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# The climate, energy, and external actions nexus

A critical discourse analysis of the EU's external climate and energy  
strategy in the emerging geopolitics of renewables

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# Abstract

The energy crisis in Europe has recently highlighted vulnerabilities that experts have recognised for a long time. The EU relies heavily on fossil fuel imports from Russia to supply its citizens with affordable energy. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the desperation to unbundle itself from Russian energy has rapidly stirred massive complexity and increased energy prices. Steps taken now should potentially have been taken by the EU a long time ago. The EU has been criticised for ignoring the importance of geopolitics and energy as its primary driver. The EU, undergoing an energy transition to mitigate climate change, now also faces the loss of its most stable energy supplies from Russia, further complicating the EU's energy security. This master thesis theorises a foreign policy nexus in energy and climate change mitigation where policies potentially intersect in a nexus of climate, energy, and external actions. The nexus is theorised and later analysed in relation to the geopolitical discourse of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by dissecting the European External Actions Service's annual reports of the CFSP between 2009 and 2017 through Critical discourse analysis (CDA) to reveal the underlying discourse characteristics and ideas of the EU's external strategy concerning the climate and energy nexus. Through asking the question: 'What characterises the EU's geopolitical discourse over time when concerned with the nexus of climate change, energy, and external action of the ongoing European energy transition?' The researcher concludes that there is a climate change, energy security and external actions nexus that is distinguishable in the geopolitical discourse of the CFSP. The nexus is not as intertwined in the early years of the EEAS, intersecting one another more seldom. Appearing more distinct in 2014, pressured by crisis and dramatic changes in the EU's energy security, the three policy areas appear to intersect more often, forming a distinct nexus in the geopolitical discourse where the areas are linguistically and discursively realised.

*Keywords:* European external action; critical discourse analysis (CDA); the geopolitics of renewables; CFSP; energy security; climate-, energy-, and external actions nexus

*Word count:* 19332

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# 1 Introduction

At the end of 2021, alongside the stabilised but still ongoing pandemic, a rapidly increasing energy crisis hit the EU and the world (Mathiesen and Hernández-Morales 2021: xv). A row of events explained the subsequent price shocks. For one, the economy's kickstart after the numerous pandemic lockdowns since 2020. The underperformance of fossil-free alternatives, such as wind power, because of a less windy summer than anticipated. Fossil fuel prices began to rise dramatically, partly due to the disconnect between the decarbonisation efforts of the ongoing energy transition and the unexpected import deficit from Russia, the EU's leading energy supplier (Hernandez and Smith-Meyer 2021; Eurostat 2022). Escalating the already tense relations between the EU and Russia, the import deficit brought to light the potential consequences of the EU's considerable dependency on Russia energy<sup>1</sup> (Hadfield 2017: 68; Fokaidis 2020: 1). Accused of causing the deficit to press forward decisions on the highly politicised pipeline Nord Stream 2 that at the time awaited final approval (Ambrose 2021).

The fear solidified not far into the new year as Russia surrounded the Ukrainian border (Weise 2022). Within a few months, the European security order and the European energy regime were on its head (Paikin 2022). The energy dependency and the concern of energy deficiency quickly gained momentum from Russia's invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February. The long-standing energy relationship with Russia quickly turned into desperation to cut any financial ties with Russia. Nord Stream 2, which was previously considered as 'not posing a security threat' in the binding opinion of the project in 2021, was soon sanctioned and went bankrupt in March 2022 (Lynch and Vela 2022; Weise 2022). The energy dependency now seen as indirectly financing the war is a part of the greater complexity of European energy security. At the emergency

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<sup>1</sup> In 2020 Russia was the most significant EU supplier of all fossil fuels, both crude oil, natural gas, and solid fossil fuels, making up 29 percent of crude oil, 43 percent of natural gas and 54 percent of solid fossil fuels (Eurostat 2022).

called European Council in Versailles the 10-11<sup>th</sup> of March, the European leaders quickly promised reductions in the overall European energy dependencies on Russia and agreed to phase out all Russian gas, oil, and coal as quickly as possible. One of the ways of doing this was by speeding up renewables development through the European Green deal (Council 2022). Yet the question remains how the tie to Russian energy is going to be cut.

The situation highlights the complex geopolitical setting in which the EU acts within the energy realm. Historically, the EU is a weak energy actor and is now facing a significant challenge to uphold energy supplies to its citizens, navigating between domestic needs for affordable and reliable energy supplies while attempting to achieve an energy transition to mitigate pressing environmental challenges. The situation adds difficulty to the EU's aspiration to remain a Climate Change leader in its foreign affairs, keeping substantial clout and influence in its diplomatic relations with international actors that remain fossil fuel economies. The EU has previously been criticised for being naive regarding geopolitics, deeming it an obsolete concept, and choosing to ignore something that it cannot change – its geography (Biscop 2018: 9-11). While some claim the 21<sup>st</sup> century is seeing a return of geopolitics, other researchers, such as Biscop (2018), argue that geopolitics never faded. While Europe chose to ignore geopolitics, it has now come back to bite at a critical time in the energy transition. While Biscop's view is a realistic approach to foreign policy, the situation in Europe at this moment makes it hard not to question whether the EU should have paid more attention to its geopolitical surroundings regarding energy security. This thesis aims to analyse the underlying ideas and intentions of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at the intersection of three EU policy areas crucial to the EU currently; climate change, energy security, and external actions – choosing to call this *the climate change, energy, and external actions nexus* and examining the state of the EU's geopolitical discourse over time.

Against the backdrop of Europe's critical situation, the question of the characteristics of the EU's external energy strategy becomes crucial. This thesis aims to uncover how it has developed over time and how the aims for energy security and its green ambitions have been dealt with together within the CFSP – looking for a potential nexus between energy security, climate change and foreign affairs in the EU's geopolitical

understanding. It allows the researcher to analyse how the geopolitical discourse has developed and articulated since the early years of the CFSP by asking the following question.

## 1.1 The European energy transition

Even before the 24<sup>th</sup> of February 2022, the European Union's energy prospects were fragile. Seeing increasing disruptions, escalating living costs and destabilised security of supply throughout Europe. The emerging energy transition introduced by the European Green Deal, the most far-reaching climate and energy strategy yet to mitigate the climate crisis, could also solve this increasing issue in the long run (Commission 2021b). Through the 'The European Green deal' and the related EU strategies, the Commission set out to be a 'geopolitical commission' attempting to lead international climate and energy policies by cutting emissions to zero by 2050 (Commission 2021b). As the most far-reaching emission target in the international context, the green deal and its related strategies supposedly include essential components for an energy transition and its geopolitical effects (Commission 2019).

Because energy is so strategic (Eyl-Mazzega and Mathieu 2020: 43-44), shifting to a new energy base will inevitably transform geopolitics and geoeconomics and, in the short term, destabilise the energy system as will any transition. Mitigating such a transition's risks demands specific policies to take the EU through such a transition which the EU have to consider in their external affairs (Eyl-Mazzega and Mathieu 2020: 43-44). The transition alone could result in significant geopolitical challenges for the international system, as geopolitics historically has been defined by the uneven distribution of fossil fuels (Hafner and Tagliapietra 2020: xv). Energy is deeply embedded in geopolitics and has long shaped power politics and conflict (Hafner and Tagliapietra 2020: xv). The mainstreaming of climate neutrality in EU policies could stir massive waves of complexity and repercussions for the EU and its relations with the rest of the world.



### 1.1.1 Purpose and research question

Energy has a long withstanding relationship with conflict (Hafner and Tagliapietra 2020: xv). It is not surprising that conflict, also, in this case, forced the issue to the surface. The context also illustrates that European energy consumption does not solely affect the EU and the energy mix of its member states but also has geopolitical consequences that span far into the foundation of the international system (Eyl-Mazzega and Mathieu 2020: 43-44). The way Russia uses energy as a piece in the war in Ukraine to pressure Europe highlights the interconnection between energy, sustainability, and external affairs in its most acute way. This master thesis studies the EU's geopolitical discourse and its understanding of the connection between foreign policy, climate change and energy security over time as the EU is attempting an energy transition.

From an understanding of strategies as discursive in their character (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012: 25), this thesis aims to critically examine the geopolitical discourse of the external dimension of the EU's energy and climate strategy over time between the years 2009 and 2017. Strategies are discursive in expressing the prioritisation of their originator's values, principles and understanding of the world (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012: 25). Suitable when concerned with geopolitics, as geopolitics is inherently discursive (Flint 2013: 146). CDA allows the researcher to interpret the underlying principles and values obtained in the external dimension, what is considered problems and priorities, potential solutions and what is discarded through the geopolitical discourse. These questions will be crucial for how the EU in the global energy transition and will affect the geopolitical situation the EU is part of creating and simultaneously will face as an international actor. Understand the more profound ideas behind the EU's geopolitical strategy for the energy transition.

This master thesis sets out to critically examine the external dimension of the EU's climate and energy transition strategy through understanding a nexus of three policy areas: climate change, energy, and external action. Together with a critical discursive framework, the understanding of the *climate change, energy and external actions nexus* allows the researcher to decipher the dynamics between three policy areas that conclude the geopolitical outlook of the EU in its ongoing energy transition.

The following question is asked to fulfil the purpose of the thesis:

- **What characterises the EU's geopolitical discourse over time when concerned with the nexus of climate change, energy, and external action of the European energy transition?**

Through a thorough examination of the annual reports of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the researcher analyses the EU's united external actions efforts and the EU's geopolitical discourse over time through the theoretical and methodological framework of critical research analysis (CDA) and climate, energy, and external actions nexus.

Analysing the climate and energy strategy as a foreign political issue adds to a particular gap within EU research – and adds to the understanding of synergies between three policy areas climate change, energy and external action and their role in the EU's geopolitical outlook in the emerging energy transition (Scholten 2018). The energy, climate, and external action nexus of the energy transition<sup>2</sup>. The analysis will be conducted by unbundling the discursive characteristics of the EU's geopolitical discourse to understand how it took form from 2009 until 2017 when the last CFSP was published.

### 1.1.2 Limitations

The limitations pinpointed in this section are in no way exhaustive. The attempt is to highlight the most substantial limitations to make the research transparent and the intentions and understanding of limitations clear to the reader beforehand. The limitations are divided into three sections; methodology, theoretical framework, and material, as these are the most significant limitations of the thesis.

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<sup>2</sup> Conceptualised in chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

### **Methodology:**

When writing a discourse analysis, the researcher is part of the reproduction and constitution of discourse; this is inevitable. Every discourse analyst needs to be aware of this and try to mitigate it in the only feasible way; through transparency. Accounting for shortcomings of such a method and remaining transparent throughout the thesis. This section of limitations is one attempt at doing this.

