on children, young people, people with disabilities and under-representing groups”. Audiences vary in every MS, what the public likes in Slovakia might not be the same as what it is enjoyed in Portugal, that is why, and reaffirmed by the Conference of European Audiences,

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<sup>125</sup> European Court of Auditors, “EU Investments in Cultural Sites: A Topic That Deserves More Focus and Coordination” (Luxembourg: European Court of Auditors, 2020).

<sup>126</sup> Faucher, Charlotte. “The Culture Shock after Brexit.” UK in a changing Europe, December 3, 2020. <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-culture-shock-after-brexit/>.

<sup>127</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 227.

<sup>128</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 231.

the exchange of practices will cause a “data collection and interpretation to fine-tune products and works and target new audiences intelligently”.<sup>129</sup> Going back to chapter three –on European identity— it is young people who tend to travel more frequently and show willingness to learn languages; therefore, if these cultural projects are presented to them, it will be easier for this group to show understanding and empathy with the different artists, their projects and the way they, and their Member States, conceive the world. Additionally, the EU seeks to have the funded programs to be as inclusive as possible since culture should not be limited to a certain age or social class; thus, avoiding having an elitist competition. Given this circumstance, the focus on people with disabilities and under-represented groups is another point in favour for the EU: if Member States do not have enough fund to facilitate their access to culture or representation, these groups will form a favourable opinion of the EU and rely more on this body than on their Member State to participate in cultural life<sup>130</sup>.

A pertinent point that the EU is making backing the Europeanness enhancement is “ensuring a balanced geographical coverage”, which is, in fact, crucial and influential. In other aspects –such as economics or politics—, there might be some Member States that stand out more than others. For instance, the Netherlands –that has twenty-six members in the European Parliament<sup>131</sup>—, can have more political weight than Cyprus –which has only six<sup>132</sup>. Similarly, in economic terms, Germany can have more relevance than the Czech Republic in the EU panorama – Germany contributed in €28 million in 2020, while Czechia contributed with €2 million.<sup>133</sup> However, culturally and creatively speaking, the EU is trying to put all the Member States on the same level, to give them the relevance they all equally deserve and thus, the concerns that might be raised from this less-considered in hard power matters MS can be lessened.<sup>134</sup>

The Regulation adds an article –Article five—on the European Added Value. This article consists of two paragraphs and four subparagraphs attached to the second one. While the first paragraph deals with a more economic perspective –which will be discussed later on

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<sup>129</sup> European Commission, “European Audiences: 2020 and Beyond” in *Culture* (Brussels: European Commission, 2012), [https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/culture/library/reports/conference-audience\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/culture/library/reports/conference-audience_en.pdf).

<sup>130</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 231.

<sup>131</sup> European Union, “Netherlands,” european-union.europa.eu, n.d., [https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/country-profiles/netherlands\\_en](https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/country-profiles/netherlands_en).

<sup>132</sup> European Union, “Cyprus,” european-union.europa.eu, n.d., [https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/country-profiles/cyprus\\_en](https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/country-profiles/cyprus_en).

<sup>133</sup> D Clark, “EU Contributions by Country,” Statista, January 19, 2021, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/316691/eu-budget-contributions-by-country/>.

<sup>134</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”.

the paper—, the second paragraph explains how the European added value will be ensured: by guaranteeing that the activities will impact on the cultures of the EU and will bring a new deck of knowledge of cultures to citizens others than their own; by developing and promoting cooperation among artists from different MS; by providing them with additional funds; and by ensuring “a more level playing field in the European cultural and creative sectors by taking account of low production capacity countries and/or countries or regions with a restricted geographical and/or linguistic area”. This is the point that I consider the most beneficial to the use of culture as a soft power tool in order to improve European citizen’s idea of the EU, seeing that MS with a more unexplored culture or cultural interest for the rest of Europe acquire a wider visibility and trigger the interest and understanding of their conventions and heritage.<sup>135</sup>

In Chapter three, Article twelve, the Regulation describes the priorities of the Culture Sub-programme, from which cooperating internationally and internationalising the careers of artists in the European Union and internationally is the goal; but also, “supporting international touring, events, exhibitions and festivals”. This is an asset for European entrepreneurs who take on the initiative of starting a cultural event. In some MS, given the limited budget destined for the cultural sector, receiving economic support from the national government can be difficult. Nevertheless, when the EU collaborates economically, these entrepreneurs will reinforce and, probably value, the EU more than they can cherish their own country in this aspect. Apart from that, once the EU funds an activity or event, the logo must appear in all the promotion of the event as well as in the visual content; therefore, it is not only the organisation who recognises the contribution of the EU, but also the attendees or whomever explores the event, even virtually.<sup>136</sup>

