



LUND
UNIVERSITY

**Coloniality in Nordic Identity Constructions: The Case of
Finland and the Immigration Discourse of the Finns
Party and Riikka Purra**

By Unna-Majja Matinlauri

Master's Thesis

Department of Political Science

Global Studies

Supervisor: Ketevan Bolkvadze

Abstract

Coloniality persistently prevails in the many aspects of today's societies, including identity constructions. However, the role of the Nordic region in colonialism and its continuous consequences has been severely downplayed, if not ignored, not least in connection to Finland. Thus, this research explores the visibilities of coloniality in social identity constructions in the context of Finland. As such connections are often the most apparent in the anti-immigration discourse of the far-right, the focus will be on the visibilities of coloniality in the in-group and out-group constructions in the immigration discourse of the Finns Party, and the current chair Riikka Purra, using the Finns Party immigration policy and Riikka Purra's immigration discourse as data. The data is analysed with the guidance of Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis and a theoretical framework rooted in decolonial theory. The analysis of the findings is conducted within four thematic categories based on the most evident colonial hierarchies found in the data, which are: immigrant as a criminal threat/Finnish nation as a victim, immigrant as an economic strain/Finnish nation as a victim, immigrant as a demographic threat/Finnish nation as a victim and cultural inferiority of immigrants/cultural superiority of the Finnish nation.

Keywords: coloniality, far-right, Finns Party, immigration discourse, critical discourse analysis

Table of Contents

1. Introduction.....	4
2. Historical Background.....	5
3. Previous Research.....	10
3.1. Coloniality and Nordic Identity.....	10
3.2. Finns Party and Identity.....	13
4. Theoretical Framework.....	18
5. Methodology.....	23
5.1. Data.....	23
5.2. Operationalization.....	25
5.3. Method of Analysis.....	26
5.4. Ethical Considerations.....	29
6. Analysis.....	30
6.1. Immigrant as a Criminal Threat/Finnish Nation as a Victim.....	31
6.2. Immigrant as an Economic Strain/Finnish Nation as a Victim.....	39
6.3. Immigrant as a Demographic Threat/Finnish Nation as a Victim.....	49
6.4. Cultural Inferiority of Immigrants/Cultural Superiority of the Finnish Nation.....	54
7. Conclusions.....	62
8. Bibliography.....	66

1. Introduction

Through multiple decades now scholars have exposed the ways in which the European identity construction has been and persists to be deeply molded by imperialism and colonialism (Kinnvall, 2016). Coloniality, as in the enduring power structures that emerged as a result of the European colonial conquest and colonial rule, continuously affect everything around us, including identity constructions (Keskinen, Mkvesha, Seikkula, 2021:49; Maldonado-Torres, 2007:243). Still today eurocentrism pervasively lingers as the prerequisite for the construction of the “Other” (Keyman in Kinnvall, 2016:155).

Yet, when it comes to the role of the Nordic region in colonialism and its identity constructions, the wider scholarly debates regarding it have emerged only rather recently (Keskinen, 2019:163). In the public sphere, dominating discourses regarding Nordic histories have centered around notions such as “Nordic exceptionalism” and “white innocence” in which the Nordics wash their hands from the histories of colonialism and the consequences of those on today’s societies (Keskinen, 2019:163; Loftsdóttir & Jensen, 2016:2). Such notions are particularly evident in the common representation of the Nordic countries as global “good citizens” and conflict-resolution oriented advocates of peace (Loftsdóttir & Jensen, 2016:2).

Finland, a country with a colonial history and present that has been extensively overlooked due to it being under Swedish and Russian rule until becoming independent in 1917, yields a complex yet valuable example to explore the visibilities of coloniality in identity constructions (Keskinen, 2019:164). Therefore, this paper aims to explore the connections between identity constructions and coloniality in the context of Finland. As such connections are often the most evident in the anti-immigrant narratives of the far-right, this research will focus on the Finnish populist far-right political party Finns Party, their current leader Riikka Purra, and the connections between coloniality and social identity constructions in their immigration discourse (Kinnvall, 2016:153).

The Finns Party (previously the “True Finns”) is a populist far-right party and the second biggest party in Finland currently. National identity is a pivotal element to the party and they are known for their strong anti-immigration and Islamophobic stance (Norocel et al., 2020:10-11,14). While research regarding the immigration discourse of the Finns Party is rather extensive, especially in connection to the former chair of the party Jussi Halla-aho, research directly connecting coloniality to the Finns Party and their immigration discourse is, to my best knowledge, rather scarce and so is the research on the current chair of the party Riikka Purra. Thus, the purpose of this research is to challenge the enduring colonial power structures through exposing the visibilities of coloniality in the social identity constructions in the immigration discourse of the Finns Party and Riikka Purra.

In aims of fulfilling this purpose, the visibilities of coloniality will be explored through investigating the most recent Finns Party immigration policy from 2019 as well as Riikka Purra’s speeches, Facebook posts and tweets from since she was elected as the chair of the party. The analysis of the data will rely on Critical Discourse Analysis and more specifically on Fairclough’s three dimensional model. The theoretical framework supporting the analysis will be based on decolonial theory.

In order to do this, the research will be guided by the following research question:

How is coloniality visible in the in-group and out-group constructions in the immigration discourse of the Finns Party and their current leader Riikka Purra?

2. Historical background

In order to be able to investigate the relationship between coloniality and the Finns Party immigration discourse, it is of great importance to gain a deeper understanding of the colonial and racial histories of Finland. Before diving in, it should be noted that when seeking to trace colonial and racial relations and

processes it is essential to take into account the interaction between local, state and global elements (Loftsdóttir & Jensen, 2016:1). With this in mind, this section will explore the Finnish colonial history in close contact with these elements, with a particular focus on intra-Nordic power relations.

In terms of colonial power relations, the Nordic region provides a wide range of experiences, varying from colonial powers to colonies. This can be exemplified through the still on-going colonization of Sámi communities in Sweden, Finland, Norway (and Russia outside the Nordic region), the Danish colonization of Greenland and Swedish Empire's invasions in the U.S, Caribbean and Africa, just to name a few (Loftsdóttir & Jensen, 2016:3). Regardless of this rather wide array, Nordic colonialism is frequently denied, or if not denied, characterized as somehow "kinder" or "less colonial" (Ojala & Nordin, 2019:102).

When it comes to Finland more specifically, connections to colonialism are often brushed off by pointing to Finland's late independence, as it only gained independence in 1917. Previously to that, Finland was first under Swedish rule for six centuries and then from 1809 to 1917 an autonomous Grand duchy of the Russian Empire (Keskinen, 2021:69). The dominating Finnish national narrative, especially in everyday discourse, paints a picture of Finland as a small country that managed to survive independence struggles, wars and economic hardship, all with the help of Finnish "sisu" (translation: resilience)(Keskinen, 2019:178). In the name of this historical narrative of Finland as an underdog, Finland is continuously manifested as innocent when talking about colonialism (Keskinen, 2021:69-70).

However, this narrative of Finland as the innocent underdog comes at a high price as it ignores the histories of the marginalized by hiding the trajectories of Finnish colonial participation, both before and after independence (Keskinen, 2019:164; Keskinen, 2021:70). In order to capture the many layers of Nordic participation in colonial processes, Suvi Keskinen, Sara Irni, Diana Mulinari and Salla Tuori (2016:1-2) introduced the concept of colonial complicity. Colonial complicity

refers to the ways in which colonialism shapes the cultural, social and material reality, also in countries that had no colonies or large colonial territories (Keskinen et al., 2016:2). It exposes “the seductiveness of being included in hegemonic notions of eurocentric modernity and the material benefits it promises for countries located at the margins of Europe” and emphasizes the political ambiguities as well as the changing power relations within the Nordic region (Keskinen, 2019:164; Keskinen et al., 2016:2). Yet, colonial complicity by itself is not adequate enough in giving a nuanced picture of Finland’s role in colonialism as it fails to capture the profound and continued forms of Nordic, and in this case more specifically Finnish colonialism, including the settler colonialism of the Sámi (Seikkula & Keskinen, 2021:11).

In aims of providing a more evolved understanding, Suvi Keskinen (2019) has defined three main patterns of the colonial and racial histories of Finland. Firstly, similarly to other Nordics and Europeans, Finns and companies in Finland engaged in and benefited from colonialism and settler colonialism that took place on various continents, such as the Americas, Africa and Australia (Keskinen, 2019:167). While the histories of Nordic overseas colonization and slave trading are mostly discussed in connection to Denmark and Sweden due to their regionally dominant position, these discussions often forget that Finland used to be an integral part of the Swedish Kingdom until 1809 (Keskinen, 2019:167). Consequently, the Finnish involvement is often disregarded (Keskinen, 2019:167).

Nevertheless, Finns played an active role in Swedish settler colonial projects, including “New Sweden” in Delaware in North America, and St. Barthélemy in the Caribbean (Keskinen, 2021:72-73). Even the so-called “Barthélemy-fever” prevailed in Finland with Finns dreaming about the promises of prosperity in the Caribbean (Keskinen, 2021:74). Trade in the Caribbean was a significant source of income for companies operating in Finland (Keskinen, 2021:74) Additionally, Finns, such as the Finnish-Swedish brothers Ulrik and August Nordenskiöld, participated in the process of initiating and planning the establishment of Swedish

colonies as well (Keskinen, 2019:168). These examples of Finnish participation in overseas colonial projects are evidence of colonial complicity, demonstrating how Finns also benefited from the geopolitical world order constructed through colonialism (Keskinen, 2021:75).

Secondly, in terms of racial taxonomies, transnational relations played also a pivotal role in how the position of Finns was determined in scientific racism (Keskinen, 2019:171). When it comes to scientific racism, the categorization of race was a relational process under constant change (Keskinen, 2019:171). In the context of the Nordic region, the racial hierarchies were largely set according to the taxonomies created in the 18th century by the well-known Swedish naturalist Carl von Linné, also known as the “father of taxonomy”. In accordance with these taxonomies, the Nordic race was defined as the superior race and included Swedes, Danes and Norwegians (Keskinen, 2021:76). Finns, along with the Sámi, the Roma and other groups living in the Nordics, were excluded from the definition and depicted as inferior (Keskinen, 2021:76). The Sámi in particular were further inferiorized due to their alleged primitiveness and nomadic lifestyle (Keskinen, 2019:172). As a part of his skull study in the 18th century, Friedrich Blumenbach defined Finns to be of Mongolian descent, excluding Finns from the “white race” and categorizing them to be part of the “yellow race” (Keskinen, 2021:76). Yet, rather than challenging the nature of such racial categorizations, some Finns engaged in the knowledge production and politics of these categorizations, seeking to affirm the “whiteness” of Finns and to dissociate themselves from groups depicted as racially inferior (Rastas, 2016:3; Keskinen, 2019:173-4). Such racialized hierarchies were particularly prevalent after Finland gained independence, as the young nation was building its national identity and connection to Europe (Keskinen, 2021:78). This desire for connection with “European modernity” was sought by distinguishing oneself from the “less civilized” Others, both within and outside of the country (Keskinen, 2021:78-79). With time and changing categorizations, Finns were gradually perceived as “whiter” and as a result were hesitantly accepted into Europeanness (Keskinen, 2019:173).

Thirdly, as noted before, the Finnish colonial and racial trajectories are deeply intertwined with the processes of state- and nation building (Keskinen, 2019:175). Indeed, as Goldberg (2002:2) stresses with his concept “racial state”, the modern nation-state was created amid the colonial high tide and thus is intrinsically racially configured. Similarly to elsewhere in Europe, the nation building in Finland relied on the exclusion of indigenous and minority populations as biologically and/or culturally inferior “Others” (Keskinen, 2019:175). While many of the repressive and assimilatory policies and practices towards the Sámi and Roma people were established already under Swedish and Russian rule, the racialized othering further intensified during the post-independence era (Keskinen, 2019:175). An example of the and assimilatory state politics towards the Sámi in post-independence era Finland is the assimilatory school system, as Sámi children were forced to attend boarding schools where Finnish language and culture was imposed on them (Keskinen, 2019:175). Similar traumatic tactics were utilized towards the Roma people for example through strategically taking their children into custody and placing them in children's homes (Keskinen, 2021:82). Hence, the histories of the Sámi and Roma people calls into question the much cherished image of the welfare state as a level playing field (Keskinen, 2021:82-83)

All in all, even though the three main patterns introduced above are far from an exhaustive list of Finnish colonial participation, they successfully confront the prevalent yet inaccurate national narrative and instead situates the history of Finland “in the triangle of nordic/european colonialism, racial thinking, and modern state-building” (Keskinen, 2019:178). They demonstrate how the image of Finland as small, resilient and equal becomes something much darker, when Finnish histories are integrated into the European histories of colonialism and racism (Keskinen, 2021:83). In addition to revealing the importance of global, regional, state, and local layers, these patterns prove that solely concentrating on “colonial complicity” is not sufficient enough in grasping the complex histories of Finnish colonialism (Keskinen, 2021:84). This research echoes the important argument

made by Keskinen (2021:84), how instead of hiding racial and colonial histories and clinging on to the narratives of exceptionalism, there is a pressing need to explore the debates leading to today's society.

3. Previous Research

After going through the existing research regarding the visibilities of coloniality in the in-group and out-group constructions in the immigration discourse of the Finns Party and their leader Riikka Purra, one could notice how the research connecting coloniality to the Finns Party is scarce. Therefore, this section will first focus on coloniality and the Nordic identity and then move on to Finns Party and identity in order to gain a better understanding of the existing research.

3.1 Coloniality and Nordic Identity

As briefly mentioned in the introduction, much of the scholarly exploration regarding the connections between European identity constructions and coloniality have primarily focused on the major European colonial powers (Loftsdóttir & Jensen, 2016:1-2). Outside of post- and decolonial interventions, ideas considered pivotal to the European historical experience, such as nationalism and modernity, are often discussed in isolation from imperialism and colonialism (Loftsdóttir & Jensen, 2016:1). For multiple decades now, post- and decolonial scholars have challenged such discourse and have emphasized the role of colonialism in European identity constructions through stressing how the colonized were used as essential sources for counter-identifications (Kinnvall, 2016; Loftsdóttir & Jensen, 2016:1; Quijano, 2007:168). Indeed, one of the scholarly giants of the postcolonial field, Edward Said (1995), underlines how colonialism is not something that happens somewhere far away, but at the “heart of European culture”.

While the scholarly focus in relation to the intertwined relationship between colonialism and identity has geographically mostly been on the European colonial

“superpowers”, such investigations in the mainstream have been scarce in the Nordic context until the rather recent surge (Keskinen, 2019:163). It is crucial to note that this is not without resistance from anti-racist and anti-imperialist movements (Keskinen, 2021:83). For example, the first international Sámi conference was held in 1917 and in Finland the Roma and Sámi movements were particularly active already during the 1960’s and the 1970’s (Keskinen, 2021:83).