The linguistic aspects of the CDA also entail a risk of subjective assessments of the linguistic features as every person reads and pick up tones in language differently. In a perfect world with unlimited time, the author would dissect every single grammatic feature of the texts to assess the grammatic constructions of the sentencing relaying meanings in the material. As this is not possible, the acknowledgement of this weakness hopefully invites the reader to scrutinise as the writer constantly evaluates the importance of upholding a particular example of a linguistic feature.

### **Theoretical framework:**

The nexus understanding is both the limitation and the strength of the thesis. It allows for an understanding of the complexity of contemporary foreign policy since it is studied at the intersection of three policy areas, usually regarded as separate. As a simplification of reality, the lines drawn between policy areas are magnified to study the intersection that occurs whenever policy interests overlap. However, this also limits the scope of focus and understanding of the three policy areas. Hence, there is no claim to a comprehensive understanding of all three policy areas, which is beyond the scope of the thesis—the study is of the synergies – the nexus, the space where climate change, energy security and external action overlap in the material.

The aim is to analyse the existing discourses in the strategies and distinguish the most prominent ones<sup>3</sup> for further discussion and analysis through the theoretical understanding of the *climate, energy, and external actions nexus*. It is neither the aim

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<sup>3</sup> See chapter 5: for the operational methodological framework

nor a possibility to identify all the discourses in the material. Some aspects are filtered out through the formulation of the research problem. It is also essential to understand that the EU is studied as a foreign policy actor in the international context, with internal complexities put aside. Hence, little attention is paid to the internal policies of energy governance of the European Union, although these affect the energy security situation as well as the external energy relations.

### **Material:**

Another drawback necessary to address is the unfortunate limit of the chosen material. The publication of annual reports of the CFSP seems to have ended in 2017 with an unexplained disruption in 2015. After reaching out to the EEAS without success and two local EU offices, the efforts to find more recent reports had to be put aside. Therefore, the material analysed is the annual reports of the CFSP between 2009 and 2017, with a material gap from 2015. The limited material has effects on the findings and leaves the years between 2018 and 2022 unanalysed. In future studies, it would be interesting to continue with similar materials or publications of strategies instead of reports of actual actions since these seem to be more limited.

Nevertheless, the timeframe of this study leaves many exciting aspects to analyse. The first annual report is from 2009, the same year as the diplomatic service of the EU, affecting how the EU conducted foreign affairs. Hence the material allows the researcher to follow the early establishment of the EEAS. Although the CFSP was formed throughout the '90s, the CFSP was strengthened and reformed through the Lisbon Treaty (Morgenstern-Pomorski 2018: 14). The material will also account for the annexation of Crimea in 2014, which had a vital energy security component for the EU as Ukraine is a significant transit state (Balmaceda 2012). Beginning to map out the discourse development from 2009 until 2017 will hopefully add to the field whilst also inviting further studies that can continue to analyse the geopolitical discourse from 2017 onwards.



## 2 Literature review

This section serves as an orientation of the research field on the geopolitics of renewables. By introducing the historical understanding of geopolitics and its more recent developments, the main concepts are defined and allow a better understanding of how geopolitics can be regarded as discourse. The geopolitics of renewables is regarded as an extension of the broader geopolitics of energy that has shaped international relations throughout history due to the uneven distribution of energy resources (Scholten 2018). The chapter ends with a section about the geopolitics of the EU.

### 2.1 Geopolitics

Geopolitics was historically pursued by political elites, guiding statecraft and international affairs to increase the state's power and influence at the expense of others spreading European control and domination (Flint 2013: 145-49). The territorial practice through which states are understood to naturally strive for power and influence over territory and resources (Kuus 2017: 3). In contrast, modern geopolitical academics have developed to be critical in its essence, criticising the colonial and Eurocentric power struggles of classical geopolitics while still recognising the necessity of understanding the remains from that form of statecraft when studying power structures today (Flint 2013: 145-46, 51; Kuus 2017: 2). The uneven distribution of resources is still a determinant for global influence, welfare, and economic stability (Flint 2013: 145-46). Each superpower developed its own 'geopolitical traditions', presented as entirely neutral and objective trajectories, providing simplified understandings and classifications, regionalising the world into strategic imperatives, and geographically determined behaviours. Traditional geopolitics was statecraft which regarded territory as a zero-sum game of strategy and control, practised by state elites that claimed to know the dynamics of the world to such an extent that predictions warranted a particular foreign policy. Traditional geopolitics added rudimentary geography to practices of

realist international relations. As such, geopolitics is a contested enterprise. What emerged over time was an understanding of geopolitics that did not only work as a tool for political elites, justifying their particular foreign policy objectives but as an analytical tool aimed at giving voice to oppressed or marginalised voices (Flint 2013: 148-49).

### 2.1.1 The geopolitics of renewables

Geopolitics concerns power relations, and the uneven distribution of energy sources has always and continues to shape the geographies of power. (Pastukhova and Westphal 2020: 354). Moreover, the energy base has always been the guide of such relations. Whilst the energy base has changed throughout modern history. Geopolitics has always been guided by the uneven distribution of primary energy resources. It has been the decider of superpowers, favouring the state with the required resources or the possibility of acquiring it (Hafner and Tagliapietra 2020: xv). The importance of energy to industrialised society has made securing national supplies one of the most central concerns for national governments, hence making energy security a priority (Simpson 2013: 248). Energy security is only one aspect of energy policy, both as an internal and external issue and usually refers to the security to supply. More recent conceptualisations of energy security involve a built-in understanding of climate change and renewability as an essential aspect of a secure energy supply (Simpson 2013: 248).

Energy transitions are not a new phenomenon. There have been a few of these shifts historically. Every shift in energy technology has also meant a shift in geopolitics. The most prominent example is Britain's shift from coal to oil which shifted the energy source from national coal mines to oil produced in the middle east and the gulf—making the gulf states inherently more potent in the new geopolitical order. The energy transition we are now facing will also rewrite the global maps of influence and power structures. Only a few studies have been published in the area, focusing on how future scenarios might play out. However, the research field remains in the making, and much is left to study within the emerging energy transition into renewables (Hafner and Tagliapietra 2020: 6-7; Scholten 2018: 1-3).

### 2.1.2 The EU and the geopolitics of renewable energies

Energy security has traditionally been an endeavour for states, which dealt with energy from a national security perspective (Simpson 2013: 248). The EU has changed the game in this sense as a Union attempting to create an integrated internal energy market and upholding the energy security for the Union as a whole. Something that has shown to be very complex and challenging to accomplish but that is expected to be more stable in the long run (Criekemans 2018). As the EU has never been strong from a strong actor from an energy perspective, the potential for the EU, through the energy transition, is to make use of its high technological development and integrated market to become a stronger energy actor as renewable energy will substantially shift the traditional energy structures (Skjærseth 2017; Da Graça Carvalho 2012; Eyl-Mazzega and Mathieu 2020). Unlike fossil fuels, renewables are technically and geographically different since these are not tied to a state's geographies in the same way as oil, coal and gas (Scholten 2018: 1-3).

For the EU, external geopolitical volatilities highlighted energy vulnerabilities, one of them being the appropriateness and reliability of Russian natural gas supplies. Especially since the Russian annexation and further aggression toward Ukraine in 2014 made the question of energy security an important consideration for the EU (Hadfield 2017: 164). The traditional energy security discourse is embedded in geopolitics and international relations because of the uneven distribution of fossil fuel resources. This unequal distribution has led to asymmetrical mutual dependencies and conflicts over these asymmetries (Hafner and Tagliapietra 2020: xv).

Due to the energy transition, the expected shift will result in new winners and losers in the international arena. The EU's role as a net importer is one of the driving forces for the EU climate change prioritisation. The EU can gain more from the energy transition than big fossil fuel exporters such as Russia and the Gulf countries (Pastukhova and Westphal 2020: 342-43, 54). Fossil fuel exporting countries will have their assets devalued, affecting the political economy of those states and, hence, their position on the international level. The fundamental changes caused by the energy transition will be



met with varied resistance depending on the diversification of a state's economy. However, the shift will also affect their economic and social systems since the wealth from fossil fuel resources is part of their social contract (Pastukhova and Westphal 2020: 354). The winners of the energy transition are expected to be among those big energy consumers who lack traditional energy resources such as coal, oil and gas (Pistelli 2020: 161).

Although attempts have been made since 2006 and further since the 2014 Ukraine crisis to limit this dependency, it does remain (Buschle and Westphal 2018: 55). Import dependency and the vulnerability resulting from it have left a profound, lasting impact on the politics in Europe and created the impression that fossil fuels can be used as a political weapon, such as in the 2009 gas spat. The high politicisation of energy has promoted energy security as one of the most critical objectives of global politics and EU energy policy. The EU energy transition will undoubtedly affect the entire global energy market. The EU is preparing for such a transition is vital for the European foreign policy dimension and EU diplomacy in general. The fundamental change in energy and its sources will shift the roles of exporter and importer and, in unpredictable ways, reconstruct geopolitics globally. Another significant challenge that states will have to face soon and the political institutions must be prepared for the geopolitical risks that the renewable energy transition will bring (Buschle and Westphal 2018: 56; Scholten 2018: 1).

Researchers such as Eyl-Mazzega and Mathieu (2020) uphold that it will demand a reshaping of all its domestic political priorities towards the purpose of fulfilling the fundamental goal of carbon neutrality and, at the same time, maintaining the EU cohesion both socially and politically (Eyl-Mazzega and Mathieu 2020: 43-44). Energy security is also an issue for the stakeholders in the EU energy market since the energy transition of the EU risk affecting many built-in mechanisms in the international energy market, with some being of the highest foreign political interest as a potential game-changer for interstate relations and possibly rearrange the geopolitical playing field for good (Scholten 2018; Hafner and Tagliapietra 2020).

### 2.1.3 Geopolitics as discourse

Traditional geopolitics considers the world non-discursive, embedded in environmental determinism, where geographies are understood as static and objective (Flint 2013: 149; Kuus 2017: 4). In contrast, critical geopolitics regard geographical knowledge as a crucial part of the contemporary discourses of power (Marje Kuus, 2017:4) - a way of rationalising power relations and viewing the world (Flint 2013: 146).

Critical geopolitics is influenced by the post-structuralist understanding of power as productive and enabling (Kuus 2017: 3), offering a way to critically examine geopolitics as discourse through pinpointing intentions, representations, and imaginations in the understanding of the world (Flint 2013: 146). Geographies are understood as something that can be made and remade. The organisation and reorganisation of spaces affect groups, societies, and politics and allow a more critical understanding of geopolitics that recognises the problems with the classic and realistic geopolitics. Understanding geographies as inherently strategic yet simultaneously changeable is the foundation for this thesis (Dodds 2014; Hatipoglu, Al Muhanna, and Efirid 2020).

