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The Demos Index

A Pilot Project Constructing a Democracy Index
Evaluating the Level Of Democracy From A Demos
Perspective

Abstract

Democracy is both a question of who the people are (demos) and how they rule (kratos); our understanding of democracy is imbalanced in favour of the latter. The aim of this thesis is to conduct a pilot project evaluating and comparing the level of democracy from a demos perspective through an index. The findings of a research review establishes the theoretical foundation of the index, which is the Nationalist Principle, the All-Affected Principle, and the Coercion Principle. The principles are selected due to having the most support amongst contemporary political theorists. The level of democracy is evaluated for 87 demoi (85 states, the European Union, and Catalonia), which were selected due to data availability. The evaluation is based on relative fulfilment of criteria derived from the principles and measured through twelve standardised indicators presented in a codebook and compiled in a dataset. Index scores are calculated through an aggregation formula giving equal impact to the three theoretical perspectives. The results of the analysis are presented in a diagram comparing the level of democracy from a demos perspective. Suggestions are made for how the index could be improved and used to further study the demos part of democracy.

Keywords: Demos, Boundary Problem, Democracy Evaluation, Nationalist Principle, All-Affected Principle, Coercion Principle, Mixed Methods, Democracy Index, Demos Index

Words: 10 000

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1 Introduction

Our understanding of democracy could be substantially improved by putting greater emphasis on the question of how it is constituted. The word democracy is constructed by combining the words demos (the people) and kratos (rule) (Judge 2014: 25). Discussions on democracy tend to favour the perspective of ruling rather than the questions of how the body of members that rule is composed. Within the field of political theory the demos question has for long been overlooked (Song 2012). When evaluating the level of democracy it is often a neglected perspective (Koenig-Archibugi 2022; see Coppedge et al 2023b; The Economist 2023). Attempts to improve democracy often struggle with the demos aspect (Näsström 2010: 197; Bartelson 2010: 218-234), since setting the boundaries of who the people should be is often more complicated than deciding their system of ruling. In my thesis, I confront this issue and empirically address the question of how democratic political units are from a demos perspective.

1.1 Purpose

The study has four purposes. Firstly, it aims to highlight the importance of recognising the demos as an essential part of democracy in theory and practice. Secondly, it is a pilot study attempting to measure how democratic political units are from a demos perspective. Using "political units" rather than states indicates the third objective: the ambition to compare not only state bound demoi, but also supranational and secessionist ones. Lastly, the ambition is to provide a solid foundation for others to use for advancing our understanding of democracy from a demos perspective.

1.2 Research Question

How can we compare the level of democracy from a demos perspective?

1.3 Three Phases for Answering the Question

For answering the question a mixed methods research design is used, which is structured in three phases. The first phase (chapter two and three) begins with an exposition on the methodology used for conducting a research review of the field of demos research. Three perspectives answering the question of who the people should be distinguish themselves as having the most support amongst contemporary political theorists. From these perspectives, criteria for what a demos should be are derived.

Having outlined the theoretical criteria, the second phase (chapter four and five) commences, with the purpose of comparing the relative fulfilment of the criteria for different demoi. Firstly, a method for aggregating the results of the fulfilment of the criteria into an index is constructed (see equation 1). Secondly, operational indicators for the normative criteria previously derived are developed. A codebook is designed for how to apply the indicators on different cases of demoi.

The final phase (chapter six and the appendices) consists of compiling a dataset using the indicators and an extensive analysis of the 87 cases. The results are illustrated in a diagram. After all the phases are completed, an answer to the question is given in form of the index that compares how democratic political units are from a demos perspective.

1.4 Claims, Limitations, and Assumptions

The claims made when presenting the results of the study is an effect of its limitations. The index's theoretical foundation is limited to the three perspectives

with the greatest support in contemporary research, but there are other possible approaches to answer the questions of what the demos should be that might give a more satisfactory answer. Consequently, no claim is made that this approach is necessarily complete. However, I assume that the criteria are the best we currently have due to their support amongst contemporary political theorists. To index democracy entails the assumption that an attempt at objective comparison is meaningful (Badersten 2006: 60; see Coppedge et al 2019: 108-109 for the reasoning behind V-Dem; Ginzberg 2017: 35 for the reasoning behind The Economist's Democracy Index). More than that, I assume that political units can be placed on a scale from being an ideal democracy to the opposite – this is what "level of democracy" in the research question refers to. The indicators are limited in amount and scope. To fully grasp the compliance with the criteria, more indicators would be needed to measure all ways they are relevant. This discussion is elaborated in the last chapter. The number of cases is limited due to data deficit (see 4.6).

Method For Establishing DemosCriteria

This chapter is devoted to the methodology used for establishing the theoretical foundation of the index, which consists of a set of criteria. The criteria are the answer to the question: What should a demos be?

2.1 Research Review

To establish the criteria a research review over the demos research is conducted. For grasping the research field the database Political Science Complete (n.d.) was used. The language was set to English and the search term was "demos", which gave 487 hits. The relevant hits – given titles, subjects and abstracts – were examined in detail. The examined hits were used as the foundation for grasping the research field by comparing the reasoning behind different standpoints and which positions and theorists appeared as most influential in the field (with regards to who and which perspectives are referenced). I put great emphasis on articles with a more general approach (e.g. Koenig-Archibugi, 2022; Scherz, 2013; Martí, 2021; Song 2012), and from them I gained insight into the field and was able to identify the perspectives on what a demos should be with the most support within the scholarly debate. Combining the overview articles on the theoretical arguments about the essence of demos – the empirically oriented ones; the ones arguing for or examining different positions; and going back to theoretical roots of different perspectives – I feel confident that no major perspective remains undiscovered. However, it is possible that arguments that have hitherto failed to obtain an established position within the field have been excluded.

2.2 Criterion for Choosing Criteria

The question of what a demos should be is a normative question and thus requires a normative answer (Hardin, 2011: 94). The normative answer is presupposed to my analysis, since it consists of the demos perspectives that political theorists have previously laid out. As explained before, I am not concerned about the possible biases of the perspectives, since, arguably, they are the most established ones. They should be regarded as most suitable for evaluating political units from a demos perspective – given the cumulative ideal of science (Teorell – Svensson 2007: 281). I will make an evaluation of political units relative fulfilment of a set of criteria (see Beckman 2006: 337-339 for a discussion about evaluating democracy in this manner). It is an empirical analysis based on normative criteria (see Badersten 2006: 44–47; Beckman – Mörkerstam 2010: 366 regarding the method). The criterion used for choosing the demos criteria, which is what constitutes the main normative element of the analysis, is impact within the scholarly debate (see 2.1 for how this is measured).

3 Demos Within Political Theory

In this chapter the theoretical foundations for the index are outlined. Given the empirical approach, this theoretical exposition will not delve into extensive deliberations.

As background, a related discussion within demos research, often referred to as "the boundary problem" (e.g. Erman 2021; Näsström 2021) should be mentioned. The term was coined by Whelan (1989) and refers to the question of who should be included in a political unit and who to be excluded (Whelan was first to use this term, but others have discussed the question before, e.g. Schumpeter 1994: 244;). It is referred to as a problem because Whelan (1989: 22) argued that it is impossible, with democratic means, for a demos to decide upon what the boundaries of inclusion should be because this decision presupposes a demos already in place. As we will see, political theorists have proposed solutions to the problem by tackling it from another perspective. Instead of examining how the boundaries of a demos should be decided, they have proposed criteria derived from democratic theory which a demos should meet to be democratic. In the coming, I will explain the most influential perspectives on what the criteria should be.

3.1 The Nationalist Principle

One way to answer the question of what the demos should be is through what is called the nationalist principle. There are different suggestions for how to define the nation within the body of literature that supports this perspective, but the common denominator for the theorists doing so is that they claim that the boundaries of demos should correspond to the boundaries of nations (Koenig-Archibugi, 2022: 405). The idea is illustrated below through a demos whose boundary corresponds to that of a nation.




Figure 1: Illustration of the overlapping of demos and nation.

One influential advocate for the perspective is David Miller (e.g. Scherz 2013; Martí 2021; Song 2012). Miller (2009: 203; 2013) argues that if there is a nation; a demos is righteous. Therefore, the criteria for what a demos should be is the same criteria for whether a nation exists.

The criteria raises the question of how to define a nation, which is something Miller (2013: What is a nation?, paragraph 1-3) does. Firstly, they are made up of personal identities, referring to self-identification with a given nation. Secondly, nations hold an ethical component, granting a certain type of loyalty and responsibility to those within the given community. Lastly, there is a political aspect which consists of an institutional structure to govern the community.

Miller emphasises a few points about national identity: a nation is a belief and exist when it is believed to; it has historical continuity – and a future; the identity is active in the sense that decisions and memories exist as collective phenomenon; the identity is connected to a geographical area; and that the nation must be a distinction to other nations (Miller, 2013, What is a nation?).

A common objection to the nationalist principle is the case of overlapping and contested national boundaries (e.g. Goodin 2007: 48-47). The objection is illustrated

below with the overlapping of the blue and purple nations (an example of this is Israel and Palestine who both claim the same territory), and the orange nation existing within the purple nation (i.e. a secessionist nation, such as Kosovo in 2008 and the Catalonian secessionist movement). The answer to the problem, based on the nationalist principle, is that a nation existing within a larger nation (as the case of the orange one) has the right to secede (Buchanan 1997: 37-38). The issue of how to handle situations such as the one between the blue and purple nations remains unsolved.




Figure 2: The problem with overlapping nations.

Miller (1998: 69) develops the argument by giving two criteria for secession:

The first is that the group should form a nation with an identity that is clearly separate from that of the larger nation from which they wish to disengage. The second is that the group should be able to validate its claim to exercise authority over the territory it wishes to occupy.

Consequently, the criteria for being a demos is more advanced for a political unit wishing to secede from another than from one existing independently of others. Likewise, the legitimacy of a demos is lesser for one infringing on another (as the case of *Nation*₂ on *Nation*₃ along with *Nation*₁ and *Nation*₂ on one another in figure 2) compared to demos existing independently.

