



If You Cannot Beat Them, Join Them?

**An Analysis of Political Party Behaviour Using the Case of the
Turkish Republican People's Party (CHP)**

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Abstract

This thesis aims to contribute to the academic debate surrounding how votes affect political party behaviour. To do so, two theories explaining political party behaviour, which belong to opposite camps, will be under focus. These theories are the cleavage theory by Lipset and Rokkan and the voter transition and policy positioning theory. While the cleavage theory argues that political party behaviour is intransigent, the voter transition and policy positioning theory suggests that political party behaviour can be flexible depending on whether and to what extent they have lost their votes to their rivals (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Abou-Chadi & Stoetzer, 2020). These theories will be tested on the Republican People's Party (CHP) in Turkey, which is the founding party of the Turkish Republic, by comparing the speeches of the previous and current party leaders, Deniz Baykal and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Having a long history, CHP was the backbone of a strong secularist tradition in Turkey. However, as Turkey experienced drastic changes in its socio-political conditions towards a more conservative structure and policy, CHP was hard pressed to keep its commitment to the strong secularism of its founding. This makes the CHP case both interesting and essential to test the theories mentioned above so as to seek answers to the political party behaviour debate.

Keywords: Turkey, CHP, AKP, political party behaviour, content analysis

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1. Introduction

Having been founded in 1923, the Republican People's Party or *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP) of Turkey is almost a hundred years old political party (Turan, 2006). Being the oldest and the very first political party of the Turkish Republic, the CHP represents a significant tradition in the political history of Turkey. Specifically, this tradition is based on the ideals of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic and the CHP. In a nutshell, these ideals originated from Western positivism and hence included ideas such as secularism and reformism at CHP's very core (Turan, 2006; Kirişçi, 2012). As these were the founding ideals of the Turkish Republic, a strong and, at times, aggressive secularist paradigm was dominant in the country for many decades until the 2000s.

With the start of a multiparty system in 1946 and CHP's subsequent election loss, CHP became the main opposition party and remained as such until today. Consequently, CHP adopted the role of standing up for Atatürk's ideals, including a strong emphasis on secularism (Turan, 2006). Although CHP failed to secure a position in the government through elections, as the representatives of the founding ideology of Turkey, their influence still shaped the political paradigm of the country. However, following the first electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party or *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP) in 2002, this secularist paradigm started being attacked (Toprak, 2005). Instead, the secularist paradigm was replaced by a new conservative paradigm heralded by the AKP government. As a result, secular lifestyles and practices became marginal through various systemic changes as AKP continued to rule Turkey without any intervals (Kaya, 2015). In the face of new and heavily conservative conditions, CHP's role of secularist representation gained special importance, for this mission was transformed from an ideological axis into a matter of survival for almost everyone who did not associate with the AKP government's conservative ideas. Interestingly, in recent years, there has been a rising discussion about whether CHP actually represents the concerns of secular demographics in Turkey or whether they have changed and started to cater to the shifting ideology of the political mainstream (Erdemendi, 2020).

With all these considered, the Turkish CHP case will be utilised to better understand how political parties behave. In doing so, two contrasting theories will be tested, characterising

party behaviour completely different from each other. While Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) cleavage theory suggests that political party behaviour is intransigent, Abou-Chadi and Stoetzer (2020) argue quite the opposite. They indicate that party behaviour can be flexible and adjust their policy positioning based on the votes they get or lose.

1.1 Research Aim and Question

The expansion of academic understanding of the political party behaviour is critical for researching the power dynamics of many polities, especially the political entities where there are significantly competitive elections. As these power dynamics make up one of the most important aspects of a country's regime, the field of development could make use of the results of this research. Policy positioning of political parties are not only relevant to the current political climates of many countries that development school is especially interested in, but they are open for further research and theoretic analysis.

This thesis will use this case to contribute to the theoretical debate regarding how political parties act. This will be done by impartially testing two contrasting theories: *voter transition and policy positioning* and *the cleavage theory*. These theories offer two exceedingly different explanations regarding political parties' behaviour. In order to achieve this, the thesis will discover whether the country's oldest and heavily secularist political party, CHP, has altered its ideological standing and political language to tackle its strictly conservative and anti-secularist rival AKP. Therefore, the thesis will pay attention to religious wording and calculate its frequency in texts. The observation will take place between the speeches of two consecutive party leaders from CHP: Deniz Baykal (2000-2010) and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (2010-present). While Deniz Baykal was the leader of CHP right before and after the victory of AKP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's term coincides with a period when AKP had won the elections multiple times. Therefore, in order to test the aforesaid theories in the Turkish CHP case, the research question is formulated as **"how has the discourse of CHP changed between the party leadership of Deniz Baykal and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in terms of religious themes?"**.

2. Background

2.1 Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Beginning of a New Republic

The Republican People's Party or *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP) emerged as the very first political party of the Turkish Republic in 1923, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the efforts to permanently transition into a multiparty system by the CHP elite themselves, CHP continued to be in power as the single party until 1946 due to concerns that a democratic opposition could undo the reforms of the founding years of the republic (Turan, 2006). Before 1946, this is exemplified in the case of the Progressive Republican Party, in Turkish, the *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (TCF). The TCF was originally founded with the support of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to establish an opposition to the CHP to transition into a more democratic political system. Soon, however, the Islamists crowded the TCF and used this opportunity to express ideas threatening the newly founded regime (Jamshid Kyzy & Khaldibekova, 2022). To protect order in the new republic, the TCF was closed in 1925 (Jamshid Kyzy & Khaldibekova, 2022).

With the end of the foreign occupation after the Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923, the spirit of unity among different groups in the country disappeared as the debates on the young republic's fundamental values drowned out the joy over the victory at the Turkish War of Independence (Dündar, 2017; Köker, 2010). The first group that separated from the mainstream unitarianism was the Islamists, who wished to continue with the old religious institutions and the political understandings based on Orthodox Sunni Islam and Ottoman Monarchism. Specifically, this group was a strong proponent of re-establishing the Sultanate and the Caliphate. Moreover, Islamists thought that Islam must rule every detail of the civic life and administrative bodies under the codified laws of Islam or *şeriat* (Köker, 2010). Opposing the Islamists and forming the political elite of the young republic are the reformist Westernists who supported the modernisation of institutions under a republican system. The Westernists believed that if Islam was dominant in public spaces, the country would have been unable to transform itself into a modern state (Köker, 2010). According to Westernists, a secular transformation was the only way to turn the new republic into a country that could compete with major foreign powers and become a major power itself. The dissolution

between these groups accelerated as the question of "which ideals the newly founded Turkish Republic would be ruled by" became even more pressing.

