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The Effects of Violence on Political Trust in Mali

A Quantitative Analysis of How Levels of Insecurity and Violence,
Affects Trust in Different Types of Security Actors.

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Abstract

This thesis generates new theory on how violence affects the levels of political trust toward state and non-state security actors in Mali. The theory that is generated will further be tested through a quantitative regression analysis to be able to answer the overarching research question of: *In contexts with high levels of insecurity and violence, under what conditions do populations put their trust in different types of security actors?* Furthermore, two additional research questions are examined: *How does regional variation, whether violence is taking place within a region or not affecting how populations put their trust in state or non-state security actors?*, and *How do different types of violent events affect whether populations put their trust in state or non-state security actors?* The thesis can conclude that the levels of trust in state security actors are affected by the levels of violence in Mali, additionally, the thesis finds evidence that the levels of violence within a region and that regions location effects the will of a population to trust state security actors negatively. The thesis does not find sufficient results to conclude that violence affects the levels of trust in non-state security actors. The thesis also concludes that more research is needed to fully understand the effects of different types of violence on political trust.

Key words: Mali, State Capacity, Political Trust, Rebel Governance, Regional Violence, Security.

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1 Introduction

The first chapter is an introduction to the research puzzle which seek to clarify the purpose of this thesis, which is to develop new theory on how violence affects levels of trust towards state and non-state security actors.

The importance of understanding societal dynamics in conflict is and will always be a key factor to understand how and why conflict occurs, as well as how to keep and work towards a more stable and sustainable peace (Lia, 2015). The field of conflict research has constantly strived towards furthering the understanding of how insecurities emerges and how these are manifested and developed in societies struck by conflict (Breslin & Croft, 2012; Krasner, 2004). Onwards, literature on political trust has established a sound foundation for how we can understand political and public trust in relation to external crises as attacks on the state (Hetherington, 2005; Hutchison, 2011; Newton, 2007). This thesis will take the study of state capacity, security, and political trust further by developing and testing new theory on how state capacity and insecurity affects political trust within states and how regional variation in the levels of violence could affect whether a population tend to trust state or non-state security actors.

1.1 Presentation of the Problem

Theory on state capacity, security and political trust is as of now separate, with very few common denominators. This thesis will bridge this gap in current literature by working towards developing and testing theory on how to understand the effects of the lack of state capacity and violence on political trust. The reason for exploring and connecting these phenomena is to understand how to work towards an improvement of security in contexts of high levels of violence. To do this we also need to understand what actors a population trust and what consequences the actions of these actors have on a populations

will to listen and trust the actors when it comes to policy implementation (Besley & Persson, 2009).

To explore these connections, we can of course look at a variety of cases where conflict affects different group dynamics and loyalties. However, these types of dynamics that are mentioned above are at the centre of conflict in Mali (Sandor, 2017). Adding to this, unprecedented levels of international involvement have been generated by the crisis, most notably through the founding of the UN peacekeeping operation (MINUSMA) in 2013 and the French military operation Serval (which was replaced by Barkhane until November 2022) (BANSEPT & TENENBAUM, 2022; Gehringer, 2022). The security situation is still getting worse despite the 2015 peace accord that was signed by the Malian government and two coalitions of rebel groups (Lorentzen, 2021). Mali has also seen a rise in insurgencies, intracommunal conflicts, banditry and violence targeting civilians. These developments have made preventing and countering violent extremism key priorities for the international community, still almost no research has been done with the purpose of developing theory on how the levels of political trust are affected by the levels of violence.

1.1.1 Aims and Objectives

The aim of this thesis is to get a better understanding of the conditions that lead populations to put their trust in different types of security actors (state or non-state) in conflict settings. More specifically, the thesis studies whether the Malian population puts their trust in state or non-state security actors depending on how the security situation looks in a particular region and what types of violent events they are exposed to. The thesis seeks to generate new theory regarding the connection between violence and political trust in Mali. The thesis will be using survey data on reported trust in security actors from the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) database Mali-Mètre, and violence occurrence data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). Thus, this thesis will explore empirical data about violent events as well as survey data from the years 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021 and 2022 to explore and develop theory on how violence affects the levels of political trust.

1.2 Research Question

Research on Mali and Sahelian politics have as of now mainly been focused on qualitative studies (Bodian et al., 2020; Desgrais et al., 2018; Hagberg & Körling, 2012; Sangare, n.d.). This study will explore under what conditions populations put their trust in different actors that can provide security, such as the Malian army (FAMA), the police, the national guard or non-state security actors, such as, rebel or separatist groups. Current studies have been focused on specific aspects of Malian security but not the connection between the occurrence of violence and reported levels of trust towards different actors in Malian society (Bencherif et al., 2020; Bodian et al., 2020; Keita, 1998). Therefore, this thesis will have the following overarching research question:

In contexts with high levels of insecurity and violence, under what conditions do populations put their trust in different types of security actors?

Building on this overarching research question, two sub questions will be examined to further the understanding of how a population reacts to insecurity and violence.

The different types of actors that have the capacity to provide security in Mali are in general state or non-state security actors. State security actors can be the Malian Army, the Police, National Guard, or the Gendarmerie. Actors that have the capacity to provide security but are not state actors are mostly rebel or separatists' groups. These non-state groups are mainly located in the northern and central regions of Mali, where they control some areas of land and oversee security (Bodian et al., 2020; Lecocq & Klute, 2022). Trust towards state and non-state security actors is different from every region but with the tendency that in northern and central regions of Mali, trust in state security actors is lower and the levels of violence higher than the capitol and southern regions.

We may therefore assume that levels of reported trust should be affected by the frequency of violent events since the frequency of violent events are largely focused on the northern and central regions of Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal and Ménaka. In these northern region, we can observe a high level of insecurity i.e., high numbers of violent events (ACLED, 2017; Bencherif et al., 2020; Bodian et al., 2020), we are also able to observe

lower levels of trust in actors that are responsible for the security provision in the northern and central regions (Klatt, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021, 2022). The region that stands out is Ségou which is situated in the south of Mali but still display relatively high numbers of violent events during the period this thesis will examine (ACLED, 2021). Because of these internal conflicts in the regions of Mali the Malian state cannot be seen as a security provider for the entire country and this gives us the need for a complimentary research question to explore this regional variation of internal or external violence in regions and trust towards state and non-state security actors. This first sub question therefore attempts to encompass this possible regional variation in political trust in Mali, and is formulated as such:

How does regional variation, whether violence is taking place within a region or not affecting how populations put their trust in state or non-state security actors?

Onwards, of course both state and non-state security actors could be violent, and this opens the discussion around the second sub-question. Violence can take many forms, it can be between organised groups, it can be inflicted remotely via drones, rockets, or mines and it could be directed towards civilians (Jackman, 2021; Sandvik, 2016). The nature of these different types of violence can have an impact on how political trust is manifested. Different types of violence could have different outcomes on political trust. Therefore, the second sub question is formulated as such:

How do different types of violent events affect whether populations put their trust in state or non-state security actors?

2 Understanding Mali

This section will touch on how the conditions for political trust and violence manifest themselves in Mali as well as give a background to why we have the situation that we have today. This section will also provide and explain why we have the type of violence that we have today, and how different actors are handling the conflict and the violence that comes with it.

Mali has since its independence from France in 1960 struggled with corruption, and a lack of trust in government institutions. The end of the cold war constituted a new beginning for Mali, often seen by international observers as a role model for democratic development and stability. However, underlying divisions in Malian society, often reinforced by aid regimes have contributed to the widening of the gap between Mali's positive international reputation and its internal problems. These aid regimes contributed to the consolidation of a government that became more and more unpopular and discredited. On the other side, this structural flaw did produce a situation that gave the organisations challenging the State's authority and constitutional order during this crisis legitimacy and support among the public, i.e., separatist, and insurgent groups got momentum and legitimacy (Bergamaschi, 2014).

Division between mainly northern Tuareg groups and the central government resulted in a build-up of instability during 2011. To understand this division, we need to understand the geography of Mali and where different groups are formed and where they operate. In Figure 1 a map of Mali is presented to give a better overview of the different regions and where the different groups are operating, and where violence occurs.



Figure 1 - Map of Mali and its regions (UN Geospatial, 2020).

The MNLA¹ was created by northern militias and set up the goal to have an autonomous northern Mali for the Arab, Fulani, Tuareg and Songhai ethnic groups (Bergamaschi, 2014; Issaev & Korotayev, 2022).

The confrontation between the government and the northern separatist movements resulted in the takeover of government in 2012. The coup d'état was largely driven by the Tuareg movement in the north, as well as the government's inability to tackle widespread corruption and political extraction among large parts of Malian society (Hagberg & Körling, 2012).

¹ National Movement for Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad, MNLA) – A coalition between Tuareg ethnic groups and returners from the Libyan civil war.

Since the rebellion in 2012, Mali has suffered from instability and insecurity. The rebellion opened for the possibility for soldiers from the Libyan civil war to gather followers and create radical jihadist groups. These jihadist groups have since operated in Mali and there is an increasing spill over effect to the neighbouring states of Burkina Faso and Niger (Lecocq & Klute, 2022). These jihadist groups are fighting against Malian security forces but also together and against other non-state groups in the northern regions of Mali (Ananyev & Poyker, 2023; Desgrais et al., 2018).

The unrest in Mali cannot be separated from international trends and events and the 2012 coup d'état was driven by both the internal factors mentioned above and external factors involving the conflict in Libya and the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The Islamist factor in the context of the 2011 Arab Spring in the region saw a large influx of religiously driven fighters that saw an opportunity in the insecurity and instability in the rural regions of Mali. Onwards, the abrupt fall of the Libyan regime and its consequences, including the spread of illegitimate weapons and ammunition inside Mali contributed to the resources needed to fight the underfunded Malian army.

The Tuareg's involvement in Muammar Qaddafi's military was important. After 2011, they helped the Malian northern militias rise to power through training and weapons support (Issaev & Korotayev, 2022). The Tuareg rebellion and the following jihadist occupation of the northern regions of Mali revealed many cleavages in society and governance that had grown and worsened since 2012. The government departing from the majority of the northern territories of Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal and Ménaka and the following pressure on local populations by resource competition, illegal arms trade and clashing ethnic groups and ideologies have worsened the internal conflicts between people and groups (Bencherif et al., 2020; Keita, 1998; Sandor, 2017; Walther & Christopoulos, 2015).

The French intervention in 2013 halted Jihadist groups in the northern regions of the country but these groups have still managed to keep a presence in Mali. However the religiously motivated groups are quickly changing character to fit into what populations in the northern regions agree with (Desgrais et al., 2018). Non-state actors have now been responsible for multiple attacks on both UN peacekeepers, Malian security forces and French forces. In 2015 the Alger's peace treaty was signed between an alliance of

northern Tuareg militias called the *Plateforme* and the *CMA*². The signing of the peace treaty has not improved the security for the population in the northern regions. The *Plateforme*, *CMA* and other non-state groups are still fighting both against other non-state groups and state security forces, violence have even spiked significantly since 2015 resulting in violence gradually moving southwards in Mali, since 2021 the region of Ségou have experienced a large spike in the number of violent events, giving an indication that violence in Mali is no longer isolated to the most remote regions but is working its way down through the country (ACLED, 2021; BANSEPT & TENENBAUM, 2022; Lecocq & Klute, 2022; Sangare, n.d.).

After the coup d'état in 2012 Mali has experienced two more coup d'états, one in late 2020 and one in the spring of 2021 and the violence against civilians in the central and northern regions of the country has constantly increased. The situation is worsened by severe droughts, the growth of self-defence groups and other non-state actors that seek spoils in the deteriorating security landscape which in turn leads to a decline in trust both towards public institutions and between individuals (Bodian et al., 2020; Desgrais et al., 2018; Raleigh et al., 2021; Walther & Christopoulos, 2015).

The absence of, and further retreat of the state from the northern regions that are the most affected by insecurity, are giving violent non-state actors increasing room to operate and become integrated into local communities through either force, or by providing these local communities with basic public goods such as food, water, and security from other local non-state violent actors (Bodian et al., 2020; Rupesinghe et al., 2021a; Rupesinghe & Bøås, 2019).