3.2 The all-affected principle

A second option to answer the question is with reference to the all-affected principle which states that all affected by a decision should be included in the demos making that decision (Hultin Rosenberg 2019: 73). The principle potentially grants an extraordinarily wide definition of demos. Goodin, as one of the strongest defenders of the perspective, suggests that perhaps the implications is that everyone should always have a vote on every given issue (Koenig-Archibugi, 2022: 406). However, Goodin (2007: 64-66) also recognises the impracticality of such an interpretation of the principle and further on suggests that if political entities were to participate in a system granting legitimacy to a higher authority, people excluded from one demos' jurisdiction could appeal to this higher authority and thus have their interests heard. Accordingly, a criteria for a legitimate demos possible to derive from the all-affected principle is that a demos should participate in a system that allows other demoi to appeal to a higher authority for contesting a decision. This is with the exception of a demos that encompasses all interests in itself (i.e. a world demos, as discussed frequently within the research field, see for example Goodin 2016; List – Koenig-Archibugi 2010; Weinstock 2009; Valentini 2014; Little 2015).

3.3 The Coercion Principle

A related, but more restricted, perspective is the coercion principle (Scherz 2013: 4). The principle builds upon a similar claim as the all-affected ditto, but instead of including all-affected interests, only the ones subjected to coercion grants a place in the demos making the decision. This gives cause to contestation about how coercion

should be interpreted and I will use Abizadeh's interpretation for the index, since his interpretation is the most developed and the most common within the research field (see Asseldonk 2022; 164, 173; Beckman 2019: 415; Koenig-Archibugi 2022: 405-406; and Owen 2012: 146). However, note the discussion below about the probable insignificance between using Abizadeh's perspective compared to other interpretations of the principle (e.g. Dahl 1989; 208; Lopez-Guerra 2005: 222).

Abizadeh (2012: 878) defines being subject to coercion as:

[...] direct physical force, invigilation via agents authorized to use physical force, and threats of punitive harm [...] coercively undergirded symbolic processes of socialization and identity formation

Abizadeh argues in favour of a wide interpretation (e.g. Abizadeh 2008), but similarly to how Goodin reasons, Abizadeh (2012: 880-881) considers that the principle should be adjusted to reality. The conclusion drawn by Abizadeh is that the non-coercive demos is an unachievable, yet desirable, ideal.

3.4 The Principles' Compatibility With Reality and One Another

Before examining the compatibility of the different principles a short summary of the derived criteria is presented in the table below.

Table 1: Criteria derived from the principles for what a demos should be.

Principle	Criteria
The Nationalist Principle	A collective self-identification with an imagined community with historic and future intention and a connection to a given geographical area.
	A distinctive ethical component, differentiating the given community from others.
	A suggestion for an institutional structure on how to govern the demos.
The All-Affected Principle	A criterion is that demoi participate in system(s) with higher authority than itself; making, at least some of, those affected by its decision able challenge it.
The Coercion Principle	A criterion is that the demos, comparatively less to other demoi, not make others subjected to coercion by its decisions.

Have the theories' reach been extended by making them more general? The answer is obviously yes. I will explain why this is suitable with two arguments. Firstly, as demonstrated, the theorists themselves argue in favour of adapting the principles to reality to evaluate a demos legitimacy. The disparity between theory and practice should be acknowledged and adjusted for. Secondly, for constructing a useful index the theories must be applicable to a variety of study objects. As the observant reader will have noticed, the criteria for the nationalist principle are formulated without the term nation, which is replaced with "community". This choice is made to be able to use the principle for evaluating demoi that are not primarily nations (e.g. local or global demoi, or demoi entailing the question of secession). One could criticise this as abusing or even distorting the theory. However, it is a reasonable choice with reference to that similar criteria are used by theorists reasoning about the legitimacy of demos irrespective of nations (e.g. Dahl, 1989: 207-208; Song 2012). Additionally, by formulating the nationalist principle in a wider sense, it is possible to provide a more comprehensive evaluation of the democratic legitimacy for different kinds of demoi. Furthermore, if one would disapprove of the extension, that would not pose a problem (see 4.4 about the adjusting the index). Lastly, the discrepancy between possible operationalisations and theory presumably negates the difference a more narrow claim would have on the theory side. It is thus more transparent to already on the theoretical level make wider claims. It would, for example, not be possible to measure every way demoi are coercive to others, but it is possible to measure how coercive it acts compared to others. The claims would be measured the same way irrespective of whether a narrow or wide interpretation were made; it is more reasonable to adjust theory to reality than to attempt to adjust reality to theory.




Figure 3: The relationship between the All-Affected- and the Coercive Principle.

Another subject that should be addressed is the relationship between the coercive and all-affected principles. As the illustration above depicts, if something falls within the scope of the coercive principle it necessarily falls under the scope of the all-affected principle too. This poses two critical questions: (1) Would not the all-affected principle be sufficient to use by itself to measure both principles; (2) is it not theoretically contrary to use the coercive perspective if the all-affected is also used? I answer the first question with yes: If someone is subjected to coercion they are necessarily affected by the decision. However, as I have mentioned before, and will explain later (see 4.4) using both principles grants the possibility for the index user to choose whether to restrict oneself to the narrower interpretation of demos. It is thus meaningful to use both principles. My answer to the second question, which is applicable to the first one too, is no but potentially yes. It is potentially yes, because the principles stand in contrast to one another as different interpretations of how "affected" should be interpreted (Scherz 2013: 4). However, I argue that the meaningful answer, when applying the principles to reality, should be no. Firstly, as

detailed before, the discrepancy between operationalisations and theory makes it hard to distinguish between how they should be interpreted in reality; there is no consensus on how they should be interpreted in theory either (compare Abizadeh 2010; Miller 2010). Secondly, I propose that we should consider the demos literature collectively when evaluating reality. This is the acknowledged way of measuring democracy with a kratos perspective; we combine both procedural and substantive approaches to democracy for a more thorough understanding of reality (see The Economist Intelligence Unit 2022: 3; Papade et al 2023: 50). Inspired by this way of thinking I suggest we should do the same with demos.

4 Methodology for Evaluating the Level of Democracy

In this chapter, the methods for finding operational indicators for the criteria, evaluating the relative fulfilment of them, and aggregating the results into an index are discussed

4.1 Combining Measurements in an Index

Inspired by previous successful attempts to measure democracy (e.g. The Economist Intelligence Unit 2022) and with the following reasoning, a discrete three-graded scoring system for all indicators will be used. As Trueb (2013: 3538-3539) explains, using the same grading for all indicators, not only the analytical units will be comparable, but also the indicators. Additionally, a three-graded scale is used because I reject the dichotomous scale on the basis of being blunt and unable to express the complexity of reality. As will become apparent it is often not meaningful to measure many of the criteria as either fulfilled or not, which calls for something in-between. There is a value in adopting a more fine graded scale than three, since it then less problematic to treat it as an interval scale (Esaiasson et al 2017: 362); thus more useful for regression analysis (Teorell – Svensson 2007: 164-172, 191-205). However, this purpose will, to a large extent, be fulfilled through the aggregation of the indicators. Using even more grades increases the risk of portraying a false preciseness in the measurement, and more importantly, it severely raises the risk of arbitrary scoring and worsening the intercoder reliability (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2022: 68-69). Since I am conducting the scoring on my own it seems reasonable to choose broader categories (i.e. fewer grading options) to ensure that someone else would have coded the same way. For developing the index, I would recommend a finer graded scale.

4.2 Amount of Indicators per Criteria

When possible, multiple indicators for one criterion will be used, since the aggregated value of the indicators will pose a more reliable way of measuring the relative fulfilment of the criterion rather than using only one indicator (Essaiasson et al 2017: 397-398). This may appear as highly controversial given the common mantra to use mutually exclusive dimensions when measuring (e.g. Bergström – Svärd 2018: 166; Trueb 2013: 3539). Though when looking at the praxis for measuring democracy the case is different. For example are multiple indicators used for measuring: that elections are free (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2022: 70); the sovereignty of the state (Coppedge 2023a: 189-294); and freedom of expression and belief (Freedom House 2023a: 10-13). Clearly, even though we only have one theoretical criterion or value, it is oftentimes in reality expressed and relevant in a multitude of ways. Therefore, an attempt of measuring the fulfilment of the criterion, entails measuring it in different ways – despite this appearing contrary to some methodological praxis.

4.3 Developing Operational Indicators

For finding valid operational indicators inspiration is drawn from the V-Dem institute's reasoning. This is to search for factors that are: (1) related to at least one criteria for democracy (in my case demos criteria); and (2) are measurable over time and space (Coppedge et al 2023b: 7). I do this with the vision of being able to compare such a broad scope of political units as possible. The balance between measurement precision, and applicability is highly apparent, but since this is a pilot study I consider the values of accessibility and applicability to be of higher dignity than precision. The case would be different if indices on the subject already existed. The data for the indicators were found through research databases.

4.4 Should Certain Criteria be Given Greater Impact?

A question that must be addressed is whether certain criteria should be given greater impact than others. The theoretical foundation is based on research impact and I have not favoured any of the perspectives. As will become apparent in the next section, the perspectives are weighted equally, which indirectly entails a weighting of indicators. This should not be confused with selected weighting of indicators to enhance the impact of certain criteria (which would be reasonable if one considered some criteria more important than others. An example of this is the selected weighting of certain rights in other democracy indices). The weighting I use should rather be deemed a harmonisation, since the purpose is to give equal impact for the three perspectives. However, a side effect is that certain indicators receive disproportionate impact due to different amounts of indicators per perspective (see equation 1 and chapter 5). If someone were to disagree with my aggregation, it is easy to weigh indicators whichever way one considers suitable by simply changing the factors in the formula. One could also choose to neglect certain perspectives by erasing them from the formula.

