



European Jewishness and European Muslim-hood

A comparative analysis of religious organisations' approach to the
European integration project and European identity

Name: Louise Dahlstedt

Programme: The Master of Arts Programme in European Studies

Supervisor: Kristian Steiner

Year of publication: August 2022

Word count: 18 213

Abstract

Certain religious organisations restrict their operations to a specific geographical area despite the fact that their aim presumably would be to transcend these boundaries. They promote one overarching religious identity that is shared worldwide which is why it should not be in the organisations interests to limit themselves geographically. The study's objective is therefore to comprehend how the European Jewish Congress and the European Muslim Union represent the idea of being European. It is attained by answering the research questions of how they frame European integration in order to include the Jewish and Muslim groups in the project, and how their approaches diverge or align. A qualitative content analysis on the websites of the organisations is conducted and Neil Fligstein's theory of European identity applied in order to fulfil the aim. The findings illustrate that the European integration project is expressed as having a European core made up of shared affiliations, including a beneficial European Union, removing obstacles, providing a sense of belonging, and being transformable. It is also described as the antithesis of factors that undermine "Europeanness," such as nationalism, illegitimate governance, lack of safety, and weak procedures. As a result of their roles as minorities, and notwithstanding their differing perceptions of their position within the project, the organisations both present the idea of being European as compatible with the religious identification. They also depict flaws in the presented ideal of European integration.

Keywords: European integration, European identity, religion, European Jewish Congress, European Muslim Union, minority groups, Judaism, Islam.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	1
1.1 Problem statement, purpose, and research questions.....	1
1.2 Research design	2
1.3 Thesis structure.....	3
2. Background.....	4
2.1 European idea and identity	4
2.2 European Jewish Congress (EJC)	5
2.3 European Muslim Union (EMU).....	5
3. Research review	7
4. Data	14
4.1 Research ethics.....	17
5. Analytical framework.....	19
5.1 Qualitative content analysis.....	19
5.2 Preconceptions.....	22
5.3 Fligstein's theory on European identity.....	23
5.4 Design of the deductive interpretation's codes and categories	27
6. Analysis of the EJC's and EMU's framing of European integration	31
6.1 European Jewish Congress – deductive analysis.....	31
6.2 European Jewish Congress – inductive analysis	39
6.3 European Muslim Union – deductive analysis.....	41
6.4 European Muslim Union – inductive analysis	47
7. Comparative analysis of EJC's and EMU's framing of European integration	48
8. Conclusion and discussion	56
References.....	60
Internet sources.....	60
Literature.....	64

1. Introduction

Much debate has surrounded the issue of who is included in the European integration process and what it means to be European. According to Douglas Murray, it is difficult to define what it is that makes a group Europeans among such various peoples.¹ As a result, it is an identity-building process that has caused conflict throughout Europe with contrasting perceptions of what the identity entails, for example in regard to religious beliefs. In previous research, this is attributable in part to the fact that the discussion emanates from people pertaining to the “centre,” or more specifically, the majority of the populace.² This initial struggle between the centre and those in the periphery forms the basis for this study.

This struggle manifests in the contradiction that some minority groups, e.g., religious organisations, limit their operations specifically to Europe. It is paradoxical since they advocate for religion to be the variable that unites people worldwide, rather than the factor of belonging to the same geographical area. They should therefore have less interest in prioritising the issue of geographical community but choose to still constrict themselves to the European sphere. It is also of relevance in conjunction with religious minorities’ position in society, states Gosewinkel, which indicates something special about what it means to be European and included within the European integration project.³

1.1 Problem statement, purpose, and research questions

This study draws attention to how religious organisations portray European integration which is a key issue in the European Union who seeks to contribute to as well as strengthen European identity as reported by Shore, making it an important topic for European studies.⁴

¹ Douglas Murray, *The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 5.

² Roberto Alzetta, “Building a Home”, in *Young Migrants: Exclusion and Belonging in Europe*, ed. Katrine Fangen, Thomas Johansson, Nils Hammaren (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 183, 187. Nick Lambert, “In Hiding? The Jews of Europe”, *European Judaism* 40, no. 2 (Autumn 2007): 71.

³ Dieter Gosewinkel, “Conclusion: Membership as Basis and Boundary for Protection, Equality, and Freedom,” in *Struggles for Belonging: Citizenship in Europe, 1900-2020* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021): 428, 429. Aktürk Sener, “Comparative Politics of Exclusion in Europe and the Americas: Religious, Sectarian, and Racial Boundary Making since the Reformation”, *Comparative politics* 52, no. 4 (July 2020): 715.

⁴ Cris Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European integration* (London: Routledge, 2000), 54, 83.

It is a key tenet of the European architecture, which is particularly clear in the scientific journal of European studies, where identity-related issues are major concerns.⁵ Several religious organisations have distinctly self-identified as European.⁶ Two examples include the European Jewish Congress and the European Muslim Union who represent Jews and Muslims, who made up roughly 0.2 percent and 6.8 percent of the population in Europe, respectively, in the year 2020.⁷ These organisations in the margin therefore shape their role within the larger whole in different ways. The purpose of this research consequently becomes to better understand how the European Jewish Congress and the European Muslim Union embody or represent the idea of being European.

It is not explored how local affiliations or national perceptions of the European integration phenomenon are formed since it is not helpful for reaching the study aim. Additionally, as the goal is not to compare the organisations' opinions throughout time, the study is restricted to examining their official websites in the time period between March and May in 2022. It is limited to contemporary data as a result. The following research questions, and operational research questions developed from an abductive working progress in later chapters, result from the analysis of the content on the organisations' websites and a comparison of their various approaches to integration.

- How do the European Jewish Congress and the European Muslim Union frame the European integration project in order to include the Jewish and Muslim groups in the European project?
- How are their approaches different from each other and/or similar?

1.2 Research design

A comparative design for the study is implied by the research questions regarding how the European Jewish Congress and the European Muslim Union frame European integration project and how their approaches differ or coincide. The goal is to contrast two comparable examples in order to see how one organisation's framing contrasts the other. The objective, as stated in the introduction, is to comprehend how they express the concept of being

⁵ "Articles: identity," Journal of European Studies, accessed July 5, 2022, <https://journals.sagepub.com/action/doSearch?filterOption=thisJournal&SeriesKey=jesa&AllField=identity>.

⁶ Some examples of European religious organisations are European Jewish Congress, European Muslim Union, European Jewish Association, European Evangelical Alliance.

⁷ "Europe," Religious Composition by Country, 2010–2050, Pew Research Center, last modified April 2, 2015, <https://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projection-table/2020/percent/Europe/>.

European by illuminating these parallels and differences. To learn more about the phenomenon being examined, this design adopts Todd Landman's contextual description as a guide, mirroring perspectives on European integration in one another. Classification, hypothesis-testing, and prediction were among the other comparative designs that were disregarded because they place a greater emphasis on generalisation and do not contribute to addressing the study's research concerns. Although contextual description has received criticism for being purely descriptive, a strong description must come first in any systematic investigation as stated by Landman.⁸ The qualitative nature of the research design results from the methodological decision to use a qualitative content analysis.

1.3 Thesis structure

The European idea, the European Jewish Congress, and the European Muslim Union are all topics covered empirically in the next chapter. A presentation of earlier research on European integration follows. The fourth chapter describes how websites were chosen as data sources and evaluates research ethics while analysing minority populations. Then, in the chapter "Analytical framework," the method of qualitative content analysis is explained along with the researcher's prior knowledge and Neil Fligstein's theoretical viewpoint on European identity. Thereafter, before the analysis, the material from the theory and earlier studies is organised into a deductive coding framework. With the aid of a deductive and an inductive method, the first part of the analysis presents how the EJC and the EMU, respectively, frame European integration. In order to better understand the intricacies in the manifestations of European integration, the results are then contrasted in the second section of the analysis. Finally, the results are discussed followed by the conclusions.

⁸ Todd Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*, (London: Routledge, 2003), 4–6.

2. Background

This chapter introduces key ideas that serve as the foundation for the study in order to help the reader properly comprehend the analysis. The first section introduces the idea and identity of Europe, then describes the European Jewish Congress and the European Muslim Union, whose perspectives on the project are evaluated in the analysis.

2.1 European idea and identity

The politics of European integration are centred on the concept of European identity, although it is unclear whether this latter identification has fully materialized among the citizens. It is listed in the Declaration of European Identity from 1973 that convergent lifestyles and a shared past are crucial for the development of a European civilisation.⁹ According to the special report of Eurobarometer polls however, democratic ideals are cited by 40 percent of Europeans as being the most important factor in forming their identities, while 26 percent of respondents say that history and culture are more important. Another 40 percent think it is critical for Europe to have a common currency. In contrast, only about 3 percent of respondents, on average, think that religion plays a significant role in defining European identity.¹⁰ Additionally, Grötsch and Schnabel state that establishing a “we” vs “them” distinction is necessary for the development of the European identity, which only takes on significance when compared against non-European elements. The flexibility of European identity may be ignored as a result and hinder the contribution of people with non-European descent to the continent’s societal, economical, and cultural areas. Simply defined, by positioning Europe against its alleged competitors, the European identity is promoted.¹¹

⁹ “Declaration on European Identity,” Bulletin of the European Communities. December 1973, No. 12. Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities. 118–122. https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable_en.pdf.

¹⁰ Galina S. Klimova, “European Identity Between Religiousness and Secularity,” *RUDN Journal of Political Science* 22, no. 4 (December 2020): 622, 623, 625.

¹¹ Florian Grötsch and Annette Schnabel, “The Ambiguous Roles of Religion: The European Integration Project as a Multilevel Case,” *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* 9, no. 7 (January 2013), 2.

2.2 European Jewish Congress (EJC)

According to their website, the European Jewish Congress was founded in 1986 as a regional affiliate of the World Jewish Congress to operate as the collective Jewish voice for the communities of Europe and their common interests and concerns. It serves as the representative body for the European Jewry and has its headquarters in Brussels.¹² The organisation declare to be working for both Jews living in EU member states and Jews in non-EU member states and consists of national communities from 42 different nations.¹³ It is currently run by a president, general assembly, executive committee, council, senior management, and staff.¹⁴ The EJC acts as a platform for these national communities and organises internal elections to choose the direction of future projects, goals, and governance.¹⁵ Its primary efforts are directed toward preserving the Jewish way of life, fighting antisemitism, upholding the Shoah memorial, and safeguarding the entire Jewish community. These objectives are furthered by 1.) advocating for legislation; 2.) encouraging interfaith dialogue and fair decision-making with Israel; 3.) serving on the advisory board of the European Parliament; 4.) working with governments to develop Holocaust education to preserve its memory; 5.) participating in the International Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremonies with the European Union and Council of Europe; and 6.) establishing the “Security and Crisis Center” to facilitate partnerships.¹⁶

2.3 European Muslim Union (EMU)

In 2005, the European Muslim Union was established to support European Muslims.¹⁷ The union makes no mention on their website of whether it supports Muslims only in the EU member states or across the entire continent, however. It is only explicitly stated that the EMU, which has its headquarters in Strasbourg, represents communities from several

¹² “Who We Are: Our History,” European Jewish Congress, accessed March 28, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/who-we-are/our-history/>.

¹³ “Communities,” European Jewish Congress, accessed March 28, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/communities/>.

¹⁴ “Who We Are: Our Structure,” European Jewish Congress, accessed March 28, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/who-we-are/our-structure/general-assembly/>.

¹⁵ “Who We Are: Our History,” European Jewish Congress, accessed March 28, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/who-we-are/our-history/>.

¹⁶ “Who We Are: Our Mission,” European Jewish Congress, accessed March 28, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/mission/>.

¹⁷ “About Us: Introduction,” European Muslim Union, accessed March 28, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/introduction/>.

European nations.¹⁸ The religious group does not disclose any links with neither Sunni Islam nor Shia Islam either. Based on their website, the fundamental goal of the EMU is rather to create a unified Europe with an infrastructure that appeals to the continent's Muslim residents. It seeks to change the current situation within existing forums and sees the current political representation of Muslims in decision-making bodies as being insufficient.¹⁹ The organisation focuses on issues including youth, intercultural communication, democracy, the fight against racism and prejudice, active citizenship, and human rights.²⁰ It works to advance in these areas by: 1.) fostering relationships between its communities, NGOs, and European institutions to combat Islamophobia; 2.) fostering intercultural dialogue and intercommunity and interethnic interactions in the EU; 3.) organising various initiatives, such as fact-finding expeditions regarding Muslim communities; 4.) advocating for equal rights for immigrants; and 5.) organising cultural events to advance public understanding of their religious heritage.²¹ These initiatives are articulated to seek to further the conversation about minorities in European nations and to build solidarity in society.²² Along with fostering integration within the Muslim community in Europe, the EMU seeks to build and deepen community solidarity outside its communities.²³ In an effort to safeguard its members against extremism and radicalisation, the EMU for example encourages younger Muslims to become familiar with European culture.²⁴

¹⁸ "About Us: Objectif," European Muslim Union, accessed March 28, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

¹⁹ "About Us: Introduction," European Muslim Union, accessed March 28, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/introduction/>.

²⁰ "Home," European Muslim Union, accessed March 28, 2022, <http://emunion.fr>.

²¹ "About Us: President", European Muslim Union, accessed March 28, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/president/>, and "About Us: Objectif," European Muslim Union, accessed March 28, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

²² "About Us: President," European Muslim Union, accessed March 28, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/president/>.

²³ "About Us: Introduction," European Muslim Union, accessed March 28, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/introduction/> and "About Us: Objectif," European Muslim Union, accessed March 28, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

²⁴ "About Us: President," European Muslim Union, accessed March 28, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/president/>.

3. Research review

This chapter examines earlier studies on European identity and integration, as well as their relation to religious minorities. The most significant findings in the previous research are introduced and the current knowledge gaps to which the thesis can contribute are presented, which aids in positioning this study in the field of European studies. The conclusions from some of the studies are also later used in the development of the analytical framework.

Numerous subfields such as the study of democracy, Europeanization, foreign policy, immigration, territorial politics, as well as other disciplinary views are according to Angela Bourne brought together by the variety of analytical approaches used in the study of European identities.²⁵ One such study in *Religion and National Identities in an Enlarged Europe* focuses on if, and how strongly, European identity outweighs national identity. It is investigated if integration has resulted in alterations to national identities, a rise in European identity, or even a rise in support for European integration.²⁶ Claire Sutherland concludes that the potential friction between these identities originates from differing political projects and worldviews. It entails establishing one mode of discourse as superior to another by creating a new common sense that alters the identities of the many groups.²⁷ There is consensus among scholars, including Sirkka Ahonen, about this dynamic process of communal identity, in which great narratives sustain uniform identities in addition to serving the secondary purpose of excluding people who do not fit the story.²⁸ Because of this, argues Neil Fligstein, collective identities are often seen to be framed as a reaction against some

²⁵ Angela Bourne, "European Identity: Conflict and Cooperation" in *Research Methods in European Union Studies*, ed. Kennet Lynggard, Ian Manners, and Karl Löfgren (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 56.