Dynamics between state and non-state actors in Mali are constantly fluctuating, we can observe dynamics of both cooperation and antagonism between state and non-state actors. This fluidity is even more evident between non-state actors as they work to control areas, by using targeted attacks towards rival groups, bandits and claimed jihadist strongholds. Concerns about generalized insecurity or the presence of armed non-state actors can put large pressure on inter and intra community dynamics, thus dividing groups and armed

² *CMA* - the Arab Movement of the Azawad. Militia movement mainly consisting of Arab ethnicities from the northern regions of Mali.

movements along tribal lines, which only become momentarily connected by ad hoc arrangements based on how the security situation is perceived at the moment (Sandor, 2017).

A key notion in the Malian case is that the line between rebel, separatist, jihadist, self-defence, and bandit groups are constantly fluctuating, and it is very hard to get a comprehensive understanding of how non-state actors are aligning themselves towards each other and what they are doing with the areas that they control. According to the literature, many African states, like Mali, struggle with governmental reach and are unable to offer their citizens protection in the country's rural and peripheral regions. This frequently manifests as carelessness and neglect from the central government that often has a lack of desire to ensure the safety of the entire population. The regions that are mostly affected by this in Mali is the northern and central regions of Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal and Ménaka (Carey, 2007; Hoffmann & Verweijen, 2019; Rupesinghe et al., 2021a; Sandor, 2017).

Much of the research concerning Mali is coherent in that the country faces broad issues of insecurity spanning over both more traditional issues of territorial integrity, monopoly on violence and sovereignty to issues of security connected to the use of farmland and tensions building up between not only different ethnic groups but between villages because of the shrinking areas of arable land. The country is very close to going into a downwards spiral of insecurity and violence because of this combination of insecurity issues (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015; Klute, 2020; Osland & Erstad, 2020; Rupesinghe & Bøås, 2019).

There are a bewildering number of challenges for anyone attempting to comprehend the landscape of conflict in Mali. First, it is important to keep in mind that disputes in Mali frequently overlap and can sometimes have a long historical context (Sangare, n.d.). Linked conflicts between various social and ethnic groups, between jihadist organisations and the government, and between various armed organisations frequently lack defined borders.

Another difficulty is that there are many armed organisations operating in Mali, occasionally with shared, occasionally with conflicting objectives and sometimes with shared territories. Even the distinctions between armed groups labelled as "jihadist" and "non-jihadist" are frequently hazy. The label "jihadist" can often be used as a way to motivate and legitimize violence towards groups that are conflicting with the Malian state or as a mean to gain more or less support for certain policy (Lia, 2015; Rupesinghe et al., 2021b; Sangare, n.d.).

There are claims that there sometimes is some collaboration between jihadist and allegedly non-jihadist armed groups. Based on location or regional conditions, combatants frequently switch between all kinds of organisations. Due to this mobility, claims that pro-government armed organisations and previous separatist or non-jihadist armed groups have worked together with different jihadist groups are frequently made. Any attempt to map this diverse array of groups is by its very nature inaccurate given the continual changes in the security and political environment in the entire Sahel region (Desgrais et al., 2018).

The research on the situation in Mali is rather unison, arguing that the freedom of operation that many non-state actors enjoy increases the instability and unpredictability in both Mali and the greater Sahel region. The research on Mali agrees that the situation is strained both for the Malian state and for the population that faces an array of different challenges, from the decrease in arable land to an increased sense of insecurity. Trust towards political institutions and between people is in a situation like this often vital for both state, non-state, and international actors to establish to be able to work towards an improvement of the security situation. In addition, Malian security forces struggle with a shortage of governmental capability (Bencherif et al., 2020; Bodian et al., 2020; Desgrais et al., 2018; Rupesinghe & Bøås, 2019; Sandor, 2017).

It is stated by the research on Mali that non-state groups and actors enjoy comparatively much freedom, being able to sometimes extort resources and spoils from areas and establish a connection with the local population, in theory some non-state actors are with this consolidating their legitimate control over parts of the populations and some regions of Mali (Berti, 2018; Huang, 2016; Rupesinghe et al., 2021b; Rupesinghe & Bøås, 2019; Whitehouse & Strazzari, 2015; Worrall, 2017).

3 Literature Review

The literature review presented below will highlight prominent research contributions in the field of state capacity and legitimacy, political trust, and rebel governance. The aim of this review is to begin with an initial focus of the field at large and then narrowing it down to specifically research important to this thesis theory generating ambitions. This chapter will serve as the starting point for the development of my theory.

3.1 State Capacity and Legitimacy

The connection between insecurity and state capacity is emphasized by the literature, some are also emphasizing that more research needs to be done on this connection outside of western democracies, to properly understand how state capacity and security are connected (Levy, 2004). Important to note is that the literature on state capacity is largely stemmas from the Hobbesian notion of the state having monopoly on violence within its territory and that it is this monopoly that gives the state capacity to implement and enforce policy upon its population.

The assumption that the state should have monopoly on violence and the ability to both defend the population from external threats and enforce its rule over the population that it has under its control forms the foundation of much of the literature on state capacity (Hobbes & Brooke, 1982). It is at the same time from this notion that the states legitimacy stems, a state without capacity to enforce policy and security i.e., monopoly on violence cannot be seen as a legitimate state (Englebert, 2002; Hobbes & Brooke, 1982).

The conceptualization of state capacity as territorial reach is developed from theory on infrastructural power, meaning the institutional capacity of the central state to penetrate its territory and implement political decisions (Mann, 1984, 2008). The literature frequently assumes that the conventional Weberian state must entirely rule a territory; if

it does not, it has left that area. According to this lens, state sovereignty and authority are either present or not. (Andersen et al., 2014; Levy, 2004; Weber, 1978). A strong and legitimate state is capable of leading development through its ability to protect property rights, contract enforcement and importantly its ability to provide security (Besley & Persson, 2009).

This implies that the literature on state capacity is not concerned with the constraints on authority but with how the power is used and how it effects policy outcomes (D'Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2017, 2021). Large parts of the literature that contributes to develop these theories of the state assert that defending citizens from external dangers and upholding the nation's territorial integrity are the nation state's two essential goals and the basis for its legitimacy (Ridley, 1997; Tilly, 1992). This notion becomes even more evident when it comes to the question of how to make the distinction of state capacity output between states and it can be argued that it is not about a state's form of governance but its ability to constitute and enforce policy (Huntington, 2006). In the case of this thesis the policy in question will be security provision and the thesis will explore within state variation on the levels of security.

The literature argues that state capacity can manifest in different ways. One can either have an emphasis on the resources required for the implementation of political decisions and view state capacity as the ability to carry out any political decision, be it bureaucratic quality, territorial reach, or information resources. This is called by some scholars as a Weberian approach that is defined like quality as competence or epistemic quality, which is a result of professionalisation (D'Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2021; Weber, 1978). A functional approach can be seen as the state's ability to maintain a monopoly of violence as the key trait to state capacity as a concept (Besley & Persson, 2009; Persson, 2008).

Despite the fact that state capacity manifests itself in many different ways and functions, it is difficult to come to a broad agreement on what constitutes essential state functions because doing so consequently requires taking a normative stance on the size of the state and what functions it is supposed to provide to the population (D'Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2021; DeRouen Jr & Bercovitch, 2008; Risse, 2011). Furthermore, it can be challenging to distinguish between the impartiality of policy implementation and the content of policies when state capacity is defined in terms of policy outputs and outcomes.

Arguments about the impact of state capacity on policies and outcomes have the risk of becoming circular, which is a drawback of this outcome-based approach. The assertion that an insurgency started because the state couldn't stop one is redundant and therefore inevitably true (DeRouen Jr & Bercovitch, 2008; Kocher, 2010).

Literature on state capacity is in large focused the state's ability to create and implement policy. Additionally, there is a significant emphasis on state legitimacy and how the populace views the policies that the state develops and puts into effect (Andersen et al., 2014; D'Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2017, 2021; Kocher, 2010). Some of the literature takes this notion further and asserts that it is not only physical control that is of importance for state capacity but also a control over the mind, a cultural hegemony (Lears, 1985). Even though a state does not possess physical capacity to control a territory it still has a large influence on the notion of who is and is not allowed into the community that is the nation state (Persson, 2008).

When a state prioritises giving public goods or advantages to selected groups over others while also having low levels of quality of government, the emergence of an "us" and "them" is frequently inevitable (Persson, 2008; Singh & vom Hau, 2015). Above mentioned literature have in large focused on the top-down approach to nation building and state capacity, with assimilation or group recognition policies in focus, and they have concluded that these policies can have radically different effects in sub-Saharan Africa, sometimes leading to cooperation between communities and towards the state and other times to conflicts (Persson, 2008; Posner, 2005; Singh & vom Hau, 2015).

To conclude we have seen that the literature is largely focused on physical control of territory as the essence of state capacity, and this control is seen as superior to other forms of influence and control. The state's ability to project other values are often neglected, the Gramscian notion of cultural hegemony is often overlooked by the literature on state capacity. The bridge between literature on state capacity and political trust emerges when the literature is trying to explain and understand the dynamics of how policy is accepted by a population and how a state can work towards having its intended policy accepted by the population (Hutchison, 2011; Persson, 2008; Posner, 2005).

3.2 Political Trust

This part will explore how current literature on political trust have explained the concept and under what circumstances a population may gain or lose trust towards the state. The literature both explores the basis for political trust, how a state can build legitimacy and therefore trust, and how political trust develops in a time of crisis.

Political trust is a wide and abstract notion but it is described by (Hetherington, 2005) as “*An individual’s confidence in his or her governmental institutions based on his or her perceptions of institutional performance*”. The importance of trust towards state institutions is further emphasised because a trusting population can deepen regime norms, and contribute to political stability within the state (Hetherington, 2005; Hutchison, 2011). Important to note is that this thesis will consider trust towards both state and non-state actors.

The literature on state capacity and political trust is connected through some scholars who have examined the tools a state can employ to gain trust within its population. The conditions where state capacity is best established, according to this body of literature, are those in which the state enjoys the trust of its population and also has full control over it, since it is under these conditions that policy is most effective and also can benefit a significant portion of the population (Besley & Persson, 2009; Lindvall & Teorell, 2016; Persson, 2008).

Onwards, the literature argues that if there is concerns about generalized insecurity or the presence from armed groups or bandits within the territory of the state, it will become much harder to establish trust both between the state and the population as well as putting large pressure on inter and intra community dynamics, thus dividing groups into recompositions along often political or tribal lines, which only become momentarily connected by short-sighted arrangements between non-state actors and this is the case that we also can observe in Mali (Ananyev & Poyker, 2023; Hagberg & Körling, 2012). It is also described on a more general note by the state capacity literature with the argument that this is the theoretical outcome of what happens when the state cannot provide basic territorial control and no institutional foundation to build trust upon (Besley & Persson,

2009; Persson, 2008). These dynamics often reinforce generalized insecurity due to the degradation of social trust between different communities and individuals. Violent actions that target rival communities also assuredly fuel support for and loyalty towards groups who are more extreme and radicalised, that through their ideology shows a willingness to protect against shared enemies, no matter who these enemies are (De Rouen Jr & Sobek, 2004; Skjelsbæk et al., 2020)

The literature frequently asserts that in cases where a central government is neglecting a region of its territory, it cannot be considered to control that territory because it neither has a monopoly on violence nor on legislative authority (Bates et al., 2002; Hobbes & Brooke, 1982). Therefore, only relying on political trust among the populace is a poor strategy to assert control because there is no proof that it will bring about any benefits for neither the state nor the population (Asal & Shkolnik, 2021; Hobbes & Brooke, 1982).

Onwards, territorial conflict is often connected to lower levels of general trust towards actors in society. However, this theory is somewhat contradictory, an external threat to the territory of the state can rally the states citizens and foster unity and trust within society and towards the state (Hutchison & Gibler, 2007). These findings are consistent with the “rally-round-the-flag theory”, that asserts that the populations trust in the state increases in connection with external threats to the state. However, most of studies on this rally-round-the-flag-effect have been done in the United States where approval ratings towards presidents often increase when there is a perceived external threat as was the case with the 9/11 attacks (Baker & Oneal, 2001).

To be noted is that later studies suggest that the rally round the flag theory only is a by-product of media campaigns aimed at supporting governmental policy and that these campaigns often mute political oppositions, thus strengthening the rally-round-the-flag effect, perhaps more than what it is. These later studies about the rally-round-the-flag effect have when controlling for how the threat is perceived concluded that it is vital that the threat to the state is extremal for it to generate an effect (Baum, 2002; Brody, 1991; Gibler, 2010; Lambert et al., 2011). Therefore, media coverage of a crisis can have an impact on how the threat is perceived. For a rally-round-the-flag-effect to occur the literature states that it only appears when we don't have any opposition or debate about the crisis among elite groups (Groeling & Baum, 2008).

