Charting a Course for the Future: An Analysis of the Level of Climate-Security Integration in the EU's Development Cooperation

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"The world will not be destroyed by those who do evil, but by those who watch them without doing anything." — **Albert Einstein**

Abstract

Climate-related security risks (CRSR) have risen on the foreign policy agenda of the European Union (EU). As climate change accelerates, its impacts exacerbate existing social, economic, and environmental challenges within and between communities and increase the likelihood of states experiencing humanitarian crises and conflict. These so-called *climate-related security risks* (CRSR), or *climate-security*, include impacts on food, water and energy supplies, increased competition over natural resources, loss of livelihoods, climate-related natural disasters, and forced migration and displacement. The EU is among the most vocal proponents of the need to integrate climate-related security risks in its development cooperation, but previous research has shown ambiguous results on the level of climate-security integration into the EU's development cooperation. More importantly, existing literature has not analyzed the level of climate-security policy integration in relation to the level of risk a country is exposed to. By using a qualitative content analysis of EU documents, this thesis analyzes the level of policy integration of climate-security into the EU's development cooperation throughout the previous and current policy cycles, in relation to the level of risk for experiencing humanitarian crisis. This study has selected 9 different countries in Africa with differences in their levels of risk throughout the years. The findings in this study indicate that the EU has considerably improved the policy integration of climate-security into its development cooperation at all stages of the policy cycle. However, this has not been in relation to the changes in risk levels of the respective countries. In addition, these improvements have not been systematic across the different stages of the policy cycles nor across the different countries.

Key words: climate-security, climate change, development cooperation, European Union, policy integration.

Word Count: 19.831

List of Abbreviations

AAP	Annual Action Plans
AD	Action Documents
CAR	Central African Republic
CAS	Conflict Analysis Screening
CEP	Country Environmental Profile
COP	United Nations Climate Change Conference Of the Parties
CPI	Climate Policy Integration
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CRA	Climate Risk Assessment
CRSR	climate-related security risks
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DG ECHO	Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for Development Cooperation
DG INTPA	Directorate-General for International Partnerships
Dir.ISP	Directorate for the Integrated Approach to Security and Peace
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EDF	European Development Fund
EEA	European Environmental Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
EFSD	European Fund for Sustainable Development
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
EPI	Environmental Policy Integration
EU	European Union
EWS	Early-warning system
UK FCDO	United Kingdom's Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office
GHG	greenhouse gas emissions
HEPI	Horizontal Environmental Policy Integration
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
INFORM	Index For Risk Management
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MFF	Multi-annual Financial Framework
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme
NDICI-GE	Neighbourhood, Development, International Cooperation Instrument-Global Europe
NIP	National Indicative Programme
PI	Partnership Instrument
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SEA	Strategic Environmental Assessment

SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VEPI	Vertical Environmental Policy Integration
WPF	World Food Programme

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Climate-related security risks (CRSR) have risen on the foreign policy agenda of the European Union (EU). As climate change accelerates, its impacts exacerbate existing social, economic, and environmental challenges within and between communities. If not addressed correctly, these impacts increase the likelihood of states experiencing conflicts and humanitarian crises (IPCC, 2022). These so-called *climate-related security risks* (CRSR), or *climate-security*, include impacts on food, water and energy supplies, increased competition over natural resources, loss of livelihoods, climate-related natural disasters, and forced migration and displacement (UNEP, 2022). If the current climate change projections continue, it is expected that by 2050 over 3.5 billion people could suffer from food insecurity and over one billion people will be at threat of being displaced due to climate-related security risks (IEP, 2020).

Especially in regions that are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, such as the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, and Central and South Asia, climate change can have far-reaching impacts on human- and state security (Barnett and Adger, 2007; Goldstone, 2018). In addition, the risks are even greater in countries where ongoing conflicts have undermined the capacity of institutions and communities to absorb the additional climate-related stresses or adapt to the changing environment, resulting in compounding overall risk and risks cascading across sectors and regions (IPCC, 2022). In the last decade, a growing number of countries have experienced extreme weather events such as long-lasting droughts and excessive floods, causing severe food insecurity and fueling resource competition (European External Action Service (EEAS), 2021). Globally, climate-related disasters almost tripled compared to the 1980s, resulting in a record amount of internally displaced people and humanitarian assistance needed (OCHA, 2022). Climate-related security risks are at the core of what many communities view as their most pressing human security concern, as well as strong factors that contribute to persistent conflict and competition (Gaston et al., 2023). However, even though the impacts of climate change are considered as

important drivers of conflict and insecurity, often development cooperation does not address these risks (UNEP, 2022). The growing climate emergencies require significant investments into climate change resilience and adaptation practices, if the international community wishes to stop climate change from continuing to be a key driver of insecurity and humanitarian crisis (OCHA, 2022). However, without a coherent and integrated response that includes climate-security, development programmes do little to decrease the level of vulnerability to climate change and undermine their own objectives in the long run. Hence, in order to be effective and sustainable, international development cooperation needs to address the multidimensional nature of the challenges and effectively integrate climate-security across the different development activities.

As one of the world's largest development donors, the European Union has proclaimed itself as a global actor contributing to international peace, stability and security (EEAS, 2016). In recent years, the EU has redirected its efforts towards crisis prevention, under the notion that preventing crises is more efficient and effective than engaging with crises after they break out (EEAS, 2016, p. 29). In this role, the EU is also among the most vocal proponents of the need to integrate climate-related security risks in development cooperation and has taken a leadership role in putting the topic on top of the international agenda (Bremberg and Mobjörk, 2018). Yet, although the EU has put climate-related security risks at the center of its development cooperation discourse, the academic literature shows ambiguous results when it comes to the actual level of policy integration of climate-security. For example, whereas a wide variety of international scholars and practitioners highlight that the EU is underperforming when it comes to tackling climate-related security risks (Michel, 2021; Youngs, 2015; Sonnsjö and Bremberg, 2016; Zwolski and Kaunert, 2011), other scholars find that the EU has integrated climate-security in a limited fashion (Brown, Le More, and Raasteen, 2020), or even find that the EU has harmonized climate change adaptation practices throughout its development cooperation (De Roeck, Orbie and Delputte, 2018). The ambiguity surrounding the integration of climate-security has also been recognized by the EU, which has tried

to bridge the gap between discourse and practice over the years by adopting numerous policy tools, working documents and communications on climate-related security risks (Council of the EU 2018; Council of the EU, 2019; Council of the EU, 2020; European Commission, 2021a). Additionally, the EU has increased its spending target on climate change mitigation and adaptation to 30% in the current 2021-2027 *Multi-annual Financial Framework* (MFF), as compared to 20% in the 2014-2020 MFF policy cycle (Regulation 2020/2093). However, it remains unclear whether the increased EU policy tools and resources available to address climate-related security risks have resulted in improved policy outcomes.

More importantly, considering the EU's focus on crisis prevention, it is important to assess the level of climate-security integration in relation to a respective country's level of risk for experiencing future crisis, since this is an important indicator for what the EU's development cooperation should focus on. Moreover, climate-related security risks are context-specific and dependent on the climate-vulnerability of a respective country, thereby making the level of risk for experiencing future crisis an important indicator for the type and amount of development support a country should receive. One can therefore expect that a higher level of risk should be associated with the EU paying more attention to climate-related security risks in that respective country. However, the existing literature on the topic does not analyze the EU's efforts to address climate-security in relation to the level of risk a respective country is exposed to. Nor has the existing literature focused on how the level of policy integration has developed over time. Given this, as well as the EU's improved policy tools and resources devoted to integrating climate-security, it is therefore an important exercise to take stock of how the EU has addressed climate-security in its development cooperation in relation to the level of risk a country is exposed to. By using the Global INFORM Risk database, a global indicator-based analysis that combines hazards, exposure, vulnerability and lack of coping capacity indicators to estimate the risk for experiencing future humanitarian crises (Thow et al., 2022), this thesis analyzes how the level of policy integration of

climate-security of the EU has evolved throughout the previous 2014-2020 and the current 2021-2027 MFF policy cycles in relation to the level of risk for experiencing humanitarian crisis. Thus, this thesis answers the following research question:

How has the level of policy integration of climate-security into the development cooperation of the European Union (EU) evolved in relation to a country's risk for experiencing a future humanitarian crisis throughout the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 MFF policy cycles?

In answering this research question, this thesis not only provides clarity on the existing ambiguity surrounding the level of policy integration of climate-security, it also provides an assessment on whether the EU's efforts to integrate climate-security have improved over time. In particular, this study can help in drawing conclusions on whether changes in the level of risk correspond with higher or lower levels of climate-security integration. At the same time, this study can help in assessing whether the EU's level of integration of climate-security in its development cooperation corresponds with reduced levels of risk for the respective countries. This, in turn, can be a strong indication on whether the integration of climate-security actually leads to improved impacts, e.g. whether climate-security policy integration is successful in achieving climate-resilience. In doing so, this study can draw conclusions on whether the EU's increased discourse on the topic has actually resulted in improved outcomes, or in other words, whether the EU has successfully bridged the gap between theory and practice. Lastly, given the importance of addressing climate-related security risks, this thesis can help inform policy makers and practitioners in improving their practices on integrating climate-security.

This thesis is build up as follows. First, in order to effectively answer the research question, it is important to provide the reader with the conceptual points of departure for this thesis. The

conceptual framework explains the relationship between climate change and security and helps inform the reader on how to address the subject area as well as on how to interpret the security risks posed by climate change. Following this is a theoretical framework build upon the theories of Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) and Climate Policy Integration (CPI), which have been chosen to effectively analyze to what extent the EU has integrated climate-related security risks in its development cooperation. In the methodology section, the chosen method, research design and case selection are explained. The qualitative content analysis approach used in this thesis is further operationalized through an adapted analytical framework. This adaptation was necessary given the more detailed focus and nature of climate-related security risks. Subsequently, in the results section, the key findings are presented per selected policy cycle stage as well as per selected case. After the analysis, this thesis presents a discussion section detailing some of the key implications of the findings. Lastly, the conclusion summarizes the findings of this study, as well as discussing the limitations of the research and proposing relevant avenues for future research.

Chapter 2: Theory

2.1 Conceptual Framework

As touched upon in the introduction, it is important to provide the reader with the conceptual points of departure in this thesis in order to have a solid understanding on how to interpret the security risks posed by climate change.

2.1.1 Understanding Climate-related Security Risks

All of the conceptualizations used in this thesis are taken from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), since all UN countries as well as the EU have agreed to these definitions and these conceptualizations commonly inform EU policy makers. It is also the IPCC's risk-based approach to climate change that is mostly fitting to adequately understand the negative effects posed by climate change, since it allows us to recognize the complex interdependencies that are inherently part of the multifaceted character of climate change (Bremberg, 2016, p. 4). In taking this approach, it is important to stress that climate change must not be seen as predominantly external in its cause, but rather exposes risks that are inherent in modern societies that lead to situations of insecurity (Bremberg, 2016, p. 4). As such, the impacts of climate change on states and societies are not simply dependent on the scale and magnitude of climate change, but rather on the *vulnerabilities* and *adaptive capacities* within societies to certain climate *hazards* (IPCC, 2022). In this sense, the *vulnerability* of a society relates to the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected and the *adaptive capacity* consists of the ability of systems, institutions, humans and other organisms to adjust to actual or expected climate effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities (IPCC, 2022, p. 2927 & 2899). Continuing, *hazards* are natural or human-induced physical events or trends that may cause loss of life, health impacts, as well as damage and loss to

property, infrastructure, livelihoods, service provisions, ecosystems and environmental resources (IPCC, 2022, p. 2911). Examples of climate hazards include extreme weather events such as excessive droughts, floods, and tropical storms. The level of exposure to these climate hazards, together with the differences in vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities of people and societies, then translates to higher or lower levels of *security* risks. The concept of security, as used by the IPCC, is centered around human security, referring to a condition that is met when the vital core of human lives is protected, and when people have the freedom and capacity to live with dignity (IPCC, 2022, p. 2911). Furthermore, the IPCC defines climate change as "a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persist for an extended period, typically decades or longer" (IPCC, 2022, p. 2902). To simplify, climate change refers to any change in biophysical conditions that are or will be affected by a change in the state of the climate or by variations in the mean state of the climate (CNA, 2007; Schubert, 2007).

2.1.2 Illustrating Climate-related Security Risks

Taking the aforementioned concepts together, one can understand climate-related security risks as:

> "the potential for adverse consequences for human or ecological systems, resulting from the dynamics between climate-related hazards with the exposure and vulnerability of the affected human or ecological system" (IPCC, 2022, p. 2921).

Climate-related security risks can encompass a wide variety of risks, each dependent on context-specific vulnerabilities, exposures, and adaptive capacities. One of the most severe security risks is water scarcity, which has been described as one of the main causes for future wars (Wolf, 2007; Jägerskog et al., 2015; Steinbruner, Stern, and Husbands, 2013). Especially in regions that already

experience extreme water shortages throughout the year, such as the Sahel, water stress will have severe implications for human security (Bremberg, 2016). In these regions, communities are often dependent on rain-fed agriculture in dry or semi-dry seasons. Studies have shown that due to changes in the climate, regions with higher variability in precipitation (for example, regions with wet and dry seasons), will experience even higher variability, leading to extended dry periods or increased rainfall in shorter time periods (Konapala et al., 2020; Pascale et al., 2015; Zeng et al., 2014). Often, these regions lack the efficient resources to capture sufficient rainfall in the wet season or to make use of groundwater reservoir, in order to provide water during the dry season. Besides creating profound implications for the available drinking water and sanitation, this will influence entire ecosystems, increase soil erosion, create floods, and limit agricultural development (IPCC, 2022, p. 551-668). At the same time, droughts and floods, as well as heath wave-induced wildfires contribute to reduced food availability and increased food prices, in turn threatening food security, nutrition, and livelihoods (IPCC, 2022). Moreover, droughts, floods or lack of drinking water will not only increase food insecurity, but it might also trigger people to migrate to regions with higher availabilities in water and food. This, subsequently, increases competition over the scarcer resources available in other regions. Additionally, forced migration potentially fuels cultural or ethnic tensions between communities when, for example, farmers expand to areas reserved for pasture or vice-versa when pastoralist migrate to farmland in search pasture (Zografos et al., 2014; Bremberg, 2016). Whether this water and food scarcity subsequently *directly* influences violent conflict is debatable (e.g. Wolf, 2007; Steinbruner et al., 2013), but scholars have shown that at a community level water disputes have had particularly destabilizing effects (Raleigh and Urdal, 2007; Von Uexkull et al., 2016; Koubi, 2019). Furthermore, and perhaps most impactful, climate change is leading to changes in the frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration, and timing of extreme weather and climate events, and can result in unprecedented impacts to human and state security (IPCC, 2022). Particularly sudden shocks, such as cyclones and wildfires, have immediate

consequences that significantly exposes vulnerabilities in societies (Bremberg, 2016). Similarly to water scarcity and food insecurity, there is little evidence to suggest that extreme weather events directly influence violent conflict (Adger et al., 2014). However, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that extreme weather events exacerbate existing tensions and grievances within and between societies (e.g. Harris et al., 2013; Walch, 2016; Dabelko et al., 2013).

In sum, a changing climate is resulting in increased seasonal variation, increasingly leading to longer periods of droughts or intensifying rain seasons. At the same time, it is increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as tropical storms and heatwaves, exposing significant vulnerabilities. Lack of adaptive capacities of people and societies is resulting in severe water scarcity and food insecurity, and can cause significant humanitarian crises. This, in turn, can trigger large migration flows which can fuel competition for resources as well as exacerbate communal tensions in neighboring regions. Climate change is thus posing significant risks to human security, which states and international organizations have to address in their development cooperation in order to not undermine the development objectives in the long run.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

In order to assess the level of integration of certain policy objectives into other sectoral policies, this thesis builds upon the theories of Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) and Climate Policy Integration (CPI). Both theories emerged as a response to increased public concerns about the deteriorating state of the environment and the increased risks posed by climate change. These theories are chosen based on their thematic applicability to the subject area, namely the climate, as well as based on their analytical functionality in assessing the level of policy integration. The following section goes into the respective concepts, discussing their conceptual, analytical and operational differences, as well as the implications for EU policy making.

2.2.1 Environmental Policy Integration (EPI)

The concept of Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) refers to the incorporation of environmental concerns into other sectoral policies with the goal to improve policy coherence and better address environmental problems (Lafferty and Hovden, 2003, 1; Van Oosten et al., 2018, 63). As a cross-cutting issue, environmental concerns never really had a clear institutional home within governments and international organizations, which has made its integration into policy-making a rather challenging process (Peters, 1998). As such, it is also difficult to pin down the conceptual origin of EPI, which started to emerge throughout the 1980s when non-environmental policy areas increasingly started to consider environmental concerns in international agreements (IUCN, 1980; McCormick, 1987). It was particularly the UN's Brundtland Report in 1987, which laid out the sustainable development framework, that enabled EPI to gain a prominent role in international policy making (Lafferty and Hovden, 2003). Within the EU, the idea of integrating environmental concerns into general policy-making emerged slightly earlier. In the 1973's Environmental Action Plan the European Community highlighted that the environment cannot be considered as a solely external factor and that the environment is essential for human progress. Continuing, the plan emphasizes that environmental effects *must* be considered in any measure that is adopted or contemplated at national or Community level (Commission of the European Communities, 1973, title 2). Subsequently, in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, the EU reiterated that environmental concerns *must* be integrated into other policy sectors (European Union, 1992), and in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the principle of integrating environmental considerations is even given a constitutional basis (European Union, 2002, Art. 6), showing the increased political commitment of the EU to integrate environmental concerns.