The disagreements between Islamists and Westernists would soon become violent conflicts to which the CHP responded, showing its authoritarian and extreme secularist aspect. After just one year, the TCF was abolished for supporting the Nakshibendi religious order, a group that rioted against the state in Şeyh Said Uprising in the Eastern provinces of Turkey in 1925 (Jamshid Kyzy & Khaldibekova, 2022). The Şeyh Said Uprising showed the urgency of the secular transformation as the Muslim scholars or *ulema* posed a great danger to the modernisation of Turkey (Köker, 2010). To disincentivize actions that targeted the future reforms of the CHP to modernise the young republic, the CHP hung the leader and five supporters of the rebellion (Jamshid Kyzy & Khaldibekova, 2022). Another brutal event that caused further aggression between the two groups was the Menemen Incident. In 1930, a young officer and schoolteacher named Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay was beheaded by an Islamist group under the leadership of a self-proclaimed prophet who aimed to bring the caliphate back. The CHP executed the 28 insurgents where they were caught. This incident prolonged the single-party rule of the CHP by causing the declaration of martial law in order to protect the institutional reforms of the early republican era (Azak, 2008).

The CHP's single-party period between 1923 and 1946 proved to be a highly important phase since the reforms that turned the Turkish Republic into a secular state took place then (Turan, 2006). The CHP was determined to make these reforms permanent no matter what, which consolidated the already authoritarian and extreme secularist actions. The breakout of the Şeyh Said Uprising resulted in the immediate nullification of all religious orders as well as the sealing of Islamic lodges or *tekkes*, Islamic monasteries or *zaviyes*, and shrines or *türbes* in 1925 (Köker, 2010). It also became forbidden to associate with religious orders and associate with them via wearing their symbols, clothing, and facial hair style (Köker, 2010). However, in result, many religious orders went underground while Islamic discourse vanished from public spheres (Köker, 2010). In 1925, "the Hat Law" was put in force, which constrained the usage of religious hats and only allowed imams to wear them (Köker, 2010). This law was important as religious order members wore distinctive headgear to show their respectability among the commoners. Eighteen people were put to death for disobeying the Hat Law (Köker, 2010). In 1926, the Islamic calendar and clock were replaced by their Western alternatives (Köker 2010). To remove the ultimate religious authority, the CHP

abolished the caliphate once and for all in 1924. Last but not least, in the 1924 Constitution, the phrase that reads "The religion of Turkish State is Islam" in the second article was erased in 1928. Instead, in 1937, the phrase "The Turkish State is ... secular." was added to the constitution, and its amendment or revision was banned (Köker, 2010).

2.2 The Secularist Paradigm

The single-party period of CHP ended in 1946 after a successful multiparty system trial with the initiative of the then CHP leader İsmet İnönü. In 1950, CHP lost the election to the liberal-conservative Democratic Party (DP) and ever since remained as the main opposition party defending Kemalist ideals, also known as CHP's six pillars (secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, reformism, and republicanism) (Turan, 2006; Kirişçi, 2012). Even though the CHP has failed to rise to power on its own for more than seven decades, the CHP has, in fact, succeeded in setting modern ideals as a defining part of the country and the majority of its citizens' identity (Yılmaz & Kaya, 2012). In other words, despite being no longer in power, the CHP's pillars, which are also the founding ideas of the Turkish Republic, remained the dominant understanding in public spaces and key institutions, especially the military (Çınar, 2006).

Because the founders of the Turkish Republic, such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, had military backgrounds, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) have had a very special position as an institution since the day the Republic was founded. The army played a key role during the nation-building and secularisation of the country (Burak, 2011). Therefore, TSK saw it justified to interfere in politics as a guardian of the founding ideas when they thought Atatürk's legacy was in danger. In consequence, the army committed many coups in the last century (in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997) (Burak, 2011). These coup attempts mostly targeted Islamist practices such as Quran reciting competitions or celebrating the prophet's birthday and treated them as threats, with the notion that secularism was endangered (Kuru, 2012). Although the secularist paradigm under the guardianship of TSK against Islamism may seem rather extreme, some incidents created serious concerns for the secularist way of life in Turkey (Toprak, 2005). In 1990, the Madımak Hotel in Sivas, Turkey, was set on fire by an Islamist mob when Alawite and Atheist academicians were staying in the hotel leading to 35

deaths (Toprak, 2005). People who had critical views on Islamism, like Bahriye Üçok and Turan Dursun, were assassinated by Islamists (Toprak, 2005).

For the first time, an openly Islamist party called the National Salvation Party or *Milli Selamet Partisi* (MSP) caught relative success by becoming a part of the coalition in the 1970s under the party leader Necmettin Erbakan (Toprak, 2005). Necmettin Erbakan could be considered as the starting point of the slowly increasing Conservative perspective in Turkish politics. Following the 1980 coup d'etat, however, the military closed the party as the secularist view was still dominant in the political and military elite (Toprak, 2005). In 1983, Erbakan started a new party with similar views: the Welfare Party (RP), which won the election in 1995 in a coalition government. This proved an important breaking point in the existing paradigm. After 1995, the existing secularist paradigm slowly started to leave its place to conservatism. The underlying reason is that Erbakan started upward mobility of the Islamist and conservative populace by placing them in the bureaucracy (Toprak, 2005).

2.3 The New Paradigm and the Silent Reformation

In 2001, a new conservative party, Justice and Development Party or *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP), was founded by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who strived to avoid the mistakes of the previous conservative parties (Toprak, 2005). First, the AKP refused any affiliation with extremist Islamic thought as well as the RP. In reality, Erdoğan used to be an active member of the RP (Toprak, 2005). Instead, Erdoğan coined the term "conservative democrat" to define his new party to portray a much more moderate picture. Second, initially, the AKP defended the expansion of civil liberties against the military apparatus' more iron-handed approach (Toprak, 2005). To guarantee their support for civil liberties and democracy, they announced they would work on making Turkey a European Union (EU) member (Toprak, 2005). Naturally, this signalled the future democratisation of Turkey's institutions.