Moreover, political trust can be considered a measurement on state legitimacy, high levels of trust can demonstrate the populations confidence in its political institutions and provide the state with confidence in its decision making processes and policy implementation (Englebert, 2002; Hüsken & Klute, 2010; Molenaar et al., 2019; Osland & Erstad, 2020). It is even argued that trust can be synonymous with legitimation, and that this type of legitimisation is of greater importance for a political system than the trust in individual political leaders, or the government that currently holds office (Newton, 2007).

In summary, the literature on political trust is closely linked to the one on state capacity and it is further on asserting that without capacity there is no legitimacy and onwards no trust among a population. The literature on political trust is on the other hand developing the rally-round-the-flag theory which provides us with a deeper understanding of what could happen when there is a crisis that is perceived as external. The literature on the rally-round-the-flag-effect have been focused on international crises. However, this external perception of threats could in the Malian case be translated to a regional level since the levels of violence differ greatly between regions as well as what actors that have control over the regions. Thus, this thesis will explore if the rally-round-the-flag effect can be applicable in internal crises as well and on this basis attempt to develop a theory on how violence and political trust is connected in Mali.

3.3 Rebel Governance

To properly understand the theoretical foundation for this thesis we need to further explore the developments of state capacity and political trust. As is evident in many cases around the world, the state does not always have neither monopoly on violence, nor does it enjoy the trust of its population. The development of non-state actors operating as a de facto state to control an area and its population is a common phenomenon, in not only Sahel but parts of the Middle east and wider sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, the literature on rebel governance has risen from the necessity for more in-depth case analysis and a regionalization of state capacity studies (Hoffmann & Verweijen, 2019; van Baalen, 2021).

The literature concerning rebel governance examines how rebel groups or non-state groups use existing societal norms and discourses to strengthen an administrative power over an area (Bøås & Strazzari, 2020; Carey, 2007; Menkhaus, 2006; van Baalen, 2021). Much of the rebel governance literature concerns jihadists rebel groups and how especially religiously driven groups often tend to use pre-existing notions, conflicts, and norms in society to both gain followers and radicalise often young men that feel left out and disenfranchised by existing norms and structures (Dowd, 2015; Walther & Christopoulos, 2015).

However, governance is often more legitimate if it is locally rooted. Rebel groups or non-state actors could according to the literature be argued to be more legitimate providers of security than state forces, especially in remote areas, far from capitals (Hoffmann & Verweijen, 2019; Worrall, 2017). Insurgency groups that use local elites, village chiefs, Imams, and marabouts to govern territories are often more successful in their rule. By using local elites these non-state security actors can tap into and control clientelist networks and people to extort taxes, natural resources and recruit new fighters to further nurture the groups cause, be it territorial, religious or monetary (Carey, 2007; van Baalen, 2021).

Rebel groups do not necessarily need territory to deliver governance and that governance can quickly arise with just limited territorial control (Huang, 2016; Risse, 2011; Worrall, 2017). This notion is closely related to (Persson, 2008) theory about a state's ability to project sense of community without having the capacity to project that influence in the traditional sense of territorial control. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that non-state actors are capable of interacting with and appropriating existing political and power systems while exerting influence remotely, for instance through surveillance or other psychological means (Worrall, 2017).

Another branch of the rebel governance literature has focused on the structure of militant groups and how these groups interact with ethnic groups to adapt and take advantage of divisions, disputes and conflicts that often revolve around the utilisation of natural resources and the use of land. These divisions are often exploited to exaggerate and fuel distrust between different groups within society, towards the state or both. Onwards, this

branch of rebel governance literature states that these cleavages along with different forms of coercion are used to recruit new soldier, as well as gaining public support (Asal & Shkolnik, 2021; Berman & Laitin, 2008; Burchall Henningsen, 2021; Rustad et al., 2011).

Some case studies have examined how this is used by rebel and non-state groups in practice to control the movement of persons and products over enemy-controlled territory by tapping into patron-client relationships in a specific area and shaping civilian behaviour accordingly (Hoffmann & Verweijen, 2019). In addition, (Lia, 2015) notes that jihadist actors often have the advantage of religion, which gives them the possibility to rule people without exerting considerable territorial authority in neighbourhoods, refugee camps, or jails. The extent or durability of insurgent territorial control is thus not always a barrier to behaviour resembling the traditional form of governance.

The literature on rebel governance is situated between the study of state capacity, political trust and peace and conflict studies, which makes it very suitable for understanding societal dynamics that fall outside the narrower scope of these fields regarding actions undertaken by non-state actors. The rebel governance literature states that rebel groups can control large areas of land without having considerable material capacity, but with a capability to gain followings and support among different groups in society. It is further stated that rebel groups tend to use large amounts of violence to control populations that do not agree with their rule, making rebel groups more prone to not be trusted by a population (Hoffmann & Verweijen, 2019; van Baalen, 2021; Worrall, 2017). How this effects peoples trust towards these non-state actors have not extensively researched in Mali and how these dynamics play out on the ground could be one of the key aspects towards establishing a stable political order in the northern and central regions stricken by insecurity and distrust towards any form of actor (Klatt, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021, 2022).

3.4 Summary of the Literature Review

By reviewing the literatures on state capacity, political trust, and rebel governance, we have substantially improved our understanding of how violence and insecurity are related to the capability of security actors and the populations' faith in these security actors to provide them with security. However, the literature rarely introduces an analytical framework that examines relationships between various phenomena we can find. As is described above, the literature has focused on either political trust, state capacity, or security. There is no literature that examines how violence and trust correlates and furthermore, there are no studies that does this in the Malian context. The lack of an aggregated perspective and a bridge between different fields of research represents a gap in the studies specifically on Mali. This thesis will attempt to bridge this gap, between the three fields of state capacity, political trust, and rebel governance, as well as giving the research on Mali a supplement in the form of a thesis aimed at understanding the correlations between violence occurrence and trust towards state and non-state actors.

Furthermore, as is stated by (Bodian et al., 2020) the conflict in Mali is a consequence of both internal and external drivers, giving the situation a fairly typical character for how conflicts are manifested in the Sahel region, this makes Mali a suitable case to examine for us to expand our understanding of the dynamics between violence and political trust, not only in Mali but in other Sahelian states as well.

Based on this review of the literature, I will develop a theory on how violence affects the levels of trust in state and non-state security actors. This will be done by a combination of violence occurrence data and survey data on the reported trust in security actors from all regions of Mali.

4 Theoretical Framework

This thesis will generate new theory to expand the understanding of the connection between the occurrence of violence in Mali and the levels of political trust towards state and non-state security actors and if there is regional variation to these levels of trust depending on if the violence is occurring in the same region and can be perceived as internal or in another region and can be perceived as external. The theoretical aim is in other word to explain average variation of trust in state and non-state security actors on a regional level.

It is in situations like in Mali, where regional and rural security is strained that non-state actors have the possibility to exploit these low levels of security as something this said group can fix and not the state, possibly acting as a new legitimate security provider for a population. As is stated by some of the state capacity literature, even though the state do not have control over parts of its territory, it could still be the actor with the best conditions to project a sense of community to the population (Persson, 2008; Posner, 2005; Singh & vom Hau, 2015). What we do not know in the Malian case is if the population tends to trust the state for security or if they trust non-state actors, and furthermore if it depends on what region in Mali we look at. For example, the conditions for security in Koulikoro are vastly different from the security conditions in Mopti.

4.1 State Capacity as Security Provision

The conceptualization of state capacity as territorial reach is developed by Mann's theory on infrastructural power, meaning the institutional capacity of the central state to penetrate its territory and implement political decisions (Mann, 1984, 2008). The Malian state is frequently competing as a legitimate power in many areas of its territory. In this thesis state capacity will be conceptualized as security provision, and state capacity is therefore closely linked to the occurrence of violence. If the level of violence is high in

one region, this will be understood as an area where the state does not have the capacity to provide the population within that region's territory with security, and therefore does not have control over the territory. Onwards this conceptualization is derived from theories who argues that the state has two primary functions, the first is to provide domestic order and material well-being, the second to protect the states territorial integrity and provide protection from external threats to its citizens (Herbst, 1990; Tilly, 1992).

Thus, the level of state capacity is seen as the ability to provide security, which in turn means that the level of security is an indicator for state capacity. In the Malian case, state capacity and security differ widely between regions. In the south of Mali and urban areas populations enjoy comparatively high levels of security, while we have rural regions where the occurrence of violence is frequent, and the levels of state capacity is low. This implies further that the populations will perceive violence and insecurity differently depending on if the violence is close to you or if it is far away from you.

4.1.1 External Threats

Given that both (Hutchison, 2011; Ridley, 1997 and Tilly, 1992) argues that the population should be more prone to gather around state actors in times of crises we can also assume that this could be an outcome for this study. The state has not lost parts of its *raison d'être* because of other actors undermining its legitimacy and the threat of violence is still making the population turn towards traditional state actors for security in a time of crisis. There is with this rationale in other words no significant move towards other actors that could provide security for the population, the state security forces are still seen as the most legitimate security actors and the ones that enjoys the highest degrees of trust and accountability (Baum, 2002; Lecocq & Klute, 2022).

The reasoning behind this idea is that the population will search for what is perceived as stable and safe in a time of crisis. The most evident manifestation of this was observed in the USA after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the trust for the Bush administration increased when the state (USA) became threatened, but the legitimacy i.e., its *raison d'être* was not questioned (Lambert et al., 2011). The population will move towards state actors because

they are seen as the most legitimate actors that can provide the population with security in an uncertain time (Baker & Oneal, 2001; Lambert et al., 2011).

When it comes to Mali, this theory can help to understand why we can see different levels of political trust towards state actors in different regions, in some regions where the security situation is more stable than in other regions populations may tend to perceive the violence that is occurring in other regions as external. This may tend to have a positive effect on trust in Malian state security actors since the violence is seen as external i.e., outside of the region and that the state is the only legitimate actor that can protect the population from this violence coming closer.

The opposite effect could be theorised to occur if we look at a region where the occurrence of violence is high, here the violence is not external and something to be protected from, but something in people's everyday life, the population in these regions of Mali have to relate to the same violence but from another perspective than the population in the capital or in the southern regions, this lead us further towards the next section of internal threats.

4.1.2 Internal Threats

In the case of Mali, the populations in the northern and central regions have violence much closer to them than in the southern regions of Mali. This violence, in the same regions as they live and sometimes in the same village or town (Ananyev & Poyker, 2023; Bencherif et al., 2020; Whitehouse & Strazzari, 2015). The violence in the northern and central regions cannot be perceived by the population as an external threat but rather an internal security threat that is happening here and now rather than somewhere else.

The perception of where violence takes place is important for our theory because this implies that we could experience some regional variation to how people perceive violence and which actors to trust with solving an insecurity problem. This means that if an insecurity problem is perceived as internal the population could tend to trust non-state security actors rather than state security actors. This notion of internal threats is based on the rebel governance literature who argues that a population can put their trust in other actors to perform state-like tasks such as providing security if they do not perceive the

state as a legitimate or effective enough provider of goods such as security (Hoffmann & Verweijen, 2019).

4.2 Violence

Violent acts can be both physical and psychological, sometimes both, as violence can manifest in many ways and forms. Violence can be studied from many different perspectives i.e., the perpetrator, the victim, the third party or the objective observer. Violence can be both individual and institutional, physical, and psychological, be committed by an individual or by a group or institution, violence can occur in events or be systematic and institutionalized and happen over time. Existing definitions of violence display a wide range of definitions that are often based on different theoretical domain assumptions of human nature, social order, or history. Violence is therefore very difficult to theoretically define because as a phenomenon it is multifaced, socially constructed and ambivalent (Body-Gendrot & Spierenburg, 2009).

