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Legacy of Postcolonial and Self-Determination in Occupied Lands

Comparative Case of Palestine & Tibet from Within and Beyond

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Abstract:

This thesis has presented a comparison between two occupied territories Tibet and Palestine as countries that have a long legacy in postcolonialism and strife for self-determination. The comparison was conducted from a postcolonial perspective of how Palestine is being occupied by Israel with full Western backing, while Tibet being occupied by another postcolonial country China. This clearly shows how the issue of Tibet contradicts the postcolonial theory that Western countries usually occupy Eastern countries, since it shows clearly that an Eastern country can occupy another Eastern country. Another similarity between Tibet and Palestine is what is known as stateless diasporas. In both cases the biggest host countries normally allow them to engage in their political (and less frequently military) strife to self-determination and recognise their diaspora as their representatives on the international arena. Lasty, I also discussed about the comparative nationalism such as Palestinian Secular and Islamic Nationalism for the attack against Israeli aggresion and how they use violent attack to securitise themselves. Meanwhile, Tibet uses Buddhist Nationalism to counter China with non-violent attacks that is self-immolation which is their method to self-determination. Furthermore, discussing how these occupied territories are behaving towards their occupiers.

Keywords: Palestine, Tibet, Postcolonialism, Diaspora, Self-determination

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It was quite a journey by trying to work on this thesis with lots of ups and downs. However, I am grateful that this journey is coming to an end and would like to explain what motivated me to write about this topic specifically because of many personal reasons. Firstly, my mom being a Palestinian, and my late grandfather was born in Palestine, and told me lots of stories about Palestine that made me feel that I have a connection to this land. Thus, becoming an activist of the Palestinian cause, since age 12, even to this day, I have been involved in many protests and debates about Palestine that I am consistently passionate about, and this makes me feel like my grandfather is truly looking down on me for how his stories about Palestine inspired me to write about Palestine. I also would like to express my gratitude to my father for always having my back and motivating me to keep working hard and wanting the best for me, as well as also being my main influencer about Palestine. He also helped me gain my passion for Palestine.

Onwards to Tibet, why I chose to write about Tibet was in September 2019, when I travelled to India for a fellowship. There, I met a couple of Tibetans, and they shared their story of their oppression and the occupation of Tibet, which inspired me to also write about TIbet afterwards. When I heard about Tibet from my Tibetan friends' stories. I saw that it was the first time I compared Palestine to another country. Therefore, I decided to compare both of the issues. Because I wanted to compare how the occupation in Tibet resembles the occupation in Palestine.

Another person that I would like to also express my deepest gratitude is to my supervisor Catarina Kinvall, who was always supporting me, giving great feedback to what I should be doing, even if I made some mistakes. However, I consider myself lucky to have a supervisor, who has put ontological security theory on the map, and inspired me to embark upon this theory for my masters.

List of Abbreviations:

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation

PNC: Palestinian National Council

TGIE: Tibetan Government-In-Exile

UN: United Nations

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

CTA: Central Tibetan Authority

PRC: People’s Republic of China

PLA: People’s Liberation Army

1. Introduction

This thesis will discuss Tibet and Palestine on various aspects that seem to uniquely blend and contradict one another. The present thesis will examine a comparative case of how occupied zones behave towards their occupiers from within the occupied territories and beyond in the diaspora community. However, what will also be examined is how they both are to be analysed upon various discourses and narratives of perspectives on postcolonialism and strife for self-determination. These two-cases (Tibet and Palestine) are considered holy in their own culture and religion, where they share their respective pilgrimages towards their faiths. Tibet and Palestine are two cases where their diasporas have been the backbone of their right to self-determination - while Palestine has had the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) as its main representative on the international level. Tibet likewise has its diaspora institution being its legitimate representative on the international level, called Tibetan Government-In-Exile (TGIE), where its spiritual leader Dalai Lama has also been part of the Tibetan diaspora community in India. Palestine is a Muslim-majority country, where Islam has great social influence within the community. Tibet, on the other hand, is the holy land of Buddhism and naturally the Tibetan community is quintessentially Buddhist.

This thesis will also examine Palestine and Tibet as cases of how the theory of postcolonialism has been seen as a clash between how the West is occupying Palestine, while another postcolonial state (China) occupies Tibet. The reason why these two countries have been differentiated has to do with the ways in which they behave towards their occupying counterparts and how they are interpreted through the narratives from the historical and scholarly literature of postcolonialism, diaspora, nationalism, and securitization.

2. Research Questions and problems:

A set of research problems will be dealt with in this thesis which all centre around the question of why each of the occupations of Palestine and Tibet necessitates a different narrative in spite of the fact they both belong to the postcolonial times. This can be understood by highlighting the respective unique socio-political contexts of the occupied territories. Palestine, being one of the most prominent topics on the world stage, has grabbed much attention by the western media for one thing, among others, Palestine is occupied by a Western created Israel in contrast to Tibet being in a unique position where an Eastern country is being occupied by another Eastern power. Another research problem is explaining how diasporic and local institutions from both occupied territories have been playing a role of emancipation and securitization of their identity and self-determination. They have their legitimate representative organisation from their diasporas with their neighbouring communities. Palestine has been relocating its PLO headquarters in various countries in the Arab world, throughout its occupation. Tibet, on the other hand, has managed to allow its TGIE headquarters to remain in India, since its occupation. This leads to narrating certain events that each of these cases has faced and comparing their approaches from a violent and nonviolent content, where this will lead to a further discussion of the behaviour of one's approach to self-determination. I will also look into the nature of the diaspora of the two cases; how their host countries have been treating them and how they have helped preserve their self-determination and their diaspora. Furthermore, I will also be discussing a comparative approach to Palestinian and Tibetan Nationalism.

All the above discussion would eventually turn to answering the following questions:

- How can we understand independence movements from a postcolonial perspective?
- How and why do different independence movements in occupied territories behave differently to their occupiers for self-determination?
- To what extent has self-determination been defined from different perspectives?
- What is distinguishing the locals in the occupied territories from the diaspora in terms of identity and self-determination?

3. Historical Background

Before I discuss the theoretical framework through which the problem will be handled, I would like to give a brief review of the history of each of Tibet and Palestine in order to obtain a clearer conceptual picture of what the populations of these occupied regions have been going through in the course of the many years of occupation.

3.1. Palestine

The British mandate of Palestine lasted from the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1917 until the British termination of the mandate in 1948. Meanwhile, US support for Israel began in 1949 with a $100 million loan, which was followed over subsequent decades with additional aid (Stokes, 2019; p.111). The conflict, however, between Palestinian Arabs and Jews is a modern phenomenon, which began around the turn of the 20th century. Although these two groups have different religions (Palestinians include Muslims, Christians, and Druze), religious differences are not the cause of the conflict. It is essentially a struggle over land. Until 1948, the area that both groups claimed was known internationally as Palestine (Beinin & Hajjar, 2014). During the holocaust, when Hitler and his followers who were actively helped by many people including industrialists in the US killed the Jews, millions of them. During the same period of the holocaust, it is the people of Palestine who welcomed the Jews to their land offering them warm hospitality. But it is these people who were subjected to a second holocaust in 1948 called Nakba and they had to flee their homes (Gidri, 2008).

At the end of 1947, the Arabs of Palestine were more than two-thirds (about 1,350,000) of the country’s two million people. Thus, it possessed about 90% of Palestine’s privately-owned land. Hence, as an indigenous stable majority, they believed in their right to take control of a free and complete Palestine. As the indigenous majority they were ready to share the country with the Jewish minority, not by dividing it but rather by living together (Manna, 2013; p. 90). The first of the two new declarations of war on the Palestinians came on 29 November 1947 via UN General Assembly Resolution 181 for the partition of

Palestine. This resolution, also known as the Partition Plan, was essentially engineered by the United States and the Soviet Union, which manufactured a General Assembly majority by ensuring that their compliant allies and satellites voted for it, some of them as a result of outright compulsion. UNGA 181 handed over most of an Arab-majority country to its Jewish minority without the consent of that majority, thereby violating the principle of self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter (Khalidi, 2017). This was analogous to how the Mandate for Palestine had violated Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In 1962, the Israeli government purchased its first advanced weapons systems from the US. US Aid and military sales helped to establish a precedent for US support of Israel in what would later become referred to as the Israeli qualitative military edge over its neighbours that the US government pledged to ensure.

Following the year of 1948, it was divided into three parts: the state of Israel, the West Bank (of the Jordan River) and the Gaza Strip (ibid.). It saw the establishment of a settler-colonial Zionist state on 78% of Mandatory Palestine. It also embodied the Palestinian Nakba (the ‘disaster’ or ‘catastrophe’) the destruction of historic Palestine. In 1948 the expulsion and dispossession of the Palestinians were carried out as an integral part of the infamous Plan Dalet and through the systematic use of terror and a series of massacres, of which the massacre of Deir Yasin in April 1948 was the most notorious (Masalha, 2008; p. 124). The year of the Nakba is a key date in the history of the Palestinian people – a year of dramatic rupture in the continuity of historical space and time in Palestinian history. Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi likens the Nakba to the ‘ineluctable climax of the preceding Zionist colonization and the great watershed in the history of the Palestinian people, marking the beginning of their Exodus and Diaspora’ (ibid.). In 1987, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza revolted against the Israeli occupation in the First Intifada, or ‘uprising’. Protests in Gaza and the West led to proposals for a declaration about the status of Palestine, namely that Palestine was a state and that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was the governmental structure that would administer the Palestinian territory (Stokes, 2019; p. 112).

On April of 1987, a meeting of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), helped to reconcile Fatah the Palestinian liberation movement, and factions that had challenged Yasser Arafat’s leadership in the Palestinian movement. These and other actions undertaken by the PNC helped reduce factionalism among the Palestinian people. These actions also helped pave the way for a unified leadership structure to come about in 1988 to sustain and direct the intifada (ibid.). After the Intifada, came a popular Palestinian discontent which grew during the Oslo peace process because the reality on the ground did not match the expectations created by the peace agreements. From 1993-2000, many aspects of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip deepened rather than abated. Palestinians expected their lives to improve in terms of freedom of movement and socioeconomic standing; when both worsened, significant resentment built up in Palestinian society (Stokes, 2016). A second intifada, from 2000 and 2005, that occurred saw violence in Israel and actions by Israeli security forces that undermined much of the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority. After the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004 and his succession by the current president of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, the Israeli military withdrew settlers and military forces from Gaza (Farsakh, 2016; p. 56).

3.2. Tibet

When the Dalai Lama declared independence from China in 1913, he created a structural opening for Tibet to be politically recognized. The seeds of this opportunity for recognition, however, trace back to the ninth century, when China first set its eyes on annexing Tibet (Stokes, 2019; p. 107). At that time, Tibet entered into a treaty with the Tang dynasty, the Sino-Tibetan treaty of 821/823, which established the Chö-Yön relationship between Tibet and China. In the chö-yön relationship, Tibet's leaders agreed to help provide spiritual guidance to China in exchange for protection. In this relationship, which helped give a normative and structural form to Tibet-China relations, both retained their independence, forging what was viewed as a peaceable alliance between them (ibid.). When China occupied Tibet In 1959, this led Tibetans to escape to India, a newly independent country. As the government in exile explained, "Tibet existed as an independent sovereign state before Chinese rule. But having no representation in the United Nations, the world largely stood by and allowed China's occupation to happen" (McGranahan, 2018). Thus, the accompanying history is as follows; when Mao Zedong's People's Liberation Army marched into eastern Tibet and by 1951 it had invaded Lhasa, the capital and by 1959 the fighting reached Lhasa, therefore igniting the Chinese occupation of Tibet. Fearing being kidnapped and assassinated, the Dalai Lama escaped into exile in India. In an imperial move of settler colonialism, the People's Republic of China fully incorporated Tibet into its polity (Topygal, 2019).

The Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetans first found refuge in South Asia, as they now increasingly do in other countries around the world. The Tibetans have used various military and non-military strategies and instruments in their struggle against China (Topgyal, 2013). Meanwhile, in April 1960, a year after China's People's Liberation Army crushed the Tibetan national uprising in the capital Lhasa, the Dalai Lama re-established the Tibetan Government in the North Indian hill station of Dharamsala. Over the following decades, the exiled Tibetan community has developed and institutionalised the TGIE; a political organisation in exile that is widely regarded as one of the most established and well-managed in the world (McConnell, 2009). While the violent element of the Tibetan struggle ended with the closure of the CIA-backed Tibetan guerrilla base in Nepal in 1974, violent riots continued to break out occasionally in Tibet (McGranahan, 2018). In the face of Chinese intransigence violence is still being considered as an option by some Tibetans in Tibet and exile. Yet, the mainstream Tibetan movement, as represented by the Dalai Lama and the TGIE and demonstrated by the largely peaceful protests in Tibet, has remained wedded to nonviolence. In March 2008, the sight of maroon-robed monks demanding Tibetan independence and armed Chinese military on the streets of Lhasa renewed the world's attention to Tibet as the site of an oft-ignored struggle over homeland, identity, and self-governance, which has been ongoing since 1949 (McConnell, 2009).