Nonetheless, it would later be revealed that the expansion of civil liberties was ultimately intended for conservatives.

After their first victory in November 2002, AKP initiated a series of democratising reforms to ease Turkey's accession to the EU in their early years (Kubicek, 2011). The regulations that were placed by the army in 1982, which limited freedom of expression and assembly, were

repealed by the AKP (Kubicek, 2011). Banning parties from political life became significantly harder. Another big step taken by AKP was permitting broadcasting and publishing in minority languages (Kubicek, 2011). There were also changes that appealed to the conservative community, such as the removal of the headscarf ban at universities in 2007 and for public servants in 2013 (Kubicek, 2011; Armutçu, 2016).

Conservatism became the dominant paradigm of Turkey, with the collaboration between many religious orders or *tarikats* that had previously operated out of the public gaze and AKP. In this regard, AKP placed its supporters and religious order members, especially the Gülenists who were connected to a massive politico-religious network, in key positions in state bodies like the military, jurisdiction, and police services (Yavuz & Koç, 2016). This way, AKP aimed for a slow, conservative transformation in Turkey. Starting from the 2010s, religious orders and similar entities became more and more visible in public life, despite numerous scandalous incidents. For instance, in the Ensar Waqf Incident, a religious association whose dormitories still operate, 45 children aged 8-10 were reported to have been sexually abused in 2016 (KRT TV, 2021). A more recent event was the suicide of an Atheist university student called Enes Kara in 2022, who was forcefully sent to a dorm belonging to the Nur Cemaati, another religious order, by his parents, who were also members of the order (Kamer, 2022). Even discussing these two incidents is heavily frowned upon in conservative political circles for fear that it may hurt the conservatisation process led by AKP. The newspapers close to the AKP, such as Yeni Şafak, consciously tried to whitewash these incidents to protect the AKP's image.

Erdoğan openly announced that one of his ideals was raising a religious youth in a speech he gave in 2012 (Yilmaz, 2018). An important stronghold of the conservative transformation became the department of education. The AKP increased the number of clergy schools or *imam hatip okulları* by 43% between 2015-2019 and altered the school curriculums (Büyükbayrak, 2021; Kaya, 2015). One drastic alteration was the removal of evolution as a topic from science classes and the addition of the concept of jihad for 7th graders (Kaya, 2015). Furthermore, the optional classes of Civic Education and Agriculture between 6th-8th grades were replaced by the Quran, Prophet Muhammed's Life, and Fundamentals of Religion (Kaya, 2015). AKP also made it mandatory for all schools to have a prayer room or *mescid* (Duran, 2017). The AKP further let religious orders infiltrate the education system by allowing them to open private schools and preparatory courses (Kaya, 2015).

Despite AKP's democratising attitude in its early years, Turkey became even more authoritarian under the increasingly repressive regime of Erdoğan. This was the result of the adoption of the presidential system, which gave significant power to Erdoğan as the president in 2017 (Behrendt, 2022). The expansion of Conservative practices, in the end, led to the restriction of the secular lifestyle. For instance, before, even though the university dormitories were not segregated by gender, even visits of the opposite gender to these facilities became forbidden starting in 2013 (Kaya, 2015). In 2021, AKP brought a ban on music in restaurants, bars, concert halls, and many other places after midnight showing the ongoing pandemic as an excuse (Sağkal, 2022). On top of this, since the start of AKP's regime, the taxes on alcohol have risen dramatically, making Turkey one of the most expensive countries to purchase drinks with alcohol (Cagaptay & Ersoz, 2010). Moreover, one of the primary goals of the early Republican years, women's participation in employment, is reversed by the AKP. Instead, Erdoğan often reminds women to have multiple children in his speeches, emphasising the reproductive role of women (Kaya, 2015). AKP's efforts to create a more conservative society paid off. This is especially pronounced by the fact that such restrictions and bans used to cause a great reaction from society. The best example of this is the Gezi Parkı protests in 2013, in which citizens organised major demonstrations against the AKP's restrictive policies (Bilgiç, 2018). Instead, now, the public has normalised the introduction of top-down conservative measures as the protests against such limitations are a rare sight.

The reason why AKP has been successful in elections for so many years is their effective utilisation of religious language. This was further reinforced as the Turkish society became more and more conservative throughout the years, thanks to AKP's engineering of the society towards a more conservative structure. While the AKP reinforced its influence all over the country, the CHP, on the other hand, remained as the main opposition party and kept losing elections to the AKP.

3. Theoretical Framework

The CHP case in Turkey presents us with some important opportunities to observe political party behaviour. First, Turkey has been experiencing a drastic shift from secular to conservative conditions in most spheres. Moreover, as the Conservatives gained more power

in the state and bureaucracy, they continuously attempted to alter the social and political practices of the public. Second, being almost a centenarian political party as well as the first in the country, the CHP is known for its strong secular tradition, which is connected to the founding ideals of the Turkish Republic. What consolidates this tradition is the existence of a sharp conservative-secularist cleavage, which has its roots reaching as deep as 19th-century Ottoman politics. Hence, this thesis has an interesting and suitable case to contribute to the academic discussion around political party behaviour. This is because this research can study if the CHP changes its positioning to catch up with its rival's success in Turkey, like voter transitions and policy positioning theory claims; or stick to its secular roots without any concessions as the cleavage theory suggests. In other words, at the end of this study, this case will show us whether political parties' policy positioning is dynamic or static.

When it comes to the behaviours and strategies of political parties, it is possible to observe two types of theoretical camps within political science. The first camp involves theories that claim that political parties update their policy positioning in response to votes. As a result, political parties can shift their positions depending on to whom they have lost their voters. The second camp argues that political parties do not change their positions. This is due to the strictness of voter profiles and the existing societal conflicts.

