

## **Demanding a Seat at The Table**

*Brazil's and South Africa's Role Conception in their Quest for  
Permanent Seats at the United Nations Security Council*

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# Abstract

In a changing world order, emerging middle powers from the global South may seek new positions in international societies. Using the United Nations as an international society, this thesis aims to investigate what roles the emerging middle powers, Brazil and South Africa, enact in pursuing permanent seats at the Security Council. This research conducts a qualitative text analysis using official data from 2010-2019 to explore Brazil's and South Africa's relationship with the United Nations and their calls for reform of the Security Council. The English School of international relations is used to understand the international environment and state behavior, and role theory is applied to analyze states' foreign policy and their role conception in international relations. This study shows that while Brazil and South Africa are reformists, they are strong supporters of multilateralism and international society is fundamental for their ability to influence global order. Furthermore, both Brazil and South Africa adopt roles connected to their interests as middle powers and advocates for the global South, but these are embodied differently. Brazil's arguments are more rational and global, focusing on performance, resources, and capabilities, while South Africa's arguments emphasize fairness, morality, and justice for Africa.

*Key Words:* Brazil, South Africa, emerging middle powers, UNSC reform, role conception, international society.

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# 1. Introduction

Our world is constantly changing, as is the international order in which states exist and act. Order is understood as an arrangement of social life that promotes specific goals and values (Bull 1977:4). Today, we have departed from the unipolar world that followed the end of the Cold War, as a structural transformation towards multipolarity has emerged since the rise of new powers, especially from the global South (Schweller & Pu 2011:42, Cooper & Flermes 2013:947-948). The rise of the global South has challenged liberal and Western order, ideas, and norms in international relations, and emerging states have played an active role in changing global power dynamics (Gaskarth 2017:288, Sandal 2014:695). Much attention is drawn to China and Russia when discussing challenges to the international order. Still, other emerging states from the global South, such as Brazil and South Africa, have developed to become strong regional powers and active voices of change on a global scale. Brazil and South Africa are two “emerging” middle powers (Jordaan 2003:166) that have also become influential actors on the global stage.

Furthermore, the rise of the global South affects the order within international society. International society could be understood as a group of states with constructed rules for interaction, and this thesis will focus on the United Nations. While countries such as Brazil and South Africa are supporters of multilateralism and international institutions such as the United Nations, they do express the need for reform. Therefore, this thesis aims to deepen our understanding of how emerging middle powers act in a changing international order focusing on international society and global governance, using the Security Council as an institution for global governance. A permanent seat at the UNSC could be argued to be the ultimate goal for emerging powers, as it consolidates its position as a global power with decisive influence (Van der Westhuizen 2016:242). Through qualitative text analysis, this thesis aims to gain more knowledge of how emerging powers position themselves in international relations and analyze the roles these states may enact in their pursuit of global power and influence, such as a permanent seat at the Security Council.

Several critical voices have been raised to change the current structure of UNSC members by expanding the number of permanent and non-permanent members. The UNSC has received much attention from scholars, raising questions about its structure, selectivity, and ineffective practices (see Allen & Yuen 2020, Gould & Rablen 2016, Lundgren & Klamberg 2022, Mahapatra 2016). There is also a broad consensus among states in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that there is a need to reform the Security Council by criticizing the underrepresentation of developing countries and the veto power (UN 2022). Since 2007 there has been an annual debate concerning this matter in the UNGA known as the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform. However, since the UN was established in 1945, only once has the UNSC structure changed, which was in 1963 when the number of non-permanent members increased from six to ten (Ronzitti 2010:4). The demands are somewhat the same throughout these years; the UNSC needs to increase the number of permanent and non-permanent members to be more representative, legitimate, and effective. Still, no actual change has taken place.

The UN is the key forum for discussions and debates on several international issues among states, making it an important study area. At the center of power is the Security Council, the only organ with authority to make decisions, while others may only make recommendations (Trivedi 2021). Much power sits within the Security Council as it “has the primary responsibility for international peace and security” (UN 2023). For middle powers, it may be difficult to act alone, but through organizations such as the UN, they may have a greater impact on global issues (Önis & Kutlay 2017:168). As the most powerful organ of the UN, reforming the Security Council might be a way to impact world order and create space for emerging middle powers in a multipolar world, which is the theme of this thesis. Today, the UNSC consists of 15 members, of which five are permanent, also known as the P5 (China, France, the UK, the US, and Russia). While the P5 is still, to different degrees, influential states on a global scale, the international milieu has changed a lot since the UN was created in 1945. When the UNSC was created, its 11 members represented 22% of the 52 UN members, while today, there are 193 member states, and the 15 members in the Security Council only represent 8% of them, signaling the need for reform.

## 1.1. Research Questions

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze what roles Brazil and South Africa enact in a changing world order, focusing on the reform of the Security Council. The English School will be used to understand international relations and the concept of international society. Through text analysis, this qualitative study will investigate Brazil's and South Africa's calls to reform the UNSC by using role theory to analyze their roles and positions within the international society. The material used is official data produced prior to the covid-19 crisis, therefore, the time period is set to 2010-2019.

The main question for this thesis is: *How do emerging middle powers such as Brazil and South Africa navigate and position themselves in international society?* Furthermore, this question will be translated into two sub-questions for the analysis: (1) How do Brazil and South Africa view the UN and the Security Council? (2) What roles do these countries seek in international society, expressed in their calls for reform of the Security Council? Finally, there will be a discussion about the similarities and differences between Brazil and South Africa in their roles and relationship with the UN connected to international societies, international order, and their position as emerging middle powers.