4. Theoretical Framework

In this project: Firstly, I will make use of "Postcolonialism" as a conceptual frame in order to understand the Tibetan and Palestinian contextual peculiarities. Secondly, I will be using "Diaspora Theories" to discern how the diaspora of the two occupied countries have been able to maintain their identity and self-determination. Lastly, I will be using "Religious Nationalism" as underlying the strength, the maintenance of identity, the passions and ontological security of the two countries. Finally, a Venn diagram representing the main theories and their overlapping will be included.

4.1. Comparative approach to Postcolonialism

The first theory used in practice comes through the **Postcolonial Theory**. These two parties (Palestine & Tibet), both hold unique perspectives about the theory itself. Defining postcolonialism is a notoriously difficult task and so it still remains. Since postcolonial theory's emergence within literary studies in the 1970s, the broad body of work it has precipitated has steadily worked against definitive categorizations, taxonomies, and concrete assumptions (Jazeel, 2019; Loomba, 1998). Jazeel (2019) claims that postcolonial scholars argue that the legacies of colonialism and imperialism are still with us, that they have indelibly shaped the world as we know and experience it. We should also be clear that any definition of postcolonialism itself must be partial, provisional, and attenuated to new, unthought-of strategies for thinking and living through, past the inequities of colonialism, in the present. However, these new developments, by the 1990s, were an avowedly postcolonial enterprise, characterised by their preoccupation with the challenge of thinking through what happens where (and when) spaces, cultures, and identities meet, overlap, and displace one another (Jazeel, 2019; p. 124). As such, they were as equally concerned with the spatial imperatives of boundary thinking as they were with the temporal questions precipitated by thinking of and beyond the limits of colonial discourse (ibid.). If colonial discourse, as Said (1978) had so effectively demonstrated, produced imaginative geographies characterised by limitation, containment, and overgeneralization, then the very instabilities of the boundary, that is its inability to perfectly contain and delimit, provided a motif for the release, dynamism, and change of culture and identity (Nakagawa, 2018). Indeed, Said's term **Orientalism** refers to the idea that European identity is superior in comparison with all the non-European cultures, which are presented as backward and dependent. In addition, numerous media analyses are concerned with the representations of race and ethnicity in the western media (Sabido, 2015). While Said also makes explicit connections between colonialism and the use of binary opposites, such as 'civilised' and 'uncivilised'. Thus, the links between discourse and the postcolonial have already been explored at length under different guises (ibid). Moreover, postcolonialism still focuses on sovereignty and governing techniques and has been the subject of many academic debates on security and securitisation, as evident in the emphasis on 'critical' as well as human security, but also in the increasing attention given to the concept of **ontological security** in which securitisation and desecuritization have come to refer to elements of societal and existential security both within and beyond the spatial confines of the nation-state (Kinnvall & Cash, 2017; 268).

Kinnvall (2018) highlights ontological security as not only the securitising aspects of identity stability but also the opening up of these processes in terms of refusing or resisting contemporary narratives of closure and essentialisation. Hence, the special issue deals with critical aspects of bordering, territory and the rewriting of the state in postcolonial terms. Although, the term ‘postcolonial’ does not apply to those at the bottom end of this hierarchy, who are still at the far economic margins of the nation-state so nothing is ‘post’ about their colonisation (Loomba, 2015; 185-186). Spivak (1995) claims that in her theory of the **Subaltern**, which refers to subordination in terms of class, caste, gender, race, language, and culture and was used to signify the centrality of dominant/dominated relationships in history. The victims of "post-colonial sequestration", by contrast, failed therefore to make it past the barrier of independence and international recognition. Instead, they fell into a state of half-recognised but contested existence. After the war of 1948-49 the "Palestine question" disappeared almost entirely from the international scene, only to re-emerge with the defeat of the Arab armies in the six-day war of 1967 (Halliday, 2008). Tibet too has undergone long years of neglect in the international arena, punctuated by periodic reincarnations of interest: the bloody British occupation of Lhasa in 1904-05, the insurrection against Chinese rule and the flight of the Dalai Lama in 1959, and now uprising of March 2008 (ibid.). This has caused the reason why Tibet and Palestine have very different approaches to postcolonial theory. Shakya (1991; p. 23) argues that “if the Tibetan issue is to be taken seriously, Tibet must be liberated from both the Western imagination and the myth of Shangri-la”. The inability of the Tibetans to muster any support among the existing states is also disturbing. Here one may point to one of the paradoxes of the Tibetan situation vis-à-vis the Palestinians. While the support for Palestinians comes overwhelmingly from Third World countries, similar support is conspicuous by its absence when it comes to the Tibetans (Chowdury & Nair, 2002; 220).

4.2. Diaspora

The second theory that will be mentioned is about *Diaspora*. This defining term of diaspora has been chosen to focus on the role considered the most theoretically interesting: Firstly, diasporas as independent actors exerting influence on homeland foreign policies. Secondly, the incorporation of the diaspora factor into IR theory places it at the meeting point between the constructivist emphasis on identity, which explains the motives of diasporas, and the liberal focus on domestic politics, which explains their venue of influence (Shain & Barth, 2003; 451-452). Most scholarly discussions focused on the criteria proposed by William Safran in 1991 continue to be rooted in the conceptual framework of **homeland**, its loss and the desire to return (Harutanyan, 2012). William Safran (1991) in his short article “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return”, also described several groups and classifies them according to the following points: Dispersal from a centre to two or more peripheral or foreign regions, Believing that full acceptance by the host country is not possible; Regarding the ancestral homeland as the true or ideal home and place of final return; Commitment to the maintenance or restoration of safety and prosperity in the homeland; Lastly, personal or vicarious relations to the homeland in an ethnic-communal consciousness (Gazso, 2017; p. 67-68). According to Koinova (2017), there is one term to describe diaspora as a positionality to capture the power diaspora political agents perceive themselves or are perceived as deriving from the socio-spatial context in which they are embedded through a system of ties to host lands, homelands, and other global locations where diasporic brethren live. Chen (2012) claims that diaspora political agents operate in what sociologists define as three different aspects of socio-spatial positionality: relativity, power, and fluidity. **Positionality** is relative, since “the conditions of possibility for an agent depend on his or her position concerning others". Diaspora positionality addresses the fact that diaspora political agents with strong links to a particular context might have a specific value for other agents in the transnational social field: “Space is more than geography” (ibid). Shain & Barth (2003) claims that diasporas may become the pretext for state-sponsored irredentism - the effort by a homeland government to recover territory populated by ethnic kin in a nearby state.

Theoretically, diasporas have been posited as challenging traditional state institutions of citizenship and loyalty, and as an important feature of the relationship between domestic and international politics. Thus, by giving their importance, and their status as a permanent feature in the imperfect nation-state system, diasporas now receive growing attention from decision-makers around the world (ibid). Therefore, the study of diasporas nowadays constitutes a growing research field, despite increasing recognition of the importance of diasporas in international relations (ibid; 450-451). Gazso (2015) sets on motives and triggers for diaspora engagement and also supports the plasticity of this kind of policy: "Clearly, homeland state elites are not passive actors stirred only by feelings of national affiliation or by demands made on them by those abroad. Instead, shifts towards increased diaspora engagement are driven in large part by the interests and perceptions of homeland state political elites." Feron & Voytiv (2021) discusses diaspora by focusing on a specific type of **deterritorialized diasporization** process. Rather than directly associating diaspora formation to dispersal or investigating diasporic mobilisation in all its forms, by highlighting a specific diasporization process that is triggered at a distance by conflicts occurring in the homeland and which can lead to the diasporization of migrants or their descendants in the host country. According to Hutnyk et al. (2005), deterritorialization implies staking identity outside originary claims to the land. These non-territorial claims may still be about nationality but they cannot make the argument that this sense of nationality is derived from the land. Many diasporic groups can be called deterritorialized because their collective claims to identity do not depend upon residence on a particular plot of land. Koinova (2018) emphasises the spatial dimension between agents in these fields.

Diasporas have specific linkages to contexts - homelands, host lands, and other locations that shape how they might be empowered to contribute to a sending state. In such contexts, a field-wide "habitus" could be existent but weak, as agents' life experiences are defined by spatial specificities. Hutnik et al. (2005) point out that a defining characteristic of the homeland theory is a blockage to return – that has been almost impossible in returning to the place of migration. Forced exile becomes essential to the heightened sense of longing for home and is central to this understanding of diaspora. However, a criterion of the Diaspora studies that raises a set of questions is the concept of homeland as an imagined centre. Diaspora-homeland relationship is often seen from the perspective of the so-called **Solar System**, where the Diaspora is viewed as a "my" connection and belonging to one "centre", namely the homeland (Harutanyan, 2012). In this regard, Harautanyan (2012) criticises the classical Diaspora theory for paying too much attention to the dispersal of people from the centre without challenging the notion of the centre in and of itself: where was the homeland (ibid)? Another criticism of the classical diaspora theory, Shain & Barth

(2003) claims that the same weak element that is important in the host land also comes into play in the homeland, albeit not necessarily in the same manner. As in the hostland, policymaking is more susceptible to diasporic influence the more democratically permeable the homeland is. Yet this is not the only manner in which a state may be 'weak.' Because in this context weakness means permeability, a 'weak' state is not only one that is 'too democratic,' but also one that is permeable because it is poor in ideological, material, and institutional resources (ibid).

Another section of the diaspora theory comes from the diaspora institutions. According to Gamlen (2014; p. 181), diasporas are not what they used to be. The term was once reserved for a few archetypal groups maintaining an intact identity despite traumatic dispersion in the distant past. What is more likely understood as an expression of identity in flux. Rather than fixed social groups, diasporas are now recognized as constituency-building projects mobilised by political and social entrepreneurs, including policy-maker. **Diaspora entrepreneurs** are individual and institutional agents who actively make claims on behalf of their original homelands. Sending states are original homelands that maintain durable linkages with diasporas abroad and incorporate diasporas into policy areas such as health, labour, economy, culture, education, voting, and foreign policy (Cummings et al., 2013). Diaspora community usually needs to resist cultural assimilation while integrating socially; to preserve its **otherness** concerning the majority of the host state. For maintaining ethnic boundaries and transmitting the desire to exist as a distinguished ethnicity from one generation to another, diaspora communities have founded several institutions (Gazso, 2017).

The different nature of these diaspora institutions offers another criterion for inventing typologies. There are several ways to classify diaspora institutions, such as the date of their creation, their goals or the areas of their activity (ibid). Cummings et al. (2013) claim that diaspora institutions may also help the diaspora themselves to win better wages and living standards, looking out for their welfare abroad, and empowering them at home. Engagement policies and diaspora institutions can also help create a win for destination states, by helping to manage international recruitment through legitimate channels, assist others to access support services in the destination society, and if necessary facilitate their timely return. Koinova (2018) claims that diaspora institutions may be rebuilt, but governments are often plagued by partisan politics, war networks, or local belligerents.

Guerrilla Groups may carve territories and proclaim autonomy or de facto statehood. The attitudes of wartime elites may be carried into post-conflict reconstruction, with sporadic violence and an expectation that diasporas will provide resources for internal warfare, lobbying international governments, staging demonstrations, and influencing public opinion (ibid). Militant leaders and members of such stateless diasporas know full well that clandestine terrorist and guerrilla activities per se cannot win independence for their homelands. The main purpose of their violent activities is to draw the greatest possible general attention to their national plight and struggle. Those activities also are intended as public expressions of their unequivocal determination to see the establishment of their independent national states (Sheffer, 2003). For example, in the case of Palestine, where the **mughtaribun** "expats in Arabic" rests at the return of the migration of the Palestinian political elite labour in support of the state-building project. They are the returnees or "a'idine" in Arabic." This is the first migratory flow of this size of Palestinians who legally cross the border from this direction, coming in rather than out of Palestine since 1948 (Peteet, 2007; p. 627). Cheffer (2003) claims that it is difficult to start a **diaspora militant**, by rejecting the legitimacy of their host states and showing absolute loyalty to their homelands. Diasporas are far from always being supportive of homeland interests. Hutnik et al. (2005) claim that diaspora does, however, differ markedly from ethnicity in terms of where it draws attention. In some ways, the space in which ethnicity is allowed to exist is often determined by the policies and institutional procedures of a nation-state.

4.3. Religious Nationalism

Religious Nationalism is the last theory I will describe, as both Palestine and Tibet are striving for an identity as well as using their religion to identify and justify their emancipation, since the beginning of the occupations. It became increasingly popular through the works of Anthony Giddens and has been incorporated into a plethora of studies in political science, IR, cultural studies, political psychology and media studies. Religious nationalism has been dealt with more explicitly in the ontological security literature. For Giddens, **ontological security** refers to the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action. A sense of the reliability of persons and things, so central to the notion of trust, is basic to feelings of ontological security (Kinvall, 2002). Another point that Anthony Giddens (1991) points out is that the notion of ontological security ties in closely to the tacit character of practical consciousness or, in phenomenological terms, to the 'bracketings' presumed by the `**natural attitude**' in everyday life (Mitzen, 2006). On the other side of what might appear to be quite trivial aspects of day-to-day action and discourse, chaos lurks and this chaos is not just disorganisation, but the loss of a sense of the very reality of things and other persons (Juergensmeyer, 2010). Kinvall (2004) compares Giddens to Erikson, that self-identity consists of the development of a consistent feeling of biographical continuity where the individual is able to sustain a narrative about the self and answer questions about doing, acting, and being.