Yet, for a long time the Nordic countries have managed to enjoy the fruit of the Nordic exceptionalist narrative, which, research-wise, has been especially visible in research regarding the current forms of internationalization, where the focus is often on the idea of Nordic-countries as peace-loving global “good citizens” (DeLong, 2009:38-9). Cristopher Browning (2007:27-8) believes that this narrative has been stretched to the extent that Nordic exceptionalism has become a key component in the national identities of Nordic states, serving as a specific kind of nation branding. Anni Rastas (2016) has pinpointed this phenomenon specifically in the Finnish context with the term Finnish exceptionalism, referring to the differentiation of Finland and Finnish people from other nations and how that is rooted in moral superiority. However, more scholars, like Browning (2007:27-8) and Rastas (2016), are starting to question and confront these long sheltered identity constructions defined by Nordic exceptionalism and expose the widely ignored colonial history and present of these countries.

When confronting the connections between coloniality and Nordic identity, scholars have emphasized how the notion of whiteness, while commonly implicit and taken-for-granted, is a core component of the Nordic national identities (e.g. Loftsdóttir & Jensen, 2016; Keskinen, 2013:226). The notion of whiteness in this context does not solely concern bodily distinctions, but a system of privileges and power (Keskinen, 2013:226). It is also understood as relational, under constant (re)construction in relation with class, religion, culture and other markers of difference, as exemplified with the racial history of Finland in the previous background section (Rastas, 2016:3; Keskinen, 2013:226). Whiteness is

often linked to the idea of “Westernness” and belonging to the “white West”, a place perceivedly superior in cultural, scientific and economic terms, is argued to be central to the Nordic national imaginaries as well (Keskinen, 2013:226). However, it is emphasized that while the Nordics celebrate being part of the “West”, a self image of Nordics as more humane than the rest of the West is promoted (Palmberg, 2009:75). Moreover, scholars have stressed how in the creation of this identity around whiteness, the colonized were utilized for counter-identifications (Loftsdóttir & Jensen, 2016:1). As a result, the ones with bodies characterized as non-white are racialized and depicted as “immigrant” or “foreign” “Others”, even if they are born or raised there (Keskinen, 2013:226).

In a Finnish context scholars, such as Suvi Keskinen (2013, 2014), note how the idea of “Finnishness” is essentially connected to “Europeanness” and “white Westernness” too. The idea of “white Westernness” is understood as a sought after identification inside the nation as well as a normative requirement for those seeking to become members of the nation (Keskinen, Näre & Tuori, 2015:2). Scholars have problematized how the ones seeking to belong to this imagined Finnishness are required to adopt a certain attitude on issues such as equality, gender relations and sexual freedom, yet even then racialized assumptions related to skin colour or country of departure are used to marginalize their position (e.g. Keskinen, 2012; Keskinen, Näre & Tuori, 2015; Tuori, 2009).

In addition to whiteness, the notion of gender equality has also been defined as a key component of the Nordic national identities and the definitions of who can and who cannot belong to such identities. Multiple feminist scholars have emphasized how the notion of gender equality provides a tool for molding a Nordic self-images as progressive, advanced and modern nations (e.g. de los Reyes, Molina & Mulinari 2003; Keskinen *et al.* 2009; Keskinen, 2013:226; Norocel *et al.*, 2020:1). It is viewed that such discourses are constructed through “a juxtaposition to migrant “others” projected to the past and stagnation” (Keskinen, 2013:226). In other words, a perception of Nordic nations and citizens as emancipated, equal and tolerant is

advocated through a comparison to “bad patriarchies” situated in far away places and migrant bodies (Keskinen, 2013:226).

Feminist researchers have explored such comparisons especially in the context of racialized discourses around “honour-related violence” and sexual violence as well as how such discourses are used in Nordic nation building, highlighting the gendered and sexualized elements of nation building (e.g. de los Reyes, Molina & Mulinari, 2003; Keskinen, 2009; Keskinen, 2016). In such discourses the bodies of women turn into battlegrounds of nation building where decisions regarding who belongs and who does not are made, making gender equality a marker of difference defining the in-group, as in “us” and out-group, as in “them” (Keskinen, 2009:258; Keskinen, 2016:107). While this is a wider phenomenon not restricted to far right-wing parties, scholars have noted that such dichotomous discourses around nation, ethnicity and belonging in relation to questions of gender and sexuality are particularly pronounced amongst the populist right-wing parties and their political agendas.

All in all, in relation to this kind of constructions of “us” and “them” Mai Palmberg (2006) reminds how a “Nordic colonial mind” persists to exist.

3.2 Finns Party and Identity

The Finns Party, formerly named as the “True Finns”, was founded in 1995 as a replacement for the moribund populist Finnish Rural Party. In Finnish the party is named “Perussuomalaiset”, which could be translated in multiple ways, including “typical, fundamental, average or ordinary Finns” (Wahlbeck, 2016: 579). For a long time, the first 20 years to be more specific, the party was part of the opposition, but in conjunction with the Nordic and international trend of increasing popularity of the far-right, the popularity of the True Finns increased as well (Ylä-Anttila, 2012:1). After shocking the Finnish political scene with its major break-through in 2011, the success of the party has been gradually escalating, reaching a spot as the

second biggest party and becoming part of the coalition government in the 2015 elections (Wahlbeck, 2015:579).

There has been some confusion in terms of locating the party on the left-right continuum, as the party consists of politicians with diverse interests, but generally the party is defined as a far-right populist party due to its emphasis on ethnic nationalism (Arter, 2010:484). In aims of clarifying some of the confusion, scholars have pinpointed two significant strands of the party: the agrarian conservatives and the radical anti-immigration wing (e.g. Jungar, 2016; Norocel et al., 2020; Pyrhönen, 2015)

However, scholars such as Ann-Catherine Jungar (2003:117), remind that the Finns Party cannot be defined as a far-right populist party from the outset, but that the party gradually radicalized after 2003. According to Jungar (2003:117), the two dimensions that have undergone the most drastic changes are immigration and European integration. In a similar manner, Cristian Norocel, Tuija Saresma, Tuuli Lähdesmäki and Maria Ruotsalainen (2020) in their comparative study of the Finns Party and The Sweden Democrats, conclude that in the past the Finns Party embraced a more pronounced anti-elitist rhetoric and utilized class-based antagonism as a tool to gain electoral support, but shifted their focus to the anti-immigration agenda around issues of “protecting” national identity and the welfare state. Currently the party is openly populist and prides itself as the “only Finnish party that is truly critical of immigration” (Perussuomalaiset, 2021).

However, while the party itself defines itself like so, scholars have not necessarily agreed with this statement. While the increase in anti-immigration is often associated with the rise in popularity of the Finns Party, scholars have stressed how it is not only the far-right parties, such as the Finns Party, that are guilty of racialized anti-immigration sentiments (Keskinen, 2009:33; Keskinen, Rastas, Tuori, 2009:9). In addition to the Finns Party, parties such as the National Coalition party, the Finnish Social Democratic party and Finnish Centre party have called for stricter

immigration policies (Keskinen, 2013:227). Thus, it has been argued that the rise of nationalism and right-wing populism in Finland, and in the Nordic countries, must be seen as part of a broader historical continuum in which the connection between the nation and Western whiteness has emerged (Keskinen, Näre, Tuori, 2015:3). This thesis echoes this notion that the Finns Party and the far-right should not be understood as something inherently exceptional or alien but as “radicalised extensions of more accepted and normalised ways of thinking and acting” (Keskinen, Skaptadóttir, Toivanen, 2009:1).

Still anti-immigration is a major theme in the politics of the Finns Party, and hence a significant amount of academic research regarding the party is focused their anti-immigration discourse, at least partly (e.g. Horsti, 2015; Jungar, 2016; Keskinen, 2009; Norocel et al., 2020; Pyrhönen, 2015; Wahlbeck, 2016). As the Finns Party is a nationalist party, national identity and the idea of “Finnishness” are focal elements of the party ideology, and hence the anti-immigration discourse is often discussed in connection to national identity (Arter, 2010:484). As is common with far-right parties, the Finns Party discourse around national identity and the nation often plays with the politics of nostalgia, using nostalgia as a communication tool to further their political agenda (Menke, Wolf, 2021; Silvennoinen, 2017). This has been demonstrated for example with the Finns Party slogan “Take back Finland” (Suomi takaisin). Oula Silvennoinen (2017) explains this tendency through the palingenetic myth, a concept coined by Roger Griffin (1991) to describe the core of fascism. The palingenetic myth refers to the aim of a “national re-birth”, which often, as is the case with the Finns Party, entails a goal of a monocultural community (Griffin, 1991; Silvennoinen, 2017).

Furthermore, in terms of national identity, scholars, such as Östen Wahlbeck (2016:575) note how the Finns party promotes itself as representative of the Finnish nation and a “defender of the majority”, more specifically the “true” and “typical” Finns, as reflected in the party name. Wahlbeck (2016:575) further notes how this

narrative of defending the majority is commonly intertwined with exclusionary understandings of the modern welfare state.

It is emphasized how, in harmony with such exclusionary tendencies, the Finns Party asserts a dichotomy between an in-group, the “true” Finns, and out-group, as in immigrants and minorities threatening the Finnish national identity and the prided welfare state (e.g. Norocel et al., 2020; Wahlbeck, 2016). In other words, the Finns Party portrays the majority as the discriminated and threatened group in the Finnish society. This reverse logic is not unique to Finland and the Finns Party, but prevalent in other Nordic countries too, and explained as the “politics of reversal” by Suvi Keskinen (2012:270).

Furthermore, there seems to be a particular trend of exploring anti-immigration discourse of the Finns Party and its major figures on social media platforms, possibly because social media platforms are defined to be central for the rise of the far-right in the 21st century (e.g. Hatakka, 2016; Horsti, 2015; Keskinen, 2013; Nortio et al., 2021, Ylä-Anttila, 2020).

A lot of this research regarding Finns Party anti-immigration discourse uses the writings of the former chairperson, Jussi Halla-aho as an example (e.g. Horsti, 2015, Jungar, 2016; Keskinen, 2009, 2012, 2013; Wahlbeck, 2016). Halla-aho entered the political arena and gained his following through his blog titled *Scripta*, and subtitled *Writings from a sinking West* (translated from Finnish). His blog is known for posts neglecting the boundaries of free-speech with arguments around anti-immigration, anti-multiculturalism and Islam, reaching even international attention, as for example from the Norwegian terrorist and mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik referred to Halla-aho’s writings in his manifesto published after his terrorist attacks (Jungar, 2016:127-128; Wahlbeck, 2016:581).

In 2012, this neglect culminated in Halla-aho getting prosecuted and convicted in the Supreme Court for disturbing religious worship and ethnic agitation due to

calling Islam a “pedophile religion” and describing robbing passersby and living on taxpayer’s expense as cultural if not genetic characteristics of Somalis (Sundqvist, 2012). The Green Women’s Association also filed a complaint against Halla-aho for inciting rape as in one of his writings Halla-aho stated how increase in the amount immigrants equals increase in the amount of rapes, and how he therefore hopes that immigrants would rape leftist and green politicians and their supporters as they support immigration (Keskinen, 2009:34-35)

These writings by Halla-aho have been criticized for the racist and misogynistic characteristics in them as well as for (re)producing a hierarchical and dichotomous contrast between a gender equal Finnish society and a patriarchal and oppressive gender order of Islam. Suvi Keskinen (2012:270) argues how such writings utilize gender equality rhetorics to legitimize exclusionary and racial anti-immigration agendas in order to “blur the racism embedded in these political strategies”. Moreover, it is problematized how, similarly to immigration, Islam is portrayed as a threat to the Finnish society (Keskinen, 2012; Wahlbeck, 2016). After becoming a member of the parliament in 2011, it has been noted that Halla-aho became slightly more careful with his writings on online platforms, but remained a key figure of the anti-immigration fraction of the party, and became the chairman of the party in 2017 (Horsti, 2015:351-361).

While research regarding the writings and politics of Halla-aho is rather extensive, there seems to be a lack of academic research focusing on the current chairperson, Riikka Purra. Purra was elected as the chairperson in 2021, and as a result became a popular topic in the media. Previously Purra is said to have voted for the Green League (Vihreät) among other parties, but due to the strong anti-immigration stance of the Finns Party, Purra shifted her support towards the Finns Party (Koivisto, 2021). Indeed, when elected, Purra strongly stressed the need for stricter immigration policies and presented their goal to be zero asylum seekers in Finland (Aaltonen, 2021). Yet, regardless of the media attention and the alarming statements on immigration, academic research regarding Riikka Purra or her views

on immigration have not, to my best knowledge, been thoroughly explored in academic research. Additionally, as briefly mentioned before, while it has been argued that postcolonial subjectivities are often the most evident in the anti-immigration rhetoric of far-right parties, academic research directly connecting coloniality to the Finns Party and their anti-immigration rhetoric is rather scarce. Therefore, this research aims to participate in filling these research gaps and contribute to the already existing research regarding the Finns Party through investigating the visibilities of coloniality in the anti-immigration discourse of Riikka Purra and the Finns Party at large.

4. Theoretical framework

This section will focus on the theoretical framework of this research, introducing the key theoretical concepts. The theoretical framework of this research relies on decolonial theory. Decolonial theory, briefly summarized, emphasizes the continuity of the modern capitalist world order and the racial and ethnic classifications inherent in such power structures (Keskinen, Mkwesha, Seikkula, 2021:49). Decolonial theory seeks to find ways to dismantle such power structures and propose decolonial alternatives, not only in the circle of academics but together with social movements and artists (Keskinen, Mkwesha, Seikkula, 2021:50-51).

Coloniality is a key concept of decolonial theory, as well as of this research. To be able to investigate the visibilities of coloniality in the anti-immigration discourse of the Finns Party and their current leader Riikka Purra, one needs to have an elaborate understanding of the concept. Firstly, it is important to differentiate between colonialism and coloniality as although often confused with colonialism, coloniality is not the same as colonialism (Maldonado-Torres, 2007:243). Colonialism is commonly referred to as particular “episodes of socio-historical and geopolitical conditions” and thus often portrayed to be “locked in the past, located elsewhere, or confined to specific empirical dimensions” (Maldonado-Torres, 2016:10). In contrast, coloniality, a concept developed by Aníbal Quijano, refers to the enduring

power structures that emerged as a result of the European colonial conquest and colonial rule, power structures that continue to affect everything around us, including relations and processes of economy, knowledge and authority (Keskinen, Mkwesha, Seikkula, 2021:49; Maldonado-Torres, 2007:243).

Historically, coloniality came to being in the late 15th century through the conquest of the Americas (Maldonado-Torres, 2016:11). It was in this socio-historical setting where the already prevailing economic system of capitalism became enmeshed with domination and subordination, enabling the European colonial control that was started in the Americas and then expanded elsewhere (Maldonado-Torres, 2007:243). Through these expansions coloniality evolved into a model of power, an universal social classification, molded by a system of domination constructed around the idea of “race” (Quijano, 2007:271; Maldonado-Torres, 2007:244). A pivotal element of this sort of social classification is how the “relation between the subjects is not horizontal but vertical in character”, granting particular identities superiority over others (Maldonado-Torres, 2007:244). This given superiority then presumes the degree of humanity assigned to these identities, dividing the world into zones of humanity and sub-humanity (Maldonado-Torres, 2007:244; Maldonado-Torres, 2016:13, 19). Thus, this classification was used to justify and naturalize the oppressive and exploitative relations of colonialism (Keskinen, Mkwesha, Seikkula, 2021:49). However, race was not the only such classification being imposed, as along with race, classifications such as ethnicity, nationality, gender and sexuality gained prominence as well (Quijano, 2007:168; Lugones, 2007). Through classifications like these, coloniality forcibly imposed one universal ideal of society and subalternized those that differ and their knowledges (Mignolo, 2007:459). The power structures of the world we live in today are still firmly based on these classifications (Quijano, 2007:168).