The increased political commitment, however, did not correspond with increased legal clarity or enforceability of the principle. Part of the lack of clarity around EPI comes from the

confusion related to the principle of sustainable development. Since the concepts emerged simultaneously, there was confusion within governments and international organizations around what should actually be integrated into different policy sectors: environmental objectives or sustainable development (Collier, 1994; Lenschow, 2002; Adelle and Russel, 2013). Moreover, there was also a lack of clarity on the question of what 'integration' in general actually entails. Eggenberger and Partidario (2000), for example, highlight five different levels of integration: *substantive, methodological, procedural, institutional* and *policy*. Relating this to the practices of EPI, one can distinguish between integration in terms of *policy outputs* or integration in terms of *policy process*, with both forms having their individual practical implications relating to how EPI should be achieved (Eggenberger and Partidario, 2000, p. 204). Especially when faced with conflicting (and usually economic) objectives, environmental concerns often tend to come second place (Liberatore, 1997; Jordan and Lenschow, 2010). Liberatore (1997) emphasizes the importance of giving a certain weight or importance to certain policy objectives, because if the conflicting objectives are given similar weight, the output will be a 'diluted' rather than an integrated policy (1997, p. 119). However, giving weight to certain policy objectives requires inter-departmental bargaining between the different sectoral policy makers, which can often result in 'layering', in which new environmental demands are placed on top of existing policy processes (Hertin and Berkhout, 2001 and 2003). Additionally, the sectoral institutional setting of governments and international organizations often results in institutional fragmentation in which cross-cutting issues such as the environment are difficult to integrate (Jordan and Lenschow, 2008). All in all, this can result in a suboptimal or even inefficient policy outcome, rather than a strongly integrated environmental policy (Hertin and Berkhout, 2001 and 2003).

In trying to provide procedural clarity on how much weight should be given to environmental objectives, Lafferty and Hovden (2003) make a strong normative claim for the superiority of environmental goals. They argue that the entire goal of EPI is, at the very least, to

avoid the situation in which environmental concerns become subsidiary to other objectives, and in light of the goal of sustainable development, to ensure that environmental objectives become superior to other societal objectives (Lafferty and Hovden, 2003, p. 13). They argue that the crucial aspect of EPI is its relative importance vis-a-vis other policy sectors, claiming that environmental policy objectives should not *just* be brought into other non-environmental policy sectors, but rather that the environmental objectives should be given *'principled priority'* over other objectives. Environmental policy objectives cannot simply be balanced against other policy objectives when they are in conflict, since we are facing 'potentially irreversible damage to life-support system', and environmental concerns must therefore generally be considered a priority (Lafferty and Hovden, 2003, p. 10). Hence, a complete integration of environmental policy objectives entails prioritizing environmental objectives vis-a-vis other policy objectives. Importantly, Lafferty and Hovden distinguish between *vertical* and *horizontal* environmental policy integration. The vertical dimension (VEPI) relates to the extent to which a particular policy sector or governmental department has integrated environmental objectives as a central aspect among other policy objectives (Lafferty and Hovden, 2003, p. 12). This can for example, be exemplified by the way in which the EU's transport sector has increasingly started to include environmental objectives such as decarbonization into its general objectives (European Environmental Agency, 2022). Horizontal integration (HEPI), on the other hand, refers to the extent to which a central (higher) authority develops a cross-sectoral strategy for the integration of environmental objectives, which also includes substantive coordination and a willingness to prioritize among sectors (Lafferty and Hovden, 2003, p. 14). This can be exemplified by the creation of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy of 2001, which set out concrete objectives and actions across a wide range of policy sectors to improve synergies and reduce trade-offs to ensure a more integrated approach (European Commission, 2001, p. 5).

In sum, although there has been a gradually developing willingness to integrate environmental objectives more systematically across different policy sectors, the literature on EPI highlights substantially different interpretations of the concept which have resulted in significant challenges to effectively integrate environmental policy objectives across different policy sectors in practice.

2.2.2 Climate Policy Integration (CPI)

As opposed to EPI, the concept of CPI emerged as a response to the increased awareness of the impacts of climate change on societies and came to encompass a much more specific sector - the climate. Even so, it is the 'principled priority' EPI conceptualization by Lafferty and Hovden (2003) that many authors in the Climate Policy Integration (CPI) literature find their conceptual clarity (Nilsson and Nilsson, 2005; Ahmad, 2009; Mickwitz et al., 2009; Mickwitz and Kivimaa, 2007; Jordan and Lenschow, 2010). Compared to EPI, many authors simply substitute 'environment' with 'climate' to define CPI as a process of giving principled priority to climate objectives over other policy sectors (Nilsson and Nilsson, 2005; Ahmad, 2009; Mickwitz et al., 2009; Mickwitz and Kivimaa, 2007). In this sense, CPI can be seen as more of a specific component of EPI, instead of a completely different concept. In essence, climate change can be seen as an environmental concern, but it differs from the mostly geographically limited nature of environmental problems (Rietig, 2019). Additionally, CPI has often been linked to certain specific policy sectors, following Lafferty and Hovden's vertical policy integration, rather than with a 'whole-of-government' approach commonly more associated with environmental policy integration (Ahmad, 2009, p. 13). Hence, the CPI literature has narrowed down the scope of EPI not only by what it should encompass, namely climate policy objectives, but also in terms of what it should be integrated into (specific sectors, i.e. transport)(Adelle and Russel, 2013, p. 5). As a result, the CPI practice has commonly been more associated with certain specific sectors over others, particularly the transport sector (Eichhorst et al.,

2011), the energy sector (Knudsen, 2012; Dupont and Primova, 2011), and development cooperation (e.g., Gupta, 2010; Yamin, 2005; Klein et al., 2007). Importantly, Mickwitz et al. (2009) believe this specificity can help in providing clarity on the implementation of CPI, compared to the rather ambiguous concept of EPI. At the same time, the narrower and more tangible conceptualization of CPI has also been perceived in the literature as a weaker interpretation than the definition of EPI, resulting in a weaker normative underpinning of CPI (Adelle and Russel, 2013). This is exemplified by a stronger debate within the CPI literature as to whether climate objectives should be given principled priority, or whether emphasis should be put on pursuing synergies (e.g. Kok and De Coninck, 2007) and co-benefits (e.g. Kok et al., 2008) between possible trade-offs between climate, social and economic objectives. Additionally, Mickwitz and Kivimaa (2007) argue that the argument for principled priority for climate or environmental objectives can equally be applied to other cross-sectoral issues such as gender (2007, p. 71). There is thus less of a consensus in the CPI literature on the normative underpinnings of the concept.

Similarly to EPI, the principle of CPI can also be interpreted as integration in terms of the policy process, in which integration is achieved through the process of day-to-day policy making. However, as a cross-cutting issues, both environmental and climate change concerns struggle to successfully integrate due the institutional and sectoral fragmentation of many organizations (Kassim, 2003; Peters and Wright, 2001). Especially within the EU context, it is difficult to overcome working in such policy 'silos'. In reviewing the literature, it seems that the EPI principle has been far more successful at integrating in EU policy making than CPI (Jordan and Schout, 2006; Adelle and Russel, 2013). The EU has for example, created EPI mechanism relating to hierarchical instruments, bureaucratic rules and standard operating procedures (SOPs), staff training, specifications on tasks, and mission statements. In addition, the European Environmental Agency (EEA) has created checklists to evaluate the progress of EPI, including through trends in drivers and pressures, political commitments and administrative practices (Adelle and Russel, 2013,

p. 5). Contrary to this, CPI has received far less attention on how to effectively integrate climate concerns into policy making processes. Most of the attention has been diverted to climate change *mitigation* and *adaptation* capacities (see, e.g., Storbjörk and Hedrén, 2011; Rietig, 2019), but this has mainly been used in the context of international development cooperation (Kok et al., 2008). Part of the difficulty of integrating climate change as a process lies of course in the difficulty in grasping what climate change actually entails. As such, most of the CPI literature has focussed on the integrating climate change concerns as a policy *output*.

Many authors agree that the general idea of policy integration should not only be limited to bureaucratic institutions, but should actually have a real-world impact (e.g. Jordan and Lenschow, 2010; Mickwitz and Kivimaa 2007). It can, however, be difficult to measure the (causal) impact of EPI and CPI, since it often relates to the general state of the environment (e.g. biodiversity) or the prevention of certain climate change-induced events (e.g. preventing extreme droughts or floods). Nonetheless, the literature arguably believes CPI outcomes to be easier measurable than EPI outcomes, resulting in CPI outcomes to be more easily included into policy evaluation frameworks (e.g. Mickwitz and Kivimaa, 2007, Mickwitz et al., 2009), in particular by focusing on for example greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and energy consumption (Adelle and Russel, 2013). This is partly due to the fact that policy proposals have a quite clear structure in the sense that inputs need to be translated into outputs and outputs in turn into outcomes. The EU's 20% and 30% spending targets on climate change can, for example, be seen as a CPI policy output that can be easily measured (in terms of the impacts and indicators of each of the additional climate change activities). The aforementioned EPI mechanisms (SOPs, staff training, mission statements etc.), on the other hand, are far more difficult to measure in terms of impact. Nonetheless, the development of CPI at the EU level is ultimately considered to be incremental (Rietig, 2019). This ultimately circles back to the normative underpinnings of CPI and that key policy-makers are reluctant to prioritize climate

change considerations without identifying and recognizing the co-benefits for their other policy objectives (Rietig, 2019, p. 241; Kok et al., 2008).

In sum, the concepts of Environmental Policy Integration and Climate Policy Integration emerged as a response to the increasingly more important concerns about the state of the environment and the threats posed by climate change. Both EPI and CPI refer to the incorporation of these concerns into other policy sectors. As cross-cutting issues, the concepts have been difficult to operationalize, especially in fragmented institutions such as the EU. In this context, environmental and climate concerns often come second when faced with conflicting objectives. As such, in order to successfully integrate environmental and climate objectives into sectoral policies, it is essential give principled priority to these objectives.

2.3 Literature Review

After having provided the reader with the concepts and theories on which this thesis is build upon, it is important to situate the research within the existing literature on the topics. Besides further showing the relevance and contribution of this study to the existing literature, the literature review helps to gain an understanding of the current state of the EU's efforts to address climate-related security risks in its development cooperation. In doing so, the literature review helps build a foundation of knowledge on the topic that helps inform the analysis.

2.3.1 The EU's climate-security actions: a review of the literature

As briefly touched upon in the introduction, although the growing body of academic literature acknowledges the EU's leadership role in promoting climate-related security risks on the international agenda, scholars find ambiguous results when it comes to integrating climate-security

into practice (Michel, 2021; Youngs, 2015; Sonnsjö and Bremberg, 2016; Brown, Le More, and Raasteen, 2020; Zwolski and Kaunert, 2011; De Roeck, Orbie and Delputte 2018).

In one of the earlier works on European climate security, Youngs (2015) analyses how the geopolitical strategies and international relations of the EU and its member states have changed due to the impacts of climate change. Although Youngs finds that some member states have begun to integrate climate-security considerations into other policy areas, including the British on their defense strategy and the Dutch on their trade relations, he concludes that climate-security is overall insufficiently prioritized across the different foreign policies (Youngs, 2015). Focusing on the European Union, Youngs finds that climate-related security risks are insufficiently addressed in the EU's conflict prevention policies (2015). In particular, he argues that although European policy-makers acknowledge that climate change significantly influences the risk of civil conflict in resource-stressed countries, this has not caused the EU to integrate climate-security in its conflict prevention mechanisms nor to approach conflicts that include significant climate-related risks differently (Youngs, 2015, p. 105). The EU has continued to prioritize addressing underlying governance pathologies in developing countries, on the basis that climate risks make conflict prevention strategies even more insufficient. However, the EU has been reluctant to respond to 'climate conflicts', exemplified by a general unwillingness to contemplate military missions; the fact that resources dedicated to conflict resolution have remained meagre; and EU development policies incorporate relatively few security-related specificities (Youngs, 2015, p. 6).

Nonetheless, the EU has gradually increased the procedural tools and mechanisms at its disposal in order to address climate-security (Juncos and Blockmans, 2018; Brown et al., 2020; Pérez de las Heras, 2020). Brown et al., for example, argue that "climate security is being integrated in a *limited fashion*" by the EU (Brown et al., 2020, p. 4). They base their argument on some institutional changes the EU has taken to improve its policy coherence, including the creation of an early warning system and conflict analysis screenings, as well as using comprehensive qualitative

and qualitative data indexes such as the Global Conflict Risk Index to inform their development activities (Brown et al., 2020, p. 13). However, even after the institutional changes in the EU's conflict prevention mechanisms and procedural tools, Juncos and Blockmans (2018) argue this has not resulted in improved early actions. They point to conceptual confusion among policy makers as well as to inter- and intra- organizational policy coherence as main challenges for bringing the gap between early warning and early action (Juncos and Blockmans, 2018, p. 134). Moreover, Brown et al. find that the EU is still lacking a systematic approach to coordinate the integration of climate-security across different development projects. They argue that the integration of climate-security in EU projects is rather the result of initiatives taken by individual project managers (Brown et al., 2020, p. 4). To go even further, in analyzing the EU's Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the financial instrument particularly focusing on conflict prevention programming (Sonnsjö and Bremberg, 2016), Brown et al. find that only 6 out of 470 projects under the IcSP (less that 2%) listed climate-related security risks in the rationale and objectives of the projects (Brown et al., 2020, p. 16). So, even though the EU has better tools and instruments at its disposal to monitor situations and regions at risk of deteriorating into conflict, these policy tools have not resulted in a significant improvement of EU's conflict prevention strategy (Pérez de las Heras, 2020, p. 343). This thus points towards significant shortcomings in translating the climate-security discourse into practice. However, relating this to integration in terms of the *policy process*, the above findings point towards increased capabilities and procedural tools of EU policy makers to address the climate-security nexus in the EU's development cooperation and thus a certain level of policy process integration (for further explanation, see 4.2 Policy Process).

Furthermore, De Roeck, Orbie and Delputte (2018) argue that the EU has not prioritized climate change adaptation in its development cooperation. However, in their analysis of 9 selected countries, they do find a slightly lower level of policy integration, namely *harmonization*. By focusing on the strong links between climate and sustainable agriculture, rural development, food

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security and climate resilience, De Roeck et al., find that the EU harmonizes climate change adaptation strategies in its aid activities. Importantly, all their 9 selected countries structure their intervention logics on the interlinkages between climate resilience and the aforementioned sectoral activities. However, they also find that climate change adaptation is not *consistently* mainstreamed and only 3 out of 9 countries include aid activities where climate change adaptation is prioritized above other objectives. Moreover, they find that there are significant differences between different EU Delegations on their mainstreaming efforts and conclude that these differences likely point to context specific variations (De Roeck et al., 2018, p. 41). These context specific variations could potentially be explained by the findings from Brown et al., who emphasize that the integration of climate considerations is due to the decisions of individual project managers rather than the systematic approach orchestrated from and guided by EU headquarters (Brown et al., 2020, p. 4).

So, in sum, the literature has highlighted that the EU is performing ambiguously in addressing climate-security in its development cooperation. Although there seems to be a general consensus that the EU has improved the integration of climate security in its policy process, through the creation of several procedural tools and instruments that integrate climate-security, this is yet to be translated into concrete policy outputs and impacts.

Chapter 3: Methodology

The following section contains an overview of this thesis' research design and operational framework, as well as a justification for its methodological approach and selected cases. This thesis uses a qualitative content analysis of key policy and working documents of the EU. It analyzes 9 selected cases using a framework originally taken from De Roeck et al. (2018), but adapted for the purpose of this study.

3.1 Method

This study conducts a qualitative content analysis of EU documents and communications, in particular relating to programming documents. As a research method, content analysis can be understood as the systematic and objective procedure of describing and quantifying phenomena, through distilling text and words into fewer content-related categories (Krippendorff, 1980; Mayring, 2000; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). It is used for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context, with the purpose of providing new knowledge, insights and understanding (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p. 108; Downe-Wamboldt, 1992, p. 314). Content analysis can be useful to study changing trends in theoretical content (Prasad, 2008), making it particularly relevant for the study of policy change. Within qualitative content analysis, one can makes use of inductive or deductive approaches. Whereas the former refers to the method of open coding while reading the units of analysis, the latter makes use of existing categorical and coding schemes in order to test or extent existing theories (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281).