²⁶ Sabine Trittler, Slawomir Mandes, Matthias Koenig, "Religious Dimensions of National and European Identities: Evidence from Cross-National Survey Research" in *Religion and National Identities in an Enlarged Europe*, ed. Willfried Spohn, Matthias Koenig and Wolfgang Knöbl (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 126.

²⁷ Claire Sutherland, "Nation-Building Through Discourse Theory," *Nations and Nationalism*, 11, no. 2 (April 2005): 190–191, 194.

²⁸ Sirkka Ahonen, "Politics of Identity through History Curriculum: Narratives of the Past for Social Exclusion – or Inclusion?," *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 33, no. 2, (March/April 2001): 179–180, 190, 192.

manufactured “other” group.²⁹ This is important to consider when examining how the EJC and EMU frame the European integration process and who is involved in it.

Quantitative techniques have been used to determine who is more likely to belong to the abovementioned classification. Fligstein asks why some people identify as Europeans while others do not. He studies Eurobarometer data on social interaction indicators, which show that European identifiers have a similar profile to those who are most likely to speak second languages and visit other European nations. The evidence reveals that the educated and middle/upper classes can forge patterns of affiliation across Europe that have given the privileged few a strong sense of European identity and support for the EU mission. For the majority, who interact infrequently, the national story dominates instead.³⁰ Contrasting viewpoints, however, contend that the results are not supported by enough evidence.³¹ As part of the criticism, it is stated that there are not enough response alternatives in Eurobarometer surveys to address more serious issues with internal validity.³² The latter includes concerns about feeling attached to a particular place, which may be perceived differently by various people, and concerns about feeling European, which may have varied connotations depending on the related imagined community, states Michael Bruter.³³ Meinhof similarly means that people might not have solid ideas about who they are, or that the literature has not taken into consideration the possibility that identity labels are more fluid in reality than they are in surveys.³⁴

Another quantitative method is used when examining whether or not support for the European integration project is influenced by one’s sense of European identity. One of these studies grew out of a need to understand the differences in people’s opinions toward

²⁹ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 123–124, 127, 137, 156, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

³⁰ Neil, Fligstein, “Who are the Europeans and How Does This Matter for Politics?,” in *European Identity*, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 113, 142–145, 155.

³¹ Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Calculation, Community, and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration,” *European Union Politics* 6 no. 4 (2005): 433.

³² Sean Carey, “Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?,” *European Union Politics* 3, no. 4 (December 2002): 405, 408.

³³ Michael Bruter, “Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe: The Impact of News and Symbols on Civic and Cultural European Identity,” *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no 10 (December 2003): 1154.

³⁴ Ulrike Hanna Meinhof, “Europe Viewed from Below: Agents, Victims and the Threat of the Other,” in *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, ed. Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilyn B. Brewer, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 220.

European integration based on identification rather than economic integration indicators.³⁵ For instance, Lauren McLaren's research demonstrates the importance of European identity in justifications for support for the EU. She contends that sentiments about the EU are shaped by broad antagonism to other cultures in addition to the importance of self-interest in doing so. The research distinguishes between risks to national group resources and dangers that other groups pose to the groups' way of life in order to operationalise perceived cultural threat.³⁶ Measures were generated from Eurobarometer questions that asked respondents if they believed that minorities exploited the social welfare system or whether their religious activities damaged the culture of the respondents' community.³⁷ Hooghe and Marks elaborate on this notion by proclaiming that those who view their identities as exclusive of other identities are more likely to be anti-European than people who view their national identities as more open to some form of affiliation with Europe. Like many other academics, they discover that national identities can both strengthen and weaken support for European integration, but they employ political cues to show the variety.³⁸ Research on European identity thus emphasizes the numerous identities that people hold, and the fact that these identities may still have distinct relationships with one another.

The impact of EU symbols on European identities is examined by Bruter, in contrast, in his study of how the media portrays the EU. He evaluates the responses of participants from France, the UK, and the Netherlands regarding questions that evaluate civic and cultural understandings of European identity, using experimental methodologies. The evidence suggests that receiving consistently positive news about Europe alters how people view the process of unification and affects how likely they are to identify with Europe. In other words, a citizen's sense of identification with Europe is strengthened by ongoing exposure to symbols of European integration.³⁹ The influence of the EU's political institutions on people's perceptions of their identities and the groups to which they belong is another key issue in studies on European identity. Wodak explores this identification among European

³⁵ Matthew Gabel, "Public Support for European integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories," *Journal of politics* 60, no.2 (1998).

³⁶ Lauren McLaren, "Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?," *The Journal of politics* 64, no. 2 (May 2002): 558, 564.

³⁷ McLaren, "Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?," 558.

³⁸ Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "Calculation, Community, and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration," *European Union Politics* 6 no. 4 (2005): 433.

³⁹ Michael Bruter, "Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe: The Impact of News and Symbols on Civic and Cultural European Identity," *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no 10 (December 2003): 1165-1166.

elites from a sociolinguistic and discourse analytical viewpoint. By concentrating on when and how identities are employed, the research seeks to represent the fluid aspect of identities.⁴⁰ However, there is an inclination in the studies on European integration to conflate European identity with the EU. This is empirically challenging states Bourne since a person may identify as European while remaining disinterested in the EU. In assessments of the EU, a significant portion of prior study has looked at European identities, which cannot be said to be true of earlier stages in EU studies.⁴¹

There is a discrepancy in terms of research intent in the work thus far discussed between those who use quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Comparatively to qualitative research, quantitative methodologies try to forecast and explain general EU behaviour, explains Sean Carey.⁴² While qualitative techniques typically think of identities as being too contradictory to be measured through survey methods, quantitative approaches tend to see identities as cohesive entities that can be measured through those means. For instance, Laffan and Monnet uses a study of treaty texts to formulate theories about the identity-building capabilities of each EU agency.⁴³ Ruth Wodak carefully asserts, however, that her research offers a viable explanation for some of the parallels and discrepancies in the orientations to and constructions of identities made by the persons in EU organisations examined through interview and qualitative content analysis.⁴⁴

The relationship between the process of European integration and its strategy for doing away with frontiers has furthermore been the subject of a sizable body of literature.⁴⁵ However, the project is not believed to have affected a sufficient number of individuals to foster a

⁴⁰ Ruth Wodak, "National and Transnational Identities: European and Other Identities Constructed in Interviews with EU Officials," in *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, ed. Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilyn B. Brewer (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 99.

⁴¹ Angela Bourne, "European Identity: Conflict and Cooperation" in *Research Methods in European Union Studies*, ed. Kennet Lynggard, Ian Manners, and Karl Löfgren (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 55.

⁴² Sean Carey, "Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?," *European Union Politics* 3, no. 4 (December 2002): 388. Lauren McLaren, "Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?," *The Journal of politics* 64, no. 2 (May 2002): 563–564.

⁴³ Brigid Laffan and Jean Monnet, "The European Union and Its Institutions as 'Identity Builders,'" in *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, ed. Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilyn B. Brewer (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 85.

⁴⁴ Ruth Wodak, "National and Transnational identities: European and Other Identities Constructed in Interviews with EU Officials," in *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, ed. Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilyn B. Brewer (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 125.

⁴⁵ Matthias Koenig and Wolfgang Knöbl, "Religion, Nationalism, and European Integration: Introduction," in *Religion and National Identities in an Enlarged Europe*, ed. Willfried Spohn, Matthias Koenig and Wolfgang Knöbl (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 10. Cris Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European integration* (London: Routledge, 2000), 42.

strong mass identity or political integration effort in Europe, according to *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*.⁴⁶ Ernst Haas defines this as a process that involve a change in political allegiance, in contrast to Deutsch, who incorporates a sense of community in his definition of integration.⁴⁷ Comparative research methodologies have also been successfully used to investigate how national histories and cultures influence sentiments toward European integration.⁴⁸ In *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres* a comparable strategy is employed, concentrating on elite discourse, to show how national identities are, on the other hand, Europeanised.⁴⁹ Similar definitions of Europeanness as a historical, social, cultural, and model-based identity have been presented in these research papers to set Europe apart from other identities. The unity in diversity within this concept, however, has been read as both a celebration of pluralism and as a call for centralization of authority. The idea of European identity, in Shore's opinion, mean that Europe's mosaic of cultures is really a lesser component of a larger European design. Therefore, European culture is a broad amalgam of national cultures that is more than the sum of its parts.⁵⁰ Cultural diversity and the realities of European intolerance are thus in conflict. It challenges the widely held belief that anyone may become a member of Europe and that all one needs to do is reside in the continent, concludes Douglas Murray.⁵¹

Furthermore, only a few studies specifically discuss European identity in relation to religion in light of the extensive literature on the subject. According to the authors of *Religious Dimensions of National and European Identities: Evidence from Cross-national Survey Research*, Western states exhibit a stronger European orientation than the majority of Eastern European countries, which have more national identities. It is implied that this is due to confessional roots.⁵² They also demonstrate how, whereas discourses about European

⁴⁶ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 125–126, 156, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

⁴⁷ Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–1957* (London: Stanford University Press, 1958), 16.

⁴⁸ Juan Díez Medrano, *Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

⁴⁹ Thomas Risse, *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 10, ProQuest Ebook.

⁵⁰ Cris Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European integration* (London: Routledge, 2000), 54, 83.

⁵¹ Douglas Murray, *The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 114.

⁵² Sabine Trittler, Slawomir Mandes, Matthias Koenig, “Religious Dimensions of National and European Identities: Evidence from Cross-national Survey Research,” in *Religion and National Identities in an Enlarged Europe*, ed. Willfried Spohn, Matthias Koenig and Wolfgang Knöbl (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 131–133, 142.

identity have traditionally promoted a liberal integration project of a pluralistic and inclusive polity, a more restrictive and nationalistic counter-discourse has recently emphasized the Christian legacy of Europe.⁵³ As a result, Angela Ilic research immigration in relation to the issue of who is considered European and what makes us Europeans. She looks into current discussions and raises the question of whether non-Christians fall under the geopolitical and cultural conceptions of Europe that are usually accepted in Christian-majority states.⁵⁴ Favell similarly uses ethnographic studies to analyse how immigration has affected identity in Europe, including how the EU's free movement of people has affected it.⁵⁵ In *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration* it is argued that the cultural history of Europe is thus presented in a conflicting light—partially as something that naturally results from Europe's diversity and partly as something that has to be preserved.⁵⁶

Thus, this theological viewpoint reopens the debate over what it really means to be European. According to some, the relationship between religious connection and European identity has several facets, including the function of belonging. Klimova conducts a correlation study on data from the Eurobarometer, the European Value Study, and the World Value Study, which demonstrates that despite having secular foundations, European identity has strong ties to religion. It is concluded that religion, not as a particular confession, but as a faith, is a component of European identity. However, the findings show variations in the impact of Christian confessions on self-identification as European, allowing for a more comprehensive examination of religion's role in European identity and professed European values.⁵⁷ Similarly to how it might affect public support for integration, Nelsen and Guth illustrate how particular religions affect European identity.⁵⁸ Different perspectives on Christianity's influence, or lack thereof, on the development of Europe, the secular EU, and

⁵³ Matthias Koenig and Wolfgang Knöbl, "Religion, Nationalism, and European Integration: Introduction," in *Religion and National Identities in an Enlarged Europe*, ed. Willfried Spohn, Matthias Koenig and Wolfgang Knöbl (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 6.

⁵⁴ Angela Ilic, "Both Insiders and Outsiders: Identity and Interreligious Dialogue in the Discourse of Islamic Communities in Croatia and Serbia Concerning European Integration," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 50, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 127–128, 136. Atla Religion.

⁵⁵ Adrian Favell, "Immigration, Migration and Free Movement in the Making of Europe," in *European Identity*, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 180–181.

⁵⁶ Cris Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration* (London: Routledge, 2000), 52.

⁵⁷ Galina S. Klimova, "European Identity Between Religiousness and Secularity," *RUDN Journal of Political Science* 22, no. 4, (December 2020), 617.

⁵⁸ Brent F. Nelsen & James L. Guth, "Religion and the Creation of European Identity: The Message of the Flags," *The Review of Faith and International Affairs* 14, no. 1 (2016), 81.

its treaties are also debated by for instance Murray.⁵⁹ These findings are important for comprehending how religion shapes the integration project and for the idea of being European.

These research themes make use of a range of research methodologies, including quantitative analysis and examination of the identity discourse of state elites. Nevertheless, on these subjects, cross-regional and national comparisons, as well as case studies focused on a specific location, are more common. They are undervaluing comparisons that are more qualitative and detail-rich, such as in the field of minority groups' influences on the same issue. I now turn to my own study to illustrate the potential presented by utilising comparative studies to look at European identity and the framing of European integration.

⁵⁹ Douglas Murray, *The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 4–6. Florian Grötsch and Annette Schnabel, “The Ambiguous Roles of Religion: The European Integration Project as a Multilevel Case,” *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* 9, no. 7 (January 2013), 3.

4. Data

In order to understand how the EJC and EMU frame European integration in order to include the Jewish and Muslim groups in the European project and how their approaches differ and/or are similar, this thesis compares the websites of the two organisations. A qualitative content analysis and the theoretical idea of European identity will be used to accomplish this. The data upon which the analysis is based is supplied in this section. Following the introduction of the subject matter, the specific content is given together with the parameters for its use in this study. Finally, various concerns of the sources and research ethics with reference to studying minority communities are examined.

The websites of the European religious organisations were located using LobbyFacts.eu. The key words “organisations representing churches and religious communities” were used in the information search, and the results included 9 distinct, reliable organisations that are active in the study’s topic. The predetermined criteria related to the study topic: the organisation’s European and religious nature, the work being done in Europe, and any discussion of European integration and the availability of this information, meant that only 5 of these 9 organisations warranted further examination. The initial broad search is beneficial to obtain potential variance in how European integration is framed and how organisations conceptualise being European.

However, the volume of texts would be too great to analyse under the constraints of the study’s word count. For the study’s findings to be as accurate and comparable as feasible, the organisations had to also supply a similar type of data for analysis. The number was consequently reduced to the two remaining representative organisations which had created relatively recent websites, where intricacies might develop. The only platforms that consistently surfaced and provided relevant information for the study’s objectives were these websites. This approach, even though the amount of data is limited, still offers useful insight. The specific European religious organisations which were left and whose websites are analysed are: European Jewish Congress (7 pages, published 2022) and European Muslim Union (4 pages, published 2020).