Decolonially speaking, coloniality is tightly interconnected with modernity, to the extent that the concepts are often expressed as a compound expression: modernity/coloniality (Mignolo, Walsh, 2018:4). Indeed, the compound expression

is used to accentuate how coloniality is constitutive of modernity, in other words, there would not be modernity without coloniality (Mignolo, Walsh, 2018:4). This refers to how modern Europe was established through a “process of conquest and colonial expansion, a process that made colonialism, more than a practice, an organizing logic and a modality of knowledge, power, and being—that is, coloniality” (Maldonado-Torres, 2016:11). Thus, coloniality is the hidden, darker side of modernity, “the hidden weapon behind the rhetoric of modernity” (Tlostanova, Mignolo, 2009:132-133). This combination of the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality forms the colonial matrix of power (Mignolo, Walsh, 2018:4).

Neglecting to acknowledge the inherently intertwined relationship between coloniality and modernity enables the erasure of the ways in which today’s power structures came to be (Bhambra, 2014:119). Modernity/coloniality then allows us to expose the consequences and realities of colonialism and therefore is pivotal to any investigations of contemporary global inequalities and their emergence (Bhambra, 2014:119). Hence the concept of coloniality is essential in investigations of the anti-immigration discourse of the far-right as well. While a decolonial perspective does not see the rise of right-wing nationalism in the West as somehow worse than the preservation of neoliberal globalism, it emphasizes how both of them persistently preserve and further coloniality (Mignolo, Walsh, 2018:5-6).

The implications of coloniality to the variety of areas in society are often discussed with the help of three concepts, which are: coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being (Maldonado-Torres, 2007:242). Firstly, coloniality of power illustrates the connections between modern patterns of exploitation and domination (Maldonado-Torres, 2007:242). Secondly, coloniality of knowledge seeks to understand the impact of colonization on knowledge production (Maldonado-Torres, 2007:242). Thirdly, coloniality of being refers to the lived experience of colonization as well as its effects on language (Maldonado-Torres, 2007:242). The concept of coloniality as a whole has “opened up, the re-

construction and the restitution of silenced histories, repressed subjectivities, subalternized knowledges and languages” of the colonized (Mignolo, 2007:451).

However, this research will mostly rely on two additional key concepts regarding coloniality: coloniality of gender and coloniality of migration. Firstly, coloniality of gender, a concept developed by María Lugones (2007) to expand and complicate Quijano’s concept of coloniality of power, pinpoints the significance of the intersections between race, class, gender and sexuality. Lugones understands gender to be rooted in colonialism as colonizers violently imposed it on the colonized, constituting the coloniality of gender. The coloniality of gender refers to the forced universalization of a European heterosexualist gender binary that enforces positions of masculinity as superior and positions of femininity as inferior. These positions become more complex when they intersect with colonial racist classifications, because once masculinity is racialized as non-white, it is depicted as “animalistic”, and thus as violent and inferior (Lugones, 2008:15). Simultaneously, once femininity is racialized as non-white, it is animalized and excluded from “civilized” womanhood (Lugones, 2007:203). Such colonial negotiations around femininity and masculinity continue to fundamentally shape today’s societies, including discourses and practices around migration. Coloniality of gender helps to explore and expose these kinds of negotiations and therefore is a pivotal tool for this research.

Secondly, in the context of migration, Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez (2018) coined the concept coloniality of migration, an analytical framework also developed from Quijano’s concept coloniality of power, to analyze migration policies and discourses. With coloniality of migration, Rodríguez (2018) builds on Quijano’s notion regarding how the establishment of European nation-states stems from a racial classification system, by arguing that “this system has been further developed through migration regulation and control”. As this research aims to explore the visibilities of coloniality in the in-group and out-group constructions in the immigration discourses of the Finns Party and their leader Riikka Purra, coloniality

of migration is a fruitful theoretical tool to utilize. Coloniality of migration as a concept brings to the fore the racism embedded in contemporary migration regulation, policies and official national discourses and exposes the colonial roots of such discourses and practices (Rodríguez, 2018:24-25). More specifically, it problematizes how migration policies reproduce the logic of coloniality through racialized dichotomies between citizens and migrants based on colonial discourses of the “Other”, here migrant, as fundamentally different and inherently inferior (Chatterjee, 1993; Rodríguez, 2018:24-25). “The vilification of the refugee as sexual perpetrator, potential terrorist, and destroyer of Western democratic values and beliefs” greatly exemplifies this reproduction of the logic of coloniality through racialized dichotomies between citizens and migrants (Rodríguez, 2018:19). Moreover, migration policies and discourses not only undermine the right to seek sanctuary when fleeing from violence and persecution but also depict it as something unrelated to the unequal global power relations. Additionally, they portray migration as something new, as something external to Europe’s history, ignoring Europe’s history of colonialism-migration and exile (Rodríguez, 2018:19, 23-24).

Similarly to Rodríguez, Minna Seikkula and Suvi Keskinen (2021) problematize this tendency to ignore the long history of racism but in the context of Finnish academic research regarding immigration. They stress how research regarding migration at times portrays racism as something new, as something related to migration, and overlooks how racism and racialized categorizations have been a part of everyday life in Finland for centuries (Seikkula, Keskinen, 2021). This demonstrates the importance of decolonial theory in investigating anti-immigration discourses as it will allow to capture the impact of colonial history in these discourses. All in all, with the help of this theoretical framework rooted in decolonial theory, this research aims to contribute in interrupting the logic of coloniality through exposing its visibilities in the anti-immigration discourse of the Finns Party and Riikka Purra.

5. Methodology

This section will introduce and discuss the relevant methodological aspects in conducting an analysis regarding the visibilities of coloniality in the in-group and out-group constructions in the immigration discourse by the Finns Party and their current leader Riikka Purra.

To begin with, this research will adopt a qualitative approach in conducting the research. While a quantitative approach might provide higher levels of breadth, with a focus on depth, a qualitative approach will allow this research to provide a deeper understanding of the visibilities of colonialism in the immigration discourse of the Finns Party and Purra and is therefore the most suitable approach for this research.

In terms of ontology, this research ascribes to a social constructionist worldview, which believes our understandings of the world to be constructed in social processes and emphasizes the impact of the historical and cultural context in such constructions (Burr, 1995:3-5). Furthermore, to be more specific, this research ascribes to a critical realist worldview, which challenges the assumption of social reality as something universal and instead views it as an open system that should not be reduced solely to its material form (Bhaskar, 1975; Tinsley, 2021:237). Critical realism as an ontological framework bears an ability to analyze and destabilize hegemonic knowledges as it pays attention to the expressions and effects of power, and thus greatly complements the CDA as the method of analysis, the decolonial theoretical framework, as well as the overall purpose of this research (Tinsley, 2021:237).

5.1 Data

This subsection will introduce the data utilized to investigate the visibilities of coloniality in the in-group and out-group constructions in the immigration discourse of the Finns Party and their current leader Riikka Purra.

Firstly, to get a better picture of the visibilities of coloniality in Finns Party immigration discourse, this research will use the most recent Finns Party immigration policy document from 2019. This document is their main, and to my best knowledge their only current public policy document that focuses solely on immigration. Therefore, it is a great fit for this research and allows to provide an understanding of the immigration policy discourse of the Finns Party as a whole. While Purra was not the leader of the party when the policy was published, Purra already had a central role in molding the politics of the Finns Party as Purra worked as a policy planner of the party since 2016 and as a deputy chairperson since 2019.

Nevertheless, to gain a deeper understanding of the visibilities of coloniality in the immigration discourse of Purra specifically, this research will also utilize Purra's speeches as well as Facebook posts and tweets as data. The data consists of both verbal speeches and written communication in aims of getting as comprehensive of an understanding as possible within the limits of this research. As the research is interested in the immigration discourse of Riikka Purra as the leader of the Finns Party, the data only includes material that has been posted after Riikka Purra was elected as the chairperson of the party on the 14th of August, 2021.

Strategic sampling was used to generate the data, meaning that the data was selected based on its relevance to the research question. Thus, first the keywords immigration (in Finnish: maahanmuutto), immigrant (in Finnish: maahanmuuttaja) and refugee (in Finnish: pakolainen) were used to find relevant material regarding the immigration discourse of Riikka Purra.

When going through the written data, one could see how there were strong similarities between Purra's Facebook posts and tweets, and often the posts were even the exact same texts, only difference being that the Facebook posts were longer cohesive texts while the tweets were cut into shorter separate texts, likely due to Twitter's word limit. In such instances where the texts were identical, only the

Facebook posts were selected, as it was more practical to analyse the texts as cohesive texts. In addition to Facebook and Twitter, the original plan was to also include Purra's blog posts from her blog *Dust/Bones/Politics*, but again there was a strong overlap with the Facebook posts and tweets. Thus, due to the similarity between the texts as well as the scope of this research, the focus is solely on Riikka Purra's speeches, Facebook posts and tweets.

All of the data, as in the immigration policy as well as the selected speeches, Facebook posts and tweets by Purra are in Finnish. Here it is an advantage that Finnish is my native language, as a nuanced understanding of the language is crucial when closely analysing discourse. However, this means that when utilizing quotes from the data as examples, the quotes need to be translated into English. This increases the risk of misinterpretation and words getting lost in translation due to structural and cultural differences between languages. Such risks have been minimized through a careful and detailed translation process.

5.2 Operationalization

This sub-section will discuss the operationalization process, as in the process focusing on defining the observable implications of coloniality in the data. As mentioned previously, coloniality refers to the pervasive colonial hierarchies that continue to thrive in today's societies, affecting everything around us, including social identity constructions, and such hierarchical subjectivities rooted in colonialism are often the most apparent in the anti-immigrant narratives of the far-right (Keskinen, Mkwesha, Seikkula, 2021:49; Maldonado-Torres, 2007:243; Kinnvall, 2016:153). Thus, based on a preliminary reading of the data and the decolonial theoretical framework focusing on coloniality, thematic categories of the most evident colonial hierarchies in the Finns Party immigration policy and in Riikka Purra's immigration discourse were defined. In terms of the decolonial theoretical framework guiding the operationalization process, a central notion regarding coloniality, and coloniality of migration in particular, is the reproduction

of the logic of coloniality through racialized dichotomies between citizens and migrants based on colonial discourses of the “Other”, as fundamentally different and inherently inferior (Chatterjee, 1993; Rodríguez, 2018:24-25). This process often involves a vilification of the immigrant (Rodríguez, 2018:19). While not necessarily directly connecting it to coloniality of migration, researchers have, in relation to the Finns Party, similarly emphasized the party’s exclusionary tendency to assert a dichotomy between an in-group, the “true” Finns, and out-group, as in immigrants and minorities threatening the Finnish national identity and the prided welfare state (e.g. Norocel et al., 2020; Wahlbeck, 2016).

Thus, this notion of racialized dichotomies guided the operationalization process. With this notion in mind, the most evident colonial hierarchies found in the data include: immigrant as a criminal threat/Finnish nation as a victim, immigrant as an economic strain/Finnish nation as a victim, immigrant as a demographic threat/Finnish nation as a victim and cultural inferiority of immigrants/cultural superiority of the Finnish nation. In order to provide a systematic analysis, the data was then carefully coded manually, in accordance with these thematic categories defined through the preliminary reading. The structure of the analysis also follows these thematic categories of colonial hierarchies. However, it is important to note that these aforementioned colonial hierarchies are not somehow separate, but intertwined hierarchies that interplay with each other.

5.3 Method of analysis

To analyse the above introduced data, this research will rely on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as an analytical framework, and more specifically on Norman Fairclough’s three dimensional model. Fairclough (1995) refers to CDA both as a label for his approach as well as for the broader movement within discourse analysis, but the main focus in this text will be on Fairclough’s approach.

With CDA the starting point is a discourse-related problem in some aspect of social life, in this case the tendency of othering and its connections to coloniality in the immigration discourses of the Finns Party and Riikka Purra (Chouliaraki, Fairclough, 2000:60). CDA stems from the notion of discourse as an important element of social practices and discourse is defined as “semiotic elements of social practices” (Chouliaraki, Fairclough 2000:vii, 38). Thus, discourse as a social practice is perceived to play a significant role in the creation of the social world, including social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and meaning (Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002:60). In addition to discourse, CDA defines three other main moments of a social practice: material activity, social relations and processes (for example power and institutions) and mental phenomena (for example values, beliefs and desires) (Chouliaraki, Fairclough, 2000:61). The main ambition of CDA then is to investigate the relationships between discourse and these other moments of social practice (Chouliaraki, Fairclough,2000:61).

Indeed, in line with critical realism, a crucial distinction in relation to ontology of Fairclough’s approach, as well as this research, is this dialectical relationship, a perception of discourse as both constitutive and constituted, as discourse both contributes to constituting the social world and is simultaneously constituted by other social practices (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:61). In other words, while discourse partakes in the reproduction and change of the social world, it also resembles them and thus cannot be examined in isolation from the social context (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:61, 70). Applying this understanding of discourse to the context of this research, the immigration discourses of the Finns Party and Riikka Purra are then considered to both contribute to constituting the surrounding social world as well as reflect it.

When it comes to Fairclough’s three dimensional approach, the focus of analysis is on the three levels of discursive and non-discursive practices, namely: text, discursive practices and social practices (Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002:68). Firstly, with the level of the text the focus is on analysing the linguistic structures of the text,

such as vocabulary and grammar (Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002:69). Secondly, the level of discursive practice brings attention to the production and consumption of the text, with a focus on interdiscursivity and intertextuality (Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002:69). More specifically, this level examines the ways in which the author/s draw on already existing genres and discourses to construct a text as well as the ways in which the consumers of the text apply already existing genres and discourses when consuming and interpreting the text (Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002:69). Last but not least, the third level of social practice is concerned with the wider networks of social practice to which the discursive practice is connected to (Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002:69). Moreover, this level contemplates if the researched discursive practice either reproduces or restructures the prevailing discourse and considers how it affects the wider social practice (Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002:69).

However, discourse analysis alone is not sufficient enough to analyse the wider social practice and thus requires the assistance of social and cultural theory for the analysis to be successful (Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002:69). Therefore, as previously mentioned a theoretical framework based on decolonial theory will be used to support the analysis. All in all, these three levels of CDA, together with the theoretical framework, will allow this research to fruitfully analyse the visibilities of coloniality in the immigration discourse of the Finns Party and Riikka Purra in close connection with their wider social practice.

As the name suggests, CDA strives for critical research, for “enhanced critical consciousness of language” (Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002:64; Chouliaraki, Fairclough, 2000:viii). CDA views discourse as something that functions ideologically, meaning that discourse plays a significant part in the production and reproduction of unequal power relations and thus has ideological effects (Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002:63). Being the second biggest party in Finland currently, the True Finns and their discourses hold a great amount of power. As previous research has emphasized, the True Finns often maintain and further unequal power relations through (re)producing in many ways alarming anti-immigration discourse (e.g.