## 2. Background

This section will briefly explain Brazil's and South Africa's development since the 1990s, as these countries are now considered emerging middle powers. This will lay out a contemporary context for this thesis and the two cases it concerns. Furthermore, this section also defines the global South and introduces how it may challenge international order.

### 2.1. Brazil in the 21st Century

Since the 1990s, Brazil has emerged as a growing power in international affairs. Following the end of authoritarian rule in 1985, Brazil experienced several changes. Brazil converted to a democratically elected government and experienced rapid economic growth in the early 2000s. For example, Brazil was the sixth-largest economy in 2012, surpassing the UK (Inman 2012). Brazil is a powerful regional actor in Latin America as the largest and most populated country. With over 200 million citizens, Brazil is also the world's sixth most populated country (Worldbank). Furthermore, in 2020, Brazil was the world's fourth-biggest food producer and the third-biggest food exporter (FAO 2022). Growing international influence allowed Brazil to show the world its importance in the commercial arena as well, as the country hosted both the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Summer Olympic Games in 2016. This was an opportunity for Brazil to gain international attention and show the world its development in, for example, infrastructure and security, making Brazil a more attractive country (Suparmanto 2015). Brazil has developed considerably in several aspects during the last decades, becoming an emerging global power.

### 2.2. South Africa in the 21st Century

Following the end of apartheid in 1994, a new beginning awaited South Africa. South Africa, under apartheid rule, was politically, economically, and commercially excluded from international societies (Clark & Worger 2022). Coming from an isolated position, democratic



South Africa under Nelson Mandela grew both regionally and globally, restoring its international image and creating a foreign policy built on a new morality and legitimacy (Hendricks & Majozi 2021:67). Regionally, South Africa may be challenged by other growing states such as Nigeria and Egypt, yet South Africa has been successful as it has often been viewed as *the* representative of Africa in international forums (Hendricks & Majozi 2021:66, Graham 2022:2). South Africa has become a politically and diplomatically strong power in international relations, which is visible as South Africa is the only African member in political groups such as the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), and the G20. As South Africa joined the BRICS in 2011, it has been considered one of the emerging powers in the multipolar world of the 21st century (Cooper & Flames 2013:945). However, compared with other emerging powers from the global South, such as Brazil and India, South Africa is not as dominant looking at size, population, and economy (Adlen & Shoeman 2013:115), but South Africa has been successful in securing its global position as a voice for Africa within international societies.

### 2.3. The Rise of the Global South

The ideas of the ‘rise of the global South’ and its challenge to international order are not new. Firstly one must understand what the global South is. Mignolo states that the global South is mainly an ideological concept (Mignolo 2011:166) and a metaphor “that indicated regions of the world at the receiving end of globalization” (Mignolo 2011:184). The global South is further identified by processes of de-westernization and delinking from colonial power structures (ibid). The global South may challenge the international order in many ways, yet the economic sphere has gained the most attention. For instance, Golub (2013) argues that the global South is altering the international hierarchical order by reconstructing world capitalist systems from within. East Asia has primarily driven these processes, which have experienced tremendous economic expansion during the last decades. Powerful actors from the global South, such as the BRICS grouping, have established their own mechanisms for development, for example, the New Development Bank and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement in 2014. Economic growth and diplomatic achievements of several countries of the global South, especially China and the rest of the BRICS, may indicate a new phase of “challenge or construction of alternatives to the hegemonic and neo-colonial politics of the

global North” (Gray & Gills 2016:558). While the global South has been a recurring concept for decades, some might suggest that the time is now ripe for the rise of the global South to challenge international order once again.

## 3. Previous Research

This section explores previous literature concerning the area of interest. It is divided into three parts with specific topics; Southern internationalism, Brazil, South Africa, and the concept of “middle powers”, and UN Security Council reforms. Previous research is presented to understand this thesis's position and introduce the areas of research and some relevant concepts.

### 3.1. Research on Southern Internationalism

The rise of the global South has impacted the foreign policy of Southern states and, therefore, their attitude towards internationalism. Moore (2018) discusses the concept of Southern internationalism in the changing world order. In this sense, Southern internationalism is understood as an overarching perspective on international politics based on shared experiences of colonialism, contested sovereignty, and developing economies. Some powerful Southern states such as Brazil, India, China, and South Africa have chosen to represent the developing world's interests in their foreign policies and multilateral negotiating positions (Moore 2018:852-853). Southern internationalism has four fundamental tenets: solidarity, multilateralism, non-interference and respect for sovereignty, and non-violent means of conflict resolution (Moore 2018:863). Furthermore, the economic rise of the global South has generated extensive resources for Southern ideas, and the emergence of groupings such as the BRICS has given more power to the global South on a global scale (Moore 2018:859). Moore even describes the BRICS as a “unique opportunity for the design of an alternative conception of world order” (ibid.). However, that does not mean the global South opposes a rule-based order or organizations such as the UN (Weiss & Roy 2016:1147-1148). Southern internationalism and the growing capability of the global South may alter international power structures and impact how states such as Brazil and South Africa act towards international organizations. While the global South may be seen as one category of countries, these countries still have different attitudes and capabilities. It is, therefore,

interesting to analyze how internationalism is embodied by two emerging states from the global South, Brazil and South Africa, in their pursuit of global power.