The Creative Europe Desks deserve to be mentioned in this section, for they are intended to provide information about the programme in the different Member States as well as assisting the targeted sectors. It is particularly point D) – “support the Commission by providing assistance regarding the cultural and creative sectors in the countries participating in the Programme”<sup>137</sup> – that serves of help to artists: MS will consider different organisations in different countries to partner up with before making a final decision. In this way, they are grasping different cultures and ways of working before choosing the one that fits the best

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<sup>135</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 226.

<sup>136</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 227.

<sup>137</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 231.

with their vision. This measure can be very effective because empathy and/or understanding will be developed with those MS considered, and even with those disregarded. As an example, Spain, with the help of their Creative Europe Desk developed 521 projects between 2014-2020, with 331 different Spanish organisations and receiving more than sixty million euros<sup>138</sup>. Among the financed projects, one can find the previously mentioned SYMBOLS in which Spain partnered up with cultural organisations from Ireland, France, UK, Slovenia and Italy; the project Other Words –meant to link authors who produce their writings in minority languages—joined organisations from the Netherlands, Northern Macedonia, Ireland and Slovenia.<sup>139</sup>

On the whole, the EU has outlined the importance of working across Member States in the Regulation on establishing the Creative Europe programme, and in the study of the two following documents, the way in which these are implemented and how they will condition the budget projects receive as well as the mid-term evaluation of the programme will be detailed.

### **5.2.2 Creative Europe Culture Sub-programme 2014-2020 Guidelines**

Following the studying of how the feeling of Europeanness can be boosted according to the Regulation on the Implementation of Creative Europe, the same procedure of study will be reflected on the Culture Sub-programme Budget Guideline.

After the 2018, in line with the New European Agenda for Culture, culture cooperation was proposed as a method that can serve as a pathway to address “common challenges together”. Thus, one can infer that once that representatives of Member States have collaborated in cultural matters –which, being a soft power tool can be considered as less coercive—there will have overcome the ‘ice-breaking’ process in institutional relations and take it further to hard power matters, such as policies or law implementation.<sup>140</sup> This is once again reinforced with the following argument:

The Joint Communication "Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations" encourages cultural cooperation between the EU and its partner countries

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<sup>138</sup> Ministerio de Cultura y Deporte de España, “Europa Creativa. Informe de Resultados Del Periodo 2014-2020 En España” EUROPA CREATIVA, (October 28, 2021), <https://europacreativa.es/europa-creativa-informe-de-resultados-del-periodo-2014-2020-en-espana/#:~:text=Documento%20que%20recoge%20las%20convocatorias>.

<sup>139</sup> Ministerio de Cultura y Deporte de España, “Europa Creativa: Informe de Resultados Del Periodo 2014-2020 En España” *Interarts*, 2021, <https://www.interarts.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/INF-EUROPA-CREATIVA-WEB.pdf>.

<sup>140</sup> European Commission, “CREATIVE EUROPE. Culture Sub-Programme”: 3.



and promotes a global order based on peace, the rule of law, freedom of expression, mutual understanding and respect for fundamental values, putting culture at the heart of EU international relations.<sup>141</sup>

As a consequence, the close work of MS will be reflected in their citizens: the more they work together in reaching common goals, the more the citizens will forget about borders and the dichotomy of “us” and “them”, especially towards integration. This does not mean that MS should forget their own culture and particularities; on the other hand, they should embrace them yet understanding what makes the neighbour special, “connecting national borders through its pluralism and diversity of expressions”.<sup>142</sup>