3.1 Previous Literature

The most important link between citizens and their states is political parties. Therefore, to understand how political systems work, we need to understand how political parties function and especially in the face of public opinion changes (Sommer-Topcu, 2009). To begin with, in this camp, Strom (1990) indicates political parties can have a few goals at the same time that conflict with each other. Notwithstanding, principally, political parties care about surviving until the next election date by increasing their voter share or their potential of winning most of the contested seats, according to this line of thought (Downs, 1957; Robertson, 1976). Sommer-Topcu (2009) argues that political parties alter their policy positioning if they know much of the public opinion has distanced itself from the parties' stances. Nevertheless, Sommer-Topcu (2009) also points out that parties may avoid changing their policy positions as it comes with certain risks, such as defaming the party's name or creating factions in parties. That is why elections prove an important source of information regarding future strategies.

Elections are highly important since they provide information on voter behaviour and, in return, influence parties' behaviour (Budge, 1994). In later years, academicians brought up the performance of rival political parties and how this affects other parties in this academic debate. For instance, Laver (2005) defends that political parties attempt to ameliorate their future election results by imitating other parties' behaviour. A more recent article from Abou-Chadi and Stoetzer suggests that as well as knowing if they gained votes or not, parties are aware of how other parties fare in terms of votes and shape their strategies in accordance with this (Abou-Chadi & Stoetzer, 2020).

However, there is a completely different camp in this political science debate. In contrast to the dynamism of political parties as presented in the last paragraph, this line of thought portrays political parties as highly static. One of the best-known and highly quoted arguments, namely the cleavage theory, in this camp belongs to Lipset and Rokkan (Özbudun, 2013, p.4). To summarise, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) state that various historical events, such as the industrial revolution, radically shaped Western communities leading to various societal divisions. These divisions were frozen, which created the basis for modern political parties (Özbudun, 2013, p.7). Due to this, the political parties do not engage in policy shifting (Hooghe & Marks, 2018). Notwithstanding, this theory was also criticised by several scholars. A noteworthy argument was that because of the growing economic welfare after the 1940s, there was an increase in the adoption of postmaterialist values. However, the "frozen" state of Lipset and Rokkan's cleavages did not explain this rise of new cleavages (Özbudun, 2013, p.7).

3.2 Voter Transition and Policy Positioning

One of the most recent theoretical articles that describe party positioning as flexible belongs to Abou-Chadi and Stoetzer (2020). In "How Parties React to Voter Transitions," Abou-Chadi and Stoetzer (2020) start by indicating that changing party positioning is a common phenomenon in multiparty systems. Often, politicians see voter behaviour as a justification to retouch the approach of their political parties. In other words, one of the cornerstones of political parties' strategic positioning is voter transitions (Abou-Chadi & Stoetzer, 2020).

The authors argue two important points about party behaviour and voting. First, political parties tend to shape their policies similar to the opponent party they have lost their voters to (Abou-Chadi & Stoetzer, 2020). This similarity increases as the number of lost votes go up. The reason why they adopt this strategy is the possibility that moving toward their opponents' positioning could help them regain their votes (Abou-Chadi & Stoetzer, 2020). Second, when political parties experience an overall vote loss, they will be even more likely to shift their policy positioning (Abou-Chadi & Stoetzer, 2020). However, the incentive to follow such a path decreases if a party has gained more votes than it has lost. This is because this move also comes with the risk of losing more votes (Abou-Chadi & Stoetzer, 2020). Additionally, Abou-Chadi and Stoetzer (2020) and other authors from the same camp, like Somer-Topcu (2009) state that even though political parties can shift their policy positioning, the parties can avoid major ideological shifts for it may create inner fractions as well as tarnishing the party's name.

3.3 The Cleavage Theory

A prominent view from the opposite camp belongs to the cleavage theory. Despite being a very old theory, this perspective is still being referred to in many contemporary political science articles. The formulators of this theory, Lipset and Rokkan (1967), argue that existing societal conflicts and cleavages are transformed into national party competition. However, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) neglect assessing the strategic exchanges among political parties. These cleavages can be in the form of central state-peripheral community, the central state-supranational religious institution, urban-rural, and worker-employer cleavages (Hooghe & Marks, 2018). Such cleavages were the results of identity conflicts or ideological movements between various groups. What solidified and sharpened these cleavages was the repeated experiences of societal conflicts in a given nation's history (Hooghe & Marks, 2018). Consequently, when political parties were founded, these entities became an apparatus for socially closed and self-conscious groups to voice their wishes and concerns (Hooghe & Marks, 2018).

Due to the experiential history and socially closed structure of social cleavages, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) make three fundamental claims within the cleavage theory. First, party systems are defined by episodic breaks from the past by external social pressures (Hooghe &

Marks, 2018). Second, the strictness of social cleavages deems political parties structurally intransigent. Third, because of the previous factor, change in party systems takes place with the founding of new political parties (Hooghe & Marks, 2018).

4. Methodology

4.1 Research Design

Case studies take interest in the detailed assessment of an individual situation, person, group, or institution without neglecting its real-life context (Robson & McCartan, 2016, p.150). In other words, a case can be anything a researcher wishes to analyse. Case studies offer various possibilities due to their different types with varying purposes. Additionally, the importance of context for case studies should be highlighted as cases are meaningful when regarded in their own sites (Robson & McCartan, 2016, p.151). Even though case studies can be conducted both qualitatively and quantitatively, this method is most often associated with qualitative studies (Robson & McCartan, 2016, p.151).

The degree of flexibility in case studies depends on the nature of the study. For instance, exploratory research tends to leave room for extensive flexibility initially, for there is little guidance in studying a particular novel case (Robson & McCartan, 2016, p.152).

Nevertheless, if a study is done for confirmatory purposes and there are previous explanations on a case, researchers can adopt a pre-structure in their studies. But there is a major limitation that comes with the trade-off between looseness and selectivity (Robson & McCartan, 2016, p.152). Starting with a rigid conceptual or theoretical framework can cause researchers to skip or misconceive details. Practical reasons, such as time management, as well can lead to pre-structuring and cause researchers to only pay attention to easily observable features of a case (Robson & McCartan, 2016, p.152).

There are several reasons that make case studies a favourable research method for this thesis. First, what defines a case study is its extensive analysis of a particular case. Similarly, the purpose of this thesis is to take a closer look at the main opposition party in Turkey as its case. Hence, a case study sufficiently facilitates this purpose. Second, the context of the research topic carries immense importance. As the boundary between the phenomenon and

the context is highly blurred, a full comprehension of this case depends on the proper inclusion of the context (Robson & McCartan, 2016, p.150). In case studies, the context is an indispensable component of the research, which is another underlying reason for preferring case studies. Third, the method of analysis for this thesis will be content analysis and will observe the changes in the language used by the CHP to understand how political parties act. Employing a case study provides this thesis with the necessary flexibility to catch the details that are not included in the actual study material, in this case, religious wording.