### 3.2. Research on Brazil, South Africa, and the Concept of ‘Middle Powers’

Research on Brazil’s and South Africa’s impact on international order and international societies is somewhat limited. While there is some previous research on Brazil’s and South Africa’s position in the international order and the different forms of status-seeking projects they attempt to achieve, the literature on how these countries navigate international societies is lacking. This thesis seeks to fill this gap and further analyze their roles in international society. As cases, they have been analyzed mainly from a comparative political economy perspective with themes such as race (Marx 1998), public health (Liebeman 2009), and South-South Cooperation (Vieira & Alden 2011). Focusing on their foreign policy, many look at Brazil and South Africa within groups such as IBSA and BRICS (see Hopewell 2017, Mielniczuk 2013, Shaw 2015). In contrast, Van der Westhuizen (2016) focuses on the “like-mindedness” of these two emerging middle-power countries. Moreover, he concluded that both countries have engaged in various ‘status signaling projects’ to pursue the ultimate prize, permanent seats at the UNSC (Van der Westhuizen 2016:242). Estathopoulos (2021) also studied Brazil’s and South Africa’s like-mindedness concerning internationalism and multilateralism. He describes their position in the liberal order as ambiguous (Estathopoulos 2021:389), with ambivalent internationalism, restrictive like-mindedness, and selective multilateralism. While engaging with authoritarian states such as Russia and China through forums like the BRICS, Brazil, and South Africa still seem to highly value relationships with Western democracies such as the US and Germany. As middle powers, Brazil and South Africa support internationalism and multilateralism. However, their ambivalent foreign policy also challenges the existing liberal order as they seem to ‘choose’ when and what to do based on self-interests.

Brazil and South Africa are often referred to as middle powers. Nevertheless, using Jordaan’s (2003) definition of ‘emerging’ middle powers, they could be distinct from the position of ‘traditional’ middle powers such as Australia, Canada, and Norway. Brazil and South Africa can be defined as emerging middle powers, which is a good base to start from when

analyzing their roles and behavior in the international society, which this thesis aims to do. Jordaan identifies emerging middle powers as semi-peripheral to the global political economy with a recent and even poorly working democracy in place (Jordaan 2003:171-172). This contrasts traditional middle powers that have a consolidated democracy and whose citizens enjoy some of the highest quality of living in the world and are well integrated into the global political and economic sphere (ibid.). However, traditional middle powers are not regionally powerful, contrary to emerging middle powers, which are regionally dominant and active in initiating regional projects (Jordaan 2003:172-173). Jordaan continues to describe the behavior of middle powers, as both traditional and emerging powers are supporters of internationalism. However, he describes emerging middle power orientation as ‘reformist’ instead of the traditional orientation of ‘appeasing’ (Jordaan 2003:176). While Jordaan uses examples of global economic rules and structures when discussing emerging middle powers’ position as reformists, a similar perspective is visible in debates concerning international governance and the UN.

### 3.3. Research on UN Security Council Reforms

UNSC reforms have been discussed for decades among states and have therefore been a target for scholars as well. Looking at studies on UNSC reforms and the cases of Brazil and South Africa, many tend to focus on groups of states as they have made specific proposals and claims. However, this thesis seeks a more individualistic perspective on UNSC reforms by focusing on Brazil and South Africa as independent countries. Scholars such as Binder and Heupel (2020) and Winther and Bang Lindegaard (2020) have used groups of states as analytical tools. However, these present different focuses. Binder and Heupel focus on the 2005 draft of reform presented to the UNGA by the G4 (Brazil, India, Germany, Japan). They mix social psychology and political science to analyze the strategy of rhetoric coercion and find that the G4 failed to justify their proposed reform as their argumentation focused more on performance rather than fair and democratic procedures (Binder & Heupel 2020:94). They briefly mention the African Group and South Africa in opposition to the G4’s proposal (Binder & Heupel 2020:99). Winther and Bang Lindegaard also use the G4 group as a focal point for their critical discourse study, but in comparison with another group called the

Uniting for Consensus (UfC)<sup>1</sup>. They study the 2015/2016 debate in the UNGA concerning UNSC reforms looking at democracy and governmental rationality. While the G4 uses a more realist argumentation, focusing on resources and representation (Winther & Bang Lindegaard 2020:237), the UfC is more idealist, discussing equality, representative democracy, willingness, and intent (Winther & Bang Lindegaard 2020:243). The African Group is also briefly mentioned in their study, yet in contrast with the G4, focusing on discussing the veto power (Winther & Bang Lindegaard 2020:241). In these previous studies, Brazil has gained some attention as part of the G4, while South Africa and the African Group are visible in these debates. Therefore this thesis focuses on Brazil and South Africa as individual cases.

In contrast, Gaskarth (2017) has studied UNSC reform by focusing on rising powers' view of responsibility concerning becoming a permanent member of the UNSC. He focuses on Brazil, China, and India, using the English School theory to interpret their views on responsible actors and actions. Gaskarth presents an interesting approach to understanding how these states view themselves and their relationship to international society and international order. He discusses the unequal distribution of power within the UN and the Security Council and how that affects the idea of responsibility (Gaskarth 2017:292-293). Furthermore, he considers the ambiguous approach to coercion and use of force that Brazil, China, and India have, which might be problematic with their ambition to become a great power since force does have a role in maintaining international order (Gaskarth 2017:305-307). While Gaskarth presents compelling points about the view on responsibility and opens up a discussion concerning if rising powers are ready to become great powers as permanent members of the Security Council, this thesis seeks to investigate further Brazil's and South Africa's roles in relationship to the Security Council and their position as rising powers in an international society with unevenly distributed power.