However, we can derive a theoretical definition of violence that will work for this thesis which focuses on physical, political, or institutional violence, that often are the most apparent form of violence in conflicts. With the above discussion in mind, the definition of violence will be set based on the ACLED definition of violence *the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation*. Additionally, violence occurs in events that can be mutually non-dependent of each other, and this thesis focuses on the type of physical violence that can be divided up into single events. These violent events can be directed towards other groups, towards civilians or not be directed towards anyone in particular (in the form of mines and traps etc.). (ACLED, 2021; Body-Gendrot & Spierenburg, 2009; Raleigh et al., 2010)

4.3 Security Actors

Security actors could be a wide range of different groups or individuals, ranging from organized groups such as a military or a rebel group to self-defence groups formed by a village or a group of villages trying to defend their property and themselves against attacks and theft. This thesis will aggregate types of security actors into two different categories, state security actors and non-state security actors. These are actors that have the capacity to influence the number of violent events in an area, as well as providing the population in that area with physical protection from other actors in the same area. However, just because these actors have the capacity to provide protection from outside actors does not mean that these actors are managing a population without the use of force or the threat of violence by themselves to control a population (Bodian et al., 2020; Desgrais et al., 2018).

4.4 Political Trust

Political trust is an attitude within a population that can assess if the threats posed to the state and the population manifests in the increased trust towards state actors or undermines state legitimacy (Hutchison, 2011). For this thesis the definition of political trust will be expanded from “*An individual’s confidence in his or her governmental institutions based on his or her perceptions of institutional performance*” (Hetherington, 2005) to also include trust towards non-state actors to be able to work on the development of a framework that can help us understand the connection between violence and political trust in Mali. The definition that this thesis will use is subsequently: *An individual’s trust in his or hers state or non-state security providers based on his or her perception of security provision.*

4.5 Summary of the Theoretical Framework

This thesis will contribute with a theory generating study of political unrest in Mali and the theoretical assumption will be made that the population is expected to trust the actors that they consider to be their legitimate security providers, be it a state or a non-state security actor. Onwards, this thesis will attempt to develop a new theory by examining the average regional levels of trust in state and non-state security actors and how this trust is affected by the occurrence of violence between 2017 and 2022 – the unit of analysis is therefore region-year.

The theory that is put forward by this thesis will explore if the population put their trust in state security actors when there is a high level of insecurity or if the population put their trust in non-state security actors when there is a high level of insecurity. Furthermore, the theory that will be put forward is expecting to have regional variation to who the population put their trust in, this means that if a region has much internal violence the levels of trust towards state actors is expected to be affected negatively by the occurrence of violence. This reasoning leads us to the idea that if a region is experiencing a high degree of internal violence, the violence is expected to affect the levels of trust in state security actors negatively. If a region is experiencing lower levels of violence the levels of trust in state security actors is expected to be affected positively.

Onwards, as is manifested in the second sub question, the type of violence that occurs is expected to affect the levels regional trust towards state and non-state actors differently. If there for instance is a high level of violence against civilians, we could expect an increase in the levels of trust towards state security actors since it is often non-state security actors that are committing violence against civilians (Hoffmann & Verweijen, 2019).

To make this framework more comprehensible, Figure 2 and Figure 3 displays how the theoretical framework is expected to connect the concepts of state capacity and insecurity, violence, security actors, political trust, and regional variation in the form of internal or external violence. The lack of state capacity is seen as an underlying condition for our chain of events. Furthermore, violent events can take the form of battles, violence against

civilians, or explosions and remote violence. The existing literature does not give us any clues as to whether the average levels of trust in the Malian regions are depending on which category of violence that occurs or if the location of the violence that occurs affects the levels of trust towards state or non-state security actors, so the thesis will explore this relationship empirically.

Given that this thesis attempts to explain regional variation in the levels of trust in Mali, we will have this regional variation as a moderating variable, meaning that the relationship between violence and who a population trust will be moderated by if the violence that occurs is internal or external to a region. The theory suggests that the regional levels of trust in state and non-state security actors could either be affected by the type of violence that occurs or by the levels of any type of violence, but as is shown in both Figure 2 and Figure 3, we do not know if this is the case before we have done the empirical analysis. If we look at a region where the violence can be seen as external, as in Figure 2 the levels of trust towards state security actors is expected to be affected positive by the levels of violence, on the same note, the levels of trust towards non-state security actors is expected to be affected negatively.




Figure 2 - Theoretical framework for external violence

If we look at a region where the violence can be seen as internal, the levels of trust towards state security actors is theorised to be affected negatively, and trust towards non-state security actors be affected positively.




Figure 3 - Theoretical framework for internal violence

As is shown in the figures, violent events can manifest in three different types of violence, therefore we have three independent variables: battles, violence against civilians and explosions and remote violence. Regional averages of political trust in state and non-state security actors are theorised to be the dependent variables, furthermore the regional variation of external or internal violence is theorised to work as a moderating variable. Here, the basis for the theory developing undertaking is demonstrated and this theory will furthermore be explored and tested to figure out if it has any validity in our empirical material in the following sections.

5 Methodology

The following chapter will focus on the methodology that will be used to answer the research questions. First, our independent, dependent, and moderating variables will be established and explained. Secondly, the research design will be presented. This thesis will use a method consisting of a quantitative analysis of both the correlation between the variables and a regression analysis of how they affect each other to examine the reason for why and if violence affects regional levels of political trust. Thirdly, the material that will be used to examine our independent and dependent variable will be described. Lastly, there will be a reflection on what limitations the material might have to the analysis.

This thesis will use data spanning from 2017 to 2019 and between 2021 and 2022. It is vital for the study that we have data from before and after 2020 and 2021 when two coup d'états took place, as these coups are seen as key events that are having a large impact on the situation in Mali (Bodian et al., 2020; Lecocq & Klute, 2022; Lyammouri, 2021). To answer the research question, *in contexts with high levels of insecurity and violence, under what conditions do populations put their trust in different types of security actors?* The material that will be used will be a combination between two datasets, first, the thesis will be using survey data spanning between 2017 and 2022 from the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) database Mali-Mètre and violence occurrence data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) spanning over the same period. Both the ACLED and the Mali-metre data is coded so that the unit of analysis is in region-year to be able to answer the research questions as well as give an opportunity to explore the difference in how violence affects the average levels of trust in state and non-state security actors in the Malian regions.

5.1 Variables

To answer the research question, we will explore if there is a correlation and an effect between the levels of violence in Mali – our independent variable and the levels of trust towards state and non-state security actors – our dependent variables. The three sub sections below present and explains the independent and dependent variables as well as the moderating variable. In Table 1 a list of the different variables is presented.

Table 1 - Table of the independent and dependent and moderating variable

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	Moderating Variable
Level of Violence: - Battles - Violence Against Civilians - Explosions and Remote Violence	Political Trust: - State Actors - Non-State Security Actors	Regional variation: - Internal violence - External violence

5.1.1 Independent Variable - Violence

In this sub-section the independent variable will be presented. Levels of violence can of course be measured in many ways and violence can also take many different forms as is manifested in the theoretical definition of violence above. To operationalise violence this thesis will use the ACLED definition of what violent events can be and how violence is categorised. A violent event can be battles, explosions and remote violence or violence against civilians (ACLED, 2021). Table 2 presents the three different ACLED categorisations of violent events.

Table 2 - List of violence that is included in Violent Events (ACLED, 2021).

<i>General</i>	<i>Violent Event Type</i>
Violent events	Battles
	Remote Violence
	Violence Against Civilians

The independent variable is closely linked to state capacity since the number of violent events can be imagined to be higher if the central state lacks capacity to maintain control over a certain region. If the levels of attacks are high in one region, this will also be seen as an area where the state does not have control over the territory, and therefore does not have the capacity to provide the population within that territory with security, subsequently, this is theorised to correlate with lower degrees of trust towards state security actors in that specific area.

The fundamental unit of analysis in the ACLED data is the event. Events involve actors such as governments, state forces, militias, or rebel groups. Events occur at a specific time and location, identified by name and coordinates. ACLED codes six types of events and twenty-five types of sub-events (ACLED, 2021). However, for this thesis the unit of analysis will not be the event, but the region and year. The number of events will be accumulated to a regional level and categorised for every year.

This thesis will only focus on the violent event and three different violent event types.³ These definitions are only including violent events that are done by organized groups with an agenda, with that said violent acts can in the context of organised violence be spontaneous and initiated not from a higher command but by individuals without previous

³ See Table 2

consideration or thought (ACLED, 2021; Raleigh et al., 2010). Some violent events will not be relevant for this thesis as they are not occurring in Mali. Nevertheless, violent events can be divided into three parts: First we have the most obvious violent event, battles, mentioned by ACLED as a “violent interaction”. The violent interaction battle is defined by ACLED as “*A violent interaction is the exchange of armed force, or the use of armed force at close distance, between armed groups capable of inflicting harm upon the opposing side*” (ACLED, 2021).

Second, we have violent events that are not direct interactions, i.e., an improvised explosive device (IED), suicide bomb, an air or drone strike. This remote violence will be defined as “*one-sided violent events in which the tool for engaging in conflict creates asymmetry by taking away the ability of the target to respond*” (ACLED, 2021).

The third violent event is violence against civilians. Violence against civilians is one-sided, caused by an armed group or groups with purpose of inflicting fear, harm, or a general sense of insecurity, it can also be unplanned and have no purpose. Violence against civilians will be defined as “*violent events where an organised armed group inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants*” (ACLED, 2021). Civilians are unarmed and cannot engage in any organized violence. The perpetrators of such acts against civilians include both state forces and their affiliates as well as non-state forces (ACLED, 2021; *Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*, n.d.).

5.1.2 Dependent Variable – Trust

The dependent variable will be described in the following sub-section. Trust is going to be the outcome variable of this thesis. Our theory suggests that trust is dependent on the levels of violence and that a population can entrust different actors with their security provision. As is described in chapter two, the number of different actors with a capacity to commit violence is constantly fluctuating and different groups merge and split dependent on short term gains and personal relations between individuals within these groups (Burchall Henningsen, 2021; Desgrais et al., 2018; Lyammouri, 2021).

The Mali-Mètre dataset will be used to derive the data on the dependent variable. The dataset consists of survey data asking how Malians perceive their own well-being as well as what they think about society at large. The Mali-Mètre data is the data that is setting the time scope for this thesis, between 2017 to 2019 and 2021 to 2022⁴. All people who are eighteen years of age or older who are present in the regional capitals or the district of Bamako at the time the polls are performed make up the targeted population for Mali-Mètre. As a result, both the District of Bamako and the regional capitals are represented in the surveys (Klatt, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021, 2022).

Within the survey data, this thesis will focus on the question that is dedicated to perceptions of security providers. The question is formulated as such: “*Which actors do you trust to provide you with security in your region?*” (Klatt, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021, 2022)⁵. Security providers can of course be many different actors in society, however, the focus in this thesis will be trust in state, and non-state security providers. The different actors that are included in the categories are the key actors that constitute the capacity of the state to provide security as well as the non-state actors that have the largest capacity to provide security or challenge state legitimacy in different regions (Bodian et al., 2020; Lecocq & Klute, 2022; Lyammouri, 2021). Again, the data from Mali-Mètre will be aggregated to a regional level, not measuring the individual respondents’ levels of trust over the years but the average regional levels of trust over the years examined.

In Table 3, the actors that are categorised as state as well as non-state security providers according to this thesis are listed. The reason these actors are listed and examined in this thesis is because they are the ones that are the best documented as well as the non-state actors that occurs in all the Mali-Mètre surveys, from this it is therefore possible to be able to get a more coherent and understandable result to base the analysis on (Esiasson et al., 2017). Important to not is that when it comes to the levels of trust in non-state security actors, we can still observe some missing values for the regions of Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, and the capital of Bamako during the years 2017, 2018, and 2022. Also, to have

⁴ The 2020 survey had a complete focus on the coup d’état of 2020 and did not ask any questions regarding the sense of security or trust towards security actors (Klatt, 2020).

⁵ Survey was mainly done in French or in local languages; the question is a translation by the author of this thesis. Original formulation of the question is: “Quel sont les acteurs, en qui vous avez confiance pour la sécurisation de votre région?”

in mind is that there are a variety of other different non-state actors in Mali that could be subject for the kind of analysis that will be done in this thesis, however the structure and organisation of these often very violent and extreme groups make them very difficult to document and track over time (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015).