This study uses a deductive content analysis approach, in which it builds upon existing theory in order to draw meaningful inferences from EU policy documents over time. In particular, this study aims to detect to what extent the level of integration of climate-related security risks into

EU policy and programming documents has changed over the years. Given the focus on a changing trend in policies, a qualitative content analysis is most fitting for the purpose of the research. In conducting this study, it extends conceptually the theoretical framework of EPI and CPI to the field of climate-related security risks and tries to detect trends in policy integration. Moreover, this study makes use of an existing categorical scheme (developed by De Roeck et al., 2018), but adapted for the purpose of the research question (explained further below). In order to adequately compare the level of integration of climate-related security risks in the EU's development cooperation over time, the use of existing categorical systems can help in the comparability of the findings and the evaluation of the reliability of the analysis (Mayring, 2014, p. 40). As such, a qualitative content analysis is best fitted for the design of this study.

The documents are analyzed through the use of content analysis software called ATLAS.ti. ATLAS.ti is a qualitative research tool that helps in coding and analyzing documents through a structured and efficient way (ATLAS.ti, 2023). Through the use of the program, the findings can more easily be gathered and compared and as such, the program has been instrumental in the analysis.

3.2 Operational framework

As mentioned, this study builds on existing literature in the broader field of Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) and Climate Policy Integration (CPI). Based on the EPI and CPI literature, and particularly on the concept of principled priority, De Roeck et al. (2018) created a framework to analyze to what extent the EU has *mainstreamed* (often interchangeably used with *integrate*) climate change adaptation in its development cooperation. This thesis has adapted the framework created by De Roeck et al. (2018) to apply it to the integration of climate-related security risks (see table 1 below, also in Appendix 1).

Table 1: Adapted Operational Framework of De Roeck et al., (2018) to assess the level of policy integration of climate-security.

Level of integration	No integration	Weak to moderate integration		Successful integration	Consulted material
Policy cycle stage		Coordination	Harmonization	Principled prioritization	
Agenda-setting	- No reference to climate-security.	- Climate-security integration framed in guiding policy documents as add-on component in external relations and development aid activities. - Focusing on end-of-pipe measures (e.g. reducing carbon footprint).	- Climate-security framed in guiding policy documents as standing on equal terms with development activities. - Focus on finding synergies and win-win solutions between development aid activities and climate-security.	- Climate-security integration framed in guiding policy documents as absolute priority within development aid activities. - Focus on installing climate-security as overriding objectives for development aid practitioner.	- Guiding EU policy documents.
Policy process	- No specific procedures in place for the integration of climate-related security risks.	- Integration tools intended and used for the integration of climate concerns in sectoral aid activities.	- Integration tools intended and used for finding synergies and win-win solutions between sectoral development aid activities and climate-security.	- Integration tools intended and used for redesigning sectoral aid activities in order to prioritize climate-security.	- EU guidelines, working documents, tools, reflection papers.
Policy Output	- No climate-security integration in indicative programming policies.	- Climate-security references in the outlining of sectoral activities but limited to incidental mentioning and not interlinked with sectoral policy priorities. - Recognition of climate change as having security risks (e.g. on food security), but without a description of how climate change affects other sectoral objectives or without reference to any response measures.	- Clear image or description of how climate-security affects sectoral activities and/or how the integration of climate-security can improve overall policy objectives. - Recognition of climate change as having security risks and on equal footing with other root causes of unrest, lack of development, and poverty.	- Climate-security as central priority along which other sectoral activities are structured.	- National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), and Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs).
Policy Implementation	- No climate-security integration in project designs.	- Climate-security integration in project design limited to incidental mentioning, not interlinked with project designs and objectives. (e.g. solely as operational risk or background development) - Climate actions mentioned, not necessarily linked to insecurity, and as secondary objective or less.	- Clear image of how climate-security affects the project design and/or clear description of how the need to tackle climate-security is essential to reaching the project objectives. - Climate-security described in the project rationale and given prominent position vis-a-vis other objectives. One or more specific objectives included on climate-security.	- Climate-security as central priority along which the project is designed and structured. - Climate-security as central priority in the project rationale and as main objective of the project.	- Annual Action Plans (AAPs).

The analysis is divided between four different stages of the policy cycle: the agenda-setting, policy process, policy output and implementation stage. By looking at all these different stages, this study can generate a more comprehensive picture of the level of policy integration, ranging from the EU's discourse and procedural tools to the practical outputs and outcomes. Within every phase, this thesis differentiates between four separate levels of integration: no integration, coordination, harmonization and prioritization. As one can expect, 'no integration' means no mentioning of- or availability of resources related to the integration of climate-related security risks. Secondly, 'coordination' in the agenda-setting stage refers to the mentioning of climate-related security risks in guiding policy documents, but merely as a potential side-consideration and not weighing equally as other policy objectives. For example, it could mean a reference to the need to reduce carbon emissions throughout development activities, if it would not limit the other objectives. Moreover, in the policy process stage, 'coordination' means the availability of tools to integrate climate-security

in other policy objectives, but not necessarily the success of these tools. In the policy output and implementation stage, 'coordination' means an incidental reference to climate-related security risks in EU policy documents and projects, without considering the *real* correlation between climate change, security and the development activities — that is, what influence climate-security actually has on the success and sustainability of the projects. Importantly, the location of the reference within the documents is essential here. For example, a project might include the recognition of climate-related security risks as a potential operational risk, but this does not mean the project addresses the issue. Similarly, references might be made to climate-security throughout the rationale or context of the project or country, but if it is not included in the projects' objectives and activities, climate-security is not given any actual weight or importance, but is more seen as a general background development. Hence, this would still be categorized as 'coordination'. Furthermore, 'harmonization' implies that, throughout the policy cycle, climate-security is *at the minimum* on equal footing with other policy objectives. For example, integration would entail the need to find synergies between climate-security and other objectives. Harmonization also means that in the policy output and implementation stage there are clear descriptions of how the integration of climate-security leads to improved climate-resilience of the target population. Finally, 'prioritization' implies that climate-security is given priority over other objectives. Hence, it would be the central priority along which other sectoral activities are structured around and would be a central component of the intervention logic of development activities.

Importantly, as mentioned, this thesis adjusts the operational framework for the purpose of the research question. So, instead of focusing on *climate change adaptation* as De Roeck et al., this thesis analyzes *climate-related security risks*. This is an important distinction to make, since climate change adaptation efforts do not necessarily relate to insecure- or conflict situations and can be applied in any country or region (so also non-fragile countries). For example, the EU has quite some development cooperation focusing on climate change adaptation with Small Island Development

States (SIDS) such as Fiji and Barbados. Since these countries are considered as politically relatively stable, the EU does not consider them at a high risk for conflict and insecurity. Hence, by focusing solely on climate change adaptation, one can overlook the underlying interlinkages with levels of insecurity. Given the acknowledged correlation between climate change and insecurity, it is important to specifically address the climate-security nexus in the EU's development cooperation in order to create a more holistic and integrated approach that effectively addresses root causes of insecurity. As such, it is important to make a clear distinction between climate change adaptation and climate-related security risks.

3.3 Material

The analyzed documents are all published after the start of 2006 up until the first half of 2023. The documents include European Commission, Parliament and Council communications, technical reports, press releases, summaries of debates, programming documents, annual action plans, action documents, speeches and working documents. Similarly to De Roeck et al. (2018), this thesis first explores the first step of the policy cycle, the agenda-setting stage, by examining the extent to which climate-related security risks have been presented in the main EU development policy documents and communications. Then, this thesis analyzes the policy processes of the main Directorate-Generals focusing on development cooperation, namely DG INTPA (formerly DG DEVCO), EEAS, EEA, and DG ECHO. This includes an analysis of, for example, working documents or methodological tools developed for the purpose of integrating climate-related security risks or other climate considerations into their day-to-day working methods. For the policy output and implementation phases, this research analyzes particular programming and implementation documents of the EU's development cooperation activities, namely the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), the Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs), as well as the Annual Action Plans (AAPs) and Action Documents (ADs). The NIPs (2014-2020) and the MIPs (2021-2027)

describe the main priorities for a respective country in a respective policy cycle and the AAPs state the specific interventions (ADs) taken place in a country in a respective year. All these documents are publicly available on the DG INTPA website and/or were send through by the EU after an official public request to access the documents. Importantly, since the new policy cycle is only its early years, only the AAPs of the years 2021 and 2022 are available (except for Uganda which adopted AAPs for the years 2022-2024). However, given that on average 2-3 actions are planned per year, this still gives a significant indication on the level of climate-security integration in the EU's development cooperation.

3.4 Case selection

Each year, the EU publishes the Global INFORM Risk Index database, which is a global indicator-based analysis that combines hazards, exposure, vulnerability and lack of coping capacity indicators to estimate the risk for future humanitarian crises (Thow et al., 2022). The database consists of a list of countries on a scale from most likely to least likely to experience humanitarian emergencies in the near future that could overwhelm national response capacities, and would thus lead to a need for international assistance (Thow et al., 2022). The first official INFORM release was in 2014 and since then the database has been updated yearly with new indicators and improved methodology, to the point where it now encompasses a total of 80 indicators (Thow et al., 2022). In addition, database has increased in popularity among humanitarian crisis managers, development actors and policy makers as a useful tool to inform international development assistance measures (Marzi et al., 2021). The database includes a wide variety of indicators to assess the risk of a country experiencing humanitarian crises, by measuring its internal and external vulnerabilities, its exposure to natural and human hazards, and a country's mechanisms to cope with the shocks. Importantly, the index includes a significant amount of indicators related to the effects of climate change, including the exposure to natural hazards such as floods and droughts, as well as the number of forcibly

displaced and government measures on disaster risk reduction (DRR) (Thow et al., 2020). The index has been used by many international organizations and agencies to inform their development activities, including the EU's DG ECHO, DG INTPA and the EEAS, UN OCHA and UNICEF, UK's Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the US Agency for International Development (USAID)(Messina et al., 2019; Marzi et al., 2021). Since the index captures both vulnerabilities and coping mechanisms to the impacts of climate change, the INFORM database is an extremely useful tool to assess the need of a respective country to receive help in addressing climate-related security risks. As such, one can expect that a higher level of risk, e.g. a higher index, should be associated with the EU paying more attention to climate-related security risks in that respective country.

In order to analyze how the level climate-security policy integration of the EU has evolved in relation to the level of risk, this study has selected nine countries with a variety in their risk levels over the years. As mentioned, this will help in drawing conclusions on whether the increased level of risks correspond with higher levels of climate-security integration, or whether the EU's level of integration of climate-security in its development cooperation corresponds with reduced levels of risk for the respective countries. Overall, the results can provide strong indications on whether the integration of climate-security actually leads to improved impacts, e.g. whether climate-security policy integration is successful in achieving climate-resilience. Besides selecting countries with a strong variance in their levels of risk over the years, this study also looks at countries who have consistently been at a high or an extremely high risk to experience humanitarian crisis. In picking these extreme cases, this study can also draw representative conclusions on the general level of policy integration of climate-related security risks in the EU's development cooperation. The different risk levels are taken from the years 2014 and 2021, the starting years of each of the respective policy cycles and thus most likely to have informed the programming.

This study has only selected the countries the EU has had a continuous development cooperation with over the past two policy cycles. So, the countries which the EU has not adopted a National Indicative Programme (NIP) or Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) for in the respective policy cycles, or the EU has halted its development cooperation with (due to political instability), have been excluded. In addition, this study only focuses on countries located in Africa, the continent which is most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (IPCC, 2022). Based on the aforementioned reasons, the following cases have been selected for analysis: Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Out of these countries, it is Cameroon (from rank 55 to 12), Nigeria (21 to 14) and Uganda (32 to 14; same index as Cameroon) that have experienced a significant increase in their level of risk for experiencing humanitarian crisis. Based on this, one could expect the EU to increase their focus on climate-security in these countries. Moreover, out of the selected countries, it is Guinea-Bissau (from 29 to 55) and Zimbabwe (18 to 41) which have experienced a relative decrease in their levels of risk. This study analyzes whether these developments correspond with EU measures taken on climate-security over the years. This could be the case when, for example, the EU has successfully integrated climate-security in its development cooperation already throughout the earlier years of the previous policy cycle. Lastly, the Central African Republic (CAR)(from rank 7 to 5), Chad (from 8 to 7), the DRC (from 3 to 6), and Somalia (ranked 1st in both years) are picked based on their consistent and extremely high risk for experiencing humanitarian crisis. Importantly, these countries are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and future crises and to some extent already experience significant humanitarian crises (International Rescue Committee, 2023), thereby giving even more urgency to investing into climate-security in these countries. As such, one would expect the EU to pay relatively more attention to the interlinkages between climate change and security there.

Chapter 4: Results

The following section contains the results of the conducted analysis. The results are discussed per stage in the policy cycle. Additionally, in the agenda-setting and policy process stage, the results are discussed per policy cycle, while in the policy output and implementation stage, the results are discussed per risk group, i.e. whether the country experienced an increase-, a decrease- or a similar level in risk. The reason for this is that the agenda-setting and policy process stage is an analysis of general EU policy documents and procedures, without specific focus on certain countries, whereas the policy output and implementation phases are country-specific. The first two sections can thus not be considered in relation to a country-specific risk level.

4.1 Agenda-setting

4.1.1 2014-2020 MFF policy cycle

In order to assess the level of climate-security integration in the agenda-setting stage, it is important to look at the guiding policy documents predating the respective policy cycles. Since the early 2000s the EU started framing climate change as a significant security concern (Michel, 2021). In the 2006 European Consensus on Development, the EU confirms to combatting climate change through development cooperation, in particular focused on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (European Union, 2006, p. 37). This stated goal shows a certain level of commitment by the EU to integrate climate change into its development activities, but it also remained without a clear description of how the EU intends to do so. More importantly, in the section dedicated to cross-cutting issues that require mainstreaming efforts, the EU only refers to environmental sustainability without any reference to the climate (or climate change) (European Union, 2006, p. 44), thereby not showing the commitment to integrate climate-security.

One of the first times the EU started to acknowledge the interlinkages between climate change and security was in the 2008 paper from the High Representative of the European Commission, in which the representative describes climate change as a 'threat multiplier which *exacerbates* existing trends, tensions and instability' (High Representative and the European Commission, 2008, p. 2). Continuing, the paper expresses the EU's unique position to respond to the impacts of climate change on international security. Here one can see the increased recognition of the interlinkages between climate change and security, as well as the EU's prominent role in combatting climate change impacts.

Through the 2011 Agenda for Change, the EU took a significant step in integrating climate-security in its development activities. In particular, the Agenda states that development aid is not sustainable if it damages the environment, biodiversity and natural resources and increases the exposure/vulnerability to natural disasters. As such, the EU aims to improve the resilience of developing countries to the consequences of climate change (European Commission, 2011, p. 7). The Agenda for Change includes a more elaborate description of how the integration of climate change should take place, including by more clearly linking sustainable agriculture and energy with climate-resilience, as well as focusing on promoting local capacity building and technology transfers (European Commission, 2011). By linking climate-resilience with other development objectives such as agriculture and energy, the Agenda shows an increased salience of the need to integrate climate-security into development cooperation, with a particular focus on finding synergies between the objectives. To go even further, in the 2012 EU Approach to Resilience, the EU firmly commits to improving the resilience of developing countries, in particular to "…climate change, desertification, environmental degradation, pressure on natural resources, inappropriate land tenure systems, insufficient investment in agriculture…" (European Commission, 2012, p. 2). The Communication elaborates on the strong link between external shocks and vulnerability and

even states that the *central aim* of the EU's support to developing countries is to reduce the vulnerabilities and improve their resilience (European Commission, 2012, p. 3).

Furthermore, in one of the guiding policy documents in the agenda-setting stage of the 2014-2020 policy cycle, namely the 2013 EU's Joint Communication on 'The Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises', the EU emphasizes the importance of addressing climate change by even stating that the risk-multiplying threats of climate change include potential conflict and instability related to reliable access to food, water and energy (European Commission, 2013, p. 10). The Communication sets out a number of concrete steps that the EU is taking towards an increasingly comprehensive approach in its external relations policies and actions, with the goal to improve the EU's strength, coherence, visibility and effectiveness in its external relations (European Commission, 2013, p. 3). Since the Communication mainly lists actions to be taken internally by EU policy makers to improve policy coherence and does not include any other sectoral specific themes than climate change (besides briefly mentioning terrorism and rule of law, p. 8-9), it shows the paramount importance of addressing climate change in the EU's approach to conflicts and crises.

In sum, the agenda-setting stage prior to the programming of the 2014-2020 policy cycle shows significant efforts to harmonize climate change objectives within development cooperation. Whereas the 2006 Consensus on Development and the 2008 Paper only include incidental references to climate change or the security risks posed by climate change, the 2011 Agenda for Change, the 2012 Approach to Resilience and the 2013 Comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises, show clear signs that the EU harmonizes climate-security objectives with other objectives. The 2011 Agenda for Change lays down concrete win-win solutions for addressing climate change in development cooperation as a way to improve resilience to insecurity. Moreover, the 2012 Approach to Resilience further elaborates on how climate change affects security and makes a strong commitment to reducing vulnerabilities in developing countries, which is further

operationalized in the 2013 comprehensive approach. Overall, the analyzed documents show clear signs of how the EU aims to integrate climate change in its external relations to ensure the sustainability of the EU's development cooperation.