The first priority of the programme, in order to achieve the previously-mentioned objectives, is the promotion of transnational mobility, which helps artists to move internationally along with their creative work, and can be linked to the second priority – strengthening the audience development: Creative Europe can help artists to reach new audiences through the trans-national mobility, especially with the focus on “children, young people, people with disabilities and underrepresented groups” . The third priority, since it is more related to economy, will be discussed further in the paper. The fourth priority is intended to facilitate the integration of refugees in Europe with intercultural dialogue, the promotion of EU values and mutual understanding. This priority was introduced after the refugee crisis of 2015: by having refugees feeling welcomed in Europe, there will be higher chances of integration rather than differentiation between “us” –Europeans— and “them”—refugees. And finally, the fifth priority is the closest to the use of culture as a tool of soft power since it is aimed at raising the consciousness of “common history and values, and reinforce a sense of belonging to a common European space”. Moreover, related to partnerships, since MS are allowed to partner up with third countries –non-Member States of the EU—, and the goal is reflecting the “role of culture in EU’s external relations”, starting by establishing cultural relations that can lead to hard power relations in the future or better understanding in discussions of these matters. When it comes to audience development, what is sought is engaging with communities in the process of experiencing and valuing art and culture.<sup>143</sup>

Section D), about the social integration of migrants and refugees, deals with the mutual understanding and respect for the other. As it has been commented previously, if refugees

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<sup>141</sup> European Commission, “CREATIVE EUROPE. Culture Sub-Programme.”: 3.

<sup>142</sup> European Commission, “Call for Proposals EACEA 32/2019 GUIDELINES”: 4

<sup>143</sup> European Commission, “Call for Proposals EACEA 32/2019 GUIDELINES”: 5

feel welcomed, they will be more likely to participate in society and contribute assertively to the economy either by consuming products or by working. Also, when integrating, the gap between "us" and "them" is reduced; therefore, they are passively integrated into European culture. Apart from that, it will be easier for them to learn how Europe works and how MS understand society if they are presented to projects that portray –in a nutshell— what Europe is.<sup>144</sup> Once again, this issue is reinforced on page nine, when the document re-states that the integration of refugees into projects can both facilitate their insertion into the European social life and labour market, as well as furthering creative projects by adding another point of view or a missing artistic skill.<sup>145</sup> What is more, by having the EU coordinating and facilitating the arrival and integration of refugees, individual MS follow the policies established by the Union, and, even if they still spend part of their national economic resources in accommodating refugees, the load of responsibility is less than if they were to draw plans of integration themselves.

The targeted projects mentioned on page eight, involve exchanges of cultural players, including residencies. These stays and residencies are beneficial for the artists and the organisations they belong to: there, they get to meet different people with different perspectives and working path, they have the chance of networking and meeting face to face possible future partners. Apart from the stays and the projects that are worked on during the residences, the artists get the chance of performing in different countries, thus, broadening their European and international audience.<sup>146</sup> That is the case of SYMBOLS –one of the nine successful projects of the 2014 call under the Culture sub-programme—, a project funded in 2017 developed by six different partners across Europe. The aim of this project was enriching people’s awareness of funerary arts as a legacy of European memory.<sup>147</sup> With the focus on targeted projects, one of the mentioned aspects is the “cross-cooperation between different types of cultural heritage organisations”, in this way fomenting an improvement of the interpersonal relations, as well as contributing to the investigation and development of good practices in terms of sustainability in cultural heritage commodities.<sup>148</sup> The project includes two artistic residencies where thirty-nine European artists visit a cemetery in Spain

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<sup>144</sup> European Commission, “Call for Proposals EACEA 32/2019 GUIDELINES”: 7

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

<sup>146</sup> European Commission, “Call for Proposals EACEA 32/2019 GUIDELINES”:8

<sup>147</sup> SYMBOLS, “About Project,” symbolsproject.eu, accessed April 28, 2022, <https://symbolsproject.eu/about-symbols.aspx>.

<sup>148</sup> European Commission, “Call for Proposals EACEA 32/2019 GUIDELINES”: 9.

and Scotland as a source of inspiration to create, further on an exhibition, which was opened in Genoa in 2016.<sup>149</sup>

The cultural activities that are intended to be showcased in multiple European regions do not always have to be displayed in the capital cities of Member States, they can be part of a project that involves rural areas, leading to the exploration of smaller, non-touristic or semi-deserted areas of certain Member States whose cultural value is relevant, yet unexplored, as a way to enhance “under-represented aspects of Europe’s cultural heritage”.<sup>150</sup> This documenting and encouraging of the discovering of remote areas and their traditions can entail a cultural renaissance of their own – thus, fitting new pieces into the European culture puzzle. In this way, we can notice that the EU does not try to force a regional identity in a European scale by blocking other type of identities, but to add them to the collage.

Among other things, the EU has reserved the right to remove from the programme any organisation or applicant that can be considered “guilty of grave professional misconduct”.<sup>151</sup> This is an obvious point that the EU outlines given that it would not benefit the Union to promote the wrong projects or organisations, it would both drive MS apart and lower the position of the EU in the international ladder.