According to Shani (2017), in contrast, ontological security does not necessarily entail Human Security. Individuals may find ontological security by belonging to communities which deny the right of others to freedom or dignity, whether on the grounds of culture, gender, sexuality, race or religion. Ontological security may, therefore, be found in reinforcing or strengthening the boundary between ‘self’ and ‘other’ or ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’. According to Mitzen (2006; 342), on a state level, ontological security-seeking reveals another, second, dilemma in international politics: ontological security can conflict with physical security. Even a harmful or self-defeating relationship can provide ontological security, which means states can become attached to conflict. When **trauma** happens, the individual’s fall is cushioned by the social order, which reproduces general ontological security until she can pick herself up again. But society is no more than the social practices its members engage in, which means that its continuation depends on the constant reproduction of those practices (Mitzen, 2006; 348). According to Kinvall (2004), Race and gender are thus at the heart of identity construction in relation to nationalist and religious discourse. The fact that racism is a necessary element in the constitution of religious nationalism makes it a core feature for constructing the abject other. Both biological and cultural racism involve the stigmatization of otherness as manifest in practices of elimination, violence, intolerance, humiliation, and discrimination. For example, If Palestinian religious-nationalists stress is a consequence of occupation, discrimination, poverty, etc., the religious-Zionist distress is caused by the difficulty to settle faith and politics, spirituality with secularism (Tzidikayhu, 2015).

Religious nationalism not only shatters the presumptions of geopolitics but also reveals the limits of sociological theory. Religious nationalism is a particular form of collective representation. In this essay, I first argue that religion partakes in the symbolic order of the nation-state and that contemporary nationalism is suffused with religion (Friedland, 2001). Religious nationalism in its most manifest expression is a complex set of identification in which both components of the combination are inseparable, when one's nationality is "religious" and when one's religion is "**national.** In the less strong manifestations of religious nationalism, one can belong to nationality and in addition to being religious; one might even connect the two, in some way left open for interpretations (Tzidkayhu, 2015). But in its strong manifestations, a symbolic hyphen connects the two components of the phrase, demonstrating the inseparability and interdependence of both parts of a national-religious identity. Both adjectives, though not identical, are equal in importance. Strong religious nationalism plays an important role in ethnic, religious and national conflicts throughout the world (ibid). Kinvall (2004) claims that there is an obvious difference between religion in a more fundamentalist form and religion as a cultural experience, where the latter may have an empathetic relation with political power even when opposed to it, as well as a readiness to accommodate secular thought. According to Fox (2004), religion is said to be among the essential foundations of civilization, as well as one of the bases for modern political phenomena like nationalism and the Westphalian state system. For many it is still an influence on individual ethical and political choices. Some argue that it is only the privileged and affluent that try to replace religion with secular phenomena, and even many of them return to religion in times of need.

Friedland (2002) claims that religious nationalism cannot be explained and hence interpreted in terms of class-specific material or status injury. Neither can it be understood as a project of religious inclusion, or group representation. Nor is it merely a clerical power-play. Religious nationalist movements are often led by the laity, not the clerics. Cleric, rabbi, sadhu, and mullah mount the rostrum, occupy the public place, seeking to ordinate society according to a text originating outside of it. Religious nationalists make politics into a religious obligation that want to view the religious nationalist project as a retreat from modernity (Tzidikyahu, 2015). **Religious fundamentalism** incorporates trying to reinforce traditional religious communities and values against the forces described above. Often, religious fundamentalism takes the form of religious nationalism. In these cases, the preservation of traditional values is linked to the preservation of the nation or the state as a citadel of religious values (Fox, 2004; p. 718). This can mean fundamentalists trying to seize control of a government when more secular members of their religion control the government or seeking autonomy from the state when it is ruled by those of another ethnicity (Friedland, 2001; p. 132). Sturm (2018) claims that nationalism certainly has a **spiritual principle**, as it is classically observed the attempt to formulate a theory for religious nationalism is one fraught with problems. There have been many attempts to fuse religion and nationalism as it relates to overlapping language, analogous histories, as a part of nationalism, or that there is a particular form of religious nationalism. According to Juergensmeyer (2010), these attempts to accommodate religion in secular nationalism lead to a double frustration: those who make these compromises are sometimes considered traitors from both a spiritual and a secular point of view. Moreover, these compromises imply that spiritual and political matters are separate, an idea that most religious activists reject and see as a capitulation to secularism. Because both religion and secular nationalism are ideologies of order, they are potential rivals. Either can claim to be the guarantor of orderliness within a society; either can claim to be the ultimate authority for social order (Friedland, 2001; 138).


Postcolonialism
Orientalism
Subaltern
Western
persp
Diaspora
Homeland
Diaspora Organizations
& Militarization
Stateless Diaspora
Religious Nationalism
Islam and Buddhism
Secularization
Ontological Security
Religious Stereotype
East vs East or East vs West
Liberation from hostnation
Stateless activities

Venn Diagram 1: Theoretical Frameworks

5. Research Methodologies:

5.1. Indigenous/Decolonizing Methods

This paper uses a Qualitative research approach, specifically the Indigeneous/Decolonial methods. The reason why I chose Indigeneous methodologies was because both Palestinians and Tibetans are considered on the international stage or perhaps the Western context as indigenous people). Because Indigenous methodologies are relatively emergent within western qualitative research, it is useful to explain what exactly is meant by the claim that Indigenous methodologies are a paradigmatic approach. Within a paradigmatic approach to research, the paradigm influences the choice of methods, how those methods are being gathered, and how the data will be analysed and interpreted (Kovach, 2010; p. 41). Indigenous knowledge also plays an important role in the articulation of indigenous research methodologies. Indigeneous knowledge's role in framing postcolonial-indigenous research methodologies can be summarised with the following: Firstly, Indigenous knowledge is embodied in languages, legends, folktales, stories, and cultural experiences of the formerly colonised and historically oppressed (Chilisa, 2012; p. 96). Secondly, Postcolonial indigenous knowledge systems can enable the researcher to use new topics, themes, processes, categories of analysis, and modes of reporting and dissemination of information not easily obtainable through conventional research methods (ibid). Thirdly, Postcolonial indigenous knowledge can enable researchers to unveil knowledge that was previously ignored. Hence, enabling the researcher to close the knowledge gap that resulted from imperialism, colonisation, and the subjugation of indigenous knowledge (ibid). However, A large body of postcolonial indigenous research advocates for a process of decolonizing and indigenizing Euro-Western research methodologies. Indigenization is a process that involves a critique and resistance to Euro-Western methodological imperialism and hegemony as well as a call for the adapting of conventional methodologies by including perspectives and methods that draw from indigenous knowledge, languages, metaphors, worldviews, experiences, and philosophies of former colonised, historically oppressed, and marginalised social groups (Smith, 1999; pp. 23-24). Indigenization, given the complexities instilled within this word, enables us to understand at what point we can say that we do indeed understand something? I begin to ponder my own immediate process of understanding in relation to others. I think of the students who come into my research class. The word epistemology sends us off into different directions, creating a dialectical force field. Tensions arise from the need to attach meaning to lofty and effervescent words like truth and knowledge (Kovach, 2010; p. 43).

Meanwhile, we have added another method into the indigenous/decolonial methodology that is digital storytelling. According to Harper et al. (2013), decolonizing research, knowledge, and methods - comes from both indigenous scholars conducting their own research and writing from within indigenous positions and cultures, and from nonindigenous researchers working in partnership with indigenous individuals, communities, organisations, and governments. Smith (2005; p. 88) argues that decolonizing knowledge is not simply about challenging or making refinements to qualitative research. It is a much broader but still purposeful agenda for transforming the institution of research, the deep underlying structures and taken-for-granted ways of organising, conducting, and disseminating research and knowledge. As one participant explained: “it is very emotional, because on the academic level, they usually do not share their stories” (Harper et al, 2013; pp. 133-134). Thus, deciding why I chose to apply the decolonizing storytelling method is because since I believe that storytelling has what kept the indigenous studies survive to research about, where these communities have been using their story to want people to understand their oppression and how both the Tibetans and Palestinian diaspora are willing to share their stories about how they left their homes and how they managed to settle and initiate their emancipation from their host countries (Lebanon, Jordan, India, Nepal, etc.) and without digital stories as part of the methods utilized, a powerful and meaningful aspect of lived experiences would have been absent from our results.

5.2. Narrative Analysis

For the majority of the methods will be conducted through Narrative Analysis, since I will be mainly discussing how each scholarly article describes the issue, and I will therefore be able to compare how each of my two cases have similarities or differences. Researchers look for and find narratives in policy texts, leadership activity and policy formation, political theory, interview material such as oral accounts of critical, dramatic events in the lives of organisations, civic rituals and reconciliation commissions, political autobiography, life stories, illness narratives, novels, film, historical accounts, maps, news stories, scientific accounts, and symbols and myths (Robertson, 2018; p. 221). The narrative system was based on ideas from structural analysis on the one hand and new results in sociolinguistic studies of natural narratives (stories of personal experience) obtained by Labov and Waletsky (1967) on the other. They found that everyday stories about a serious topic (Were you ever afraid to die?') would often consist of a canonical structure of categories like Setting, Complication, Resolution, Evaluation and Coda (van Dijk, 1980; p.9). Chatman (1978) defines narrative as consisting of a story and a discourse. The story (histoire) is familiar from the structuralist take on narrative, consisting of the content of the tale or chain of events and the 'existents', or the characters and other components of the setting (Robertson, 2018; p. 236).

Another passage that I would add in my narrative method is going deeply into the Analysis part. Where I get to pragmatize the entire story of Tibet's story from pre-1959 and post-1959 was brought upon, also what was the analysis behind their self-immolation to counter the Chinese forces, as well as the context of the diasporic centre TGIE. Meanwhile, with Palestine, this also goes from pre-1948 to post-1948, where I get to analyse certain events that have disrupted the Western media on how it managed to gain global attention for being a central role in the world peace dilemma, as well as its constant relocation of its representative centre of the PLO and its various other political parties. Narratives, however, also exist on different levels, or in different dimensions, and can be more or less abstract. The analytical instruments presented in this chapter have been used to explicate concrete narratives – the stories a librarian or a television journalist actually told and the words they used to tell them. But such analyses can only be interesting if they can give us insights into something larger or more general, and such generalisation can only take place if specific micro-level narratives are related to accumulated or macro-level and recurrent narrative themes (Robertson, 2018; pp. 240-241). The way I will analyse some of these narratives come from historical narratives and scholarly articles. Chronology is a key element in how we naturally tell stories and it is equally important to social researchers in mapping personal and social change. This is evident in the enduring usefulness of the concept of 'career' in sociological research (Earthy & Cronin, 2008).

6. Tibet and Palestine: Comparative Case:

This is where I will be conducting all my empirical research of the comparative case of Tibet and Palestine. Starting with the Approaches to Postcolonialism; which talks how each of their narratives and discourses is perceived or interpreted by various scholars from an Eastern or Western perspective. Secondly, I will discuss how the Tibetan and Palestinian diaspora engagement of emancipation of their homelands from within and beyond (diaspora). Lastly, I will further analyse nationalism from within the occupied zones, where they use their religions and identity as a way to get back their lands.

6.1. Comparative Approach to Postcolonialism

What is to be compared towards both Tibet and Palestine. Analytically, both can be understood as cases of what Halliday (2008) calls "the syndrome of post-colonial sequestration", in which certain peoples failed to establish themselves as independent countries at decisive moments of international change when imperial powers were retreating. A radical, Postcolonialism-inspired, way to understand these situations would be (as Halliday suggests) to abandon the notion that our contemporary nation-state system corresponds to "fundamental principles", and further to caution that "nationalism cannot cut the link between reason and capital at the core of imperialism" (Yeh, 2009; p. 985). Yes, Said's main enterprise of postcolonial theory has unpacked the notion of neutral academic expertise and highlighted how Western knowledge and representations of the non-Western world are neither innocent nor based on some pre-existing "reality," but implicated in the West's will to power, and its imperial adventures. The image of a scientific, apolitical, disinterested, knowledge-seeking "gentleman" braving all odds to study non-Western cultures has been revealed as hollow (Anand, 2007).