The remaining content, other than the 7 respectively 4 pages on the websites that will be analysed, discusses topics that are unrelated to the organisations' comprehension of European integration and are consequently excluded. The following EJC pages are important to the study: our history, our mission, combatting anti-Semitism, preserving the memory of the Shoah, safeguarding Jewish life and tradition, and protecting our communities. The pertinent EMU pages are home, introduction, objectif, and president. The study is more intensive than extensive which is why the material is not more substantial.⁶⁰ Since the data is dynamic in nature, it has also been limited in time. The study's focus on assessing current data rather than making long-term comparisons, meant that the data which is later analysed was retrieved between March and May 2022.

For a number of reasons, European religious organisations were chosen as the subject matter. First of all, they operate beyond national boundaries but within Europe, indicating that public justification for why this ongoing work is appropriate is anticipated. Secondly, the organisations produce a good amount of easily accessible communication materials and arguments for their existence. In contrast, there would have been greater restrictions on the number of platforms offering documents and, as a result, less data, if national religious communities had been evaluated. Additionally, a specific local setting could not be justified, and a European environment elicited more intriguing dynamics for the objective of this study.

Websites were chosen as the source of information from the religious organisations. Websites were selected in part because the content needed to be a text that each organisation had individually created so that trends in their descriptions could be identified. The content, however, was the main deliberation. Information about who they see themselves as, who they represent, what their objectives are, and what they do is provided on their websites. It is considered that the content for this study can be obtained on these websites since they are a platform for the organisations to communicate through with their audience and position themselves in relation to Europe. It is therefore appropriate to use as sources.

The webpages are focused on 2020 and 2022 because those are the years in which they were most recently updated. It was therefore preferable to favour these because of their relevance

⁶⁰ Todd Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*, (London: Routledge, 2003), 27, 69.

to the current situation and their ability to condition further research. The volume of the sources is also thought to support variety while still being manageable. According to Leth and Thurén, determining whether a source is trustworthy can be done by looking at its most recent update to its website.⁶¹ Although these documents can and will be used as data, there are some drawbacks. Since the content is limited, they cannot serve as an exhaustive universal answer for how all religious organisations conceive European integration. It can and should only be viewed as one illustration of the research problem, which is in keeping with the study's objective. Another disadvantage is that the information is not always consistent between sources and that the content does not always directly address the subject of European integration, which could make it difficult to provide a satisfactory response to the research questions. However, the websites were chosen as sources of information because they offer both implicit and overt perspectives on the subject of European integration. It is relevant because it fits a qualitative content analysis, which is the chosen method for the study, that enables examination of content at both levels.

For the study, it is additionally crucial that the websites are published by the EJC and EMU themselves in order to be accurate and that the analysis is based on their understanding rather than someone else's interpretation. Given that the information was collected from their websites, it is impossible to determine with absolute certainty that the numbers or assertions are true. Investigating how they perceive being European is the main goal, though. As a result, even if inaccurate information is utilized to conceptualise a specific framing of the integration project, the study's findings will still reflect the organisations' perspective.⁶² It is possible for example that the websites are embellishing or downplaying the truth, omitting details, or using emotive language without intending to mislead anyone.⁶³ The correctness of the websites is less significant though.⁶⁴ A collective depiction of their ideas rather than a singular viewpoint was one reason for why websites were chosen instead of undertaking for example interviews, as well as due to research ethics.

Additionally, according to Boréus, by analysing literature, we may learn a lot about how people form their impressions of society, which in turn shape how they identify with particular groups and individuals. Texts can be examined as expressions of particular

⁶¹ Göran Leth och Torsten Thurén, "Källkritik för Internet," (Stockholm: Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar, 2000), 143, 148.

⁶² Leth och Thurén, "Källkritik för Internet," 148.

⁶³ Leth och Thurén, "Källkritik för Internet," 144.

⁶⁴ Alan Bryman, *Samhällsvetenskapliga Metoder*, (Malmö: Liber, 2018), 489.

societal beliefs and relationships.⁶⁵ This is relevant to the objective of the study as well. The issue of representativeness, who the organisations are working on behalf of, is important in this study but more difficult to determine. Potential misconceptions present a drawback of using websites as data. It could occur when conclusions regarding one level of investigation are drawn using data from another, states Landman.⁶⁶ It is best prevented by responding to inquiries and using data from the same position as it most frequently originates from data availability. Making accurate comparisons and being as transparent as possible about the decisions that have been taken in the general design of a comparative study, such as the theoretical perspective and the types of conclusions that can be drawn from it, are crucial he explains.⁶⁷

4.1 Research ethics

Particular ethical considerations must be taken into account when studying religious minorities. This means that the research should ensure that European Muslims and Jews haven't been treated unfairly according to Robert K Yin.⁶⁸ The approach of qualitative content analysis is the foundation of the study and as previously stated, the study intends to use information gathered from public sources. As people's language use isn't being scrutinized in this way, ethics are less of an issue in accordance with Vetenskapsrådet.⁶⁹ Nonetheless, it is crucial to consider whether the research findings are damaging or contentious while producing and presenting the findings in order to avoid exacerbating preconceptions about vulnerable groups.

Although the identities of specific individuals are not mentioned in this study, it is indicated that whole groups may be stigmatized as a result of the release of particular research findings.⁷⁰ Fair presentation of findings and conclusions is therefore even more important. The constraints of the conclusions and the context in which they apply, as well as a discussion of potential objections, are all requirements for published research findings writes

⁶⁵ Kristina Boréus, "Texter i vardag och samhälle" i *Handbok i Kvalitativa Metoder*, ed. Göran Ahrne och Peter Svensson, (Stockholm: Liber, 2015), 149.

⁶⁶ Todd Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*, (London: Routledge, 2003), 43.

⁶⁷ Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*, 45.

⁶⁸ Robert K Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, (London: SAGE, 2014), 77–78.

⁶⁹ Vetenskapsrådet, *Forskningsetiska Principer inom Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskaplig Forskning*, 2002, 12.

⁷⁰ Vetenskapsrådet, *Good Research Practice*, (Stockholm: Swedish Research Council, 2017), 40, 41.

Vetenskapsrådet and are all considered in the present study.⁷¹ One such issue is, for instance, how the researcher's status as a European inside the project's majority rather than minority affects the findings.

The content discrepancies between the two webpages are another thing to acknowledge since they could affect the balance of the research in the findings. With regard to the European Muslim Union, the European Jewish Congress has more extensive texts. It may have been caused by the redirection from an EU-domain to a French domain, which in turn may have been caused by different levels of resource accessibility. Despite the different quantities on the platforms, it is the subject matter that is important in carrying out the comparison study, therefore it does not pose a problem for analysing the approaches to Europeanness. The information is nevertheless regarded as being of adequate scope, and the language remains meaningful despite any errors. The data collection reflects the stances of the religious organisations, but it is also important to keep in mind that the reason for the findings need not be based on their membership in a minority but rather be a product of intersectionality.

⁷¹ Vetenskapsrådet, Good Research Practice, (Stockholm: Swedish Research Council, 2017), 28, 53.

5. Analytical framework

This chapter aims to clarify the analytical model that connects the qualitative content analysis to the theoretical instrument. It includes a description and operationalisation of both the content analysis and the theory, along with justifications for why both are best suited for examining how religious organisations frame European integration on their websites. Due to its crucial relevance in the methodological approach and for framing the research problem, the theoretical idea of European identity is presented here as well.

5.1 Qualitative content analysis

In order to comprehend the complexity of a phenomenon, the qualitative content analysis relies on analysing written words, explains Bryman.⁷² According to Schreier, it is a descriptive approach that is used with various methodological instruments and at various degrees of abstraction.⁷³ Given that the thesis discusses how material published on the websites of religious organisations expresses European integration, it is pertinent. The modus operandi may be carried out in numerous ways. The methodology used in this study is an adaptation of the abductive interpretation from the discussion paper *Methodological Challenges in Qualitative Content Analysis*, given that there is no set procedure for carrying out the analysis and that it has been carried out differently in previous studies. Graneheim, Lindgren, and Lundman are recognized as some of the architects of qualitative content analysis, which is why their explanation is utilized at the same time as the approach is developed to best fit the study's aim. It is in general a complementary proceeding between a deductive and inductive interpretation which is outlined below.

The deductive approach, which is the first step, is derived on prior studies and the theory of European identity. These are carefully reviewed to have a comprehensive understanding of the current central beliefs and theoretical stances towards European integration and what it is. Second, distinct categories are created and included in a coding chart with the relevant

⁷² Alan Bryman, *Samhällsvetenskapliga Metoder* (Malmö: Liber, 2018), 340–341.

⁷³ Margrit Schreier, "Qualitative Content Analysis," in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*, ed. Uwe Flick (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2014), 180–81. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243.n12>.

findings. The next step is to look for information on the EJC and EMU websites that correlate to the coding frame. The data points from the source material that correspond in substance are listed in the graphic under the appropriate category. In this manner, it is investigated about whether there is any correlation between the descriptions in past study, the theoretical idea, and the sources.⁷⁴

An inductive interpretation is used to conduct a separate analysis of the components that the established frame cannot code. The opposite to a deductive interpretation happens in this second step. The analysis develops toward a more abstract understanding by drawing on the texts of the websites without a predetermined theory. First, the meaning-bearing units are identified, i.e., the words or phrases on the websites that include details about how the religious organisations view Europeanness. Second, the sentences are shortened to just include the key points of the description provided, creating a code.⁷⁵ The coded content is interpreted and categorised in a third step.⁷⁶ It indicates that several codes with comparable information are grouped together under one “umbrella.” This process makes it possible to compare several categories as reported by Martyn Denscombe.⁷⁷ While the codes specify what is put in the content pertaining to these categories, the categories are the “what” in the websites explains Schreier.⁷⁸ The outcomes are incorporated into the predetermined coding framework, either as new categories or inside existing ones. It is repeated until no more new ideas can be discovered.⁷⁹ The fourth and last step is to search for the so-called theme, or latent material, on the websites. It embodies the connecting factor—the meaningful thread—that ties the data together.⁸⁰ All of the discovered categories from the websites are linked to the theory and interpreted to recurrent themes that surface as an explanation for “What is this about?”⁸¹ Or indeed, in connection to what is framed as European integration.

⁷⁴ Ulla H. Graneheim, Britt-Marie Lindgren and Berit Lundman, “Methodological Challenges in Qualitative Content Analysis: A Discussion Paper,” *Nurse Education Today* 56 (September 2017): 30.

⁷⁵ Graneheim, Lindgren and Lundman, “Methodological challenges in qualitative content analysis: A discussion paper,” 32.

⁷⁶ Graneheim, Lindgren and Lundman, “Methodological Challenges in Qualitative Content Analysis: A Discussion Paper,” 32.

⁷⁷ Martyn Denscombe, *Good Research Guide: For Small-scale Social Research Projects* (Berkshire: McGraw-Hill Education, 2010), 282, 285–86, ProQuest Ebook Central.

⁷⁸ Margrit Schreier, “Qualitative Content Analysis,” in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*, ed. Uwe Flick (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2014), 175. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243.n12>.

⁷⁹ Schreier, “Qualitative Content Analysis,” 177.

⁸⁰ Ulla H. Graneheim, Britt-Marie Lindgren and Berit Lundman, “Methodological Challenges in Qualitative Content Analysis: A Discussion Paper,” *Nurse Education Today* 56 (September 2017): 32.

⁸¹ Graneheim, Lindgren and Lundman, “Methodological Challenges in Qualitative Content Analysis: A Discussion Paper,” 32.

The qualitative content analysis was selected as a method based on the chosen material and aim. Since the material does not expressly inquire as to what the EJC or EMU perceive of the European integration issue, it is assumed that the religious organisations' representations of being European (in their capacity as minority group) are present on both a descriptive and abstract level which the qualitative content analysis is able to examine. Although a narrative analysis could produce comparable implicit expressions, this method is incompatible with the study's sources because the websites do not represent any particular person's personal narrative.⁸² Discourse analysis is another possible qualitative approach; however, it is not consistent with the stated objective because it focuses on how language is used to produce particular outcomes or how meaning is formed in social contexts.⁸³ The qualitative content analysis is hence useful for interpreting abstract components in texts, such as how the EJC and EMU frame the European integration project and how their approaches are different and/or similar.⁸⁴

Additionally, the abductive approach's combined interpretations enable it to provide a more thorough knowledge of European integration. The deductive process, which develops categories based on an explanatory model, and its leftover data, which could not be coded with the aid of the theory, are crucial contributions for creating new dimensions to the phenomenon under study according to the authors of *Methodological Challenges in Qualitative Content Analysis*.⁸⁵ It also permits an inductive strategy in which the data "speaks" freely and unconditionally.⁸⁶ This approach reduces the possibility that the findings may be superficial descriptions or based purely on assumptions.⁸⁷ Every relevant part to the research questions is examined in the websites which enables a wide variation of

⁸² Cigdem Esin, Mastoureh and Corinne Squire, "Narrative Analysis: The Constructionist Approach," in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*, ed. Uwe Flick (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2014), 203. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243.n14>.

⁸³ Carla Willing, "Discourses and Discourse Analysis," in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*, ed. Uwe Flick (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2014), 341. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243.n23>.

⁸⁴ Göran Ahrne and Peter Svensson, *Handbok i Kvalitativa Metoder* (Stockholm: Liber, 2015), 10.

⁸⁵ Ulla H. Graneheim, Britt-Marie Lindgren and Berit Lundman, "Methodological Challenges in Qualitative Content Analysis: A Discussion Paper," *Nurse Education Today* 56 (September 2017): 30–31.

⁸⁶ Graneheim, Lindgren and Lundman, "Methodological Challenges in Qualitative Content Analysis: A Discussion Paper," *Nurse Education Today* 56 (September 2017): 30.