About legal commitment, the EU is set to transfer the economic fund to applicants in Euros and no other currency;<sup>152</sup> and while this seem determined by an economical reason, there is an identity issue involved: if the grant is awarded to organisations in France, the Netherlands, Belgium or any other MS using the Euro as their own currency there is no need to apply a conversion rate to the amount transferred; on the other hand, if the grant is transferred to organisations in Denmark, Hungary or Poland, the conversion rate applied to the amount that is received in their national banks can affect negatively to the amount of money transferred. This issue does not affect MS directly, but it does affect artists and their projects, thus they might try to partner up with entities belonging to the Eurozone.

The twelfth point of the document is about publicity: “Beneficiaries must clearly acknowledge the European Union’s contribution in all publications or in conjunction with activities for which the grant is used”. Therefore, all the funded projects must recognise the

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<sup>149</sup> SYMBOLS, “Artistic Residence,” symbolsproject.eu, accessed April 28, 2022, <https://symbolsproject.eu/about-symbols/artistic-residence.aspx>.

<sup>150</sup> European Commission, “Call for Proposals EACEA 32/2019 GUIDELINES”: 9.

<sup>151</sup> European Commission, “Call for Proposals EACEA 32/2019 GUIDELINES”: 14.

<sup>152</sup> European Commission, “Call for Proposals EACEA 32/2019 GUIDELINES”: 20.

contribution of the European Project in the activities in which the grant is applied. That is to say, the EU must appear in all the “publications, posters, programs and other products realised under the co-financed project”. If this was not to be done, the grant can be reduced. Furthermore, the Union provides the emblem and the disclaimer with which they should be added in the visuals of the project, establishing the way and frequency they should be acknowledged.<sup>153</sup>

Additionally, the beneficiaries of the grant can be required to attend events organised by the Commission in order to “share their experience with other participants and/or policy makers”.<sup>154</sup> This is beneficial for all recipients of the fund, so that they exchange their expertise, good practices, and approaches; but it is particularly for them to talk to policy makers, since they can provide them with real experiences and direct feedback to improve the conditions for artists to try making a living out of their projects. Referring once again to the case of the UK and what they might have lost with Brexit, one of their biggest drawbacks in terms of culture at a European level, is, according to Dr. Mattocks, is the lack of opportunities to “learn from and collaborate with other member states on issues relating to cultural policy”, and thus proving the pros of belonging to the Union when dealing with the cultural sector and economic resources.<sup>155</sup>

### **5.2.3 Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020) – European implementation assessment**

When it comes to this document, one can find multiple signs of European identity enhancement as a hallmark of the Creative Europe programme, at least in this first evaluation carried out in 2018.

According to the two forestudied documents –the Regulation and the Budget Guideline—, the programme is open to both EU countries and non-EU, and this research proves that this condition has been respected, but with limitations: all the Member States of the EU can participate freely in all the sub-programmes as well as Iceland, Norway, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; on the other hand, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Tunisia can only participate in the MEDIA branch, and Armenia is only allowed to join the Culture Sub-programme.<sup>156</sup> One could qualify these distinctions in

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<sup>153</sup> European Commission, “Call for Proposals EACEA 32/2019 GUIDELINES”: 29.

<sup>154</sup> European Commission, “Call for Proposals EACEA 32/2019 GUIDELINES”: 30.

<sup>155</sup> Kate Mattocks, “Brexit: Impacts on the Arts and Culture,” UK in a changing Europe, April 6, 2021, <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-impacts-on-the-arts-and-culture/>.

<sup>156</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 13,

participation as unfair, but once again, if one state wishes to have full privileges in participation and funding, then, the requisite is being a member of the European Union, or at least either a candidate country –such is the case of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia<sup>157</sup>— or being part of the Schengen Area –as is the case for Iceland and Norway.<sup>158</sup>

The Creative Desks are showing the worthiness of their role in disseminating information and assistance to applicants, so that they receive information relevant to their country and eligibility conditions, rather than having the applicants directed to the Commission and having to wait long virtual queues for an answer.<sup>159</sup>

Regarding the budget laid out for the Culture sub-programme, it is mentioned that there was the possibility to support twenty-three “innovative platforms for promoting emerging artists and fostering a truly European programme of cultural and artistic works”.<sup>160</sup> Therefore, one can understand that the projects that were funded were chosen deliberately after ensuring they provided meaning to the European unity and could collaborate in a meaningful way with their European added value.