6.1.1 Orientalism

The fact that postcolonial studies has not recognised in Palestine and the struggle of the Palestinian people, which is now more than seventy years, as a colonial situation and anti-colonial resistance shows the extent to which postcolonial theory can indeed be hijacked to serve imperialist interests, or at the very least, to be complicit with the silence on Palestine with some spaces being rendered safe for study and others forbidden (Hamdi, 2019; p. 10). According to Moore-Gilbert (2018), that Postcolonial literature has been addressing the Palestinian issue very lately and be paid little attention to it by continuing to avoid Palestine/Israel also corroborated a perception in some quarters that the field preferred to focus on postcolonial conjunctures - which were safely historical, rather than more ethically and politically challenging contemporary problematics. It is also noteworthy that Postcolonial theory was not included into International Relations discipline until the 2000s and the Palestinian question neglected by the Postcolonial theory until recently. Moreover, Mainstream postcolonial writing, wholeheartedly adopted by Western institutions, sees the conflict surrounding Palestine as not ‘remote’ enough to be a safe topic with which Western humanist thought can comfortably engage in and sympathise with, but a hotly contested issue brought into existence by the very same Zionist/imperialist ideological forces which control many Western educational institutions in the first place (Hamdi, 2019; p. 11). Sabido (2015) observed the term ‘Palestinian’ as the third most frequent term to refer to actors within the conflict (966 instances). Thus, ‘Palestinian’ has now become more visible, although ‘Palestine’ (70 occurrences) is, once again, mainly excluded from the discourse. ‘Zionist’ (30 occurrences) has also nearly vanished from the news coverage, partly because of the negative connotations associated with the term, and because ‘Israel’ and ‘Israeli’ are the preferred, recognized options to refer to this side of the confrontation. ‘Zionist’ (the term) has also been nearly vanished from the news coverage, partly because of the negative connotations associated with the term, and because ‘Israel’ and ‘Israeli’ are the preferred, recognized options to refer to this side of the confrontation (ibid). Therefore, Palestinian discourse has been tremendously interrupted by Zionist colonization. Palestinian discourse was fundamentally disrupted when 80% of the land was colonized in 1948 and the indigenous people were forcibly displaced. Consequently, relationships between the land, art, and original geopolitical discourse were altered to fit a harsh new reality (Habashi, 2005; p. 771).

The fact that postcolonial studies has not recognised in Palestine and the struggle of the Palestinian people, which is more than seventy-years old, a colonial situation and anti-colonial resistance shows the extent to which postcolonial theory can indeed be hijacked to serve imperialist interests, or at the very least, to be complicit with the silence on Palestine with some spaces being rendered safe for study and others forbidden (Hamdi, 2017; p. 9). The term "Zionism" originated in Europe in the late 19th century. Political Zionism was, in large measure, the product of the religious and racial intolerance of the Europeans. It originated from the conditions of late nineteenth century Eastern and Central Europe. European Zionist nationalism and settler-colonialism in Palestine imagined itself closely linked with the biblical Hebrew covenant and the State of Israel was built on old biblical symbols and legends and modern Zionist nationalist myths and the Zionist claim to Palestine was based on the notion that God had promised/given the land to the Jews (Masalha & Isherwood, 2014; p. 193). In contrast to mediaeval and early-modern religious maps typically featuring mythical creatures and biblical place names, modern European explorers-cartographers based claims to the realism and accuracy of their maps on the "scientific" methods underlying them (Agha, 2020). Once Edward Said said in a speech:

> *"The paramount thing is that the struggle for equality in Palestine/Israel should be directed towards a humane goal, that is, coexistence, and not further suppression and denial."* (Mavroudi, 2010; p. 152)

Although Said's writing on the future of the conflict called for co-existence, he was ambivalent about the exact nature of such co-existence. Despite this, such a position is a useful one to bear in mind as it reminds us of the importance of looking beyond current boundary formations and controls to a more general recognition of the humane sharing of land and resources (ibid). According to Hamdi (2017), the contestation of space, which is at the heart of many postcolonial debates, can most effectively be gauged by examining Palestinian and international cultural productions in response to the extreme settler-colonialism of the Zionist state, which in essence should claim a central role in postcolonial studies today. The cultural responses to colonialism inevitably involve, as Said (1984) argues, a 'socially acceptable narrative to absorb, sustain and circulate them'. However, at the same time, a certain danger lies in the globalisation of the Palestinian issue. Some postcolonial critics and editors of postcolonial journals have started the project of placing Palestine on the postcolonial map. The problem which arises has to do with the outsider's understanding of the actual history and dynamics of the Palestinian tragedy (Young, 2003; p. 64).

Another important point to be mentioned is that Khalidi (1998) claimed that Said has been successful in conveying a difficult and unpopular message regarding Palestine, in part because of his transparent personal integrity, his obvious erudition, his sense of humour, and his engaging and open personality. All of these characteristics are readily apparent in person, in lectures, and the classroom, but they are also manifest on radio and television. Said's ability to express himself articulately and concisely has been supported by his commanding, authoritative presence on camera. This presence appeals to audiences and encourages open-minded thinking on the question of Palestine (Khalidi, 1998). What has also dwelled upon a new era of orientalism which is the 1993 Oslo Treaty, that Khalidi (1998) pointed out what Said (1993) critiqued the mistakes and incompetency of the approach of the Palestinian leadership to the negotiations with Israel and their dealings with the United States has been scathing:

> *"Is it acceptable to formulate and sign an agreement with Israel without seeking any expert legal opinions? ... Arafat and his principal aides ... do not speak or understand English, which is the language in which the Oslo document is written. Nor did they seek advice about the language. If you want to sign an agreement with Israel, then you must know that the other party to this agreement will take what you sign seriously... I really do not know the explanation for this kind of performance- lack of competence or complicity, or both".* (Khalidi, 1998)

6.1.2. Tibet Exotica

Meanwhile, with Tibet's case on postcolonialism, which has been questioned of where would Tibet fit in? Since, it was never a European colony, though it was for some time under British influence. Ironically, it was colonised by postcolonial China at a time when the rest of the world was witnessing movements for decolonization. However, if we use "postcolonial" to mean a different approach, one that signifies the continuing impact and relevance of colonial practices, the contours of our analysis shift dramatically (Chowdury & Nair, 2002; 210). The theoretical claims are substantiated by an empirical analysis of Western representations in various cultural sites during the twentieth century. This sets the stage for analysing the politics of Exotica Tibet. By examining Tibetan identity discourse ('Tibetanness') in the cultural and political spheres. Anand (2002) not only did he consider the productive effect of representations but more importantly, provided new ways of theorising identity through postcolonialism-inspired symbolic geography and a discursive approach (ibid). Exotica Tibet bases itself on several factors – no European colonisation of Tibet, lack of internal consistency in Western conceptions, willing participation of the Tibetans, and paternal rather than coercive power relationship between the British and the Tibetans (Anand, 2010). Anand (2002) also claims that a concept called "Exotica Tibet" is framed as an Orientalist construct that shares with other `Orients' various rhetorical strategies of cultural representation. Exotica Tibet as a site of Orientalist desires, representations, and practices had its peculiarities. Some of these include the overwhelming attention to and importance of religion; geographical and imaginative location at the edge of the British empire; closed, mystical place resisting opening up; celibate monks as the main custodian of culture; the figure of the Grand Lama, the 'god-king', and so on (ibid). Exotica Tibet, itself is a convenient label for diverse and often contradictory Western representations of Tibet. It should therefore be considered a complex discursive construct characterised by the play of consistency, contradiction, and possibility (ibid).

According to McGranahan (2008), postcolonialism was used in the 1970s as a historical reference indicating the time period following colonials. However, the understanding of postcolonialism has been shifted as more of an ideological term that evokes epistemological knowledge of the historical and political context that imperial relations, which focuses mainly on European empires. According to Hui (2011), different kinds of people support "Tibetan independence," and apart from the criticisms of China's politics from the angles of democracy and human rights, there are three aspects that deserve attention from the perspective of history: (1) knowledge about Tibet in the West is deeply rooted in their Orientalist information, which to this day has not been clarified or sorted out and exerts a strong effect on Europeans; (2) manipulation of public opinion and the organisation of political activities by specific political forces, which for the most part affects the United States; and (3) sympathy for Tibet is mixed with concern about, fear and rejection of, and aversion to China - especially to a China that is registering a rapid economic growth and possesses a radically different political system (ibid).

Anand (2010) also adopted a postcolonial critical attitude, the paper argues for framing Exotica Tibet – shorthand for exoticised (predominantly, but not exclusively, Western) representations of Tibet and Tibetans – as an Orientalist construct. Tibetan exceptionalism is challenged and the importance of Orientalist critique for understanding the construction and continuing imaginative hold of Exotica Tibet is highlighted. Many well-intentioned liberals in the West today are likely to agree with Robert Thurman's extolling narratives of the virtues of Tibet as a uniquely spiritual civilization:

> *"While Western and Tibetan personalities share the complex modernity of consciousness, they are diametrically opposed in outlook, one focused on matter and the other on mind ... While the American national purpose is ever greater material productivity, the Tibetan national purpose is ever greater spiritual productivity" (ibid).*

Anand (2007) also claims that the postcolonial focus on the interrogation of ways in which the West continues to spin a web of knowledge–power regimes in the non-Western world is also critical for understanding the Tibet question. Postcolonial theory contributes substantially to our understanding of imperialism, representation, identity, diaspora, and resistance. However, there is little analysis when it comes to nationalism, sovereignty, self-determination, and domination by postcolonial states (largely because of its scepticism of macro-political ideas). A narrative of what Slavabifooj Zizek describes:

> *"What characterises the European civilization is ... its ex-centred character—the notion that the ultimate pillar of Wisdom, the secret agalma, the spiritual treasure, the lost object –cause of desire, which we in the West long ago betrayed, could be recuperated out there, and in the forbidden exotic place" (Hansen, 2009).*

Meanwhile, another narrative by the Tibet Post International, an NGO run by Tibetan journalists, states that 'Chinese colonialism of Tibet (referred to as the roof of the world), has been the biggest disaster the Tibetan people had to confront in thousands of years of its history. Additionally, the CTA states that ``Colonialism Underlies China's "Modernisation" Drive for Tibet', criticising China's top-down modernisation policies (Frilund, 2020). A discourse that Wang Hui's work on the problem of Tibet as well as his volumes on Chinese modernity is particularly salient here. Wang argues that the Western fascination with Tibet and freeing Tibet from China is partly rooted in orientalism, a claim that is surprisingly controversial or somehow irrelevant to conventional China experts (Vukenovich, 2017). Moreover, the resolution of the crisis—and it is one, for Tibetans and China alike—would be better approached not through independence and modern (and Western) nation-state borders for Tibet, but the Mao-Zhou Enlai formulations (from the 1950s) of relative autonomy under a more traditional empire (ibid). China's arguments have been consistent with traditional colonialist rhetoric, for as Dibyesh Anand argues, under the banner of "chronopolitics," or the "politics of the time," colonial regimes have always claimed that they have "the duty/right to bring progress to the Other," even if that means destroying local cultures (Hartnett, 2013). It is therefore intriguing to speculate about how

China, traditionally understood as a postcolonial state, is deploying chrono-political rhetoric about Tibet that so clearly echoes the premises of colonialism making the Chinese rhetoric an example of postcolonial colonialism (ibid). Similarly, James Hilton's Shangri-la – the hidden valley in the Lost Horizon (1933), a secret repository of ancient Eastern wisdom and Western classical achievements had Europeans as the elite and Tibetans as the subaltern. This discourse presents the myth that Shangri-la came to be associated with Tibet with how it is portrayed by the West (Vukovich, 2017). Anand (2010) claims that Tibet as a Shangri-la performed the role of a service society at a psychic level, existing for the West's self-gratification and self-criticism of Western desires thus leaving little room for cultural and historical specificity of Tibet. Western travellers' search for the 'real Tibet' often takes them beyond actual Tibetans:

> *"The real Tibet I was searching for was not out in the open. It was not in the magnificent temples and palaces, in the colourful bazaars, in the happy and carefree life of its farmers or the entrancing charm of Lhasa's social life. Real Tibet transcends politics and economics; it is invisible, beyond sense perception, beyond intellect. It is the mysterious land of the psyche, of what lies beyond death, a universe to which some Tibetans have the key and which their subtle soul seems to have explored as thoroughly as Western scientists have explored our physical universe" (ibid).*

6.1.3. East vs. West/East vs. East

6.1.3.1 Western Discourse of Tibet

In this section is where I will discuss how Tibet with its non-Western occupation/colonialism contrasts with Palestine's Western occupation/colonialism. Starting with Palestine, which has already been a place and concept of continued interpretation and representation. Its subjects and objects have constantly replaced one another, coexisted, merged with one another, or discontinued. Its boundaries existed only in rudimentary, but shifting imaginations. Contradictory and competing claims and narratives have constructed, again and again, their own Palestine for a period of time and disappeared, leaving behind their traces (Albadarin, 2013). The hostile image of Israel in the first decade of the twenty-first century has come to be identified with commonsense positions, unlike the situation in the United States, where aggressive anti-Israel rhetoric is mostly associated with militants on the political fringe such as David Duke or radicals like Noam Chomsky (Sicher, 2011). Yet, since the early days of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, the struggles between Palestinians and Israelis have been about territoriality, identity, ethnicity and religion, economics, competing nationalisms, colonialism and imperialism. This means that the struggles are multifaceted due to the wide range of factors that have complicated the situation (Sabido, 2015; p. 200-202).