Horsti, 2015; Jungar, 2016; Keskinen, 2009; Norocel et al., 2020; Pyrhönen, 2015; Wahlbeck, 2016). Therefore, with a political commitment to social change, this research aims to contribute to exposing the role of discursive practice in the maintenance of such power relations with the help of CDA (Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002:64). To do this, CDA encourages to explore “the discursive practices which construct representations of the world, social subjects and social relations and the role that these discursive practices play in furthering the interests of particular social groups” (Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002:63). This critical standpoint and emphasis on the connection between discourse and unequal power relations makes CDA a greatly suitable analytical framework to interrogate the visibilities of coloniality in the in-group and out-group constructions of the immigration discourse of the Finns Party and their leader Riikka Purra.

5.4 Ethical considerations

As with any research, it is of immense importance to reflect on the ethical aspects of this research. To begin with, my positionality as the researcher of this study should be addressed. In harmony with the thoughts of Donna Haraway (1988), this research recognizes knowledge as something situated, as something contextual, and underlines the notion that forms of knowledge bear resemblance to the conditions in which they have been produced. As a white researcher who grew up in Finland and then attended university in Sweden, first in Malmö and then in Lund, I have undoubtedly been exposed to the hegemonic Western construction of knowledge. Therefore, while this research aims to challenge such hegemonic constructions of knowledge, it should be noted that, to some extent, this can and will affect the way I approach this research. Furthermore, in relation to positionality, it should also be addressed that I, as a young researcher who does not share the same political values as the Finns Party or Riikka Purra, am researching data that rather strongly opposes my own values and views. Thus, my own subjectivities and biases can have an influence on how I interpret and interrogate the data. Nevertheless, I have attempted

to the best of my abilities to minimize the effects of my subjectivities and biases through a careful and rigorous analysis of the data.

Furthermore, to respect the ethical values of privacy, this research will only utilize public material as data.

Last but definitely not least, as this research studies the immigration discourse of a populist far-right Finns Party and their leader Riikka Purra, I want to express my worries about the possibility of this research giving a platform to populist, and often racist and in other ways discriminatory discourse. Thus, it is crucial to emphasize that this research does not in any way condone such kind of discourse nor aims to contribute to it. Instead, with the help of decolonial theory and CDA, this research aims to critically analyse and challenge such discourse through investigating the visibilities of coloniality in the in-group and out-group constructions in the immigration discourse of the Finns Party and Riikka Purra.

6 Analysis

This section is devoted to conducting the actual analysis of this research. With the guidance of Fairclough's CDA and the decolonial theoretical framework, both of which were introduced above, this section will explore and analyse the visibilities of coloniality in the in-group and out-group constructions in the immigration discourse of the Finns Party and their current leader Riikka Purra. In addition to CDA and the theoretical framework, elements from the historical background and previous research are utilized to contextualize the findings. From here onwards, the analysis will be structured into the previously discussed thematic categories, based on the most evident colonial hierarchies in the data: immigrant as a criminal threat/Finnish nation as a victim, immigrant as an economic strain/Finnish nation as a victim, immigrant as a demographic threat/Finnish nation as a victim and cultural inferiority of immigrants/cultural superiority of the Finnish nation.

6.1 Immigrant as a criminal threat/Finnish nation as a victim

One of the most prominent visibilities of coloniality in the data is the construction of the immigrant as a criminal threat, relying on a racialized dichotomy between immigrants as criminals and the Finnish nation and Finns as their innocent victims. Throughout the data, and in many different ways, immigrants are portrayed to be more prone to criminality than Finns, posing a threat to Finns. This sub-section will introduce and analyse the ways in which this criminal/victim dichotomy is constructed in the data.

To begin with, a rather blatant example of this juxtaposition is how, in the Finns Party immigration policy, the mere existence of undocumented migrants in Finland is criminalized. A sense of threat is constructed through statements such as: “it is completely unbearable that there are thousands of people on our streets whose identity or history no one knows” (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:7). Amplified choices of words, such as “completely unbearable” are used to emphasize the gravity of the situation, while words such as “our streets” are used to exclude undocumented migrants from the in-group, the Finns Party’s depiction of the Finnish nation. Another example of this sort of disparaging attitude towards undocumented migrants is how the word undocumented is in quotation marks in the policy (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:6). In addition to undocumented migrants, asylum seekers and especially asylum seekers that have been refused asylum are portrayed as serious threats in need of careful surveillance and systematic detention (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:6).

Along with the criminalization of the existence of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, the immigration policy constructs a juxtaposition between criminals and victims through stressing, without mentioning sources, that in contrast to Finns, foreigners are overrepresented in crime rates (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:4). Special emphasis is put on sex crimes, and especially on sex crimes towards children (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:4). The policy underlines that such

crimes are not individual cases but rather a result of migration policy (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:4).

Similarly to the Finns Party immigration policy, Riikka Purra also highlights crime rates in relation to immigration. For example, Purra tweeted “a reminder from Finland” on how people born abroad are overrepresented in cases of rape as well as in cases of sexual exploitations of a child, placing particular emphasis on countries of the Middle East and North Africa (Purra, 2022a).

This criminalization of immigrants through emphasizing such crime rates is a great example of coloniality of migration, as the discourse reproduces racialized dichotomies through portraying immigrants as inherently more prone to criminality in comparison to Finns (Chatterjee, 1993; Rodríguez, 2018:24-25). The choice to place particular emphasis on countries of the Middle East and North Africa really spells out the racialized thinking behind such statements. Furthermore, vilifying immigrants as sexual predators through focusing on sex crimes, rape and sexual exploitations of children greatly demonstrates the intertwined relationship between coloniality of migration and coloniality of gender. Similarly to what previous research has noted in relation to gender equality and the Nordic self-image (e.g. de los Reyes, Molina & Mulinari 2003; Keskinen *et al.* 2009; Keskinen, 2013:226; Norocel *et al.*, 2020:1), here a perception of Finland as peaceful, progressive and equal is advocated through a comparison to “bad patriarchies” located in migrant bodies and far away places.

The role of gender equality in nation building can also be seen in the way in which the Finns Party immigration policy criminalizes burkas and niqabs in the name of gender equality, as demonstrated in the following quote: “Burka and niqab scarves covering the face of women and scarves for little girls should be banned in order to protect secular social order, equality and children's rights” (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:8). As is common in far-right discourse, the notion of gender equality is used to control women and girls, and what they can and cannot wear, as well as to further

anti-immigration agendas. This is a great example of a discourse in which women's bodies, in this case how they are covered or not, turn into battlegrounds of nation building (Keskinen, 2009:258; Keskinen, 2016:107). However, burkas and niqabs are not the only aspect related to Islam that is criminalized in the Finns Party immigration policy. For example, while the party often goes to the extremes to "protect the freedom of speech" in instances of racist hate speech, the immigration policy stresses that "Islamic hate speech in mosques should not be allowed in Finland" and that "Islamic hate preachers must be deported immediately and the hate mosques closed" (Jungar, 2016:127-128; Walhbeck, 2016:581; Perussuomalaiset, 2019:8). Indeed, the immigration policy even defines "Islamic radicalism" as "the most acute internal security threat in Finland" (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:8).

Another example of the dichotomy between immigrants as criminal and Finns as their victims is how the policy asserts the "arrival" of terrorism to Finland to be "an entirely expected result of reckless immigration policy" (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:4). Portraying the arrival of terrorism in Finland to be a result of immigration not only depicts immigration and terrorism as new phenomena in Finland but also exposes who, according to the Finns Party, can and cannot be a terrorist. Through equating the label terrorist solely with immigrants, the policy reproduces the racialized stereotype of immigrant as a terrorist and ignores for example the increased threat of far-right terrorism in Finland (Suojelupoliisi, 2022). Purra does not directly mention terrorism in the data collection, but in a speech about family reunification Purra does reference the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service and states how loosening the family reunification laws would facilitate the entry of individuals threatening the national security of Finland, portraying reunification of family members as a national security threat to Finland (Purra, 2021a).

When it comes to the construction of Finns as the victims in the criminal/victim dichotomy, the following quote from the Finns Party immigration policy yields a great example:

“If the border policy is not fixed, the result will be a constant increase in control and supervision within our country. This means more and more concrete piglets in public places, guarding and controlling by the authorities - as in measures that restrict the freedoms and privacy of ordinary people” (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:6).

So, the policy argues that if the assumed threat caused by “loose” immigration policy is not controlled, increased control and surveillance within the country is required. Disturbingly, the policy uses the words “ordinary people”, presumably meaning Finnish citizens, to describe the victims of such increase in control and surveillance. Immigrants are not only excluded from this definition of “ordinary people” but, through this, also from the zone of humanity and thus pushed into the zone of sub-humanity (Maldonado-Torres, 2007:244; Maldonado-Torres, 2016:13, 19). Moreover, this is a great example of “politics of reversal” as the majority is portrayed as the discriminated and threatened group in the Finnish society (Keskinen, 2012:270).

Similar victimization is prominent in the discourses used by Purra as well, as exemplified with the following quote from one of Purra’s Facebook posts: “In Finland people are naive (direct translation: blue-eyed). Everything coming from the outside has been received with innocence. Welcome to Finland, we take care of you, trust you, help you and even turn our eyes away from obvious risks” (Purra, 2022b). The post also includes a picture of an angry dog, presumably depicting immigrants, chasing a scared human, presumably depicting the Finnish nation, and the text “it is easier to help those who do not threaten the security of the helper” (Purra, 2022b). This depiction of immigrant as an angry dog again demonstrates how immigrants are stripped away from their humanity and placed into the zone of sub-humanity (Maldonado-Torres, 2007:244; Maldonado-Torres, 2016:13, 19). Thus, in contrast to the construction of immigrants as a security threat, Finns are

constructed as naïve innocent victims blindly helping immigrants, no matter the consequences. Not only does this reproduce the logic of coloniality through the subhumanization and the criminal/victim dichotomy but also through constructing Finland as a white savior. Simultaneously, Purra, with a rather patronizing tone, sort of ridicules this assumed role of a savior to further her anti-immigration agenda.

Shifting the focus back to the construction of immigrant as a criminal, while the Finns Party immigration policy argues terrorism to be a result of reckless immigration policy, Purra argues that “gangs, like many other forms of criminality today, are largely the consequences of immigration” (Purra, 2022c). In relation to the driving forces behind gangs, Purra ignores the role of racism by straightforwardly specifying, in two different Facebook posts, that “it is not a matter of segregation but of choosing to move where money and power are most readily available” (Purra, 2022c; Purra, 2021b). Purra brings up such arguments regarding connections between gangs and immigration extensively in multiple other Facebook posts and tweets, including a Facebook post stressing that “street gangs, largely consisting of young people with a foreign background, are operating more and more extensively” (Purra, 2021b). As demonstrated in the above quotes, Purra views immigration as the reason behind gangs and “young people with a foreign background” as the majority members. This racialized labeling of immigrant youth as criminals becomes even more vivid when, Purra, in a Facebook post, discusses a video of a violent incident spreading online in which, in Purra’s words “a group of young people (with a foreign background) attack one (most likely Finnish) young person” (Purra, 2022d). In the Facebook post Purra describes her views on the reasons behind the attack in the following quote:

“But this is about mass migration from developing countries and the descendants of immigrants. On average, people coming from the Middle East and Africa do not integrate anywhere in the Western world. It is not about the failure of integration, the resources of the

police or corona. The point is that there are people in Finland who should not be here. And this is one essential indication of that” (Purra, 2022d).

As can be seen from the quote, Purra not only targets immigrants but specifically immigrants from developing countries, and, again, puts particular emphasis on the people from countries of the Middle-East and Africa. Here Purra also mentions the descendants of immigrants, revealing that the descendants of immigrants are excluded from the in-group as well. In terms of this quote, the coloniality of migration is not only visible in the accusations regarding the ties between criminality and immigrants from developing countries, but also in the portrayal of people from the Middle East and Africa as somehow inherently different and inferior by claiming them to be incapable of integrating anywhere in the Western world (Chatterjee, 1993; Rodríguez, 2018:24-25). In line with colonial logic, these arguments regarding the incapability to integrate construct a contrast between people from the Middle East and Africa and their descendants as “underdeveloped” and “uncivilized” in contrast to the “developed” and “civilized” people from the Western world and Finland.

Moreover, again, the blame and responsibility regarding criminality in Finland is pushed on to immigrants and their descendants, and Finns, in this case Finnish youth, are solely depicted as victims. This victimization is greatly demonstrated in the following quote:

“The safety of young people on our streets has been seriously jeopardized. It feels so horrible that such insecurity has been caused to our own young people by poor and ACTIVE immigration policy decisions. In their own country! Their free youth, in an otherwise safe country.

Girls at risk of harassment and sexual offenses. Boys at risk of being robbed and beaten.

My heart breaks when I think about it as a mother. My children are just that age” (Purra, 2022d).

In line with the previous quotes, immigration policy decisions are defined as the reasons behind insecurity. Furthermore, the phrase “in an otherwise safe country” puts the blame on immigrants by painting a picture that immigrants are the only source of insecurity in Finland. Again, phrases like “our streets”, “our own young people” and “in their own country” not only strengthen the victim narrative but also highlight the in-group and to exclude immigrants from this in-group. Purra describes her feelings regarding this with emotive phrases such as “it feels so horrible” and “my heart breaks”. The way in which Purra emphasizes her role as a mother and that her children are the same age, brings a deeper personal and emotional dimension to the text. It is also an interesting example of the intertwined relationship between coloniality of migration and coloniality of gender, as motherhood is used as a way to make the anti-immigration discourse more convincing. This intertwined relationship between coloniality of migration and coloniality of gender is visible also in how, again, the heightened risk of harassment and sexual offenses due to insecurity caused by immigration policy decisions is mentioned. Moreover, it is of importance to note how it states in the quote that only girls are at risk of sexual offenses, while boys are at risk of being robbed and beaten, reproducing harmful patriarchal stereotypes about who can and cannot be raped.

Similar victimization is visible also in one of Purra’s other Facebook posts, as exemplified below:

”At the same time, when our young people have to live in a reality where it is necessary to be afraid and careful, the other angle (in Finnish: toisesta tuutista) warns against being prejudiced and

blames for wrong thoughts and words. As that apparently creates unsafe spaces” (Purra, 2021b).

Here in addition to the victimization of Finnish youth in relation to gang violence, they are also victimized for being encouraged against prejudice and “wrong thoughts and words”. Thus, not only does this quote carry this sense of victimhood but also a sense of entitlement, an entitlement for prejudice.

When it comes to criminality and especially street violence, Purra often uses Sweden and its immigration policy as a warning example. An illuminating example of this is a tweet by the Finns Party that Purra retweeted, stating: “The road of Sweden must not be our road. The immigration policy must be guided by Finnish interests” (Perussuomalaiset, 2022). This text is paired with a picture of a person kicking a burning car and a text: “When integration does not work, repatriation is required. Finland must not walk the road of Sweden. We do not need burning police cars. The policy must change” (Perussuomalaiset, 2022). Purra uses similar, yet more detailed, rhetoric in one of her Facebook posts presented below:

“In Sweden, riots are again taking place. The rioters have a lot of similarities with Putin in their action logic: Only aggression and force matter. Örebro, Linköping, Norrköping - a few examples from recent days of what Finland has to avoid. Multiculturalism - when it means hauling people from developing countries to our countries, as it usually really means - is not suitable here. How can it still be unclear to many?” (Purra, 2022e).