Concerning the cooperation projects, small-scale cooperation projects –with a project leader and at least two partners—, eighty-four were chosen in 2018, with a success rate of 19.5%— ; whereas for larger-scale cooperation projects had its peak of participation in 2014 with twenty-one out of seventy-two proposals submitted, and a success rate of 29.2%.<sup>161</sup> Hence, even if projects were not elected to be funded, it is possible to see the willingness to collaboration among different Member States and third countries, even from early stages of the programme.

Further in the document, the report includes a graphic showing the participation of countries in small- and large-scale European cooperation countries in 2018 one can see which countries participated more actively in these projects. When it comes to the role of coordinator, Italy leads the graphic with fifty-one organisations, followed by France –forty-

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<sup>157</sup> European Commission, “Candidate Countries - Enlargement - Environment - European Commission,” ec.europa.eu (European Union, n.d.), <https://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/candidates.htm#:~:text=Albania%2C%20the%20Republic%20of%20North>.

<sup>158</sup> European Commission, “The Schengen Visa,” ec.europa.eu (European Union, n.d.), [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/schengen-borders-and-visa/schengen-visa\\_en#:~:text=These%20countries%20are%3A%20Austria%2C%20Belgium](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/schengen-borders-and-visa/schengen-visa_en#:~:text=These%20countries%20are%3A%20Austria%2C%20Belgium).

<sup>159</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 13.

<sup>160</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 22.

<sup>161</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 23.

nine— and the United Kingdom with thirty-nine. The Member States that had the lowest number of coordination roles, on the other hand, were Bulgaria, Estonia, Luxembourg and Slovakia, with one each. With the role of partner, the list is headed by the United Kingdom with 100 organisations, Spain comes next with ninety-seven, and on third place Italy with ninety-seven. The countries with the least organisations participating as partners are Malta —three—, Luxembourg —six—, and Cyprus —ten.<sup>162</sup> This fact is confirmed at the end of the report, when in the Conclusions it is stated that there is a predominance of countries in the role of coordinators that have a good system of funding at a national level.<sup>163</sup>

What is more, the benefit artists take by being funded by the Creative Europe programme is showcased in the following page in the document, when it is displayed that “90 % of Culture sub-programme respondents and 75 % of Creative Europe programme respondents described the cooperation projects as effective or very effective in 'developing skills and competences’”.<sup>164</sup> Along this, the Commission emphasises the “social inclusion and intercultural dialogue” as being a remaining part of European cooperation projects under the Culture Sub-programme; ensuring that organisations from all MS as well as the audiences are represented in these projects.

As for the support for refugee integration projects, the initiative launched after the migration crisis in 2015 aimed at “facilitating the integration of refugees in the European environment, enhancing mutual cultural understanding”, meeting the expectations settled in the Budget Guideline. Thus, twenty countries—the UK, Italy, Sweden, Croatia, Denmark, France, Poland and Spain as project coordinators and eighteen countries as partners— took the initiative of facilitating the arrival of refugees and helping their integration and transition into a European lifestyle. One example the report provides is the project *Refugee Journeys International*, which counted with the participation of 525 refugees to develop the project and included a total audience of 383,145 people.<sup>165</sup> What I consider a failed opportunity in this aspect is not including as partners the countries from which people had to flee during the crisis in the list of third countries. If that would have been done, the EU would have indirectly supported those artists that had not manage to leave their homes and would have earned a more profound trust from the migrants.

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<sup>162</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 47.

<sup>163</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 61.

<sup>164</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 24.

<sup>165</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 34.

The Commission, additionally, pointed out “five key achievements of the implementation of creative Europe”, being one of them related with economy –and thus, discussed in a later stage of the paper—, another one qualified as the “ensured European added value”,<sup>166</sup> and the engagement of third countries in the programme, which is a developer for a feeling of sympathy and being supported towards the EU.

And finally, the Parliament reflected their intention of guaranteeing a balance geographic coverage, as well as the attention to small-scale organisations from all Member States.<sup>167</sup>

The role of the Parliament here is determinant in the applicant-organisations’ feeling towards the EU: even if it is the Commission who implements the programme and takes care of the details, the Parliament will stand up for those smaller organisations and smaller MS so that they receive the economic help they deserve as well as the visibility they should receive.