The postcolonial nature of the Israeli Palestinian conflict is a complex one for various reasons. In addition to the debates surrounding the definition and use of the term ‘postcolonial’, the postcolonial history of Palestine is intrinsically connected to the history of Israel, as one cannot be separated from the other. Hence, what is needed to be concerned with is the postcolonial relation between Palestine and Britain, rather than the settler colonist situation that exists between Palestine and Israel (ibid; 202-203). Moreover, intellectual and academic understanding of world affairs is heavily dominated by a postcolonial agenda that has tended to exclude consideration of Jewish issues or anti-Semitism, while making “Palestine” the center of political consensus (ibid). Habschi (2005) claims that ignoring Palestinian reality is a colonialist power perception. Colonialist discourse refuses to account for Palestinian rhetoric but enhances the muting of historical narrative. Thus, drawing upon preconceived assumptions, academic imperialism as a power composition it consciously avoids addressing the historical realities of oppression. Locations have also been a complex political issue and has been an ambiguous invention of the terms: "Israeli settlement" and "Palestine ", which are constructed through discourse as well as space. Each term is contested within a location constructed through colonial experience, contemporary history and war, which situate the terms uncertainty within the postcolonial (Strawson, 2002). In each case, slipping between discursive circulation of representations and the gravity of events. Each discourse articulates new boundaries and with them allocates new identities in which depressing and problematic binary opposites become so mimetic that they are repressed beneath the rubble of rhetorical excess (Habaschi, 2005). This proposition appears in stark contrast to the narrative as it is developed on the web site. It illuminates a more complex history of Zionism than the essentialist presentation by the current Israeli government (Stawson, 2002).

6.1.3.2. Eastern Discourse of Tibet

Tibet is one example of a state that was never colonised by a European empire, but was drawn squarely into the British imperial domain in ways that still matter today. Tibet's neighbour Nepal, however, was also not a colony of the British. The "Never colonised" status, however, is often presumed to signify the lack of a past imperial relationship or the absence of a postcolonial politics in the present (McGranahan, 2017). The Tibetan independence issue emerged at the same time as the West extended its imperialist politics of recognition, that is the system whereby nation-states are recognized as sovereign entities. Almost no country has publicly denied that China possesses sovereignty over Tibet, but the Western concepts of civilization, nation, and sovereignty that dominate the world are unable to countenance the models of feudal allegiance and tributary relations that have existed in the past (Anand, 2010). The views on Tibet, held by contemporary thinkers in Europe, are not only traced back to missionary accounts, but are also rooted in their differing attitudes toward Catholicism. The belief of Ippolito Desider (1684–1733), one of the founders of European Tibetology, that Tibet was a peaceful nation had a drastic effect on changing the image of Tibet in the west. (Wang, 2011; pp. 9-10).

Johann Gottfried Herder, on the other hand, saw similarities between Tibetan Buddhism and Catholicism in that it was a "papal religion." Meanwhile, Immanuel Kant's view on Tibet was that an occult and ancient relationship exists between Europe and Tibet, maintaining at the same time that the Tibetans and peoples of India, Japan, and China are all "strange" hybrids (ibid; pp. 10-11). Tibet has been a unique object of inquiry that complicates the East/South Asian divide, that reminds us of postcolonial studies' lack of attention to current colonialisms, that is often defined through images of imagined authenticity, and that necessitates a de-centering of the novel as the primary object of study, Tibet rarely appears in context of Anglophone and western postcolonial approaches to both South and East Asia (Schultheis, 2007; p.89). Paradoxically, despite its difference, Tibet was often seen as the non-Western culture with which Europeans could identify the points that are founded upon two poles: "On the one hand, Tibet is the least accessible, most mysterious, and most foreign country of Asia; on the other hand, Tibet is paradoxically the only Asian culture with whom Europeans can identify so much that they seem surprisingly intimate and related truly a sort of coincidental oppositorum" (Anand, 2007; p.34). Whereas in the Eastern discourse (Chinese) The system of ethnic regional autonomy is premised on the unity of diversity of the Chinese nation. As compared to the foregoing “Chinese nation” discourse, the unity of diversity concept emphasises the unity among plurality. It not only refers to the state of coexistence of multiple ethnicities, but also means that multiplicity exists in any society that is defined as a minzu (Wang, 2011).

6.2. Comparative Securitization from Diaspora & Homeland

An analysis will be conducted here on the comparative role that the Diaspora of Palestine & Tibet play in their respective securitization and emancipation. I will draw upon the activities that mediate between home and communities in diaspora and the way diaspora expresses the community and its identity on the international level. Furthermore, I will be discussing how the diaspora from both Palestine and Tibet have resorted at times to either violent or non-violent means (self-immolation) as a way to realise their self-determination.

6.2.1. Palestinian Liberation Organization

6.2.1.1. PLO diaspora in Lebanon (pre-civil war)

As previously mentioned, the 1948 Nakba being the starting point of the exile of the Palestinians to foreign lands, where they have been deprived to return to their lands. The loss of their homeland in stages between 1948 and 1967 led among the Palestinians to the evolution of a range of transnational actors and networks. At an informal level, contacts were maintained between Palestinian refugees and Palestinians living inside the Occupied Territories, particularly between those in Jordan, Lebanon and the West Bank. More formally, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) structured itself in exile and evolved into a strong political and associative movement that continues to federate the dispersed communities (Dorai, 2013). This is where I will focus mainly on the Palestinian diaspora organiasations in the Arab region, mostly non-state armed groups. Hence, the Palestinian discourse of resistance was dominated by what was essentially a diaspora-based liberationist strategy adopted by the three main guerrilla groups of the national movement – Fatah, The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). By the 1980s however, the dynamic of the resistance had steadily shifted towards territorialism and the search for sovereignty (Singh, 2012; pp. 529-530). As a result, the national movement too was less anchored in the diaspora and much more so in the occupied territories. In the diaspora, then, it was the PLO and its constituent political organisations that initiated "civil society" institutions, ranging from youth and women's associations to clinics and hospitals, from militias and popular committees in camps to artisan shops and, in some cases, factories (Hilal, 1993; p. 50). Designated as mughtaribun by the Palestinians from the OPT (Occupied Palestinian Territories) - a label that implicitly casts them as foreigners-they prefer to introduce themselves as of the 'Palestinian diaspora.' (Guignard, 2016; 137-138). Autonomous Palestinian institution-building, by contrast, began in the diaspora.

Fateh (PLO in Arabic), the first authentic Palestinian organization, emerged in Lebanon in 1959, and its success in dominating the PLO ten years later further diasporized the movement. A profile of Fatah's leadership reflects its diaspora political roots - which leads to Yasser Arafat becoming the undisputed Palestinain leader in politics solely in the diaspora (Frisch, 2009). Once Fatah and the other guerrilla factions took over the PLO in 1968, and Fatah established its hegemony over the organisation, the composition of the Executive Committee changed radically in favour of those who had made their mark outside the physical boundaries of Mandate Palestine (Frisch, 2012). A comparison between the composition of the Executive Committees of the PLO during the years 1964-67 and during the three years after Arafat became chairman at the sixth PNC meeting in Cairo in January 1969 also clearly reflects the hold of the diaspora-based leadership over the PLO (ibid). One important event that occurred in later that year was tensions that soon erupted between the PLO and the Lebanese Army into open fighting between the sides from April 1969 until the signing of the Cairo Agreement on November 1969, where the PLO recognised the government's sovereignty over Lebanon in exchange for the total right of stay in the refugee camps and urban areas where the Palestinians lived. Beyond that, the Lebanese government tolerated Palestinian guerrilla actions against Israel on the condition that these were coordinated by the Lebanese High Command. For the first time a front line state agreed formally to the use of its territory for guerrilla warfare against Israel (Siklawi, 2010; p. 602).

These political and military achievements were complemented by social and organisational ones. Through the 1970s and early 1980s the PLO's administrative structure had seen considerable expansion, such that by the spring of 1982 it constituted a virtual Palestinian "para-state" in Lebanon. The PLO's military forces-over ten thousand well-armed fighters in semi-regular formations, backed by thousands more militia-were but one element of this (Brynen, 1989; pp.52). On the political front, West Beirut had become the headquarters of the Palestinian leadership and the nerve center of a vast international network of diplomatic and information offices and personnel. Lebanon had also become the centre of a vast array of PLO social support institutions constructed to aid Palestinians in Lebanon and throughout the diaspora (Siklawi, 2010; p. 605). The creation of the para-state in Lebanon took a military turn with the transformation of guerrilla units into conventional army formations. It is estimated that the PLO spent at least a third of its budget just to support its standing army. The effort to establish a conventional army was another indication that Lebanon was becoming a permanent base of Palestinian nationalism (Hilal, 1993; p. 49).

6.2.1.2. PLO diaspora in Jordan

Jordan on the other hand, has had a more basic problem for the PLO to lay in its failure to grasp the near impossibility of creating a para-state in foreign territory. In Jordan, the organisation had been foiled by a sovereign territorial state (Shiblak, 1997). Even though Jordan has a very big population of Palestinians - which According to official figures, Palestinian-origin Jordanians account for about 43% of the population. The majority hold Jordanian citizenship which was given to all those residing in Jordan after the Al-Nakba; when Israel was founded on the land of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who were dispossessed from their homes (El Abed, 2021). However, when democratization and the legalization of political parties began in Jordan, there arose a complicated relation between the PLO and its constituent groups on the one hand and Jordan's Palestinian community, the largest outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip on the other. In the absence of direct political mobilisation, given the citizenship status of Palestinians in Jordan, indirect and complex mediations have been necessary (Hilal, 1993; p. 53).

After September 1970, however, it was a moot point. For the Palestinian movement, the major lesson of Black September in Jordan was clear: the continued survival of the Palestinian resistance required the mobilization of a broad base of Arab support, one which would both sustain the PLO and constrain the ability of certain regimes to strike at it (Brynen, 1989; p. 55). It had been clear that King Hussein of Jordan did not want to lose his control over the Palestinians at a time when he was trying to negotiate with Israel to recover the West Bank to create a Greater Jordan. But the PLO was able to operate freely in Jordan due to the fact that Palestinians form the majority of the Jordanian population. When the Black September erupted, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked Swissair, TWA, and BOAC airlines and forced them to land in the Jordanian desert airport of Zarqa (Siklawi, 2010; pp. 604). This along with an unsuccessful assassination attempts by the PFLP targeting King Husayn was enough to muster the Jordanian Army "against the growing guerrilla power of Palestinian resistance movement in the country. In the following months, the commando leadership found itself obliged to accede to royalist demands for the dismantling of commando and militia organisations in the cities" (ibid). The Palestinian diaspora outside the camps, have unfortunately lacked the basic features of communities, dispersed as they are in their places of work and residence and, in some cases, more or less integrated economically and socially into the host country (as in Jordan and to a lesser extent Syria) (Frisch, 2009; p. 259). Moreover, in the various countries where the Palestinians are concentrated and where their cause has popular support, any organized expression of Palestinian national identity - which of necessity has a prominent political dimension is almost inevitably seen as destabilizing (Hilal, 1993; p. 56). Thus, establishing the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 as the de facto representation of the Palestinian community, both territorial and diaspora. It began under Yasser Arafat's leadership where he took charge of the Palestinian voice. The PLO includes different political and armed groups with varying ideological orientations. In the 1960s, the PLO's primary base of operations was Jordan. In 1970-71, fighting with the Jordanian army drove the PLO leadership out of the country, forcing it to relocate to Lebanon. When the Lebanese civil war started in 1975, the PLO became a party in the conflict. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the PLO leadership was expelled from the country, relocating once more to Tunisia (Beinin & Hajjar, 2014; 34).

6.2.1.3. PLO diaspora in Lebanon (post-civil war)

PLO has been confronted with a number of serious challenges. Since its resistance movement lost its major operational and social base in Jordan in 1970-71, which meant that it could no longer operate freely against Israel from Jordanian territory or mobilize the large Palestinian population in the country (Frisch, 2009; p. 253). But as serious as they were the ramifications of the defeat in Jordan, they had taken place earlier than the catastrophic effects of the bloody civil war in Lebanon that began in 1975, in which the PLO had become entangled. The Israeli invasion and three-month siege of Beirut in 1982 culminated in the forced departure of the PLO and its exile to Tunis, the effects of which still reverberate to this day (Hilal, 1993; p. 49). Firstly, I would be talking about how the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) has been a turning point for the Palestinian diaspora - when it started to get involved in its war with the pro-Israeli Lebanese Christian party the Kataeb (Phalalngists). This war posed a serious threat to Palestinain survival, with the fall of their refugee camps of Tal al-Za'tar, al-Naba, Jisr al-Basha and Dubaya (all in East Beirut) into the hands of the Kataeb (Siklawi, 2011; 607).