4.5 Index Aggregation

For combining the indicators into an index, the following formula is used:

$$\left(\frac{\sum NPp}{\sum NPt} + \frac{\sum AAPp}{\sum AAPt} + \frac{\sum CPp}{\sum CPt}\right) \times \frac{1}{3} \times 10$$

Equation 1: Index aggregation formula

The formula can be broken down in five steps:

- (1) The points given for each perspective are summarised;
- (2) those sums are are divided by the summation of the total amount of possible points for each perspective;
- (3) all the quotas are summarised;
- (4) they are multiplied with $\frac{1}{3}$;
- (5) the product is multiplied with ten.

The first step is to award points for a demos's fulfilment of the perspectives criteria by following the codebook (see chapter 5). The second step is to calculate the relative fulfilment of the criteria by dividing points awarded with the maximum number of points. The third step is to summarise these sums. The three first steps result in a quota representing the relative fulfilment of all indicators for a demos with the maximum value 3, which is a bit counter-intuitive because it could be interpreted as being 300 percent democratic. Therefore, all quotas are multiplied with $\frac{1}{3}$. This also means that the perspectives have an equal impact on the total index value. An alternative would be to assign different perspectives an unequal impact on the index value, but this would be contradictory to my previous reasoning about not taking a stand for a certain perspective of demos. Consequently, I have chosen to assign the perspectives equal impact. The fifth step is a matter of taste. I consider scales from 0 to 10 to be more appealing than those of 0 to 1.

4.6 Missing Indicators

If an indicator is not available for a demos, two points are subtracted from that perspective's total points for the demos (for example, if an indicator is missing for Uruguay within the coercion principle, Uruguay's CCPt will be subtracted with two). It is two points that are subtracted because two points is the maximum score for each indicator. This way the quotas (and index scores) are comparable, even though some demoi cannot be measured over all indicators.

For being part of the index a demos cannot lack more than three indicators in total and never two within one perspective. The demoi that did not fill this criteria have been erased from the data file. No other strategy for choosing the cases of state demoi have been used than this strategy based on data availability. The cases of Catalonia and the European Union were chosen due to their common occurrence within demos literature and data availability. It should be mentioned that there are two indicators that stand out by affecting the measurability badly (see 5.2.2; 5.3.1). The missing indicators for all demoi are marked in column B in appendix 1. I encourage others to find interchangeable indicators for these criteria to improve the index's reliability.

5. The Codebook

In this chapter I will detail the operational indicators used for constructing the index and how they should be interpreted. The indicators will be formulated as ordinal scales and every analytical unit will be assigned a value for each variable (i.e. indicator) that is either: (2) criteria completely or to a large extent fulfilled; (1) criteria somewhat fulfilled; or (0) criteria not fulfilled.

Before presenting the indicators, a comment about the construction of them is suitable. As will become evident, the grading limits are ultimately arbitrary. On the one hand, I will do my best to construct them as reasonably as possible, but on the other hand, where the line is drawn between the three scores will always be a product of subjective judgement. I will make no claim for intersubjectivity in the construction of gradings; I will strive for transparency to enable high intercoder reliability. Through the extensive and thorough explanations of why the indicators are suitable measurements and how they should be used to code demoi, high intercoder reliability is ensured. With this arrangement, I will meet the purposes of the study, which is a pilot-project to construct a demos index, and it will be highly adaptable for future studies.

5.1 The Nationalist Principle

In this section I will outline the indicators used for the Nationalist Principle (NP).

5.1.1 A Distinct Ethical Culture

For measuring whether a distinct ethical culture exists, I use the Inglehart-Wetzel World Cultural Map (2023) based on the world value survey.

2: The demos have unique values, which is measured by being at least a distance, equivalent to the size of a data point on the map, from another geographically bordering demoi.

1: The demos exist within one of the identified cultural spheres.

0: The demos exist in two or more cultural spheres.

Explanation: To hand out one or two points, the coder examines whether the demos exist in one cultural sphere, as depicted on the map. To decide if two or one points should be given, the coder examines the distance of the demos to other geographically bordering demoi, and if the distance is more than one data-point, as depicted in the map, two points are handed out. Only geographically bordering demoi are examined for two points, since the NP is discussing national demoi. There is thus no point to lower the score for cultural similarity with geographically distant demoi.

5.1.2 Collective self-identification

For measuring whether a collective self-identification exists, two operational definitions suggested by Koenning-Archibugi (2022: 412-413) will be used. The first one is the World Value Survey's (Haerpfner et al 2022) measurement of self-identification, which is formulated in question 275 as "Feel close to your country".

2: $x \ge 85$ index value.

1: $85 > x \ge 70$ index value.

0: 70 > x index value.

Explanation: The coder uses the index value from the referenced dataset to assign points. The parameters are set so that the answers "very close" and "close" give a positive score, while the answers "not close at all" and "not very close" give a negative score. The reason behind the grading limits is an attempt to divide the data into three roughly equal parts. One could reasonably object that the grading is set somewhat generously. However, with these grading limits more cases can be

distinguished from others, compared to if the upper limit was set higher. Another aspect that should be addressed is the involvement of the negative answers. I chose to incorporate these as an additional way of giving resistance to the demos an impact on the index.

5.1.3 Opposition to the National Identity

The second indicator suggested by Koenning-Archibugi (2022: 412-413) is to measure the opposition to the common identity through secessionist movements. The measurement of the secessionist movements is the one suggested by Koenig-Archibugi, but also adds the existence of proto-states. The data I will use is from Griffiths (2016).

- 2: No secessionist movement or proto-state has existed since 1950.
- 1: Either a secessionist movement or a proto-state has existed since 1950.
- **0**: At least one secessionist movement and one proto-state have existed since 1950.

Explanation: The coder compares the demos with Griffiths (2016) to decide whether secessionist and/or a proto-state has/have existed since 1950. The reason for choosing 1950 is that a secessionist movement can probably, over time, join the national identity and die out. However, I assume that such a movement could also become inactive to eventually resurrect. I chose the year 1950 as a way of balancing between the two perspectives.

5.1.4 Cultural Similarity

Another way of measuring the existence of an imagined national community with a historical and future intention, is to measure the absence of cultural diversity. A notion, often existing within nationalistic ideology, is tying the history, present and future into one collective continuous identity (Cox 2021: 20). The existence of cultural diversity could be argued competing with this notion, since it will then exist multiple imagined communities. Thus, I will use Gören's (2013) measurement of cultural diversity as a reversed indicator. One could also choose to operationalise the

existence of a nation by measuring ethnic diversity (for example with Gören 2014: Table 7). However, I consider Gören (2013) more appropriate, since this measure adjusts the cultural diversity for lingual homogeneity and downplays the impact of ethnic similarity; this type of measurement is better in line with the established understanding of nations as a social constructs (see for example Jeffers 2019). An argument provided by Gören (2013: 13) for this perspective is that countries such as Brazil, that are ethnically heterogeneous, but culturally homogeneous, are better captured with this measurement. The measure used is Table A1 in Gören (2013). Ranking countries from 1 (most culturally heterogeneous) to 0 (least culturally heterogeneous), described as the GI-score.

2: $x \le 0.15$ GI-score

1: $0.15 < x \le 0.5$ GI-score

0: 0.5 < x GI-score

Explanation: Similarly to previous reasoning, the data is divided into three roughly equal groups. There is no more nuanced thought on why the limits have been decided this way, and I welcome further discussion on where the lines should be drawn. Furthermore, I encourage development of better indicators to measure cultural similarity.

5.1.5 System of Government – Functionality

As previously outlined, a criteria for the NP is that an institutional structure of government exists. For measuring the existence of an institutional structure, able to govern the demos, I will use the Fragile States Index data for 2022 and the index scoring (Haken et al 2022). The index uses indicators such as water supply, monopoly on violence, and access to healthcare.

2: $x \le 40$ Fragility Score

1: $40 < x \le 80$ Fragility Score

0: 80 < x Fragility Score

Explanation: The Fragile State Index measures on a scale from 0 to 120 how fragile a state is, and a non fragile state scores low. I have divided the scaling into three equally big parts, which also divide the data into three roughly equal parts.

5.1.6 System of Government – Democratic Intention

Being a non-fragile state is arguably not enough to fulfil the criteria of having an institutional structure for how to govern the demos. As Dahl (1989, p. 193-208) explains, when evaluating the demos from a democratic perspective, a democratic intention is necessary. Therefore, the Fragile State Index-ranking is complemented with Freedom House's (2023b) Global Freedom Score. The indicator is interpreted as to what extent the demos are actively trying to be a democracy.

2: $x \ge 90$ Freedom Score

1: $90 > x \ge 70$ Freedom Score

0:70 > x Freedom Score

Explanation: The Freedom Score is set to 90 to be able to distinguish between the top ranked countries. The second line is drawn at 70, because this is approximately where the Freedom House's (Freedom House 2023a: 17) own scoring draws the line between free and partly free.

5.1.7 The Secessionist Case

An important question is the case of secessionist movements and how to assess their potential for becoming independent demos. Due to lack of good measurements for this type of potential of governance for secessionist nations, I will propose a qualitative coding for the cases and exemplify with how it should be used. The scoring below is meant to replace 5.1.5 and 5.1.6. Further down, I explain how to assign scores for the other indicators.

2: A, to a large extent, democratic system of government, tied to a clearly defined geographical area, is proposed and it has support from the movement.

- 1: A system of government, tied to a geographical area, is proposed but it has severe democratic flaws and it has support from the movement.
- **0:** No proposal for a democratic system of government exists, or one exists but lacks support from the movement.

Explanation: It is of importance that the proposed system of government is democratic (see Dahl 1989, p. 193-208 for discussion on the importance of a democratic intention). Having this in mind, a suitable way for distinguishing between the two top points is the democratic intention. Please note that the two-point-grading entails a possibility for minor democratic flaws; since it is non-exist states we are discussing I advocate that this should be interpreted generously. Another important aspect is support from the movement for the proposed system. This criteria is formulated as a safety for ensuring that the proposed system will be the one put in place.

Furthermore, connecting the government to a defined geographical area is relevant. However, one might argue that secessionist movements might not be able, due to ongoing conflict, to clearly define the area. Therefore, one point should be given even though it is not clearly defined. The coder does a qualitative analysis based on these criteria for assigning the unit a score.