### **5.3 Creative Europe Programme linked to other sectors**

In this section it is worthy returning to the previous question of the real value of the Creative Europe Programme. Are artistic projects funded because of their contribution towards European identity, or because they impulse the economy of the EU?

In the documents previously analysed, one can understand how the spillover effect is present in cultural policy, thus affecting other sectors, such as the Single Market and economy in the EU, or even technologies. The spillover hypothesis predicts that cooperation in one policy area will trigger cooperation in a second area. If it is a functional spillover, the purpose is maximising the policy outcome; if it is a political spillover, it will be used to solve problems; and if it is cultivated, it will be used to have the supranational actors responding positively.<sup>168</sup>

In the following sub-chapters, the effect of spillover from culture to the economic sector will be presented and developed.

#### **5.3.1 Regulation on Establishing the Creative Europe Programme**

All throughout the document, sectors other than the cultural and creative are mentioned. Consequently, it is easy to understand that these two sectors do not come on their own, but that they are interrelated to other relevant areas in the EU, such as education, youth, tourism, employment and economy, among others.

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<sup>166</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 37.

<sup>167</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 38.

<sup>168</sup> Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, *European Union Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019): 59–60.

On many occasions the interrelation between the cultural sector and the economic one is fact is shown in the Regulation: on the first page, paragraph three, culture is described as a “catalyst for creative in the framework for growth and jobs and culture as a vital element in the Union’s international relations”. In fact, the Europe 2020 Strategy aims at turning the EU in a “smart, sustainable and inclusive economy delivering high levels of productivity and social cohesion”.<sup>169</sup> Thus, culture and creativity become sources of products that can derive into a positive economic impact and growth in the job market.

Sometimes the economic factor is also related to the idea of expanding the European cultural identity: it is stated on paragraph twenty that the program should “take into account the dual nature of culture and cultural activities” acknowledging the value of culture and the economic value of the sector.<sup>170</sup> As a result, the recognition of Europe's diversity and spreading the MS cultural features also contributes to the growth of the economy—it is implied that if artists establish a cross-border partnership it will be likely that they travel to one another's country and contribute economically to the system. Besides, nowadays, since it is very common to work online, by establishing a cross-border partnership with multiple organisations from different country, they would also be tackling the goal of overcome the digital shift.

Once again, going to Article five on the European added value, it is clearly explained how economy and this factor are intertwined: The first paragraph of the article is about the recognition of the economic value of the culture and, in consequence, the program “shall support actions and activities with a European added value in the cultural and creative sectors”.<sup>171</sup>

Economically, linked to the soft power in terms of participant countries in Creative Europe, in order for the candidate countries –MS, EFTA, Swiss Confederation and countries covered by the Neighbourhood Policy—to participate in the programme, they have to pay the “additional appropriations”.<sup>172</sup> So, it is not an open door for MS to join the programme, but they must contribute first economically. After considering this, could this be a reason why MS do not invest enough in culture and creativity, because they know that the EU will cover the expenses needed of those artists who seek launching their projects internationally?

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<sup>169</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 222.

<sup>170</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 223.

<sup>171</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 226.

<sup>172</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 227.



When it comes to ensuring the functioning of the programme, monitoring the share of employment and the gross domestic product is fundamental. In this line, the more successful the projects are, the more jobs are created, developing the economic panorama of multiple countries – given the partnerships have to happen in at least three different countries in the case of smaller projects.<sup>173</sup>

The Regulation also states that those who have participated in the Creative Europe Programme increase their employability chances; therefore, it is admitting that including in one's CV the participation in an artistic project partially funded by the EU can enhance the relevance of one's work and show to the commitment to the cultural sector and to the Union.<sup>174</sup>

All in all, the Regulation on the establishing Creative Europe shows clearly the importance of linking the cultural and creative sectors to the labour market and the economic sector, given that the more projects are funded, the more people will become active in the European economy.

### **5.3.2 Europe Culture Sub-programme 2014-2020 Guidelines**

As it was already happening in the previous analysed document, culture is contemplated as a sector where it is worth investing given it can contribute to innovation, creativity and particularly to the creation of sustainable jobs and growth.<sup>175</sup>

The economic challenges could be more significant in the cultural market than in other sectors, consequently, being in an “interconnected world” it is reasonable that the EU invests money in helping “artists and creators” to help them stabilising their profession,<sup>176</sup> thus making a living out of it, and not having to leap across sectors. What is more, when an artist has the possibility of developing their career from their artistic production, it is sure that there will be third people involved: actors if it is a script-writer, printers and/or publishers if it is an author, distributors if it is a photographer or painter, and even models if they are painters or sculptors, for instance. Nevertheless, the EU is not willing to wager any project or ‘rescue’ any artists, in fact, applicants will be rejected if found out in bankruptcy.<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> European Parliament and European Council, “REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013”: 230.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> European Commission, “Call for Proposals EACEA 32/2019 GUIDELINES” (2020): 3.