What Purra fails to mention is how these instances of violence refers to started off as protests against the Swedish tour of a far-right Danish politician Rasmus Paludan, who has been jailed for racism and is known for burning the Quran in his events (BBC, 2020; BBC, 2022). Instead of taking into account what fuelled the events, Purra places the blame, once again, on immigrants from developing

countries through her definition of multiculturalism as “hauling people from developing countries”. Hyperbolic word choices, such as “hauling”, are used to emphasize the argued “looseness” of the Swedish immigration policy. Furthermore, to construct an even graver sense of a threat, Purra compares the “rioters” to Putin, one of the world’s most powerful leaders who recently started the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

All in all, as demonstrated with the above examples, the construction of a racialized dichotomy between immigrants as criminals and the Finnish nation as their victim is visible throughout the data, in a variety of ways, from criminalizing the mere existence of undocumented migrants to racialized depictions of gang related violence. Following the logic of coloniality, these exclusionary and dehumanizing constructions of the criminal/victim dichotomy were used not only to further the anti-immigration agenda of the party but also as a nation-building tool to highlight the exceptionality of the Finnish nation.

6.2 Immigrant as an economic strain/Finnish nation as a victim

Another prominent, if not the most prominent, observable implication of coloniality in the data is the racialized construction of immigrants as an economic strain to the Finnish nation. In contrast to the construction of immigrants as an economic strain, Finland and the Finnish nation are again portrayed as a victim. This constructed dichotomy of immigrants as an economic strain and Finnish nation as a victim is visible in many different aspects of the data. Thus, this sub-section will explore and analyse the different ways in which this economic strain/victim dichotomy is visible in the data.

To begin with, a lot of the Finns Party anti-immigration discourse concentrates on the economy, and especially the assumed negative consequences immigration has on it. When it comes to these consequences, the emphasis is often on social security.

Indeed, in a speech during a debate in the parliament, Purra stresses that “most of the costs of immigration come from social security expenses and services”, instead of direct costs such as reception costs and integration (Purra, 2021a). Purra further explains this argument in the following quote:

“On the one hand, the very high costs are due to low employment rates and wages, and on the other hand, due to significantly higher use of income transfers compared to the native population, even after a long stay in the country. This poor performance continues with the second generation as well, and the current integration has no effect on this” (Purra, 2021a).

As can be seen from the quote Purra stresses the social security expenses of immigrants to be due to low employment rates and wages as well as due to higher use of income transfers compared to the “native population”. Thus, through these arguments a dichotomy between immigrants and “native Finns”, in relation to economy, is constructed. Immigrants are portrayed as an economic burden and through this portrayal “native Finns” are portrayed not only as victims but as hardworking taxpayers. Purra also connects these arguments to the second generation, excluding them from the in-group as well. Bringing up the second generation also shows how the in-group is not tied to citizenship, even if you have lived in Finland all your life. Following colonial logic, this dichotomy is constructed in a capitalist and dehumanizing manner, as the worthiness of immigrants is measured in terms of their presumed productivity and economic benefits. Word choices such as “poor performance” strengthen this construction. This logic is also visible later on in the debate, when Purra states that “if you want to lure trained top professionals to the country, sure do so”, depicting trained top professionals as more acceptable immigrants due to the assumed economic benefits. Furthermore, by stating that integration has no effect, Purra washes her hands of any responsibility and places the blame and responsibility solely on the immigrants

and their descendants, depicting the low employment rates and wages as their own fault and ignoring for example the role of racist societal structures.

When it comes to this construction of immigrants as an economic strain, both the Finns Party immigration policy and Purra portray humanitarian immigration as particularly straining. This emphasis is greatly demonstrated through the following quote from the immigration policy:

“Those arriving in the context of humanitarian immigration are clearly more problematic than others in terms of their employment rate and overall net economic impact. The weakest nationalities from year to year are Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq - the countries from which Finland receives the most humanitarian immigrants. The impact of these groups on Finland's public finances is very negative - immigrants receive income transfers and use public services on average considerably more than they pay taxes”
(Perussuomalaiset, 2019:3-4)

As can be seen from the quote, through depicting humanitarian immigration as “more problematic” in terms of economic impact, a racialized dichotomy is constructed between immigrants within the context of humanitarian immigration the Finnish nation, providing a telling example of coloniality of migration. Coloniality of migration is particularly visible in the racist description of Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq as “the weakest nationalities”, giving the impression of Finland as somehow stronger or superior. Through this description, these nationalities are also defined as the most threatening. That being said, Finland is again portrayed as the victim, for example through arguing that “the impact of these groups on Finland’s public finances is very negative”.

Similarly to the Finns Party immigration policy, Purra also puts strong emphasis on humanitarian immigration. For example, in a speech opposing humanitarian

immigration in connection to family reunifications in particular, Purra stresses that due to a crisis in Finnish public finances, a responsible government would only take measures that support Finnish welfare, security and the country's economic recovery and argues that "accelerating and attracting humanitarian immigration is irresponsible and unfair to our own citizens and taxpayers" (Purra, 2021a). Thus, in addition to portraying humanitarian immigration as an economic strain to Finnish public finances, Purra victimizes specifically "our own citizens and taxpayers", simultaneously emphasizing the in-group.

In another speech, a speech Purra held when elected as the chair of the party, she states:

"We want changes to the border policy and the so-called humanitarian and social immigration. Under the current program, our target is 0 asylum seekers, as is the case with the Danish Social Democrat-led government" (Perussuomalaiset ev., 2021).

When introducing this target of 0 asylum seekers, a disturbing target that breaches the right to seek and enjoy asylum granted by the Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Purra refers to the current Finns Party immigration policy, showing the close connection between the policy and Purra's immigration discourse. Also, while Sweden is commonly used as a warning example, Denmark and its intensely strict immigration policy is commonly used as an example of a desirable goal, both by Purra, as seen in the above quote, and by the Finns Party immigration policy.

Another example of using Denmark as an example of a desirable goal, as well as an example of coloniality, is when Purra, in one of her Facebook posts, celebrates Denmark's aim to place asylum seekers seeking asylum in Denmark in Rwanda instead, meaning those seeking asylum and those granted asylum would be placed in Rwanda (Purra, 2022f). While this is deeply alarming in a myriad of ways, from

breaches of human rights to abuse of power relations, this following quote from the Facebook post provides an insightful example of coloniality in the in-group and out-group constructions in Purra's anti-immigration discourse:

“Once Denmark cannot be accessed, the number of fortune-seekers and asylum shoppers will drop dramatically. Who would want to go to Rwanda? Only someone who actually escapes personal persecution” (Purra, 2022f).

Purra depicts asylum seekers as “fortune-seekers” and “asylum shoppers”, gravely minimizing and ridiculing the urgency of their situation. This attitude is visible in the phrase “only someone who actually escapes personal persecution” as well, especially in the use of the word “actually” as it assumes that most asylum seekers lie about escaping personal persecution. Furthermore, the question “who would want to go to Rwanda?” positions Rwanda as inferior in comparison to Denmark, also exposing the malicious intent behind this aim and Purra's celebration of it. As Purra celebrates the Danish immigration policy as a desirable goal, it seems that Purra connects the same sense of superiority she grants Denmark to Finland as well.

In addition to celebrating Denmark's aim to place asylum seekers to Rwanda, Purra, as well as the Finns Party immigration policy, presents aid and local crisis management as an option to humanitarian immigration. In the immigration policy, this is defined to be more effective as “with smaller costs, larger numbers of people can be helped” (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:4). However, this contradicts with the practice of the party as simultaneously, the Finns Party rarely advocates for increasing development aid, actually quite the opposite, as the party often calls for decreasing development aid. For example, in their alternative budget for 2022, the Finns Party wanted to cut 520 million euros from development cooperation, the biggest cut in the whole budget (Perussuomalaiset, 2021). However, Purra does state in one of her speeches that the party would be willing to increase development

aid if humanitarian immigration is stopped, so development aid is used as a tool to push against humanitarian immigration and thus further the overall anti-immigration agenda of the party (Purra, 2021a).

Moreover, when it comes to Purra's negative attitude towards humanitarian immigration, a troubling example of coloniality is the striking contrast between Purra's arguments regarding immigrants from Afghanistan and Purra's arguments regarding immigrants from Ukraine, both groups repeatedly brought up in the data. Firstly, similarly to the immigration policy, Purra portrays humanitarian immigration from Afghanistan as a particularly serious threat to Finland. For example, when the situation escalated in Afghanistan in August 2021, Purra stated in a Facebook post that "the most significant threat to Finland in this acute situation is that significant flows of asylum seekers may and likely will move towards Europe" and expressed worries of 2015 happening again, referring to the so-called "immigration crisis" (Purra, 2021c). However, I would argue the similarity to be in the discourse, as similarly to the discourse around the 2015 "immigration crisis", Purra depicts Finland as the victim, not the asylum seekers.

In another Facebook post discussing a recommendation of the Minister of Interior to increase the refugee quota due to the situation in Afghanistan, Purra strongly disagreed, claiming that "humanitarian immigration is not a sustainable solution", opening her reasonings in the following quote:

"We know how much it costs us and what other problems it entails. Afghanistan is one of the most problematic countries of origin. Those who have come from the country are severely over-represented in terms of unemployment, exclusion, crime and many other negative things" (Purra, 2021d).

This quote is a clear example of how Purra defines Afghanistan to be particularly "problematic", not only economically, but also in terms of crime among other

things, demonstrating the intertwined relationship between the different sections of this analysis. In line with the immigration policy, Purra stresses the more “ethical” and “effective” solution to be supporting local crisis management, without any concrete plans or recommendations to increase its budget.

This particularly negative attitude towards immigrants from Afghanistan can also be seen in one of Purra’s tweets with a picture stating: “The admission of a thousand Afghans to Finland costs about 500 million in a lifecycle and up to a billion with family reunification. Is this why you pay taxes?” (Purra, 2022g). In addition to the text in the picture, the tweet stated:

“With a billion one could also hire 20,000 social and healthcare professionals a year. Life is about choices, politics in particular. If you too think that tax euros of Finns must be used for the benefit of Finns, vote for the Finns Party” (Purra, 2022g).

Again, specifically Afghan immigrants are highlighted as particularly straining to the Finnish economy. A discourse of Finland and the Finnish nation as victims is further constructed through focusing on tax, with an emphasis on “the tax euros of Finns”, and how those “must be used for the benefit of Finns”, putting on a pedestal the needs of those who fit in Purra’s narrow definition of a Finn. The claimed costs of Afghan immigrants are also pitted against costs for hiring social and healthcare professionals, as if a choice between the two needs to be made, creating a sense that the shortage of staff in the social and healthcare field is the fault of Afghan immigrants.

The construction of the Finnish nation as a victim of the claimed economic burden caused by Afghan immigrants is also visible in one of Purra’s speeches posted on the True Finns Youtube channel titled “Why Afghans, why not Finns?” (Suomen Uutiset - Perussuomalaiset, 2021). In the speech Purra argues that “once the situation in Afghanistan escalated, it has not been acceptable to talk about money

again” and that “everything is about worry, care, help, debt of honor, obligation and quick response” (Suomen Uutiset - Perussuomalaiset, 2021). Purra explains this argument further in the quote below:

“Parliament is convened in the middle of a break, politicians are competing over who is the most concerned, who is promising a larger refugee quota and more taxpayer money to help Afghans. We who bring different views to the debate and strive to recall facts and scale are condemned as cold, unpathetic, evil, and selfish. Why don’t we have the same competition to show concern and rush to solve our own problems? Why does not the state of health care, care for the elderly, the dissatisfaction and fatigue of caregivers, the alarming situation of police and other internal security, the problems of schools and child welfare, poverty and domestic suffering, compare, ever, to this” (Suomen Uutiset - Perussuomalaiset, 2021).

The depiction of the Finnish nation as a victim is constructed through asserting that the situation in Afghanistan and those fleeing from it receive special treatment from politicians in comparison to “our own problems”. The phrase “our own problems” accentuates the exclusivity of the Finnish nation as an in-group and depicts the situation in Afghanistan to be outside of this category of “our own problems”. Furthermore, by listing a long list of challenges Finland is facing, Purra claims that the situation in Afghanistan and those fleeing from it are prioritized over all of those issues, strengthening the depiction of the Finnish nation as the victim in all of this. In addition to depicting Finnish nation as the victim, Purra also depicts herself and others who “bring different views to the debate” as victims and simultaneously emphasizes themselves to be honest politicians brave enough to bring up the so-called “facts”. This portrayal of Purra and the Finns Party as the ones delivering the facts is visible also later on in the speech, when Purra asks why this supposedly “simple” and “completely logical” question will be frowned upon, and answers that “many parties have become detached from many facts, Finland and Finnishness,

and also because moralism and self-emphasis are the most important elements of modern politics”. This is interesting also in the sense that accusing others of moralism and self-emphasis seems rather contradictory and hypocritical after a speech focusing on how Finland should be focusing on its “own problems”.

In contrast to Purra’s discourse regarding humanitarian immigration from Afghanistan, Purra’s discourse on humanitarian immigration takes on a profoundly different tone in the context of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. As demonstrated with the example of Afghanistan, a significant part of Purra’s political discourse focuses on opposing humanitarian immigration. However, Purra’s attitude towards humanitarian immigration from Ukraine is remarkably more positive. The following quote from one of Purra’s Facebook posts greatly exemplifies this:

“Helping the Ukrainians is important. It is clear to most why such humanitarianism is in a completely different category than what Finland usually receives - young men selective of their destination arriving from thousands of kilometers away, who remain in the country regardless of the decision regarding their asylum application” (Purra, 2022h).

While humanitarian immigration from Afghanistan was depicted as particularly problematic, Purra depicts helping the Ukrainians as “important” and even as a “completely different category”. It is of significance to note as well that earlier in the post Purra emphasizes that “women and children are fleeing war from Ukraine” and that “the men remain to defend their country”, as the link between coloniality of gender and coloniality of migration becomes evident again (Purra, 2022h). Firstly, through emphasizing the ones fleeing from Ukraine to be women and children, Purra portrays them as more worthy of protection than the “young men from thousands of kilometers away”, as well as ignores women and children fleeing from elsewhere than Ukraine. Secondly, through celebrating the Ukrainian men

who remain to defend their country, Purra portrays them as superior to the “young men from thousands of kilometers away” seeking asylum. Both of these examples enforce positions of masculinity as superior and positions of femininity as inferior, through gendered and racialized hierarchies of who should be the protector and who should be protected.

Purra’s racialized double standards regarding the economic challenges of humanitarian immigration are also apparent later on in the Facebook post when she argues that due to poor state finances, worsened by the consequences of the war in Ukraine, the arrival of Ukrainian asylum seekers should reset the refugee quota for the on-going year of 2022, and the following year of 2023 (Purra, 2022h). Here Purra not only prioritizes Ukrainian asylum seekers, but also aims to use them as a racist tool to control humanitarian immigration from elsewhere. In a tweet discussing this plan to reset the refugee quota, Purra states that “responding to an acute situation is exactly what a refugee quota should be used for”, minimizing the acuteness of situations other than Ukraine and revealing the racially selective nature of her stance against humanitarian immigration and the goal of 0 asylum seekers (Purra, 2022i). This racial selectivity is particularly visible in another one of Purra’s tweets with the following question and statement:

“Did anyone really believe that this time, Europe's new instruments to help Ukrainians would not be misused - and to facilitate the passage of Middle East and Africa to Europe? That is exactly why we demand strict restrictions there” (Purra, 2022j).