As a support for the coder, I will give an example of how I suggest a case should be evaluated. The Catalonian secessionist demos should arguably be graded two for this criteria, since the movement is working with democratic means (i.e the parliament) and has expressed its wish to continue on a democratic path (Serhan 2017). Considering the democratic status of Catalonia (and Spain), the clearly defined geographical area, and the democratic nature of the movement, the grading is uncomplicated.

For assigning points for the other indicators, the coder should use indicators that are comparable to the standard ones. Secessionist demoi can obviously not be evaluated with the same standards as demoi that sometimes have existed for centuries, because one could not expect secessionist demoi to have developed as much as independent

demoi in any nationalistic aspect. In the dataset (see appendix 1), there is an example of how secessionist demoi should be coded on the other indicators.

5.1.8 A Remark on Supranational Demoi

Despite one might argue the theoretical contradiction of a supranational demos from a nationalistic perspective, I still consider it to be relevant to evaluate such demoi from the NP since the possibility of supranational demoi is a vivid debate within demos-research (e.g. Alt 2022; Risse 2010). For coding these demoi, a more qualitative approach is necessary. 5.1.1 can be used, but without the possibility for scoring two; 5.1.2 can be exchanged for a similar measurement (i.e. survey that asks a similar question); 5.1.3 can be exchanged to evaluate the amount of secessionist movements in a similar manner measured by states or organisations actively working for secession; 5.1.4 cannot be easily replaced, and I encourage others to produce comparable data; and 5.1.5 and 5.1.6 should be evaluated in accordance with what is outlined at section 5.2.4.

5.1.9 Geographical Area

Many of these indicators use state-centric data, why the geography criteria will be built in when evaluating state demoi. The same goes for supra- and intergovernmental organisations, since the scope is then that of the states. I consider this operatioanlisation to be sufficiently good, since what could be opposed to it – that demoi act in areas not formally within their territory – will be captured by other perspectives.

5.2 The All-Affected Principle

In this section I will outline the indicators used for the All-Affected Principle (AAP). The criterion for the AAP is that the demoi are part of a system of higher authority, so that those affected by its decisions are able to challenge it. One could also take

into account how well the state follows through on its international commitments (see Koenig-Archibugi 2022: 416-417, who have suggested two indicators I have been inspired by). Many possible operationalistations are thinkable, and I will use a handful of them. The choice of indicators has been made to consider a variety of perspectives on the criterion.

5.2.1 Compliance With International Law

The first indicator is compliance with international law. To comply and cooperate with supranational legal initiatives is a way for demoi to allow those affected by its actions to appeal to a higher authority. I will use declaration of recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and being part of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by ratification of the Rome Statute as an indicator. These are two different jurisdictions, filling two different purposes; one is directed towards states and the other at individuals.

- 2: The demos has declared recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ, and has ratified the Rome Statute
- 1: The demos has declared recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ, or has ratified the Rome Statute
- **0**: The demos has not declared recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ, nor has it ratified the Rome Statute.

Explanation: By using both judicial systems, it is possible to create a three-graded scale out of two binary variables. The coder consults the ICJ's and ICC's (International Court of Justice, n.d.; International Criminal Court, n.d.) own documentation of compliances to assign a score. I urge the coder to carefully study the coding scheme: Two points are given for complying with both systems; one point for one of the systems; and zero points for neither of them.

5.2.2 Climate Change Responsibility

An issue where a demos actions undeniably affects others against their interests is

when the demos contributes to climate change. One might oppose this

operationalisation, accusing me of misinterpreting the criterion of allowing appealing

to a higher authority. Then I would argue that we know, a priori, that it is against the

interest of those affected to contribute to climate change. Consequently, the more

climate change a demos contributes to, the less it adheres to the AAP. The

measurement used is the Climate Change Performance Index (Burck et al 2022: 7),

which measures climate- impact and policy, energy usage and amount of renewable

energy.

2: $x \ge 60 \text{ CCPI}$

1: $60 > x \ge 50$ CCPI

0: 50 > x CCPI

Explanation: The coder assigns points based on how well the demos score on the

CCPI index (Burck et al 2022: 7). The limits are based on the index ratings, where all

the units over 60 are given a "high" or "very high" rating; those between 60 and 50 a

"medium" rating; and those under 50 a "low" or "very low" rating.

5.2.3 Voice Plurality

Another indicator used is to what extent different actors are allowed to participate in

decision making processes. The assumption behind this is that the more power is

concentrated, the less the decisions take into account the diversity of interests

affected by it. Therefore, the more interests consulted, such as NGOs, the better the

demos could be argued to be according to the AAP. As measurement the V-dem data

for Range of consultation (Coppedge et al 2023c) is used. It is measured on an

ordinal scale from 0-5 (5 is maximum) based on how much consultation is made at

high levels for critical policy decisions (Coppedge et al 2023a: 164-165).

2: $x \ge 3.5$ v2dlconslt_osp

1: $3.5 > x \ge 2$ v2dlconslt osp

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0: 2 > x v2dlconslt osp

Explanation: The coder assigns a score based on the v2dlconslt_osp variable value (in the dataset from Coppedge et al 2023c) with the year 2022. V-Dem presents multiple versions of the variables, but I have chosen to use the "original scale" one (see Coppedge 2023b: 26-27 for explanation of the different variable versions), which is an estimation of the variable based on the ordinal scale used by the coders. Since it is an estimation, no unit scores a five. Therefore, the first threshold is set a bit wider than the others.

5.2.4 Coding Supranational Demoi

The measurements are applicable for state-demoi (although EU are sometimes measured), but with some tuning they could be used for supranational demoi as well. For doing this, I propose calculating the relative fulfilment of the criteria for the supranational demoi.

2: $x \ge 90$ percent

1: $90 > x \ge 50$ percent

0:50 > x percent

Explanation: The coder calculates the supranational demos' relative fulfilment of the criteria by assessing the score of demoi on lower levels (i.e. state-level). If over 90 percent of the demoi on lower levels scores a two, so should the supranational one and the same reasoning applies to the other scorings.

5.2.5 A Remark on Secessionist Movements

The indicators for the AAP are not suitable for secessionist movements (since they presuppose an already active demos), and I encourage others to develop suitable criteria for evaluating such demoi in accordance with the AAP. Until then, the coder should base the evaluation for secessionist movements solely on the NP.

5.3 The Coercion Principle

In this section I will outline the indicators used for the Coercion Principle (CP). The criterion for the CP is that the demos, comparatively less to other demoi, make those outside of the demos subjected to coercion by its decisions. As earlier explained, the ideal would be that all those subjected to coercion are part of the demos, but as also explained, this is a probably unachievable ideal. Adapting the ideal to reality, one can compare to what extent coercion without representation is occurring, which is a way of measuring the fulfilment of the principle.

5.3.1 Integration of Migrants

One group, often discussed within demos literature in relation to the CP (e.g. Abizadeh 2010; Miller 2010; Koenig-Archibugi 2022), is immigrants and their situation. Immigrants are clearly subjected to coercive decisions (i.e. through laws and their enactment) but often lack the right to influence those decisions. One way to measure the fulfilment of the CP's criterion is to compare the level of integration of immigrants in society. The more inclusive policies for immigrants, the less the demos make them subject to coercion, compared to other demoi. For measuring this I will use the Migrant Integration Policy Index (Solano – Huddleston 2020: 13-14), which assesses, among other things, political opportunities, process of becoming part of the demos and integration efforts. I will use the MIPEX general score for 2020.

2: $x \ge 60$ MIPEX score

1: 60 > x > 40 MIPEX score

0: $40 \ge x$ MIPEX score

Explanation: I have based the limits on MIPEX's own evaluation, where 60 and above is deemed "favourable" or "slightly favourable"; under 60 and over 40 is deemed "halfway favourable"; and 40 and under is deemed "slightly unfavourable", "unfavourable" or "critically unfavourable". The coder compares the MIPEX scoring and then assigns a scoring based on the description above.

5.3.2 Military Intervention in Conflicts

Another way to evaluate the fulfilment of CP is by comparing the occurrence of military intervention. For measuring this, the UCDP/PRIO dataset (UCDP 2022) for armed conflicts where at least one part is the government of a state is used. A broader timeframe than only a year is used, which is based on the assumption that only looking at a single year might be misleading for assessing the extent of a demos' military actions. Conflicts in the dataset within the interval 2000-2021 will be observed. What UCDP codes as the primary parts in the conflict (coded as side_a or side_b) will not be accounted for, instead those who enter the conflict on the b-side but are not a primary part of the conflict (coded as side_b_2nd) will be examined. Furthermore, only intrastate conflicts will be examined, since by combining these variables (coded as conflict type 3 and 4) and the secondary parts in the conflicts, the information used will be limited to states that support the non-government side in intrastate conflicts (see Pettersson 2020 for descriptions of the variables).

The variable choice is made because it is not always clear which sides hold the moral responsibility for the conflict, and I do not consider it to be reasonable to punish the score for a demos that defends itself in an armed conflict. Moreover, demoi participating in peacekeeping missions should reasonably not be given a lower score (which would be the case if the side_a_2nd variable was used). Perhaps it is not desirable to punish all demoi who intervene in a conflict on the non-governmental side either, and I encourage others to refine this operationalisation. Nevertheless, I consider it to be a sufficiently good indicator of the CP to measure to what extent demoi intervene militarily in ongoing intrastate conflicts on the nongovernmental side. It is an obvious case of using coercion against those not able to influence the decision.

- 2: The demos has not been classified as side_b_2nd by UCDP in any conflict during the period 2000-2021
- 1: The demos has been classified as side_b_2nd by UCDP in one conflict during the period 2000-2021
- **0:** The demos has been classified as side_b_2nd by UCDP in at least two conflicts during the period 2000-2021

Explanation: The coder examines whether the demos has been part of a conflict in accordance with the variables and instructions outlined above and then assigns points.