<sup>176</sup> European Commission, “Call for Proposals EACEA 32/2019 GUIDELINES”: 4.

<sup>177</sup> European Commission, “Call for Proposals EACEA 32/2019 GUIDELINES”:14.

With respect to the technology sector, among the priorities previously mentioned in the sub-chapter 5.2.1, one more must be added: “improve capacity by developing new skills for cultural professionals and promoting innovative approaches to creation, new and innovative models of revenue, management and marketing for the cultural sectors, in particular as regards the digital shift”.<sup>178</sup> In a fast-changing world it is important to adapt quickly to changes as they might happen, and with technology and social media, new trends are constantly entering our lives. The EU is determined to make an investment on helping artists to keep up-to-date with the new possibilities of creation, materials and to pay attention to the competence that might be online. Besides, apart from the importance of the creation’s aesthetic, artists should learn how to market their product in order to have a fair competition with fellow neighbours of the EU and with external competition from the international market.

### **5.3.3 Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020) – European implementation assessment**

The evaluation of the cultural sector in this mid-term report continues to be linked to its repercussion to other sectors; thus, demonstrating the spillover effect culture has in economy with the creation of job positions, or the other way around: the way that the digital shift is influencing the evolution of the cultural and creative sectors.

The Commission introduced an educative initiative in a master’s degree level consisting of launching a programme that includes instruction in arts and entrepreneurial skills. This is an experimental strategy very much benefitting the new generation of artists, so that they are ready to step onto the changing world, prepared to adapt to new artistic trends and new models of business. In such manner, the students and future professionals understand the direct link between the cultural sector and the economic one; they will be one step ahead in art and commerce to overcome possible unexpected changes. The overall purpose of this proposal is promoting an “interdisciplinary approach in masters and university courses by fostering cross-sectoral curricula combining both technology with Arts”, meant to be implemented through the application of modules in “existing arts, culture, science, engineering, technology and/or other relevant masters”.<sup>179</sup>

What is more, the Commission, to support artists and reinforce the economic aid provided, decided to start the Cultural and Creative Sector Guarantee Facility (CCS GF), destined to

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<sup>178</sup> European Commission, “Call for Proposals EACEA 32/2019 GUIDELINES”: 4.

<sup>179</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 34

impulse small and medium enterprises and organisations through loans. The Commission acknowledged the difficulties the cultural and creative sector have in developing their projects and/or make a living. Therefore, additionally to the Creative Europe fund, the EU has forwarded this financial intermediaries –“banks, guarantee institutions, leasing companies”<sup>180</sup>— to support projects that lack funding. According to the report, nine guarantee contracts were signed among Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Italy, Romania and Spain, thus providing more than €630.4 million to SMEs in the cultural and creative sector. Above that, 80% of the interviewees in a public consultation carried out by the Commission agreed that this deposit had strengthened “the coherence of Creative Europe”,<sup>181</sup> proving that some projects would not have been concluded if they had not had the extra funding.

In the mid-term evaluation report on the European Commission, it was learned that by channelling €544 million into the cultural and creative sectors, 2,580 entities were supported, creating around 3,000 jobs. The programme is certainly showing positive monetary results: it was meant to spread culture and amplify the field so as to reach wider territories, but also to activate the economy and finance the artistic market. Furthermore, naming, once again, the “five key achievements of the implementation of Creative Europe”, one must recall the “economic benefits for the European cultural and creative sectors”, and as it has just been showed, this goal is met.

Consequently, as proved in this mid-term report, the Creative Europe programme is efficient: helps artists developing their projects, broadens the labour market and brings new perspectives by having different MS working together.

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<sup>180</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 32.

<sup>181</sup> European Parliament and Zyegierewicz, “Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)”: 33.

## 6. Conclusions

Having gone through a contextual background and a study of three documents regulation the Creation Europe programme, it can be stated that the cultural sector has had a slow and late evolution in the EU: it was first taken into account in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and gradually the sector gained recognition. Yet, it was not until the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 that a definitive policy area on this matter was introduced; and thus, cooperation to promote culture would be sought among the Member States.