# 3 The climate change, energy, and external actions nexus

This section presents the nexus thinking in 3.1. and explains how it will be applied in the thesis with separate definitions of each policy area. 3.1.1. Climate Change, 3.1.2. European energy security and the external actions of the EU (Commission 2022)in 3.1.3. At the end of each section includes a simplified explanation of how the concept is understood and used throughout the analysis in chapter 9.

## 3.1 Nexus thinking

Within research on climate and energy policy, nexus thinking has become popular since the areas often overlap (see Zelli et al. 2020). Considering nexuses instead of individual policy fields highlights policy areas' interconnections, synergies, and communal trade-offs. Helpful to take appropriate and viable measures across sectors and mitigate adverse effects across policy goals (Zelli et al. 2020: 4). In this thesis the idea of nexuses as existing between all policy areas, allows an integrated analysis of the intersection of where three policy areas meet. This thesis sets out on the EU level and looks at the external dimension of climate change and energy policy, all essential for the EU's geopolitical discourse. It is especially helpful in analysing the external dimension of energy and climate change policies as the EU in many ways combines climate change and energy strategies, one example being the external dimension of the green deal (Commission 2021a). In this section, the nexus is explained by separating the three policy areas and explaining the most crucial concepts to be able to later decipher these areas and how they interact with one another in the foreign policy realm of the material. That will allow the researcher to understand the synergies and trade-offs between *climate change, energy, and external actions within the CFSP*.

### 3.1.1 The climate change dimension

The climate change dimension of the nexus is the external climate change policies. Climate change policies are governed within the broader area of environmental policy and are regarded as an under category within environmental policy (Lenschow 2015: 334-37). Through the climate change policies, the EU has been able to play an active role in the international arena. It has been pushed significantly by the distinctive ability of the Commission to shape and frame long-term climate objectives, a perspective deprioritised by national politics because of the short-term focus on national governments to win the next election (Skjærseth 2017: 48-50). By appearing as one actor in climate change negotiations such as COP15 and COP20, it has increased the EU's bargaining power and successfully distinguished the EU as a progressive actor within climate change mitigation policies. Reflecting the EU's objective as a normative power, it has, over time, become an essential part of the EU's external representation, a part of its ambition to lead by example and an essential part of European diplomacy through the EEAS (Buchan 2015: 360; Lenschow 2015: 340-41).

*Application of the concept in the analysis:* Climate Change mitigation will sometimes be referred to as climate change in the thesis since this is the focus for the EU as a governor of climate change. It refers to mitigation, meaning the attempts to stop the evolving heating of the climate and the process called anthropogenic climate change.

### 3.1.2 European energy security

Most definitions of energy include some combination of availability, affordability, and reliability. Recent work has added concepts such as sustainability to it. However, considering the complete perspective of environmental security means that energy security is impossible to achieve at the expense of other aspects of environmental security, such as food or water security. Hence, energy security is conceptualised as being achieved when sufficient energy is available to satisfy the practical needs of the political community in an affordable, reliable and sustainable manner as long as pursuing it does not cause environmental insecurity to that or any other political community (Simpson 2013: 248).

Energy policy is critical for all states. However, some claim that the EU should be especially cautious in its energy considerations because of its geopolitical situation (see

section 1.1.2.), its current reforms of the energy market and the internal market in general since these factors risk making the EU's energy market particularly vulnerable (Matsumoto, Doumpos, and Andriosopoulos 2018: 1737). The question of energy has always been a simultaneous issue about *energy security* for the EU (Scholten 2018). A field within the energy policy area that is complicated by the ambiguous nature of what constitutes European energy security and national energy security within the EU (Hadfield 2017: 164), related to EU competencies, where the EU has the full legal right to legislate, a shared responsibility with the member states or the right to coordinate (Hix and Høyland 2011: 6). National and supranational competencies are not of direct interest to this thesis, yet it needs mentioning as it is one of the EU's internal issues within the area. Since energy is both a national and international security issue (Heshmati and Abolhosseini 2017: 292) and the member states have varying priorities and perspectives regarding energy and its interpreted security implications and required foreign policy responses and understandings of what it means to secure energy systems (Hadfield 2017: 163) it may lead to cross-national tensions (Heshmati and Abolhosseini 2017: 292). The EU is a relatively weak actor in energy because of its high import dependency. The energy transition has presented an opportunity for the EU to become a winner in energy in the long run. Renewables are, in this respect, a possible way to get around the geopolitics of Europe since renewables have a completely different political inclination (Sattich 2018: 164-67, 78).

*Application of the concept in the analysis:* energy security is kept separate from climate change as this is a component recognized on its own within the nexus. The energy transition is referred to throughout the thesis, the transitioning to renewable energies as the primary basis of the energy system. This is a process that the EU started a long time ago through governing and dividing fuels into different taxonomies (Commission 2022) – hence it is understood as an ongoing process.


### 3.1.3 The external action of the EU

The external actions of the European Union are a broad concept. Essentially it is all the EU's international and diplomatic relations as a united international and security player through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) practised by EU

representatives and the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Giergerich 2015: 437-39, 50-51). The field is highly complex and occurs on different levels between national and supranational leadership (Hadfield, Manners, and Whitman 2017). The external dimension of the nexus is concerned with the energy and climate policies' geopolitical and external relations concerns. The EU is a part of the international system and bargains in the international arena to persuade other states to commit to similar targets of lowering GHG through climate diplomacy. The EU has med climate diplomacy to one of its essential foreign relations tools –strategically pioneering the early transition. However, doing this is not risk-free and will inevitably affect other actors dependent on the EU exports, risking geopolitical tensions and complicating inter-state relations (Criekemans 2018: 40). The external dimension of the EU's climate change and energy policies will determine the EU's response to a new geopolitical setting and hostile or non-hostile these encounters will be. Therefore, the external dimension of the Green Deal and its related policies are crucial.

*Application of the concept in the analysis:* Foreign affairs and external action are used as synonyms throughout the thesis, referring to the EU's common external policy towards third countries – hence EU diplomacy. It is conducted and steered by the EEAS and the member states within the CFSP – the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Table 1



## 3.2 Summary of the nexus

The nexus between energy-climate and external actions occurs where energy handlings through the energy and climate strategies are aimed to be a part of interstate relations between the EU and third parties. The climate, energy and external affairs nexus is understood as the interconnections and policy interests of the three policy areas transcend. The nexus is helpful as a concept because of the comprehensive understanding it allows of a complex reality and where policy decisions affect the situations and policy decisions in other areas – in this thesis, climate, and energy strategies on the one side and external action and geopolitical implications on the other. The EU is a relatively weak actor in energy because of its high import dependency. The energy transition has presented an opportunity for the EU to become a winner in energy in the long run. Renewables are, in this respect, a possible way to get around the geopolitics of Europe since renewables have a completely different political inclination (Sattich 2018: 164-67, 78).

# 4 Discourse as theory and method

The chapter explains the research philosophy behind the methodological framework. It covers the epistemology and ontology of Norman Fairclough's Critical Discourse Framework (CDA) and accounts for its built-in theory. It will further help distinguish CDA from other understanding discourse and explain the usefulness of the theory and method within the EU foreign policy research upheld by Aydın-Düzgit (2014), previously discussed in the literature review. A discussion will follow on the merits and limitations of the specific method. The operational methodological structure used to answer the research question; presented in chapter 5.

## 4.1 Critical discourse analysis

Fairclough's three-dimensional framework is a method and theory with specific philosophical premises that form a basis for empirically studying relations between language and social reality (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 60, 65-68). CDA is inspired by critical linguistics. It offers a textual analysis of language in social interaction, carried out systematically and concretely through an empirical study of how it is used in a specific set of social interactions (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 63). A critical analysis aims to uncover the linguistic-discursive dimensions of textual communication. Discourse is a type of social practice that is a part of the social world and simultaneously reflects it. As often characteristically expressed as both constituting and being constituted by social practice. At the same time, the social practice of discourse is in a dialectic relationship to other social practices that are not purely discursive, such as, for example, the institutional set-ups of a political system. It exists within the discursive realm but is not discursive in its entirety (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 61-62). In the context of this thesis, it can, for example, be the European Union's institutional set-ups and the functioning of the member states or third countries'



institutions. While the legal texts are in part discursive, the function of the legal framework has non-discursive outcomes.

The prominence of the Faircloughian framework is that it is still in development after 30 years since it first was published (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 65). It has continued developing both by his hand and by other researchers in different directions to further their research and the theoretical scope.

## 4.2 Research Philosophy

The thesis aligns itself with the critical discourse framework. Critical discourse analysis, as developed by Fairclough, implies a specific theoretical understanding closely linked to its understanding of research and reality.

### 4.2.1 The understanding of discourse

The understanding of discourse as distinguishable from other social conventions and realities is one thing that sets the CDA framework apart from more post-structuralist understandings of discourse, where all social phenomena are considered discursive by nature (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 24, 62). Theoretically, CDA lies closer to understanding language aligned with social constructionist ideas (Aydın-Düzgit 2014: 357), which see language as a type of action through which the world is shaped and formed—situated in a social and historical context in a dialectic relationship with the world's tangible, material, social aspects (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 24, 62). Discourse is not everything, and Fairclough objects to reducing all social life to language (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 2-4). Neither is discourse something that is possible to grasp in its totality. Instead, any discourse analysis attempts to reproduce and empirically study the realisation into practice through the necessary methodological framework of linguistics (Aydın-Düzgit 2014: 354-55).

In making this distinction between discursive and the non-discursive realms of social life (Aydın-Düzgit 2014: 357), Fairclough also allows for other rationalities such as

economic, sociological or cultural logics that are not compatible with other discourse frameworks. These can be used to analyse the social practice that discourse analysis cannot fully capture (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 86-87). It shares some fundamental epistemological understandings with the post-structuralist line of thought, such as the critical approach to taken-for-granted knowledge, the possibility of bias-free research, the importance of cultural and historical aspects within discourse, and the understanding of social interaction as a force that shapes the world (Aydın-Düzgit 2014: 357). Discourse is epistemologically understood as conceptual formations reproduced through repetition and recurrence over time in different social settings. Ontologically discourses are materialised through text (Fairclough 2006: 41)

Discursive practice constructs the social world, social and power relations, and the role these practices play in maintaining and increasing the interests of certain social groups (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 63). The aim is thus to shed light on the discursive dimensions of social and cultural phenomena and change processes. This theoretical positioning focuses on language's role in power relations, processes of exclusion, inequality and identity building (Aydın-Düzgit 2014: 356-57). Critical Discourse Analysis is critical in its analysis of the reproduction of unequal power relations and the upholding of existing hegemonies (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 63). This is why CDA helps analyse EU foreign affairs (Aydın-Düzgit 2014: 356-57). The analysis conducted in this thesis deals with the unequal power relations on the international scale between states and state-like actors due to unequally distributed resources in the future challenges of the global energy transition.