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<sup>1</sup> The Uniting for Consensus (UfC) consists of Argentina, Canada, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Spain, South Korea, and Turkey.

## 4. Theoretical Framework

This thesis will use two theories to analyze and understand how Brazil and South Africa navigate and position themselves within the international society. Firstly, the English School will be used to understand international relations and the concept of international society. Secondly, this thesis will use role theory to analyze these countries' roles in international society, which may explain why and how these states argue for reform in global governance and claim a permanent seat at the Security Council.

### 4.1. The English School and the Concept of International Society

The English School will be adopted to understand the international environment and international relations. This school of thought can be traced to Hedley Bull's *An Anarchical Society* (1977) and Martin Wight's *Systems of States* (1977), which explored the order in world politics and international arrangements. The English School is state-centric (Devlen et al. 2005:176) and introduces the ideas of an international system and an international society. These elements co-exist and operate simultaneously, creating a pluralist perspective on international relations which transcends the binary opposition between realism and liberalism (Buzan 2001:476). The English School states that the international system is anarchic, and the risk of conflict increases as states interact. Therefore international societies may be formed as they could be economically and strategically beneficial or due to cultural likeness (Buzan 1993:334, 341). For instance, an international society allows less powerful states to validate their claims and interests (Buzan 1993:347). The hypothesis is that international societies lead to greater cooperation and order among states (Devlen et al. 2005:188).

International society is here understood as a group of states with constructed rules for interaction. Bull and Watson define international society as "a group of states which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules,

and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements” (Bull & Watson 1989:1). International societies do not need to be *global*, as several international societies may exist simultaneously. Buzan describes two different types of societies that may exist, those with “like units,” meaning shared identities and goals, and the unity of unlike units (Buzan 1993:335). The latter is more complicated but builds upon accepting “a set of rules that legitimize the differentiation of units and establish the distribution of rights and responsibilities among functionally differentiated actors” (Buzan 1993:336). International societies may occur due to likeness (shared values and identities) or by “function,” meaning they benefit states that are not culturally similar. However, international societies will be unevenly distributed in the international system, and there will also be an uneven distribution within a society, with a varied spectrum of development and participation (Buzan 1993:345). Looking at the world today, the UN is an organization that creates mechanisms for state interaction through common rules and norms. The UN could be seen as a global international society with unlike units and unevenly distributed influence.

## 4.2. Role Theory and Role Conception

When studying foreign policy, role theory may be useful for understanding state behavior in international relations. Role theory is imported from sociology and social psychology and was introduced by Holsti (1970) to analyze decision-makers' conception of their state's role in the international system. Role conception affects foreign policy, which may impact ideas such as internationalism and the positions of emerging middle powers within international society. “Role” is, however, a vague concept, but Holsti presents four concepts to help analyze foreign policy: role performance (decisions and attitude), self-defined national role conceptions, role prescriptions (norms and expectations within a culture, society, or institution), and position (Holsti 1970:240). While “position” is somewhat static, the other concepts are more dynamic, and states may behave differently and enact different roles in different contexts and settings. Holsti describes several different roles states may identify with, such as bloc leader, balancer, mediator, and isolate (Holsti 1970:255). Holsti conducted his study on foreign policy in general, and the roles he identified are not context specific to this study. Therefore this study will identify “new” roles using similar ideas and methodology. This thesis will use role conception to explain and understand the behavior of



Brazil and South Africa concerning UNSC reform by identifying the different roles they enact.

Karim (2018) is a good example of how role theory, especially role conception and status, may be interesting to analyze when looking at middle-power behavior. Karim analyzed Indonesia's and South Korea's pursuit of middle-power status and their preferences in foreign policy (Karim 2018:344). In this way, role theory can capture the various roles of middle powers by examining interests and norms. Karim concludes that the middle-power status of South Korea and Indonesia are pursued in both similar and different ways. South Korea uses roles such as a regional balancer, an advocate for development, and a bridge-builder, while Indonesia enacts roles such as the voice of developing countries, a regional leader, an advocate for democracy, and a bridge-builder (Karim 2018:359). Karim further discusses how these roles relate to the status of being a middle power and the behavior of Indonesia and South Korea. Role theory enables one to engage with international relations in a constructivist way and try to understand state behavior by focusing on role conception, which will be used in this thesis.

How roles are identified is highly interpretive. Role conception depends on role performance, which Holsti defines as governments' general foreign policy behavior of governments (Holsti 1970:245). Patterns of decisions and behavior indicate the presence of role conceptions. Several sources of role conceptions exist, such as location, natural, economic and technical resources, traditional policies, national values, and ideology (Holsti 1970:246). This thesis will therefore combine general foreign policy towards internationalism and the UN with context-specific attitudes and behavior towards the Security Council in order to grasp the roles of Brazil and South Africa in international society. Holsti describes this type of research procedure as "noting themes" that give evidence for a role conception (Holsti 1970:258). Therefore, the research conducted in this thesis seeks to find patterns in argumentation and recurring topics that Brazilian and South African officials use when speaking of the UN and the UNSC, which will indicate specific roles.

## 5. Research Design

In this section, the methods and material of the thesis will be presented and motivated. This thesis is a qualitative comparative study with two cases, Brazil and South Africa, and uses data from 2010-2019 to conduct a text analysis. It will start with a discussion of the limitations of the research and case selection, then present the research design and methods used, followed by a discussion on the material. Finally, the research questions will be operationalized.