Even if the policy area was implemented in the 2000s, cultural programmes supporting artists started in 1996: “Raphael”, “Ariane” and “Kaleidoscope” promoted arts, merging these three into “Culture” and “Culture 2000”. All these programmes are the predecessors of what is known today as Creative Europe, which officially began in 2014.

Creative Europe provides artists with an economic fund to help artists developing their work as long as they meet the criteria established in the guidelines; and, the more partners from different MS collaborate and the more they appeal to the European added value, the more fund they are likely to be provided with.

In this paper, in order to answer the main research question –how is the European identity sustained by creative Europe?— it was necessary to do a thematic analysis of three documents related to the implementation and evaluation of the Creative Europe programme 2014-2020, being these the Regulation on Establishing the Creative Europe programme, the Budget Guidelines and a mid-term evaluation published in 2018. What was sought was studying how Creative Europe could be a tool of soft power for the EU and, from these documents, the European added value and the enhancement of European identity were studied, concluding that the EU relies on MS working with different countries –both within the EU and third countries— to, firstly, dissolve the “Us” vs “Them” dichotomy among member states –especially after the integration of the latest countries into the EU—, and secondly, to exercise some type of mild power in countries who do not belong to the EU, thus, starting to influence the way the affected parties –artists and artistic organisations— behave in their professional life and conceive the notion of the EU.

After all, the requirement of artists to work with other professionals from other countries contributes to the purpose of expanding audience: it is easier to spread awareness of one’s works and local values when touring in different countries. And, since the EU is the main

organisation injecting money, their logo has to appear in every project funded, letting the public know they put faith in the cultural and creative sectors.

It has been found out that, by helping artist with a larger economic contribution than individual MS could fund, artists will develop favourable feelings towards the EU. Besides, by having artists from different nationalities working with each other, a better understanding of the values of other countries is developed and this might help incorporating and developing new skills. In relation to the digital shift, when artists from different MS work together, it is likely they will make use of technology to communicate and, when travelling to each other's headquarters, the economy of the country will be affected positively. Above it, what the EU does correctly is not trying to erase MS identities to fit a European one; what it does is to facilitate it as a complementary one.

This, nevertheless, does not only affect MS and third countries, but also the refugees that had to flee to Europe: they are included in the projects as developers by integrating new skills, and as an audience. After the 2015 refugee crisis, the EU introduced a new incentive to incorporate migrants within the Creative Europe programmes, thus facilitating their arrival to the Union and starting a slow inclusion into the European traditions, for there is no better way of introducing the working culture and general values than including the newly arrived refugees to the development of the creative works and their inclusion as audience.

A secondary effect of this investment in culture is the impact it has on the national economies and labour market: by funding artistic projects developed by several member states, artists of different nationalities get to work together, bring job opportunities to several European areas and foster the economic landscape in their region: artists are expected to participate in residencies and travel to a different country or city to develop their expositions, festivals or any other artistic events. And even if they are not, given the evident physical distance among partners of different MS, online meetings will be required, overcoming, thus, the challenge the digital shift might pose and, therefore, adapting to a fast-changing world. As shown in the mid-term evaluation, around 3,000 new jobs were created in the first four years of the 2014-2020, proving the effectiveness of the guidelines and procedures of the programme.

Due to the limited space conceded to write this paper, some questions that were meant to be addressed could not be included; therefore, if I had the chance to continue this research I would also conduct interviews with the coordinators and partners of successful projects –not

only within the Culture Sub-project, but extending it to the MEDIA and Cross-sectoral paths—to listen to their opinions about the programme, what they brought as the European added value and if their view on European identity has been reinforced. Besides, I would also like to study how the cultural and creative sectors are connected to third sectors other than the economic one, such as the technological sector.

The obtained results displayed in the Analysis chapter and subchapters can be applied academically for further research in the same line of study but for future blocks of time, such as the present programme and guidelines –2021-2027. I believe it will be necessary to research how the programme and its funds have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of events that are in person – such as art exhibitions or residences—, and if this adversity has brought citizens together to work and overcome the difficulties as one, or, if in a contrary case, it has divided the popular opinion on how the EU has tackled the hardships and how MS have responded to these. To carry out this study, it will be necessary to study how the budget for cultural and creative sectors have changed, not only in the European Union as a single body, but also in the individual Member States.

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