4.1.2 2021-2027 MFF policy cycle

The EU policy developments on climate change in the 2000s and early 2010s were seen as significant steps of the EU to become the global 'leader' on climate policy (Dupont, 2019). However, the subsequent years were marked by significant crises within and beyond the EU's borders, including international conflicts in Ukraine, Syria and Northern Africa, as well as the migration crisis and Brexit, which resulted in the EU's policy agenda being overcrowded with other (more pressing) issues and caused the rate of policy innovation on climate-security to falter (Dupont, 2019, p. 380; Falkner, 2016; Youngs, 2015). Hence, in terms of agenda-setting, it was not until the 2015 Paris Agreement that the EU arguably started picking up the pace on climate action again (Oberthür, 2016). Through its leadership role in the ratification of the Paris Agreement, the EU sent out a strong signal to the international community of the necessary commitments to mitigate the impacts of climate change (Dupont, 2019, p. 382).

Subsequently, it was the 2016 Global Strategy in which climate-security received a prominent place in EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), where it directly states that "Climate change and environmental degradation exacerbate potential conflict, in light of their impact on desertification, land degradation, and water and food scarcity" (European External Action Service, 2016, p. 27). In addition, the Strategy states that the EU has an important role to play in assisting partner countries in addressing climate challenges and addressing security risks (EEAS, 2016, p. 23-27). The Global Strategy was the start of several publications on how the EU aims to address and improve climate-security in its external relations, particularly the Commission's joint communication on 'A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action' (European

Commission, 2017), the New European Consensus on Development Cooperation (European Union, 2017), the Council Conclusions on the Sahel (Council of the European Union, 2019), the European Green Deal (European Commission, 2019), an updated Council Conclusions on the EU's Climate Diplomacy (Council of the European Union, 2020), a Climate Change and Defense Roadmap (European External Action Service, 2020), a Commission communication on the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change (European Commission, 2021a), and an EEAS working document on the Integrated Approach to Climate Change and Security (EEAS, 2021).

Throughout these publications, there is clear trend visible highlighting the increased importance of addressing and integrating climate-security in the EU's external relations. For example, in the 2017 joint communication on 'A Strategic Approach to Resilience', the EU recommends to include environmental, climate- and disaster risk assessments in its early warning systems so the EU can formulate preventive and adaptive measures as a response (European Commission, 2017, p. 19). Moreover, the 2017 New European Consensus on Development expands the commitment for the integration of environment in development cooperation to explicitly include climate change (European Commission, 2017b). Continuing, in the 2018 Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, the EU takes a further step in linking climate change with security by recognizing:

"…that climate change has *direct* and *indirect* implications for international security and stability, chiefly affecting those in most fragile and vulnerable situations, contributing to the loss of livelihoods, reinforcing environmental pressures and disaster risk, forcing the displacement of people and exacerbating the threat of social and political unrest." (Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 3).

Whereas previously the EU mainly referenced climate change as something that *exacerbates potential conflict*, the EU now states that climate change has *direct* implications on security, reflecting a higher level of securitization and urgency to address climate-security. The Conclusions also highlight the EU's commitment to further mainstream the climate-security nexus in policy dialogue, conflict prevention, development, humanitarian and disaster risk strategies (Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 3). They also express the need to further integrate effective responses to climate security risks across different policy areas – ranging from climate action and resilience building on the one hand to preventive diplomacy and improved risk assessment on the other hand, in order to strengthen the bridge between early warning and early action (Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 4). The Council Conclusions were believed to be a significant step towards closing the gap between EU's discourse and practice on climate-related security risks (Bremberg and Mobjörk, 2018).

Furthermore, the 2019 European Green Deal firmly rooted climate change and environmental protection as one the 6 priorities of the new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The strategy aims to transform the EU into a resource-efficient, competitive economy with no net greenhouse emissions by 2050 (European Commission, 2019). Besides setting ambitious climate goals internally, the Green Deal also emphasizes the need to help partner countries in their green transition. In particular, it highlights that:

"The EU will work with all partners to increase climate and environmental resilience to prevent these challenges [i.e. climate and environmental challenges] from becoming sources of conflict, food insecurity, population displacement and forced migration, and support a just transition globally. Climate policy implications should become *an integral part* of the EU's thinking and action on external issues, including in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy." (European Commission, 2019, p. 20).

As one of the 6 Commission priorities for the 2019-2024 period, the European Green Deal represents a strong commitment by the EU to prioritize the mitigation of the the impacts of climate change. Moreover, climate policy implications are to become 'an integral part' of the EU's external action, especially in relation to conflict prevention, showing the fundamental importance of addressing the matter, as well as acknowledging it as root cause of conflict.

The prioritization is further visible in the 2020 Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, in which the EU not only reiterates the urgent need to mitigate the "existential" threats of climate change globally, it also states that climate-resilient development will be *underpinned* in all external policy instruments, including the financial instruments and trade policy (Council of the EU, 2020, p. 3), thereby showing that climate-security has become an overriding objective along other external policies. To go even further, the EU will work "as a matter of priority" with the most vulnerable countries, including the LDCs, in strengthening their resilience to the impacts of climate change (Council of the EU, 2020, p. 4). The Conclusions thus frame climate-security as an absolute priority within their external action.

In sum, throughout the agenda-setting stage of the 2021-2027 policy cycle, there have been several policy documents adopted showing the increased salience of climate-security. All of these policy documents form an integral foundation for the 2021-2027 MFF programming cycle and show the trend that the EU has increasingly prioritized climate-security. Whereas the agenda-setting stage predating the 2014-2020 policy cycle showed significant levels of harmonizing climate-security objectives alongside other sectoral objectives, the agenda-setting stage predating the current policy cycle shows significant prioritization efforts. In particular the European Green Deal and the Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy state how climate objectives should be a central priority in the EU's external relations. Overall, the key EU policy documents adopted in the last decade show a strong trend towards prioritizing climate-security in the EU's external relations.

4.2 Policy Process

The following section contains an analysis of the EU's procedural tools and instruments in place for the integration of climate-security objectives into the EU's development cooperation. Over the years, the Commission has created several tools and instruments in order to integrate certain environmental and/or climate objectives into the policy-making process. This analysis assesses the functionality and use of these procedural tools and instruments and to what extent they allow for a successful integration of climate-security into development cooperation.

4.2.1 2014-2020 MFF Policy cycle

As the previous section has shown, the key policy documents published throughout the 2014-2020 policy cycle increasingly acknowledge the need to integrate climate-security into the EU's external relations, among which development cooperation. In 2016, DG DEVCO published the guidelines for "Integrating the environment and climate change into EU international cooperation and development", which provided a framework for strengthening the EU's efforts to integrating environmental and climate change considerations into the different phases of the EU programme and project cycle (DG DEVCO, 2016). Amongst these, is the Country Environmental Profile (CEP), which is a key tool in the programming phase that provides the necessary information to integrate environmental and climate change concerns into the country analysis and response strategy (DG DEVCO, 2016, p. 15). In addition, the EU has created tools such as a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and a Climate Risk Assessment (CRA). In essence, these tools assess the extent to which a given policy, plan or programme (i) provides an adequate response to environmental and climate change–related challenges; (ii) may adversely affect the environment and climate resilience; and (iii) offers opportunities to enhance the state of the environment and contribute to climate-resilient, low-carbon development (DG DEVCO, 2016, p. 15). Although these tools have the potential to systematically integrate climate-security

objectives in the EU's development cooperation, an internal DG DEVCO review concludes that they are not used systematically, if at all (DG DEVCO, 2018, p. 29). It turns out that the CEP analysis is more absent than present in most country programming cycles, and that if an EU delegation does have such a profile at its disposal, it is usually outdated, irrelevant or only conducted to comply with the requirements. Moreover, there seems to be no use at all of the climate risk assessments (DG DEVCO, 2018, p. 30). In this thesis' review of the programming documents, there also seems to be little evidence to suggest that these assessments are conducted (see Chapter 5: Discussion).

Furthermore, one of the core integration activities is the joint review of programming and project documents (NIPs, MIPs, and AAPs) among different Commission units. The draft documents are reviewed and commented on, in order to ensure environmental and climate change concerns are addressed (DG DEVCO, 2018). Often suggestions are adopted which results in a supposedly better integration of environmental and/or climate change concerns. However, a key challenge here is to be involved in the identification and formulation of the action on time, so as to avoid retro-fitting of climate concerns (DG DEVCO, 2018). This links back to the challenges identified by the EPI literature, in which the inter-departmental bargaining between the different sectoral units often results in policy 'layering', in which new (climate) demands are placed on top of existing project objectives (Hertin and Berkhout, 2001 and 2003). To go even further, the EU also seem to suffer from limited capacity and expertise in mainstreaming climate change (DG DEVCO, 2018, p. 28). This is exemplified by a clear lack of climate-sensitive awareness among staff before the arrival of a designated 'climate focal point', even though the designated focal points would work on related issues such as food security and agriculture already before. Hence, there might be less of a willingness to pursue climate change adaptation strategies outside of the respective focal points (De Roeck et al., 2018, p. 40). In this regard, the EU emphasizes the need to raise awareness and reinforce capacities among staff with the ultimate goal to normalize the considerations of climate change concerns into the day-to-day work (DG DEVCO, 2018, p. 20).

Usually, this takes place through standard staff training packages on climate change. However, the demand for trainings remains limited, most notably due to resource constraints and new priorities (DG DEVCO, 2018, p. 20). This finding is also in line with the debate within the CPI literature on the normative underpinnings of climate change, where there is discussion on whether climate concerns should actually be given priority over other objectives, i.e. over other 'new' priorities (e.g. Kok and De Coninck, 2007; Kok et al., 2008). Additionally, this also points towards the lack of *systematic* climate change mainstreaming efforts across the different delegations and policy sectors (Brown et al., 2020).

Furthermore, another key tool used by EU policymakers working in external relations is the EU's conflict Early Warning System (EWS), which has the responsibility to systematically collect and analyze indicators to identify the risk of violent conflict early on and to develop strategic responses to the root causes of conflict, including those related to climate-security (Pérez de las Heras, 2020). This tool is also complemented by the Conflict Analysis Screening (CAS), which is an EU exercise that aims to ensure conflict-sensitive programming in order to avoid any negative impacts of EU interventions and maximize the positive impact on conflict dynamics (EEAS, 2022). The EWS has gained importance as the main tool to systematically collect and analyze data to identify risks of conflicts as well as to develop strategic EU responses to reduce those risks (Pérez de las Heras, 2020, p. 342). However, there remains a significant gap between the EU's early warning and early action on conflicts (Davis, 2018; Pérez de las Heras, 2020; Juncos and Blockmans, 2018; Debuysere and Blockmans, 2019). The EU seems to suffer from a lack of the necessary political leadership to establish priorities, particularly for prevention over response and linking early warning with early action (Davis, 2018, p. 162), as well as suffering from a lack of agreement on the need to prioritize climate-security (Sonnsjö and Bremberg, 2016, p. 17). To go even further, some EU policy makers even highlighted that the oversupply of procedural requirements, such as the Strategic Environmental Assessment, the Climate Risk Assessment, the Conflict Analysis Screenings, and Early Warning System, generates competition between different

tasks and thematic issues within delegations and headquarters, thereby resulting in a sense of 'mainstreaming fatigue' (DG DEVCO, 2018, p. 3). This is further problematized by a lack of sufficient and climate-competent human resources within headquarters and delegations to conduct the required tasks (DG DEVCO, 2018).

4.2.2 2021-2027 MFF Policy cycle

Although the 2021-2027 policy cycle has the availability over the same tools as the previous policy cycle, there are several important changes in the new policy cycle that need to be highlighted, most notably relating to the financing instruments of the EU's development cooperation.

In the new policy cycle, the EU's external actions make use of an entirely new financial instrument to fund its activities, namely the Neighborhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe (NDICI-GE) (Regulation 2021/947). The NDICI is the result of 3 years of negotiations and a response to the growing skepticism the EU faced about its inability to address the complexities in its internal and external policy priorities (Sergejeff et al., 2022). In particular, the instrument is another effort by the EU to overcome its institutional fragmentation and to become a more coherent global actor, most notably by merging ten previous external financing instruments and programmes, including its Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the Partnership Instrument (PI), and the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), into one single instrument (Sergejeff et al., 2022).

Furthermore, the EU's aim to increase its external policy coherence is also reflected in the changes in the design of the MIPs, which are to move beyond the formerly strict limitation of three traditional focal sectors, towards a broader approach that allows for better interlinked approaches and synergies across different sectors of interventions (Sergejeff et al., 2022, p. 12). In particular,

NDICI requires that all actions should contribute to achieving the SDGs, as well as paying particular attention to the interlinkages between the SDGs and actions that can create co-benefits and meet multiple objectives in a coherent way (Regulation 2021/947, p. 4). Given its cross-cutting nature, this would particularly benefit the EU's approach towards climate-security, which by definition requires combining multiple sectors. However, a key challenge remains to not only link the different organizational silos at EU-level in order to implement multi-sectoral approaches, but also in the administrations in partner countries, implementing organizations and donors (Sergejeff et al., 2023, p. 13). For implementing organizations working in a certain sector, for example, it has led to difficulties in obtaining funding for cross-sectoral initiatives. Similarly, donor organizations experience administrative burdens in terms of reporting and contracting, which has become more difficult for cross-sectoral approaches. On top of this lies the difficulty to ensure efficient coordination, which requires more time and resources for multi-sectoral approaches. At worst, this can become an additional burden to the already time-sensitive interventions and packed work schedules (Sergejeff et al., 2023, p. 13).

Importantly, the NDICI requires that climate change and environmental protection are mainstreamed throughout all programmes and actions (Di Ciommo and Ahairwe, 2021). Besides integrating the 30% spending target to support climate and environmental objectives in NDICI, the EU also committed to adding 4€ billion to supporting partner countries in climate change mitigation efforts (Von der Leyen, 2021), as well pledging another 100€ million to the Adaptation Fund during COP26 (European Commission, 2021b), and agreeing to a 'loss-and-damage fund' for developing countries during COP27 (European Commission, 2022). Additionally, the EU aims to mobilize external investments to tackle climate change through its 'blending' and 'guarantees' financial mechanisms (Di Ciommo and Ahairwe, 2021). Whereas in the past the EU mostly made use of grants to fund its development projects, the EU now aims to combine public and private financing mechanisms better to mobilize additional funding for development and to de-risk potential losses

(DG INTPA, 2022). Through the use of guarantees, the EU guarantees to pay parts of the investments or loans that private investors and development banks have made, in the unlikely event that a loss occurs. Blending uses public money to cover part of the initial costs of development projects to get the project started, after which public and private investors finance the rest (DG INTPA, 2022). Through the new NDICI, the EU is giving blending and guarantees activities a more prominent place in its programming, with the goal to mobilize more funding for development and to meet its targets. And this already shows results, throughout the 2014-2021 period, the funds earmarked for blending facilities grew from 29.7€ billion to 53.5€ billion (Vermeiren et al., 2022). All of these pledges show an increased importance of the EU towards climate change financing, which reflects the higher level of priority the EU is giving to combatting climate change.

In sum, the EU's wide range of created tools and instruments at its disposal give the Union a favorable position to address climate-related security risks in its external relations. For the 2014-2020 policy cycle, however, the evidence given in this analysis suggests that the created tools do not effectively serve their purpose. Both internal reviews as well as secondary literature sources confirm that the tools are insufficiently used to integrate climate change concerns, let alone climate-related security risks. Besides conceptual differences and institutional fragmentation, the EU is also suffering from mainstreaming fatigue and a lack of competent human resources in order to successfully integrate climate-security in its development cooperation. Hence, there is a limited level of climate-security integration in the policy process stage during the 2014-2020 policy cycle. For the 2021-2027 policy cycle, evidence does not suggest the EU has overcome the challenges it has faced during the previous cycle, in particular the institutional fragmentation which is also experienced by partner countries, implementing organizations and donors. However, given the significant changes to its financial instrument, and in particular the emphasis that is given towards finding synergies and co-benefits to serve multiple objectives, there is thus significant reason to believe the EU is harmonizing climate-security policy objectives in its development cooperation and now has improved financial resources to do so.

4.3 Policy Output

When the new policy cycle starts, the EU delegations within partner countries are responsible for submitting indicative programming priorities, structured along a series of focal sectors (documented in the NIPs and MIPs). These indicative programming documents are created in collaboration with relevant Commission units as well as the EEAS. The following section contains an analysis of the level of integration of climate-security into the indicative programming documents of the selected cases over the years, structured along the changes in the countries' level of risk for experiencing future crisis (see Appendix 2 for results table).

4.3.1 Increased Risk: Cameroon, Nigeria & Uganda

The two previous sections highlighted a trend in which the EU increasingly prioritized (agenda-setting stage) and harmonized (policy process stage) climate-security objectives. This trend of increased importance of climate-security objectives is also visible in the policy output stage in the final versions of the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) and the Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs) of Cameroon, Nigeria and Uganda, the countries that experienced an increase in their risk level for experiencing future crisis.