Table 3 – Table of the categorization of state and non-state actors⁶

State Security Actors	Non-State Security Actors
<p>Malian Armed Forces (FAMA – Forces Armées Maliennes)</p>	<p>The Plateforme The main groups that make up the Plateforme are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the Groupe d’Autodéfense Tuareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA), • the MAA-Plateforme, and • the Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance (CMFPR-1).
<p>Malian National Police Force (Police Nationale du Mali)</p>	<p>CMA The main groups that make up the CMA are.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), • the Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad (HCUA), • and parts of the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA-CMA).
<p>National Guard (Garde Nationale du Mali)</p>	
<p>Gendarmerie (La Gendarmerie).</p>	

⁶ See explanation of the different security actors in Appendix 1

5.1.3 Moderating Effects – Regional Variation

As is mentioned in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 the theory put forward suggest that we will be able to observe some regional variation to how violence affects the levels of trust towards state and non-state actors. As the literature on political trust suggest, a population is prone to trust state actors for their security if they are experiencing an outside threat, however, based on the vast differences in the amount of violence in different regions in Mali we can also assume, that people will perceive this violence differently depending on if they live in a region with low levels of violence or in a region with high levels of violence (Baum, 2002; Lecocq & Klute, 2022). In regions where there is a high level of violence, we need to assume that this violence is not perceived as external, but internal (Hoffmann & Verweijen, 2019). Therefore, this regional variation to violence will be added as a moderating variable for our independent and dependent variables.

Violence in Mali is largely based on the location of the regions and these regions distance to the capitol, with northern and central regions predominantly affected by violent events. Regions closer to the capital are less affected by violence. However, the region of Ségou stands out with being relatively close to the capital of Bamako and still displaying high numbers of violent events. Of course, all regions in Mali have experienced some degree of violence during the years examined, but some more than others (Lecocq & Klute, 2022; Molenaar et al., 2019).

The basis for determining which region that is coded as having internal violence opposed to coding a region as one without internal violence is determined by the data from ACLED and location of the violent events that the ACLED data records. Onwards, a region is coded as 1 if it is experiencing a high degree of violence internally. If a region has over 200 recorded violent events during the entire period examined the region will be coded as one with internal violence. All but one region that will be coded with internal violence is situated in the northern or central parts of Mali, the only region that is not situated here is Ségou. The other regions, situated in the south of Mali have lower numbers of recorded violence and will be coded as 0. It is in the regions with internal violence where we are expecting trust in non-state actors to be higher than in state actors. We are also expecting violence in these regions to have a negative effect on the levels of trust in state security

actors and a positive effect on the levels of trust in non-state security actors. Table 4 shows each region and how each region is coded.

Table 4 – Coding of moderating variable - internal violence

Region (Total number of Violent events in parenthesis).	Internal Violence =1 No Internal Violence = 0
Kayes (43)	0
Koulikoro (97)	0
Sikasso (78)	0
Ségou (375)	1
Mopti (1592)	1
Tombouctou (314)	1
Gao (590)	1
Kidal (213)	1
Ménaka (275)	1
Bamako (21)	0

5.2 Research Design

This chapter will outline the research design that will be used for this thesis. The research design will consist of two parts, first a correlation analysis that examines if the variables are correlated with each other. As is mentioned above, we could expect some regional variation, having some regions driving the correlation between our variables more than others. To understand if this is the case a jack-knifing test will be made to see if regions with a very high numbers of violent events could be the drivers behind the correlations that we can observe in Mali.

There is a promising chance to conduct a more thorough analysis to understand how violence affects the levels of political trust in the Malian regions over the years by using two regressions analyses, one with trust in state security actors as the dependent variable and one with trust in non-state security actors as the dependent variable. The moderating effect of internal violence in regions will be added in these regressions to be able to observe if we have some validity to the theory that is generated above in chapter four. This approach has a strong link to this certain research objective, which is to determine whether a particular factor has an impact, or whether it "makes a difference" (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). This design will therefore suit the goal of this thesis which is to explore if the generated theory in this thesis has any empirical validity.

5.3 Limitations

The following section will present the possible limitations with the empirical data. First presenting the limitations with the Mali-Mètre survey data. Secondly, presenting the limitations with the ACLED data. Thirdly, a discussion about the general limitations of conducting research in a country which is affected by conflict, insecurity, and instability.

Given that Mali-Mètre is a survey of perceptions by the Malian population at a given moment in time, its findings cannot be regarded as absolute truths. Onwards, we have to reserve us to the possibility that respondents have answered untruthfully, given answers that they thought were wanted by the surveys as well as misunderstanding the interviewee and questionnaire (Esiasson et al., 2017). The Mali-Mètre data covers a wide range of actors, however non-state security actors are not as widely examined in the data as state security actors. This means that important non-state security actors and extremist groups that would have given a fruitful insight to how violence affect the levels of political trust on a regional level are excluded from this analysis due to the data not covering levels of trust towards them more than a few single years. It is therefore important to keep in mind that this thesis is only examining actors that were included over the entirety of 2017 to 2022.

Onwards, the conflict data from ACLED has its limitations in that it is a dataset that primarily relies on media coverage of conflict and violent events (ACLED, 2017). This opens the risk of attacks and violence not being reported, coverage of smaller events committed by, including individuals aligned with state or non-state actors may not be reported with any great frequency. For example, urban bias may be a prominent issue in the media-based monitoring, and as a result not being integrated in to the ACLED dataset (Raleigh et al., 2010). On a more conceptual note, ACLED employs a rather narrow definition of violence where the violent event is the central unit of observation and analysis. It is not a dataset that encompasses a wider definition of violence such as structural, racial, or institutional violence. Because of this narrow definition of violence, some depth to the analysis may be missed. For this thesis it is of lesser concern, but nonetheless important to note.

The data is collected in a challenging environment that is politically volatile and where the risk of researchers being victims of the same violence that they try to examine are very real. What this means for this thesis is that the data that is used is likely to be affected, moving forward, this can provide us with a not entirely reliable empirical foundation. It is important to note that our empirical data can provide us with a general overview of how the connections between our variables look, and how they affect each other. With this said more research is needed to compliment the larger field of qualitative research on conflict in Mali. This means that we need to approach the data with caution, bearing in mind that we could have violence that is not reported, unobserved, or ignored and respondents with subjective perceptions of the phenomena we are trying to examine that in the end distorts our values for regional levels of trust.

6 Analysis

This chapter is the core of this thesis, here the results of the correlation and regression analyses will be presented. The first part, section 6.1 will present descriptive statistics over the variables that are included in the analysis. The second section of this chapter, section 6.2 will present the values of our independent variable, violent events. Thirdly, in section 6.3 the values of the dependent variable, political trust in state, and non-state actors over the period examined will be presented. The regressions analyses will be presented in sections 6.4 and 6.5. Finally, in section 6.6 a discussion of the analysis will be presented.

6.1 Descriptive Statistics

Below, in Table 5 the number of observations for every variable is displayed in the first column. As is mentioned in chapter 5 the unit of analysis is region and year, meaning that all statistics are aggregated to a regional level for every year. Onwards, in the second column the mean value of every variable is displayed. The third column displays the standard deviation for every variable. The two last columns show the minimum and maximum values of the variables. As is presented, the three categories of violent events, battles, explosions and remote violence, violence against civilians and the total number of violent events are coded for every year and region, The value of political trust is on a scale of 0 to 1 where 0 is no trust in a security actor and 1 is complete trust in an actor. This means for example that the highest trust that state security actors enjoy is 71.1 % and the lowest 0%, for non-state security actors the highest trust they enjoy is 69.4 % and the lowest 2%. Concludingly the years are displayed in the last row, important to note is that 2020 is not included in this analysis because of the absence of data on the trust in security actors from that year (Klatt, 2020). Onwards, the data for 2022 on conflict occurrence from ACLED is until the 30th of September 2022 (ACLED, 2021).

Table 5 - Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Battles	50	25.26	32.46	0	149
Explosions/Remote Violence	45	15.4	19.56	0	93
Violence Against Civilians	50	32.84	51.881	0	210
Total Violent Events	50	71.96	100.145	0	427
Trust in State Security Actors	49	.459	.169	.02	.711
Trust in Non-State Security Actors	39	.181	.2	.002	.694
Internal Violence	50	.6	.495	0	1

6.2 Independent Variable

The data for the independent variable is presented in Table 6 and Table 7. In Table 6 the number of violent events over the years examined are displayed. As we can observe, all three types of violent events have increased during the years examined. The total number of battles have for example, doubled between 2017 and 2022. The number of explosions has more than doubled and the same goes for the occurrence of violence against civilians. The total number of violent events have more than doubled during the period, going from 407 events in 2017 to 1012 events up until the 30th of September 2022. In total, Mali experienced 3598 violent events during the years examined, excluding year 2020.

Table 6 - Tabulation of Event Type and Year on a national level.

Violent Event Type	Year					
	2017	2018	2019	2021	2022	Total
Battles	183	202	185	327	366	1263
Explosions/Remote violence	94	113	106	188	192	693
Violence against civilians	130	263	297	498	454	1642
Total violent events	407	578	588	1013	1012	3598

The numbers of violent events that are displayed in Table 6 provides us with an overview of the violence in Mali over time. However, as is stated in this thesis, the violence is centred around some areas and regions in Mali, it is not evenly distributed over the entire country. That is why, in Table 7 the distribution of all three categories of violent events is displayed for all regions, clearly showing the uneven distribution of violence in Mali. Interesting to note is that the total number of violent events in the northern and central regions of Mali are vastly higher than in the regions situated in the south of Mali. We can also see in Table 7 that especially the regions of Mopti and Gao stand out in the number of violent events both for every year and with their total number of violent events over all the years examined.

The regions of Kidal and Ménaka are as well two regions with a high degree of violent events, interesting to note is the remoteness of both Ménaka and Kidal which makes the regions woundable for both a lack of state reach and violence. On the other end of the violence spectrum, the capital of Bamako stands out with only 21 reported violent events during the years examined, furthermore the region that Bamako is situated in, Koulikoro also displays relatively low numbers of violent events, both for every year and during the entire period examined. Another region that stands out with its low levels of violent events is Kayes with only 43 violent events during the period examined, as can be seen in Figure 1, Kayes is situated in the west of Mali, the furthest from the northern and central regions

of Mali that have been hit the hardest by violent events and general insecurity (Lecocq & Klute, 2022; Sangare, n.d.).

Table 7 - Tabulation of Violent Events for every Region over Years


Region	Year					Total violent event in every region
	2017	2018	2019	2021	2022	
Kayes	0	2	3	19	19	43
Koulikoro	7	9	8	28	45	97
Sikasso	1	1	8	41	27	78
Ségou	36	40	26	152	121	375
Mopti	123	261	368	427	413	1592
Tombouctou	49	63	45	83	74	314
Gao	72	97	73	162	186	590
Kidal	81	44	15	48	25	213
Ménaka	35	56	36	48	100	275
Bamako	3	5	6	5	2	21
Total violent events in Mali	407	578	588	1013	1012	3598

6.3 Dependent Variable

Below in Graph 1 the levels of trust in state actors are displayed. The trust in state actors is relatively stable over all the years but what is interesting to note is that the levels of trust in state actors goes up slightly over time and it is relatively similar levels of trust in every region. However, the region of Kidal stands out with very low levels of trust in state actors over all the years examined. Two other regions to note is Tombouctou and Ménaka that are experiencing lower levels of trust in state actors then other regions. Note that Mopti, who experience very high levels of violence over every year examined, and

an increase in violence since 2021 is also displaying an increase in levels of trust towards state actors since 2021.

Graph 1 - Trust in State Actors for every year




Trust in non-state actors displayed in Graph 2 is in general lower than trust in state actors, we can also see that we have a spike in trust in non-state actors in 2019 one year before the coup d'état in 2020. Again, Kidal is one region that stands out from the rest with a reversed pattern to the rest of Mali, with lower levels of trust in state actors in 2019. Since 2019, trust in non-state security actors has gone down in almost every region. The situation for Kidal, that we can consider somewhat of an outlier in the levels of trust towards security actors have the reversed trend with a steady increase in levels of trust towards non-state actors since 2019.

Onwards, the regions of Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Ménaka and Ségou all display lower levels of trust in non-state actors than in state actors, however the levels of trust in non-state actors in these regions are still higher than in regions that are situated in southern parts of Mali. Kidal is the region that stands out from the other regions with comparatively

lower levels of trust towards state security actors than non-state security actors. Kidal is also the only region that has the reversed pattern of higher trust in non-state actors than in state actors over the years examined. Important to note is that on a general level, the levels of trust in state actors are higher in all regions except for in Kidal. The levels of trust towards non-state actors in the northern and central regions of Mali, and in the regions that are coded as the ones with internal violence have higher levels of trust towards non-state actors compared to regions in the south of Mali and the regions that are coded as not having internal violence.