### 5.1. Limitations of International Society and Case Selection

In this thesis, international society has been limited to the UN as an institution for global governance, specifically the UNSC. The Security Council could be seen as the core of the UN regarding international governance and power since it is stated that “the UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for international peace and security” (UN 2023). Therefore, the UNSC is relevant for analyzing emerging middle powers, international society, and world order. However, the UNSC is not the only existing international society for global governance. Future research could, for instance, use the World Trade Foundation (WTO) or other UN agencies as a focus.

The process of case selection has gone through several steps. Starting from the ideas of changes to world order and reforms within the Security Council, emerging powers from the global South became an interesting group to study since their growth may alter the existing dynamics. The BRICS is identified as a powerful group when discussing challenges to the world order. However, there is already much focus on Asia in this study area (China and India included in BRICS). Focusing on the UNSC, Russia and China are already permanent members. Brazil and South Africa, therefore, became the two cases for this study. Brazil and South Africa represent two different regions of the world and are powerful regional states with global ambitions. Furthermore, Brazil and South Africa are identified as emerging

middle powers (Jordaan 2003), yet they have developed differently (see section Background). Both countries are involved in the debates concerning the reform of the Security Council and are seen as candidates to become new permanent members, making them suitable cases for this thesis.

## 5.2. Research Design and Methods

The chosen research design for this thesis is a qualitative comparative study. This research aims to gain intense contextual knowledge, making a qualitative design most suitable. Since the goal is to investigate specific state behavior, a small N-study is conducted with two cases: Brazil and South Africa. Small case studies may generate intensive knowledge and enable the researcher to incorporate broader history and context, which is positive for internal validity (Halperin & Heath 2017:154). However, case studies are often weaker in the sense of generalizability due to their limited focus, which may harm external validity (ibid.). Case selection may also impact the quality of this study since selection bias may occur, meaning that the chosen cases can influence the answers in the specific research as the research may choose cases that fit the hypothesis (Halperin and Heath 2017:175, 256). This is especially dangerous in research that tries to generalize its findings. However, the thesis aims not to generalize but to understand specific state behavior and position, which makes the chosen research design suitable.

This thesis will conduct a qualitative text analysis, which is useful for its research purpose. Text analysis highlights the importance of language and meaning and enables the researcher to analyze official data to explore perceptions and attitudes (Halperin & Heath 2017:335, 345). Furthermore, as this thesis uses role theory, the method for this text analysis is similar to what is known as content analysis. Role theory concerns finding themes (Holsti 1970:258), which is a “recording level” within content analysis (Halperin & Heath 2017:348). However, as roles are not pre-given “categories” used to analyze and code the data, this thesis uses forms of “open coding” (Halperin & Heath 2017:250), which means the roles have appeared during the study of the whole texts. However, some may argue that content analysis is highly interpretive and subjective (Berström & Boréus 2012: 81, 85), yet, through such text analysis, one may uncover patterns and reveal meanings and motives (Halperin & Heath 2017:336).

This fits the purpose of this research; to uncover the roles Brazil and South Africa enact in changing world order, focusing on the reform of the Security Council.

### 5.3. Material

To answer the question for this thesis, the material used will primarily originate from official sources. Role theory is based on the idea that top leaders reflect the country's foreign policy and role conception of the country (Holsti 1970:256). The sources used vary from official statements, speeches, and records from UN forums. The UN sources used have been limited to UN General Assembly Official Records concerning the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reforms. Furthermore, the official websites of the Foreign Ministries of the respective countries have been used as the primary source for official statements and speeches. The limitation has been to exclude joint statements with groups of states such as the G4 since this research aims to analyze the individual country's role. Speeches and statements have been chosen through 2010-2019 by looking for topics concerning the reform of UNSC and international governance.

The data for this thesis has been limited to 2010-2019 due to the Covid-19 crisis. The Covid-19 crisis greatly impacted discussions concerning global injustice and North/South imbalance debates (see Balfour et al. 2022, Makau 2021, Stiglitz 2020), where the issue of UNSC reform may be placed. For example, in a 2021 interview, the South African Minister of International Relations, Dr. Naledj Pandor, confirmed that, as South Africa served as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2019-2020, discussions such as the reform of the UNSC was disrupted due to the Covid-19 crisis (Pandor 2021).

It is, however, essential to acknowledge that using official sources raises questions of political bias. While using official data may reduce the risk of personal bias compared to other data from, for example, interviews (Halperin & Heath 2017:345), official data will always have an inherent political bias. Therefore these types of material should not be seen as given truths. However, since this research aims to understand the position and behavior of specific states, the potential bias might be useful as it may provide evidence of these states' roles and relationships to the international society.

## 5.4. Operationalization

Operationalization in this thesis focuses on visualizing states' roles and relations to international society. Operationalization means “defining a variable, so that we know it when we see it,” and essentially refers to what indicators the researcher uses to visualize the concepts and theoretical framework of choice (Halperin & Heath 2017:135-136). The operationalization for this thesis will be based on two sub-questions generated from the theoretical framework described below.

### *(1) How do Brazil and South Africa view the UN and the UNSC?*

The first question focuses on state interests, foreign policy, and official positions related to internationalism, the UN, and the UNSC. This question investigates Brazil's and South Africa's position as emerging middle powers, their relationship to international societies, and how they interact with the UNSC by analyzing their attitudes towards internationalism and multilateralism in foreign policy and the calls for reform of the Security Council.