CDA has a critical role in critical research focused on strategies, not the least in international relations and EU foreign affairs. Strategies have a strongly discursive character: they include imaginaries for change and new practices and systems, and they include discourses, narratives and arguments which interpret, explain, and justify the area of social life they are focused upon – in its past, its present and its possible future. These discursive strategies are crucial in assessing and establishing their practical adequacy to the state we are in and the world as it is and their feasibility and desirability concerning ideas of human well-being. The critical analysis seeks to provide explanations of the causes and developments of the crisis, identify possible ways of

mitigating its effects, and transform capitalism in less crisis-prone, more sustainable, and socially just directions (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012: 24)

CDA aims to investigate complex and often puzzling relationships of causality and their relations to different discursive practices to understand what role these discursive practices play in upholding the social world and the power relations that rule it. Since CDA does not set out to be politically neutral, it allows the researcher to commit to radical social change (Aydın-Düzgit 2014: 356-57; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 64). In the context of this thesis, social change is the energy transition required to mitigate climate change, a primary concern for humanity.

Critical research is fundamental in times of crisis, and it is helpful to analyse and critique strategies developed to mitigate crises. Strategies have a strongly discursive character through shaping and representing imaginaries of change, the perspectives and outlooks for new practices and systems that reflect discourses, narratives, and arguments which we can interpret (Fairclough 2010: 18). Strategies can be viewed as attempts to mitigate the failures of existing structures to transform them in specific directions. CDA helpful in such research requires normative evaluation and the descriptive analysis of emerging and competing strategies. It is the normative critique that makes the discourse analysis critical. The necessity for positive critique is especially emphasised by Fairclough (2010), which seeks possibilities and transformations of social life and social forms to mitigate the limits the crisis causes on human well-being (Fairclough 2010: 14).

#### 4.2.2 The role of CDA in EU foreign policy

Although Fairclough has done some research on international organisations and the EU, most of the development of CDA for foreign policy and international relations research has been developed by researchers who have seen its use in new contexts. CDA provides a way of systematically studying EU foreign policy through the sophisticated tools of linguistics and argumentation. There has been a lack of focus on linguistics in EU foreign policy discourse analysis. The refined linguistics and argumentative tools offer tools that make it a valuable framework for studying the EU's institutional foreign policy discourse and member states' discourse. Discourse-analytical approaches to EU

foreign policy have been particularly valuable in shedding light on the identities and subjects constructed through EU foreign policy discourse, albeit with certain shortcomings. For instance, while discursive methods focusing on systems of signification are particularly useful in tracking how subject identities are constructed through discourse, they do not sufficiently address the question of how discourses are naturalised in texts by the marginalisation of alternative interpretations or, for that reason, have a substantial impact on general debates on EU foreign policy (Aydın-Düzgit 2014: 354-57).

# 5 The methodological framework

The critical discourse analysis framework divides social reality into three dimensions of communicative events that can be analysed separately; (1) the dimension of the text, (2) the dimension of discursive practice and (3) the dimension of social practice (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 68, 81). These will be explained one at a time together with each level and its included toolset. The three dimensions are not mutually exclusive. The two first dimensions overlap but are separate through the analysis for clarity. Hence, the framework is an ideal type of these practices for the possibility of more precise analysis (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 65-68).

## 5.1 The textual level

The text dimension is the core, the pure textual level where the researcher is concerned with the linguistic features of the material. The text level can be different kinds of texts (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 65-68). The textual dimension will be interpreted through a detailed examination of existing discourses in the texts to see how these materialise on the textual level. The focus is to study constructions of identities and identity articulation in the text. The implied wording choices are analysed together with syntax (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 69). The construction of sentences is disassembled and analysed in its context. Two essential concepts will be explained before they are applied in the analysis; *Transitivity* and *modality* (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 83-84).

### 5.1.1 Transitivity:

*Transitivity* in the text works as the connections between the events and processes and how these connections take form (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 83). It can have the fundamental distinction between how a message is received and gives the researcher the tools to reveal the underlying textual articulations of a discourse. The three

fundamental parts of transitivity are processes, participants, and circumstances. Processes are divided into actions and events, in which actions are considered intentional and active, while events are a course of events that was not caused with intent. Participants are divided into actors and receivers for the process, called the target and the object. Finally, this thesis divides circumstances into time and location instead of space since location does not have any meaning in this context. (Bergström and Boréus 2012: 281-83). Different transformations can be distinguished through zooming in on transitivity; one example is nominalisation, which is essential in this thesis. The wording is crucial, and its choice among the multiple possible descriptions of a course of events carries meaning. For example, leaving parts of events is called a transformation. Nominalisation is when a participant is intentionally left out, for example, an actor or a target (Bergström and Boréus 2012: 283-84).

### 5.1.2 Modality:

*Modality* is about the degree of concurrence in text and speech. For example, 'truth' means full concurrence, while 'maybe' or 'like' more implies uncertainty or distance to a claim. Sentence construction removes the agent of responsibility through passive form or nominalisation, which plays down the agent's actions by replacing them with a noun. Modality has consequences for constructing the discourse of both social relations and knowledge and meaning systems. The interest in text in critical discourse analysis lies in mapping ideological consequences like different forms of representation. For instance, Objective modalities give the impression of authority and reinforce the authority of the 'speaker' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 83-84). See explanations of all modalities used in the methodological framework in Table 2.

Table 2

The textual level:	Interpretation:	
<b><u>Transitivity:</u></b>	How events/processes are connected to subjects and objects (or a lack of such connections)	It affects the ideological consequences of different forms. Ex. Disconnecting an event from a process, giving or taking away responsibility etc.
<b><u>Nominalisation:</u></b>	Using a noun to stand in for a verb, adverb, or adjective	Reduces the agency and emphasises technicality
<b><u>Modality:</u></b>	The degree of affinity or affiliation with a statement, ex. Truth – full confirmation, expressing certainty or uncertainty through modal words such as 'perhaps' or 'maybe.'	Linguistically the modal verbs have consequences for the discourse construction of social relations, meanings, or systems of knowledge
- <b>Permission:</b>	The modal verb 'can' is often found in this context.	A type of modality that constructs social relations so that the 'speaker' becomes the giver of permission to do something
- <b>Objectivity</b>	Presents something as if it is a fact rather than an opinion.	Reinforces or reflects authority

Based on: Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 83-84).

## 5.2 Discursive practice

### 5.2.1 Communicative events and order of discourse

However, a text can never be analysed in isolation and will always be studied concerning other texts and the social context (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 70). The discursive practice is the dimension concerned with producing and consuming the text. Hence, the construction and reproduction of discourse, where the researchers interpret logics and justifications, analyse how the discourse evolves through the production and consumption of text. Here in the communicative event, discourses' reproduction and eventual change take form. When someone draws on a discourse order, they are both taking part in it, potentially changing it and reproducing it (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 71-72). The order of discourse delimits what can be said within that discourse, yet it can change its boundaries and the discourse itself through new ways of use and combinations with other discourses over time (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 71-72).

Table 3

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<b>Discursive practice 1.0</b>	
<b>Communicative events:</b>	The communicative event is the communication form of language use, such as a newspaper column, research article, press release, film, or political speech.
<b><u>Order of discourse:</u></b>	All the types of discourses are used within a specific field's social institution.
<b>6 Discourses</b>	Language systems/usage – ways of speaking that give meaning to experiences from a specific perspective
<b>7 Genres</b>	Specific use of language that constitutes a part of a specific social practice, ex. A news genre or a media genre

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Based on: Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 83-84).



## 5.2.2 Interdiscursivity and intertextuality

Discourse practice details how the text is produced and consumed, for example, following it through its transformations, how it is created, and whether it is revised or changed before publication. This thesis focuses on identifying how the text is constructed more linguistically and how it carried discourses from previous productions of texts in the same field, also called interdiscursivity. It will also consider the intertextuality, whether the text is built on previous texts. The most apparent manifestation of intertextuality is *manifest intertextuality* when a text is directly based on another text by referring to them explicitly. High interdiscursivity is often connected with change, according to Fairclough, whilst low interdiscursivity is a sign of reproduction of the already established understanding of reality (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 83-84).

Table 4

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<b>Discursive practice 1.1</b>	
<b><u>Intertextuality:</u></b>	The condition that all communicative events draw on previous communicative events
- <b>Manifest intertextuality</b>	When texts draw explicitly on other texts, such as citing other texts
- <b>Intertextual chains</b>	When a text can be seen as a link in a chain of texts
- <b>Interdiscursivity:</b>	The articulation of discourses and genres together in a communicative event.
<b>Interdiscursive mixes:</b>	Mixing of discourse types within one communicative event.

Based on: Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 83-84).

## 5.3 Social practice

The third dimension, social practice, is the context in which discourses belong (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 65-68). In this part, the researcher analyses the discursive practices found in the text concerning the non-discursive practices through a different theory. The non-discursive practices are other logics for analysis and theories outside the discursive realm, covering non-discursive logics (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 86-87). This thesis analyses the social practice through the *climate-energy and external actions nexus*.

The last step is to place the two dimensions concerning the social practice they are a part of through two steps. First, the relationship between the discursive practice and the order of discourse to which it belongs will be explored. Is it a part of a system of linked discourses? Moreover, how are these divided and regulated in this system? Following Fairclough, the aim is to pinpoint and describe the partly non-discursive social practices, cultural practices, and structures that create the discursive practice frames (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 65-66).

What type of strategies form depends on the actors that form them. They are systematic in that they can be expected to promote the values of the actors that form them. In this case, the EU.

## 6 Material

The material analysed is the annual reports from the European External Actions Service (EEAS) between 2009 and 2017. The first step of selecting material lay in deciding the relevant institution. The institution selection required some reasoning. The European Commission, the EEAS and the European Council were the most forthright choices because of their respective roles in steering the CFSP and external policy within the EU. Together with the council presidency, they have also historically been the most significant players in the field (Burns 2017: 52). Although having considerable influence during their respective turns, the Council Presidency would have complicated the ambiguous nature of the presidency seat and its varying properties from the presidency to the presidency. The Commission represent the mid and long-term policy perspectives (Hix and Høyland 2011: 8, 32) and would in future studies be a suitable additional material to add to a bigger study. The European Parliament (EP) was excluded from the corpus regarding the time and space of this thesis but would offer an exciting dimension in future studies on the topic. As the EEAS is the diplomatic service of the EU, it ended up being the most straight forward choice and would allow an overall understanding of the EU's priorities and main considerations within the CFSP.