5.3.3 Political Participation

If the people constituting the demos are not participating in its decisions, one could argue that the demos should be evaluated as less fulfilling of the CP. Because then, the non-participants are subjected to coercion without influencing the decision. With this background I will use the Economist Intelligence Unit (2022: 12-16) scoring on political participation as an indicator.

2: x > 8 on EIU political participation

1: $8 \ge x > 6$ on EIU political participation

0: $6 \ge x$ on EIU political participation

Explanation: The limits are set to match EIU's limits for different regime types (the Economist Intelligence Unit 2022: 68). The coder examines the EIU scoring and then assigns points accordingly.

5.2.4 Coding Supranational Demoi

The situation for the CP scoring for supranational demoi is the same for the AAP (see 5.2.4 for an explanation).

5.3.5 Another Remark on Secessionist Movements

Please see the discussion in 5.2.5, which is applicable for the CP too.

6. Results

The results consist of the demoi's index scores calculated in the dataset (appendix 1) and are illustrated in a diagram (appendix 2). The case of Catalonia should be highlighted, since it might otherwise be misinterpreted. Interpreting the diagram, one might be confused about Catalonia's scoring of 7,5 on the NP (since the normal maximum scoring is 3,33 on each perspective, as explained in 4.5). Catalonia scored 6 out of its 8 possible points for the NP, and because the indicators for AAP and CP are not applicable for secessionist demoi (as explained in 5.2.5 and 5.3.5), only the NP score is used to calculate the index score. Catalonia's index score is thus the same as its aggregated NP score (0,75 x 10). Though this makes the data and diagram a bit more challenging to interpret, the choice was still made to demonstrate Catalonia as a case of a secessionist movement, because I consider it to be highly valuable to examine other demoi than states. Additionally, I recommend future studies on the subject to further look into non-state cases of demoi such as supranational and secessionist ones and wanted to demonstrate the possibility.

A few things to mention about the results is that the average index score is 5,64; in total 87 demoi are indexed (85 state-demoi; one supranational demos; and one secessionist demos); the lowest scoring demos is Russia (1,94); and the highest ones are Finland and Norway (10,00).

7. Discussion

In this chapter the relevance and implications of the findings are discussed. While recognising that it is unusual, I have chosen to keep further analysis of the results relatively limited. This is because I recommended that the results be analysed in relation to other data. If I were to further analyse the results, I would initiate a completely new study. I will further elaborate on what I mean with this in section 7.5.

Before initiating some thematic discussions I will return to the initial purposes. I set out to conduct a pilot project attempting to compare the level of democracy from a demos perspective. Additionally, I aimed to compare different kinds of demoi and for the results to provide a foundation for others to build upon. I consider these objectives achieved.

7.1 How Should the Results be Interpreted?

Some of the results stand out as particularly interesting. Two of these are the European Union's mediocre scoring and, despite the narrower scope, Catalonia's high scoring compared to well established demoi. The variety of scores is also noticeable and calls for further investigation. However, I want to underline that the index scores are of no interest on their own; the numbers do not mean anything meaningful other than as relative fulfilment of the criteria. If not put in context, the individual results should not be interpreted at all. Though together, and in relation to each other, they are fascinating and provide endless possibilities for analysis and interpretation. I will detail some of my suggestions in section 7.5.

7.2 A Short Reflections on the Reasons to the Results

I would like to emphasise that the results are certainly a product of the choices made. If, for example, I had chosen other perspectives, other, fewer, or more indicators, or weighted the index instead of harmonising it, the results would not have been the same. I have already explained and defended the choices made and will not do it again, but I will make some critical reflections on them.

The first crucial decision was that of perspectives. I chose to use the ones identified as most established within the field of demos research. Perhaps these perspectives are not the ones that give the most satisfactory answers to the question of what the demos should be. I welcome criticism against my choices, and encourage political theorists to conduct further research on the topic and those more empirically oriented to conduct similar studies as I have based on other theoretical standpoints. The second crucial decision was about which operational indicators to use. While regarding the indicators as adequate, I recognise the necessity of improving and increasing them and welcome a critical examination. Comparatively to other democracy indices, I use few indicators, which is a consequence of having conducted a pilot study. I encourage others to develop more extensive indicators, and I elaborate on this issue in section 7.4. The final crucial decision was how to aggregate the indicator-based scores to a total index score. On the one hand, I want to downplay the importance of this step, since it is easily adjusted by changing a few formulas in the dataset. Hence, if someone would disagree with my reasoning, it is easy to adapt the index to one's own preferences. On the other hand, the index is the ultimate result of the study and by using another aggregating formula different results could be obtained. Since the question of how the indicators should be aggregated is ultimately a question of which answer to the overarching question of who the people should be is most satisfactory, I encourage future studies to further base their aggregation formulas on their standpoints in political theory.

7.3 The Study's Relevance

I consider the results of the thesis to be relevant in mainly three different ways. Firstly, as a pilot project, I have demonstrated the possibility and argued for the necessity of considering the level of demoi as a crucial part when discussing the level of democracy in a wider perspective. Moreover, I have contributed to the broader field of democracy research (somewhat on the theoretical side, but foremost on the empirically oriented side) by emphasising the importance of demos and suggesting a way of scientifically evaluating the level of democracy from a demos perspective. Secondly, I have contributed to our current understanding of the level of democracy in the world by evaluating 87 demoi's level of democracy. This is a significant scientific contribution to our understanding of democracy in the world. We can now compare a substantial share of the world's states; we now have methods for indexing secessionist and supranational demoi; and we can compare different types of demoi with each other. Despite not being a perfect comparison, it is still a valuable contribution. Thirdly, the results can also be of relevance outside academia. The index can provide insight for those seeking recognition of sovereignty, those wishing to become stronger demoi, or those wanting to better understand their situation. The index provides insight into which aspects need to be improved by using multiple perspectives. For these situations and others, people can consult what I have provided to gain understanding of what they could do to enhance (or decrease) their level of democracy.

7.4 Improving Validity and Reliability for the Index

As mentioned throughout the thesis, the indicators used are efficient ways of measuring the relative fulfilment of the criteria, but should be improved and increased. They are applicable to many states, but as we have seen, we are in need of better indicators for other types of demoi. Preferably, we would have indicators that are applicable to all types of demoi. The best way of further improving the validity of the index would be to develop more indicators for the different criteria. The

indicators are valid ways of measuring the criteria, but are not sufficient to measure all ways the criteria are relevant. The index should be considered reliable, since the coding is transparent, the data is from recognised sources, and the same scoring system is used for 85 out of 87 demoi, leaving little room for arbitrary judgements. However, when compiling the dataset I have done the vast majority of the data processing manually, and it is reasonable to assume that a few small mistakes might have occurred. The reliability would be improved by a recompiling of the dataset and a recoding to detect possible errors. Due to time constraints, I have not had the time to do any reliability-tests or redo the datawork. Nevertheless, it is easy for anyone doubting to examine what I have done and how the index is constructed by consulting the dataset. If major errors would have occurred it would have been clear by examining the index scores, which then would have appeared strange. Consequently, the reliability should be judged as satisfactory.

7.5 Further Research

As indicated before, the study's main contribution is as a foundation for further research. Working with the index has raised many thoughts about what it could be used for and I imagine interpreting it does for others as well. The analysis I have conducted is about the level of democracy for a range of political units from a demos perspective, and the results of this analysis generate many new questions. I will give a few examples of questions I suggest others look into that the index could be useful for.

Firstly, I have demonstrated that we can differentiate between different levels of demos. This observation calls for an explanation to why that is. One could use the index for trying to answer that question. For example, one could ask: What is the relationship between the level of demos and level of democracy in general? What underlying variables determine the level of demos? I suggest investigating variables such as geography, the age of demoi, wealth, people-factors (for example age and culture), and so on. Secondly, I assume that the level of demos has an impact on a variety of matters. One could ask to what extent the level of demos is a variable affecting other variables. Does the level of demos affect how legitimate the political

unit is perceived by its own members and others? Does the level of demos affect what type of decisions political units make? Does the level of demos affect how successful a political unit is? For example in terms of well-being among its members, wealth, or power. Thirdly, I strongly recommend others to use my thesis as a foundation and improve the indicators, develop more indicators, and most importantly index more cases. With the foundation I and others before me have provided, we can now compare different types of demoi in a standardised way, and it would pose a significant contribution to our understanding of democracy to index more secessionist and supranational demoi. Moreover, I suggest further research on the cases of local and global demoi as well transnational movements and other sorts of organisations as demoi. Lastly, the index is not only relevant for extensive studies, but could also be useful for case selection when conducting intensive research.

To summarise, I envision the index to be developed and improved by others both qualitatively and quantitatively, and I wish it can inspire others to consider the importance of demos both within the field of democracy research and in general. Hopefully many will find the index and dataset useful for a broad variety of studies.