The fall of the Palestinian refugee camps in East Beirut signified that the Palestinian resistance had lost the battle. The Phalangist offensive against the Palestinian camps in East Beirut was the major turning point of the Lebanese Civil War, as it led to massive Palestinian retaliation against the Christian town of Damour (ibid; Frisch, 2009; p. 259). The civil war and the withdrawal of an effective state left a vacuum in the provision of social services that the PLO felt only it could fill in order to take care of the needs of the Palestinian people. The ‘alternative state’ (al-watan al-badil) in Lebanon came to comprise 140 Palestinian Red Crescent Society clinics augmented by 47 more run by Samed, the PLO’s economic arm, ten hospitals, and a vast bureaucratic network of over 8,000 employees (Frisch, 2009; p. 248). The PLO para-state presumably enjoyed a budget in the hundreds of millions of dollars (including constituent organisations), three-quarters of which went to support the PLO’s social and administrative programs. Such a build-up amounted to state-building rather than just the replacement of the official Lebanese presence (Frisch, 2012; p. 252-253). The Palestinians’ defeat in the Lebanese civil war, resulted in the removal of the PLO from the region of conflict. The relocation of the Palestinians within Lebanon began after the 1982 war. Major events, primarily the horrendous massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shetila in West Beirut (Siklawi, 2011; pp. 246-247) plus the fact that some other camps in Lebanon, particularly the Dubya camp have been totally demolished, had a direct effect on the need to restructure the Palestinian camps. Equally, which is currently con as the "Palestinian Embassy" since it contains the political headquarters of many Palestinian organizations, including humanitarian, social, aid, and civilian organizations (Frisch, 2012; p. 253). Further, with the relocation of the PLO headquarters from Beirut to Tunis in 1982, the semi-state apparatus (military, paramilitary, diplomatic, administrative) became an obvious political and financial burden, due to the PLO having a greater difficulty in maintaining the cohesiveness and effectiveness of its institutions outside the occupied territories (ibid). Thus, causing the organization's failure to respond to the one factor in the PLO crisis that sharply differs from the Palestinians both in the diaspora and the occupied territories resulting in different paths of growth within the Palestinian movement (Hilal, 1993; p. 50)

6.2.1.4. Intifada - Oslo Accord

During the days of when Tunis hosted the PLO came one of the most relived events that occurred at the expense of the Palestinians; the Intifada. The Intifada was the emergence of an institutionalized Palestinian nationalism that was independent of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict which was trailing after the Arab defeat in the 1967 war (Alin, 1994; 482). Hilal (1993) claims that there was no guarantee that the West would not aspire Palestinain self-determination to loftier heights, especially since they claimed credit for the success of the Intifada. Although, many Western and Israeli analyses of the relationship between the internal leaders of the intifada and the then-Tunis-based leadership of the PLO have tended to emphasise the political distance between Tunis and the occupied territories (Cobban, 1990). Other writers have judged that the PLO leaders were taken by surprise by the original eruption of the uprising in 1987 and have been trying to make up the lost ground ever since. While some analyses claim that it had attained a significant success in capturing the spirit of the Palestinian national movement, through the empowerment within the movement of the constituency resident within the bounds of the historical Palestinian homeland (Frisch, 2009; p. 252).

The First Intifada has helped raise awareness of the Palestinian people and helped bring world attention to the Israeli occupation. The intifada was a critical period for Palestine in that it helped create the social and political environment in which Palestine was to issue its second declaration of independence, in 1988 (Stokes, 2016). This geographical remoteness from Palestine coincided with a strengthened involvement in the diplomatic option. This choice led the Palestinian movement to embark upon the negotiations that would result in the signature of the Oslo accords in 1993. The PLO agreed to postpone the discussion around implementing the Palestinian refugees' right of return to the "Final status agreement" designated to take place in 1999 (Guignanrd, 2016; pp. 135-136). In return, the Israeli government conceded to grant the possibility of return to a few thousand Palestinians. The concession was presented as a 'gesture of goodwill' that did not involve any explicit recognition of UN General Assembly Resolution 194, which was the first to grant Palestinians a collective right of return (Hilel, 1993). Some discernible differences did exist between the political trends and imperatives operating among resident Palestinians and the outside leadership, but such differences never threatened the essential unity between these two wings of the national movement underlined by both sides throughout the intifada (Cobban, 1994). In fact, after the two years of chronic suffering that accompanied the intifada, lay the resident Palestinians' greatest achievement. For if the real intention of Prime Minister Shamir, when he launched his election proposal, was to foster the emergence of an alternative leadership that would challenge the PLO's claim to lead the Palestinians, then he failed to achieve this (ibid). This has been considered to be an inconsistent and disloyal to their sense of Palestinian identity to make a separate peace negotiation of both parties at the expense of the Palestinian diaspora, because they themselves are under occupation, they look to the diaspora for leadership in the pursuit of their national right (Kelmen, 1987; 350-351). Aruri et al. (2012) claimed that the PLO was easily enticed to embark on the Oslo process, just as it had been persuaded to enter into the joint diplomatic struggle for a futile two-state solution two decades earlier. Israel’s aim was to side-line the political/civil society struggle going on inside the Occupied Territories. From there the road to Oslo was paved for an unprepared PLO, and the result was the present disaster.

6.2.2. Tibet-Government-In-Exile

6.2.2.1. TGIE diaspora political structure

As mentioned above, for the past six-decades, the Tibetan-Government-In-Exile has been centred in the city of Dharamsala India, where their spiritual leader Dalai Lama also is based. In South Asia (India & Nepal), Tibetans re-created their sovereign government as a functioning political body. In doing so they both remade the previous Tibetan government and forged an entirely new, modern extraterritorial polity (McConnell 2009). The Tibetan refugee community has managed to rebuild their lives in a completely alien environment with about 130,000 refugees worldwide: achieving almost total economic self-reliance (Bernstoff & von Welck, 2003). The majority of the refugees in South Asia are settled in 46 settlements, comprising 24 agricultural, 16 agro-industrial and 10 handicraft units. Almost all the settlements are provided with primary and secondary schools, primary health care centres, and cooperative societies (ibid). Their claims to sovereignty in Tibet rested on their refusal of citizenship in India and Nepal, a refusal that allowed them to be claimed as refugee citizens by the exile government. This refusal took place in the context of multiple histories of empire and sovereignty: ongoing Chinese settler colonialism in Tibet (McGranahan, 2018). When the Chinese occupied Tibet, causing their leader Dalai Lama to exile in Dharamsala, along with many other Tibetan diasporas, though the Tibetan diaspora elite's observation might be uncomfortable to many, as well as to Tibetophiles, the other displaced people with whom the Tibetans share significant characteristics are the Palestinians. The duration of the Palestinian diaspora is similar to that of the Tibetans, since both "lost" their homelands in the middle of the twentieth century (Anand, 2003; p. 211). The first major challenge the Dalai Lama faced was to ensure the acceptance and survival of 80,000 Tibetans in an alien country with a tropical climate. India, itself a fledgling democracy and facing huge development challenges, generously donated humanitarian assistance and helped thousands of Tibetans to find jobs (Sangay, 2003). In addition, the government in Delhi provided land on which to establish separate Tibetan settlements. Indian magnanimity thus not only helped to save lives, but also aided the preservation of Tibetan national identity and sustained the Tibetan freedom struggle (Tongypal, 2013). Institutionally, the Tibetan diaspora is organised hierarchically with the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE), or the Central Tibetan Administration (CTE), at the apex, with a popularly elected "Sikyong", or prime minister, and ministries under him, a Parliament and a judiciary headquartered in Dharamsala, with local offices providing a number of public services and de facto embassies conducting diplomatic activities around the world (ibid). According to Chen (2012), Tibetans as 'Indian Other' (i.e. the Tibetans in India) have gained less attention than Tibetans as 'Tibetan Other' (i.e. the Tibetans in China). Hence, this chapter concentrates on Tibetans as 'Indian Other' although migration of Tibetan-born Tibetans as a whole is an example of Tibetan Other both in China and in India. Particularly, two major discourses that trigger their onward-migration aspirations in Dharamsala stand out in this study: their subaltern position in India and the international networks available in Dharamsala. To an important extent, the non-ethnic Tibetan diaspora have redefined the nature and character of diasporic nationalism through economic, political and specific cultural interventions. In their effort to salvage a culture facing extinction, these converts have extended generous economic support for the establishment and upkeep of new monasteries, educational institutions and cultural centres outside Tibet. Thanks to the religion–politics interface of Tibetan identity, the promotion of Tibetan culture has contributed towards the articulation of autonomy demands (Misra, 2003).

6.2.2.2. TGIE diaspora in India

The Tibetan diaspora has also been shown to possess unique characteristics that have theoretical implications for diaspora studies in terms of definition, emergence, organisational and spatial logics and political agency. Firstly, because the Tibetan diaspora is diverse in its migration history from traumatic events, attachment to Tibetan culture and nostalgia for Tibet as a homeland and commitment to the political project of the TGIE, by avoiding the trauma of the diaspora (Topgyal, 2011). Secondly, Tibetan diaspora is treated as deterritorialized entities, however, some diasporas are supposed to inhabit sacred territories valued by themselves and coveted by both host-states and neighbouring states ruled by co-nationals (ibid). Lastly, since the Dalai Lama has given up all his political authority to popularly elected officials in TGIE by adding something unique to its tapestry by organising an hierarchical-like state institution that examines Tibetan diasporic democratisation to assume statehood (ibid). Anand (2003) points out some specific reference to the theoretical category of Diaspora as it is inevitably used for the Tibetans, the term not only contained the reality of Tibetan exile community and the remnants of classical definitions, but also the constitutive traces of its travel among several theoretical fields as well as among several formations that have adopted the label of Diaspora. According to McGranahan (2005), diaspora communities are usually reconstituting communities in a time of national trauma within new and scattered locales which is not an easy task, yet the Tibetan diaspora has worked hard to create a coherent refugee community. Although dislocation does force a new shared refugee identity on Tibetans, this identity does not always trump the power of "local, tribal, and sectarian identities" that have long played "a divisive role in the Tibetan world. Meanwhile, as events after 2008 have demonstrated beyond doubt, there is also a sizable number of Tibetans inside Tibet who aspire to be part of an independent Tibet. Because they directly experience China's repressive policies and lack the moderating counsel of the Dalai Lama, some of them rioted violently in Lhasa and other regions on March 14-16, 2008 (Topgyal, 2013; 213).

Anand (2003, p. 205) claims that the rhetoric of the homeland can be seen as a hyperreal construction to keep the Tibetan identity in firm relation to the nation-state world order, as one people belonging to a distinct nation. The act of rooting outside of Tibet is thus a difficult issue. It is neither really allowed by the host nor wanted by the Tibetan government in exile. Many Tibetans in India and Nepal appear content with their ascriptive existence. Although those living in the settlements in central, eastern and southern India lead a particularised and somewhat isolated existence, they nonetheless appear reconciled to their situation. But, it is more important to note that those living in various designated areas in the foothills of the Himalayas and other high-altitude regions in the north harbour a false sense of nationhood (Misra, 2003). In terms of the relationship between the exile Tibetan administration and the Indian Government, the latter has been an extraordinarily generous and tolerant host, and exile Tibetans have been grateful and largely obedient guests. The relationship is founded on the basis of long-standing spiritual and cultural connections between Tibet and India and the high regard with which the Dalai Lama is held by the Indian public (McConell, 2011). Moreover, these relations are, in many ways, mutually beneficial. The TGIE has relied on Indian political and bureaucratic expertise for the development of its constitution, its election system and for training its civil servants (ibid). The presence of the exile Tibetan community and its numerous successful institutions has, in turn, instigated a cultural and religious revival in India's Buddhist Himalayan regions.

Despite such hospitality, India has never offered the TGIE formal legal or political recognition as a government, nor the Dalai Lama the status of a legitimate political leader (Misra, 2003). Unfortunately, the TGIE has not been recognized by any nation-state, including India. Nevertheless, India has given the TGIE much leeway in determining policy for its subjects in India. More importantly, the power of the TGIE lies in its ability to generate loyalty from the exile (Hess, 2009) in a context where it holds very little actual authority over them. That it has largely continued by so after 60-years of exile is a testament to the Dalai Lama's stature and the devotion of his followers, as well as to the democratic transformations that have taken place within the exile government (McGranahan, 2018).

6.2.2.3. TGIE-CIA plan

A significant event occurred within the Tibetan diaspora in 1958, when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began collaborating with Tibetan exiles to form a Tibetan Guerilla warfare. The notions of "Tibet" and "Tibetans' ' and how to categorise Tibetans have been problematic for the United States ever since (McGranahan, 2006). Hess (2005) argues that the United States' responses to Tibet depend on current strategizing with Tibet's neighbours and alignment with current interpretations of "American " moral and political ideologies. This narration occured as early as 1949:

> *"When the U.S. ambassador in India proposed in a memo to the State Department that if the Chinese Communists succeeded in taking control of Tibet, the United States should be prepared to recognize Tibet as independent."* (ibid).

Masko (2013) claims that when the CIA began to establish its Tibetan program following the Chinese invasion, it would take full advantage of both pro-Buddhist and anti-PRC sentiments in the region, creating a network of sympathisers that stretched from India to Taiwan to Nepal. McGranahan (2006) pointed at a Tibetan proverb that "an unspoken word has freedom, a spoken word has none." But the freedom of things unspoken is not without limits. Secrets, for example, though supposedly not to be told, derive their value in part by being shared rather than being kept. Sharing secrets - revealing the unspoken - often involves cultural systems of regulation regarding who can be told, who can tell, what degree of disclosure is allowed, and so on (ibid). As a form of control over knowledge, secrecy is recognized in many societies as a means through which power is both gained and maintained. Together, Tibet and the CIA present the irresistible combination of two twentieth-century icons of forbidden mystery and intrigue (ibid). The Tibetans in Colorado were members of a guerrilla resistance force that fought against the Chinese PLA from 1956 through 1974. Began as a series of independent uprisings against increasingly oppressive Chinese rule, the resistance soon grew into a united volunteer army, known as the Chushi Gangdrug Army.