⁸⁷ Margrit Schreier, "Qualitative Content Analysis," in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*, ed. Uwe Flick (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2014), 172. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243.n12>.

descriptions of European integration, and a systematic procedure to the analysis that in turn structures the research problem.⁸⁸

In qualitative content studies, a text does not, however, imply a single meaning. The findings are more accurately the researcher's interpretation of what is most likely.⁸⁹ To enable the reader to assess the process that produced the results, it is crucial to explain the decision-making throughout the study.⁹⁰ Accordingly, examples from the original text are provided to illustrate the coding process and the used coding frame.⁹¹ It offers examples of the interpretation, making it easier to assess transparency and confirming the accuracy of the results. Despite this, there is a risk that the results give an angled understanding of reality because of the material which only represents a fraction of the available information. Due to time constraints, it was not possible to triangulate the sources in a way that would have increased the credibility, such as by conducting interviews and analysing website contents simultaneously. However, large empirical studies may exclude nuances and instead base their conclusions on a summary of the data they have gathered explains Alan Bryman.⁹² Hence, a more manageable number of websites has been used to produce deeper understandings within a limited context in accordance with the study's aim rather than being generalizable. The material is deemed wide enough in scope to describe the European integration issue and to include enough data to also cover variation in the content.⁹³

5.2 Preconceptions

Furthermore, since preconceptions influence how depictions of European integration are interpreted, it is necessary to clarify them when utilising a qualitative content analysis.⁹⁴ Ergo, the present perceptions of the researcher need to be defined before the study is conducted for an overarching reliability to be assured or not. It is for that reason recognized that the religious organisations' websites will be read from a position which is part of the

⁸⁸ Ulla H. Graneheim, Britt-Marie Lindgren and Berit Lundman, "Methodological Challenges in Qualitative Content Analysis: A Discussion Paper," *Nurse Education Today* 56 (September 2017): 31, 34.

⁸⁹ Alan Bryman, *Samhällsvetenskapliga Metoder* (Malmö: Liber, 2018), 355.

⁹⁰ Martyn Denscombe, *Good Research Guide: For Small-scale Social Research Projects* (Berkshire: McGraw-Hill Education, 2010), 299–300, ProQuest Ebook Central.

⁹¹ Margrit Schreier, "Qualitative Content Analysis," in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*, ed. Uwe Flick (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2014), 181. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243.n12>.

⁹² Alan Bryman, *Samhällsvetenskapliga Metoder* (Malmö: Liber, 2018), 355.

⁹³ Ulla H. Graneheim, Britt-Marie Lindgren and Berit Lundman, "Methodological Challenges in Qualitative Content Analysis: A Discussion Paper," *Nurse Education Today* 56 (September 2017): 33.

⁹⁴ Graneheim, Lindgren and Lundman, "Methodological Challenges in Qualitative Content Analysis: A Discussion Paper," *Nurse Education Today* 56 (September 2017): 34.

European majority and not the minority, which inevitably influences the perspective on the research. Furthermore, because having Swedish citizenship entails being a part of “Western Europe” and an EU member, it may affect perceptions and points of view towards the integration issue. By systematically implementing the methodology’s components, this potential drawback is subsequently reduced to the greatest extent possible. For instance, all of the information on the websites on European integration has been used, and the delimitations are based on created criteria from the theory that are unrelated to supporting any ideology or belief. Above all, the aim is directing the analysis which has its basis in the European Jewish Congress’ and the European Muslim Union’s formulations. Additionally, the choice of qualitative content analysis entails that the epistemological and ontological basis of the thesis is that reality is established in the human consciousness rather than being independent of it.⁹⁵ It connects to the qualitative content analysis’ characteristics as socially constructivist and interpretative.⁹⁶ The study is founded upon the understanding that our knowledge is constructed via language and therefore that comprehension about the world is temporary as put forward by Bergström and Boréus.⁹⁷ It is impacted by the assumptions about reality, limits regarding material and time in this study, which in turn has consequences for what this study can contribute with. This basis becomes more evident from the choice of theory as well.

5.3 Fligstein’s theory on European identity

This section outlines Fligstein’s theory on European identity, which serves as the theoretical foundation for this study. In the deductive portion of the analysis, the theoretically provided fundamental concepts are explicitly employed to generate codes and categories which are then placed into a coding frame in the following section. The parts which have been coded are demonstrated below by being underlined.

The theory of European identity is an approach by Neil Fligstein which introduces a connection between feeling European or non-European and attitudes toward the European

⁹⁵ Göran Bergström och Kristina Boréus (red.), *Textens Mening och Makt: Metodbok i Samhällsvetenskaplig Text- och Diskursanalys*, (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2012), 26–27.

⁹⁶ Todd Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*, (London: Routledge, 2003), 16.

⁹⁷ Göran Bergström och Kristina Boréus (red.), *Textens Mening och Makt: Metodbok i Samhällsvetenskaplig Text- och Diskursanalys*, (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2012), 28–29.

project.⁹⁸ Fligstein's theoretical idea is applicable because there are no other clear or obvious theoretical literature about how marginalised groups comprehend European integration; instead, most come from a majority perspective. It examines into what kind of European collective identity has emerged and for whom, which is important given that the religious organisations have named themselves European Jewish Congress and European Muslim Union. They constitute minority groups at the same time, which suggests that the question of European identity is central to their ambition of European integration.

The theory has a total of four assumptions that align with the objectives and research questions of the study. It is stated as a primary component, that European identity is more likely to emerge from interaction with others like oneself across other European countries, which can be assumed to happen between individuals within the religious organisations.⁹⁹ As a result, persons engaged in both political and economic integration have changed how they perceive their own identities as well as those of their neighbours. According to Fligstein, they become identified with the group due to their similar affiliations. This interaction is said to generate a sort of fate that is shared with others from all across Europe.¹⁰⁰ However, the theory also highlights how several communities give the European identity a multitude of meanings. For instance, European is promoted as being modern for Spaniards, yet for the British, it is an identity that has proved advantageous when contrasting oneself with others.¹⁰¹ People share common affiliations is the theory's code for this idea.

These common interests are likewise anticipated to manifest a more approving perception of the EU in this theory, if the religious organisations have some European identity.¹⁰² According to Fligstein, they perceive the European Union as a force for good rather than as an inhospitable place where the nation-state is weakened.¹⁰³ However, this is understood as a necessary but not a sufficient factor for European identity. In contrast to the relatively high level of overall political support for the EU among member states, only a small number of people strongly identify with Europe.¹⁰⁴ Fligstein argues that the organisations' support is

⁹⁸ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 143, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

⁹⁹ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 123, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

¹⁰⁰ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* 124.

¹⁰¹ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, 138.

¹⁰² Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* 137.

¹⁰³ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, 124.

¹⁰⁴ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, 125.

influenced by whether the EU serves their interests or if they stand to gain from it, and that this allegiance is brittle if a change in direction takes place. Additionally, he clarifies that emotional attachment to ideas, such as the EU or governments, makes people more forgiving of errors.¹⁰⁵ It could be significant for this study in terms of how Jews have historically fared on the continent. Because of this, the theoretical notion holds that European identity, and a positive perception of the European Union are related.

The European core, which is viewed as one of the categories for understanding European integration, is the foundation for the aforementioned codes. The viewpoint implies that the aim of European integration is founded on a set of shared values, which must manifest and endure through regular engagement with group members.¹⁰⁶ Thus, it may be inferred that individuals who do not adopt them are not a part of the integration project. According to Fligstein, the formation of linkages between diverse European societies that imply that members are more similar than distinct and that they are therefore Europeans, is necessary for the development of a European identity. These shared ideals could have an impact on this procedure. It implies that the identity building assigns a group of people a fundamental and accepted similarity that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves. In that way, they are more likely to see themselves as Europeans and involved in a European project.¹⁰⁷ This reconnects to the aim of the study of how the religious organisations represent the idea of being European. It also contributes with an understanding for which role the minority perspective has in the descriptions on the integration project.

In comparison, the collective identification, and the idea of who we are is comprehended as being about the construction of an “other”. It is presented as a response to another group, explains Fligstein.¹⁰⁸ The opposites to a European identity, based on the theory’s premises, is a person who lacks either the opportunity or desire to interact with their counterparts across Europe. For example, those who hold conservative or right-wing views and prioritise the nation, who are less likely to interact with people that are not like them.¹⁰⁹ The passage is consequently classified as the category threats against Europeanness because these “others”

¹⁰⁵ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 139, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

¹⁰⁶ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, 140.

¹⁰⁷ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, 126.

¹⁰⁸ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, 127.

¹⁰⁹ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, 145–147.

affirm the groups' status as European by being the opposite of it. However, the issue is further developed as Fligstein states that people choose to identify with one group over another because they want to be a part of one that has a more positive identity. When their identity has been diminished, a person may attempt to pass as a member of another group or make improvements to the perception of their group as a whole. As a result, collective identities in a given domain are hierarchically ordered and may overlap, be exclusive, be situational, or incompatible.¹¹⁰

The theory also acknowledges the possibility of numerous collective identities, even ones that appear to be in opposition to one another. The mechanism by which individuals can hold contradictory identities is the fact that people in smaller groups are likely to feel more control than in larger groups. It tends to make people identify strongly with their local groups. Larger groups might provide positive identities for individuals though, particularly if the larger group's identity acts in a way to promote the smaller group's worth. This means that the larger group's identity comes into play under circumstances where it can prove useful.¹¹¹ A sense of collective European identity is always accompanied by the need to distinguish "Europeans" from "others," since people prefer to view the group they identify with more favourably than the out-group, argues Thomas Risse.¹¹² The theoretical concept's remaining elements won't be used in the qualitative content analysis because of the material chosen. It will not be possible to analyse because the websites' information is incomplete or does not help to address the study topics. For instance, the framework of European identity holds that social interaction patterns and economic interdependence are related in Europe. It is therefore somewhat directed towards social class in its explanations which is not of relevance for this study.

The theoretical concept of European identity is not an established theory, but an understanding of how the European people can be defined based on research, which arguably could be disadvantageous for the thesis. Since it is not a conventional theory it does not directly provide codes or categories for the abductive analysis. Instead, these are searched for from the theory's central assumptions. This feature could make the theory's components

¹¹⁰ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 128, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

¹¹¹ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of*, 128–129.

¹¹² Thomas Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration," in *European Integration Theory*, ed. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 145.

vague to a degree. Nonetheless, it allows for a broad interpretation of the data which is important for the deductive part of the abductive analysis and makes the analysis open for more variations in the results. These are all of significance in reaching the aim of understanding the religious organisations' representation of the idea of being European because it is based on interpretation.

Additionally, it is recognised that the emergence of a European identity, and the theory's base, is originating from the model of national identity forming. It may be stated to refer to the idea that the goal of European economic integration is to create a nation-state. This idea, however, is currently at dispute as formulated by Fligstein.¹¹³ The deductive part of the analysis will either verify the theory's assumptions or present a lack of data for its theoretical ideas. For example, in what the religious organisations' frame as a part of the integration project. Therefore, it is not a hindrance to the theoretical concept's validity.

The theory's reliance on research may also present a challenge in demonstrating how interaction between members of various European societies shapes European identity. The data used to show this connection comes from Eurobarometer surveys that inquire about respondents' travel to other European nations, their use of second languages, and their sense of identity in Europe. The author argues that interaction may be directly measured through travel, and that a desire to engage with people from different cultures can be demonstrated by a commitment to learning a second language.¹¹⁴ But, there is limitations regarding the questions asked on each survey. Since neither survey included a question about European identity, the findings must be combined in an indirect manner as reported by Neil Fligstein in order to assess the general hypothesis about the relationship between identity and social interaction.¹¹⁵ It is crucial to keep in mind though when examining theories, that each theory is based on preconceived ideas.

5.4 Design of the deductive interpretation's codes and categories

The first part of the deductive interpretation, using the theoretical perspective, resulted in codes and categories which have been structured in the coding scheme below. In the following section, the remaining precondition for the deductive interpretation is laid out. It

¹¹³ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 124–125, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

¹¹⁴ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, 140–141.

¹¹⁵ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, 147–148.

is illustrated, through quotations, what codes and categories were given from reading the previous research. The results from these are summarised into the coding chart together with the provided categories from the theory. These theoretical assumptions are then emanated from the beginning of the analysis when similar codes are searched for on the websites of the European Jewish Congress and the European Muslim Union.

Deductive figure no. 1

Categories	The European core	Threats against Europeanness
Codes	People have shared affiliations	
	The EU as beneficial	

The previous research has not executed qualitative content analyses and the codes have for that reason not been systematically lined up in the research. Instead, examples on European integration have constituted the foundation on which to create codes that have then been placed under existing or new categories in the coding frame. The underlined sentences are the content that have been coded.

The first visible and common code in the research is that European integration is perceived as “[...] dismantling barriers to the free movement of capital, goods, services, and labour.”¹¹⁶ It is, similarly, viewed as a process which not only removes hindrances but creates new contexts which “[...] should affect strategies of boundary-making and thus be expected to provoke considerable changes in constructions of collective identity.”¹¹⁷ The alteration in identity is described in several ways, both as a “[...] shift of loyalties by political actors in several distinct national settings to a new political centre [...]” and as “[...] a sense of community [...]”.¹¹⁸ Comparingly, it is presented that if Europe “[...] fails to act as a single entity – if it falls prey to [...] ugly nationalism and chauvinism, – it will be consigned to the

¹¹⁶ Cris Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration* (London: Routledge, 2000), 42.

¹¹⁷ Matthias Koenig and Wolfgang Knöbl, “Religion, Nationalism, and European Integration: Introduction,” in *Religion and National Identities in an Enlarged Europe*, ed. Willfried Spohn, Matthias Koenig and Wolfgang Knöbl (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 10.

¹¹⁸ Angela Bourne, “European Identity: Conflict and Cooperation,” in *Research Methods in European Union Studies*, ed. Kennet Lynggaard, Ian Manners, and Karl Löfgren (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 55.

side-lines.”¹¹⁹ It can be understood that it is intended to project the major obstacle to European integration as the continued presence of the ideology of nationalism, due to the negative connotations of the word ugly.

At the same time, there are also negative perspectives on the European integration which are mentioned repeatedly in the sources. According to this description the project does not have a connection to the people of Europe who it is aiming to unify. It is put forward in the previous research in the following way: “[...] has been an elite-led, technocratic affair orchestrated primarily by a small layer of key politicians and civil servants with little reference to the ‘citizens of Europe’ in whose name it justifies its existence.”¹²⁰ This code is hence formulated as: illegitimate governance. It is also problematized how the European integration and its required citizenship might complicate the matter even more in regard to the unity of a people. European integration may therefore be potentially excluding, which is how the overarching category is presented. “[...] citizenship is classificatory device; a way of ordering people in terms of boundaries of inclusion (insiders) and exclusion (aliens).”¹²¹

One last code and category from the research is on how contradictory the project and its heritage are represented. “[...] portrayed as a well-established [...] phenomenon arising naturally from Europe’s rich diversity and centuries of shared history (and hence, as something strong, proud, distinctive, and unambiguous) [...]” as well as “[...] something that needs to be nurtured and protected from dangerous, even ‘contaminating’ foreign influences [...]”¹²² It is formulated into the code weak procedure to explain their contents on the integration project. From the previous research it is possible to identify the following codes: removing obstacles, sense of belonging, ideology of nationalism, illegitimate governance, and weak procedures. These can, after interpretation, in turn be structured into the following categories: European core, and threats against Europeaness.