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	Appendix	x 1							The Demos Index - Dataset						
Demos	Perspective Index Score Lacking Indicator	NP 5.1.1: Ethical NP 5.1.1 Culture	: Points NP 5.1.2: Self NP 5.1.2 Identification	2: Points NP 5.1.3: NP 5.1.3: No National Identity	NP 5.1.3: Points NP 5.1.4: Cultural Similarity NP 5.1.4: Poi	nts NP: 5.1.5: NP 5.1.5: P Governmental Functionality	Points NP 5.1.6: N Governmental Democracy	NP: 5.1.7: NP 5.1.7: Point Secessionist Coding. exchanging 5.1.5	∑NPp: ∑NPp/∑NPt: NP Summation of Points awarded Harmonisation NP-points divided by total (quota multiplied awarded points (normally with 1/3)	AAP 5.2.1: International Law AAP 5.2.1: Points AAP 5.2.2: Climate Change Responsibility	AAP 5.2.2: Points AAP 5.2.3: Voice Plurality AAP 5.2.3: Points	Summation of AAP-points awarded AAP-points awarded by total awarded with 1/3) ∑AAPp/∑AAPt AAP Harmonisation (quota multiplied with 1/3)	CP 5.3.1: Migrant Integration CP 5.3.1: Points CP 5.3.2: Military Intervention	Points CP 5.3.3: Political Participation CP 5.3.3: Points	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
State-demoi Sweden	9,72	2 Intensive interpretation	2 83	1	2 0,06	2 20,9	2 100	and 5.1.6	11 0,916666666666 0,3055555555555555555555555555555555555	5 ICJ, Rome 2 73,5	28 2 3,812	6) 1 0,33333333333333333333333333333333333	33 86 2	2 8,33	6) 2 6 1 0,33333333333333333333333333333333333
Denmark	, in the second	Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	2 88 97	2 One proto-state	2 0,14 2 0,06	2 18,1 2 15,6	2 97 2 100	2	1 0,333333333333333333333333333333333333			2 6 1 0,333333333333333333333333333333333333	33 49 1 33 69 2	2 8,33 2	2 5 0,833333333333 0,2777777777777777777777777777777777777
Finland Netherlands		Interpretation Intensive interpretation Intensive	2 91 2 65	2 0 Two proto-states,	2 0,11 0 0,11	2 15,1 2 22,1	2 1002 97	2	1 0,333333333333333333333333333333333333			2 6 1 0,333333333333 2 6 1 0,3333333333333		2 8,89 2 2 8,33 2	2 6 1 0,33333333333333333333333333333333333
Switzerland	7,78	interpretation B Intensive interpretation	2 89	two secessionist movements 2 One secessionist movement	1 0,5	1 18,9	2 96	2	10 0,833333333333 0,27777777777777	7 ICJ, Rome 2 58,	61 1 4,783	2 5 0,83333333333 0,27777777777	77 50 1	2 7,78	1 4 0,666666666666 0,2222222222222
Germany	8,89 AAP 8,61	Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	2 83 90	2	2 0,16 2 0,07	1 23,6 2 17,1	294294	2	10 0,833333333333 0,2777777777777 12 1 0,33333333333333333333		11 2 4,857 3,85	2 6 1 0,333333333333333333333333333333333333	33 58 25 56 1	2 8,33 2 2 8,89 2	2 5 0,833333333333 0,2777777777777777777777777777777777777
United Kingdom	8,06	5 Intensive interpretation	2 49	0 Multiple proto- states, multiple secessionist movements	0 0,09	2 40,6	1 93	2	7 0,583333333333 0,19444444444444	ICJ, Rome 2 63,	07 2 3,599	2 6 1 0,333333333333	33 56 1	2 8,33	2 5 0,833333333333 0,277777777777
Canada		Intensive interpretation	2 71	1 One proto-state, one secessionist movements	0 0,69	0 20,1	2 98	2	7 0,583333333333 0,19444444444444			1 3 0,5 0,16666666666	66 80 2	2 8,89	2 6 1 0,33333333333333
Australia New Zealand		Intensive interpretation Intensive	2 73	1 One proto-state, one secessionist movement 1 One secessionist	0 0,01	2 22,7 1 17,5	2 95	2			26 0 3,866 55 1 3,946	2	 22 65 2 77 77 2 	2 7,78	1 5 0,8333333333333333333333333333333333333
United States (USA)	5,83	interpretation 3 Intensive interpretation	2 49	movement 0 Multiple protostates, multiple secessionist	0 0,23	1 46,6	1 83	1	5 0,416666666666 0,13888888888888888888888888888888888888	38,	53 0 3,829	2 0,33333333333 0,111111111111	11 73 2	2 8,89	2 6 1 0,33333333333333
	7 17	7 Intensive interpretation	2 69	movements 0	2 0,06	2 22.5	42	0	6 0,6 0,2		0,634	0 0 0	0	2 5,56	0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
South Korea Taiwan		Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	2 79	1	2 0,25	2 32,5	94	2	8 0,8 0,2666666666666666666666666666666666666		3,983	1 2 0,333333333333333333333333333333333333	66	2 7,22	1 4 0,666666666666666666666666666666666666
Mongolia China	2,78	Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	259278	1 Two proto-states, multiple	0,31 0,14	1 51,6 2 66,9	1 84	0	7 0,583333333333 0,1944444444444 6 0,5 0,16666666666666		2,598 80 0 1,031	1 0,25 0,0833333333333333333333333333333333333	0 32 0	2 6,11 2	1 3 0,75 0,25 0 2 0,333333333333333333333333333333333333
Japan	7,50	O Intensive interpretation	2 75	secessionist movements	2 0,01	2 31,0	2 96	2	11 0,916666666666 0,3055555555555555555555555555555555555	5 ICJ, Rome 2 40,	85 0 3,507	2 4 0,666666666666 0,222222222222	22 47 1	2 6,67	1 4 0,666666666666 0,2222222222222
Czech Republic Lithuania		Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	279277	1	2 0,06	2 39,9 1 38,6	2 92 2 89	1	9 0,75 0,25	Rome 1 44, ICJ, Rome 2 59,3		2	50 1 77 37 0	2 6,67 7,22	1 4 0,666666666666666666666666666666666666
Latvia Estonia		Interpretation Intensive interpretation Intensive	2 81	2	2 0,51	0 42,8 1 37,7	1 88 2 94	2	7 0,583333333333 0,194444444444444 11 0,916666666666 0,30555555555555			2 5 0,833333333333 0,277777777777 2 6 1 0,33333333333		2 6,11	1 3 0,5 0,1666666666666 1 4 0,66666666666666 0,222222222222222222222222222222222222
Slovenia Spain		interpretation Intensive interpretation Intensive	2 88	2 0 Multiple proto-	0,15 0 0,28	2 27,7 1 44,4	2 95	2	1 0,333333333333333333333333333333333333			2 3 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666	66 48 1	2 7,22	1
Slovakia		interpretation	2 88	states, multiple secessionist movements		1 37,1	2 90	2	11 0,916666666666 0,3055555555555			1 4 0,66666666666 0,22222222222	22 30 0	2 5,56	0 2 0,33333333333 0,11111111111111
Italy		Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	2 57	One proto-state, multiple	0 0,08	2 43,4	1 90	2	7 0,583333333333 0,19444444444444			2 5 0,833333333333 0,27777777777	77 58 1	2 7,22	1 4 0,666666666666 0,222222222222
France	6,39	Intensive interpretation	2 82	movements 1 Multiple protostates, multiple	0 0,38	1 30,9	2 89	1	7 0,583333333333 0,194444444444444	Rome 1 52,5	97 1 3,974	2 4 0,666666666666 0,222222222222	22 56 1	2 7,78	1 4 0,666666666666 0,2222222222222
Austria	8,06	5 Intensive interpretation	2 81	secessionist movements	2 0,01	2 25,4	2 93	2	11 0,916666666666 0,305555555555555	5 ICJ, Rome 2 51,	56 1 3,294	1 4 0,666666666666 0,22222222222	22 46 1	2 8,89	2 5 0,833333333333 0,277777777777
Belgium		Intensive interpretation	2	Two proto-states, multiple secessionist movements	0 0,54	0 31,9	2 96	2			38 0 4,708	4 0,66666666666 0,222222222222	22 69 2	2 5,00	0 4 0,666666666666 0,2222222222222
Croatia Portugal	,	Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	273284	1 One secessionist movement 1 Multiple secessionist	0 0,05	1 49,3 2 27,5	1 84 2 96	2	7 0,583333333333 0,1944444444444 9 0,75 0,25	ICJ, Rome 1 52,6	04 2 3,36 55 3 4,169	1 4 0,666666666666666666666666666666666666	39 0 89 81 2	2 6,11 2 6,67	1 3 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
Poland Theiler 1		5 Intensive interpretation 7 Intensive	2 88	movements 2	2 0,15	2 42,2 1 70.0	1 81	1	10 0,833333333333 0,2777777777777 5 0.5 0,16666666666666			0 2 0,33333333333 0,111111111111 0 0 0	11 40 0 0	2 6,67	1 3 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
Thailand Israel		7 Intensive interpretation 1 Intensive interpretation	2	One secessionist movement Two proto-states, one secessionist movement	0 0,28	1 70,0 1 42,6	1 77	1	5 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666		23 0 0,964 3,777	0 0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666	66 49 1	2 6,67	1 3 0,75 0,25 2 5 0,8333333333333333333333333333333333333
South Africa	5,78	3 Intensive interpretation	2	Multiple proto- states, two secessionist movements	0 0,73	0 72,0	1 79	1	4 0,4 0,1333333333333333333333333333333333333	Rome 1 45,6	69 0 3,75	2 3 0,5 0,16666666666	66 48 1	2 8,33	2 5 0,833333333333 0,277777777777
Vietnam Bulgaria		Intensive interpretation Intensive	2 81	1 One secessionist movement 2	1 0,24 2 0,35	1 60,9	1 19	0	9 0,75 0,166666666666		31 0 3,05 15 0 4,433	1 0,16666666666 0,055555555555555555555555555	22 40 0	2 3,89	0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
Russia		Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	1 55	One proto-state, multiple secessionist	0 0,35	1 72,6	1 16	0	3 0,25 0,0833333333333333333333333333333333333			0 0 0	0 31 0 2021, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2014,	2 7,22	0 2 0,333333333333 0,1111111111111
Ukraine		7 Intensive interpretation	1 54	o Secessionist movements One secessionist movement	1 0,33	1 68,6	1 50	0	4 0,333333333333 0,11111111111111		3,414	1 0,25 0,08333333333	2014, 2008	2 6,67	1 4 0,666666666666 0,2222222222222
Belarus Greece	6,67	Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	1 51	2	2 0,2	1 68,7 1 55,8	1 86	1	5 0,416666666666 0,13888888888888888888888888888888888888			0 0 0 1 4 0,66666666666 0,222222222222	22 46 1	2 3,89 6,11	0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666 1 4 0,66666666666666 0,222222222222222222222222222222222222
North Macedonia Brazil		Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	1 39 2 16	0	2 0,47 2 0,01	1 62,6 2 73,9	1 68 1 72	1	5 0,416666666666 0,13888888888888888888888888888888888888		2,617 39 0 2,82	1 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666	66 42 1 11 64 2	2 6,11	1 4 0,666666666666666666666666666666666666
Argentina Uruguay	1 1 1 D CD	Interpretation Interpretation Intensive Intensive	2 60	2	2 0	2 47,9 2 35,2	1 85 2 96	2	8 0,66666666666 0,22222222222222 1 0,333333333333333		19 0 2,455 3,142	1 2 0,33333333333 0,111111111111 1 3 0,75 0,2	11 58 1	2 7,22	1 4 0,66666666666 0,222222222222 1 3 0,75 0,25
Mexico	5,28	interpretation Intensive interpretation	2 67	0	2 0,54	0 70,3	1 60	0	5 0,416666666666 0,13888888888888888888888888888888888888	3 ICJ, Rome 2 51,		0 3 0,5 0,16666666666		2 7,22	1 4 0,666666666666 0,2222222222222
Colombia Venezuela		Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	2 62 75	1	2 0,08	, ,	0 15	0	8 0,66666666666 0,2222222222222 7 0,583333333333 0,19444444444444		50 1 3,317 0,274	1 3 0,5 0,1666666666666 0 1 0,25 0,0833333333333333333333333333333333333		2 6,11 2 3,89	1 3 0,75 0,25 0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
		Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	257266	0	2 0,81 2 0,48	0 88,2 1 69,1	0 52 1 70	1	4 0,33333333333 0,11111111111111 7 0,5833333333333 0,19444444444444		1,398	1 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666		2 6,67	1 3 0,75 0,25 1 3 0,75 0,25
Philipines Azerbadjan		Interpretation Intensive interpretation Intensive	2 83 67	1 Two secessionist movements 0 Two secessionist	0 0,59	0 80,5 2 73,1	0 58 1 9	0	3 0,25 0,083333333333333 5 0,4166666666666 0,13888888888888888888888888888888888888		75 2 3,36 0,387	1 4 0,66666666666 0,22222222222 0 0 0	0	2 7,78	1 3 0,75 0,25 0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