4.2 Data Collection

For this thesis, the main source of data will be CHP's official video archive and the Grand Assembly, in short TBMM, proceedings. It is possible to split the timelines into two components. First, this thesis will gather the ten speeches done by Deniz Baykal, who was the previous party leader of CHP, in the Grand Assembly during his leadership starting from 2002, as this was the year AKP was elected for the first time and the paradigm change was newly being taken to mainstream politics. Second, the thesis will move on to collecting the most recent parliamentary group meeting speeches done by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who rose to leadership following a society shifting to more of AKP's conservative standards. This was done as the thesis plans to measure the latest changes in the party's behaviour during the leadership of two different politicians: Baykal and Kılıçdaroğlu. From each timeline, the thesis will collect ten major speeches done by each party leader in the Grand Assembly and transcribe the excerpts that include religious terms. The reason for monitoring the number of religious terms is that, in Turkey, the way secular and conservative people speak in their daily lives differs significantly. These two different groups embed different words and idioms in their speech. As such, the wording, even in daily dialogues, can give important insight into one's political alignment.

4.3 Data Analysis

Using content analysis, we will assess the change in frequency of the religious wordings. Hence, the purpose here is to capture whether there were any behavioural transformations of the CHP, which will show us which of the theories that present a general pattern in party behaviour is valid.

Content analysis is, as defined by Neuendorff, 'the systematic, objective and quantitative analysis of message characteristics' (Robson & McCartan, 2016, p.350). According to Krippendorff, this type of data analysis is a technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts to their contexts of use (White & Marsh, 2006, p. 23, 27). This is usually done by counting particular phrases in the documents using analytical constructs and the varying characteristics attached to these phrases (Robson & McCartan, 2016, p.351). This way, researchers can reach conclusions relating to the speaker, the message, and the background (White & Marsh, 2006, p. 27). This type of data analysis method is incomplete without the inclusion of contexts. This is because the context provides essential information on the purpose of the analysed material along with socio-cultural angles (Robson & McCartan, 2016, p.350).

In order to determine and compare how dominant the religious terminology is in CHP's speeches, this thesis will employ a frequency content analysis. What makes this type of analysis favourable is that it is replicable. Moreover, it is also a liberating method as it allows researchers to analyse immense bodies of texts in a straightforward way (Laver et al., 2003). A popular text on content analysis in the field of political science belongs to Laver et al. (2003), as they provide a discussion on the effectiveness of various methods for finding word frequencies. A similar assessment of widely-used methods and the significance of content analysis is also done by Grimmer and Stewart (2013). One useful method is using sophisticated programs that can recognise words and phrases. Nevertheless, because these phrase recognition systems work only in a few languages, the phrases that are required by the thesis will be hand collected (Dicle & Dicle, 2017).

Even though most of the religious words to be counted were defined before conducting the analysis, this study later added several highly specific and rare words to the count. This addition was made as the study encountered such unprecedented words when analysing the speeches to prevent missing any important details. For coding, this thesis created a table with various categories. Moreover, the counted words are presented in the table in English (see page 18-19).

When analysing the frequency of religious terms, this thesis abides by several rules in order to ensure the accuracy of its findings. First, if the CHP quotes any AKP member and that

quote includes any religious terms, those words are omitted from the count. It is important not to confuse CHP's usage of religious terms with AKP, which is already a heavily religious political party. Similarly, if a religious wording is used with negative connotations against Islamic practices, they are not included in the count. The reason behind this is such connotations are made to defend secularist interests rather than giving conservative messages. Second, because the speeches are originally Turkish, the count will be done based on the Turkish version in order to preserve the originality in the analysis. Third, because some religious terms have no direct translation or because some are simply religious phrases with multiple words, more than one word can be marked as a religious word in the English translation. Another related matter is the fact that Turkish is an agglutinative language. This means, at times, one Turkish word can be equal to multiple words in English.

5. Findings

Here, this thesis evaluates the patterns observed in the speeches of the two CHP leaders, Deniz Baykal and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, during content analysis. In doing so, the thesis explains the repeated themes, their meaning, and their context in chosen excerpts in a detailed way. The main factors in the selection of excerpts are the recurring themes and unprecedentedly similar actions to those of the AKP. Later, this paper compares the patterns between the two different timelines as well as the repeated religious word count. Based on this, the thesis will have reached theoretical conclusions regarding general party behaviour.

Looking at the table below, we see that the frequency of CHP's religious wording in Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's speeches is more than six times compared of the frequency in Deniz Baykal's speeches. An important detail to remember is that the CHP has been losing elections to AKP since 2002 without intervals. Moreover, CHP became aware that they required votes from the conservatives to become the ruling party. There are also other notable numbers in the table. For instance, we see that the words that refer to God were used mostly by Kılıçdaroğlu. The phrases involving God are also mostly used by Kılıçdaroğlu, and they both express exclamation and religious legitimation. The latter is not observed in the speeches done by the previous party leader Baykal. Kılıçdaroğlu uses a high number of words that refer to religious rules, unlike Baykal. On the other hand, the type of religious wording Baykal uses most

frequently were the general terms of Islam. Among them, Baykal mostly uses the word "religion." Nevertheless, Baykal mostly mentioned the words under this category in an unapproving manner.