### *(2) What roles do Brazil and South Africa seek in international society?*

This question uses the concepts of role conception from role theory as its departure. Identifying role conceptions is about “noting themes” (Holsti 1970:258), and the material has been read to find patterns of argumentation and recurring topics which may indicate specific roles. Below is an example of such an analysis. Looking at Brazil's and South Africa's statements concerning the reform of the UNSC, indications of what role and self-image these countries give themselves may become visible. Focus has been on the perception of the UN and the UNSC, how these institutions should work or act, and how Brazil and South Africa contribute to it.

*“(…) Brazil continues committed to working with its neighbors to build an environment of democracy, peace, prosperity, and social justice. We have made great progress in integrating the Latin American and Caribbean region as a*

*priority for our international insertion. Our region is a good example for the world.” (Rousseff 2012)*

*“In our region we have a long tradition of peaceful coexistence with our neighbors – which is not something we simply inherited but was instead achieved through many years of diplomatic action.” (Vieira 2015)*

This is interpreted as an indication of a potential role since there is a pattern to argue that Brazil is a peaceful and cooperative actor, using its region as an example.

## 6. Analysis

In this section, the content analysis of official material concerning Brazil's and South Africa's roles and relationship with the UNSC will be conducted. It is presented in two parts following the research question and the theoretical framework: (1) *How do Brazil and South Africa view the UN and the UNSC?* This part concerns these emerging middle powers' relationship with the UN and the UNSC and their call for reform of the Security Council. (2) *What roles do Brazil and South Africa seek in international society?* The second part identifies what roles these countries may enact when claiming a permanent seat at the UNSC.

### 6.1. How does Brazil view the UN and the UNSC?

Brazil strongly supports multilateralism as an emerging power, and its relationship with the UN has been consistent throughout its years as a member. Brazil has been an active member of the UN, for example, hosting the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in 1992 and later the Rio+20 in 2012. Furthermore, Brazil has a long history of support for UN peacekeeping missions worldwide, with its greatest achievement being the lead role in the UN Stabilization Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH) (Passarelli Hamann & Ramirez Teixeira 2017). Both former President Lula Da Silva (2003-2011) and former President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) used classical middle-power strategies as their foreign policy relied on multilateralism and international participation to achieve international influence such as the engagement with the UN (Dauvergne & Farias 2012:906, Suparmanto 2015:21). The UN is considered the "most legitimate expression of multilateralism and international legitimacy" (Press Release 2015). Brazil sees the UN as a vital part of the world, and multilateralism is stated as an essential part of the desired international order (Vieira 2015). If international societies create cooperation and order (Devlen et al. 2005:188), Brazil might use the UN to establish order in a changing international environment. As an emerging middle power such as Brazil tries to navigate an international society that has an uneven distribution of power,

Brazil may call for order by reforming a global and multilateral institution such as the UN and secure its influence in the new order by becoming a permanent member of the UNSC.

Brazil seems to claim more influence and power in the unevenly distributed international society within the UNSC. The UNSC is criticized for lacking both legitimacy and credibility: “We risk bringing discredit and erosion of authority to the United Nations as a whole” (De Aguiar Patriota 2015a). Brazil establishes its position as a reformist power, as the urgent need to reform and expand the Security Council is repeatedly expressed. The UNSC is seen as anachronistic, reflecting a mid-twentieth-century environment as the world emerges into the 2020s (De Aguiar Patriota 2015b). Bringing more representatives of developing countries from Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean is crucial, and Brazil is one of the candidates. Brazil has gained recognition from other states for its status as a potential permanent member of the UNSC, most clearly is the consensus among the G4 (and its supporters), as Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan announced their joint proposal for reforms in 2005. Brazil has pushed for reforms for many years and has been actively involved in the process. It is seen as a collective responsibility to reform the UNSC for it to fulfill its role, and it is stated that not a single member of the UN questions this necessity (De Aguiar Patriota 2013b). In order to restore the legitimacy of the UN, the Security Council needs reform, and Brazil seeks to be a part of this transformation.

An important observation made in this analysis is that Brazil’s approach to the UN clearly changed as Bolsonaro became president (2019-2022). In his speech to the General Assembly in 2019, he never mentioned the need for reform of the Security Council, which previous Brazilian speakers had done. Instead, he spoke more about sovereignty and freedom from socialism, which reflected a change in Brazilian politics. While recognizing Brazil’s continued commitment to UN missions, he stated that nationalities and sovereignty should not be erased in favor of global interests (Bolsonaro 2019). This observation leads to a discussion on the relationship between changes in government and international behavior, which is a very interesting topic for future research.



## 6.2. What roles does Brazil seek in International Society?

Through a text analysis of official data from the General Assembly and Brazil's foreign policy collected between 2010-2019, four roles have been identified in the Brazilian call for the reform of the UNSC. These roles are a committed and capable actor, an advocate for developing countries, a bridge-builder, and a peaceful actor.