This tweet greatly demonstrates how Ukrainian asylum seekers are defined to be worthy of Europe’s protection, while other asylum seekers, namely those from the Middle East and Africa, are condemned and in need of restrictions for doing the same, seeking asylum.

To sum up, with these examples, one can see that coloniality, as the racialized construction of immigrants as an economic strain to the Finnish nation, is a central component of both the Finns Party immigration policy and Purra's immigration discourse. While this economic strain/victim dichotomy appears in many different ways in the data, it was particularly visible in relation to social security and humanitarian immigration. In terms of humanitarian immigration, the striking differences in Purra's discourse regarding humanitarian immigration from Afghanistan and humanitarian immigration from Ukraine greatly illustrated the racialized double standards within her immigration discourse, providing an insightful example of coloniality.

6.3 Immigrant as a demographic threat/Finnish nation as a victim

When it comes to visibilities of coloniality in the data, a racialized construction of immigrants as a demographic threat to Finland and the Finnish nation is prominent in the Finns Party immigration policy as well as Purra's immigration discourse. As a contrast to this construction of immigrant as a demographic threat, a depiction of Finnish nation as a victim is constructed again, forming the demographic threat/victim dichotomy. With that in mind, this sub-section will explore the ways in which this dichotomy is found in the data.

In the Finns Party immigration policy, a section titled "Alarming demographic change" is devoted to the party's concerns regarding immigration and demographic change (Perussuomalaiset 2019:3). Already the title and the word "alarming" gives away that the party considers demographic change as a threat. Below that title, the policy expresses the party's worries about an increase in immigrants and foreign speakers, especially in the capital area, and presents "official predictions", without mentioning specific sources (Perussuomalaiset 2019:3). One such prediction claims that in Espoo, a city right next to the capital Helsinki, the amount of foreign speakers will exceed 50% in 2053, and that the majority would be speaking African and Asian languages (Perussuomalaiset 2019:3).

The policy goes on to emphasize this phenomenon among children and youth:

“The figures are even more dramatic when looking at children and youth. The lower the birth rate of Finns, the higher the proportion of children born to people with an immigrant background. For example, 35% of Somalis currently living in the country are aged 0-14” (Perussuomalaiset 2019:3).

This quote again shows how in addition to excluding immigrants from the in-group, even children born to people with an immigrant background are excluded from the in-group. In addition to excluding children born to people with an immigrant background, coloniality of migration is pervasive in the way in which the policy disturbingly portrays them as particularly threatening demographically, using children with a Somali background as an example.

In sync with the Finns Party immigration policy, Purra highlights similar concerns in relation to demographic change. The following quote from a speech Purra held when elected greatly exemplifies this:

“And yes, we are also concerned about demographic change. For example, in about 15 years, one third of Espoo's residents will be foreign speakers. The largest groups will be Asian, North African and Middle Eastern people. Or that in about 2053, Finns will be a minority in Espoo. I am convinced that most Finns do not like this development. Another thing is whether they dare to say it out loud or whether they dare to comment on it at all knowing what will happen to them. For demographic reasons alone, restricting immigration is essential, as newcomers never run out (applause)” (Perussuomalaiset ev., 2021)

As demonstrated by the above quote, Purra too considers demographic change a serious threat, and that demographic change alone is enough of a reason to further restrict immigration. Similarly to the immigration policy, Purra also uses predictions of demographic changes in Espoo as an example to demonstrate her concerns. Purra's inherently racist concern that in Espoo Asian, North African and Middle Eastern people will become the majority, and that Finns will become a minority shows how, according to Purra, people from the above-mentioned countries are not considered as Finns. This depiction of Finns as a minority also ties in with one of Purra's other speeches in which she states that "a Finn should not feel like a foreigner in their own country". The statement victimizes Finns and in it the phrase "their own country" emphasizes the in-group and reminds of its exclusiveness and exceptionality.

Furthermore, Purra's negative attitude towards such demographic changes is particularly spelled out in how she is "convinced that most Finns do not like this development" even if they do not "dare to say it out loud". Through these statements Purra claims that her attitude is shared by "most Finns" and positions herself as the "defender of the majority" as well as the brave spokesperson of those too afraid to comment due to apparently known consequences (Wahlbeck, 2016:575). These statements not only portray "Finns" as victims of demographic change but also those who oppose such changes as victims and Purra as the defender of these perceived victims.

A similar attitude towards the public opinion regarding demographic change can be found in one of Purra's Facebook posts, as exemplified with the quote below:

"When I have tweeted on the subject a few times in the last few days, a queue of those who resign from the problem forms under the tweets. In their opinion, the decline of Finns in their own country is not at all problematic. I don't understand why they sign up under

my tweets. Their wish is coming true and the matter is progressing at a rapid pace, so they should be delighted. Instead, the majority of us find many problems in it” (Purra, 2022k).

In the quote Purra continues to insist that the majority agrees with her arguments on demographic change regardless of the queues of people on Twitter opposing her argument. Demographic change, however this time described as “the decline of Finns in their own country”, is again portrayed as a problem, a threat, and Purra again positions herself as the “defender of the majority” opposing such change. Something else that is repeated as well is the excluding phrase “their own country” (Wahlbeck, 2016:575).

As with the construction of immigrant as a criminal threat, Sweden is used as a warning example in terms of this construction of immigrant as a demographic threat as well. The Finns Party immigration policy states that Sweden is a warning example of direct demographic change, because from the population of 10 million, roughly 8 million have been born in Sweden (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:3). While this positioning of Sweden as a warning example due to increasing numbers of immigrants already serves as an example of coloniality of migration, coloniality of migration is particularly explicit in the further explanation of this argument, demonstrated by the following quote:

“Noteworthy is the pace of change and changes in the backgrounds of newcomers. In 1990, Finns made up almost a third of those born abroad. In 2017, Syrians had become the largest group. Other notable groups include Somalis, Turks, Afghans, Eritreans and Indians” (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:3)

Here coloniality of migration is particularly explicit in the way in which the policy puts emphasis on the changes in the backgrounds of newcomers. Finnish immigrants are portrayed as less threatening compared to Syrians, Somalis, Turks,

Afghans, Eritreans and Indians, exposing the racialized foundation of the construction of immigrant as a demographic threat. In other words, it seems that the perceived threat of demographic change is less about immigration per se and more about a racial hierarchy regarding the background of the immigrants.

The policy uses similar discourse in the Finnish context as well, by stressing that *“the future of Finland also looks much less Finnish than what it does now”*, using increasing numbers of people with an Iraqi background as an example (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:3). The policy then asserts that *“for demographic reasons alone, restricting immigration is essential, as newcomers never run out”*, an identical statement to what Purra stated in her speech when elected, as mentioned previously (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:3). According to this racialized understanding of Finnishness, increasing numbers of people with an immigrant background decreases the level of Finnishness in Finland, and thus poses a threat to Finnishness. This aspiration towards a monoculture of the past presumes as if such a thing ever existed in Finland and portrays migration as something new and external to Finnish history, ignoring Finland’s history of colonialism-migration and exile (Rodríguez, 2018:19, 23-24). Nevertheless, these quotes greatly exemplify how, in line with the logic of coloniality, the idea of immigrant as a demographic threat is constructed and used as a tool to further the anti-immigration agenda of the Finns Party.

After exploring the different ways in which the demographic threat/victim dichotomy is visible in the data, one can see that it is a significant aspect of both the Finns Party immigration policy and Purra’s anti-immigration discourse. Indeed, both the policy and Purra argued that immigration should be restricted even for demographic reasons alone. Coloniality was particularly evident in how the urgency of the claimed demographic threat is based on a racial hierarchy regarding the background of immigrants. Finnish nation, and particularly those Finns who oppose demographic change in Finland, were portrayed as victims and Purra as their defender. Overall, the demographic threat/victim dichotomy is utilized as a tool to

further the wider anti-immigration agenda as well as nation-building tool, through emphasizing the perceived exclusiveness and exceptionality of the Finnish nation.

6.4 Cultural inferiority of immigrants/Cultural superiority of the Finnish nation

The last but not least prominent visibility of coloniality in the data is the construction of the cultural inferiority of immigrants. Throughout the data, the construction of the cultural inferiority of immigrants prevails and is used to, again, portray immigrants as a threat, this time in the context of culture. This construction relies not only on a contrasting construction Finnish nation as a victim but also on a contrasting construction of the cultural superiority of the Finnish nation, forming the cultural inferiority/cultural superiority dichotomy. Thus, this sub-section is focused on investigating the variety of ways in which this dichotomy appears in the Finns Party immigration policy and Riikka Purra's immigration discourse.

To begin with, the Finns Party immigration policy asserts that cultural background affects integration in a way that “immigrants whose group identity – for example in terms of culture, religion or language – is particularly strong, integrate and find employment worse than those who do not” (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:4). Without providing any context of why such a thing might occur, one example being the pervasive ethnic discrimination in the Finnish labour market, strong group identity is straightforwardly depicted as a problem and a threat (Ahmad, 2019). Indeed, the policy argues that the above argument should act as “a strong criticism towards integration and diversity policy emphasizing multiculturalism”, emphasizing their strongly anti-multiculturalist stance (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:4).

Furthermore, the Finns Party immigration policy boldly claims that regardless of opposing arguments “Finland has followed a one-way integration method, where the receiving society step by step submits to the values, wishes and demands of

immigrants from foreign cultures” (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:8). This profound victimization of Finns is another illustrating example of politics of reversal as the majority is depicted as the discriminated and threatened group, forced to submit to the values, wishes and demands of the minority (Keskinen, 2012:270). The reversal logic behind this claim becomes particularly clear once one takes into account the 2018 “Being Black in the EU” study, carried out by The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, according to which Finland is amongst the most racist countries in the EU (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2018). According to the study, Finland had the highest rates of racial harassment, which was 63 percent, as well as of racial violence, which was 5 % (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2018).

This victimization is apparent in both the Finns Party immigration policy and Purra’s immigration discourse. In terms of Purra’s immigration discourse, a great example is one of her tweets discussing Finnish healthcare system, arguing the following:

“It is ridiculous that Finnish elderly and other patients in Finland in the 2020s are no longer worthy of being helped in their own language, but at the same time the interpretation and other guardianship services received by the immigrants themselves are being improved” (Purra, 20221).

Purra portrays Finnish elderly and other patients as the discriminated group while immigrants are portrayed as the more privileged group, for receiving interpretation and guardianship services. The word choice “ridiculous” further amplifies this victim perception. The Finns Party immigration policy on the other hand argues that the claimed submission is particularly prevalent when it comes to immigrants with a Muslim background, as can be seen from the following quote:

“...especially for immigrants with a Muslim background, numerous exemptions have been tailored under the guise of special characteristics of minority cultures. At the same time, Finns are trained with a hard hand to act in a way that pleases the newcomers” (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:8)

Here immigrants, and especially immigrants with a Muslim background are, in line with the reverse logic of politics of reversal, portrayed as a privileged group with exemptions in the Finnish society, while Finns are victimized for having to “please” the newcomers. As examples of exemptions, the policy uses a custom to organize separate swimming hall shifts for Muslim women as well as the censoring of school Christmas parties. The policy goes on to even state that these exemptions have led to Islamization of the Finnish society, as demonstrated with the quote below:

“Although these practices have been justified by the ideal of multiculturalism, the end result has meant that Finnish society begins to converge with inflexible Islamic traditions, i.e. it becomes Islamized” (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:8)

Not only does this quote demonstrate the party’s argument regarding the Islamization of Finnish society, it also demonstrates how Islamic traditions, and thus Islam, are viewed by the party. In a rather hypocritical manner the policy describes Islamic traditions as inflexible, while simultaneously strongly problematizing any “submission” to the values and wishes of immigrants or any “exemptions” for immigrants, such as the occasional swimming hall shifts. Thus this portrayal of Islamic traditions as inflexible greatly exemplifies the cultural inferiority/cultural superiority dichotomy, as the portrayal of Islamic traditions as inflexible assumes Finnish traditions to be more flexible.

This cultural inferiority/cultural superiority dichotomy becomes even more visible when the policy later on stresses that “of particular concern is the breakdown of

equality and the emergence of demands that belittle and oppress women and girls” and asserts that “cultural and religious abuses against children, animals or, for example, sexual minorities, do not belong to developed Finland” (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:8). With the help of these colonial stereotypes portraying immigrants, and especially Muslim immigrants, as oppressing disruptors of equality who culturally and religiously abuse children, animals and sexual minorities, Finland is depicted as “developed” and thus culturally superior, as if immigrants are the reason behind gender inequality issues in Finland. Ironically, immigrants are blamed for gender inequality issues rooted in the forced universalization of a European heterosexualist gender binary (Lugones, 2008:15). This greatly exemplifies the intertwined relationship between the coloniality of migration and coloniality of gender, as masculinity is understood as violent and inferior here only once racialized as non-white (Lugones, 2008:15). Furthermore, these concerns regarding gender equality and sexual minorities, strongly contradict the remaining discourse and practice of the party as, outside of immigration discourse, the party is rather known for loudly opposing such values. For example, the Finns Party opposed the gender neutral marriage law and even gave a notice to the three members who voted for the law, and has for years been hindering a law reform regarding gender self-identification, further revealing the artificial and tactical nature behind these concerns (Pilke, 2017; Valkama, 2020).

This tactical use of the notion of gender equality is evident also in Purra’s immigration discourse, particularly in relation to Afghanistan. In one of her Facebook posts discussing the fall of Kabul in August 2021, Purra argues the following:

“... the state and the culture seem to be unable, alone or even with strong help, to develop in such a way that people, especially women and children, would feel good and safe in the country. This is a fact, but it cannot be fixed by Finland or other Western countries” (Purra, 2021c).

The way in which Purra, with confidence, assumes that, no matter the amount of help provided, Afghanistan is “unable” to develop into a safe country for women and children, reproduces the logic of coloniality through racialized dichotomies based on colonial discourses of the “Other” as fundamentally different and inherently inferior (Chatterjee, 1993; Rodríguez, 2018:24-25). This claimed inability to develop is even presented as an unchangeable fact, which adds to this construction of inherent cultural inferiority. In contrast, Purra assumes not only Finland, but also other Western countries as culturally superior in contrast to Afghanistan, further demonstrating the racialization of the cultural inferiority/cultural superiority dichotomy. This sense of cultural superiority in comparison to Afghanistan is also blatantly visible in the following quote from one of Purra’s Twitter posts discussing a Youtube show Purra was a guest in:

“Breaking! Purra thinks that Finnish culture is better than Afghan culture. This fact should not surprise anyone. But maybe such things are not so clear anymore in today's upside down world (direct translation: somersault world)” (Purra, 2021e).

Here Purra directly expresses the perceived cultural superiority of Finland and simultaneously the perceived cultural inferiority of Afghanistan, and by stating that her argument should not surprise anyone, she depicts it as something obvious. This arrogance, again, builds on to the colonial construction of the “Other” as fundamentally different and inherently inferior (Chatterjee, 1993; Rodríguez, 2018:24-25).