In analyzing the indicative programming documents of Cameroon, the findings indicate a significant improvement in the level of climate-security integration. At the start of the previous policy cycle in 2014, when Cameroon ranked 55th on the risk index and scored particularly bad on its coping capacities, the indicative programming document only includes incidental references to climate change without addressing its relation to or influence on the developmental objectives set out in the programming document. In the focal sector focusing on rural development, a reference is made that sustainable rural development must respect the sustainable management of natural resources, and combat land degradation, particularly in the areas most vulnerable to desertification in the north of the country. As an additional benefit, the proposed interventions can help in

mitigating the effects of climate change (NIP Cameroon, p. 18). In this sense, climate change is not considered as affecting the goals of rural development and is more framed as a development taking place in the background, rather than a root cause of instability and crisis that affects the overall development objectives. In 2021, Cameroon increased significantly on the risk index and ranked 12th, meaning the country is at a considerably higher risk to experience future humanitarian crisis. This increased risk is also reflected in the MIP, in which there are clear signs to harmonize climate-security throughout the programming. The third priority area (Green Deal: Sustainable Development and Climate Action) is entirely dedicated to mitigating the impacts of climate change and includes clear descriptions of how climate change affects security, in particular relating to climate-induced displacement, competition over scarce resources, water and food security (MIP Cameroon, p. 6). As specific objectives, the priority area combines social and economic development with climate change adaptation and mitigation practices, thereby putting climate change on equal footing with other objectives and thus harmonizing climate-security (p. 15). This is thus a clear improvement of climate-security integration compared to the previous policy cycle, when climate change was not considered as affecting the development goals.

Similarly to Cameroon, the indicative programming documents for Nigeria also show the trend of increased importance of climate-security. The indicative programming document of the previous policy cycle makes only incidental references to the impacts of climate change, in particular in relation to malnutrition and health. This, however, is not interlinked with the programming objectives nor is it framed as something that should be addressed (NIP Nigeria, p. 19). In the new policy cycle, on the other hand, climate-security has received a more prominent spot, in particular as part of the priority area focusing on the green and digital economy (MIP Nigeria, p. 4). This priority area emphasizes the need for climate change adaptation and mitigation practices and searches for synergies and win-win solutions by combining economic development and employment creation with climate change adaptation and mitigation. This is exemplified by

investments in the renewable energy industry, waste management and circular economies (MIP Nigeria, p. 11-13). Additionally, the priority area focusing on governance, peace and migration includes objectives that combine peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms with climate change initiatives in a search for win-win solutions (p. 17). There are thus clear signs of harmonizing climate-security objectives with other sectoral policy objectives in the new policy cycle.

Comparably to Cameroon and Nigeria, Uganda also improved the integration of climate-security throughout the different policy cycles. For the previous policy cycle, the NIP includes a focal sector focusing on agricultural development and emphasizes the need to tackle food insecurity in a climate-resilient way. This, however, is framed as an economic opportunity through employment creation rather than as a security risk (NIP Uganda, p. 18). Additionally, the NIP mentions land degradation and soil erosion as affecting agricultural development, but it does not link this to climate change (p. 12). In 2021, after Uganda's risk index increased compared to 2014 (from rank 32 to 14), there is an increased focus on climate-security in the MIP. The first priority area focuses entirely on the green and climate transition and targets specifically disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation practices and natural resource governance (MIP Uganda, p. 3-4). In doing so, the indicative programming pursues synergies between different sectoral activities such as biodiversity protection, agricultural development, governance, and green urbanization, and thereby thus harmonizes climate-security considerations with other objectives.

In sum, the findings indicate that the agenda-setting phase as well as the improved policy processes bear fruit, with delegations in Cameroon, Nigeria and Uganda picking up on the increased importance of integrating climate-security into their indicative programming. Additionally, the increased integration of climate-security objectives corresponds with the increased risk the countries are exposed to.

4.3.2 Decreased Risk: Guinea-Bissau & Zimbabwe

Compared to the previous countries, Guinea-Bissau and Zimbabwe decreased considerably in their risk for experiencing humanitarian crisis. In analyzing their indicative programming documents, the countries show opposing trends in their level of climate-security policy integration.

First, Guinea-Bissau has a declining trend of integrating climate-security into the indicative programming documents. In the 2014-2020 NIP, the EU harmonizes climate change considerations by including it in the specific objective of the second focal sector: Sustainable rural development. In this priority area, addressing the climate-vulnerability of the country is on equal footing with the other objectives, including reducing poverty, fighting malnutrition and food insecurity (p. 26). This can be considered remarkable, as Guinea-Bissau is the only country that has a priority area in the previous policy cycle that harmonizes climate-security objectives. The 2021-2027 MIP, on the contrary, makes very limited references to the impacts of climate change. The MIP recognizes that Guinea-Bissau is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, but this is not interlinked with the programming objectives. In fact, the only reference to climate change is by stating that the proposed actions are expected to "mitigate… the adverse environmental/climate impact" (p. 10). Instead of climate-security, the indicative programming focuses on improving governance, rule of law, urban living conditions, education and health. There is thus no integration of climate change considerations in the new policy cycle. Considering the country also decreased considerably in its risk for experiencing crisis, going from rank 29 in 2014 to 55 in 2021, this finding can be considered as corresponding to the decreased risk trend.

As opposed to Guinea-Bissau, the indicative programming documents for Zimbabwe show a clear trend towards harmonizing climate-security. The 2014-2020 NIP incidentally states climate change considerations, in particular in relation to the aim to mainstream environment-friendly practices and adaptation to climate change in all sectors. One of the focal sectors aims to address food insecurity by promoting agricultural development, but this is not viewed in light of the impacts of climate change but rather as an opportunity for economic growth and the creation of livelihoods

(p. 9-10). The 2021-2027 MIP, on the other hand, has clear signs of harmonizing climate-security considerations amongst other objectives. Priority Area 2 focusses on green economic growth and searches for synergies between agricultural development and climate change adaptation (p. 13). In addition, priority area 3 on health includes the need to address food security and improve the resilience against 'shocks'(p. 20). So, even in sectors that are commonly not directly linked to climate-security, there is an increased level of climate-security policy integration. Even though the country is considerably less at risk for experiencing humanitarian crisis in the new programming cycle as compared to the old (from rank 18 to 41), the integration of climate-security concerns in the indicative programming for Zimbabwe has improved considerably over the years.

Hence, the findings of Zimbabwe indicate a counterintuitive trend in which climate-security is more integrated, even though the country is less at risk. These findings are also opposed to the programming documents of Guinea-Bissau, where the findings indicate that climate-security was harmonized in the previous policy cycle, but not integrated at all in the current policy cycle.

4.3.3 Similar Risk: CAR, Chad, DRC & Somalia

The Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia are all extremely vulnerable to the effects of climate change and have been at a relatively consistent risk for experiencing future crisis. However, this has not been reflected considerably different in the indicative programming documents compared with the previously discussed countries.

In the indicative programming document of the Central African Republic (CAR) of the previous policy cycle, there are incidental references made to the impacts of climate change, most notably in relation to agricultural production. The NIP includes a clear description of the interlinkages between conflict over natural resources, food insecurity and agricultural production, but does not link this to the effects of climate change (p. 19). Climate change is mentioned as an external development that is taking place in the country, but the NIP does not address it or explains

how it influences the programming objectives. In the 2021-2027 MIP, on the other hand, there is a clearer description of climate-related security risks and how it is a root cause of unrest and tensions, in particular due to droughts and clashes between pastoralists and farmers. Climate change is also framed as affecting agricultural production and thus food insecurity (p. 23). Moreover, the indicative programming aims to find synergies between agricultural development, natural resource management, and biodiversity protection with climate-resilience and thus harmonizes climate-security with other objectives (p. 25).

Compared to the CAR, the programming document of Chad of the previous policy cycle makes stronger linkages to climate change. The NIP priorities include large sections on food security and rural development and climate change is often mentioned as having an affect. However, this is still mostly framed as a general development (e.g. "…in the context of a changing climate …"), and without a clear description on the importance of addressing it (p. 11 & 13). In the current policy cycle, the programming document includes stronger linkages with climate-related security risks, in particular on the relationship between fluctuating rainfalls, recurrent floods, forced displacement and conflicts between pastoralists and farmers (p. 19). In addition, the third priority area focuses specifically on the green deal and aims to mitigate the impacts of climate change in its objectives. However, although the indicative programming includes stronger linkages with climate-security, there is still significant room for improvement, especially considering that the envisioned results do not touch upon climate-related security risks (p. 24). Even so, given the stronger descriptions of climate-related security risks and the inclusion of climate change mitigation in the programming objectives, climate-security is harmonized with other sectoral objectives.

As opposed to the previous countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) does not follow the trend of better integrating climate-security considerations in the policy output stage. Interestingly, the DRC programming documents show a declining interests in climate change, even though the country is still at a considerably high risk for experiencing humanitarian crisis, going

from rank 3 in 2014 to rank 6 in 2021. In the NIP, there are incidental references made to climate change and reducing its impacts, most notably in focal sector 2 focusing on sustainable agricultural development and resource management. The focus is, however, on promoting socio-economic development and addressing food security, without a description of how climate change influences the programming objectives (p. 14). In the MIP, surprisingly, there is little improvement in integrating climate-security. In fact, the priority area that arguably comes closest to climate change concerns, priority area 3: sustainable development, does not make any reference to climate change in its description or objectives (p. 19-22). Although it focuses on agricultural development and sustainable resource management, areas which are commonly impacted by climate change, the MIP only makes reference to man-made environmental impacts (poaching, illegal deforestation) (p. 19). This result is especially surprising considering the DRC's extreme climate-vulnerability. Overall, there is thus no policy integration of climate-security in the new policy cycle.

Lastly, in analyzing the indicative programming documents of Somalia, there are clear indications that the EU has improved the integration of climate-related security risks throughout the years. In the previous policy cycle, the NIP makes only incidentally reference to the impacts of climate change, but without framing this as a security risk. One of the priority areas, food security and resilience building, can in principle be very easily linked to climate-security, but it does not make reference to climate change. Even though the priority area includes descriptions of climate-related security risks, namely droughts, floods, food insecurity and conflicts between pastoralist and farmers, the document solely links this to potential 'crises' and does not state the changing climate as cause (p. 11). The 2021-2027 indicative programming document, on the other hand, makes stronger and clearer references to the impacts of climate change, in particular by describing the way in which climate change causes desertification, floods, droughts, forced displacement, and conflict (p. 10). Investing in climate-action is framed as a win-win solution, in which climate change adaptation and mitigation can be combined with job creation, livelihoods and social inclusion. Besides having a specific priority area, namely area 3 resilience building and social inclusion,

dedicated to building resilience against climate-related security risks (p. 15), priority area 2 'inclusive and green economic growth' also emphasizes the need have a climate-resilient growth path (p. 9), thereby showing the EU's improved efforts to harmonize climate-security with other policy objectives.

In sum, whereas the Central African Republic, Chad and Somalia showed increased levels of climate-security policy integration between the respective policy cycles, the Democratic Republic of Congo does not follow this trend. On the contrary, it does not integrate climate-security at all in the new policy cycle. More importantly, even though all countries are at an extremely high risk to experience future crisis and thus require significant investment into climate-resilience, the indicative programming documents of the countries do not reflect this higher risk. In fact, compared to the previously discussed countries, the indicative programming documents do not portray a higher urgency to address climate-security and the differences between the focal sectors harmonizing climate-security remains marginal.

4.4 Policy Implementation

Throughout the years, EU delegations and specific Commission departments design the Annual Action Plans (AAPs), which include the specific interventions the EU has planned for a specific year, described in Action Documents (ADs). In principle, these ADs are structured along the indicative programming focal sectors and goals set out in the policy output stage. The following section, again structured according to the risk groups, contains an analysis of the level of policy integration of climate-security into the ADs of the selected countries over the years (see Appendix 3 for results table).

4.4.1 Increased Risk: Cameroon, Nigeria & Uganda

In analyzing the AAPs and ADs of Cameroon, Nigeria and Uganda, the findings clearly indicate that climate-security is better integrated throughout the years. For Cameroon, whereas up until 2019 there would rarely be a project that harmonizes climate-security objectives (1 out of 11 projects adopted), this changes from 2019 onwards when 4 out 12 projects harmonize climate-security and 1 project even prioritizes climate-security, thereby increasing with more than 30%. Most of these projects focus on rural and agricultural development, sectors that are commonly impacted by climate change. This development is in line with the changes in the indicative programming, where the third priority area in the MIP is entirely focussed on mitigating the impacts of climate change.

Comparably, in Nigeria, there is also a gradually improving trend visible, but it remains more limited. In fact, more than 70% of the projects planned in the country (16/22) do not integrate climate-security at all. Even projects focusing on resilience building (2016) or the energy sector (2016, 2017 & 2019) do not make reference to the impacts of climate change, even though these sectors share strong links with climate-related security risks and climate adaptation practices. However, an interesting development can be noticed in the projects focusing on promoting democratic governance (2017 & 2021). Whereas the former project does not mention climate change, the latter project, an extension of the first, includes a description of how climate change impacts security in the country, thereby showing the increased salience of climate-security across sectoral projects. In addition, 80% of the projects adopted after 2020 integrate climate-security weakly to moderately, whereas this percentage is just over 21% in the previous policy cycle. Hence, there is an improved integration of climate-security concerns, albeit only on a weak to moderate level.

Compared to Nigeria, Uganda shows a similarly improving trend. In the previous policy cycle, around 18% (3/17) of the projects integrate climate-security on the level of coordination (2x) and harmonization (1x). Surprisingly, even a project focusing on green economic growth, adopted

in 2018, does not mention the impacts of climate change, even though by focusing on promoting green growth one would assume strong interlinkages with the climate. In the new policy cycle, the ratio of integrating climate-security to some extent increases to 66,7% (4/6). Importantly, in 2022, for the first time a project prioritizes climate-security, which includes clear descriptions of how climate change impacts security and the overall objective is to mitigate these impacts. Overall, the findings indicate that the integration of climate-security has improved over the years, and particularly in the new policy cycle.

In sum, the cases Cameroon, Nigeria and Uganda all show clear trends of improving the integration of climate-security into the development activities, with the ratio of projects focusing on climate-security increasing significantly after 2019. Although the trend is improving, it still remains limited in the cases of Nigeria and Uganda, where most projects are still on the level of coordination. Nonetheless, the trend is in line with the improved integration of climate-security in the policy output stage, as well as in line with the increased risk for experiencing humanitarian crisis the countries are exposed to.

4.4.2 Decreased Risk: Guinea-Bissau & Zimbabwe

In analyzing the projects for Guinea-Bissau, the findings indicate there is an overall weak level of climate-security integration, since in total more than 70% of the projects do not integrate climate-security (10/14). In the new policy cycle, however, 3 out of 4 projects make incidental references to the impacts of climate change, giving it arguably a stronger policy integration of climate-security. However, given that these projects are still on the level of coordination, it remains an overall weak level of integration. Nonetheless, since the integration of climate-security considerations is still improving slightly, it goes against the declining integration trend of the indicative programming documents in the policy output stage, which is remarkable considering the ADs are in principle based on the indicative programming priorities.

Similarly to Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe also follows a trend that is not directly in line with the indicative programming of the country, since this trend would indicate a stronger level of integration in the new policy cycle. Out of all countries analyzed, Zimbabwe has the most projects that prioritize climate-security objectives (3x). Interestingly, however, all these projects are adopted in the previous policy cycle (2016, 2019 & 2020), even though the indicative programme of the previous cycle barely integrates climate-security concerns (instead focusing on agricultural & economic development). That being said, the indicative programme of the previous cycle does include an objective focusing on resilience building (without linking it to climate change), which can ultimately be strongly applied to climate-resilience. Regardless, the implementation phase of Zimbabwe integrates climate-security objectives relatively earlier and stronger than most other countries, showing the strong salience of climate-security in the country early on. As a result, this could be an indication for why the country decreased significantly in its risk for experiencing humanitarian crisis, where it goes from rank 18 in 2014 to rank 41 in 2021.

In sum, Guinea-Bissau and Zimbabwe show different levels of integrating climate-security and have opposing trends in relation to their indicative programming. The results from Guinea-Bissau indicate that climate-security is better integrated throughout the years, although this development is still weak to moderately since the country does not have any project that prioritizes climate-security objectives over others objectives. At the same time, Guinea-Bissau follows an opposing trend compared to its indicative programming, where climate-security objectives were less integrated in the new policy cycle. Interestingly, the findings from Zimbabwe show that climate-security objectives were integrated earlier and stronger than most other countries, with all projects that harmonize and prioritize climate-security having been adopted in the previous policy cycle. This development is also counterintuitive in relation to the indicative programming, where climate-security did not get a prominent place in the previous policy cycle. However, the findings could indicate that the projects are having a successful effect, since the country has decreased

significantly in terms of the risk for experiencing humanitarian crisis. Zimbabwe might thus be more climate-resilient as a result of the EU prioritizing climate-security in the country.