### 6.2.1. Committed and Capable Actor

The view that Brazil is capable is central to Brazil's pursuit of a permanent seat at the UNSC. Brazil has become a powerful country, both regionally and globally, and the argument is that the Security Council must reflect the geopolitical realities of today (De Aguiar Patriota 2015a, Vieira 2015). Brazilian officials identify Brazil as a rising power, and in a changing world order, new powers should be included in global governance (De Aguiar Patriota 2013a). Furthermore, Brazilian officials often highlight Brazil's commitment to the UN and involvement in UN missions. Brazil has, for example, been a recurrent non-permanent member of the UNSC, the second most elected member after Japan, which Brazilian officials said "is no coincidence" as Brazil has played an active role in the UN since its foundation (Press Release 2015). Brazil is recognized as able to contribute to the expansion of the Security Council, and with new permanent members, the Council will regain its legitimacy. The expansion of the Security Council is seen as a needed democratization of the UN system (Vieira 2017, Sobral Duarte 2016). With the G4, Brazil has taken clear steps toward drafting an actual resolution for reform, which Brazil keeps pushing for. The argument is that the general debates have already occurred, and now is the time for "real negotiations," and Brazil is ready to engage with this (De Aguiar Patriota 2019). Brazil's emerging position in the world, its commitment to the UN as an institution, and its involvement in the work towards a more democratic UNSC are all recurring arguments held by Brazilian officials when discussing the reform of the Council. In this way, Brazil presents itself as a committed and capable actor who can handle a permanent seat at the Security Council.

## 6.2.2. Advocate for Developing Countries

Much of the critique of the current UNSC is its lack of legitimacy. The argument that the Security Council is outdated and not representative of today's world as developing countries are not represented enough is reoccurring. Brazil might view itself as a role model for other developing countries and a protector of the developing world. Development has been a high priority for Brazilian domestic and international policies. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira stated in 2015 that there is a link between domestic development and projecting influence abroad, “social inclusion at home means a greater presence abroad” (Vieira 2015). Development is crucial for the Brazilian state and connected to both human dignity and security (Temer 2016, Temer 2017). Brazilian officials put much pride in the evolution of Brazil as it is now considered a powerful actor both regionally and globally. Brazil has been identified as a stand-out growth model and an example for the rest of the world (Rousseff 2012a), actively assisting other countries in replicating successful experiences (Amorim 2010). Brazil has successfully grown into a global economic and political power, which it may use to favor the developing world's interests. Brazil keeps advocating for the inclusion of African countries, the only continent not permanently represented in the Security Council, as it is seen as a historical injustice that needs to be redressed (Vieira 2018). Furthermore, Brazil has placed great importance on initiatives such as South-South cooperation, an important foundation of the Brazilian foreign policy driven by solidarity (Asmorim 2010). As an emerging middle power, Brazil still recognizes Southern internationalism and solidarity in its foreign policy, which may explain why Brazil takes on a role as an advocate for developing countries in the UNSC reform debate. Brazil still labels itself a developing country and states that developing countries should bring a sharper focus on the relationship between international security and development if they were included in the Security Council, which are important issues for the developing world (de Aguiar Patriota 2013a). To regain legitimacy, the Security Council must permanently include countries from the developing world. As a growing power in this world, Brazil may see itself as a much-needed voice of the developing countries.

### 6.2.3. Bridge-builder

Brazil presents itself as a bridge-builder by participating in various multilateral forums. A bridge-builder serves a valuable role as a permanent member of the Security Council since it has been criticized for its ineffectiveness and inability to manage contemporary issues. There are several examples of ways that Brazil is presented as a bridge-builder. Brazilian former president Rousseff stated that this BRICS group in itself is “an undeniable demonstration of how geographically distant countries, with different social and economic challenges, can become partners and generate a convergence that changes the axis of international politics.” (Rousseff 2012a). Additionally, Brazil is said to play a significant role in several political groups, such as the IBSA, the G4, and the G20 (Vieira 2015). This presents Brazil as committed to multilateralism and willing to cooperate with various states. Cooperation and openness are recognized as fundamental to the Brazilian state, and its approach to international relations is described as universalist (Temer 2017). Moreover, Brazilian officials argue that bridging differences is needed in the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reforms, which Brazil is said to have done already (Viotti 2010, De Aguiar Patriota 2019). Furthermore, former Minister of Foreign Affairs José Serra confirmed that the inclusion of G4 countries as permanent members of the UNSC would be positive since they could bring new approaches and help to bridge differences between current members (Serra 2016). Brazil is a middle power dedicated to multilateralism and cooperates with several other countries from various political and economic backgrounds. Brazil firmly believes in its role as a bridge-builder, which is one of the reasons why Brazil would be suitable as a permanent member of the Security Council.

### 6.2.4. Peaceful Actor

Brazil views itself as an actor devoted to peace and diplomacy. While Brazil has never been a strong military power, it has successfully developed its soft power diplomacy. Brazil has already shown its capabilities to take responsibility in field operations such as the UN Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Lebanon (Press Release 2015). However, Brazilian officials often refer to its regional peace and integration. Former president Rousseff said that the Latin American and Caribbean region is a

good example for the world of how integration has reduced tensions and attacks on democracy (Rousseff 2012b). She mentions MERCOSUR and UNASUR as stable frameworks to secure regional integration and democracy. Former Foreign Minister Vieira also references UNASUR and regional peace when presenting Brazil as a potential permanent member of the UNSC. He states that peaceful coexistence is not inherited but achieved through years of diplomatic action (Vieira 2015). Brazil has been engaged in creating mechanisms for building political consensus and peaceful resolutions, qualities needed in the UNSC. Being a non-nuclear state is also argued to be a sign of Brazil's dedication to peace (Vieira 2015, Rousseff 2012b). In 2013, Foreign Minister de Aguiar Patriota expressed that while there might be a concern that new actors may not follow rules of global governance, it is often the "established powers" that do not respect the principles of collective security. This type of statement could be seen as an attempt to delegitimize potential critique of the emergence of new powers in global governance and consolidate Brazil's role as dedicated to peace and multilateral principles. Brazil presents itself as deeply committed to the obligations of the UN Charter and has respect for international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Press Release 2015). Brazil recognizes the UN as a universal institution dedicated to promoting peace, and as a peaceful actor, Brazil should be seen as a legitimate candidate for a permanent seat.