In line with this perceived superiority of Finnish culture and the strong anti-multiculturalist stance expressed in the data, the policy asserts that “Finland must give up the idea, that active support from public authorities towards value and norm systems that are in conflict with Finnish culture would be a sustainable starting point for the harmonious coexistence of different population groups” and that

“instead of emphasizing and celebrating the factors that separate different population groups in integration policy, a shared Finnish national identity must be taken as the ideal” (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:9). These quotes from a section of the policy titled “Maassa maan tavalla”, which is a Finnish equivalent for the saying “When in Rome, do as the Romans do”, understand Finnish culture to be in conflict with the value and norm systems of immigrants and as a response call for “a shared Finnish national identity”, as in assimilation (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:9).

This call for assimilation gets even louder when the Finns Party immigration policy claims that “based on this principle, every person living in Finland has the opportunity to become sufficiently Finnish, as long as they adopt Finnish culture and rules of the game” and that “if the immigrant does not want to adopt Finland's Western Christian, humanist and egalitarian value base, it is better for them to move to a country where they can fulfill themselves without restrictions” (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:9). This reveals how the ideal of a shared Finnish national identity is more of a requirement of forced assimilation, but it also reveals how even if immigrants would “adopt the Finnish culture and rules of the game” they could only become “sufficiently Finnish” in the eyes of the Finns Party, emphasizing the perceived exceptionality of Finnishness. In addition to this requirement of forced assimilation, the assumed superiority of Finnish culture shines through from the description of Finnish value base as Western Christian, humanist and egalitarian.

This forced assimilation as a requirement is prevalent in the Finns Party immigration policy also in connection to schools and students with an immigrant background, as exemplified with the quote below:

“In schools, learning difficulties and disruptive behavior of students with an immigrant background must be strongly addressed. Students with foreign backgrounds who do not know the language and who

cause disturbances should be placed in their own classes to learn Finnish and Finnish customs” (Perussuomalaiset, 2019:8).

So, not only does the policy expect assimilation from students with an immigrant background, it also demonizes them through portraying them as burdens and disturbances in the classroom. Coloniality is also persistent in the desired response of placing students with foreign backgrounds “who do not know the language” and “who cause disturbances” in their own classes to “learn Finnish and Finnish customs”. Indeed, this assimilatory response bears strong resemblance to the assimilatory state politics towards the Sámi and Roma children in the post-independence era Finland, as Sámi children were forced to attend boarding schools where Finnish language and culture was imposed on them and Roma children were strategically taken into custody and placed in children’s homes (Keskinen, 2019:175; Keskinen, 2021:82). Thus, this greatly demonstrates the continuation of colonial strategies in Finnish politics.

Furthermore, the perceived superiority of Finnishness appears in the data in the nationalist desire to emphasize the assumed exceptionality of Finnishness. For example, in the speech Purra held when elected she states how she believes that in 2022, “a healthy backlash against the denial of the exceptionality of Finland and Finnishness as well as against various identity-political developments, such as woke-culture and so-called canceling, will strengthen even more” (Perussuomalaiset ev., 2021). Similarly to the construction of immigrants as a demographic threat, Purra stresses how “many people are really fed up, but not everyone dares to say it” as “at worst, stating an opinion or even facts can result in an activist organized social-media hunt and loss of job and livelihood” (Perussuomalaiset ev., 2021). So, in addition to embracing the perceived exceptionality of Finland and Finnishness, those who do are victimized and Purra again takes the role as their spokesperson.

This perceived exceptionality of Finland and Finnishness persists when Purra goes on to say that a “broader cultural change” to “take back Finland (“Suomi takaisin”) does not mean a sack on the head” but “being able to open your eyes to see the facts and appreciate what has been achieved” and concludes that “Finland must strive for a better national self-esteem” (Perussuomalaiset ev., 2021). Here the sense of exceptionality is particularly visible in the call for a better national self-esteem and the phrase “take back Finland”. The phrase “take back Finland”, also known as the slogan of the Finns Party, strongly resembles other far-right populist discourse and slogans, such as Trump’s “Make America Great Again” slogan and the Brexit slogan “Take Back Control”. Indeed, as mentioned in the previous research section, this sort of nostalgia and sentimental longing of the past used by Purra and the Finns Party is a common communication tool used by far-right populists to further their political agendas, here in the name of “bettering Finland’s national self-esteem” (Menke, Wulf, 2021; Silvennoinen, 2017).

All in all, investigating how coloniality, in the form of the cultural inferiority/cultural superiority dichotomy, appears in the data revealed its many visibilities as well as its centrality to both the Finns Party immigration policy and Purra’s immigration discourse. While the construction of cultural inferiority was prevalent in the portrayal of strong group identity as a threat and a problem, the construction of cultural superiority was prevalent in the portrayal of Finnish society as a victim forced to submit to the values, wishes and demands of immigrants. With the cultural inferiority/cultural superiority dichotomy, coloniality was particularly visible in relation to the notion of gender equality through the vilification of Muslim and Afghan culture. This dichotomy was also visible in the assimilatory state politics reminiscent of the past as well as in the nationalist desire to emphasize the assumed exceptionality of Finnishness with the help of using nostalgia as a tool to further the political agenda.

7 Conclusions

This final section will provide a summary of the findings, reflect on the contributions of this research and consider suggestions for future research.

The aim of this research was to explore the visibilities of coloniality in the immigration discourse of the populist far-right Finns Party and their leader Riikka Purra, with the guidance of the following research question: *How is coloniality visible in the in-group and out-group constructions in the immigration discourse of the Finns Party and their current leader Riikka Purra?* Using Fairclough's CDA and a theoretical framework based on decolonial theory, this research explored the visibilities of coloniality in the most recent Finns Party immigration policy from 2019 as well as in Riikka Purra's speeches, Facebook posts and tweets on immigration as the chair of the party. CDA, with its emphasis on the connection between discourse and unequal power relations, meshed rather seamlessly with the decolonial theoretical framework, and together they enabled this research to successfully capture the visibilities of coloniality in the immigration discourse of the Finns Party and Riikka Purra.

The analysis was structured to thematic categories according to the most evident dichotomic colonial hierarchies found in the data, namely: immigrant as a criminal threat/Finnish nation as a victim, immigrant as an economic strain/Finnish nation as a victim, immigrant as a demographic threat/Finnish nation as a victim and cultural inferiority of immigrants/cultural superiority of the Finnish nation.

Firstly, to begin with the summary of the findings, the dichotomy of immigrant as a criminal threat/Finnish nation as a victim appeared in many forms in the data, from the criminalization of the mere existence of undocumented migrants to the vilification of immigrant as a sexual predator. Indeed, this vilification of immigrant as a sexual predator greatly exemplified the entangled relationship between coloniality of migration and coloniality of gender, and how the notion of gender

equality is used to enhance the self image of the Finnish nation and to further the anti-immigration agenda. In terms of the dichotomy of immigrant as a criminal threat/Finnish nation, Purra's discourse was particularly focused on gang violence as a consequence of immigration. When it comes to Purra's discourse on gang violence, an interesting finding, that also exemplifies the entangled relationship between coloniality of migration and coloniality of gender, was how Purra used her role as a mother to emphasize the victimhood of the Finnish nation and to push her anti-immigration agenda forward.

Secondly, the dichotomy of immigrant as an economic strain/Finnish nation as a victim was very prevalent in the data, as a significant amount of the Finns Party immigration discourse focused on assumed negative economic consequences of immigration, especially in relation to social security. Immigrants were portrayed as an economic strain to the Finnish nation while Finns were portrayed, not only as victims, but also as hard working taxpayers. The data also emphasized this in relation to second generation immigrants, exposing how the in-group is not tied to citizenship, even if you have lived in Finland all your life. In line with colonial logic, this dichotomy reproduced a dehumanizing capitalist value system, as the worthiness of an immigrant was measured in terms of their presumed productivity and economic benefits. Moreover, both the Finns Party immigration policy and Purra portrayed humanitarian immigration to be particularly straining. Concerning humanitarian immigration, the sharp difference in Purra's discourse regarding humanitarian immigration from Afghanistan and humanitarian immigration from Ukraine vividly demonstrated the racialized double standards within her immigration discourse and thus provided a telling example of coloniality.

Thirdly, the dichotomy of immigrant as a demographic threat/Finnish nation as a victim was a central aspect of the immigration discourse of the Finns Party and Purra. The centrality is greatly demonstrated by how both the Finns Party immigration policy and Purra stressed that immigration should be restricted for demographic reasons alone. With demographic reasons they refer to increasing

numbers of immigrants and foreign speakers, especially in the capital area, portraying the claimed demographic changes as a threat to the Finnish nation. With this dichotomy, again, not only immigrants were excluded from the in-group but also children born to people with an immigrant background, and indeed children and youth were even portrayed as particularly threatening. An especially explicit example of coloniality was how the immigration policy, using Sweden as an example, problematized changes in the backgrounds of newcomers. Finnish immigrants were understood as less threatening compared to Syrians, Somalis, Turks, Afghans, Eritreans and Indians, revealing the racialized hierarchy rooted in the construction of immigrant as a demographic threat.

Lastly, the dichotomy of cultural inferiority of immigrants/cultural superiority of the Finnish nation emerged in the data in a multitude of ways, from slightly more “subtle” expressions to unequivocally asserting Finnish culture as superior in comparison to Afghan culture. When it comes to the cultural inferiority/cultural superiority dichotomy, coloniality was exceptionally evident in connection to the notion of gender equality, as masculinity was understood as violent and inferior only once racialized as non-white, providing yet another example of the intertwined relationship between coloniality of migration and coloniality of gender. Forced assimilation was another pervasive visibility of coloniality in terms of the cultural inferiority/cultural superiority dichotomy, especially in the assimilatory state politics towards immigrant children reminiscent of the assimilatory state politics towards the Sámi and Roma children in the post-independence era Finland. The construction of the cultural superiority of the Finnish nation was also apparent in the nationalist desire to highlight the assumed exceptionality of Finnishness by using nostalgia, in this case in the form of the Finns Party slogan “take back Finland” (Suomi takaisin), as a tool to further the overall political agenda.

With these findings, this research contributes to the already existing research both on coloniality in Nordic identity constructions as well on the immigration discourse of the Finns Party. By connecting these two research areas, this research

participated in bringing these two research areas closer together. Moreover, the focus on Riikka Purra provided a necessary and current angle to the research on immigration discourse of the Finns Party, as it has previously mostly focused on the former chair of the party, Jussi Halla-Aho.

Due to limitations regarding space and scope, this research could not dive as deep into all the findings as I as the researcher would have preferred. Therefore, in terms of future research, it would be interesting to devote a study to a specific finding from this research, one such example being coloniality in Purra's discourse regarding street violence. On the other hand, it would be interesting to further explore the visibilities of coloniality in the data by investigating any additional colonial hierarchies found in the data. Furthermore, as here the most recent Finns Party immigration policy from 2019 was used as part of the data, it could be insightful to repeat a similar study once a new Finns Party immigration policy is published, in order to explore the connections and disparities between the two. However, while racialized anti-immigration discourse is usually associated with far-right parties, such as the Finns Party, they are not the only ones guilty of such discourse within the political arena, and thus I would be curious to investigate the visibilities of coloniality in the immigration discourse of other Finnish political parties, such as the liberal-conservative party the National Coalition (in Finnish: Kokoomus). All in all, decolonial research interrupting and challenging the enduring colonial power structures entwined in immigration discourse and elsewhere is immensely needed, especially in Finland, a country with a colonial past and present that is still continuously denied and ignored.

8 Bibliography

Aaltonen, J. (2021). *Riikka Purra piti linjapuheessaan maahanmuuttopolitiikkaa hallitukseen menemisen kynnyskysymyksenä*, Helsingin Sanomat.

Ahmad, A. (2019). When the Name Matters: An Experimental Investigation of Ethnic Discrimination in the Finnish Labor Market, *Sociological Inquiry*, 90 (3), pp. 468-496.

Arter, D. (2010). The Breakthrough of Another West European Populist Radical Right Party? The Case of the True Finns, *Government and Opposition*, 45 (4), pp. 484–504.

BBC. (2020). *Danish far-right leader Paludan jailed for racism*. BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53185194>

BBC. (2022). *Dozens arrested at Sweden riots sparked by planned Quran burnings*. BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61134734>

Bhambra, G. K. (2014). Postcolonial and decolonial dialogues, *Postcolonial Studies*, 17(2), pp. 115-121.

Bhaskar, R. (1975). *A Realist Theory of Science*. Routledge.

Browning, C. (2007). Branding Nordicity. Models, Identity and the Decline of Exceptionalism in *Cooperation and Conflict*, 42(1), pp. 27-51.

Burr, V. (1995). *An introduction to social constructionism*. Taylor & Frances/Routledge.

Chatterjee, P. (1993). *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History.

DeLong, R.D. (2009). Danish Military Involvement in the Invasion of Iraq in Light of the Scandinavian International Relations. *Scandinavian Studies*, 81(3), pp. 367-80.

de los Reyes, P., Molina, I. & Mulinari, D. (2003). *Maktens (o)lika förklädnader*, Atlas, Stockholm.

European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. (2018). *Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey: Being Black in the EU*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

Fairclough, N. (1995). *Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language*. Longman Group Limited.

Goldberg, D. (2002). *The Racial State*. Wiley.

Griffin, R. (1991). *The Nature of Fascism*. Pinters Publisher Ltd.

Haraway, D. (1988). Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, *Feminist Studies*, 14(3), pp. 575-599.

Hatakka, N. (2016). When logics of party politics and online activism collide: The populist Finns Party's identity under negotiation in *New Media and Society*, 19 (12).

Horsti, K. (2015). Techno-cultural opportunities: the anti-immigration movement in the Finnish mediascape in *Patterns of Prejudice*, 49(4), pp.343-366.

Jørgensen, M. & Phillips, L. J. (2002). *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*. SAGE Publications.

Jungar AC. (2016). From the mainstream to the margin? The radicalisation of the True Finns in *Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe*. London: Routledge, pp.113–143.

Keskinen, S. (2009). Pelkkiä ongelmia? Maahanmuutto poliittisen keskustelun kohteena in *En ole rasisti, mutta... : Maahanmuutosta, monikulttuurisuudesta ja kritiikistä*. Vastapaino, pp.33-45.

Keskinen, S., Rastas, A., Tuori, S. (2009). *En ole rasisti, mutta... : Maahanmuutosta, monikulttuurisuudesta ja kritiikistä*. Vastapaino.

Keskinen, S. (2012). Limits to Speech? The Racialised Politics of Gendered Violence in Denmark and Finland in *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 33:3, pp. 261-272.

Keskinen, S. (2013). Antifeminism and White Identity Politics: Political antagonisms in radical right-wing populist and anti-immigration rhetoric in Finland. *Nordic Journal of Migration Research*, 3(4), pp.225–232.

Keskinen, S., Näre, L., & Tuori, S. (2015). Valkoisuusnormi, rodullistamisen kritiikki ja sukupuoli in *Sukupuolentutkimus*, 28(4), pp. 2-5.

Keskinen, S.; Tuori, S.; Irni, S. & Mulinari, D. (2016). *Complying with Colonialism: Gender, Race and Ethnicity in the Nordic Region*. Routledge.