The annual reports of the Common Foreign and Security Policy are a set of reports from the European External Actions Service submitted annually between the years 2009 and 2017. The annual report is produced under the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and is addressed to the European Parliament to conclude the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP (EEAS 2021). The inter-institutional agreement of December 2013 states that the HR shall consult the EP on a document stipulating the future undertakings and choices of the CFSP. The Nicolaidis Group and the PSC further examine the report, and subsequently, Coreper is invited to approve the report and forward it to the Council for endorsement. The document hence has political bearing through approval of the Foreign Affairs Council (EEAS 2017).

# 7 Analysis

The chapter the annual reports are analysed in accordance with the year from 2009 until 2017. First, the textual level has been dissected in the section, uncovering, and analysing the linguistic features of the annual reports and their underlying logic. Simultaneously, an overview of the content and structure of the reports are provided for context and the analysis of the discursive practice. Secondly, the discursive practice is derived in 8.2, and finally, in section 8.3, the analysis is conducted together with the social practice. Connections are drawn to the social practice of the climate, energy, and external actions nexus, that in chapter 9 will be discussed further as part of the discussion.

## 7.1 Textual analysis of the annual reports

### 7.1.1 Annual report 2009

In 2009 the EU was facing at the time ongoing gas spats between Ukraine and Russia, affecting the energy stability of the EU. Hence it is perhaps not surprising that ‘Energy security’ is presented as one of the top five Global Challenges when looking forward to the new year, together with ‘climate change and security’. The report is introduced with a sentence about the financial crisis, followed by the following sentences about energy security, identifying it as a significant geostrategic challenge:

“Energy security continued to underpin many of the geo-strategic challenges facing the European Union” (EEAS 2010:5).

Later in the same paragraph of the introductory summary, referring to the not very successful climate conference in Copenhagen that same year:

“The year ended with a muted response to multilateral efforts on climate change” (EEAS 2010:5).

It is clear throughout the 2009 report that the security of the energy supply is a big concern of the time. Energy security occurs repeatedly throughout the report and frame the entire introduction of the current foreign affairs. A clear line is drawn between the insecurity of the EU's energy supply and the interdependence on Russia as the EU's biggest energy supplier *suggesting transitivity*. Yet, also connecting it to the bigger picture as part of a global issue due to the security risks from climate change. Hence, recognising that this is an issue that will affect more regions of the world and where the EU is an example of a region that is already facing this issue.

“The year 2009 confirmed the global dimension of the challenges that the EU faces and their inter-connectivity and complexity [...] while growing attention was paid to the security risks stemming from climate change and energy supply.” (EEAS 2010:7).

The representation of the issue is framed straightforwardly by highlighting an issue that has occurred and saying that the issue needs to be mitigated through more predictable energy relations. The report is underlined by a reasoned rationale, where the issue can and will be solved through a new bilateral agreement with Russia and early warning mechanisms between the EU and Russia. It is not expressed as criticism towards Russia or any direct wrongdoing but rather as an issue stemming from a communications problem. The quote also implies that the issue is something that the EU is facing together with Russia and hence can be resolved by better cooperation. The quote above is the report's only explicit connection between energy supply and climate change. The choice of Russia to withdraw from the Energy charter treaty is criticised with the wording “regrettable”, which is criticism, but not very heavy criticism.

“Our potential and actual vulnerabilities in terms of supply of energy was clearly exposed at the start of 2009 with the Russian-Ukraine gas dispute. Within the CFSP framework, energy security aspects were further consolidated in the EU's bilateral relations with partners and through regional strategies” (EEAS 2010:10).

Energy security is perceived as equal to security of supply - presented as a relatively simple and transactional concept that can be dealt with through bilateral agreements. Supporting and simplifying both frameworks and infrastructure with third states such as Ukraine, through the Eastern Partnership, Moldova, and Belarus. Similarly, it is recognised concerning Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Iraq – and energy is as much a

peacekeeping mission as anything, if at all, strategic. For example, it mentioned that the relations between Israel and Palestine are to be stabilised through the EU-funded project "Solar for Peace " (EEAS 2010:11).

The focus seems to be on mutual interest and relationship building. For example, strengthening energy transport is a vital and critical priority for the EU's strategy for central Asia. A way to develop a direct route from central Asian countries to the EU is presented as a priority and essential for both sides. Similar is it with the dependence-relationship with Russia. Yes, the EU depends on Russian energy, yet it is stressed that Russia is also dependent on the EU as a consumer – the relationship is mutual. It is stated matter-of-factly, the interdependence is strong, however it is not expressed with any real suggestion of worry.

"In the case of Russia, our energy relationship is marked by a strong interdependence: Russia is the EU's main external energy supplier, and the EU is the biggest consumer of Russian hydrocarbons." (EEAS 2010:10).

Climate change and security is dedicated its own section, separate from the section of energy security, and neither subject does occur in the other section showcasing a clear separation of the subjects at the time, at least within the foreign policy realm. On the other hand, climate change is presented as a threat multiplier, although energy is not mentioned here rather physical events such as draughts and extreme weather events. Climate change as a threat multiplier is presented as something outside of the EU, in less developed countries, for example.

"[...] how climate change can act as a threat multiplier by exacerbating existing tensions in fragile or failing states, with more extreme weather events, reduced rainfall and crop yields, and sea level rises." (EEAS 2010:11).

Another example is the mentioning of "in these regions", which grammatically refers to regions outside of the own region. Suggesting that this is a foreign policy issue in the sense that the EU has a role to play here more of a support to other regions of the world than this being a major issue for the EU itself. Linguistically separating itself from the risks that exists in other regions.

“[...] and should underpin our reflection on development of climate change adaptation and climate risk management in these regions.” (EEAS 2010:12).

However, it is perceived as a phenomenon with clear security implications, and something that the EU should pursue in its multilateral relations, for example, through the EU’s leading role in different international fora. For example, is the EU has the leader of a vote on the deep concerns for the possible security implications of climate change in the UN General Assembly presented as an EU success. The modal word “should” underline an uncertainty of the possibility to carry this out or be successful with such a strategy in the regions.

### 7.1.2 Annual report 2010

The report from 2010 continues a similar note regarding climate change and its energy security implications. The issues remain separated but are both dedicated a section each as part of the global challenges. Similar solutions to the global energy issues are presented in the report from 2009. Expressing the issues as something that is best governed together through bi- and multilateralism and strategic partnerships. It is clear that the EU wants to uphold the joint efforts necessary for achieving stability regarding climate change and its global implications on energy security.

Some parts of the report involve a connection drawn between security and climate change on the one hand and energy and security on the other. The transitivity from the 2009 report remains with few direct linkages between energy security and climate change security aspects. Renewable energy is brought up with climate change but is not connected to the energy transition or geopolitics. However, energy security, climate change, and security are kept apart, often following each other but not directly linked. As in the following example:

“[...] energy security and the security implications of climate change have become a substantial part of the international agenda. For the Union, constructing a strong collective foreign policy in response, which is both coherent and able to move fast enough to shape events, presents an additional challenge.” (EEAS 2011:10).

It is clear that these two issues co-exist but it is not necessarily recognised as two areas that ultimately should be discussed together or massively affect each other. Climate change occurs in almost every EU summit with another country or region, for example, the EU-Brazil summit, EUROLAT, and EU-Cuba. When concerned with energy and security is mainly tied to nuclear security and EU donations to the funding. Similar objectives as from the annual report of 2009. Israel Palestine, dialogue with Iraq and building energy connections through stepping up energy transportation – energy is not seen as a climate change issue at this point. On Russia's energy dependency, the vulnerability is noted and is said to have remained a key theme.

“Mindful of the EU’s vulnerability, as exposed by recent crises, as well as the Union’s potential of improvement, energy security remained a key theme for the EU throughout 2010.” (EEAS 2011:44).

The issue is supposed to be solved with Russia:

“The EU also continued cooperation with Russia on global issues like climate change [...] energy security.” (EEAS 2011:18).

The emphasis on renewable energy is substantially more significant than in the report from 2009. Renewable energy is expressed as the way forward. Although it is not explicitly articulated as a solution to the energy supply issue or the dependency issue, it is difficult not to draw this connection. Multiple new commitments and strategies are presented regarding energy from the year 2010. One example is the strategy Energy 2020, which aims at unifying the internal energy market, making it cheaper, more sustainable, and more secure. This suggests that it is an answer to the difficulties the EU had been facing regarding the security of supply and energy dependency on Russia.

“In November 2010, the Commission’s Communication ‘Energy 2020: A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy’ emphasised the close interrelationship between energy security and foreign and security policy” (EEAS 2011:44).

The quote includes an implicit linkage between sustainability and secure energy and an explicit linkage between energy security and foreign and security policy, outright presenting energy security as a foreign policy issue. This had, of course, been implied by even including energy security in the dealings of the EEAS at all, the difference here



being that it is not solely something that is included in the external affairs but that is included in external affairs because of a strategic need from the EU itself within the union. The difference can be exemplified by the quote on the following page, where instead a clear articulation of how foreign policy concerned with energy looks when the EU wants to promote and influence it to others.

“In order to promote the widespread and sustainable use of renewable energy, the EU became a full member of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) by ratifying its statute in July 2010. “(EEAS 2011:45).

On climate change and international security, which is the new conceptualisation in the report, climate change and security are continuously presented as an issue outside of Europe. It is presented as something that affects regions; what regions are not specified, but the way the issue is articulated implies that the EU can help other multilateral actors with identifying their potential security risks of climate change.

“This implementation work focussed on enhancing dialogue and strengthening international co-operation with other multilateral actors, systematic dialogue with third parties to identify the **potential regional security risks of climate change**, and awareness-raising and joint response to the implications of climate change for security.” (EEAS 2011:45).

Interestingly, the modal word potential reflects uncertainty about the existence of security risks due to climate change which affects the construction of the social relations with these unidentified other multilateral actors. It might be a way to remain supportive but without making actors experience being patronised or told how to do or solve their own issues.

### 7.1.3 Annual report 2011:

The year 2011 was, to a great extent, shaped by the developments of the Arab Spring. It is somewhat surprising that energy, especially oil, was not brought up in connection to the Arab spring as Libya and Syria were significant exporters of fossil fuels. Libya remains so. However, Syria was sanctioned in 2011 when concerned with oil, which does not occur as an energy security aspect in the material. Although not mentioned as

a part of the CFSP's top agenda items, climate change and energy are highly elaborated in the report from 2011. Although not concerning Syria and Libya. It is a significant difference from the 2009 and 2010 mentioned energy security but dealt with it in a rather one-dimensional way. Renewable energy is mainly brought up concerning supporting third countries in their development prerogatives, and the focus is more on energy security and strengthening the EU's energy security rather than energy being the facilitation of climate change prerogatives. It remains essential that the EU and Russia cooperate on these issues.

There are glimpses of a more strategic view on the energy transition, although rare. For example, when presenting the Energy Road map 2050 and potential transitions and on the EU's future energy mix, which is linked to climate change implicitly and security of supply explicitly.