Romania		interpretation Intensive interpretation	2 81	movements 1	2 0,3	1 50,8	1 83	1	8 0,66666666666 0,22222222222222			0 2 0,333333333333 0,1111111111111		2 6,11	1 4 0,666666666666 0,2222222222222
India		Intensive interpretation	1 00	Multiple proto- states, multiple secessionist movements			1 66	0	3 0,3 0,1			1 4 0,66666666666 0,222222222222		2 7,22	0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
	AP, CP 4,44 NP, AAP, CP 3,33	Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	1 89	2	2 0,37	1 77,1 1 69,6	1 27	0	7 0,583333333333 0,1944444444444 5 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666		2,359 1,666	1 0,25 0,0833333333333333333333333333333333333	0	2 4,44 (0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
	AAP, CP 3,89 AAP, CP 4,17	Intensive interpretationIntensive interpretation	1 82 1 76	1 Two secessionist movements	0 0,68	0 89,7 1 75,0	03717	0	2 0,166666666666 0,05555555555555555555555555		0,744	1 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666		2 3,33 (0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
Saudia Arabia		5 Intensive interpretation	2			1 67,5	1 8	0	6 0,6 0,2			1 0,16666666666 0,05555555555	0 2021, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015	0 2,22	0 0 0
-		7 Intensive interpretation 3 Intensive interpretation	2 70 1 71	1 One secessionist movement 1 Multiple secessionist	0 0,36	2 84,5 1 93,8	0 40 0 29	0	6 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666		1,3	0 1 0,25 0,0833333333333333333333333333333333333	0	2 5,56 6,11	0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
Egypt Zimbabwe	,	5 Intensive interpretation	2 96	movements 2	2 0,18	1 83,6	0 18	0	7 0,583333333333 0,19444444444444		37 1 1,212 2,813	0 2 0,33333333333 0,1111111111111		0 3,33	0 0 0 0
		7 Intensive interpretation 6 Intensive interpretation	2 86	2	2 0,32 2 0,13	1 97,8 2 91,3	0 28 0 43	0	8 0,666666666666 0,22222222222222		3,187	1 0,25 0,0833333333333333333333333333333333333		2 3,89 6,67	0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
		7 Intensive interpretation 9 Intensive interpretation	2 85	2	2 0,04 2 0,32	2 68,2 1 72,2	1 56	0	9 0,75 0,25 6 0,5 0,16666666666666		2,256 26 0 2,387	1 2 0,5 0,1666666666666 1 0,16666666666666666 0,055555555555555555555555555555555555	55	2 7,22	1 3 0,75 0,25 0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
Albania Uganda	AAP 4,17 NP, AAP, CP 3,50	7 Intensive interpretation O Intensive	2 43	One proto-state,	0 0,21 0 0,36	1 56,7 1 92,1	1 67 0 35	0	6 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666	Rome 1 ICJ, Rome 2	1,809 2,818	0 1 0,25 0,0833333333333333333333333333333333333	1 2012, 2000	2 4,44 0 0 3,89	0 3 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
Ethiopia	AAP, CP 3,89	Interpretation Intensive interpretation	2 42	two secessionist movements 0 Multiple protostates, multiple	0 0,51	0 99,3	0 21	0	2 0,166666666666 0,05555555555555555555555555	0	2,529	1 0,25 0,08333333333	33	2 6,11	1 3 0,75 0,25
Rwanda	NP, AAP, CP 2,83	3 Intensive interpretation	2	secessionist movements	2 0	2 83,7	0 23	0	6 0,6 0,2	0	2,203	1 0,25 0,08333333333	2013, 2012, 2001, 2000	0 2,78	0 0 0
		7 Intensive interpretation O Intensive interpretation	2 83	1 Multiple proto-	2 0,65 0 0,83	0 90,5 0 97,2	0 30 0 43	0	4 0,4 0,1333333333333333333333333333333333333		2,195	1 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666	25	2 5,00 0	0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
Morocco	CP 2,78	Interpretation Intensive interpretation	2 69	states, two secessionist movements One proto-state, one secessionist	0 0,44	1 70,1	1 37	0	4 0,33333333333 0,111111111111111	0 67,	2 2,115	1 3 0,5 0,166666666666	2018, 2017, 2016, 2015	0 5,56	0 0 0
,		interpretation Intensive interpretation	2 97	one secessionist movement 2	2 0,35	1 94,3	0 10	0	7 0,583333333333 0,194444444444444		3,749	2 2 0,5 0,16666666666	66	2 3,33	0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666
	AAP, CP 3,89	Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	277284	1	2 0,58	0 69,8 2 67,0	1 70 1 54	0	8 0,666666666666 0,2222222222222222222222		1,719 2,868	0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666	2021, 2020, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014,	2 5,56 0 0 6,11	0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
Hungary	5,00	O Intensive interpretation		1	2 0,15	2 50,8	1 66	0	8 0,66666666666 0,22222222222222			0 2 0,33333333333 0,111111111111 2 5 0,83333333333 0,277777777777	2012, 2008, 2005	2 5,00	0 3 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
Chile Kazakhstan	CP 3,61	Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	2 71 2 68	0	2 0,19 2 0,6	1 43,2 0 59,5	1 94 1 23	0	9 0,75 0,25 5 0,416666666666 0,138888888888888	Rome 1 69,5	61 0 2,029	2 5 0,8333333333333333333333333333333333333	55	2 5,56 0	0 3 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
		Intensive interpretation Intensive interpretation	2 66 2 66	0 Two secessionist movements	0 0,48 2 0,67	1 71,8 0 73,4	1 58 1 66	0	4 0,333333333333 0,1111111111111111111111		2,973 1,683	1 3 0,75 0,2 0 1 0,25 0,0833333333333333333333333333333333333	33	2 5,56 6,11	0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
Myanmar	AAP, CP 2,50	Interpretation Intensive interpretation	2 56	0 Two proto-states, multiple secessionist movements	0 0,49	1 100,0	0 9	0	3 0,25 0,083333333333333	0	0,814	0 0		2 1,67	0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
Nicaragua Indonesia	4,17	1 Intensive interpretation 7 Intensive	2 48	0 Multiple	2 0,09 0 0,65	2 77,7 0 66,6	1 19 1 58	0	7 0,583333333333 0,19444444444444 3 0,25 0,08333333333333		0,45 59 1 3,586	0 1 0,25 0,083333333333 2 0,5 0,166666666666		2 3,33 0	0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
		interpretation Intensive interpretation	2 42	secessionist movements	2 0,51	0 77,5	1 49	0	5 0,416666666666 0,13888888888888888888888888888888888888		1,511	0 1 0,25 0,083333333333		2 3,89	0 2 0,5 0,1666666666666666666666666666666666666
Example of a supranational demos	ND AAD CD					Thomas	1 71			There are 22 ELL	96		66 There are 22 EU	2 14	
European Union	NF, AAP, CP 4,83	3 Intensive interpretation	O The European Union's citizens does, comparatively to other demoi, to a	0 The choice made by the United Kingdom to leave the European Union as well as	O See discussion in thesis 5.1.8.	There are 23 EU-countries in the dataset. Out of those do 14 score two and nine	1 There are 23 EU-countries in the dataset. Out of those do 14 score two; eight score			There are 23 EU- countries in the dataset. Out of those do 19 score two and four score	I do not consider the method to aggregate the states scores to EU level to be a	2 0,5 0,16666666666	There are 23 EU- countries in the dataset. Out of those do five score two and	I do not consider the method to aggregate the states scores to EU level to be a	3 0,75 0,25
			low extent identify as European. Only 56 percent	the articulated euroscepticism existing in multitude of the		score one. Thus, approximately 61% scores two, which is not	one; and one score zero. Thus, approximately 61% scores two,			one.Thus, approximately 83 percent scores two, which is not	good indicator for the Union as a whole for this indicator, since		twelve score one. Thus, approximately 22 percent scores	good indicator for the Union as a whole for this indicator, since	
			identifies as European and 14 percent answer that they are not identifying as	Union's membership countries (De Vries 2018: 77-102) is		sufficient for two points (see 5.2.4 in the thesis). One points is given.	which is not sufficient for two points (see 5.2.4 in the thesis). Approximately 96			sufficient for two points (see 5.2.4 in the thesis). One points is given.	the methods used for producing the data are to a great extent context specific. Another		two, which is not sufficient for two points (see 5.2.4 in the thesis). Approximately 74	the methods used for producing the data are to a great extent context specific. Another	
			European (Becuwe – Baneth 2021: 74). Considering the	sufficient to be compared to having at least to secessionist			percent scores one or higher. One points is given.				comparable comparable indicator is needed.		percent score 1 or higher, which is sufficient for one point.	comparable comparable indicator is needed.	
			European identity's competitive position against the national ones,	movements. Hence, the EU scores zero point on the indicator.											
			it would be reasonable to put the limits a bit lower. Still, the												
			identification is not nearly as strong as the national ones												
Example of a secessionist			given points, and a zero should be given.												
secessionist demos Catalonia	AAP and CP are	For this indicator I lack a good substitute, but it is	Approximately 40 percent consider themselves to be	1 Considering that the Catalan	1 The question for the secessionist	2		1 See reasoning in thesis 5.1.7.	2 6 0,75						
	not applicable (see 5.2.5; 5.2.5 in the thesis).	substitute, but it is somewhat measured bu the indicator for 5.1.4. I encourage others	themselves to be either only Catalan, or more Catalan than Spanish.	secessionist movement is an opposition to the Spanish national identity, and that	case is rather that of cultural heterogeneity between the main political unit and										
		to develop a standardised way to measure this.	However, an equally big share consider themselves to be	the opposition is quite strong (as reasoned in thesis 5.1.7) point(s)	the secessionist one. The indicator is supposed to measure the level										
			equally Spanish and Catalan (Statista 2022). Despite a substantial	should be given. Opposition to the national identity is something	of how the distinct culture is and what historical and										
			substantial proportion identifying as Catalan (> 80%), about ten percept	supporting the secessionist case. However, as reasoned in the dataset 5.1.2 for	future ties it has. As explained by McRoberts (2022: 3-20), Catalonia has its own										
			identifies more as Spanish. This should, interpreted as the	the Catalonian case, the identification as Catalan is not	culture, cleary distinct from the rest of Spain with its own cultural										
			other cases, be translated to scoring of 1.	conclusive. Therefore, it appears reasonable to give Catalonia one point on this indicator; the	expressions. This should be sufficient to score two on the indicator (with the										
				Catalonia one point on this indicator; the movement poses a strong opposition to the national	reasoning about comparability in mind found 5.1.7 in the thesis.										
				to the national identity, but is not entirely convincing in constructing its own identity.											
				constructing its own identity.											