Deductive figure no. 2

¹¹⁹ European Commission, “Home: Press Corner,” European Commission, accessed May 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_361.

¹²⁰ Cris Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration* (London: Routledge, 2000), 18.

¹²¹ Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, 71.

¹²² Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, 52.

Categories	The European core	Threats against Europeanness
Codes	People have shared affiliations	Ideology of nationalism
	The beneficial EU	Illegitimate governance
	Removing obstacles	Weak procedures
	Sense of belonging	

6. Analysis of the EJC's and EMU's framing of European integration

The first research question is examined in this chapter i.e., how the European Jewish Congress and the European Muslim Union frame the European integration project, in order to include the Jewish and Muslim groups in it. The analysis is performed with the help of the analytical framework, which was described in the previous chapter, and begins with the EJC's approach and thereafter the EMU's attitudes towards the project. It highlights the deductive and inductive codes one at a time with accompanying quotations from the organisations' websites.

6.1 European Jewish Congress – deductive analysis

People have shared affiliations

Within the first code, EJC portrays that European integration is founded on Europeans having mutual concerns, due to living on the same continent. On the organisation's website, it is described how: "[...] despite their cultural differences and heterogenous historic backgrounds, EJC's members share common needs and interests [...]." ¹²³ The quote could refer to the specific needs within Jewish fellowship and identity, however it also draws attention to the EU's motto of unity in diversity, where prioritising similar issues is manifested as the unifying factor between European peoples. It is unclear from the citation if the EJC considers that the cultures in Europe are similar without being identical, if a European culture does not exist at all, or if national cultures are bridged by the European culture consisting of agreed upon issues that are beneficial to all if addressed correctly. It has from the earlier research been examined how attitudes to European integration are formed by the history and culture of one's country of residence, which poses the question of how linear this framing is within the organisation. ¹²⁴

¹²³ "Who We Are: Our Mission," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/mission/>.

¹²⁴ Juan Díez Medrano, *Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

The beneficial EU

European integration is additionally expressed to be a project which shift loyalties in some ways. It is announced on the page about who the organisation is and their history that: “Since its establishment, the EJC has developed and expanded in order to meet the constantly changing and enlarging European Union (EU).”¹²⁵ In this sentence it is presumed that the religious organisation view the EU and European integration as a positive power that needs to be adapted after, since they are not working against the geographical expansion but rather in accordance with its course. It is not evident still, if the consistent inclusion of more communities is what they are implying when formulating how dynamic the EU is. However, the European Jewish Congress seemingly understands the European Union as an intergovernmental entity because the organisation ensures to always involve national branches. The following quote from the page about safeguarding Jewish life and tradition illustrates that. “[...] working with religious authorities, wider civil society, and the political echelon at the pan-European and national level, always in close collaboration and coordination with its national affiliates.”¹²⁶ It is therefore not sufficient to only cooperate with the European Union if their practices and integration are to be preserved.

The EU and its institutions are nonetheless interpreted as instruments in achieving the EJC’s aims in areas where Jewish rights are not respected. It is exemplified in the description of their mission: “To monitor developments in the legislative field that can threaten Jewish life and traditions on European and national levels and to take immediate action to protect Jewish interests.”¹²⁷ The EJC expresses, on the one hand, that there is a need to defend their entitlements also on a European level which is perceived as a negative notion, on the other hand, the EU is implied as able to bring social change for them in national settings (even if it is not perceived to be able to replace nation-states completely). This predominantly appreciative understanding of European integration, i.e., having a safety net because of their status as Europeans, is enforced further by the next statement. “[...] the EJC protects the interests of its affiliated communities, working daily with European Union institutions and

¹²⁵ “Who We Are: Our History,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/who-we-are/our-history/>.

¹²⁶ “What We Do: Safeguarding Jewish Life and Tradition,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/safeguarding-jewish-life-tradition/>.

¹²⁷ “Who We Are: Our Mission,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/mission/>.

officials, the Council of Europe (where the EJC has participatory status) and national governments and parliaments.”¹²⁸ The EU seems to be framed as beneficial since the EJC chooses to work with it so often, which can be explained by Fligstein’s theoretical perspective. The religious organisation’s support for European integration is affected by if they have something to gain from it, and this “loyalty” is consequently fleeting. For example, if a change would occur that puts an end to the obtained benefits. It is also explained that ideational support – when people feel emotionally attached to for instance the EU – makes individuals more tolerant of its potential mistakes.¹²⁹ This could be the case for the EJC in relation to the meaning that the EU has for Jewish history.

At the same time, the EJC is discerning the European Union as distant. It is not performing its expected duties towards European Jews in regard to rising antisemitism. Antisemitism is experienced to be a common occurrence, even though it should not be, simultaneously as it is portrayed not to be a natural part of what is European. EJC reports that a survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU

[...] outlines how [...] antisemitism appears to be so deep-rooted in society that regular harassment has become part of normal everyday life. Almost 80 percent do not report serious incidents to the police or any other body. Often this is because they feel nothing will change. Over a third avoid taking part in Jewish events or visiting Jewish sites because they fear for their safety and feel insecure.¹³⁰

Additionally, the organisation states on their website that it advocates for adoption of legislation which will prevent normalised antisemitic behaviour from going unpunished.¹³¹ These statements manifest therefore that a disconnection exists between the normative and “realistic” view of the EU in that it should aid European Jews’ living situation, however, it is not executing this help well. It is connected to remembrance of the Holocaust: “We must seek different methods to convey the same message of where hatred and intolerance and antisemitism lead. The most important of these is through education and the EJC works with governments and local authorities to ensure the insertion and maintenance of Holocaust

¹²⁸ “Who We Are: Our History,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/who-we-are/our-history/>.

¹²⁹ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 139, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

¹³⁰ “What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: Antisemitism in Europe,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/antisemitism-in-europe/>.

¹³¹ “What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: Antisemitism in Europe: WGAS Working Group on Antisemitism,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/ep-working-group-on-antisemitism-wgas/>.

education in curricular and non-curricular activities.”¹³² The EU is not mentioned which could likewise mean that it is recognised how some advancements can only occur on national level to have resonance.

Removing obstacles

The European integration project removes hindrances of not receiving one's rights as a group within a group. It is put forward by the EJC in: “However, in saying this, any attack on the fundamental rights of free and unencumbered expression on all or part of the Jewish community in Europe is an attack on all Europeans' rights.”¹³³ This frames EJC members as Europeans and part of the integration project. As European Jews, the attacks against them are violating both the Jewish and European identity. Consequently, they are interpreted as entitled to certain human rights which a second party has the duty to fulfil. Therefore, if these specific entitlements are not secured it means that the European idea is under scrutiny. The assumed European polity of democracy is proposed as a prerequisite for dismantling those barriers. “Individual expressions of Jewish life, religion and culture, and the free and uninhibited organisation of Jewish community structures and activities require open and democratic societies in Europe, which respect these traditions and provide the framework to allow these expressions to flourish.”¹³⁴ The outcome of a prosperous democracy is the availability of your individual rights according to EJC. Human rights are considered to be an agreed-upon European fundament and indirectly a vital unit in the integration issue. Coincidentally, the acknowledged contents of the European integration by the EJC are likewise requirements for their continued survival in Europe.

Sense of belonging

The issues of European integration are once again taken up against the backdrop of antisemitism. The European Jewish Congress explains how it is not affecting only the Jewish communities. In fact, the nature of it being a European problem means that: “[...] antisemitism poses a wider threat to society [...]. When a Jew is assaulted in the street for

¹³² “What We Do: Preserving Shoah Memory,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/preserving-shoah-memory/>.

¹³³ “What We Do: Safeguarding Jewish Life and Tradition,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/safeguarding-jewish-life-tradition/>.

¹³⁴ “What We Do: Safeguarding Jewish Life and Tradition,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/safeguarding-jewish-life-tradition/>.

being Jewish, it is essentially an assault against democratic values and the rule of law.”¹³⁵ Similarly to before, democracy is declared to be an integral component of the European idea and thus also the rule of law. The European space does not depend on a collective or “predisposed identity” therefore, but rather an assemblage of principles such as human rights and their enactment. There is a contrary relation between the good and the bad, the integration with values of fairness versus the negative violent trends that hinder its progression. It is seemingly an assault on the European identity. Moreover, this notion is continuously mentioned and advocated for on the webpage. Another example can be found in this sentence where there is an apparent need to act against antisemitism: “[...] for a tolerant and peaceful society and for the wellbeing of our future generations.”¹³⁶ It is furthermore highlighted in the quote: “To protect Jewish life and to defend the individual rights of Jews to practice Judaism and its traditions freely.”¹³⁷ The European integration project is therefore threatened, as well as under criticism, and built upon certain values such as peace and tolerance, that fall under the same category.

The theory implies that a European identity is dependent on the production of these bonds between separate European societies that suggest that members are more alike than different and hence, Europeans. It means that the identity building assigns a group of people a fundamental and accepted similarity that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves. In that way, they are more likely to see themselves as involved in the European project, explains Fligstein.¹³⁸ “More than 70 years after the Shoah, it is incumbent upon us as Jews and Europeans to maintain the memory of this most unique of genocides: [...] and to draw the lessons from this tragedy for our own days.”¹³⁹ This quote is also showcasing a shared fate and unity between Europeans. First, it is illustrating a complementary identity between being a Jew and being European which according to the theory is not surprising since

¹³⁵ “What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: Antisemitism in Europe,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/antisemitism-in-europe/>.

¹³⁶ “What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: Antisemitism in Europe,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/antisemitism-in-europe/>.

¹³⁷ “Who We Are: Our Mission,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/mission/>.

¹³⁸ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 126, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

¹³⁹ “What We Do: Preserving Shoah Memory,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/preserving-shoah-memory/>.

European identity is more likely to emerge from interaction with others like oneself across European countries that is presumably practiced within the Jewry.¹⁴⁰

But, secondly, that the European integration project means that all Europeans involved have a responsibility in ensuring that a crime against this religious minority does not repeat itself. It is a common history which should be learned from today. For that reason, it could be said that European integration is understood as an expansive process that bounds people together based on, among other things, a shared historical fate. In this code, an acceptance is put forward that there are larger common sympathies beyond peoples' differences. The EJC aims: "To assist in the revitalisation of the once rich Jewish life in parts of Europe and to help small communities to develop and flourish."¹⁴¹ This also alludes to the Holocaust, as well as the growing antisemitism that has become a reoccurring feature in Europe.

Ideology of nationalism

Antisemitism is the main topic in focus in the following quote but its connection to nationalism is of significance for this study.

Antisemitism in Europe today knows no difference between left or right political creed, origin, or religion. A heterogeneous phenomenon, antisemitism expresses itself in the crude and age-old forms of religious antisemitism, in intolerance towards the other and extreme forms of nationalism and far-right Jew-hatred, but equally in the pernicious and ever-growing anti-Zionism of the far-left, which often relies on antisemitic tropes.¹⁴²

First and foremost, the fact that nationalism is put in association to antisemitism, intolerance and hatred means that it indirectly is perceived as a negative occurrence and as something non-European. The opposite to a European identity, based on the theory's premises, is when a person lacks desire to interact with their counterparts across Europe. For example, those who put the nation first and that are less likely to interact with people who are not like them.¹⁴³ The negative connotations continue with the instance of using the word extreme. It leads to nationalism being portrayed as unwanted. In this way, the European integration project functions as an opposition to nationalism. However, it should also be mentioned that

¹⁴⁰ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 123, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

¹⁴¹ "Who We Are: Our Mission," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/mission/>.

¹⁴² "What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: Antisemitism in Europe," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/antisemitism-in-europe/>.

¹⁴³ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 145–147, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

the EJC is emphasising the extreme form of the ideology. They are not denouncing nationalism altogether.

Weak procedure

Antisemitism and extremism are furthermore given as examples by the EJC of practices which goes against the idea of Europe, and which pose immediate risk to their known lifestyle.

Among extremists, antisemitism is a common denominator and an essential element of the politics of division and intolerance on which these movements thrive, and which pose an existential threat to our democratic societies. They promote and feed off antisemitic tropes and conspiracy theories, which have become more commonplace in recent times.¹⁴⁴

The mentioned principles are put as contrasts to the unifying factors of tolerance and democracy which puts extremists as the “other”. Additionally, democracy demands certain doctrines to function that are inherently against intolerance according to the EJC’s understanding (even though there are different types of democracy which do not necessarily need the same foundations to work). Therefore, the European integration project needs continuous defending from these behaviours and is not an inherently strong phenomenon. This view is pointed out repeatedly on the webpage: “These alarming numbers show that it is time to take action against antisemitism, for the security and wellbeing of Jewish communities across Europe, and for a Europe without hatred and prejudice.”¹⁴⁵

Racism is put in opposition to the proclaimed core values of the integration project as well. “Campaigns attacking Shechita are based on an altogether more pernicious objective, one which pushes a chauvinistic and racist agenda and where the result of causing Jews and other minorities to question the actual possibility of living where they have lived for centuries is exactly what is being aimed for.”¹⁴⁶ This quote illustrates the criticisms directed at European integration for “permitting” harmful perspectives on Jews’ practices and therefore stigmatising them even more. The quote however also shows why it might be vital for EJC to promote the integration project. It is an instrument for potentially avoiding a similar

¹⁴⁴ “What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: Antisemitism in Europe,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/antisemitism-in-europe/>.

¹⁴⁵ “What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: Antisemitism in Europe,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/antisemitism-in-europe/>.

¹⁴⁶ “What We Do: Safeguarding Jewish Life and Tradition,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/safeguarding-jewish-life-tradition/>.

situation as the holocaust, the ultimate peak of anti-integration. Likewise, the resurgence of xenophobia is combatted and depicted as not having a place in the idea of Europe by the EJC.¹⁴⁷

Another example of why the integration project is a weak process in need of protection from dangerous influences is given in relation to Jews' freedom. "Recent attempts in some European countries to restrict, ban or prevent the open provision of kosher meat for Jewish communities is discriminatory, often illegal and demonises Jewish expression and our community."¹⁴⁸ It is explained to impact the open Jewish life in Europe negatively. They continue to discuss that these allegations are "[...] based on the false and offensive premise that Jewish practices cause additional suffering to animals, whilst systemically ignoring many practices prevalent in Europe that cause immeasurable suffering to animals and have no existential benefit whatsoever for humans."¹⁴⁹ The European Jewish Congress describe how their community is diminished and they connect back to mentioned criticisms of conspiracy theories. It is perceived as them being intentionally excluded as a group in parts of the European idea. This has made some Jews to consider emigrating, writes the EJC.¹⁵⁰ "Similarly, the ancient and existential Jewish practice of male circumcision, Brit Milah, is increasingly threatened by a perverse coalition of misguided children's rights activists, so called liberals and the far right." In other words, they assert that there is no Jewish life or place for them in Europe if their traditions are restricted.