Although separately, climate change and energy security are primarily mentioned in EU cooperation, partnerships and sometimes programmes to support accession or conflict-filled regions. It becomes clear from the way it is expressed that it is a critical issue to agree on and to continue to build upon in relations with third countries. Many examples are states that are key to developing the energy area for the EU. For example, Norway presented later in the material as contributing to the EU's energy imports with 13 per cent. It is, however, mostly presented when it works well. Other examples are Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and Australia. The energy issue remains tied to discussions on regional security, where the EU supports other countries. However, there are tendencies toward more strategic external action from the EU's side. One example is the ministerial meetings between the EU and third countries of Central Asia, discussing the progress of the trans-Caspian pipeline and the interconnecting pipeline between Central Asia to Europe. It is not presented as an explicit strategy but as part of an ongoing dialogue and interest for the EU.

“The strengthening of energy transport links remained an important area in the EU strategy for Central Asia. In September 2011, the European Union adopted a mandate to negotiate a legally binding treaty between the EU, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan to build a Trans Caspian Pipeline System. **This is the first time that the EU has proposed a treaty in support of an infrastructure project contributing to its energy security.**” (EEAS 2012:77).

The motivation for strengthening its energy security is evident in the last sentence of the above quote. The report seems like the EU is attempting to diversify its energy supply, and energy cooperation is upheld with Norway, Azerbaijan, and the US. However, whether this is through energy effectiveness through technology rather than trade diversification is unclear. Energy remains on the agenda. Although not mentioned as any of the top priorities of 2011, it is clear that work is being done on the issue of external energy policy as mentioned below – and seemingly mainly from the security of supply reasons rather than in connection to climate change mitigation. However, conceptualising an external energy policy as a central approach emphasises the solidifying of energy as a crucial part of external affairs.

“The Communication of the Commission in association with the High Representative on security of energy supply and international cooperation was published in September 2011. It sets out a comprehensive strategy for the EU's external relations in energy and for security of supply. Improved coordination among EU Member States in identifying and implementing clear priorities in **external energy policy** is the central approach. In November, the Council on Transport, Telecommunication and Energy tasked the Foreign Affairs Council to pursue the development of this policy.” (EEAS 2012:76).

Climate change is essentially represented as part of development policy rather than an issue or external affairs. For example, it is brought up concerning combating poverty and food insecurity. Climate change and security remain a separate section from energy and security. One example is that of Bangladesh below, but also concerning the Sahel and extreme poverty is climate change brought up as a regional issue.

“In Bangladesh, the EU key priorities remained support to democratic institutions, poverty alleviation and the fight against climate change, through its development cooperation programmes, political dialogue, including at the highest level, and the pursuit of ambitious outcomes in international climate change negotiations.” (EEAS 2012:45).

In 2011 The EU-Russia Energy Early Warning Mechanism was adapted and enhanced in February 2011, and Ukraine joined the Energy Community. On energy security in relation to Russia, there is high intertextuality. Essentially, the exact text reappears in the section on energy security between 2009 and 2011, highlighting the energy interdependence on Russia:

“The EU’s energy relationship with Russia continued to be marked by strong interdependence, as Russia remained the EU’s main external energy supplier and the EU the biggest external consumer of Russian hydrocarbon resources.” EEAS 2012:76).

The continued and reappearing use of nominalisation in the above sentence suggests a reduce sense of agency in the relations and dependencies on Russian energy, presenting it as something that just is that way rather than something the EU as an international actor has an ability to change. Both ‘continued’ and ‘remained’ are nominal words, made even stronger using ‘to be’ after ‘continued’, making it sound more objective as something that just is.

#### 7.1.4 Annual report 2012:

The intertextuality between the texts remains high. Manifest intertextuality is exhibited as the same section on Russian interdependency remains in the energy security section in every report until 2012 showcasing that every new text is most certainly a rewriting of the last, written from the same original document.

The separation of energy security and climate change in the reports has not changed much between 2009-2011. This is an example of low interdiscursivity, implying a stagnation of the development of the understanding of reality or as Fairclough would express it, a reproduction of the already existing understandings of reality. Yet in 2012 more explicit expressions connecting climate change and energy security appear in the report. There is a rearticulation of the issues on top of the reappearing sections from the previous reports where the issues only appeared in the same paragraphs. This can be regarded as two discourses integrating, moving towards a potential shift in the overall discourse order of geopolitics where climate change and energy security is starting to become understood as linked issues.

However, there remains a difference; climate change is appearing more in connection to crisis and crisis management rather than a security issue or a joint issue that affects energy security or can be solved by an energy transition. Energy security is related mainly to atomic energy, as it were also in the first report from 2009. Although energy security and climate change are not completely linked, decarbonisation more frequently

appears in discussions on energy security. For example, it is implied, as exemplified in the quote below, that decarbonisation and energy efficiency is connected to the EU's energy security; however, without linking them or presenting decarbonisation efforts as a solution to diversify energy sources and enforce energy security explicitly. Yet that the sentence directly comes after the one mentioning energy security implies that they at least exist within the same policy realm.

“Energy security through the diversification of gas and oil supply sources and routes was the subject of the EU-US Energy Council meeting on the 5th of December in Brussels. The discussion also focused on the pursuit of decarbonisation and increasing energy efficiency.” (EEAS 2013:88).

For the first time the direct link is drawn between the EU's energy mix and energy security, underlying in the sentence is the understanding that the EU cannot rely on state as its main source although Russia is not mentioned by name. As this is a very European issue<sup>4</sup>, it need not be mentioned.

Repeatedly climate and energy security are linked and upheld as one of the most critical challenges of our time. However, similarly to the quote above, the policy areas are discussed in the same paragraphs, yet not in direct and explicit linkage. It shows an understanding of the issues as existing somewhat in the same overall policy realm of external action yet understanding them as different parts of the same issue.

“[...] the EEAS will continue strengthening its engagement in some of the central global challenges of our times such as **energy and climate security** as well as water diplomacy. [...] the EEAS will continue pursuing a comprehensive approach in response to these challenges. Concrete efforts will include making the EU foreign policy more 'energy sensitive' by further integrating energy in political dialogues and by fully engaging EU delegations in energy diplomacy, while on climate change, work will be intensified mainly regarding preparations for the 2015 global climate change agreement as well as more systematically addressing the link between climate change, natural resource scarcity and international security through preventive diplomacy and dedicated cooperation measures.” (EEAS 2013:149).

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The EEAS proving itself through concluding that it will continue to strengthen its engagement of the central global challenges by expressing that this is something that they have done for long. Energy and climate security is again exemplified in the above section. The second bolded parts of the sentence “making the EU foreign policy more ‘energy sensitive’ is a peculiar expression of what one could perceive as an acknowledgement of the importance of energy in the geopolitical context without needing or wanting to express it outright. Potentially this can be understood as easing into the geopolitical perspective the EEAS later adopts through the” geopolitical Commission”. Energy as crucial in foreign affairs is perhaps most underlined by the launching of a new concept – “energy diplomacy”. Climate change, natural resource scarcity and international security is linked which in turn could either refer to the energy transition since many of the resources deemed scarce are resources and metals needed for renewable energies. Or it might refer to water scarcity and draughts which is also referred to in earlier in the paragraph through the mentioning of water diplomacy.

#### 7.1.5 Annual reports 2013:

Since the annual report was published in 2014, the report also covers parts of the energy security situation from Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 although the actual report is for the evaluation of the CFSP in 2013. The annexation has turned energy security from a little critical to very critical and is presented in the report from a more strategic outlook, emphasising the geopolitical tensions, although implicitly. Throughout the report from 2013, a more established link appears between climate change and energy security. In the annual report from 2013, an entire section devoted to the issue of linkages between climate change and energy security for the first time. Although the intertextuality regarding energy security and climate change cooperation with Russia remains the same as in previous reports, it is elaborated upon further regarding tensions within connected to energy in relation to the eastern partnership. The relationship with the US is also mentioned together with an understanding and explicit mentioning of what is in the report called **climate change and energy nexus** and the security-climate/energy dialogue. The tensions are clearer in this report than in any before it because of the explicit recognition of conflict which did not exist before but also the articulation of joined security coordination with the US, clearly presenting a

solid cooperation and front. The energy situation in Europe is greatly threatened by the conflict in Ukraine and that there is a worry for what is to come.

“As part of the security-climate/energy dialogue – one of the newest strands in EU-US relations – the US-based Centre for Naval Analyses and the Royal United Services Institute launched in Washington on the 5th of June 2013 an EEAS-funded report on 'The Climate Change and Energy Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Transatlantic Security'.” (EEAS 2014:125).

On top of the previous intertextuality, the chapter on energy security is developed further. The section that up until now climate change and security is now referred to as climate diplomacy. The focus remains on climate change on a global level without being connected to European energy. It appears more strategic to emphasise crucial materials for transitioning, climate change and the energy transition.

“On energy security, the EEAS and Commission services worked closely together with Member States to enhance the use of foreign policy tools to reflect the changing landscape of global energy security with a view to strengthening cooperation to tackle energy security challenges.” (EEAS 2014:14).

At this point energy security has become a real issue due to the developments between Ukraine and Russia. It is partly surprising that the establishment of energy policy as an integrated part of foreign policy was not established in the discourse of the annual reports earlier. Especially when considering the following quote where the commitments are pinned on the Council Conclusions from November 2011. The EEAS through the following paragraph wants to emphasise the long-term work that they have committed to long ago. Perhaps to highlight that this is not an issue that has been deprioritised by the EU previously. However, the less frequent mentioning of energy as a major issue clearly indicates that the issue was in fact not as prioritised before 2014 as after.

“In 2013, the EEAS continued to work closely with the Commission to enhance the use of foreign policy tools and assets in implementing the external energy policy of the EU as outlined in the relevant Council Conclusions of November 2011 and various other documents. Additionally, the EEAS worked to strengthen its internal capacity, resources, and awareness with regard to the role of the changing global energy landscape in shaping foreign and security policy.” (EEAS 2014:151).

Yet also through putting ‘global’ before ‘energy landscape’ emphasise that the energy situation faced by Europe at the time not only is a European issue but a global one. Although the energy situation in Europe is rather different from that of other major economies such as the US and China. However, there is a weak but still visible indication or recognition of the EEAS being inattentive when it comes to energy security up until this point since the EEAS needs to express that it has worked to strengthen its awareness regarding the changing global energy landscape in shaping foreign and security policy. Hence, indicating that it has not until now really grasped or included this issue in the shaping of the EU’s foreign and security policy. The paragraph also involves a grammatical disconnect between the event and the process in the last sentence, making it appear as if the global energy landscape just happens to be changing rather than an actual effect of an event or action/lack of action.