	Baykal (2002-2004)	Kılıçdaroğlu (2022)
Words that mean God (Allah, creator)	3	39
Religious phrases that involve the word Allah (Vallahi, billahi, inşallah, bismillah, elhamdülillah)	4	11
Important People for the Religious (Ahi Evran, Yunus Emre, Mevlana, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, hodja)	2	5
Terms Related to the Quran (Quran, verses, surah, Fatiha, Bakara, nas)	0	2
Phrases Related to Mankind (Allah's servant, the share of Allah's subjects, the created, livelihood)	0	12
Terms about Time in Islam (Ramadan)	0	1
Words on Worshipping (Worship, praying, (Friday) prayer, fasting, faith, call to prayer)	1	3
Terms Related to Religious Rules and Etiquette (Haram, halal, sin, making peace, adultery, blasphemy)	5	17
Religious Terms Pertaining to Identity (Headscarved, Muslim, religious, Furkan Waqf, religious community)	2	3
Religious Terms regarding	0	11

Places (Mosque, religion school, beyt'ül mal)		
General Terms on Islam (Islam, religion, sacred values, caliphate, sect, theocracy)	4*	3
Total Number of Religious Words	17	107
The Total Word Count of Speeches	40683	40843
Frequency of Religious Words in Speeches	%0,041	%0,261

* Because only 4 of these did not include negative connotations, the remaining 23 are not included in the count for Deniz Baykal's total religious wording

5.1 Analysis of Deniz Baykal's Speeches (2002-2004)

*"There must be an absolute separation of **religion** and politics; that is, there can be nothing more dangerous than the politicisation of **religion**. This is a very fundamental point. **Religion** is a very respectable and important notion that has been experienced and seen throughout human history; However, the biggest problem is bringing **religion** into politics. When you try to base education, law, and state administration on **religion**, all kinds of dangers await you."* (Turkish Grand National Assembly - 18.12.2003) (T.B.M.M., 2003c)

*"If a person tries to do politics in accordance with his **religious** understanding, he will not listen to words, reason, or logic and will not seek compromise."* (Turkish Grand National Assembly - 18.12.2003) (T.B.M.M., 2003c)

The word "religion" itself is the most frequent one when it comes to religious wording in Deniz Baykal's speeches. When Baykal uses the word "religion," he usually talks about how essential it is to keep state and religious affairs apart from each other. Baykal further goes as far as to say that individuals who act with religious motives in politics are open to committing unreasonable actions. Often when Baykal mentions religion, he reflects his disapproval of bringing religion up in all areas as it drives the country away from positivism. An interesting detail to note is that when Baykal talks of the dangers of religious perspective in politics, his

party members applaud him. This clearly shows that the CHP at the time had an uncompromising standing against the inclusion of religion in all areas.

Strict separation of politics and religion - in other words, secularism - is one of the six founding principles of the CHP. In this context, Baykal reminds the importance of secularist understanding due to the actions of a radical Kurdish Sunni Islamist terrorist group called Hezbollah. After questioning the government regarding the release of Hezbollah terrorists from prisons, Baykal emphasises the risks of religion in politics as the Turkish Republic has a long history of undermining Islamists from gaining power in the country.

*"Today is National Sovereignty Day. What does national sovereignty mean? Sovereignty must not belong to the sultanate, **caliphate, religion, or sect**; it must belong to the nation."*
(Turkish Grand National Assembly - 23.04.2003) (T.B.M.M., 2003a)

Deniz Baykal reads the excerpts above in his April 23, National Sovereignty Day speech. This day marks the opening of the Grand Assembly in 1920. Moreover, it was this Assembly that pushed foreign powers out while the Sultan and the Caliph remained silent in the face of the colonial countries' invasion. Hence, comes the idea that sovereignty belongs to the nation, not the Sultan or the Caliph. Furthermore, here, Baykal signals that religion, in whatever form it may come, cannot dictate anything in the governing of the country. For all identities to live in freedom as well as to ensure the Turkish Republic's ability to implement its own rules, Baykal believes it was necessary to dispose of the old systems based on religion.

*"A law was enacted called "The Law of Returning Home" that released PKK and Hezbollah terrorists from prisons. For **God's** sake, why was this law passed? Could we discuss what this law means in the face of Turkey's terrorism problem? It was only we who insistently warned about this issue."* (Turkish Grand National Assembly - 20.11.2003) (T.B.M.M., 2003b)

*"When calculating for 2004, a foreign capital inflow of 2 billion dollars is foreseen, and the balances have been established accordingly; Mr. Minister assures us that "unemployment will increase by that number." It will be **by Allah's will**, but this is the reality we live in."* (Turkish Grand National Assembly - 18.12.2003) (T.B.M.M., 2003c)

Even though it is in much fewer quantity, Baykal uses religious phrases that carry minimal extremity, such as "by Allah's will (*inşallah*)" or "for God's sake (*Allah aşkına*)." Compared to many other religious wordings, these carry less heavy religious baggage. Because of this reason, secularist demographics use these phrases at times. Nevertheless, an accurate indicator that tells us how conservative someone is is the frequency of these words. Religious people tend to include these phrases in their sentences at a significantly higher frequency when compared to secularist people. Considering that Baykal uses the word "God" and "by Allah's will" only seven times in all his ten speeches, it can be said that Baykal is far from being inclusive of conservative discourses.

*"We faced many pressures. Chief among these was the pressure on Cyprus. Instead of displaying the necessary attitude against those pressures, the Prime Minister expressed that attitude to **adultery**, and he did so by giving the impression that he was fulfilling the principles of our **religion**. This caused a great reaction in Europe. During a visit to Brussels, the Prime Minister saw that he could not resist the response in Europe and took a step back. He abandoned the attempt to criminalise **adultery**." (Turkish Grand National Assembly - 18.12.2003) (T.B.M.M., 2003c)*

*"Politics is a business of discussion, a business of persuasion. In **religion, blasphemy** is intolerable. However, in politics, a political thought without opposition is not accepted." (Turkish Grand National Assembly - 14.12.2004) (T.B.M.M., 2004b)*

Under the religious rules and etiquette category, there are two noteworthy situations in Deniz Baykal's speeches. In one speech, Baykal utters the word adultery or *zina*. However, in doing so, it is observed that Baykal criticises the then Prime Minister Erdoğan's religious approach to politics. In addition, Baykal clearly expresses his discontent with the fact that Erdoğan is much more reactive to concepts that are unacceptable in Islam compared to foreign policy issues. The former CHP leader also hints that the dissatisfaction he is in with the AKP government's attempt to criminalise adultery for it tarnished the modern image of Turkey.

In a section where Baykal names blasphemy, he provides the audience with a simple comparison of politics and religion. This way, Baykal tries to show how incompatible these two notions are. While politics without discussion is unacceptable, questioning in religion is

thought of as blasphemy or *şirk*. Therefore, Baykal signals that incorporating religion into politics would lead to an unhealthy practice where only blind allegiance becomes acceptable.