Appendix 2

				es (Falling)				
Demos	Index Score	NP Harmonisation (quota multiplied with 1/3)	NP-Score	AAP Harmonisation (quota multiplied with 1/3)	AAP-Score	CP Harmonisation (quota multiplied with 1/3)	CP-Score	
Norway	10,00	0,33	3,33	0,33	3,33	0,33	3,33	
Finland	10,00	0,33	3,33	0,33	3,33	0,33	3,33	
Sweden	9,72	0,31	3,06	0,33	3,33	0,33	3,33	
Denmark	9,44	0,33	3,33	0,33	3,33	0,28	2,78	
Portugal	9,17	0,25	2,50	0,39	3,89	0,28	2,78	
Germany	8,89	0,28	2,78	0,33	3,33	0,28	2,78	
celand	8,61	0,33	3,33	0,25	2,50	0,28	2,78	
New Zealand	8,61	0,25	2,50	0,28	2,78	0,33	3,33	
Estonia	8,61	0,31	3,06	0,33	3,33	0,22	2,22	
Netherlands	8,33	0,22	2,22	0,33	3,33	0,28	2,78	
Uruguay	8,33	0,33	3,33	0,25	2,50	0,25	2,50	
Austria	8,06	0,31	3,06	0,22	2,22	0,28	2,78	
United Kingdom	8,06	0,19	1,94	0,33	3,33	0,28	2,78	
Switzerland	7,78	0,28	2,78	0,28	2,78	0,22	2,22	
Australia	7,50	0,25	2,50	0,22	2,22	0,28	2,78	
Japan	7,50	0,31	3,06	0,22	2,22	0,22	2,22	
Catalonia	7,50		7,50					
Spain	7,22	0,17	1,67	0,28	2,78	0,28	2,78	
Slovenia	7,22	0,33	3,33	0,17	1,67	0,22	2,22	
Czech Republic	6,94	0,31	3,06	0,17	1,67	0,22	2,22	
Lithuania	6,94	0,25	2,50	0,28	2,78	0,17	1,67	
Chile	6,94	0,25	2,50	0,28	2,78	0,17	1,67	
Canada	6,94	0,19	1,94	0,17	1,67	0,33	3,33	
taly	6,94	0,19	1,94	0,28	2,78	0,22	2,22	
Taiwan	6,83	0,27	2,67	0,17	1,67	0,25	2,50	
Гunisia	6,67	0,25	2,50	0,17	1,67	0,25	2,50	
Greece	6,67	0,22	2,22	0,22	2,22	0,22	2,22	
Belgium	6,44	0,20		0,22	2,22	0,22	2,22	
Latvia	6,39	0,19		0,28	2,78	0,17	1,67	
Slovakia	6,39	0,31	3,06	0,22	2,22	0,11	1,11	
Bulgaria	6,39	0,25	2,50	0,22	2,22	0,17	1,67	
Colombia	6,39	0,22	2,22	0,17	1,67	0,25	2,50	
France	6,39	0,19		0,22	2,22	0,22	2,22	
srael	6,11	0,17	1,67	0,17	1,67	0,28	2,78	
South Korea	6,11	0,28	2,78	0,17	1,11	0,22	2,70	
Brazil	6,11	0,22	2,22	0,11	1,11	0,28	2,78	
United States	5,83	0,14		0,11	1,11	0,33	3,33	
USA)	3,63	0,14	1,37	0,11	1,11	0,33	3,33	
Croatia	5,83	0,19	1,94	0,22	2,22	0,17	1,67	
South Africa	5,78	0,13	1,33	0,17	1,67	0,28	2,78	
Poland	5,56	0,28	2,78	0,11	1,11	0,17	1,67	
Argentina	5,56	0,22	2,22	0,11	1,11	0,22	2,22	
Philipines	5,56	0,08	0,83	0,22	2,22	0,25	2,50	
Romania	5,56	0,22	2,22	0,11	1,11	0,22	2,22	
Lebanon	5,56	0,22	2,22	0,08	0,83	0,25	2,50	
North Macedonia	5,28	0,14		0,17	1,67	0,22	2,22	
Mexico	5,28	0,14		0,17	1,67	0,22	2,22	
Kenya	5,28	0,11	1,11	0,17	1,67	0,25	2,50	
 Libya	5,28	0,19		0,17	1,67	0,17	1,67	
Georgia	5,28	0,11	1,11	0,25	2,50	0,17	1,67	
Mongolia	5,28	0,19		0,08	0,83	0,25	2,50	
Ecuador	5,28	0,19		0,08	0,83	0,25	2,50	
Peru	5,00		1,67	0,17	1,67	0,17	1,67	
Nigeria	5,00			0,25	2,50		1,67	
Hungary	5,00		2,22	0,11	1,11	0,17	1,67	
India								
	4,89	0,10	1,00	0,22	2,22	0,17	1,67 2 50	
European Union	4,83		0,67	0,17	1,67	0,25	2,50	
Bolivia	4,72	0,14		0,08	0,83	0,25	2,50	
Burkina Faso	4,67	0,13	1,33	0,17	1,67	0,17	1,67	
Venezuela	4,44	0,19		0,08	0,83	0,17	1,67	
Kyrgyzstan	4,44	0,19		0,08	0,83	0,17	1,67	
Nicaragua	4,44	0,19	1,94	0,08	0,83	0,17	1,67	
Fhailand	4,17	0,17	1,67	0,00	0,00	0,25	2,50	
Tajikistan	4,17	0,17	1,67	0,08	0,83	0,17	1,67	
Bangladesh	4,17	0,17	1,67	0,08	0,83	0,17	1,67	
Zimbabwe	4,17	0,17	1,67	0,08	0,83	0,17	1,67	
Albania	4,17	0,17	1,67	0,08	0,83	0,17	1,67	
ndonesia	4,17	0,08	0,83	0,17	1,67	0,17	1,67	
Jkraine	4,17	0,11	1,11	0,08	0,83	0,22	2,22	
Vietnam	3,89	0,17	1,67	0,06	0,56	0,17	1,67	
Pakistan	3,89	0,06	0,56	0,17	1,67	0,17	1,67	
Algeria	3,89	0,17	1,67	0,06	0,56	0,17	1,67	
Ethiopia	3,89	0,06	0,56	0,08	0,83	0,25	2,50	
Armenia	3,89	0,22	2,22	0,08	0,83	0,08	0,83	
Guatemala	3,89	0,14	1,39	0,08	0,83	0,17	1,67	
Hong Kong	3,67	0,20	2,00	0,00	0,00	0,17	1,67	
Kazakhstan	3,61	0,14		0,06	0,56	0,17	1,67	
J ganda	3,50	0,10		0,25	2,50	0,00	0,00	
Uzbekistan	3,33	0,17	1,67	0,00	0,00	0,17	1,67	
raq	3,33	0,08	0,83	0,00	0,00	0,17	2,50	
Belarus	3,06	0,08		0,00	0,00	0,23	1,67	
Azerbadjan	3,06	0,14	1,39	0,00	0,00	0,17	1,67	
Egypt	3,06	0,19		0,11	1,11	0,00	0,00	
Rwanda	2,83	0,20			0,83	0,00	0,00	
China	2,78	0,17	1,67	0,00			1,11	
Morocco	2,78	0,11	1,11	0,17	1,67	0,00	0,00	
Saudia Arabia	2,56				0,56	0,00	0,00	
Myanmar	2,50	0,08	0,83	0,00	0,00	0,17	1,67	
Russia	1,94	0,08	0,83	0,00	0,00	0,11	1,11	