Graph 2 - Trust in Non-State Actors for every year



6.4 Correlation Analysis

Just examining the levels of violence or the levels of trust in Mali does help us come a bit closer to answer our three research questions, but to understand how violence and trust affect each other gets us somewhat closer to understand under what conditions populations put their trust in different security actors. Onwards, starting the analysis of how violence and trust are connected with a correlation matrix, provides an overview of how our different variables are connected and if the levels of trust also are affected by the type of violence that occurs in Mali.

A first overview of the correlation matrix in Table 8 gives an idea that our variables of both violent events, political trust in state or non-state security actors and internal violence are correlated and that the correlations are statistically significant. Furthermore, important to note is that we cannot see a statistically significant correlations between trust in state security actors and our three categories of violent events. However, the three categories of violent events are strongly correlated with each other, indicating that one type of violence can spur other types of violence, so if we have the occurrence of battles, we can also expect it to be an increase in both explosions and remote violence as well as violence against civilians. Onwards, trust in non-state security actors does not correlate with our three categories of violent events.

The last row with the moderating variable of internal violence is displaying a statistically significant correlation with battles, explosions and remote violence, violence against civilians, the total number of violent events and the levels of trust in state security actors. Also, relating to our first research question, the correlation indicates that if a region is coded as one with internal violence the levels of trust in state security actors correlate negatively with a coefficient of -0.546. This means that when there is a high degree of violence in a region the levels of trust in state actors decrease and if a region has less violence the levels of trust in state actors increase. The coefficient of the levels of trust in non-state security actors is however not statistically significant and we cannot see a correlation between trust in non-state security actors and internal violence.

To further examine if these correlations were driven by some regions with exceedingly high levels of violence a jack-knifing test is conducted to examine if the national correlations that are displayed in Table 8 are driven by certain regions or if these correlations can be considered to hold on a national level. The two regions that will be excluded from the analysis are Mopti and Gao, one at a time. The results of these two tests will be presented in appendix 3. The reason for excluding Mopti and Gao is because these two regions have experienced the highest levels of violent events during the period examined⁷. These two tests will give us an indication if it is the unusually high levels of violent events in Mopti and Gao that drives the national correlation or if we can observe the same trends in the regions that are not excluded from the correlation matrix.

The exclusion of Mopti from the analysis gave some changes in the correlations compared to the correlations presented in Table 8. To note is that the correlation between trust in state security actors and explosions and remote violence became statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.604. Meaning that if Mopti is excluded from the analysis the levels of trust in state security actors correlates negatively with the levels of explosions and remote violence. On another note the correlation between trust in state security actors and the total number of violent events went from being not statistically significant on a national level to a significance level of $p < 0.1$ when Mopti was excluded from the analysis.

When Gao was excluded from the correlation analysis the coefficients of our variables did not change considerably and we did not have correlations that went from being not statistically significant on a national level to statistically significant when Gao was excluded as in the case with Mopti.

To conclude the results from the jack-knifing test suggests that much of the correlation coefficients did not change considerably when Mopti or Gao was excluded from the correlation analysis, indicating that the correlation between our variables is not driven by one of these regions but that the correlations in Table 8 displays national correlations that apply to all regions in Mali. However, the negative correlation between state security

⁷ See table 7 – Mopti = 1592 violent events. Gao = 590 violent events.

actors and the occurrence of explosions and remote violence needs further thought in the region of Mopti.

Table 8 - Pairwise Correlation Matrix on National Level

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) Battles	1.000						
(2) Explosions/Remote Violence	0.874*** (0.000)	1.000					
(3) Violence Against Civilians	0.935*** (0.000)	0.838*** (0.000)	1.000				
(4) Total Violent Events	0.977*** (0.000)	0.909*** (0.000)	0.982*** (0.000)	1.000			
(5) Trust in State Security Actors	-0.060 (0.681)	-0.178 (0.247)	0.015 (0.916)	-0.051 (0.726)	1.000		
(6) Trust in Non-state Security Actors	-0.167 (0.311)	-0.054 (0.758)	-0.145 (0.379)	-0.131 (0.426)	0.099 (0.553)	1.000	
(7) Internal Violence	0.500*** (0.000)	0.502*** (0.000)	0.441*** (0.001)	0.494*** (0.000)	-0.546*** (0.000)	0.117 (0.476)	1.000

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

The correlation matrix does not give us a complete picture of how our variables are affected by each other, only if they are correlated or not. To answer the research questions the analysis needs to go deeper into how much violence affects the levels of trust in state and in non-state actors. Furthermore, we will need to explore if the type of violence affects which actor the population tend to put their trust in, state or in non-state actors. The moderating variable of internal violence is added on all the regressions that are displayed in table 9 and 10.

6.5 Regression Analyses

The two regression tables that are presented in this section are divided between trust in state actors as a dependent variable, in Table 9 and trust in non-state actors as the dependent variable in table 10. The tables have three columns each, every column represents one regression model with either battles, explosions and remote violence, or violence against civilians as the independent variable. The moderating variable of internal violence⁸ will be added to every analysis.

The first column of Table 9 shows the first regression model, here the effects of battles on trust in state security actors is displayed together with internal violence as a moderating variable. We can see that the effect is slightly positive, but the coefficient of 0.00153 is having a low significance level of just $p < 0.05$. An interpretation of this result could be that battles occur between organised security actors, the public is not considerably affected by these battles, meaning that the occurrence of battles does not affect the levels of trust towards state actors considerably, however slightly. The effects are in this model mostly between other variables, we can see that some of this explanation is via the levels of internal violence.

The moderating variable of internal violence is statistically significant and negative meaning that one step up on the internal violence scale (from 0 to 1) means a decrease in trust towards state security actors with a coefficient of -0.238. The occurrence of battles has in other words little effect on the levels of trust in state security actors, but the level of internal violence has a negative effect on the levels of trust in state security actors.

The second regression model displays the effects of explosions and remote violence on trust in state security actors, with the moderating variable of internal violence. In this model we can see that the levels of trust in state security actors are not affected by the levels of explosions and remote violence. We by this can imagine that the levels of trust

⁸ The regions of Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou, Ménaka, Kidal and Ségou are coded as 1 on the internal violence variable. The other regions, Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso and Bamako are coded as not having internal violence, they are coded as 0.

in state security actors is more connected to the levels of internal violence in a region which affects trust in state security actors negatively with a coefficient of -0.216. Again, the level of trust is affected more by if a region is coded as one with internal violence or not than what type of violence that occurs.

Again, similarly as with battles we can imagine that explosions and remote violence is more directed towards other organised armed groups such as the police or military, not directly affecting the population. Of course, the fear of hitting a mine by accident is very real but unfortunately not measurable in this analysis where the answers from the Mali-Mètre surveys are aggregated up to a regional level. The occurrence of an explosion happening is nevertheless affecting trust in state actors negatively.

The third regression model gives us the effects violence against civilians has on the levels of trust in state security actors. Here the occurrence of violence against civilians has a slight positive effect of 0.00108 on trust in state security actors. Again, internal violence affects trust in state security actors negatively with a coefficient of -0.238. This means that the occurrence of violence against civilians tend to make the population trust state actors more, an interpretation of this is that state actors are still seen as the actors that have the best possibility to give an offender a punishment that is considered more just than non-state security actors have the possibility to do. Another interpretation of these results are that when violence against civilians is committed it is often committed by non-state security actors (Hoffmann & Verweijen, 2019). This means that the results that are shown in this table is a manifestation of people's tendency to sway towards state security actors for security provision of towards non-state security actors.

However, even if the levels of trust in state actors is affected positively by violence against civilians, internal violence still affects trust in state security actors negatively. This negative effect of internal violence means that even if some of the effects of violence against civilians is manifested as trust towards state security actors, the level of internal violence still has a negative effect on the overall levels of trust towards state security actors.

Table 9 - Regression of Trust in State Security Actors

	(1) Trust State Security Actors	(2) Trust State Security Actors	(3) Trust State Security Actors
Battles	0.00153* (0.000709)		
Internal Violence	-0.238*** (0.0467)	-0.216*** (0.0554)	-0.238*** (0.0443)
Explosions/Re mote Violence		0.00103 (0.00135)	
Violence Against Civilians			0.00108* (0.000421)
_cons	0.560*** (0.0311)	0.577*** (0.0391)	0.563*** (0.0304)
<i>N</i>	49	44	49
<i>R</i> ²	0.363	0.295	0.385
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.335	0.260	0.359

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Onwards, we can observe high levels on R^2 -values in all three regression models in Table 9 with the first regression model having a R^2 -value of 0.363, the second model having the value of 0.295 and the third model having a R^2 -value of 0.385. The adjusted R^2 -value decreases slightly in all models, however not considerably much. The adjusted R^2 -value is 0.335 in the first model, 0.260 in the second and 0.359 in the third model. This implies that 33.5% of the variation in trust in state security actors can be explained by the variation

in battles and internal violence, 26% of the variation in trust in state security actors can be explained by explosions and remote violence and internal violence, lastly 35.9% of the variation in trust in state security actors can be explained by violence against civilians and internal violence. The relatively high R^2 -values provides some confidence in that we can draw conclusions from the three regression models in table 9.

Overall, the effect of internal violence on trust in state security actors is constantly statistically significant and negative, meaning that the levels of trust in state security actors is affected more by if a region has internal violence than what type of violence that occurs. An interpretation of this is that it does not matter significantly if a region is experiencing a high degree of battles, explosions and remote violence or violence against civilians, but it is the occurrence of some type of violence that is important to the levels of trust towards state security actors. Meaning that if some type of violence occurs, the state is held responsible for that violence happening, meaning that the state security actors have failed to fulfil their task in protecting the population from these types of hidden dangers, to connect this rationale to the theory, the *raison d'être* of the state have been questioned if we have the occurrence of any type of violence.

In table 10 the dependent variable is changed to trust in non-state security actors, otherwise the regression models in Table 9 and table 10 are identical. In regression model 1 we can observe a result that has no statistical significance, as well as in both regression model 2 and regression model 3. There are some difficulties in reporting non-significant results. However, my aim is to carefully go over these findings regarding our hypotheses. As there is insufficient evidence to support the null-hypothesis rejection, we should not draw the conclusion that the null hypothesis is true, but rather must keep it in mind as an option.

The high p-values suggest that we might as well have observed effects that are this large if the true effect was zero. For subgroup analyses, which have lower numbers than the entire study, sample size is particularly crucial when taking non-significant results into consideration (Visentin et al., 2020). The issue with fewer observations on our dependent variable of trust in non-state security actors could be the reason for the results in table 10 being statistically non-significant.

Table 10 - Regression of Trust in Non-State Security Actors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Trust in Non-State Security Actors	Trust in Non-State Security Actors	Trust in Non-State Security Actors
Battles	-0.00158 (0.00103)		
Internal Violence	0.103 (0.0766)	0.0485 (0.0945)	0.0891 (0.0753)
Explosions/Remote Violence		-0.000971 (0.00193)	
Violence Against Civilians			-0.000801 (0.000620)
_cons	0.156* (0.0573)	0.171* (0.0743)	0.151* (0.0576)
<i>N</i>	39	35	39
<i>R</i> ²	0.074	0.011	0.058
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.023	-0.051	0.005

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

However, a non-statistically significant result is still a result that needs to be reported and discussed. The low R^2 -values for all three regression models, 0.074, 0.011 and 0.058 respectively also suggest that we need further research on what explanatory variables there could be for explaining the levels of trust in non-state security actors in Mali.

6.6 Discussion of Analysis

The following part will summarize and discuss the above-mentioned tables and regression analyses. This section will go through the three research questions in relation to the regression analyses to further the understanding of political trust and violence in Mali.

The correlation and regression analyses in this thesis have displayed both statistically significant correlations between our variables and statistically significant results from our regression analyses. The correlation and regression analyses have also displayed statistically non-significant result. In the correlation analysis most notably trust in non-state security actors did not display any statistically significant correlations with our other variables. Onwards this non-significant correlation was also manifested in the regression models of table 10 where we did not observe any statistically significant results between our explanatory variables and trust in non-state security actors.

Some further examination of the connection between battles and trust in state security actors will be needed to fully understand if and how the occurrence of battles between organised armed groups affects the populations perception and trust towards state security actors. As well, the connection between explosions and remote violence and trust in state security actors need further research to understand if and how this type of violence could have an effect on the levels of trust in state security actors, the results in this thesis did however not display any statistically significant results on the effects of explosions and remote violence and trust in state security actors.