The Chushi Gangdrug Army fought against the PLA first from within Tibet and later from a military base in Mustang, a Tibetan district within the borders of Nepal (McGranahan, 2010). Even though the CIA did more than support a Tibetan guerrilla army. They have directed various activities such the establishment of offices in Geneva and New York to allegedly promote Tibetan handicrafts and to publicise the Tibetan cause but in reality to establish quasi-diplomatic offices for the Dalai Lama (Masko, 2013). Moreover, the Chushi Gangdrug resistance army defended Tibet, Buddhism, and the Dalai Lama from the PLA. In 1949, however, soon after defeating Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist army and establishing the People's Republic of China, Mao announced his intention to liberate Tibet from religion (McGranahan, 2010). Tibet, at the time, had only a small, weak army, and the Dalai Lama's government decided to cooperate with the Chinese. After several years of tense, but mostly peaceful relations between the two governments, things deteriorated rapidly as the Chinese introduced sweeping social and political reforms in eastern Tibet (ibid). Yet, after the Chinese invasion in 1950, "the United States looked toward India and Britain to take the lead in raising the issue with the United Nations". Today, the United States officially concurs with China's contention that Tibet is part of "One China." (Hess, 2005).

6.3. Nationalism and Self-Determination

Yes, people are suffering in Tibet and so are the people of Palestine. Both dream of returning to their homelands once again, for some it is the time of harvest and for others, it is the time of destruction of the lands. Around the same time as the Nakba, the Tibetan struggle occurred. Therefore, causing both parties to have a unique stateless nationalism as well as access to self-determination through violent or non-violent means.

6.3.1 Palestinian Nationalism and Self-determination

The perspective of the 'identity discourse', which sees the conflict as between a 'Palestinian people' and a 'Jewish people' both desirous of territorial self-determination within Mandate Palestine, is 'an acceptance of ethnonationalism that is unusual at best and arguably aberrant, and ruinous in this case' (Bashir & Bushridge, 2019; 388-389). Although, Palestinians continue to lose the battle of the occupied territories and the headquarters of the Palestinian authorities are under constant attack by Israeli forces. Palestinians are conceptualised as Arabs, and thus become a source of existential threat in the international system (Dondeir, 2021). The idea that Palestinian rights to national self-determination in historic Palestine should be achieved alongside Israeli Jewish rights to the same is widely seen by one-state advocates as anathema to genuine decolonisation. If nationalism is a process of 'identity-enforcement' that is 'almost always' implicated in the suppression or denial of other identities as Edward Said has argued, then not just accommodating but explicitly foregrounding national identities in any future shared polity risks entrenching separation, exclusion, and Othering – hardly the stuff of decolonising relationships (Sabido, 2019; p. 210). Edward Said's Question of Palestine (1983) narrated the history of the community in this way: "Palestine became a predominantly Arab and Islamic country by the end of the seventh century". After this seventh-century consolidation of community and geography into the territory of Filastin the country was recognized by "the entire Islamic world, as much for its fertility and beauty as for its religious significance" (Bitar, 2011). Israeli Jewish nationalism, in particular, is regarded as especially problematic to many given that it is largely a settler-colonial achievement. Particularly with the framing of Israeli Jews (and not just those in the Occupied Territories) as a settler collective as per the settler colonial paradigm, the idea that achieving self-determination on land they have forcibly occupied is considered tantamount to entrenching colonial presence and legitimising colonialism (Bashir & Bushridge, 2019; 297-398). Since, the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, the Palestinian national movement, political system and leadership faced a difficult choice over the renewal of the leadership, as Arafat had been the spine of that regime over the previous decades (Ghanem, 2013). The difficult choice, however, was not limited to Arafat's replacement in chairing the PLO's Executive Committee, the PNA or Fatah; the real challenge was to address new developments that might lead to the participation of non PLO factions, specifically Hamas, in the political scene (ibid). However, both Fatah and Hamās remain the premier political forces in Palestine. Both organisations have a primary goal that is essentially political: the creation of the State of Palestine. These groups also are Palestinian nationalistic in orientation under a similar ethnic banner (Alshadfiat, 2012; p. 44).

6.3.1.1. Islamic Nationalism (Hamas)

Palestine is apparently in the middle of a tug-of-war between Islamic and Secular nationalism. The political splits within the Palestinian national movement, and the strengthening of armed and cross-factional militias seeking political power and an end to occupation through violent confrontation, created the time and space for Hamas to rebuild its political/military infrastructure and pursue a form of militancy that went beyond Fateh's own (Roy, 2004; p. 259-260). By attacking civilian targets inside Israel - a strategy subsequently followed by Fateh and others - Hamas not only succeeded in gaining support from an increasingly desperate population, but also in undermining the PLO. The PLO was blamed for the attacks and the diplomatic initiatives it was pursuing (Singh, 2012). Stoenescu (2007) claims that in the Palestinian context the factors that promote Palestinian nationalism are the occupation of Palestine by the state of Israel, the mistreatment of Palestinians by Israel and some Arab states, the lack of economic opportunities for Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and the countries where they sought refuge, the lack of citizenship rights for many Palestinian refugees, dislike of Western and Israeli military presence in the Middle East. From a historical perspective, Arabs, including Palestinians, always tried to have Islam as a fundamental part of their Arab identity for several reasons. On one hand, as Peretz argues that Islam is seen as a way to resist the "Christian" West since the time of the Crusades up to the present, thus legitimizing religion as a factor that brings freedom in the Arab world. Hamas's reformist and military approach to the struggle against Israel has also been defined within the limits of the Palestinian territories. It does not work for a transnational reformation of the Muslim world in preparation for a global jihad against Israel and its allies. Rather, it works through a diverse network of charitable institutions in Palestine to support all Palestinians while promoting an Islamic reformation within Palestinian society (Perez, 2014; p. 806).

Hamas's goals, a nationalist position couched in religious discourse, are articulated in Hamas's key documents: a charter, political memoranda, and communiques. Yet later documentation, particularly since the mid-1990s, is less doctrinaire and depicts the struggle as a form of resistance to an occupying power-as a struggle over land and its usurpation, and over how to end the occupation (Roy, 2004; p. 507). Other problematic issues for Hamas include the party's perceived rejection by Christian and secular Palestinian owing to its Islamic identity. It seems that Hamas is aware of the problem, and there are reports that its activists approached Christian personalities in several towns asking them to stand for elections with the full and open backing of the organisation (Baumgarten, 2005; P. 42). Hamas has undoubtedly carved out a unique niche and identity for itself in the Palestinian political landscape against much more established rivals, such as Fatah. It has accomplished this primarily by rearticulating the Palestinian project for statehood and its use of violence in the national struggle in overtly Islamic terms (Dunning, 2015; Singh, 2012). Hamas's political narrative fuses an anti-secular, anti-colonial ideology with an anti-Zionist, anti-Jewish perspective that is shaped 'both by doctrine drawn from the Qu'ran and other Islamic sources as well as European anti-Semitic perspectives' (Singh, 2012). In other words, it uses the language of political Islam to harness classical Islamic symbols and conceptions to modern secular ideologies and concerns – in this case, the Palestinian quest for a nation-state. For Hamas, the individual moral obligation of jihad is framed as being central to the fight for the Palestinian state (ibid.).

6.3.1.2. Secular Nationalism (Fatah)

Fatah was then, more of an expression of a more specific Palestinian nationalism having been founded on the principle of a separate Palestinian movement. Fatah, in contrast to the Islamist Hamas was a truly mass movement whose hegemony in Palestinian politics remained undisputed until Hamas's emergence in the late 1980s (Baumgarten, 2005; p. 26). However, Dunning (2015), contrasted that aside from Yasser Arafat, the founding members of Fatah were former Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood disenchanted with the Brotherhoods's passivity and lack of military resistance against Israel (Ghanem, 2013; Dunning, 2015). Ironically, it was in 1974 when Arafat and the PLO started moving towards accommodation with Israel and a two state solution that the Islamists began to move towards armed resistance in the form of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Perez, 2014; p. 808). As a result, it is common to find that many Palestinians – whether they are inclined towards Fatah, Hamas or neither – believe that Fatah itself is an Islamic organisation, despite common assertions of Fatah's secularity in mainstream international discourses. Khatib (survey 2010), a 20-year-old Fatah supporter, for instance, describes Fatah as the "one who combined love of Islam and the country" and whose priorities are "Islam, Allah and the land." (Dunning, 2015; pp. 284-285). Although, during the beginning of the Cold War, Palestinian nationalism was mostly affiliated with Marxist, anti-Western, and secular ideology. In the Arab world, these developments and ideological currents manifested themselves as a distinct political project, commonly referred to as pan-Arabism. After the decline in Arab Nationalism, the main struggle in contemporary Palestinian society is between what Lybarger refers to as the 'Islamist milieu' represented by the dominant Hamas and the secular-nationalist milieu represented by Fatah, which is the dominant faction in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (Cutriss, 2010). Lybarger (2007) discovered that, due to competition and division between the Islamist and secular, activists integrated elements from both the Islamist and secular milieus in reformulating new political identities (ibid). The boundaries between Islamism and secularism in the Palestinian setting have become blurred as both secularists and Islamists use both secular and Islamist symbols to further their agenda in securing the Palestinian vote.In brief, pan-Arabists claimed that only by uniting under one secular and progressive nation could the Arabs hope comparing Fatah and Hamas to escape their current state of backwardness and modernize, and only then could they hope to defeat Israel and liberate Palestine (Løvile, 2014; pp. 104-105).

6.3.1.3. Securitization and Self-Determination of Palestinian Identity

Rostow (1979) claims that the proponents of "Palestinian self-determination " believe that such a step would eliminate the only point of dissension between the majority of the Arabs and the West. Palestinians believe that the object of the campaign for a third Palestinian state is not a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem, but the destruction of Israel. Israelis, however, have shown opposition to living and interacting with the Palestinians (Abu-Zahra et al. 2016). Hence, the historical trauma and conceptual rigidity of threats that lie at the core of the Israeli state have become a guide to prioritising ontological security over desecuritization (Kinvall, 2004). Nevertheless, particularly in the context of Jerusalem, both Israeli citizens and Palestinians are becoming increasingly sensitive to the contribution of these routinized relations of conflict to the cycle of violence. Thus, securitized practices of establishing ontological security by the Palestinians. Consequently, the rising demand to create space for alternative ways of security and narratives of identity (Lupovici, 2012).

Abu Zaher et al. (2016) claims that the securitization of Palestinians and a subsequent depoliticization of security discourse and practice is carried out through two primary strategies: securitizing the Palestinians by constructing them as “the Other” through a discourse of threat and containment, and maintaining repression below the threshold of visibility through depoliticization. Through these tactics, the repression of Palestinians is removed from politics and placed within the untouchable black box of “security. Palestine’s main security for emancipation comes from violent military. Mason (2021; p.113-114) pointed out that the emancipation in the Palestinian cases has envisaged here is about enabling people facing injustice and inequality to throw off colonial, apartheid, racist, and oppressive yokes. In striving for emancipation, while insecurity, violence and conflict getting ever more destructive to bare life - stripped of every right and at all times exposed to an unconditional threat of death. Hamas, on the other, has been using violent tactics, including mortar attacks and suicide bombings against the Israeli state and its citizens for its emancipation, endorsed both a military jihad (literally ‘struggle’) against Israel and social welfare as equally legitimate means for realizing its goal of an independent Islamic Palestinian state (Singh, 2012; p. 531-532).

Meanwhile, underlying all of these processes - and the two-states partition that is intended to resolve them - is the notion that Israelis and Palestinians are effectively incompatible identity groups, whose conflict is one in which the notion of security for one side requires the imposition of an indefinite state of emergency on the other. This is, then, the very epitome of securitization through the lens of the Copenhagen School (Abu-Zahra, 2016; pp. 388-389). More importantly, as the preceding testimony demonstrates it is the pursuit of greater political agency that motivates Palestinian resistance. This falls squarely within the framework of emancipatory realism as articulated by the Aberystwyth School (ibid.). Indeed, though the conceptual tools provided by the Copenhagen School discussion of securitization show us how, in this context, Palestinians have been confined to a permanent state of emergency; denied basic rights and dignity, and labelled as a threat, it is the Aberystwyth School that unabashedly articulates the need for a normative response (ibid.; p. 390). According to Fatafa & Tarir (2020), bringing a reformed PLO must answer to the Palestinian people first and foremost, by bringing in a new generation of Palestinian leaders is imperative. However, the Palestinian political playing field is currently spotted with structural obstacles to the emergence of young Palestinian leaders committed to the Palestinian struggle for justice and freedom. Due to international donors' obsession with cultivating Palestinian technocrats, who are seperateted from the lived realities of Palestinians under occupation and in the diaspora to the protection of the ruling elites and the violent suppression of voices that could challenge the status quo, young Palestinian leaders are undermined at every turn (ibid).