Keskinen, S. (2019). “Intra-Nordic Differences, Colonial/Racial Histories, and National Narratives: Rewriting Finnish History”, *Scandinavian Studies* , Vol. 91, No. 1-2, Nordic Colonialisms (Spring/Summer 2019), pp. 163-181.

Keskinen, S., Skaptadóttir, U.D., Toivanen, M. (2019). *Undoing Homogeneity in the Nordic Region: Migration, Difference, and the Politics of Solidarity*. Routledge.

Keskinen, S. (2021). Kolonialismin ja rasismien historiaa Suomesta käsin, *Rasismi, Valta ja Vastarinta: Rodullistaminen, Valkoisuus ja Koloniaalisuus Suomessa*. Gaudeamus.

Keskinen, S., Mkwesha, F., Seikkula, M. (2021). Teoreettisen keskustelun avaimet - rasismi, valkoisuus ja koloniaalisuuden purkaminen, *Rasismi, Valta ja Vastarinta*. Gaudeamus.

- Kinnvall, C. (2016). "The Postcolonial has Moved into Europe: Bordering, security and ethno- cultural belonging", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54(1): 152-168.
- Koivisto, M. (2021). *Kuka on perussuomalaisten puheenjohtajaehdokka Riikka Purra? Aloitti työnsä puolueessa keskellä kaaosta, teini-iän kokemukset vaikuttivat ajatuksiin maahanmuutosta*, Yle Uutiset.
- Loftsdóttir, K. & Jensen, L. (2016). *Whiteness and Postcolonialism in the Nordic Region: Exceptionalism, Migrant Others and National Identities*. Routledge.
- Lugones, M. (2007). Heterosexualism and the colonial/modern gender system, *Hypatia*, 22(1), pp. 186-219.
- Lugones, M. (2008). The Coloniality of Gender, *Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise*, pp. 1-17.
- Maldonado-Torres, N. (2007). On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept, *Cultural Studies*, 21(2-3), pp. 240-270.
- Maldonado-Torres, N. (2016). Outline of Ten Theses on Coloniality and Decoloniality, *Fondation Frantz Fanon*.
- Menke, M., Wulf, T. (2021). The Dark Side of Inspirational Pasts: An Investigation of Nostalgia in Right-wing Populist Communication, *Media and Communication*, 9 (2), pp.237-249.
- Mignolo, W. (2007). Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-coloniality, *Cultural Studies*, 21(2), pp. 449-514.
- Mignolo, W. & Walsh, C. (2018). *On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Nortio, E., Niska, M., Renvik T.A., Jasinskaja-Lahti, I. (2020). ‘The nightmare of multiculturalism’: Interpreting and deploying anti-immigration rhetoric in social media, *New Media and Society*, 23(3), pp. 438-456.

Norocel, O. C., Saresma, T., Lähdesmäki, T., & Ruotsalainen, M. (2020). Performing ‘us’ and ‘other’ : Intersectional analyses of right-wing populist media, *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, OnlineFirst. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1367549420980002>.

Ojala, C. & Nordin J. M. (2019). “Mapping Land and People in the North: Early Modern Colonial Expansion, Exploitation, and Knowledge”, *Scandinavian Studies* 91 (1–2): 98.

Palmberg, M. (2009). Nordic Colonial Mind in *Complying with Colonialism: Gender, Race and Ethnicity in the Nordic Region*. Routledge.

Perussuomalaiset. (2019). *Perussuomalainen Maahanmuuttopolitiikka*. Perussuomalaiset. <https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Maahanmuuttopoliittinen-ohjelma-2019.pdf>

Perussuomalaiset. (2021). *Vaihtoehtobudjetti 2022*. Suomen Uutiset. https://www.suomenuutiset.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Perussuomalaisten-vaihtoehtobudjetti-2022_aukeamittain.pdf

Perussuomalaiset. [@persut]. *Ruotsin tie ei saa olla meidän tiemme. Maahanmuuttopolitiikkaa pitää linjata Suomen etu edellä*. [Tweet, Picture attached]. Twitter. <https://twitter.com/persut/status/1516683768744009730>

Perussuomalaiset ev. (2021, August 16). *Perussuomalaisten Riikka Purran linjapuhe*. Youtube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18iZywbxfb4>

Pilke, A. (2017). *Perussuomalaiset antoi kolmelle edustajalle huomautuksen homoliittojen puoltamisesta*. Yle Uutiset. <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9476666>

Purra, R. (2021a, October 21). *Purra paaluttaa maahanmuutosta: Hallitus on niin sekaisin!* Youtube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Msg0d1lNZY>

Purra, R. (2021b, November 22). *Pitkälti ulkomaalaistaustaisista nuorista koostuvat katujengit toimivat yhä laajemmin ja voimakkaammin. Tämän vuoden ensimmäisten kuuden kuukauden aikana Helsingin poliisin tietoon tulleet.* [Status update]. Facebook.

<https://www.facebook.com/purrariikka/posts/pfbid0T93GYbidNPoQCHmfEjZiVHk8MpNCY81VopYbyGLcnYuStKSM2LFQSFd9hjiZvyECl>

Purra, R. (2021c, August, 16). *Muutama ajatus Afganistanista. Afganistanin ongelmat ovat hyvin syviä ja syvällisiä. Taliban ei ole niistä ainoa, joskin tällä hetkellä akuutein ja.* [Status update]. Facebook.

<https://www.facebook.com/purrariikka/posts/pfbid02WbYmuUWgRYvxnaRyiTbVKnEARKRMDd7FGDr8uJSgWFAN1nZpfKR5xEJNkxbrQUbel>

Purra, R. (2021d, August, 19). *Sisäministeri muutaman muun ohella haluaa nostaa pakolaiskiintiötä Afganistanin tilanteen takia. Olen täysin toista mieltä. Kuten ennenkin, humanitaarinen maahanmuutto ei ole.* [Status update]. Facebook.

<https://www.facebook.com/purrariikka/posts/pfbid02ARgwsG9mtU9hE1RT1KMkRwbv22QkZyRrBQ7PCthTjN6oe25DwFTZffPQnTdcBxatl>

Purra, R. [@ir_rkp]. (2021e, November 10). *Breaking! Purran mielestä suomalainen kulttuuri on parempi kuin afganistanilainen. Seikan nyt ei pitäisi yllättää ketään. Mutta ehkä tällaiset asiat eivät nykypäivän kuperkeikkamaassa ole enää niin selviä. Olin siis Heikelän ja Koskelon ohjelmassa. Keskustelussa maahanmuuttoa, perussuomalaista puoluetta, talouspolitiikkaa ja sen sellaista.* [Tweet, Link attached]. Twitter.

Purra, R. [@ir_rkp]. (2022a, March 16). *Muistutus Suomesta: Ulkomailla syntyneet korostuvat paitsi raiskauksissa myös lapsen seksuaalisissa hyväksikäytöissä. Erityisesti Lähi-idän ja Pohjois-Afrikan maat korostuvat huomattavasti seksuaalirikoksissa epäiltyjen lähtömaiden joukossa. (Esim. Yle*

30.9.21).

[Tweet].

Twitter.

https://twitter.com/ir_rkp/status/1504140588467343362

Purra, R. (2022b, March 17). *Suomessa ollaan sinisilmäisiä. Kaikki ulkoapäin tuleva on otettu viattomuudella vastaan. Tervetuloa Suomeen, me hoidamme, luotamme, autamme ja jopa käännämme katseemme.* [Status update, Picture attached].

Facebook.

<https://www.facebook.com/purrariikka/posts/pfbid02h28q7Sj1smD4UaWoAV2uMszb8vYVQyHudhmLLQV4EiJqUfSF8tM3zpCFHvnEa5ttl>

Purra, R. (2022c, January 30). *Katujengien toimintarepertuaariin kuuluvat esimerkiksi väkivaltaisen rap-kulttuurin ihannointi, ryöstely ja uhkailu, huumeiden myynti, aseet ja muunlainen väkivalta. Kyse ei ole syrjäytymisestä.* [Status update].

Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/purrariikka/posts/pfbid0ig2JgcHJRAF61MD1xWagrfrqHofPeAryYx66MNUAfYaX4KYuppTYERhHX5LiUa8Rl>

Purra, R. (2022d, April 13). *Jälleen sosiaalisessa mediassa on levityksessä karmea video, jossa Espoossa joukko (ulkomaalaistaustaisia) nuoria hyökkää yhden (todennäköisesti suomalaisen) nuoren päälle. Mukana on.* [Status update].


Facebook.

<https://www.facebook.com/purrariikka/posts/pfbid0pSyFkC45jCnjNxpUBdZWif5nSUDFsvLJYot5YzKbMfLGchdoTzRj3Louqeys6YBKl>

Purra, R. (2022e, April 16). *Ruotsissa taas mellakoidaan ja riehutaan. Mellakoivilla on toimintalogiikassa paljon samaa kuin Putinilla: Ainoastaan aggressiolla ja voimalla on merkitystä. Örebro, Linköping.* [Status update].

Facebook.

<https://www.facebook.com/purrariikka/posts/pfbid02EbbAnAtaE9gUWM5y9he3CbLa23NrpiRw4ppyJ4HBdg7f6yviZ69Ei8mWniDV9gmUl>

Purra, R. (2022f, April 21). *Hyvä Tanska!*  *Tanskan hallitus aikomustensa mukaisesti neuvottelee keskiafrikkalaisen Ruandan kanssa turvapaikanhakijoiden ja kansainvälistä suojelua saavien sijoittamisesta. Suojelua ei voisi.* [Status

update]. Facebook.
<https://www.facebook.com/purrariikka/posts/pfbid0236RefJrUez2xwvw9NxtmPKdnnFH8wME9HVWrEAET2Yy5Chghq4LMfzACH9yquCX2l>

Purra, R. [@ir_rkp]. (2022g, January 21) *Miljardilla saisi myös palkattua 20 000 soteammattilaista vuodeksi. Elämä on valintoja, politiikka eritoten. Jos sinustakin suomalaisten veroeurot pitää käyttää suomalaisten hyväksi, äänestä perussuomalaisia.* [Tweet, Picture attached]. Twitter.
https://twitter.com/ir_rkp/status/1484457741976485889?lang=fi

Purra, R. (2022h, March 16) *Ukrainasta pakenee sodan jaloista naisia ja lapsia. Miehet jäävät puolustamaan maataan. Myös Suomi on tarjonnut pakeneville suojaa. Heidä saapuu sekä.* [Status update]. Facebook.
<https://www.facebook.com/purrariikka/posts/pfbid02Hmidd71hJApPjwNGfr1vfLPSEFU7ByPgn6eJv1j5tv6fxB7N27YRGxM1w4EF9oqdl>

Purra, R. [@ir_rkp]. (2022i, March 16). *Ukrainalaisten turvaa hakevien saapumisen pitää nollata pakolaiskiintiö ainakin tältä ja seuraavalta vuodelta. Akuuttiin tilanteeseen reagoiminen on juuri sitä, mihin pakolaiskiintiötä kannattaa käyttää. Seuraava hallitus tarkastelkoon kokonaisuutta sitten uudelleen.* [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/ir_rkp/status/1504006980704391171

Purra, R. [@ir_rkp]. (2022j, March 11). *Uskoiko joku oikeasti, että tällä kertaa Euroopan uusia instrumentteja ukrainalaisten auttamiseksi ei käytettäisi väärin - ja edistämään Lähi-idän ja Afrikan siirtymistä Eurooppaan? Juuri siksi vaadimme sinne tiukkoja kirjauksia.* [Tweet]. Twitter.
https://twitter.com/ir_rkp/status/1502263741110439940

Purra, R. (2022k, April 8). *Uhraapa tälle tilastotiedolle hetkinen: Suomea tai ruotsia kotikielenään puhuvien määrä VÄHENI pääkaupunkiseudulla viime vuonna. Itse asiassa heidän määränsä väheni koko.* [Status update]. Facebook.

<https://www.facebook.com/purrariikka/posts/pfbid0wo7E1mPaPSgJo1S9sgz4tLEJyRpURGV8jmM9Qe5jkG5mCtL1c7vSFjgTwBsyRSsSl>

Purra, R. [@ir_rkp]. (20221, January 18). *On irvokasta, että suomalaiset vanhukset ja muut potilaat eivät ole enää Suomessa 2020-luvulla sen arvoisia, että heitä autettaisiin heidän omalla kielellään, mutta samaan aikaan maahanmuuttajien itsensä saamia tulkkauk- ja muita holhouspalveluita parannetaan.* [Tweet]. Twitter.

Pyrhönen N. (2015). *The true colours of Finnish Welfare Nationalism: Consolidation of neo-populist advocacy as a resonant collective identity through mobilization of exclusionary narratives of blue-and-white solidarity.* SSKH Skrifter 38. Helsinki: University of Helsinki.

Quijano, A. (2007). Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality, *Cultural Studies*, 21(2), pp. 168-178).

Rastas, A. (2016). Reading History through Finnish Exceptionalism in *Whiteness and Postcolonialism in the Nordic Region: Exceptionalism, Migrant Others and National Identities.* Routledge.

Rodríguez, E. G. (2018). The Coloniality of Migration and the “Refugee Crisis”: On the Asylum-Migration Nexus, the Transatlantic White European Settler Colonialism-Migration and Racial Capitalism, *Refuge*, 34(1), pp.16-28.

Said, E.W. (1995). *Orientalism.* London: Penguin Books.

Seikkula, M. & Keskinen, S. (2021). Johdanto: Muuntautuva Rasismi ja Moninainen Antirasismi, *Rasismi, Valta ja Vastarinta: Rodullistaminen, Valkoisuus ja Koloniaalisuus Suomessa.* Gaudeamus.

Silvennoinen, O. (2017). Suomi takaisin! Perussuomalaiset, populismi ja moderni fasismi. *Politiikasta.* <https://politiikasta.fi/suomi-takaisin-perussuomalaiset-populismi-ja-moderni-fasismi/>

Suojelupoliisi, (2022). Äärioikeistolaisen terrorismin uhka on voimistunut länsimaissa. <https://supo.fi/aarioikeistolainen-terrorismi>

Suomen Uutiset - Perussuomalaiset. (2021, August 24). *Miksi afgaanit, miksi ei suomalaiset?* Youtube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VyXJIY3BZOs>

Tinsley, M. (2021). Towards Postcolonial Critical Realism, *Critical Sociology*, 48(2), pp. 235-250.

Tlostanova, M. & Mignolo, W. (2009). Global Coloniality and the Decolonial Option, *Kult 6 - Special Issue*, pp. 130-147.

Tuori, S. (2009). *The Politics of Multicultural Encounters*. Åbo: Åbo Akademi Press.

United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>

Valkama, V. (2020). *Sukupuolensa juridisesti vahvistaneiden määrä viisinkertaistui 2010-luvun aikana - translain kauan odotettu uudistus jäi kuitenkin koronakriisin jalkoihin*. Aamulehti. <https://www.aamulehti.fi/kotimaa/art-2000007458025.html>

Walhbeck, Ö. (2016). "True Finns and Non-True Finns: The Minority Rights Discourse of Populist Politics in Finland", *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 37(6), pp. 574- 588.

Ylä-Anttila, T. (2020). Social Media and the Emergence, Establishment and Transformation of the Right-Wing Populist Finns Party, *Populism*. Brill.