“Energy will remain a key example linking short term and long term foreign policy goals. The current crisis in Ukraine demonstrates the necessity of adopting a long term perspective regarding **the disruption of energy flows**, in particular when major EU energy providers such as Russia are involved. The crisis has brought about the need to **diversify the sources of our energy supplies**. A good development of the energy connections between the European countries could help diversify the energy supply in Europe, including the gas and renewable energy from North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean.” (EEAS 2014:223-224).

In 2013, energy has ascended become to the major priority, as described in the above section – energy is a key example of how foreign policy goals need to be both long and short term. If there was any doubt in the early years of the EEAS, energy is in 2013 considered an integrated part of the common foreign and security policy. The issues are identified as the disruption of energy flows and lack of diversity of energy supplies. Even though the causation is clear when looking at the reasons behind the EU’s struggling energy situation – hence, over reliance on one energy supplier. The issue is not presented as one and the same issue. Instead, there is a very clear example of transitivity, where one issue is ‘the disruption of energy flows’ and another is the undiversified energy supply. Without any inclination of any mistake made by the EU itself, instead diverting the blame – not even blaming it on Russia (which of course bears diplomatic consequences) but instead presenting it as clearly separated pieces that together makes up a way bigger puzzle.



### 7.1.6 Annual Report 2014:

In the report from 2014, it becomes clear that the Ukraine crisis affects external affairs to a large extent. The report highlights the importance of helping Ukraine ensure its energy security. Yet the solution remains the same as in the reports from 2009-2011, emphasising the importance of solving it together with Russia. Perhaps not very surprising as the relations are now also a part of the peace brokering between Ukraine and Russia. Energy is in a way understood as something that has been stuck in between the conflict as the conflict directly affects the EU, as it is causing disruptions and energy insecurity. Nominal in a sense, since it is taking away agency from the EU and portraying it as something that has happened to affect the EU rather than being an issue caused by lack of strategic foresight and risk management in the EU's energy supplies.

“Energy Security developed into one of the top strategic priorities of the European Union in 2014. The way in which energy issues became instrumentalised in the Ukraine conflict served as an important reminder for the need to urgently address the challenges related to energy security and diversifying external supplies and routes and related infrastructure, with a holistic view for the long and short term internally as well as externally.” (EEAS 2015:178).

Interesting is that energy security is presented as something that has become a top strategic priority for the EU in 2014, when the issue is already occurring which is counter to the meaning of what being strategic means. The actions taken at the time of the energy crisis in 2014 would rather be considered crisis management than actual strategizing – it is the lack of strategizing that has resulted in a crisis. Yet the section develops in another direction than the previous annual report from 2013, since the disconnect between the event and the process (the crisis) is dismantled, clearly presenting it as a causation of the situation in Ukraine. Recognising that there is a need for a holistic view and that the issue also is an infrastructure problem. Yet nominalising through using the word ‘became’ making it appear as if this is something that just happened to the EU, taking away its own agency.

“Energy security was also an important element of the discussion surrounding the 2030 Climate and Energy framework agreed by the European Council in October 2014. The framework sets ambitious climate and energy policy targets, which require, on the one hand, active outreach to partners across the globe, particularly on climate change, and are, on the other hand, important contributors to the long term energy security of the EU.” (EEAS 2015:179).

Throughout the report the focus remains, not surprisingly ensuring the EU's supply through diversifying its sources, highlighting the relationship with Azerbaijan. In the reports, climate change and energy security seemed to blur first in 2014. For the first time, the distinction between the two sections, energy, and climate change, concurs on the same topics. The 2030 Climate and energy framework occurs first under the energy section to later reappear in the climate change section. Start to talk about external aspects of internal policies as a part of the EU's multilateral agenda with examples of climate change and energy. Not surprisingly, 2014 seems to be a wake-up call for the EU as a geopolitical actor, and it is the first time the issues are linked and connected to the geopolitical. The work on diversifying the energy sources got a hard kick in 2014. The previously low-key mentioning is that the cooperation with Azerbaijan was developed and extended to outright praise in the report from 2014. Emphasis was put on upholding and building relationships with potential suppliers of fossil fuels to mitigate a sudden cut from Russia.

“On the 20th of September 2014 at the Sangachal Terminal near Baku the ground-breaking ceremony of the Southern Gas Corridor took place. Azerbaijan has committed itself to become a reliable energy partner for the EU to diversify the EU's energy supply.” (EEAS 2015:66).

Although many sections remain from previous reports and intertextuality is expected in the reporting from annual meetings, developing these sections and rewriting implies that the dialogue is leading somewhere since it is changing. For example, has the EU-US Energy Council dialogue developed into a combined climate change and energy security dialogue:

“The EESS also put particular emphasis on the energy supply security questions concerning natural gas, paving the way for a targeted Stress Test to discover vulnerabilities. Also within this framework, the EU took a lead role in organising the high-profile trilateral gas supply discussion with Russia and Ukraine. The potential gas transit disruption through Ukraine was one of the most significant immediate challenges of winter 2014, while the agreement on potential Russian supplies to Ukraine was also very important to stabilise the energy situation within Ukraine and provide a positive element for the ongoing crisis-talks.” (EEAS 2015:179).

“Talks within the G7 have been largely dominated in 2014 by the response to the Ukraine crisis and relations with Russia [...]. Other considerations within this group have focused on global growth [...] the nexus between climate change and energy security.” (EEAS 2015:192).

Climate change appears as an either-or. Either climate change is presented as a global issue mostly related to development policies. Alternatively, as in the following sentence, climate change is regarded as an internal policy.

“[...] but also in relation to the EU's multilateral agenda and external aspects of internal policies (e.g. climate change, energy, digital economy).” (EEAS 2015: 247).

However, the quote above also highlights a potential ongoing linkage of what later is turned into the external dimension of climate change policies.

“Energy will remain a key element of EU external policy. The adoption of a European Energy Security Strategy and of the Energy Union will require foreign policy contributions to support their implementation, particularly in the areas of: 1) Diversification of EU energy supply and routes 2) Promoting open, rules-based and transparent global governance on energy, and 3) Common and consistent messaging to energy partners.” (EEAS 2015:262).

The above quote, is a clear example of the clear establishment of energy policies as foreign policy, solidifying in the geopolitical discourse recognising the importance of clear communications with energy partners during the energy transition.

### 7.1.7 Annual report 2016:

In the report from 2016, the linkage between energy security and climate change is further solidified. When describing political targets, they are sometimes combined to present climate and energy targets as one combined target. However, it remains inconsistent. The sectoral policies occur more divided than in the report from 2014. One reason for this might be that the issue has calmed down in direct contact to the annexation of Crimea. It is continued emphasis on partnerships containing energy as an essential aspect of the EU's external relations with other states.

Climate change mitigation and energy security are at this point more tied together than previously within the foreign policy realm but seem to be greatly dedramatized as the

situation within Ukraine has stabilised at this point and the Ukrainian and European energy situation is not as fraught. This is expressed both explicitly, but also becomes clear in the less dramatic articulations of the issue what earlier was expressed as “the situation in Ukraine” is now less dramatic, expressed as cooperation that will continue in a way that more suggests general support of Ukraine than any crisis management. There are ongoing negotiations with Ukraine and among the member states to establish a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for a strategic energy partnership. Another example of the more integrated approaches of energy security in its external affairs – a cooperation that will continue, crisis or not.

“Cooperation on energy will continue, including negotiations on a Memorandum of Understanding for a Strategic Energy Partnership. The annual EU-Ukraine Summit and the Association Council later this year will provide further impetus to the political association and economic integration of Ukraine with the EU.” (EEAS 2016:4).

However, many states that are usually mentioned in relation to the energy security dialogue in the earlier reports are in 2016, preoccupied with conflict, and much of the agenda is dedicated to terrorism and the Islamic State. For example, the fourth meeting about the gas pipeline between Europe and Azerbaijan in Baku was dedicated to what is considered the more pressing matters of the time, fighting the Islamic State. For example, below:

“The fourth informal EaP dialogue held in Baku on 11-12 September with energy as a sector component allowed the Foreign Ministers to discuss foreign policy issues of common interest: the impact of the wider neighbourhood on the EaP region, Iran, MEPP and UNGA priorities with a special focus on so called Islamic State.” (EEAS 2016:51).

Yet the EU during the previous years have established a more stable and consistent energy dialogue with many third states, an indication of a more long-term strategy where energy is embedded throughout the EU’s external relations. And the issues concerning energy remains central and connected in the report, and continued efforts are described as part of the nexus of climate change and natural resources. Rearticulating the discursive features of the annual report from 2014. The discourse can hence be regarded as more established, upholding the importance of coherence between

foreign and external policy goals and climate and energy source diversification as exemplified below:

“Energy partnerships and dialogues should continue to be coherent with relevant foreign and external policy goals- including climate goals- and promote diversification of sources, suppliers and routes, as well as safe and sustainable low- carbon and energy efficiency technologies including with a view for business opportunities for EU companies.” (EEAS 2016:49).

The focus is somewhat shifted from crisis management and the insecurity of supply of energy to sustainable energy sources, hence the energy transition where technological advancements are emphasised and economic opportunities for the EU. Focus on opportunities from climate change is also expressed, where new energy opportunities are occurring in the arctics, yet not paying attention to any potential geopolitical risks of these opportunities. The nexus perspective is however remaining, connecting it more to climate risk in the year of 2016 rather than energy risk which was the more overarching theme of the 2014 report.

“Efforts will continue to address the nexus of climate change, natural resources, including water, prosperity, stability and migration. The destabilising effects of climate change will be further dealt with by the EU with some of its partner countries, including through climate risk assessments and support to capacity building. “(EEAS 2016:48).

The development aspects of renewables are yet again expressed more in the report from 2016, tied to disaster management and supporting developing countries with their transitions into renewable energies and climate change mitigation. Perhaps not unsurprising when the highest crisis has passed. What is now integrated with the regional issues in Europe within the new framework of Climate Diplomacy that now is its own section of the reports.

#### 7.1.8 Annual report 2017:

In 2017’s annual report, which is also the last of the annual reports of the CFSP by the EEAS, energy and climate change remain connected key areas and explicitly refer to linkages and synergies when concerned with climate diplomacy that now seem to be

fully established tool to deal with the combination of climate change issues whilst being highly intertwined with energy which also seem to exist within its own diplomacy realm called energy diplomacy. Whilst a bit confusing, the connection between energy and climate change mitigation is here to stay, as it is described that the aim is to ensure maximum coherence between climate policies and energy policies as the EU transitions into renewables.

“Our climate diplomacy will combine work on the essential linkages and synergies between climate action and security, sustainability [...]. This will also involve ensuring maximum coherence between climate policy and energy policy, as the EU works to spur the transition to low greenhouse gas emissions, climate resilient [...] and a long-term path for sustainable development.” (EEAS 2017:36).