4.4.3 Similar Risk: CAR, Chad, DRC & Somalia

All of the countries which are at a similarly high risk of experiencing humanitarian crisis show an improvement in their level of climate-security integration in the implementation stage. In analyzing the implemented projects in the Central African Republic, there are two projects that effectively harmonize climate-security considerations with other objectives, in particular with agricultural development, employment creation and economic development. The projects include clear descriptions of how climate change affects security through erratic rainfalls and forced migration. Considering that the CAR already had a high risk index at the beginning of the previous policy cycle, it is surprising that it took until 2020 to adopt the first project harmonizing climate-security objectives. Although the indicative programming document of the CAR only incidentally referenced climate change, there was a considerable focus on resilience, food insecurity and agricultural development (focal sector 3), yet almost all projects adopted in this period focus on the consolidation of the state, improving the security sector or promoting democracy (9/10 projects) and hence only one project addressing resilience and agricultural development. In the new policy cycle, this development seems to improve gradually, with 1/4 projects addressing climate-security. Nonetheless, considering the extreme vulnerability of the country to the effects of climate change, it can be considered surprising there is no project prioritizing climate-security.

For Chad, the findings indicate an improvement in the level of climate-security integration throughout the years. Similarly to the CAR, it is surprising it took until 2021 to adopt a project harmonizing climate-security objectives, even though the country was already at a high risk for experiencing humanitarian crisis before. Interestingly, however, and opposed to the CAR, even projects focusing on the consolidation of the state (state & institution building), which are

commonly not associated with climate-security, make reference to the climate-vulnerability of the country and how this affects agricultural production and food insecurity. In addition, throughout the years, there are several projects adopted that address food security, notably in 2016, 2019 and 2021. Whereas the 2016 and 2019 project only incidentally integrate climate security (2016: coordination) or not at all (2019), the 2021 food security project ("la résilience des systèmes alimentaires") clearly harmonizes climate-security objectives. It focuses on win-win solutions by addressing climate-resilience, food insecurity, agricultural production, local governance and social cohesion, showing the increased salience of integrating climate-security. More importantly, in 2022, a project prioritizes (NaturA Tchad) climate-security objectives by addressing tensions over natural resources, sustainable climate-resilient farming and the protection of ecosystems. Additionally, it includes a clear description of how climate change causes floods and droughts, and how this in turn influences migration, causes tensions between communities and affects food insecurity. Thus, throughout the years, there has been a significant improvement of the level of climate-security integration into the programming documents of Chad.

Furthermore, the policy implementation stage of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) shows a very weak level of integration of climate-security objectives, which is surprising considering its high vulnerability to climate change. Although the indicative programme of the DRC suggests a declining trend in terms of climate-security integration, there is neither a declining nor increasing trend visible in the policy implementation stage. Whereas in the previous policy cycle just over 6% of the projects recognizes the effects of climate change (1/16 projects), this percentage increases to 23% in the current policy cycle (3/13 projects). However, it is important to mention that this is still on a weak to moderate level, with only one project harmonizing climate-security with agricultural development and food security and the other projects only incidentally mentioning the effects of climate change. Given the consistently high risk for experiencing crisis, it can be considered surprising the EU dedicates little attention to climate-security in the country.

Lastly, the country with the highest risk for experiencing crisis, Somalia, has significantly improved the integration of climate-security throughout the years. In general, more than half of the projects (53%) include descriptions of the climate-vulnerability of Somalia and the risks it can pose to security. In comparing the old with the new policy cycle, the findings show an increase of more than 20% (from 44% to 67%) of projects that integrate climate-security to some extent. That being said, there is still only one project that harmonizes climate-security objectives (OUTREACH, 2016) and one that prioritizes climate-security (BREACH, 2022). Although there is certainly an improvement visible over the years, given the climate-vulnerability of Somalia, climate-security is not necessarily better integrated compared to the other analyzed countries.

In sum, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia all have an improved level of climate-security integration over the years, although there are considerable differences between the countries. Whereas the CAR and the DRC only show a gradual improvement, with most projects still not integrating climate-security, Chad and Somalia show a stronger trend, with each country having a project prioritizing climate-security. However, in line with the findings from the policy output stage for these countries, the level of climate-security integration in the policy implementation stage is not considerably better compared to the previously discussed countries. Since the CAR, Chad, the DRC and Somalia are at an extremely high risk for experiencing crisis, one would therefore expect the EU to pay considerable more attention to integrating climate-security objectives in these countries.

Chapter 5: Discussion

The findings in this analysis point towards several interesting insights. First, the findings indicate an increased importance of climate-security throughout all stages of the policy cycle as well as improved efforts to integrate climate-security objectives into the EU's development cooperation. In the agenda-setting stage, from the 2011 Agenda for Change the EU started to improve the integration of climate-security objectives. Subsequently, the level of integration significantly improved after the 2019 European Green Deal, which established climate change adaptation and mitigation as a central priority both internally in the EU as well as in the EU's external relations. The agenda-setting stage thus shows a clear trend towards the prioritization of climate-security objectives. However, this prioritization of climate-security objectives in the agenda-setting stage is not reflected equally in the other policy stages, which only come to the level of harmonization.

In the procedural stage, the EU has aimed to further integrate climate-security with the adoption of numerous tools and the creation of a new financial instrument. Although these changes certainly give the EU a favorable position to address climate-security considerations, the findings indicate that the tools are insufficiently used. In fact, the programming documents of the new policy cycle certainly show the increased availability of the tools, by often including the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), Climate Risk Assessments (CRA) or the particular "mainstreaming" efforts in the Action Documents. However, these assessment are not consistently performed nor are they elaborated upon. Hence, the normative political commitment to prioritize climate-security objectives that is visible in the agenda-setting stage does not translate to the policy process stage, even though the tools are widely better available for policy officers working on these issues.

Nonetheless, the increased importance of climate-security objectives in the previous stages still bears fruit in the policy output stage, with 7 out of 9 selected countries adopting focal sectors in the new policy cycle that harmonize climate-security objectives in their indicative programming documents (compared to 1/9 in the previous policy cycle). This harmonization approach is mainly

pursued in focal sectors relating to sustainable agriculture, rural development, food security and climate-resilience (see Appendix 2). In these sectors, climate change considerations are almost consistently included in the design of the projects as a factor that has an impact on the project objectives, e.g. through resilience-building, climate-smart agriculture, or disaster risk reduction. Interestingly, the improved integration of climate-security objectives is clearly visible between the different policy cycles, since the wording of the focal sector does not change considerably between the policy cycles. Instead, there are only marginal changes that allow for the better integration of climate-security. This is exemplified by, for example, a change from "rural development" to "sustainable development" (Cameroon, CAR), from "food security and agriculture" to "green and climate transition" (Uganda), or from "economic development" to "green economic development" (Zimbabwe).

Subsequently, between the policy output and implementation phase, the level of climate-security integration remains relatively stable. However, it is particularly after the 2019 European Green Deal that climate-security is increasingly integrated into the implementation phase (see Appendix 3). Since more than 70% of projects that harmonize and prioritize climate-security objectives are adopted after 2019, this year can be considered as a tipping point in the integration of climate-security. Moreover, the findings also show that the more recently adopted projects are considerably more explicit in the interrelations climate change and insecurity. For example, whereas in projects adopted earlier on, there would be a focus on resilience building against "shocks" or "crises" (see Cameroon, Somalia and Zimbabwe), this changes throughout the years by clearly stating resilience against climate change (see Cameroon, CAR, DRC and Somalia). In addition, if climate change is mentioned in the previous policy cycle, it is more commonly framed as a background development that can potentially impact, for example, agricultural production and food security. In the new policy cycle, this interrelation is more clearly explained by highlighting the strong relationship between the impacts of climate change, such as droughts, floods or forced

migration, and root causes of vulnerability and insecurity (see for example CAR, Chad and Uganda). In turn, this is more easily translated into a harmonized approach by addressing both climate change adaptation and mitigation as well as agricultural development and food insecurity.

Importantly, the increased importance of climate-security objectives does not correspond with the changes in the level of risk the selected countries are exposed to. Even though the selected countries followed different trends in their level of risk for experiencing humanitarian crisis, with countries increasing, decreasing or having a relatively similar level of risk, the findings do not reflect these changes in the policy output and implementation phases. In fact, the EU has improved the integration of climate-security in all countries in the new policy cycle, except for the DRC and Guinea-Bissau in the policy output stage, which does not correspond with the countries decreasing in their level of risk. Moreover, the findings do not show a considerable higher importance or urgency to address climate-security in countries that are extremely vulnerable to effects of climate change, such as the CAR, Chad, the DRC and Somalia, compared to countries which are relatively less at risk, such as Cameroon and Uganda. This is exemplified by the fact that these less-vulnerable countries have a similar number of projects adopted harmonizing and prioritizing climate-security (Uganda, 2x) or even more (Cameroon, 6x). However, one interesting finding relates to Zimbabwe, which decreased significantly in its level of risk for experiencing humanitarian crisis. Besides adopting the most projects prioritizing (3x) climate-security, the EU also adopted these projects considerably earlier than all other projects prioritizing climate-security (2016, 2019 and 2020). This could be a strong indication that prioritizing climate-security in the EU's development cooperation can potentially have a positive effect on the level of risk a country is exposed to.

In linking the findings back to the academic literature, one can clearly see that the normative underpinnings of climate-security objectives still vary considerably across countries and delegations. Although the normative political commitment in the agenda-setting phase can be considered an important driver of integration in the other policy cycles, there still seems to be

considerable differences between specific delegations on whether to harmonize or prioritize climate-security objectives (cf. Brown et al., 2020; De Roeck et al., 2018). This is visible in the fact that many projects across different countries have similar topics and similar activities, like agricultural development, infrastructure development, education, health and so on. But in some projects climate-security objectives were integrated, for example in Somalia (education, infrastructure and health), but in other countries not, for example in Guinea-Bissau (education) and the DRC (education, health, infrastructure). Moreover, similarly to the CPI literature (cf. Kok and De Coninck, 2007; Kok et al., 2008), the focus seems to lie in finding synergies between different objectives, which is also something that the newly created NDICI financial instrument in the policy process specifically emphasizes. Importantly, besides pursuing synergies, the NDICI regulation can certainly be considered as an important driver for the improved integration of climate-security in the policy implementation phase. In particular in relation to the more explicit explanations and descriptions in the actions documents on climate-related security risks. These depictions contribute to the stronger need to address climate-security by going beyond the simple need for climate change adaptation or mitigation (cf. Storbjörk and Hedrén, 2011; Rietig, 2019; De Roeck et al., 2018) and increasing the importance of climate-related security risks.

However, a significant barrier limiting the integration of climate-security objectives remains the institutional and organizational fragmentation (cf. Kassim, 2003; Peters and Wright, 2001), both at EU headquarters, in delegations, and among implementing partners and donors. Although the EU is making efforts to overcome this issue internally, staff at delegations are still significantly constraint in terms of expertise and workload. The oversupply of procedural tools generates competition between the different tasks and themes, which besides resulting in mainstreaming fatigue, also results in certain (climate) objectives being pursued less (cf. De Roeck et al., 2018). Nonetheless, the findings in the policy output and implementation stage clearly indicate that the baseline for integrating climate-security has improved, and that the increased political commitment

and prioritization of climate-security in the agenda-setting stage bears fruit throughout the other stages.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This paper provided a comprehensive analysis of the level of policy integration of climate-security objectives into the EU's development cooperation throughout the different EU policy cycles of 2014-2020 and 2021-2027. Throughout the years, there is a clear trend visible of the improved efforts by the EU to integrate climate-security into the different policy cycle stages. In the agenda-setting stage, this thesis analyzed the guiding EU policies and communications and found that the EU has improved the integration of climate-security over the years. Since 2019, climate-security has become a central priority of the European Commission and through the European Green Deal climate-security has reached a prioritization level in the EU's development cooperation. This prioritization through improved political commitment bears fruit throughout the other stages of the policy cycle. In comparing the policy processes throughout the years, this thesis finds that the EU has improved the procedural tools and resources available to integrate climate-security into its development cooperation. In particular, tools related to climate and environmental impact assessments, conflict analyses, and early-warning monitoring give the EU a favorable position to address climate-security in its development cooperation. Additionally, the increased financial resources available to integrate climate-security, namely the increased 30% spending target and the creation of the NDICI financial envelop, further reinforces the EU's aim to prioritize climate-security. However, due to structural barriers the EU is facing, including the institutional fragmentation, the lack of human resources in delegations and the lack of climate-expertise among different staff members with varying sectoral responsibilities, EU officials working on development cooperation are overburdened by procedural requirements, resulting in a sense of "mainstreaming fatigue" and leading to officials not making use of the tools available to integrate climate-security. These barriers result in significant variation in the level of integration in the policy output and policy implementation stage. For the policy output and implementation stage, although the findings indicate that all countries, except the Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea-Bissau in their

policy outputs, improve the integration of climate-security by creating focal sectors in the new policy cycle that harmonize climate-security objectives, this integration is not done systematically across the different countries. In particular, the level of integration does not correspond with the level of risk for experiencing humanitarian crisis the respective countries are exposed to. Whereas one would expect countries particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, such as Somalia, the Central African Republic, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to have integrated climate-security considerably better than other less-vulnerable countries, this is not reflected in the policy output or implementation phase. Nonetheless, in general the findings indicate that the baseline for integrating climate-security has improved in the policy implementation stage, with more projects *at least* integrating climate-security to the level of coordination. This is particular visible for projects adopted after 2019, thereby following the prioritization efforts made in the agenda-setting stage through the European Green Deal and the new Commission Presidency. In linking these findings back to some of the questions asked in the introduction, this thesis can thus conclude that the EU's increased discourse on the topic has resulted in improved outcomes. Hence, although there is still considerable room for improvement, the EU has certainly bridged part of the gap between theory and practice. Through this analysis, this thesis has provided a comprehensive overview of how the level of climate-security integration has developed over time. In doing so, this thesis has cleared up parts of the ambiguity surrounding the level of climate-security integration in the EU's development cooperation.

Importantly, since the current policy cycle is still ongoing, this research only represents a partial overview of the level of integration in the new policy cycle. As such, future research could complement the conducted analysis by reviewing the conducted projects at the end of the current policy cycle, as well as extending the research to different countries and continents. Moreover, the findings point to relevant context specific conditions that allow for the integration of climate-security objectives. Future research on the topic could therefore investigate what conditions would

best allow for the integration of climate-security objectives. Such research could, for example, focus on the way in which mainstreaming fatigue can be overcome or how political leadership can best promote the integration of climate-security among policy officials, practitioners, implementing partners and donors working on these issues. Furthermore, since the findings indicate that the level of risk does not necessarily determine what type of development cooperation a country receives, future research can investigate why this is the case or why the integration of climate-security does not follow the same lines of the level of climate-vulnerability of particular countries. In turn, this can help scrutinize the policy process phase in which the indicative programming priorities get set, as well as to help improve the EU's development cooperation in general.

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Appendix 1: Operational Framework

Table 1: Adapted Operational Framework of De Roeck et al., (2018) to assess the level of policy integration of climate-security.

Level of integration Policy cycle stage	No integration	Weak to moderate integration Coordination	Harmonization	Successful integration Principled prioritization	Consulted material
Agenda-setting	- No reference to climate-security.	- Climate-security integration framed in guiding policy documents as add-on component in external relations and development aid activities. - Focusing on end-of-pipe measures (e.g. reducing carbon footprint).	- Climate-security framed in guiding policy documents as standing on equal terms with development activities. - Focus on finding synergies and win-win solutions between development aid activities and climate-security.	- Climate-security integration framed in guiding policy documents as absolute priority within development aid activities. - Focus on installing climate-security as overriding objectives for development aid practitioner.	- Guiding EU policy documents.
Policy Process	- No specific procedures in place for the integration of climate-related security risks.	- Integration tools intended and used for the integration of climate concerns in sectoral aid activities.	- Integration tools intended and used for finding synergies and win-win solutions between sectoral development aid activities and climate-security.	- Integration tools intended and used for redesigning sectoral aid activities in order to prioritize climate-security.	- EU guidelines, working documents, tools, reflection papers.
Policy Output	- No climate-security integration in indicative programming policies.	- Climate-security references in the outlining of sectoral activities but limited to incidental mentioning and not interlinked with sectoral policy priorities. - Recognition of climate change as having security risks (e.g. on food security), but without a description of how climate change affects other sectoral objectives or without reference to any response measures.	- Clear image or description of how climate-security affects sectoral activities and/or how the integration of climate-security can improve overall policy objectives. - Recognition of climate change as having security risks and on equal footing with other root causes of unrest, lack of development, and poverty.	- Climate-security as central priority along which other sectoral activities are structured.	- National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), and Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs).
Policy Implementation	- No climate-security integration in project designs.	- Climate-security integration in project design limited to incidental mentioning, not interlinked with project designs and objectives. (e.g. solely as operational risk or background development) - Climate actions mentioned, not necessarily linked to insecurity, and as secondary objective or less.	- Clear image of how climate-security affects the project design and/or clear description of how the need to tackle climate-security is essential to reaching the project objectives. - Climate-security described in the project rationale and given prominent position vis-a-vis other objectives. One or more specific objectives included on climate-security.	- Climate-security as central priority along which the project is designed and structured. - Climate-security as central priority in the project rationale and as main objective of the project.	- Annual Action Plans (AAPs).