5.2 Analysis of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's Speeches (2022)

*"The three-month interest from the state's treasury is 17.75%, which makes 92% annually. Now, wouldn't I ask my AK Party brothers? They said the **word of God**, they said **religion**, they said **faith**, and they said the **Quran**. So where exactly in 92% interest is **religion**, **faith**, **Quran** brother?" (CHP Parliamentary Group Meeting - March 29, 2022) (CHP TV, 2022d)*

Despite extremely high rates of inflation, Erdoğan's government decided to lower the interest rates. About this, Erdoğan explained that high interest rates were not acceptable based on the word of God or *nas*. Following this, to prevent ordinary citizens from investing in foreign currencies, the government announced a new plan. According to this, if citizens converted their foreign investment accounts into Turkish Lira ones, the government would give them compensation equal to what they would earn in their previous foreign currency accounts. Interestingly, this translates to a 92% interest rate. Therefore, Kılıçdaroğlu indicates the mismatch in Erdoğan's approach by mocking his unreliable commitment to God's word.

Using religious terms, Kılıçdaroğlu often shows the inconsistency between Erdoğan's heavily religious discourse and inconsistent actions. This is because Erdoğan tends to use religion as a weapon of justification, which Kılıçdaroğlu criticises. Kılıçdaroğlu, interestingly, gives Erdoğan a "lesson" on how the AKP should organise the economy based on religious principles. As well as challenging the idea of Erdoğan presenting himself as a good and responsible Muslim in many cases, Kılıçdaroğlu questions the sincerity of Erdoğan as a Muslim.

*"According to these gentlemen (in the AKP), it is not **haram** to donate national budgets under the name of guarantee payments and to steal 128 billion dollars." (CHP Parliamentary Group Meeting - April 12, 2022) (CHP TV, 2022f)*

It can also be noticed that Kılıçdaroğlu uses words such as *halal* and *haram* relatively frequently. These words are defining religious words when stating if an action is approved by

Islam or not. One pattern to observe in Kılıçdaroğlu's usage of these words is that he usually refers to the AKP's mindset. From this perspective, what Kılıçdaroğlu tries to convey is that although religion is an important component in the lives of the ruling party's elites, they give up on the principles their religion dictates for self-interest. In the excerpt above, Kılıçdaroğlu reminds his fellow party members how the state's money disappears in the AKP's hands through dubious tenders and harmful strategies against the economy.

*"The Constitution says: Everyone has the right to organise unarmed and peaceful meetings and demonstration marches without prior permission, regardless of their identity, belief, or lifestyle. The constitution says so. **Furkan Foundation**, too, whether you like it or not, whether you agree or not, wants to protest. A disproportionate force was used (by the police), my dear friends. For the first time in the history of the Republic, **headscarved** women faced such severe persecution."* (CHP Parliamentary Group Meeting - March 22, 2022) (CHP TV, 2022c)

The inclusion of conservative people, especially an extremist religious foundation, in speeches is worth mentioning. Unlike Deniz Baykal, Kılıçdaroğlu discusses the concerns or interests of conservative people. In this incident, the Furkan Foundation, a radical Islamist foundation that disapproves of the partisan actions of other Islamic foundations that try to gain the liking of the AKP, was protesting for the release of some of the Furkan Foundation's members. The protestors, however, were subjected to police brutality. Thus, in the excerpt above, Kılıçdaroğlu defends the right to protest and condemns the brutality the headscarved women faced. Moreover, in response to AKP's usual portrayal of the CHP as the cause of persecution against religious people, CHP uses this opportunity to target the AKP with the same accusation.

*"Tons of smuggled tea keep coming. I promised in Rize. If **Allah** grants us when we come to power with their votes, I will burn those smuggled teas in Rize Square!"* (CHP Parliamentary Group Meeting - April 5, 2022) (CHP TV, 2022e)

Kılıçdaroğlu also uses expressions like "if Allah grants us" or "if Allah allows us". This phrase carries a religious legitimation purpose of CHP's potential election victory. In other words, the usage of the word Allah in such a phrase hints that if CHP is elected with the votes

of the people, the party will also have God's permission and blessing in this process. This hidden message equips the CHP with religious morality.

5.3 Theoretical Implications

When the speeches of the two CHP leaders, Deniz Baykal and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, are compared, this thesis found out that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu used religious wording more than six times. The thesis observed some key differences in how religious terms are embedded in the CHP's speeches. Interestingly, even though Deniz Baykal uses the word "religion" itself in high frequency, the previous CHP leader often does this to remind the audience of the risks of not keeping religion out of politics. Additionally, Baykal does not feel the need to benefit from a religious aspect to justify his stance. In fact, when mentioning adultery and blasphemy, which are great sins in Islam, he asserts how wrongful it would be to approach these matters from a religious point of view in politics. Last but not least, in Baykal's speeches, there is no mention of the interests or concerns of the religious people.

On the other hand, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu uses words that carry a heavier Islamic background. Kılıçdaroğlu also openly defends conservative interests in his speeches, unlike Baykal, as exemplified in the Furkan Foundation protests. Moreover, Kılıçdaroğlu often re-utilises AKP's religious wording to criticise the AKP's inconsistencies between their religious discourse and real-life practices. One noteworthy detail about this is as Erdoğan attempts to show himself as a good Muslim to the public, Kılıçdaroğlu tries to elaborate that Erdoğan is far from being a proper Muslim, using Erdoğan's discourse against him. Based on these observations, it is evident that CHP follows different strategies than what they used to do in the early 2000s. Recently, the CHP has adopted strategies to draw AKP's voters by applying a more religious language in their speeches similar to its rival AKP, showing that they, too, are Muslims to religious voters.

The findings of this thesis present us with significant implications regarding the theoretical debate surrounding political party behaviour. Just like Lipset and Rokkan (1967) point out, there is a conservative-secularist cleavage in Turkish society rooted in historical events. The discord between these two groups worsened and solidified, especially in the early years of the Republic. The reflections of such identity conflicts can be observed in the established party

system as currently, the AKP represents the conservative, and the CHP stands up for the secularist. However, the findings suggest that no matter how strong ideological traditions may be for political parties, they are far from being completely intransigent. Instead, in order to maintain their contemporary relevance, it is necessary to have a flexible approach to voters and adapt to changes in political conditions. While it is true that political parties do not give up on their core pillars, this is no impediment to shifting policy positioning to attract potential voters (Abou-Chadi & Stoetzer, 2020).