The regression analyses have given us an indication for how a population acts in contexts of high insecurity and violence. What is shown in the regression models is that violence and insecurity do influence the levels of trust towards state security actors in Mali. The amount of violence is on a general note one of the drivers behind a populations tendency to trust state security actors. However, the location of the violence that occurs and how the populations perceive the violence influences how the levels of trust in our two different actors are manifested. This leads us further to the moderating variable of internal violence and its effects on the levels of trust.

The variable of internal violence indicated that populations tend to trust state actors more if the violence that occurs is not in the same region as they live. If this is the case the violence can be seen as external and something that the state protects you from. The levels of trust in state actors are therefore affected positively if a region is experiencing lower levels of violent events during the period examined. This internal violence also comes with a geographical dimension that is added on to the difference in the occurrence of violence, if this violence is in the northern regions of Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal or Ménaka, or in the southern region of Ségou the levels of trust in state actors is going down and the populations is in general more sceptical towards state security actors. The result from the regression models in Table 9 therefore indicates that in contexts where we can observe high levels of insecurity and violence and if this violence is in the regions of Mopti, Gao, Kidal, Ménaka or Ségou violence has a negative effect on populations in these regions level of trust towards state security actors.

If the insecurity and violence is occurring in another region as the population and if this violence is in the northern, central regions or in Ségou, the trust towards state actors is positively affected. The regions that are experiencing internal violence is in other words more sceptical towards state security actors. However, since the results from the regression models in table 10 did not give us statistically significant result we can here not reject the null hypothesis we can therefore not say through these results that the population in the northern and central regions and Ségou enjoy higher trust in non-state security actors than regions that are coded as ones with less internal violence. But if you are living in Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal, Ménaka or Ségou you will both be subject to more violent events closer to your home, as well as having lower levels of trust towards Malian state security actors, at the same time the trust towards state security actors will be negatively affected for every occurrence of violence in your region.

The different types of violent events have different effects on the levels of trust in state security actors. Battles did have a small effect on the levels of trust in state actors; however, the levels of explosions and remote violence did not display a statistically significant effect on the levels of trust in state actors. The levels of violence against civilians have a small positive effect on the levels of trust in state security actors, indicating that if civilians are subjected to violence, trust towards state security actors

increase slightly, however it is important to note that of course both state actors and non-state actors can commit and is committing violence against civilians in Mali.

Reasons for this decrease in trust can be many, one of these reasons are mentioned in the section above, in the discussion that the states *raison d'être* is questioned through the occurrence of any type of violence. However, another possible explanation for the decrease in levels of trust in state security actors when we can observe internal violence is that the occurrence of violence often is committed and motivated by a general frustration towards state policy and is often committed by non-state actors or individuals that are against the state (Bencherif et al., 2020; Walther & Christopoulos, 2015). The results of this regression analysis could be an indication of this frustration and it could both manifest in this violence, as well as in the decrease in levels of trust towards the actors that can be considered the ones to uphold state monopoly.

The regression models in table 10 are not displaying any significant results on the effects of violence and trust in non-state security actors. The explanations for this could lie in that the connection is not going through trust in non-state security actors and our three categories of violence or our internal violence variable but through some other factor that has not been considered in this thesis. Here, we need further research on how populations think and act in relation to non-state actors governance as we can observe that trust in trust in non-state security actors is higher in the northern regions of Mali, it is also in these regions where these actors oversee some of the security provision as well as basic societal goods (Bodian et al., 2020). The population in the regions that are coded with a high degree of internal violence are experiencing higher levels of violence compared to the southern regions of Mali, however they may have a more positive view on how non-state actors govern and, in some instances, consider these non-state actors more legitimate and better at governing their regions than the Malian state. In general, we can see that state security actors are punished for insecurity and violence, the reason for this could be that state security actors are seen as the ones responsible for internal security in Mali and they are also therefore blamed when security is lacking. It also becomes even more evident when we look at the northern regions of Mali where insecurity is high and trust in state actors is low. Internal violence has in other words a negative effect on trust in state security actors, but more research is needed to explore how the occurrence of violence affects the levels of trust in non-state security actors.

7 Concluding Remarks

This thesis has aimed to both generate new theory about how violence affects the regional levels of political trust in Mali, as well as if the variation in violence affects the levels of political trust. Onwards, the thesis has worked towards answering three research questions, firstly, the overarching research question of: *In contexts with high levels of insecurity and violence, under what conditions do populations put their trust in different types of security actors?* Additionally, two sub questions were posted with the first sub question being: *How does regional variation, whether violence is taking place within a region or not affecting how populations put their trust in state or non-state security actors?* This question was formulated to answer if the theoretical assumption that variation in violence between regions can have an effect on how trust in different security actors is affected. Thirdly, different types of violence were assumed to affect levels of political trust differently, therefore, the third sub question was formulated as such: *How do different types of violent events affect whether populations put their trust in state or non-state security actors?*

Initially, we can conclude that with the help of the correlation matrix that levels of trust in state security actors, internal violence in the form of regional variation correlated with each other, to move the analysis further six regression models were presented and analysed.

It can be concluded from the results of the regression analyses that the level of violence affects trust in state and non-state security actors differently. When it concerns the levels of trust towards state security actors, according to the regression analyses one can observe how much political trust is affected depending on what type of violence that is committed, as well as if the violence that is committed is in the form of battles, explosions and remote violence, or violence against civilians. The results are also demonstrating that if a region is coded as one with internal violence the levels of trust towards state security actors will be affected negatively.

It can be concluded from the results of the regression analyses in Table 9 that the levels of trust towards state security actors is affected positively if a region is situated in the south of Mali, and if it has lower degrees of internal violence than a region situated in the northern or central parts of Mali. The occurrence of battles is not affecting the levels of trust in state security actors much and the effects of battles on the levels of trust towards non-state security actors is non-significant, when it comes to the effects of all types of violent events, we can observe tendencies that the effect on political trust goes not through the type of violent event i.e., battles, explosions and remote violence and violence against civilians but is rather dependent on if the violence is occurring within a region or not, this is evident in table 9. It is in other words not as important what type of violent event that occurs, but that violence occurs. We can also from the regressions in table 10 conclude that the statistically non-significant answers on all three regression analyses open for more research on how political trust towards non-state security actors is affected by the levels of violence. However, this thesis has not been able to provide statistically significant results regarding trust in non-state security actors that sufficiently can answer if we can confirm or reject a null hypothesis – more research on especially political trust towards non-state security actors is therefore needed to be able to conclude how trust in non-state security actors is affected by violence.

The population in Mali is under immense pressure in the form of violence and a lack of security provision. Therefore, the levels of insecurity that the Malian population is faced with forces them to make decisions regarding what types of actors that they entrust with their security provision. The empirical findings give us evidence for that when the number of violent events is over 200 throughout the entire period examined, levels of political trust in state security actors are affected negatively. This is furthermore a validation for the theory that has been generated regarding how political trust is manifested in relation to levels of violence in Mali.

The question of what different types of security actors people put their trust in when there is an occurrence of violence is demonstrated in Figure 4. A new theoretical model for how political trust in state security actors is affected by the levels of violence is presented in Figure 4, this means that this thesis has evidence in support of a conclusion that the populations trust in state security actors is affected negatively if the violence that occurs is doing so with a higher frequency than 200 occurrences over the period examined. The

trust towards state security actors is therefore affected negatively if the violence that occurs is happening internally in the regions of Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal, Ménaka and Ségou.




Figure 4 - Confirmation of the theoretical framework for when trust in state security actors is affected negatively by internal violence

On the other hand, if a population is experiencing this violence as external, i.e., the violence is in another region the results are giving some empirical support for the theory that trust in state security actors is affected positively. Important to note is that the three types of violent events, battle, explosions and remote violence and violence against civilians have very little effect on the levels of trust in state security actors.

The question of how different violent events affects whether populations put their trust in state or in non-state security actors has with the help of the regression analyses been given a somewhat twofold answer. First, the type of violent event can have some minor effects on the levels of political trust towards state security actors and the results on the levels of trust towards non-state security actors were statistically non-significant. Secondly, this last research question needs to be researched further to be able to fully answer and understand if the results that are displayed in this thesis can be validated. This could preferably be through additional research specifically questioning if these different violent events affect what actors the population trust with their security.

The limitations of these results are evident. The three regressions in Table 9 display relatively low coefficients, however the adjusted R²-values in Table 9 is relatively high with coefficients of 0.335, 0.260 and 0.359 respectively, this means that the variation in

the dependent variable of political trust in state security actors can be explained by the variation in the independent variables of battles, explosions and remote violence, violence against civilians and internal violence 36, 29.5 and 38.5 % of the cases. The R-squared value goes down significantly in table 10 where non-state security actors is the dependent variable, here the R^2 numbers are 0.023, -0.051 and 0.005 respectively. These low numbers of R^2 were somewhat expected given the nature of the Malian conflict and under what conditions data is collected on non-state security actors. Importantly, this showcases the importance of the continued research on internal conflict and the effects non-state security actors and conflict has on political trust in Mali.

With the limitations of the results in mind we can conclude that we have found some evidence who suggest that levels of political trust are affected by the levels of violence in Mali. Furthermore, we can say that the levels of violence do not affect the Malian populations equally throughout the country. We have via the moderation for in what region violence occurs made it possible to say that the violence in the northern and central regions of Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal, Ménaka and in the southern region of Ségou have a negative effect on the levels of political trust in state security actors.

However, the same violence can also be concluded to have some positive effects on the levels of trust in state security actors among the populations in the regions of Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso and in the capital of Bamako. The theory generated in this thesis suggest that the reason for this result is that in regions with less violence, the population will be gathering towards state security actors because they are seen as the most legitimate security providers. In the northern and central regions with more internal violence the population may have a more nuanced and divided picture of how insecurity and violence is manifested and handled by state security actors on the one hand, and on the other being victims of a lack of state reach and insecurity as well as being more inclined to not trust state security actors if the violence that they are victims to increases. Therefore, the levels of trust in state security actors are suffering more in regions where its legitimacy is questioned than in regions where the state is seen as the more obvious security provider. The effects of violence on the levels of trust in non-state security actors need further research for us to give an answer that has a sound empirical foundation. As of now this thesis will conclude that we cannot reject nor confirm the theory that violence affects the levels of trust towards non-state security actors.

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9 Appendix 1 – Description of Security Actors in Mali

NAME OF ACTORS	DESCRIPTION
FAMA	The Malian armed Forces, consisting of predominantly an army and a smaller air force (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011).
MALIAN NATIONAL POLICE	The national Police of the Malian state (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011).
NATIONAL GUARD	The national guard of mali is a state para-military force, in charge of similar tasks as the police and Gendarmerie (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011).
THE GENDARMERIE	The Gendarmerie is a paramilitary police force with the primary responsibility for rural areas. It does reinforce the police in urban areas when it is considered necessary (<i>Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 United States Department of State, 2011</i>).
THE PLATFORME	The Plateforme is made up of several organisations that sometimes support Malian state power, but it is also deeply involved in regional conflicts and efforts at communal rule. The second armed organisation to sign the 2015

	<p>Algiers Accords is the Plateforme. The main groups that make up the Plateforme are: the Groupe d'Autodéfense Tuareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA), the MAA-Plateforme, and the Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance (CMFPR-1) (Lebovich, 2019).</p>
<p>GAITA - THE GROUPE D'AUTODÉFENSE TUAREG IMGHAD ET ALLIÉS</p>	<p>El Hajj Gamou, a rebel leader in 1990 and afterwards an officer in the Malian army, founded GATIA in August 2014. As the official spokesman and leader of the Imghad Tuareg population, a general in the Malian army, and the head of one of the main armed organisations in northern Mali, he holds a position at the centre of several movements. Despite Gamou's position in the Malian army, the Malian state initially maintained a formal distinction between the Malian military forces and GATIA. However, Gamou's dual positions have now been openly recognised by the Malian government (Lebovich, 2019).</p>
<p>MAA-PLATEFORME</p>	<p>The MAA-PF is made up of groups of primarily Arab militants from Lerneb, Timbuktu, and the Gao region (especially Bourem, the Tilemsi Valley, and nearby areas). Before and during the 2012 uprising, a large portion of the core MAA-PF militants</p>

	served in loyalist Arab militias (Lebovich, 2019).
CMFPR-1 - COORDINATION DES MOUVEMENTS ET FRONTS PATRIOTIQUES DE RÉSISTANCE	The CMPFR is a network of militias, primarily Peul militias, that primarily represent sedentary populations in the Niger River belt. When the first CMFPR was established in July 2012, it mostly consisted of Peul and Songhay "resistance" groups that had been formed in the 1990s and late 2000s to combat Tuareg insurgents (Lebovich, 2019).
CMA	CMA is one of the organisations that signed the June 2015 Algiers Peace Accords. It is made up of the Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad (HCUA), a portion of the Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad, and the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) (MAA-CMA). The CMA appears to be a coalition of the historically pro-independence movements in northern Mali, but in reality it is more of an umbrella organisation that does not adhere to a single philosophy or strategy (Lebovich, 2019).
MNLA - MOUVEMENT NATIONAL POUR LA LIBÉRATION DE L'AZAWAD	Following discussions with primarily Tuareg groups in northern Mali, the MNLA was established in October 2011. Its original members included both Malian defence and security force defectors as well as Tuareg returnees