The success of the European integration is put into question due to reoccurring intolerant events. "The normalization of antisemitism on the streets, online and in mainstream society, in politics and media legitimises and encourages acts of violence against Jewish individuals and institutions. In recent years, the most violent expressions of antisemitic hatred have once again risen to the point of becoming commonplace in Europe [...]."¹⁵¹ It is recognised that the European integration is struck with many problems and hence, is not providing the

¹⁴⁷ "Who We Are: Our Mission," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/mission/>.

¹⁴⁸ "What We Do: Safeguarding Jewish Life and Tradition," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/safeguarding-jewish-life-tradition/>.

¹⁴⁹ "What We Do: Safeguarding Jewish Life and Tradition," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/safeguarding-jewish-life-tradition/>.

¹⁵⁰ "What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: Antisemitism in Europe," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/antisemitism-in-europe/>.

¹⁵¹ "What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: Antisemitism in Europe," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/antisemitism-in-europe/>.

assurance of unity in diversity. The fact of it rising however illustrates that Europe usually is inclusive and that the behaviour is not approved as European. This seems to make the project worth fighting for and measures for achieving the ideal project are given. The EJC puts forward: “To enhance interreligious dialogue and to contribute to a democratic European society based on peace, understanding and tolerance.”¹⁵² The next excerpt also shows this line of thinking:

With the growth of far right and xenophobic parties in Europe clearly linked to the dulling of sensitivity and memory of the destruction of WWII and the Shoah, Holocaust memory takes on added value not only as preservation of the past, but also as a guarantor of a future for our children as Jews and European citizens, sharing values of democracy, freedom, and tolerance.¹⁵³

It is important to note that the EJC uses the phrase “sharing values” making it a collective feature across the continent. The viewpoint entails that the aim of European integration is founded on common principles, which manifest through continuous engagement with group members, as reported by the theory.¹⁵⁴ Thus, it may be inferred that individuals who do not adopt them are not a part of the integration project. According to Fligstein, the formation of linkages between European societies imply that the identity building assigns a group of people a fundamental similarity that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves. In that way, they are more likely to see themselves as involved in the European project.¹⁵⁵

Illegitimate governance

There was no text which discussed the discrepancies between the European Union’s leadership and the connection to European inhabitants.

6.2 European Jewish Congress – inductive analysis

A new category that arose in this part of the analysis was the description on the security being insufficient which is visible in the European Jewish Congress website. “Antisemitism continues to be a persistent and pernicious danger to Jews. In the view of many Jewish communities, the situation has deteriorated to the point of calling into question the very

¹⁵² “Who We Are: Our Mission,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/mission/>.

¹⁵³ “What We Do: Preserving Shoah Memory,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/preserving-shoah-memory/>.

¹⁵⁴ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 140, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

¹⁵⁵ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, 126.

continuation of Jewish life in Europe.”¹⁵⁶ The issue of safety is important for the European Jewish Congress, which is not surprising considering their history. They have always been subjected to prejudices regarding their religious practices. For this reason, it is not remarkable that the European Jewish Congress would be in favour of the integration project, specifically for peace. The idea of Europe, thanks to close collaboration and uniting core principles, is appealing if it can provide a safe place which it presumably is represented as.

The security of the European Jewish communities is a vital issue and a major concern for the European Jewish Congress. In 2012, EJC launched the Security and Crisis Centre (SACC) programme, a major effort to enhance the security of all Jews in Europe. Due to the aggravation of the threat, the programme expanded into a new entity ‘SACC by EJC’ [...].¹⁵⁷

It is available to help Jewish communities prepare for the worst as is stated in the page on what they do to protect their communities.¹⁵⁸ This seems to be a response to the integration project’s failed attempts to protect the Jewish population in Europe. “[...] to make sure that the communities are prepared to handle any situation – whether it is a terror attack, a natural disaster, or any other crisis.”¹⁵⁹ This code portrays the project as lacking in its own core values and therefore it is illustrated as negative. It can be related to the fact that the EJC wants Europe to be on better terms with Israel as well. If they are not considered welcome on the continent anymore. “To promote a balanced policy towards Israel from a European perspective, to combat the unfair vilification of Israel in Europe, and to assist in the construction of a healthy dialogue between Europeans and Israelis.”¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁶ “What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: Antisemitism in Europe,” accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/antisemitism-in-europe/>.

¹⁵⁷ “What We Do: Protecting Our Communities,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/protecting-our-communities/>.

¹⁵⁸ “What We Do: Protecting Our Communities,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/protecting-our-communities/>.

¹⁵⁹ “What We Do: Protecting Our Communities,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/protecting-our-communities/>.

¹⁶⁰ “Who We Are: Our Mission,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/mission/>.

6.3 European Muslim Union – deductive analysis

People have shared affiliations

There are no immediate excerpts from the EMU website which pertains to this specific code in framing the European integration project.

The beneficial EU

The European Union is recognised as a useful platform for creating better relations between different European groups. Its importance is stated in the following quotation on their website. “Our association aims to: promote the improvement and development of intercultural, intercommunity, and interethnic relations and exchanges in the European Union [...]”¹⁶¹ The European Muslim Union therefore seems to express that it is vital to both expand and revise the current interactions among European populations. It could be interpreted as there not being enough encounters among them. These connections could correspondingly be an embodiment of a non-established and common European identity, which is why this change is needed. The European Union is seen as a beneficial arena for reaching this aim even though it has not achieved the desired results on its own yet. It is acknowledged in the quotation as well that there is not one specific European culture or that there might exist differences within it due to the use of “intercultural”. Similarly, to the EJC, the EU might be supported as part of the integration project, because the EU works in their interests as explained by Fligstein.¹⁶²

Another intention of the EMU is to “Promote European citizenship favouring unity in cultural diversity.”¹⁶³ It is apparent that the organisation views citizenship in the EU as a solution for shaping a European identity and integration. They are however not stating whether this should include only EU members or inhabitants on the whole continent of Europe, although they explicitly underscore the EU motto. It is nonetheless evident that the EMU understands the integration project as a process of bringing together separate individuals under a common affiliation. According to previous research European identity

¹⁶¹ “About Us: Objectif,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

¹⁶² Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 139, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

¹⁶³ “About Us: Objectif,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

matters in explanations of support for the EU. It is argued that in addition to self-interest playing an important role in shaping attitudes towards the EU, attitudes are also based on antagonism to threats that other groups pose to the groups' way of life.¹⁶⁴

Removing obstacles

The European integration is understood as removing hindrances and contributing with better collaboration according to the EMU website. It is in other words, removing barriers for them as an organisation and its members. "The united Europe allows for close cooperation between Muslim [sic] in Europe."¹⁶⁵ It is proven useful for creating stronger bonds across borders between the individuals in the community and therein between Europeans. It is illustrated further as a positive factor in connection to the fact that the EMU has chosen to work within the field of living together in harmony and intercultural dialogue.¹⁶⁶ The interaction of Muslims around Europe is also stated to create a desired social and multicultural continent.¹⁶⁷ The unity and removal of hindrances also makes it easier for the organisation to act for "[...] equal rights, free movement, the right to and access to work, the right of establishment and voting for immigrants."¹⁶⁸ Additionally, it is stated by the theory of European identity that European identity is more likely to emerge from interaction with others like oneself across other European countries which can be assumed to be what the religious organisation is aiming for to be a part of the European community.¹⁶⁹

Sense of belonging

The EMU seems to consider that the European integration project has not succeeded in shaping a sense of community. It can be seen in excerpts of their website where they proclaim to "Raise awareness about active citizenship, secularism and living together."¹⁷⁰ In this way, it is alluded to that everyone in the project is not included on equal terms or

¹⁶⁴ Lauren McLaren, "Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?," *The Journal of Politics* 64, no. 2 (May 2002): 558, 564.

¹⁶⁵ "About Us: President," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/president/>.

¹⁶⁶ "Home," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr>.

¹⁶⁷ "About Us: Objectif," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

¹⁶⁸ "About Us: Objectif," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

¹⁶⁹ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 123, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

¹⁷⁰ "About Us: Objectif," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

informed of their rights. There does not appear to exist an already established common identity. The EMU writes that: “The goal is to build up a specifically European Muslim infrastructures [sic] in the interest of Muslims living in Europe.”¹⁷¹ For that reason, it is assumed that they understand the process as being exclusionary to the needs of Muslims in Europe. They also write that:

A new generation of Muslims who speak European languages today feels at home in Europe and are demanding the rights they are entitled to as citizens in all European states. The number of Muslim [sic] in Europe is not only growing steadily, but rather Muslims are also able to confidently refer to Europe’s Islamic heritage.¹⁷²

It is interpreted to mean that some Muslims are themselves identifying as Europeans but that they have to justify their belonging. Individuals are also explained to identify with one group over another because they want to belong to a group that has the more positive identity in agreement with the theory of European identity. People with a downgraded identity will try to appear to be a member of another group or work to improve their group’s collective identity in the minds of others.¹⁷³

It is argued that “[...] Islam belongs to Europe. [...] European Muslim [sic] have a key role to play in the shaping of a multifaceted Islamic life in Europe.”¹⁷⁴ It can be interpreted as the EMU having to prove their place in the integration project before they can be accepted as such. “European Muslims considers themselves as part of the European Societies in which they live: indeed, the view themselves as the proof against the alleged confrontation between Europe and Islam.”¹⁷⁵ They regard themselves as part of the European community and state that there is no reason for why the two identities would not be compatible. In that way, the European integration project has failed because it has not successfully incorporated this religious group properly. This can be explained by earlier research which studies whether integration has entailed increased identification with Europe and therefore increasing

¹⁷¹ “About Us: Introduction,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/introduction/>.

¹⁷² “About Us: President,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/president/>.

¹⁷³ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 128, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

¹⁷⁴ “About Us: Introduction,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/introduction/>.

¹⁷⁵ “About Us: Introduction,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/introduction/>.

support for European integration.¹⁷⁶ It is presented as resistance between political projects and worldviews. One form of European discourse, for example the majority's view, is hierarchically over the organisations' perspective which adjusts the identity of the groups. It becomes difficult for the EMU to impose another version of Europeanness as dominant therefore.¹⁷⁷ The grand narrative supports uniform identities and excludes those who do not currently suit it, states Sirkka Ahonen.¹⁷⁸

It is formulated further that the reason for why they are not viewed as Europeans is that they are misunderstood. The EMU therefore contributes "[...] to a better knowledge of the Muslim heritage and of the contemporary Muslim world in Europe through the organisation of cultural and tourist events."¹⁷⁹ Additionally, it is stated how only "[...] an open-door policy can overcome the present scepticism surrounding Islam in Europe." The integration of their community however seems to be a two-way issue, in that the organisation acknowledges that some Muslims do not account themselves to be a part of the European integration project. They state to promote "[...] knowledge of European culture among young Muslims."¹⁸⁰ This could be interpreted to mean that they are indeed not thinking of themselves as Europeans. "Today, it is currently Muslim businesspeople who are giving a positive impression of Islam. Our social competence, for example Muslim foundation and NGOs will become ever more important for the peaceful living together of the people of Europe."¹⁸¹ This statement implies that it is those who interact regularly with others who are met with less prejudice as formulated by Neil Fligstein, but that there remains an inherent contrast between Europeans and Muslims.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁶ Sabine Trittler, Slawomir Mandes, Matthias Koenig, "Religious Dimensions of National and European Identities: Evidence from Cross-national Survey Research," in *Religion and National Identities in an Enlarged Europe*, ed. Willfried Spohn, Matthias Koenig and Wolfgang Knöbl (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 126.

¹⁷⁷ Claire Sutherland, "Nation-building through Discourse Theory," *Nations and Nationalism*, 11, no. 2 (April 2005): 190–191, 194.

¹⁷⁸ Sirkka Ahonen, "Politics of Identity through History Curriculum: Narratives of the Past for Social Exclusion – or Inclusion?," *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 33, no. 2, (March/April 2001): 179–180, 190, 192.

¹⁷⁹ "About Us: Objectif," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

¹⁸⁰ "About Us: Objectif," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

¹⁸¹ "About Us: President," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/president/>.

¹⁸² Neil, Fligstein, "Who Are the Europeans and How Does This Matter for Politics?," in *European Identity*, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 113, 142–145, 155.

Weak procedure

There are clarified “others” which the European integration project is portrayed as an opposite to and which it has to be defended against. It is for example all forms of racism, xenophobia, violence, intolerance, and discrimination.¹⁸³ In other words, the EMU website presents these as constant hindrances to a European identity and contrasts to the European integration project’s core values. The members of the organisation are presumably met with these behaviours to some extent which poses a danger to their way of life, which could explain why the collective identity is framed as a response to the “other” constructed group as introduced by the theoretical framework.¹⁸⁴ The EMU, put differently, constructs their identity in accordance with what they do not want to be associated with, what the integration project is fighting against and what is threatening its survival. Furthermore, extremism is mentioned as a specific factor which can prevent integration. “We want that our young people are protected from extremism through a correct doctrine, that they are able to practice their religion in peace and that they feel at home throughout Europe.”¹⁸⁵ In this quote it is revealed how extremism goes hand in hand with what EMU has listed as incompatible with the project, since it hinders their human rights to exercise religious freedom.

For the European Muslim Union there seems to be the idea that there is no united Europe yet, and that Muslims do not have an obvious active role in it. It is presented in this quote: “The idea of a united Europe, but also strengthening the engagement of Muslims in European civil society, are important concerns for us.”¹⁸⁶ In other words, it is still just an idea which makes it a weak procedure. However, it is also suggested to be a dedicated wish from the EMU to engage in this European community based on the wording and that it therefore has to be fought for. It is presumably a priority. It is clear that in how the European Muslim Union understands the integration project there is some divisions made between Muslims and Europeans.

¹⁸³ “About Us: Objectif,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

¹⁸⁴ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 123–124, 127, 137, 156, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

¹⁸⁵ “About Us: President,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/president/>.

¹⁸⁶ “About Us: Introduction,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/introduction/>.