Appendix 2: Results Policy Output stage

Table 2: Level of climate-security integration in the policy output stage of the 2014-2020 MFF policy cycle.

Country	No climate-security integration	Coordination		Harmonization		Prioritization	
	Focal sector	Focal sector	Evidence	Focal sector	Evidence	Focal sector	Evidence
Cameroon	Governance	Rural development	Sustainable rural development essential to address food insecurity and to mitigate the effects of climate change (p. 18).				
CAR	Economic governance and social service provision; Security Sector Reform and democratic governance	Rural development and job creation	Climate change recognized as affecting food production and the need to build resilience, but incidental and not interlinked with sectoral objectives (p. 31).				
Chad	Rule of Law	Food security, nutrition and rural development	The context of a changing climate recognized as influencing food production (p. 11).				
		Natural resource management	Climate change recognized as influencing the degradation of natural resource (p. 13).				
DRC	Health in connection to LRRD; Governance and Rule of Law	Environment and sustainable agriculture	Improving agricultural development for food security in the context of a changing climate (p. 17).				
Guinea-Bissau	Consolidation of democratic governance; Health; RIP: Employment generation; Governance capacity development			Sustainable Rural Development	Promoting sustainable and inclusive socio-economic growth in rural areas to reduce poverty, malnutrition and vulnerability to climate change impacts as general objective of Priority Area 2 (p. 26).		
Nigeria	Sustainable energy and access to electricity; Rule of law, governance and democracy	Health, nutrition and resilience	Impacts of climate change (droughts and food crises) affecting target area (p. 19).				
Somalia	State building and peace building; Education	Food security and building resilience	Link between 'shocks' (droughts, floods and civil unrest) and resilience building and food security (p. 11).				
Uganda	Transport infrastructure; Good governance	Food security and agriculture	Climate adaptation and climate-resilience mentioned for the purpose of food security and agricultural development (p. 18).				
Zimbabwe	Health; Governance and institution building	Agricultural-based economic development	Sectoral policies and risk analysis in the area of climate change is reviewed, developed and/or mainstreamed (p. 16).				

Table 3: Level of climate-security integration in the policy output stage of the 2021-2027 MFF policy cycle.

Country	No climate-security integration	Coordination		Harmonization		Prioritization	
	Focal sector	Focal sector	Evidence	Focal sector	Evidence	Focal sector	Evidence
Cameroon	Governance, democratization, peace and stability; Inclusive growth, sustainable jobs and the private sector			Green Deal: Sustainable Development and Climate Action	Clear description of climate-related security risks (e.g. climate-induced migration, scarce natural resources) (p. 6), and climate action as key priority area (p. 13).		
CAR	Peace, Security, Justice and Governance; Human development			Green Transition and Sustainable development	Recognition of climate change (in particular drought) as a root cause of unrest and tensions, and how this affects agricultural development. Results aimed at a building climate-resilience (p. 23).		
Chad	Inclusive human development	Governance, democratization, peace and security	Forced migration due to climate change as security risk (p. 12).	Green Deal	Clear description of climate-related security risks: including the fluctuating rainfalls; pastoralist vs herders; forced displacement. One objective focusing on climate change (p. 23)		
DRC	Governance, peace and security; Human development; Sustainable development						
Guinea-Bissau	Human development; Green and inclusive economy; Good governance and stability						
Nigeria	Human development	Governance, peace and migration	Enhancing conflict resolution mechanisms and initiatives related to climate change (p. 17).	Green and digital economy	Focus on combining climate change mitigation and adaptation with job creation, livelihoods and economic development in pursuit of synergies (p. 4 & 7).		
Somalia	Governance and peace building	Inclusive and green economic growth	Climate change education (p. 6), as well as green climate-resilient economic growth and renewable energy (p. 9).	Resilience building and social inclusion	Clear image of how climate change leads to security risks, including displacement, food insecurity, and conflict. climate investments framed as win-win solution: cost-efficient, sustainable, and good for displaced and host-community (p. 10), as well as good for state building (p. 17).		
Uganda	Sustainable and inclusive growth and jobs; Democratic governance and social inclusion			Green and climate transition	Focus on combining disaster risk management with climate change adaptation and natural resource governance, as well as biodiversity protection as regional security risk (p. 8).		
Zimbabwe	Good governance and citizen's rights	Social recovery and human development	Addressing food and nutrition insecurity (p. 22).	Green economic growth	Given the increased exposure to challenges caused by climate change, there is a need for an overall approach which promotes economic recovery whilst simultaneously addressing environmental and climate dimensions (p. 13).		

Appendix 3: Results Policy Implementation stage

Table 4: Level of climate-security integration in the policy implementation stage of Cameroon between 2014-2023.

Country	No climate-security integration	Coordination		Harmonization		Prioritization	
	Project (year)	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence
Cameroon	- "Facilité de Coopération Technique 2015-2017"(2015) - "Programme d'appui à la citoyenneté active – PROCIVIS"(2016) - "l'action pour la Facilité de Coopération Technique II 2017 - 2021"(2017) - "Dispositif d'appui à la compétitivité du Cameroun (DACC)" (2018) - la Facilité de coopération technique III (2019) - "Sustainable Cocoa initiative in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Cameroon" (2020) - "Appui à la société civile au Cameroun et à sa contribution à l'égalité de genre, la paix et à la cohésion sociale dans les régions en crise" (2022)	- "Programme d'Amélioration de la Gouvernance en Milieu Forestier" (2016) - "Programme National de Développement Participatif au Cameroun PNDP-FED" (2016) - "Contrat de réforme sectorielle – développement rural" (2017) - "Contribution à la facilité d'investissement pour l'Afrique (AfIF) en faveur du secteur énergétique au Cameroun" (2017) - "Contribution à la plateforme d'investissement pour l'Afrique (AIP) en faveur du secteur énergétique au Cameroun" (2018)	Project focuses on sustainable resource management (forestry). It combats climate change through reforestation (p. 8). Clear description of how climate change exacerbates problems through more frequent and more violent droughts, storms, floods and landslides, mudflows, rock falls and landslides (p.8); The project states to integrate climate change adaptation measures into the feasibility, design and implementation stages of activities and work contracts, but this is not reflected in objectives or activities (p. 12). Project focuses on agricultural development and tackling food security, and only incidentally climate change is mentioned (p. 17). Climate change mitigation as cross-cutting issue throughout the project design, but solely as add-on component of renewable energy promotion (p. 10). The priority is economic and social development through increased access to renewable energy and as side component climate change will be mitigated (p. 11).	- "Programme de développement économique et social des villes secondaires exposées à des facteurs d'instabilité (PRODESV)" (2017) - "l'Accompagnement des mutations du bassin cotonnier du Cameroun – ABC"(2019) - "Contribution à la Plateforme d'investissement pour l'Afrique (AIP) en faveur du secteur industriel du septentrion camerounais" (2020) - "Villes vertes inclusives et durables" (2021) - "Paysage vert Sud/Sud-Est Cameroun" (2022)	Clear description of how climate change affects security and risks of migration (p. 5); Mentioning of several climate-security measures (p. 10). Activities focus on resilience building against shocks, as well as providing socioeconomic opportunities for refugees and migrants (p. 11). The specific objectives of the action are to strengthen climate change resilience. Clear inclusion of climate-security in activities: Land tenure security, sustainable land management and agro-pastoral conflict prevention are strengthened, taking into account the effects of climate change (p. 15). The project includes clear descriptions of how climate change affects security and emphasizes the importance of integrating climate security (p. 4). The project includes many reference to climate-security and importance of addressing it (p. 7). Climate-resilience on equal footing as other objectives (p. 10). The project focuses on sustainable forestry management and includes clear description of climate risks (p. 8). Climate-resilience as one of the main objectives (p. 11).	- "Septentrion vert et résilient" (2021)	Recognition of climate change as having security impacts, clear description of how it impacts security and all SOs are structured around addressing climate-security (p. 10).

Table 5: Level of climate-security integration in the policy implementation stage of the Central African Republic between 2014-2023.

Country	No climate-security integration	Coordination		Harmonization		Prioritization	
	Project (year)	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence
CAR	- "le Programme d'Appui à la Consolidation de l'Etat" (2015) - "le Programme d'Appui à la Construction de l'État – RCA I (PACAE-RCA I)" (2017) - "Programme d'appui à la démocratie en République centrafricaine" (2018) - "Projet d'appui à la mise en œuvre et à la coordination du FED – PAMOCFED" (2018) - "programme d'appui à la réforme du secteur de la sécurité et à la gouvernance en République centrafricaine" (2018) - "Renforcement et participation de la société civile centrafricaine (REPASOCC)" (2019) - "Le Projet d'appui au processus électoral en République centrafricaine - PAPEC" (2020) - "programme d'appui à la réforme du secteur de la sécurité et à la gouvernance en République centrafricaine" (2020) - "le Programme d'appui à la consolidation de l'État – RCA II (PACAE-RCA II)" (2020) - "Programme de renforcement du système de santé en République centrafricaine" (2021) - "Facilité de Coopération" (2022) - "Programme d'appui au secteur de l'éducation en République centrafricaine (RCA)" (2022)			- "Résilience rurale et création d'emplois" (2020) - "Programme NaturAfrica - Protection de la biodiversité en République centrafricaine (RCA)" (2022)	Clear description of how climate change has resulted in failed agriculture, food insecurity and fragility (p. 4), climate-resilience as one of the key objectives together with the promotion of employment and value-chains (p. 11). Clear description of how climate change affects security, including through erratic rainfall and migration from neighbouring countries (p. 7), and climate change adaptation and mitigation on equal footing with green economy development and preservation of biodiversity (p. 8).		

Table 6: Level of climate-security integration in the policy implementation stage of Chad between 2014-2023.

Country	No climate-security integration	Coordination		Harmonization		Prioritization	
	Project (year)	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence
Chad	- "Appui à l'Ordonnateur National au Tchad" (2015) - "le programme d'appui à la gestion concertée des aires protégées et écosystèmes fragiles du Tchad (APEF)" (2016) - "l'amélioration de la sécurité intérieure au Tchad" (2016) - "Programme d'appui à la consolidation de l'État au Tchad (ACET) – Phase 2" (2016) - "Consolidation des acquis des services de l'ordonnateur national au Tchad (CASON)"(2018) - "Facilité de coopération technique (FCT) du Tchad" (2018) - "Programme d'appui à la gouvernance au Tchad (PAG 2)" (2018) - "le programme d'appui à la crédibilité et à la transparence des élections au Tchad (PAPEL-ACTET)" (2019) - "le projet FORMA-NUT – Formation pour la Nutrition" (2019) - "le projet d'appui au Parlement et aux processus électoraux (PAPPE)" (2019) - "Appui à la tenue du référendum constitutionnel et des élections présidentielles au Tchad" (2021) - "Programme d'appui à la transition politique et à la consolidation de l'État au Tchad (contrat d'appui à la consolidation de l'État et à la résilience – CCER 4)" (2021) - "Améliorer la qualité et l'équité du système éducatif au Tchad (AQUEDUCT)" (2022)	- "le programme d'appui à la consolidation de l'Etat - République tchadienne" (2015); - "Sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Tchad (SAN)" (2016) - "Développement intégré des communes du Nord du Tchad (COM-NORD)" (2018) - "Programme d'appui à la consolidation de l'État au Tchad (ACET) - Phase 3" (2018) - "Projet de réhabilitation et l'extension de l'adduction en eau potable de la ville de N'Djamena en faveur d'une croissance inclusive" (2018)	Incidental mentioning of the need to address climate-resilience given the dependency and vulnerability of the agricultural sector (p. 4). Although this project addresses a clear climate-related security risk, namely food insecurity, this project only incidentally integrates climate change in this project. And when it does, it is solely as background development or operational risk (p. 3 & 9). climate change is not mentioned in the project activities (p. 12). Project emphasizes climate-vulnerability (p. 4) and the importance of promoting adaptation (p. 10), but this does not come back in the project's objectives or activities. The project makes significant references to the impacts of climate change and how vulnerable Chad is to climate change. The project recognizes how climate change affects agricultural production and food security (p. 5, 6 & 8). Access to water is recognized as an important way to build climate-resilience. Climate change is included throughout the project design, but in a limited fashion. For example, it mentions how vulnerable chad is to climate change, and how important access to water is for sustainable development. It mentions that access to water is way for climate change adaptation. But, it lacks a clear description of how climate change affects the accessibility of water, and instead frames climate change more as a external development. Moreover, none of the objectives or activities include climate change (p. 3, 9 & 10).	- "Programme de renforcement de la résilience des systèmes alimentaires (le goût de la vie)" (2021)	The project mentions climate change dependency and vulnerability and the importance of adaptation. Additionally, the objectives and activities relate to climate risks (agricultural development, food security, pastors and herders), and they focus on resilience against shocks, which climate change is included under earlier. It focuses on win-win and synergies by addressing climate-resilience, food insecurity, agricultural production, local governance and social cohesion (p. 5-9).	- "NaturA Tchad" (2022)	The project addresses several climate-related security risks, namely tensions over natural resources, sustainable climate resilient farming and protection of ecosystems. All objectives are centered around climate-security (p. 8). Additionally, it includes a clear description of how climate change causes floods and droughts, and how this in turn influence migration, causes tensions between communities and affects food insecurity (p. 6).

Table 7: Level of climate-security integration in the policy implementation stage of the Democratic Republic of Congo between 2014-2023.

Country	No climate-security integration	Coordination		Harmonization		Prioritization	
	Project (year)	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence
DRC	- "Facilité de coopération technique" (2015); - "PP-AP Projet d'amélioration de la prise en charge destinée aux victimes de violence sexuelle dans l'Est de la République démocratique du Congo." (2015); - "Accès à la justice et réparation pour les victimes de violations graves des droits de l'homme et du droit international humanitaire en République démocratique du Congo" (2015); - "Socio-economic reintegration of children and female sex workers living around artisanal mines in Mwenga Territory, South Kivu Province, and Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo" (2015) - "Programme de renforcement de l'offre et développement de l'accès aux soins de santé en République démocratique du Congo" (2016); - "Projet d'Appui Coordonné pour une gestion des finances publiques plus participative, responsable et transparente en République démocratique du Congo" (2016); - "Réhabilitation de la Route Nationale 1 – section Tshikapa-Mbuji-Mayi" en République démocratique du Congo" (2016) - "Appui au processus électoral en la République démocratique du Congo" (2017) - "Programme de renforcement de l'offre et développement de l'accès aux soins de santé en République démocratique du Congo" (2018); - "le projet d'appui à l'ordonnateur national du FED IV" (2018) - "Programme d'appui à la participation citoyenne de la société civile dans la gestion du bien commun en République démocratique du Congo (PARC-RDC)" (2019); - "l'Ordonnateur National du Fonds européen de développement (FED) (V)" (2019); - "la Facilité de coopération technique 6" (2019) - "Deuxième programme d'appui à la réforme de la justice (PARJ II)" (2020); - "Programme d'appui à la réforme de la police (PARP – Phase III)" (2020); - "la contribution au Fonds fiduciaire multi-bailleurs pour le renforcement de la gestion des finances publiques et de la redevabilité en République démocratique du Congo (PROFIT-Congo)" (2020) - "Facilité de coopération" (2021); - "Unis pour l'égalité des genres" (2021); - "Unis pour la santé et l'éducation" (2021); - "Emergency response to the Virunga–North Kivu triple crisis" (2021); - "Unis pour la paix et la sécurité" (2021); - "Unis pour la prospérité" (2021) - "Appui à la coordination de la coopération" (2022); - "Unis pour la démocratie" (2022); - "Unis pour l'Education" (2022); - "Unis pour la santé, phase 2" (2022)	- "Environnement et agriculture durable pour la sauvegarde des sites biologiques prioritaires de la République démocratique du Congo" (2015) - "Unis pour le développement durable" (2021) - "Unis pour l'agriculture et l'alimentation" (2022)	The project recognizes the effect of climate change on agricultural development and it has adaptation as one of the objectives to increase food security and biodiversity protection (p. 5 & 11). The planned action is to support sustainable forest management in five protected areas and contributes to the efforts to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change and the natural disasters that may result from it. However, climate change is only incidentally mentioned and how climate change affects the project objectives is not explained (p. 9). The project focuses on agricultural development and makes little reference to climate change. It only includes a description of how food security is caused by environmental degradation and floods in the mandatory "mainstreaming" box (p. 12). None of the objectives or activities include climate change (p. 8).	- "Action de résilience pour la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle en République démocratique du Congo" (2020)	The project focuses on agricultural development and food security and includes a clear description of how climate change affects agricultural development and food security (p. 4).		

Table 8: Level of climate-security integration in the policy implementation stage of Guinea-Bissau between 2014-2023.