	<p>from the 2011 uprising against Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi (including the group's military commander Mohamed Ag Najim). Beginning in January 2017, the MNLA's uprising against the Malian government quickly extended throughout northern Mali in an uncomfortable and short-lived alliance with the jihadist group of Ansar al-Din (Lebovich, 2019).</p>
<p>HCUA - HAUT CONSEIL POUR L'UNITÉ DE L'AZAWAD</p>	<p>Alghabass Ag Intallah, an Ifoghas Tuareg leader, is in charge of the HCUA. Prior to briefly creating the Mouvement Islamique de l'Azawad and the HCUA in May 2013, he was a senior member of jihadist group Ansar al-Din. It is active in a number of locations throughout Kidal, Timbuktu, Gao, and Ménaka and is particularly prevalent in certain sections of Gao (particularly the significant towns of Talataye) and Ménaka (Lebovich, 2019).</p>
<p>MAA-CMA - PARTS OF THE MOUVEMENT ARABE DE L'AZAWAD</p>	<p>The Front de Liberation Nationale de l'Azawad (FNLA), which was commanded by the merchant, accused smuggler, and local power broker Dina Ould Daya, an Oulad Idris tribe member, is one of the Arab militias in the Timbuktu area that emerged during the Tuareg uprising. Although they have a significant armed presence and have occasionally battled with their</p>

	CMA partners, they are less active militarily than the HCUA or MNLA (Lebovich, 2019).
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10 Appendix 2 – STATA Code

- This appendix contains the complete STATA code to use in a do-file. This code was used to conduct the analysis of the empirical material as well as exporting the tables of the descriptive statistics, graphs, correlations tables and regression tables.

```
***Start of code***  
use "MM_2017-2022.dta", clear  
  
use          "/Users/dennisfonsecakarlsson/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-  
LundUniversity/Master thesis/Data STATA/ACLED match MM.dta", clear  
***Compiling violence data to REGION-year as the unit of analysis***  
  
preserve  
keep if num_event_type==1  
tab REGION year  
restore  
preserve  
keep if num_event_type==2  
tab REGION year  
restore  
preserve  
keep if num_event_type==3  
tab REGION year  
***New dataset on region-year created. This will be merged with data in  
trust***  
  
use "Violence data .dta", clear
```

```

rename var1 region
rename var2 year
rename var3 battles
rename var4 explosions_remote_violence
rename var5 violence_against_civilians

***Generating numbering variable of the regions
sort year region

encode region, generate (numregion)

recode numregion (1 = 211) (2 = 207) (3 = 201) (4 = 208) (5 = 202) (6 = 205)
(7 = 209) (8 = 203) (9 = 204) (10 = 206), generate (REGION)

lab def REGION 201 Kayes 202 Koulikoro 203 Sikasso 204 Segou 205 Mopti
206 Tombouctou 207 Gao 208 Kidal 209 Menaka 211 Bamako
label define region_name 211 "Bamako" 201 "Kayes" 202 "Koulikoro" 203
"Sikasso" 204 "Ségou" 205 "Mopti" 206 "Tombouctou" 207 "Gao" 20
> 8 "Kidal" 209 "Ménaka"
label values REGION region_name
drop numregion
drop region

***MERGEING MALI-METRE WITH ACLED*****
use "MM_2017-2022.dta", clear
merge          1:1          REGION          year
using"/Users/dennisfonsecakarlsson/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-
LundUniversity/Master thesis/Data STATA/Violence data .dta"
drop if year==2016
drop if year==2020
drop if REGION==210
sort REGION year

```

**** GENERATE TRUST IN STATE + NON-STATE ACTORS

```
egen mean_trust_state = rowmean(trust_FAMA trust_police trust_gendarmerie  
trust_natioanl_guard)
```

```
histogram mean_trust_state, percent
```

**Change missing values of CMA

```
egen mean_trust_nostate = rowmean(trust_the_platforme trust_CMA)
```

```
histogram mean_trust_nostate
```

***GENERATING VARIABLE ON INTERNAL VS EXTERNAL
VIOLENCE IN A REGION****

***occurence of Internal violence = 1 and less internal violence = 0

***Regions are coded as numbers in the variable "REGION": 201-Kayes, 202-
Koulikoro, 203-Sikasso, 204-Ségou, 205-Mopti, 206-Tombouctou, 207-Gao, 208-
Kidal, 209-Ménaka, 211-Bamako***

```
gen internal_violence =.
```

```
replace internal_violence=1 if REGION==204
```

```
replace internal_violence=1 if REGION==205
```

```
replace internal_violence=1 if REGION==206
```

```
replace internal_violence=1 if REGION==207
```

```
replace internal_violence=1 if REGION==208
```

```
replace internal_violence=1 if REGION==209
```

```
replace internal_violence=0 if REGION==201
```

```
replace internal_violence=0 if REGION==202
```

```
replace internal_violence=0 if REGION==203
```

```
replace internal_violence=0 if REGION==211
```

*Ségou (204) is in the south of Mali, however the region has so much violence that it will be counted as a region with internal violence.

Generating variable on total number of violent events, including all three types of violence

```
generate total_violent_events = battles + explosions_remote_violence +
violence_against_civilians
```

```
*****Results tables and
graphs*****
```

**Summary on all variables

```
sum battles explosions_remote_violence violence_against_civilians
total_violent_events mean_trust_state mean_trust_nostate internal_violence
```

```
asdoc sum battles explosions_remote_violence violence_against_civilians
total_violent_events mean_trust_state mean_trust_nostate internal_violence
```

Table on conflict data

```
tab total_violent_events year
tab total_violent_events REGION
```

```
asdoc tab total_violent_events year
asdoc tab total_violent_events REGION
```

***Line plot of trust in state actors over years.

```
sort year
twoway (line mean_trust_state year if REGION==201, lcolor(blue)) (line
mean_trust_state year if REGION==202, lcolor(red)) (line mean_trust_state year if
REGION==203, lcolor(orange)) (line mean_trust_state year if REGION==204,
lcolor(black)) (line mean_trust_state year if REGION==205, lcolor(brown)) (line
mean_trust_state year if REGION==206, lcolor(cyan)) (line mean_trust_state year
```

```
if REGION==207, lcolor(green)) (line mean_trust_state year if REGION==208,
lcolor(gold)) (line mean_trust_state year if REGION==209, lcolor(pink)) (line
mean_trust_state year if REGION==211, lcolor(purple))
```

***Line plot of non-state actors over years

```
twoway (line mean_trust_nostate year if REGION==201, lcolor(blue)) (line
mean_trust_nostate year if REGION==202, lcolor(red)) (line mean_trust_nostate
year if REGION==203, lcolor(orange)) (line mean_trust_nostate year if
REGION==204, lcolor(black)) (line mean_trust_nostate year if REGION==205,
lcolor(brown)) (line mean_trust_nostate year if REGION==206, lcolor(cyan)) (line
mean_trust_nostate year if REGION==207, lcolor(green)) (line mean_trust_nostate
year if REGION==208, lcolor(gold)) (line mean_trust_nostate year if
REGION==209, lcolor(pink)) (line mean_trust_nostate year if REGION==211,
lcolor(purple))
```

***Correlation matrix on all variables national level

```
pwcorr battles explosions_remote_violence violence_against_civilians
total_violent_events mean_trust_state mean_trust_nostate internal_violence, sig
```

```
asdoc pwcorr battles explosions_remote_violence violence_against_civilians
total_violent_events mean_trust_state mean_trust_nostate internal_violence, sig
star (all)
```

***For appendix 3 - jack-knifing test on the regions of Mopti and Gao

Taking out Moptijack-knifing test

```
pwcorr battles explosions_remote_violence violence_against_civilians
total_violent_events mean_trust_state mean_trust_nostate internal_violence if
REGION!=205, sig
```



```
asdoc pwcorr battles explosions_remote_violence violence_against_civilians
total_violent_events mean_trust_state mean_trust_nostate internal_violence if
REGION!=205, sig star (all)
```

```
***Taking out Gao, Mopti is back***jack-knifing test
```

```
pwcorr battles explosions_remote_violence violence_against_civilians
total_violent_events mean_trust_state mean_trust_nostate internal_violence if
REGION!=207, sig
```

```
asdoc pwcorr battles explosions_remote_violence violence_against_civilians
total_violent_events mean_trust_state mean_trust_nostate internal_violence if
REGION!=207, sig star (all)
```

```
***Preparing for cross time regressions and for saving regression tables in
Word***
```

```
ssc install estout, replace
```

```
xtset year
```

```
***Regression models for trust in state actors***
```

```
***Regression with trust in state actors, with control for regional variation***
```

```
reg mean_trust_state battles internal_violence
```

```
estimates store st1
```

```
reg mean_trust_state explosions_remote_violence internal_violence
```

```
estimates store st2
```

```
reg mean_trust_state violence_against_civilians internal_violence
```

```
estimates store st3
```

```
esttab st1 st2 st3 using "regression state-trust.rtf", se r2 ar2 replace
```

Regression with trust in non-state actors, with control for regional variation

```
reg mean_trust_nostate battles internal_violence  
estimates store nost1
```

```
reg mean_trust_nostate explosions_remote_violence internal_violence  
estimates store nost2
```

```
reg mean_trust_nostate violence_against_civilians internal_violence  
estimates store nost3
```

```
esttab nost1 nost2 nost3 using "regression non-state trust.rtf", se r2 ar2 replace
```

*****End of code*****

11 Appendix 3 – Result of Jack-Knifing Test

Pairwise correlations result of jack-knifing test where Mopti is excluded from the correlation analysis

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) Battles	1.000						
(2) Explosions/Remote Violence	0.558*** (0.000)	1.000					
(3) Violence Against Civilians	0.822*** (0.000)	0.448*** (0.004)	1.000				
(4) Total Violent Events	0.936*** (0.000)	0.671*** (0.000)	0.941*** (0.000)	1.000			
(5) Trust in State Security Actors	-0.212 (0.167)	-0.604*** (0.000)	-0.117 (0.449)	-0.272* (0.074)	1.000		
(6) Trust in Non-state Security Actors	-0.167 (0.344)	0.028 (0.885)	-0.275 (0.115)	-0.191 (0.278)	0.070 (0.700)	1.000	
(7) Internal Violence	0.621*** (0.000)	0.657*** (0.000)	0.511*** (0.000)	0.655*** (0.000)	-0.610*** (0.000)	0.165 (0.352)	1.000

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Pairwise correlations result of jack-knifing test where Gao is excluded from the correlation analysis

Pairwise correlations

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) Battles	1.000						
(2) Explosions/Remote Violence	0.880*** (0.000)	1.000					
(3) Violence Against Civilians	0.940*** (0.000)	0.844*** (0.000)	1.000				
(4) Total Violent Events	0.979*** (0.000)	0.913*** (0.000)	0.983*** (0.000)	1.000			
(5) Trust in State Security Actors	-0.042 (0.787)	-0.165 (0.316)	0.018 (0.910)	-0.041 (0.790)	1.000		
(6) Trust in Non-state Security Actors	-0.145 (0.412)	-0.029 (0.878)	-0.123 (0.489)	-0.108 (0.545)	0.090 (0.617)	1.000	
(7) Internal Violence	0.480*** (0.001)	0.498*** (0.001)	0.431*** (0.003)	0.481*** (0.001)	-0.534*** (0.000)	0.137 (0.438)	1.000

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$