The organisation therefore “[...] aims to deepen the discussion on the place of minorities in European countries in order to build a more solidary society [...]”¹⁸⁷ Their status as minority is assumed to place them outside of the European integration project. “EMU joins in numerous forum and decision-making bodies to actively shape the positive presence of Muslim in the continent.”¹⁸⁸ Muslims are viewed as negative in and/or for Europe which is why the European idea is not understood as arising naturally for the European Muslim Union. According to Fligstein, the mechanism by which individuals can hold seemingly contradictory identities is the fact that in smaller groups, such as being Muslim, people are likely to feel more control than in larger groups as being European. It tends to make people identify strongly with their local groups. However, larger groups might provide positive identities for individuals, and act to promote the smaller group’s worth, which means that the larger group’s identity comes into play under circumstances where it can prove useful.¹⁸⁹ In summary, even though the integration project has not achieved its purpose, the intention is still understood as valid and beneficial.

Illegitimate governance

The shift of loyalties towards the European integration project does not seem to have occurred according to the European Muslim Union. It is solely focused on the national governments in connection to closer collaborations and is not restricted only to the boundaries of Europe. “Furthermore, EMU considers it should take a mediatory role between, the European Muslims and the government and institutions of the European states.”¹⁹⁰ The website does not mention the European Union institution as an actor to turn to, which might be interpreted as the EU being an intergovernmental organisation to them. Additionally, it may be interpreted as a lack of connection to the citizens of the European integration project according to the EMU website. First of all, the EMU states that it aims to: “Develop relations of Muslim communities with NGOs and European institutions.”¹⁹¹ This would indicate that such connections have not yet been made to the EU, or that the current relations are insufficient, for example. It portrays the European Union as a distant

¹⁸⁷ “Home,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr>.

¹⁸⁸ “About Us: Introduction,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/introduction/>.

¹⁸⁹ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 128–129, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

¹⁹⁰ “About Us: Introduction,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/introduction/>.

¹⁹¹ “About Us: Objectif,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

entity. In a similar vein the organisation argues to: “Develop links between European Muslim communities and the media.”¹⁹² This could potentially explain why there might not have been an apparent shift of loyalties to the European level and the EU, because they do not yet have an obvious role in the project or because it is not within reach to the organisation.

Ideology of nationalism

There were no implications of how the European Muslim Union understands nationalism in relation to the European integration project or Europeanness.

6.4 European Muslim Union – inductive analysis

The second code which was not found in the deductive approach, and which puts the European integration project in a more positive light, is that the issue is considered transformable.

Life in Europe has changed. The effect of the presence of millions of immigrants can be seen through a visible cultural contribution, the image of our cities has changed, there are now many mosques, and entire districts have been impacted by immigration. European Muslims, from Moscow to Madrid are rectifying the false notion of Islam as “foreign” immigrant religion.¹⁹³

This code is perceived as positive since the European identity and the European integration project is understood as able to adapt and give room to include more people. In other words, the integration project is adaptable and the European identity constantly changing which provides hope for being a part of the community.

¹⁹² “About Us: Objectif,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunition.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

¹⁹³ “About Us: President,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunition.fr/about-us/president/>.

7. Comparative analysis of EJC's and EMU's framing of European integration

The findings from the analysis are presented and compared in tables below in order to answer the research question of how the EJC's and the EMU's approaches differ and/or are similar. The results from both organisations are discussed based on Fligstein's theory on European identity which leads to fulfilling the aim of understanding how they represent the idea of being European. First, the codes belonging to the category of the European core are discussed and second, the codes under the category threats against Europeanness.

European core		
Code	European Jewish Congress	European Muslim Union
People have shared affiliations	The mutual concerns and prioritisation of similar issues among populations in Europe creates the European community.	

In the first theoretical idea of European people having shared affiliations, the EJC formulates that it is the common concerns across the continent which unites individuals, such as democracy. According to their website it is the precedence of the same matters that contributes to a sense of European community.¹⁹⁴ Fligstein's theory on European identity explains that people engaged in political and economic integration, which the EJC's description above and practices epitomize, change how they perceive their own and neighbours' identities.¹⁹⁵ Rather than a universal culture, it is the civil needs and interests that form and define them as a collective, as Europeans, based on a European core of agreed-upon principles that are important for everyone's benefit. This interaction between

¹⁹⁴ "Who We Are: Our Mission," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/mission/>.

¹⁹⁵ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 123, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

individuals who are resemblant of each other is understood to produce a European identity and consequently a shared fate by Fligstein.¹⁹⁶ In other words, a cultural integration. The framing of European integration and the representation of the idea of being European from the European Jewish Congress perspective is not clear from only this code, however. Additionally, the main difference between the EJC's and the EMU's approach is that the EMU in contrast, does not mention shared affiliations in their framing of European integration.

European core		
Code	European Jewish Congress	European Muslim Union
The beneficial EU	The EU is both a powerful inter-governmental instrument for change and a distant entity which does not live up to expectations.	The EU is a positive arena for improving relations between different European groups but is in-effective in its executions.

The second code which both minority organisations discuss is the beneficial role that the EU plays. The two organisations are similar in their framing of the European integration as including a beneficial and intergovernmental European Union. It is identified as an apparatus for achieving alterations and an entity which should be adapted after since it is usable to them.¹⁹⁷ At the same time, the EJC and EMU seem to agree that the EU does not meet its perceived function fully.¹⁹⁸ It only aids in reaching the organisations' aims under certain conditions which has not created the desired results. This could be why the EMU for instance promotes European citizenship favouring unity in cultural diversity since it entails certain duties imposed on the union that are grounded in law.¹⁹⁹ Put differently, in the organisations' opinion the EU is not doing its duty towards them as Europeans, which presumably is the

¹⁹⁶ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 123, 124, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

¹⁹⁷ "Who We Are: Our History," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/who-we-are/our-history/>. "About Us: Objectif," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

¹⁹⁸ What We Do: Antisemitism in Europe: WGAS Working Group on Antisemitism," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/ep-working-group-on-antisemitism-wgas/>. "About Us: Objectif," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

¹⁹⁹ "About Us: Objectif," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

reason for them choosing to turn to national governments for cooperation in addition to the union.

The regarded focus or mission of the EU is what differs between the organisations' approaches. According to the EJC website the main aim of the intergovernmental instrument is, or should be, to enhance the Jewish situation specifically.²⁰⁰ Conversely, the Muslim organisation interpret the EU mission as building relations between communities.²⁰¹ It is put into the context of helping the Muslim community to a larger degree than them already being included in the European majority. However, to some extent the EU operates as a movement in strengthening the voice of the organisations and according to the EMU in furthering integration.²⁰² According to the theory, they perceive the European Union as a force for good which is a necessary variable for shaping a European identity.²⁰³ Fligstein's understanding on European identity nonetheless also explains that the organisations' support is influenced by whether the EU serves their interests or if they stand to gain from it. Therefore, the allegiance is brittle. Additionally, he clarifies that emotional attachment to ideas, such as the EU or its foundation, makes people more forgiving of its errors.²⁰⁴

European core		
Code	European Jewish Congress	European Muslim Union
Removal of obstacles	Integration provides human rights which should lead to respect for Jewish practices.	Integration enables closer collaboration and a more united Europe which is positive for the Islam community.

Another code that the European Jewish Congress and the European Muslim Union use to frame the European integration project is its capability of removing obstacles to their way of life. The two representatives acknowledge the presence of current barriers, that integration

²⁰⁰ "Who We Are: Our Mission," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/mission/>.

²⁰¹ "About Us: Objectif," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

²⁰² "About Us: Objectif," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

²⁰³ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 124, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

²⁰⁴ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, 139.

contributes to dismantling them, and that this is advantageous.²⁰⁵ Nevertheless, the similarities in their framing ends there. The integration project is described in accordance with removing hindrances in different ways. For the EJC it is portrayed as a requirement for their continued survival. The integration project provides a support system from discrimination through the assurance of fundamental human rights within a democratic society. Although the process is deemed as lacking, it is presented against the background of EJC perceiving themselves to be part of the project and as being inherently Europeans. In comparison, the EMU sees the removal of obstacles as facilitating cooperation across borders which results in a more multicultural Europe. It therefore, put differently, allows for their positioning in European society. In that way, integration is framed on the one hand from an insider perspective, on the other hand, from an outsider perspective. Consequently, it is evident that the organisations' critical stances towards the project are different from each other.

Fligstein's interpretation of European identity illustrates how the establishment of connection between European societies which entails that members are more similar than different is necessary for the development of a European identity. It implies that identity building assigns similarities to a group that causes solidarity.²⁰⁶ In that way, they are more likely to view themselves as Europeans in a European project. This is assumably what the EJC and EMU is striving towards when promoting human rights as well as closer collaboration. It is viewed as a process which creates new contexts that provokes changes in constructions of collective identity, as presented in previous research.²⁰⁷

European core		
Code	European Jewish Congress	European Muslim Union
Sense of belonging	Integration is built on a common historical fate which	Integration has not been shaped because scepticism

²⁰⁵ "What We Do: Safeguarding Jewish Life and Tradition," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/safeguarding-jewish-life-tradition/>. "About Us: President," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/president/>.

²⁰⁶ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 126, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

²⁰⁷ Matthias Koenig and Wolfgang Knöbl, "Religion, Nationalism, and European Integration: Introduction," in *Religion and National Identities in an Enlarged Europe*, ed. Willfried Spohn, Matthias Koenig and Wolfgang Knöbl (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 10.

	shapes community and shared values of tolerance and peace.	towards the Islamic heritage persists.
--	--	--

In regard to sense of belonging from the perspective of these religious organisations, there are vastly disparate approaches. It is expressed in relation to antisemitism on the website of the European Jewish Congress. The integration project is seen as built on the shared historical fate and history of the Holocaust which brings common lessons to learn and core values such as rule of law, peace, and tolerance.²⁰⁸ For the EMU the opposite is presented. The integration project is sceptical towards them despite the EMU and its members identifying as Europeans.²⁰⁹ It is portrayed that the EMU has to argue for why their Islamic heritage has a place in the community. In that way the project is expressed as exclusionary. The European Jewish Congress depicts themselves as obviously being a part in the integration project meanwhile the European Muslim Union tries to prove that it is part of the European community i.e., that the integration project excludes Europeans that does not conform to certain attributes. The people who oppose a European identity, based on the theory's premises, lack either or both opportunity and desire to interact with their counterparts across Europe which does not fit into the organisation's descriptions.²¹⁰ Their framing is explained by Fligstein to originate from the group wanting to be a part of the more positive identity compared to the one they are currently inheriting.²¹¹

Furthermore, the mechanism by which individuals can hold contradictory identities, such as a religious identity and a geographical one, is the fact that people in smaller groups are likely to feel more in control than people in larger groups. Larger groups may however provide positive identities for individuals, if the larger group's identity acts in a way to promote the smaller group's worth. This means that the larger group's identity comes into play under circumstances where it can prove useful, for example as in the case with the EJC.²¹²

European core

²⁰⁸ "What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: Antisemitism in Europe," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/antisemitism-in-europe/>.

²⁰⁹ "About Us: Introduction," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/introduction/>.

²¹⁰ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 145–147, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

²¹¹ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, 128.

²¹² Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, 128–129.

Code	European Jewish Congress	European Muslim Union
Transformable		The project keeps adapting similarly to European identity, which provides hope for inclusion.

The next code which solely the European Muslim Union uses to frame the European integration project is how it is a transformative force. It is portrayed by the EMU as changing in the same way as the European identity is fluid and never constant.²¹³ Therefore, the organisation outlines that there is hope for the organisation to be included within the integration project. In comparison, the EJC does not discuss the notion of transformability as a characteristic in European integration.

Threats against Europeanness		
Code	European Jewish Congress	European Muslim Union
Ideology of nationalism	Extreme forms of nationalism are the opposite of European integration.	

The European Jewish Congress is similarly the only organisation that explicitly describes the integration project as the antithesis of nationalism. It especially highlights the extreme forms which are compared to the phenomenon of antisemitism.²¹⁴ This notion has its background in the collective identification, and the fact that who we are is comprehended in relation to the “other” as presented in the theory.²¹⁵ The opposites to what is understood as a European identity or Europeanness, based on the theory’s premises, is for example those who have right-wing political views and who places the nation in front. They are namely less likely to interact with people who are not like them according to Fligstein.²¹⁶ The EMU in contrast does not frame the integration project or the threats against Europeanness with this code.

²¹³ “About Us: President,” European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/president/>.

²¹⁴ “What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: Antisemitism in Europe,” European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/antisemitism-in-europe/>.

²¹⁵ Neil Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 127, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

²¹⁶ Fligstein, *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, 145–147.

Threats against Europeanness		
Code	European Jewish Congress	European Muslim Union
Weak procedures	The integration project is in constant need of nurture and protection from e.g., antisemitism.	Integration is threatened by e.g., xenophobia which hinders a united Europe and weakens Muslims' position in society.

The results illustrate how the organisations in a similar way argue that the integration project is threatened by people who do not accept their practices or beliefs. In essence, this is framed as a danger against the European core since it implies a hindrance to a united Europe and negatively affects their place in the project as minorities.²¹⁷ In this framing, it is shown how the organisations are understanding the integration project as not arising by itself, but that it needs nurture. It is due to several perils against the EJC's and EMU's members well-being which to them goes against the whole idea of the integration process and its connection to European identity. The EJC website, furthermore, questions the success of the project although remaining decisive that it is worth fighting for. The EMU on the other hand recognises that these present challenges hinder integration. They underline that the European idea is not currently a solidary society for minorities.²¹⁸ In summary, it seems that the two representative organisations recognise the European integration project and the idea of being European as fragile and under constant pressure that it occasionally falls under. The previous research and deductive interpretation potentially explain the logic behind this reasoning. The fear is that Europe will fail to act as a single entity and thus, be consigned to the side-lines.²¹⁹

Threats against Europeanness		
Code	European Jewish Congress	European Muslim Union
Lack of safety	Increasing threats mean that European integration is losing	

²¹⁷ "About Us: Introduction," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/introduction/>. "What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: Antisemitism in Europe," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/antisemitism-in-europe/>.

²¹⁸ "Home," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr>.

²¹⁹ European Commission, "Home: Press Corner," European Commission, accessed May 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_361.

	credibility of providing safety.	
--	----------------------------------	--

The EJC continues to frame the European integration in accordance with insufficiency. In the inductive analysis the EJC frames the project as not equipped to secure Jews' safety since dangers persist against their practices of life.²²⁰ The integration project is described as not upholding its purpose, therefore. EJC presents this code as evidence that there are constant challenges to upholding the European core values and consequently presents doubt in the project's success. The main difference in approach from the EMU is that the latter organisation does not mention the lack of safety as a threat against integration for its members.