Country	No climate-security integration	Coordination		Harmonization		Prioritization	
	Project (year)	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence
Guinea-Bissau	- "Facilité de coopération technique V (TCF V) et Programme d'appui à l'ordonnateur national du FED pour la Guinée-Bissau" (2016)	- "Cooperation Facility" (2021)	The project supports the MIP priorities and recognizes the security risks posed by climate change and how climate-vulnerable the country is (p. 7).	- "Programme pour la résilience et les opportunités socio-économiques – PRO-GB" (2018)	Clear descriptions of how climate change affects security and the vulnerability of the country (p. 5). The project aims to strengthen resilience and enhance socioeconomic opportunities, and agriculture (p. 17).		
	- "la Poursuite de l'appui au Programme intégré de santé maternelle et infantile (PIMI II) en Guinée Bissau" (2016)	- "Support Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn and Child Health towards a Universal Health Coverage System (PIMI III)" (2021)	The project recognizes the risks posed by climate change and how climate-vulnerable the country is (p. 3 and 8).				
	- "PALOP-TL Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF) and support to the Coordination of the PALOP-TL/EU Cooperation Programme" (2017)	- "EU for green and inclusive cities (EU4GIC)" (2022)	The project focuses on improving the living conditions of urban people, with incidental references to climate change. Mostly in the context of the need to build climate-resilience and improve the water and waste management (p. 8).				
	- "Programme for Consolidating Economic Governance and Public Finance Management systems in the PALOP-TL (Pro PALOP-TL SAI – Phase II)" (2018)						
	- "Support to the Electoral Cycles of Guinea-Bissau 2018-2019" (2018)						
	- "Employment promotion in income generating activities in the cultural sector" (2018)						
	- "Relance de l'enseignement et la formation professionnelle et technique pour l'emploi (RESET) en Guinée-Bissau" (2018)						
	- "Planification, statistiques et systèmes d'information au service du développement de l'éducation (PESIDE) en Guinée-Bissau" (2019)						
	- "Support to the Electoral Cycles of Guinea-Bissau 2018-2019" (2019)						
	- "Facilité de coopération technique VI (FCT VI)" (2019)						
	- "EU for Education and Youth Employability (EU4EYE)" (2022)						

Table 9: Level of climate-security integration in the policy implementation stage of Nigeria between 2014-2023.

Country	No climate-security integration	Coordination		Harmonization		Prioritization	
	Project (year)	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence
Nigeria	- "Support to the Office of the National Authorising Officer IV – Nigeria" (2015) - "Technical Cooperation Facility IV- Nigeria" (2015) - "Contribution to the African Investment Facility (AfIF) in support of the Energy Sector in Nigeria" (2016) - "EU Support to Energy Sector in Nigeria- Phase 1" (2016) - "EU Support to the Health Sector in Nigeria Phase" (2016) - "Action Against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants in Nigeria" (2016) - "EU Support to Strengthening Resilience in Northern Nigeria" (2016) - "Support to Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption in Nigeria" (2016) - "Agents for Citizen-driven Transformation (ACT)" (2017) - "EU Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria (EU-SDGN)" (2017) - "Second Contribution to the African Investment Facility (AfIF) in support of the Energy Sector in Nigeria" (2017) - "Support for Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism and Violent Extremism" (2017) - "Public Outreach on the Implementation of Key National Strategies & EU-Nigeria relations" (2018) - "EU Support to Energy Sector in Nigeria - Phase 2" (2019) - "EU Support to Innovation and Jobs for Youth in Nigeria (INN-JOBS)" (2021)	- "EU Support to Response, Recovery and Resilience in Borno State" (2017) - "Support for reintegration and reconciliation of former armed non- state combatants and Boko Haram associates" (2019) - "Cooperation Facility (CF)" (2021) - "EU Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria (EU-SDGN) Phase II" (2021) - "EU- Education and Youth Empowerment in north-western Nigeria" (2022)	Climate-related security risks mentioned as operational risk (p. 7), and climate change and disaster risk reduction mentioned as receiving extra attention (p. 9). The project briefly mentions the need for climate change adaptation, but the emphasis is put on creating alternative livelihoods which should be climate-resilient (p. 13). The project is in support of the MIP priorities, which includes the Green transition. Several references to the need to address climate change throughout the project design (p. 3, 5, 6, 8 & 9). Brief description of how climate change affects security (p. 4). Climate change awareness and adaptation included in education (p. 5, 7 & 11).	- "Support for early recovery from conflict and resilience building in Yobe State" (2018) - "EU- Support to Agriculture Value Chain Facility (EU-VACE) NG" (2021)	Clear description of how climate change affects security (p. 4, 7 & 12). One of the main objectives focuses on building climate-resilient livelihoods, thereby combining climate change adaptation with agricultural development and employment (p. 14). The project seeks win-win solutions for climate change mitigation and job creation, as well as to promote food security and tackle migration. It clearly describes how climate change affects security and emphasizes the importance of an integrated approach (p. 4, 6, 7 & 8).		

Table 10: Level of climate-security integration in the policy implementation stage of Somalia between 2014-2023.

Country	No climate-security integration	Coordination		Harmonization		Prioritization	
	Project (year)	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence
Somalia	- "Operational Support (Air Transport) Services" (2015) - "Education Sector Development Support for Regions in South and Central Somalia" (2015) - "Somalia Education Sector Support Programme (SESSP)" (2016) - "Governance Consolidation Programme for Somalia (GOVCON)" (2016) - "Technical and Operational Support to Development Assistance to Somalia III" (2016) - "Promoting Human Security in Somalia" (2022) - "Strengthening Inclusive Governance in Somalia (SIGS)" (2022)	- "Regional Corridors Infrastructure Programme (SRCIP)" (2018) - "INCLUCITY - Support to inclusive and sustainable development of two strategic coastal cities in Somalia" (2019) - "Support to COVID-19 Response Plan - Delivery of Health, Water and Sanitation Services for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and vulnerable groups in Somalia" (2020) - "Education Access and Quality Improvement Programme (EAQIP)" (2021) - "Economic Governance and Anti-Corruption Programme" (2022) - "Somalia Cooperation Facility I" (2022)	The project recognizes the risks posed by climate change (p. 4, 14 & 15), but the objectives focus on infrastructure and economic development. Incidental references to climate-related security risks and how it impacts the country (forced migration due to natural disasters, droughts)(p. 4, 7 & 17). Climate-related security risks as operational risk (p. 4). Recognition of climate-vulnerability and climate-related security risks (p. 4 & 7). DRR and climate adaptation training included in education (p. 9). Recognition of climate-related security risks and climate change as operational risk (p. 4 & 9). The project is in support of the MIP priorities, which includes resilience building. Incidental references to climate-related security risks (p. 4 & 5).	- "OUTREACH Programme - Partnerships for Inclusive Economic Growth" (2016)	The project clearly describes the influence of climate change on agricultural production and food insecurity. It includes activities combining climate change mitigation and adaptation practices with agricultural development and livelihoods creation and thus win-win solutions (p. 3, 4, 6 & 10).	- "BREACH - Boosting Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Change in Somalia" (2022)	Clear description of how climate impacts security, including food insecurity, migration, and livelihoods. Climate-related security risks as main rationale, problem-analysis and as overall objective of the project (p. 4-8).

Table 11: Level of climate-security integration in the policy implementation stage of Uganda between 2014-2023.

Country	No climate-security integration	Coordination		Harmonization		Prioritization	
	Project (year)	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence
Uganda	- "Strengthening Uganda's Anti-Corruption Response 'SUGAR'" (2016) - "Civil Society in Uganda Support Programme (CUSP)" (2016) - "EU support to the Democratic Governance Facility in Uganda" (2016) - "Support to Uganda's Financial Management and Accountability Programme (FINMAP III)" (2016) - "Uganda Technical Support Programme (TSP) 1" (2016) - "Contribution to the African Investment Facility: Support to Further Development of the Northern Corridor Road Axis in Uganda - Kampala-Jinja Expressway" (2016) - "Institutional Capacity Building for the Transport Sector in Uganda" (2016) - "Justice and Accountability Reform (JAR)" (2017) - "EU Contribution to the Democratic Governance Facility in Uganda - Phase II" (2018) - "Promoting Inclusive Green Economy in Uganda" (2018) - "Contribution to the Development Initiative for Northern Uganda through the rehabilitation of the Tororo-Gulu railway" (2018); - "Fiscal decentralisation and service delivery" (2019) - "Inclusive Green Economy Uptake Programme (GreenUP)" (2019) - "Technical Support Programme 2 (TSP2)" (2019) - "Sustainable Business for Uganda (SB4U) 1.0" (2022) - "Gender for Development Uganda (G4DU)" (2022)	- "Developing a Market -Oriented and Environmentally Sustainable Beef Meat Value- Chain in Uganda" (2016) - "Promoting Commercial Aquaculture in Uganda" (2016) - "Last mile electrification support project" (2022) - "Partnering for Forests in Uganda" (2022) - "Green Support Facility" (2022)	Reference to climate-resilience (p. 3) and negative environmental impacts as operational risk (p. 7). Emphasizes the need for climate change adaptation and mitigation practises (p. 9 & 10), and negative environmental impacts as operational risk (p. 6). Incidental references to climate-related security risks (p. 7 & 10), but focus is on economic growth. Although the project has climate change adaptation as overall objective, the design of the project rarely touches upon climate change and security or how it affects the project objectives. The focus is on environmental protection and economic growth opportunities (p. 7). The project is specifically in support of the MIP priorities centred around the green transition, sustainable development and climate action (p. 5).	- "The Development initiative for Northern Uganda" (2016)	The project recognizes the negative impacts climate change can have on security, in particular food security and migration (p. 2, 3 & 7) . It aims to increase resilience against climate change and promote agricultural development in a climate-smart way. As such, it focusses on building synergies between different ojectives (agricultural development, livelihoods, economy, climate change) (p. 14 & 15).	- "Climate Action for Sustainable Development in Uganda" (2022)	Clear description of how climate impacts security. Climate-related security risks as main rationale, problem-analysis and as overall objective of the project (p. 4, 5 & 8).

Table 12: Level of climate-security integration in the policy implementation stage of Zimbabwe between 2014-2023.

Country	No climate-security integration	Coordination		Harmonization		Prioritization	
	Project (year)	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence	Project (year)	Evidence
Zimbabwe	- "Support to National Authorising Office (NAO) and the Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF) - Zimbabwe" (2015) - "Contribution to Health Transition Fund IV" (2015) - "Improving Health Outcomes for the Population of Zimbabwe" (2015) - "Support to Institutional Strengthening in the Framework of the New Constitution" (2015) - "Promoting migration governance in Zimbabwe" (2015) - "Public Finance Management Enhancement Programme for Zimbabwe" (2015) - "Technical Cooperation Facility V – TCF V" (2015) - "Support to Civil Society in Zimbabwe" (2016) - "Support to the consolidation of the democratic process in Zimbabwe" (2016) - "Support to the Rule of Law and Access to Justice for All" (2016) - "Improving Health Outcomes for the Population of Zimbabwe II" (2019) - "Zimbabwe-EU Technical Cooperation Facility" (2019) - "Support to the Zimbabwean electoral process" (2022)	- "Zimbabwe Agriculture-based economic recovery programme" (2015) - "Zimbabwe Agricultural Growth Programme (ZAGP)" (2015) - "Improving Health Outcomes for the Population of Zimbabwe" (2022)	The project tackles food insecurity and makes reference to 'external shocks' but not to climate change (p. 1). Incidental references to climate change impacts and the need for climate-resilience, but focus is on economic growth (p. 2 & 7). The project includes the need for climate-resilient health and includes a description of how climate change affects security (p. 5, 8, 10 & 12).	- "Resilience Building and Food and Nutrition Security Programme" (2015)	Focus is on building resilience (against shocks, not necessarily climate), as well as support inclusive growth. Additionally, focus on agricultural development to reduce malnutrition and food insecurity. The project focuses on win-win solutions (p. 2, 5, 9 & 10).	- "Zimbabwe Natural Resource Management" (2016) - "Resilience Building in Zimbabwe" (2019) - "Support to vulnerable people in Zimbabwe" (2020)	The overall aim is to promote sustainable and climate-resilient natural resource management. Focus on climate change adaptation and mitigation in activities (p. 4 & 7). Resilience as central priority along which the project is structured. Clear description of how climate change creates security risks, in particular to agricultural production and food security. Activities included on climate change adaptation and mitigation and DRR (p. 2, 4 & 9). Resilience against climate change shocks as overall objective. Rest of the project structured along these lines. Includes a clear description of how climate change affects security. All activities shaped around climate change adaptation and mitigation practises (p. 3 & 8).

Appendix 4: List of analyzed documents

2006:
- Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: The European Consensus, 2006/C 46/01, (Council of the European Union: Brussels, February 2006)

2008:
- High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Commission, Climate Change and International Security: Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, S/113/08 (European Commission: Brussels, March 2008).

2011:
- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda For Change, COM/2011/0637, (European Commission: Brussels, 2011).

2012:
- European Commission communication on The EU approach to Resilience: learning from food security crises, COM/2012/0586, (European Commission: Brussels, 2012)

2013:
- European Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS), EU Climate Diplomacy for 2015 and beyond, Reflection Paper (European Commission: Brussels, January. 2013).
- EU Joint communication on the The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, (JOIN/2013/030).
- General Secretariat of the Council, Council Conclusions on laying down the EU Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) for the years 2014 to 2020, Council conclusion 1311/2013 (Council of the European Union: Brussels, December 2013).

2014
- European Commission, Multi-annual Indicative Programme for 2014-2020 for Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Retrievable from https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries_nl
- European Commission, Annual Action Plans (AAP) 2014-2020 for Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Retrievable from https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries_nl

2016:
- European External Action Service (EEAS), Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EEAS: Brussels, June 2016).

2017:
- Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission, 2017/C 210/01, (Council of the European Union: Brussels, June 2017).
- European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, JOIN(2017) 21 final (European Commission: Brussels, July 2017).
- European Council conclusions, operationalizing the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, (9417/17).
- General Secretariat of the Council, Council Conclusions on Implementing the EU Global Strategy —Strengthening Synergies between EU Climate and Energy Diplomacies and Elements for Priorities for 2017, Council conclusions 6981/17 (Council of the European Union: Brussels, June 2017).

2018:
- European Commission, Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), Environment and Climate Change Mainstreaming in EU Development Cooperation, Briefing note for the OECD DAC peer-learning visit (DG DEVCO: Brussels, Sep. 2018).
- European Commission, Evaluation of the EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change, Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2018) 461 final (European Commission: Brussels, Dec. 2018).
- European Commission, Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2018) 738 final (European Commission: Brussels, Dec. 2018).
- European External Action Service (EEAS), Climate, Peace and Security: The Time for Action, Meeting summary of high-level event hosted by High Representative Federica Mogherini (EEAS: Brussels, June 2018).
- General Secretariat of the Council, Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, Council conclusions 6125/18 (Council of the European Union: Brussels, Feb. 2018).

2019:
- General Secretariat of the Council, Council Conclusions on the Sahel, Council Conclusions 9102/19 (Council of the European Union: Brussels, May 2019).
- European Commission, Directorate General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), Going Climate-Neutral by 2050: A Strategic Long-Term Vision for a Prosperous, Modern, Competitive and Climate-Neutral EU Economy (European Union: Strasbourg, 2019).
- European External Action Service (EEAS), The European Union's Global Strategy Three Years On, Looking Forward (EEAS: Brussels, June 2019).
- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions: the European Green Deal, 11 December 2019.
- General Secretariat of the Council, Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, Council conclusions 6152/19 (Council of the European Union: Brussels, Feb. 2019).
- General Secretariat of the Council, Council Conclusions on Security and Defence in the Context of the EU Global Strategy, Council conclusions 10048/19 (Council of the European Union: Strasbourg, June 2019).

2020:
- European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Towards a Comprehensive Strategy with Africa, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council JOIN(2020) 4 final (European Commission: Brussels, Mar. 2020).
- General Secretariat of the Council, Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, Council conclusions 5033/20 (Council of the European Union: Brussels, Jan. 2020).
- General Secretariat of the Council, Council Conclusions on Security and Defence, Council conclusions 8910/20 (Council of the European Union: Brussels, June 2020).
- European Parliament, Annual Report on the Implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. European Parliament Resolution of 15 January 2020 on the Implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy—Annual Report (2019/2136(INI)), P9_TA(2020)0008 (European Parliament: Strasbourg, Jan. 2020).
- European External Action Service (2022). The EU's Climate Change And Defence Roadmap. March 2022.
- General Secretariat of the Council, Council Conclusions on laying down the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) for the years 2021 to 2027, Council conclusion 2020/2093 (Council of the European Union: Brussels, December 2020)

2021:
- European Commission communication on the EU's humanitarian action: new challenges, same principles, COM(2021) 110 final.
- General Secretariat of the Council, Council Conclusions on the Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security, council conclusions 12537/21 (Council of the European Union: Brussels, Oct. 2021).
- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Forging a climate-resilient Europe - the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change, COM/2021/82, (European Commission: Brussels, 2021).
- European Commission, Multi-annual Indicative Programme for 2021-2027 for Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Retrievable from https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries_nl
- European Commission, Annual Action Plan (AAP) 2021 for Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Retrievable from https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries_nl

2022:
- European External Action Service (EEAS), The EU's climate change and defense Roadmap, strategic communication (March 31, 2022).
- European Commission, Annual Action Plan (AAP) 2022 for Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Retrievable from https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries_nl