6.3.2 Tibetan Nationalism and Self-Determination

6.3.2.1. Buddhist Nationalism

According to Uhlin (2007) it is not true to simply state that Tibetan nationalism began only after the exile, as some sort of orientalist appropriation of Buddhist modernism led by the Dalai Lama, thus propagating the image of Tibet and its people as democratic, peace loving and environmentally friendly. Buddhism has always been a vital element in Tibetan Nationalism, this brand of nationalism defines the Tibetan nation by using traditional Buddhist values such as compassion, karma, and the bond between Tibetans and their gods. The nation thus defined is not, however, traditional Tibet with its diversity of local cultural, social, and political communities, but a modern country united by its opposition to Chinese oppression (Dreyfus, 2005). The Tibetans that have been exhorted by the exile government in Dharamsala and by their peers to drop regional and sectarian identities in favour of pan-Tibetan identities, by continuing to elect their representatives to the exile Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies based on just such regional and sectarian affiliations (McGranahan, 2005; 573). Security is a public good and its provision is a fundamental duty; it appears natural and incumbent upon states to create security (Tongypal, 2013; 518-519). Nationalism, however, has an image problem. It is deemed emotional, irrational and threatening. One's nationalism is desirable and positive, while others' nationalisms are "dangerously irrational, surplus and alien," and popularly associated with the extremism of fascism and ethnic cleansing (ibid). Moreover, the Tibetan parliament-in-exile is also an institution of the Dalai Lama and acts as a unifying symbol for matters of religion and politics. He is the king and the god, the active agent between this world and the next. He presents contradictory images: a 'simple Buddhist monk'/the supreme head of Tibetan Buddhism; a human god; world-renouncing/world-encompassing. Personal loyalty to the Dalai Lama plays a key role in the government-in-exile's efforts to strengthen the sense of a united Tibetan identity with its faith in Buddhism which has provided cohesion necessary for maintaining a form of 'proto-nationalism' within a broadly dispersed world society (Anand, 2000; p. 282). According to Topygal (2012), the keyword is "normal" and the Chinese state determine what "normal" is whatever serves the interests of the CCP and the Chinese state - not the Tibetan Buddhists themselves, leaving ample scope for the former to associate various aspects of Tibetan Buddhism with 'narrow nationalism", splittism/separatism, extremism and superstition in order to securitise the Tibetan religion. Chen Kuiyen, the former TAR Party Secretary, was most clear when he petitioned Beijing in 1994 for tougher measures against Tibetan Buddhists:

> *"The continuous expansion of temples and Buddhist monks and nuns should be contained. We shall not allow religion to be used by the Dalai clique as a tool for their splittist activities. This is an outstanding and key issue concerning party construction in Tibet. Under the precondition that we shall rely on education, we shall also take some forceful measures to stop this perverse trend (ibid.)."*

6.3.2.2. Securitization and Self-Determination for Tibetan identity.

The Dalai Lama embodies Tibetan culture. He creates images of Tibet, builds community through alliances among resident and exiled Tibetan populations, sustains non-Tibetan and Tibetan Buddhist believers, works toward Tibetan self-determination and functions as the central locus of power and identity within the Tibetan diaspora (Houston & Wright, 2003). The issue, therefore, is not whether the Tibetan people have or do not have a right to self-determination. This is an inalienable right for all peoples everywhere, and one that cannot be compromised. However, this right is inevitably invoked in a political context for a political goal of self-determination, and it can be exercised only by political means whether violent or non-violent (Bhattacharjea, 1996). Jnwali (2022) claims that, unfortunately, foreign powers cannot offend China at the expense of their national interests. Consequently, EU's support for the Tibetans' self-determination struggles for instance, has dwindled. Topygal (2011) pointed out that as the Copenhagen School posits, these threats from China range from 'intentional, programmatic and political to unintended and structural', which was later stated by the Dalai Lama - who often complains that Tibetan culture faces threats from 'intentional' state policies and practices and unintentional socio-economic consequences of these policies. For most Tibetans inside and outside Tibet, survival and protection of their national identity has become the core objective of their struggle. In his 10 March, 2008 address on the anniversary of the 1959 Lhasa uprising, the Dalai Lama said:

> *[A]s a result of their policy of population transfer the non-Tibetan population has increased many times, reducing native Tibetans to an insignificant minority in their own country. Moreover, the language, customs and traditions of Tibet, which reflect the true nature and identity of the Tibetan people, are gradually fading away. As a consequence, Tibetans are increasingly being assimilated into the larger Chinese population.*

The Dalai Lama often complains that Tibetan culture faces threats from 'intentional' state policies and practices and unintentional socio-economic consequences of these policies. For most Tibetans inside and outside Tibet, survival and protection of their national identity has become the core objective of their struggle. Togypal (2016) posits that self-immolation is a form of counter-securitization, a specific form of resistance against China's securitization of the 2008 uprising and the decades-long general condition of securitization by the Chinese

Party-state. The self-immolators were reacting to the Chinese crackdown in 2008. Soboslai (2012) says that most Tibetan interpretations of these self-immolations emphasise their nonviolent character. The Tibetan activist, Dhondup Tashi Rekjong, asserted that nonviolence by Tibetans was in fact a reaction to claims of violence by China. Topygal (2016) also narrated about another victim, Nyangkar Tashi, puts it bluntly: "I self-immolation to protest against the Chinese government!" Along with another Lhamo Kyap, a herdsman in his twenties who self-immolated on October 20, 2012, who wrote:

> *"His Holiness Dalai Lama advocates for a non-violent middle-way policy for the right to Tibetan autonomy. Six million Tibetans have been following His Holiness' teaching. But the CCP shows no support. Instead, they arrested and tortured those who demand Tibetan's rights. They defame the Dalai Lama and when anyone does not recognize Tibet as part of China, they will disappear or be assassinated." (ibid).*

Tibetans overwhelmingly consider the self-immolations to be selfless acts designed to help bring change, and thus to end the suffering of others. This is not to say that these are acts devoid of pain; pain most likely compels and comprises the act, as well as defines it visually. As understood by Tibetans, self-immolation constitutes a moral act, a refusal of the Chinese presence, and a sacrifice of the individual for the collective (McGranahan, 2005). Sloane (2014) contrasts that self-immolation is not just one more manifestation of political dissent in response to the denial of this right to self-determination; increasingly, it is the only available form of dissent possible in the police state in which Tibetans live. For an increasing number of Tibetans, it seems, self-immolation is preferable to a life of colonial exploitation or a worthwhile sacrifice to express their dissent from and protest to more than half a century of foreign occupation, human rights violations, and international neglect.

7. Conclusion

In conclusion, the main purpose of the paper, among others, was to bring out the similarities and differences in the predicament that the Palestinians and the Tibetans face in their strife for self-determination. This thesis revealed that both the Palestinians and the Tibetans are similar in that first they are considered as stateless diasporas (as mentioned above). Secondly, Palestine and Tibet share similarities as they both have their diasporas being their main representatives on the international stage, yet somehow the occupiers continuously dominate them from within the territories and beyond the territories. Thirdly, their similarity has not only been in their experiencing decades of occupation, they have also been constantly denied any “settlement” by their “Occupiers” in that any decent settlement activity is rejected as illegal. This is in addition to sweeping demographic changes that have rendered them minorities in their own homeland (Luo, 2019). Fourthly, is that their people within the occupied territories caused their citizenship to convert to the citizenship of the occupiers (such as Palestinians with Israeli citizenship and Tibetans with Chinese citizenship), thus causing them to almost lose their pursuit of self-determination. Meanwhile, from the diaspora they have had more opportunities to keep their pursuit of self-determination because they have had more freedom to organise their own cultural affairs and organise activities to emancipate themselves. Lastly, similarities that they have from their diasporas is how they have their diasporas being their only source of fight for self-determination (as mentioned in the diaspora section above), such as Palestinians fighting Israel from the Lebanese, Jordanian and Syrian territories and Tibetan from the Indian and Nepali territories.

However, there remains many differences between the Palestinians and the Tibetans in both their communities in the occupied territories and in their diasporas. First difference is that Tibetan nationalism has kept Buddhism embedded into their system - whereas Palestinian nationalism has become a long clash over Secular and Islamism to be embedded into the Palestinian system, yet Palestinian nationalism continues to deteriorate due this clash. Secondly, while the Tibetan diaspora, in particular, uses self-immolation as its way to achieve self-determination thus making its non-violent approach less approachable to the international system, the Palestinians in diaspora as well as in their territories use violence to gain international attention for its self-determination, until 2014, when it got an observer seat as the State of Palestine. Thirdly, the difference between the two was Tibet received help from the West, especially from the CIA to launch its short-lived Tibetan guerrilla warfare in the 1950s against the Chinese, where the US used Tibet as a stepping stone to provoke China. Palestine, however, never received support from the US as a way to stand against Israel. Instead the US fully supported Israel during the entire 70 year long conflict. Thus, interlinks to how the Tibetan case of postcolonialism differs from the case of the Palestinian one.

I believe that is demonstrated by the life and death battles faced in the occupation of Palestine as well as by Tibetan self-immolations, as both groups are seeking basic human rights denied to them - due in large part to their lack of political recognition. To better understand the stakes at play in the recognition of states, therefore, and to understand the relationship between the state, nation, and people, it is useful to briefly explore how they interrelate through sovereignty and autonomy (Stokes, 2016). I believe that what is already depriving both Tibet and Palestine from ever achieving their self-determination is that they're both facing two mega-powers; China, which is already a power and a Security Council permanent member, which gives them the veto power to keep Tibet occupied forever. Whereas Israel, though is not even a Security Council permanent member, due to its constant support from the West, this also keeps Palestine occupied. However, Palestine has a bigger opportunity than Tibet in terms of achieving self-determination and recognition since it already holds an observer seat in the United Nations, where Tibet does not. China's Security Council permanent membership makes Tibet an even more difficult situation than Palestine. On top of that, I believe that the US duped Tibet into claiming to emancipate them from Chinese rule, yet they just used the Tibets to provoke China to regain its balance of power. Palestine, on the other hand, was duped by its Arab neighbours into claiming they support the Palestinians and for decades Arab countries (such as Jordan, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Oman) initiate their relations with Israel. Hence, depriving Palestine from receiving help and unity to fight Israel.

In one of my main questions is how independent movements behave differently towards their occupiers is that the Palestinian diaspora underscores the importance of unifying the Palestinians territorially. Unfortunately, identity politics of a different sort, which pitted a more secular nationalist faction, Fatah, against the rising Islamist Hamas movement, giving new life to hardline principles such as the right of return and absolute justice and to a growing tension between two different worldviews over who can emancipate the occupied zone (Habschi, 2005). Where I personally believe Hamas has lately been securitizing Palestine, more than Fatah, due to its violent attacks against Israel. If the status quo manages to change by China allowing the Tibetan people to exercise their right as a people to self-determination, no effort "to control Tibetan discontent by means of carrot and stick" will be available (Sloane, 2014). Hence the self-immolation crisis within Tibet casts considerable light on the unresolved refugee crisis without - where some 150,000 Tibetans reside in exile, largely as stateless persons. Neither self-immolations nor the Tibetan diaspora will cease until Tibet's people receive the same right that every other formerly colonised people should receive in the postwar era (Sloane, 2005). My personal view is mainly that a cultural and religious gap is what makes these independence movements behave differently.. However, the Palestininian diaspora after the Intifada and the Lebanese civil war - have not been able to emancipate themselves as much as the Palestinians in the local territories with Fatah and Hamas being their sort of force against Israel. Whereas, Tibet after the CIA backed Tibetan Guerillas in 1951 has shown that the Tibetan diaspora have been succeeding, however, they are still trying to preserve and fight back China.

My response towards understanding independent movements in a postcolonial perspective is that the mainstream media has always tried to deprive us from reaching out to the information about Tibet and Palestine. The way we understand the legal status of Palestine and the legal discourse of Palestine itself from a postcolonial perspective presents an array of complexities at almost every level such as the Palestinians who remained in Israel itself living under military rules and saw hundreds of villages destroyed have remained more volatile for decades this population was seen by much of the Arab world as collaborators with the enemy, as they had not left the land (Strawson, 2002). The Tibetan approach, on the other hand that sees representation as a process as well as a substantive, is better placed to examine the ways in which the Western discovery and consciousness of the East went hand in hand with Western imperial rule over it. Thus, the understanding of the way the non-Western people were represented within the colonial discourse can therefore assist in identifying similar processes that continue in the contemporary world (Anand, 2007). Furthermore, what I would like to describe independence movements from a postcolonial perspective is that they are considered to be the unheard movements that have been silenced for a long time by the colonisers, which their only hope and alternative is to be heard more and have people make deeper research on them in order to understand that what they are fighting for is to gain the independence and freedom they deserve. Unfortunately, however, only certain individuals recognise them as independent movements, while state governments, who have the absolute power to grant their legitimacy as independent fighters, do not give the legitimacy or recognition as independence fighters. In other words, from a postcolonial standpoint they are rarely heard of unless you probe deeper or perhaps interact with the locals (Palestinans and Tibetans) and listen to their narratives to understand their issue in order to gain your knowledge towards their struggles and acknowledge them as freedom-fighters, whether against an Eastern or from a Western power.

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