Threats against Europeanness		
Code	European Jewish Congress	European Muslim Union
Illegitimate governance		A connection is absent between the EU and the Muslim communities which does not shift their loyalties.

EMU identifies the crisis of legitimacy in the EU as the last code describing threats against Europeanness. It is a threat since the integration project is built around the idea of representative democracy. It connects to the absence of connection between the European Union and Muslim communities.²²¹ The project becomes remote and that is the reason for why the organisation has not completely shifted its loyalties towards the European level. This code is not formulated on the website of the EJC. According to this description the project does not have a connection to the people of Europe who it is aiming to unify.²²²

²²⁰ "What We Do: Protecting Our Communities," European Jewish Congress, accessed May 23, 2022, <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/protecting-our-communities/>.

²²¹ "About Us: Objectif," European Muslim Union, accessed May 23, 2022, <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

²²² Cris Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration* (London: Routledge, 2000), 18.

8. Conclusion and discussion

In this chapter the research findings are discussed, and conclusions drawn on an overarching level in order to determine intra-academic and extra-academic implications. It is reflected upon how the data selection, method and theory have impacted the results as well as what other methodologies might have contributed positively to the study. The results are also related to previous research and what the study's implications are for future research.

The purpose of the study was to understand how the European Jewish Congress and the European Muslim Union represent the idea of being European, by answering the questions of how they frame the European integration project in order to include the Jewish and Muslim groups in the European project on their websites and how their approaches differ or are similar. It is illustrated through a qualitative content analysis that the organisations frame the project as having a European core made up of shared affiliations, including a beneficial European Union, being transformable, removing obstacles, and creating a sense of belonging. European integration is also expressed as the antithesis of factors that undermine "Europeanness" such as nationalism, illegitimate governance, weak procedures, and lack of safety. These codes are therefore described after two themes, i.e., after the categories "the European core" and "threats against Europeanness." The EJC and the EMU represent the idea of being European in their function as minorities and represents the ideal of Europeanness as flawed, although with differing perceptions of their own position within the concept of European integration. The Jewish organisation describe themselves as an apparent and integral part of the project, meanwhile the Muslim organisation expresses that they should be. However, both present the idea of being European as compatible with their religious identity.

The conclusions have intra-academic and extra-academic implications. In the field of European studies, the study contributes a description on what is and is not European, according to some religious communities, and why it is affecting their practices. It was visible in for example, the portrayal of Europe as having issues of keeping to its proclaimed identity. This affects the study of the meaning of Europe and European integration for different groups of people. European identity is portrayed as a defence against something

that the representative organisations are in opposition to, which could become even more applicable for the EU in its process of furthering the idea of Europeanness. Especially since the EJC and EMU work, and have specifically chosen to work, as a group within a group i.e., European Jews and Muslims. It indicates something special about the continent on which they are active. Furthermore, the findings have intra-academic implications in that the findings are both consistent with, and adds to, previous research findings. The study confirms the struggle between worldviews as origin to friction, for example, both between the EJC and EMU, and to a degree between the minority and majority perspective in relation to the integration project's purpose.²²³ Earlier research analyses also present how identity affect the support for the European integration project which is the case in this study too. The self-interest and cultural threats play a decisive role in this support, as in earlier findings.

Since the religious organisations lean on a shared identity across national borders already, this might explain why the European identity is represented as it is. However, this is where some conflicting results are shown. The findings from this study does not illustrate the integration project as arising naturally from a shared culture or as implying an obvious shift in loyalties as has been presented in other analyses. Additionally, the organisations seem to frame the project mostly through the theory's assumptions and thus the results of this thesis fortify the theory's understandings and strengthens it further.

These results have been affected by the study's objectives, data selection, method, and theoretical perspective. For example, the EJC and EMU are making claims of representing Jews and Muslims, and the use of website material is not able to confirm or deny if the representativeness is an empty shell or how much voice the member organisations actually have. The study is limited to analysing the message that the central organisation wants to convey, rather than what specific people of Jewish or Muslim beliefs think. For that reason, it could have been insightful to conduct interviews in addition to examining websites to reach a deeper understanding of the attitudes towards the integration project within the communities. This triangulation of data could have produced results portraying how different Jewish and Muslim people portray Europeanness, both within the same organisation but also between different national communities. It has the potential of decreasing the risk of presenting wrongful interpretations of their framing of the European

²²³ Claire Sutherland, "Nation-Building Through Discourse Theory," *Nations and Nationalism*, 11, no. 2 (April 2005): 190–191, 194.

integration project and their representation of the idea of being European, as well as presenting more generalisable results. Another kind of content analysis would presumably have generated other insightful results and perspectives, such as a quantitative content analysis or a purely inductive content analysis. It would have allowed the source material to a greater extent convey its manifest messages freely, however not the latent content. Additionally, a quantitative research design runs the risk of generalising which arguably had not been of as much aid in a similar study to highlight nuances between the different religious organisations' approaches to integration.

In regard to the theoretical selection, the criticisms against Fligstein's understanding on European identity may affect the results as well. The theory is based on the model of national identity forming, social class, and Eurobarometer surveys which could include separate attitudes from how the EJC, and EMU understand European integration. This might make the analysis more surface-levelled and descriptive, rather than systematic. However, it still provided broad interpretations and an ability to understand the inner qualities and relations of the organisations' approaches towards European integration. The results also originate from the ontological assumptions in the theory, that the structure of reality has its foundation in our consciousness, as portrayed by Bergström and Boréus.²²⁴ It connects to the qualitative content analysis as socially constructivist and interpretative. The epistemological basis, the way of explaining how we know what we know, also affect the results.²²⁵ The study is founded upon the understanding, similarly to Bergström and Boréus explanation, that our knowledge is established via language and therefore that comprehension about the world is temporary and not obviously accessible to our senses.²²⁶ It is impacted by, for example, assumptions about reality, limits regarding material and time, which in turn has consequences for what this study can contribute with.

The research study opens up for future research into how the meaning of European integration has changed for these or other religious communities over time and what has impacted their representation of the European idea during this period. It would be interesting

²²⁴ Göran Bergström och Kristina Boréus (red.), *Textens Mening och Makt: Metodbok i Samhällsvetenskaplig Text- och Diskursanalys*, (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2012), 26–27.

²²⁵ Todd Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*, (London: Routledge, 2003), 16.

²²⁶ Göran Bergström och Kristina Boréus (red.), *Textens Mening och Makt: Metodbok i Samhällsvetenskaplig Text- och Diskursanalys*, (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2012), 28–29.

to see a continuation of studies into examining these questions in relation to specific local attitudes or attitudes on a national level or analyse organisations within the same religious faith as well. Do their framing of European integration or representation of the idea of being European differ? It would be of use for European studies since this research area is intersectional and therefore provides understanding on more complexities in the European integration project.

References

Internet sources

Ahonen, Sirkka. "Politics of Identity through History Curriculum: Narratives of the Past for Social Exclusion – or Inclusion?." *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 33, no. 2, (March/April 2001): 179–194.

Alzetta, Roberto. "Building a Home". In *Young Migrants: Exclusion and Belonging in Europe*, edited by Katrine Fangen, Thomas Johansson, Nils Hammaren, 173–198. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Bruter, Michael. "Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe: The Impact of News and Symbols on Civic and Cultural European Identity." *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no 10 (December 2003): 1148–1179.

Bulletin of the European Communities. "Declaration on European Identity." December 1973, No. 12. Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities. https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable_en.pdf.

Carey, Sean. "Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?" *European Union Politics* 3, no. 4 (December 2002): 387–413.

Cigdem Esin, Mastoureh Fathi and Corinne Squire. "Narrative Analysis: The Constructionist Approach." In *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*, edited by Uwe Flick, 203–216. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2014. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243.n14>.

Denscombe, Martyn. *Good Research Guide: For Small-scale Social Research Projects*. Berkshire: McGraw-Hill Education, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central.

European Commission. “Home: Press Corner.” Accessed May 29, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_361.

European Jewish Congress. “What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: Antisemitism in Europe.” Accessed May 23, 2022. <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/antisemitism-in-europe/>.

European Jewish Congress. “What We Do: Combatting Antisemitism: WGAS Working Group on Antisemitism.” Accessed May 23, 2022. <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/combating-antisemitism/ep-working-group-on-antisemitism-wgas/>.

European Jewish Congress. “What We Do: Preserving Shoah Memory.” Accessed May 23, 2022. <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/preserving-shoah-memory/>.

European Jewish Congress. “What We Do: Protecting Our Communities.” Accessed May 23, 2022. <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/protecting-our-communities/>.

European Jewish Congress. “What We Do: Safeguarding Jewish Life and Tradition.” Accessed May 23, 2022. <https://eurojewcong.org/what-we-do/safeguarding-jewish-life-tradition/>.

European Jewish Congress. “Who We Are: Our History.” Accessed May 23, 2022. <https://eurojewcong.org/who-we-are/our-history/>.

European Jewish Congress. “Who We Are: Our Mission.” Accessed May 23, 2022. <https://eurojewcong.org/mission/>.

European Muslim Union. “About Us: Introduction.” Accessed May 23, 2022. <http://emunion.fr/about-us/introduction/>.

European Muslim Union. “About Us: Objectif.” Accessed May 23, 2022. <http://emunion.fr/about-us/objectif/>.

European Muslim Union. "About Us: President." Accessed May 23, 2022. <http://emunion.fr/about-us/president/>.

European Muslim Union. "Home." Accessed May 23, 2022. <http://emunion.fr>.

Favell, Adrian. "Immigration, Migration and Free Movement in the Making of Europe." In *European Identity*, edited by Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, 167–190. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Fligstein, Neil. *Euro-clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).

Fligstein, Neil. "Who Are the Europeans and How Does This Matter for Politics?." In *European Identity*, edited by Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, 132–166. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Gabel, Matthew. "Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories." *Journal of Politics* 60, no.2 (1998): 333–354.

Gosewinkel, Dieter. "Conclusion: Membership as Basis and Boundary for Protection, Equality, and Freedom." In *Struggles for Belonging: Citizenship in Europe, 1900-2020* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021): 419–436.

Graneheim, Ulla .H, Britt-Marie Lindgren and Berit Lundman. "Methodological Challenges in Qualitative Content Analysis: A Discussion Paper." *Nurse Education Today* 56 (September 2017): 29–34.

Grötsch, Florian and Annette Schnabel. "The Ambiguous Roles of Religion: The European Integration Project as a Multilevel Case." *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* 9, no. 7 (January 2013): 1–32. <https://eds-s-ebSCOhost-com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=14&sid=de6d9364-89b4-454d-9c5f-18cc04888e98%40redis>.

Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. "Calculation, Community, and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration." *European Union Politics* 6, no. 4 (2005): 419–443.

Ilic, Angela. "Both Insiders and Outsiders: Identity and Interreligious Dialogue in the Discourse of Islamic Communities in Croatia and Serbia Concerning European Integration." *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 50, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 127–136. Atla Religion.

Journal of European Studies. "Articles: Identity". Accessed July 5, 2022. <https://journals.sagepub.com/action/doSearch?filterOption=thisJournal&SeriesKey=jesa&AllField=identity>.

Klimova, Galina S. "European Identity Between Religiousness and Secularity." *RUDN Journal of Political Science* 22, no. 4 (December 2020): 617–633. <https://doaj.org/article/f50a3d15e86349b091d0e610c3754629>.

Laffan, Brigid, and Jean Monnet. "The European Union and Its Institutions as 'Identity Builders.'" In *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, edited by Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilynn B. Brewer. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.

Lambert, Nick. "In Hiding? The Jews of Europe." *European Judaism: A Journal for the New Europe* 40, no. 2 (Autumn 2007): 71–74.

McLaren, Lauren. "Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?." *The Journal of Politics* 64, no. 2 (May 2002): 551–566.

Nelsen, Brent F., and James L. Guth. "Religion and the Creation of European Identity: The Message of the Flags." *The Review of Faith and International Affairs* 14, no. 1 (2016): 80–88.

Pew Research Center. "Europe." Religious Composition by Country, 2010–2050. Last modified April 2, 2015. <https://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projection-table/2020/percent/Europe/>.

Risse, Thomas. *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010. ProQuest Ebook.

Risse, Thomas. "Social Constructivism and European Integration." In *European Integration Theory*, edited by Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, 144–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Schreier, Margrit. "Qualitative Content Analysis." In *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*, edited by Uwe Flick, 170–183. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2014. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243.n12>.

Sener, Aktürk. "Comparative Politics of Exclusion in Europe and the Americas: Religious, Sectarian, and Racial Boundary Making since the Reformation." *Comparative Politics* 52, no. 4 (July 2020): 695–719.

Sutherland, Claire. "Nation-building through Discourse Theory." *Nations and Nationalism* 11, no. 2 (April 2005): 185–202.

Willing, Carla. "Discourses and Discourse Analysis." In *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*, edited by Uwe Flick, 341–53. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2014. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243.n23>.

Wodak, Ruth. "National and Transnational Identities: European and Other Identities Constructed in Interviews with EU Officials." In *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, edited by Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilynn B. Brewer. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.

Literature

Ahrne, Göran and Peter Svensson. *Handbok i Kvalitativa Metoder*. Stockholm: Liber, 2015.

Bergström, Göran och Kristina Boréus (red.). *Textens Mening och Makt – Metodbok i Samhällsvetenskaplig Text-och Diskursanalys*. Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2012.

Bourne, Angela. "European Identity: Conflict and Cooperation." In *Research Methods in European Union Studies*, edited by Kennet Lynggaard, Ian Manners, and Karl Löfgren, 55–71. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Bryman, Alan. *Samhällsvetenskapliga Metoder*. Malmö: Liber, 2018.

Haas, Ernst. *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–1957*. London: Stanford University Press, 1958.

Koenig, Matthias, and Wolfgang Knöbl. "Religion, Nationalism, and European Integration: Introduction." In *Religion and National Identities in an Enlarged Europe*, edited by Willfried Spohn, Matthias Koenig and Wolfgang Knöbl, 1–16. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Landman, Todd. *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2003.

Medrano, Juan Díez. *Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

Meinhof, Ulrike Hanna. "Europe Viewed from Below: Agents, Victims and the Threat of the Other." In *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, edited by Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilynn B. Brewer. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.

Murray, Douglas. *The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam*. London: Bloomsbury, 2017.

Shore, Cris. *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Trittler, Sabine, Slawomir Mandes, Matthias Koenig. "Religious Dimensions of National and European Identities: Evidence from Cross-National Survey Research." In *Religion and*

National Identities in an Enlarged Europe, edited by Willfried Spohn, Matthias Koenig and Wolfgang Knöbl, 124–145. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.