The 2017 report is more forward looking, perhaps because it is the last report published. Instead of expressing what the EU is already doing or what the climate diplomacy is (which was the case in previous reports), the language is now upholding prospects for the EU’s climate diplomacy and separately the EU’s energy diplomacy. Whilst the two concepts energy diplomacy and climate diplomacy are separated the areas is blending, mentioning climate change within energy diplomacy and energy synergies within climate diplomacy. The link between the three policy areas is perhaps best represented by the following quote:

“We will further strengthen our energy diplomacy in support of the EU’s energy security, diversification efforts and initiatives that promote sustainable energy markets. Energy partnerships and dialogues should continue to be coherent with relevant foreign and external policy goals - including climate goals - and promote diversification of sources, suppliers and routes, as well as safe and sustainable low-emission and energy efficiency technologies including with a view for business opportunities for EU companies. Energy dialogues should, where appropriate, include discussions of global and regional energy security developments and where possible, take into account particular specificities and existing relevant engagements of EU Member States.” (EEAS 2017:36).

The last sentence is interesting since it is a low-key acknowledgement of the EU MS differences in energy and that there might be national difficulties where energy security developments or measures are appropriate. Previously, the only mentions of internal energy dealings have been referred to as ‘internal issues’ having to be linked with ‘external issues. This sentence recognises that national differences may have different

energy security inclinations, such as the German dependence on Russian gas or the Eastern blocks' overall dependence on Russian energy. However, the 'consider implies that this should be respected and left to the MS to govern, indicating that the Member States are guarding their national competence over the energy mixes.

## 7.2 Summary of the analysis

Following an overview of the year, the annual reports are divided into two sections, part I and part II, where the first is an overview of the previous year and the second is forward-looking into the coming year's prospects. The exact structure applies throughout the annual reports with minor changes. This implies high intertextuality and that the reports are based on each other, potentially using the same template from year to year. Between 2009 and 2016, the structure follows the same template with the two sections, part I, looking back at the past year and II, looking forward. The top global challenges from the year and those expected to remain important in the year to come are presented. The challenges in the past year and the following year never divert. They are expected to be the same as the previous year. Implying that there is a limit to the forward-looking, one time are there suggestions that upcoming (the COP) may affect the priorities of the coming year yet connected to an already existing priority of climate change mitigation. There are slight differences in the way the global challenges are expressed. Since 2012 the section has been referred to as threats and global challenges, implying a harsher reality. In 2016 and 2017, the reports diverted from this format, no longer comprising an overview and onward-looking sections, and diverting from the trend of identifying the top global challenges and threats in the same systematic manner. Diverting from an established format implies potential institutional changes, which perhaps can be connected to the eventual (and potential) end of the publication of the annual reports from the EEAS. This was at the time of publishing the European Global Agenda, which was only forward-looking and might have been a sort of replacement for at least that part of the annual reports.

### 7.2.1 Linguistic features

*Transitivity*, is found to be the most common linguistic feature in annual reports, is transitivity. *Nominalisation* is used extensively throughout the annual reports, suggesting a technical tone and reduced agency. Objectivity is also clearly exhibited, reflecting a certainty of the events of the world. This is not surprising in a standardised text such as the annual reports because it belongs to a specific genre of institutional texts. What, however, is interesting is the taking away of agency concerning issues the EU has influence over. For example, throughout the texts, there is nominalisation concerning energy dependence. It might be a national prerogative for the member states to decide their national energy mixes; however, the EEAS still has the mandate over the coordination of the external energy policies and still have the possibility to reflect on the challenges these energy dependencies cause for the CFSP of the EU. *Modality* throughout the text is overall reflecting certainty of the statements in the texts. Some statements are beginning in the earlier texts as expressed with more uncertainty “potential risks”, “potential crisis” and “should” which using another modal word, but which can be considered more specific than “potential and should” – “will”. It implies a sense of action, of almost conducting something, existing in the future. ‘Will’ is also more binding than potential, which is not really a promise to act but rather a consideration of doing so. Specifying *objectivity* is harder to distinguish because of the very objective overall tone typical for the genre. Overall, the reality is just presented as objective truth, expressing the situations and the challenges of the world as undisputed although few things are undisputed. A few things are of course, expected, such as climate change and the Russian annexation of Crimea. What is interesting is in looking at the objectivity of the text is not these widely recognised events but rather that of how something is presented in the texts for the first time but is regarded as something widely accepted. One example objectivity is the way the climate change nexus is referred to in 2016’s report: “The destabilising effects of climate change”, hence stating that climate change is destabilising. There is a sense of authority expressed. While in the earlier report’s climate change was referred to as something that “can act as a threat multiplier”, which instead implied some uncertainty and not an established fact or a statement that is always true.

## 7.2.2 Summary of the analysis of the annual reports



From the first report in 2009 energy relations are an essential point of connection in the EU's external relations through establishing partnerships and communicating with their already existing energy suppliers. Any situation is supposed to be solved through diplomatic communication between the EU and in this case, Russia, however, nothing suggests that it would be different with any other state if issues would occur in the energy supplies. In the early years of the material up until year 2012, the energy relations that did not concern Russia was primarily dealing with supporting less developed countries, developing their energy security and in part as a climate change mitigation strategy. It had at this point more the characteristics of development policies to support and boost the economies in the third countries rather than protecting and promoting the security of the EU: s own energy security and energy relations. The issue of energy dependency was known yet it was rather recognised as a mutual dependency, not considering, or suggesting that the EU would need energy more than Russia needed the intakes from it.

Overall, the intertextuality is significant, as can be seen by the narrowing number of quotations the further in the material the analysis gets. This is because of the few new developments and scarcity of entirely new segments regarding energy, climate and security and the interconnection that occurs in the material. Most of the early rationalities also remain in later material, sometimes with a few adjustments to the tone of certainty. And later also, the higher tone of urgency. This is not always rearticulated in the analysis for the readability of the text. Some earlier points are made again with a rearticulated point, which has been brought up in the analysis.

The climate change and energy connection first appear clearly articulated in the annual report of 2012. It is the first time it is expressed as one combined issue "time energy and climate security". The interconnection is less transparent, although still there in 2013's report. In 2014 the focus was more on the security of supply than the climate inclinations of energy and energy security as part of the energy transition. It appears forgotten amid the crisis of the annexation of Crimea and the soaring energy prices as the primary transit state was cut off. When the highest crisis management seems to have calmed down after the material gap in 2015, 2016 and 2017 have multiple articulations of the intersection of energy and climate change policies and security in the CFSP. The

nexus is most established that this point is rearticulated almost every time energy or climate is brought up and explicitly refers to a nexus of the two.

## 8 Discussion

In this section, the analysis is combined with the social practice to answer the research question *'What characterises the EU's geopolitical discourse over time when concerned with the nexus of climate change, energy, and external action of the ongoing European energy transition?'* The discussion ends with prospects for future studies within the geopolitics of renewables and ends with a conclusion of the findings of the thesis.

The European energy transition will be critical in the external context, which seems to have become apparent to the EU from early on. The geopolitical discourse became more urgent in the material from 2013 up until 2017. The crisis in Ukraine, from the material it can be concluded that Russia's annexation of Crimea, set of the EU's strategic thinking resulting in a discourse that can be considered more geopolitical in character, realising that the stability of the EU's energy supply might be under threat and not only an underlying risk. As researchers agree, the commitment to decarbonisation means vital transformations of the energy policies that will inevitably affect the EU's external policies. And it has. What in yearly years of the material (2009, 2010) started out as mostly climate change related without connections to an energy shift or any geopolitical consequences of this. Turned out to become more strategic, planning, managing alternative gas supply routes with states such as Azerbaijan. The EU cannot from the material in any way be understood as having anticipated the radical change it would see in 2014 (material from 2013). A shift in the material started to take form in 2013's material. Not surprising when considering the point in time where when the annual report of 2013 was written and published (in mid-2014). As the material is not exhaustive and ends in 2017, it is impossible to conclude anything about the geopolitical discourse of today in the same type of materials in this master thesis, but it will be an exemplary commitment to future studies on the topic.

In future studies, it would be interesting to study the relation between the development of energy security as an internal issue of the EU versus an external issue of the EU.

Something that was outside the scope of this master thesis, one hypothesis to start with will be if the state and development of international relations in the world have shifted or pushed the energy security concept from something seen as something mostly regarded as internal politics within the EU to consider a more geopolitical perspective as energy security as a foreign policy/external actions issue. It would be interesting to uncover within what policy realm (potentially the internal) where the onward looking energy security discussion took place between 2009 and 2012. Although the energy dependency was discussed in the external affairs of the annual reports of the CFSP, any potential consequences of strategies, ideas for dealing and disconnecting from this dependency appeared in the analysed material now. One thought is of the issue being less portrayed as a foreign policy issue because it was more handled as a domestic issue in other channels of the EU system.

Perhaps it is not surprising that energy security, as well as many other external actions areas, was not fully developed within the CFSP in early years such as 2009 and 2010 because of the early stage of the EEAS and the potential limits of endeavouring into policy areas that has historically been heavily guarded and seen as national by the member states. The EEAS was a new agency at that time, and, unsurprisingly, it would take a couple of years to gather both the engagement and win over some of the MS to consider traditionally internal and domestic issues as something that should be treated and included in the external actions area.

The understanding of the EU has ignoring geopolitics, in accordance with Biscop, is rather harsh however it is distinguishable from the development of the discourse that the EU has had multiple wake up calls when it comes to energy, first in 2009, later in 2014 and we see another one today. Perhaps the EU were not as prepared strategically as it could have been, yet it is hard establishing this from the discourse analysis in this thesis, it will bear great prospects for future studies and more in-depth analysis of the geopolitical discourse from 2020 and the years to come.

## 8.1 Conclusions

In this thesis, a critical discourse analysis has been conducted to answer the question *'What characterises the EU's geopolitical discourse over time when concerned with the nexus of climate change, energy, and external action of the ongoing European energy transition?'*. The characteristic of the geopolitical discourse is found to have distinctively transformed in the years between 2009 and 2017, starting out less strategic, forward-looking, and becoming increasingly so in the later years between 2014-2017. The geopolitical discourse is highly characterised by the ongoing events in the world, first the 2009 gas spats with Russia, the Russian annexation of Crimea and terrorism and the Islamic State. The nexus is not as clear in the early years and although climate policies will ultimately affect energy security and vice versa, it is not visible in the geopolitics discourse until 2013. It can be concluded that there is a nexus, where climate change policies, energy security prospects and external actions of the EU concur. The relationship between the policy areas has changed over time and has turned into a more coherent geopolitical discourse where energy security and climate change are understood as connected and inherent part of European External Policy.

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