As the CHP case shows, political parties embrace the approaches of their successful rivals, in this case, the AKP, to gain votes. When the AKP was elected in 2002 for the first time, one could see the CHP's harsh secularist behaviour pattern. Nevertheless, after continuously losing elections to the AKP for two decades, CHP's policy positioning has become much more conservative and hence, closer to AKP's strategies. Therefore, this thesis does observe the pattern suggested in the voter transitions and policy positioning theory. In other words, political parties may adopt strategies that resemble that of their rivals' when they lose their votes to them. Moreover, the incentive to adopt the rival political parties' language and methods increases when they lose more votes (Abou-Chadi & Stoetzer, 2020). An additional statement can also be added to this. The more a political party loses elections to its rival party, the more it will become similar to its opponent by time, which has been the case between the CHP and AKP.

6. Conclusion

The target of this thesis was to contribute to the academic debate around political party behaviour. To achieve this, the thesis tested two theories that had completely different explanations of how political parties behave. The names of these theories were the cleavage theory by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and the voter transition and policy positioning theory by Abou-Chadi and Stoetzer (2020). The cleavage theory defends that because of the existing identity conflicts in a society sharpened by historical events, the political parties that represent these different groups are inflexible. Moreover, instead of altering the perspective of a given party, what happens is the foundation of a new political party (Hooghe & Marks, 2018). Voter transition and policy positioning theory, on the other hand, come up with much

more different ideas on how political parties behave. According to this theory, political parties react to the changes in their votes. Specifically, if political parties lose votes to another party, they can adopt a strategy similar to their rivals (Abou-Chadi & Stoetzer, 2020).

By using the CHP case in Turkey, this thesis determined which theory on party behaviour was valid. Despite having a long-standing secularist tradition, the CHP encountered a conservative turn in socio-political conditions as well as a conservative rival, AKP, with a political language that seemed to pave the way to electoral victory multiple times. From the findings, the thesis revealed that CHP did not remain intransigent in this situation. Based on the frequency of religious wording, CHP adapted itself to different environments and political symbolism to gain votes from the AKP's voter base. Although the CHP's core values have not undergone an extreme transformation, we see that it makes concessions by acknowledging the interests and concerns of the Conservative by adopting a language similar to AKP. Additionally, this thesis discovered that the number of lost elections to a rival party is also defining when it comes to a given party's flexibility in policy positioning. Ultimately, in line with the theory of Abou-Chadi and Stoetzer, the findings suggest that political parties cannot afford to be uncompromising to different views even if they wish to sustain their political tradition, as they require votes to maintain their relevance and, most importantly, to survive.

7. Suggestions for Future Research

Based on the findings and theoretical results of this thesis, there are a number of ways to proceed to improve the academic debate regarding political party behaviour. We can split the research that can be done into two sections. First, on the Turkey level, there can also be other interesting cases to study. One could be analysing the voter transition and policy positioning theory by examining whether CHP experienced a similar case with the People's Democratic Party or *Halkların Demokratik Partisi* (HDP) adopting HDP's strategies or discourses. Another relevant and intriguing option would be studying whether AKP has altered its position to regain votes from the HDP, especially from the HDP's conservative base. Moreover, focusing on different cases and timelines, as well as places, researching the change in behaviour of political parties, could produce beneficial results for the academic discussion.

Second, in other parts of the world, the differences in political parties' strategies during electoral campaigning and non-election times can be studied extensively. In addition, another matter to study could be the main opposition parties' strategies to gain votes from the ruling party and whether this is influenced by the number of elections lost to the ruling party. Moreover, as well as democracies, this idea could be applied to countries with varying degrees of authoritarian regimes to observe and compare party behaviour in different environments.

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9. Appendices

9.1 Deniz Baykal's Speeches

Statements by Indulgence	November 26, 2002	https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c001/tbmm22001004.pdf
Right to Reply	December 17, 2002	https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c001/tbmm22001011.pdf
Off-Topic Speeches	December 17, 2002	https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c001/tbmm22001011.pdf
Statements by Indulgence	March 23, 2003	https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c009/tbmm22009053.pdf
Statements by Indulgence	April 4, 2003	https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c012/tbmm22012070.pdf
Off-Topic Speeches	November 20, 2003	https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c031/tbmm22031021.pdf
Statements by Indulgence	December 18, 2003	https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c034/tbmm22034030.pdf
Motions	August 4, 2004	https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c058/tbmm22058118.pdf

Statements by Indulgence	December 14, 2004	https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/utanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c068/tbmm22068032.pdf
Right to Reply	December 20, 2004	https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/utanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c069/tbmm22069035.pdf

9.2 Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's Speeches

Title	Date	Source
CHP Parliamentary Group Meeting 01/03/22	March 1, 2022	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hew_3AvgTtQ&ab_channel=CHP-CumhuriyetHalkPartisi
CHP Parliamentary Group Meeting 08/03/22	March 8, 2022	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IIT4oPXMSbg&ab_channel=CHPTV
CHP Parliamentary Group Meeting 15/03/22	March 15, 2022	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HTDDjicMdw&ab_channel=CHPTV
CHP Parliamentary Group Meeting 22/03/22	March 22, 2022	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FnJT6Aj7zvQ&ab_channel=CHPTV
CHP Parliamentary Group Meeting 29/03/22	March 29, 2022	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QMwrf19djRk&ab_channel=CHPTV
CHP Parliamentary Group Meeting 05/04/22	April 5, 2022	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P1X2RWN5gV0&ab_channel=CHPTV
CHP Parliamentary Group Meeting 12/04/22	April 12, 2022	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8xU28cevqzk&ab_channel=CHPTV

CHP Parliamentary Group Meeting 19/04/22	April 19, 2022	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=reWXr3nWnaQ
CHP Parliamentary Group Meeting 26/04/22	April 26, 2022	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BNS3a15-ALY&ab_channel=CHPTV
CHP Parliamentary Group Meeting 10/05/22	May 10, 2022	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RI_UGicWBTI&ab_channel=CHPTV