### 6.3. How does South Africa view the UN and the UNSC?

Democratic South Africa has been supportive of the UN as a global institution. The UN is stated to have significantly supported the South African liberation from Apartheid and is a source of hope for the voiceless, oppressed, and poor (Zuma 2015, Ramaphosa 2018). South African foreign policy towards the UN reflects ideas of Southern internationalism, such as its leadership in fighting racism and imperialism within the UN (Jordaan 2019:175) and its underpinned responsibility towards the African continent (Graham 2022:2). South Africa's approach to the UN is built on solidarity. Every state is responsible for ensuring a better world for all through cooperation. Multilateralism is needed to face the challenges of today since the world is more interdependent than ever (Pandor 2019). There is an emphasis on rule-based multilateralism (Media Statement 2010a, Media Statement 2013a, Media Statement 2017), which relates to the English School's view of international society as a way

to ensure cooperation and order among states by constructing shared rules and norms. However, under both former President Zuma (2009-2018) and President Ramaphosa (2019-), reforming global governance has been critical to restoring the role of the UN as a legitimate and representative organization that ensures international peace, security, and development.

In a changing global order, South Africa may see a permanent seat at the UNSC as a way to consolidate itself as an emerging power and secure African interests in international relations. The Security Council is seen as important and powerful concerning peace and security, with “far-reaching powers to act on behalf of the broader membership” of the UN (Matjila 2016). However, the Security Council is considered undemocratic, unrepresentative, and unfair (Tladi 2010, Mashabane 2014). It is stated that 70 percent of the work of the Security Council deals with African issues, and 80% of its peacekeepers are deployed in Africa, making it unjust to exclude Africa from permanent seats (Ebrahim 2012). While South Africa believes in a firm UNSC devoted to international commitments, it strongly promotes the African Agenda and the cooperation between the UNSC and the African Union (AU), making it visible that several international societies may be operating simultaneously. International societies are often stronger on a regional level since these societies are built more on “likeness” and shared culture rather than “functionality” (Buzan 1993:336), for example, Southern ideas of solidarity and internationalism within the AU. In order to secure African interests in global governance and for South Africa to become a permanent member of the Security Council, it needs the support of the rest of the African continent (Langa & Shai 2020:65). As an emerging middle power, reforming the UNSC may seem reasonable in order to gain more influence and impact international order within a global international society. For South Africa, a permanent seat at the table may advance African interests and restore the legitimacy of the UN as a whole.

#### 6.4. What roles does South Africa seek in International Society?

Through a text analysis of official data from the General Assembly and South Africa’s foreign policy collected between 2010-2019, four roles have been identified in the South African call for the reform of the UNSC. These roles are a regional representative, a bridge-builder, a champion for the poor and underdeveloped, and an advocate for justice and morality.

#### 6.4.1. Regional Representative

South Africa strongly emphasizes African interests and may see itself as a suitable representative for Africa in the Security Council. South African officials often refer to Africa as a unit when using the African Common Position and the African Agenda when arguing for reform of the UNSC (Matjila 2019, Matjila 2017, Mashabane 2014). Speaking on behalf of Africa and in the interests of Africans as one group could signal South Africa's position and ambition to be seen as a representative of the continent. Furthermore, it is stated that South Africa can already take a leadership role and significantly contribute to the Council on African issues of peace and security (Media Statement 2013a, Zuma 2017). South Africa is often recognized as a representative of Africa in other international forums, and seeking to represent Africa in the UNSC could be the ultimate goal. South Africa highlights the will and progress Africa has made already in addressing conflicts and other challenges, saying that South Africa is committed to being part of the transformation of the continent, reversing the impacts of underdevelopment, colonialism, and apartheid (Ebrahim 2012, Zuma 2016, Ramaphosa 2018). South African foreign policy is clearly influenced by the solidarity towards Africa and African development and enhances the ability of Africa to grow. Africa has the ability to find solutions to African issues and should continue to do so (Zuma 2011, Zuma 2017). While South Africa has emerged as a middle power in global contexts, it stays committed to its region, especially concerning the workings of the UN and the UNSC. South African foreign policy clearly emphasizes the importance of promoting the interests of Africa as a whole and believes it can play a crucial role in the Security Council by advancing the interests of the continent.

#### 6.4.2. Bridge-builder

As a regional representative, South Africa may seek to facilitate cooperation between the UNSC and the AU. South African officials often promote cooperation between the UNSC and the AU when dealing with issues related to Africa (Media Statement 2010b, Media Statement 2013a). The AU is seen as an important actor who may provide African solutions to African problems, with the needed support of the world (Zuma 2011, Zuma 2017). For

example, Africa and the African Union have created collective plans such as the Agenda 2063 and Silence the Guns 2020 initiative, highlighted by South African officials (Zuma 2017, Ramphoso 2018). However, South Africa recognizes the importance of joint actions between global and regional organizations. The UNSC is a crucial actor when dealing with conflicts since it is responsible for international peace and security. This may be especially important in Africa as the UNSC has no permanent African representative and may ignore regional will, such as in the case of Libya (Zuma 2015). With permanent African representation in the Security Council, cooperation with the AU might be more effective and enhance African agency. This bridge-builder role may be one South Africa seeks. South African officials recognize that South Africa has significantly contributed to deepening the cooperation and alignment between the two organizations (Media Statement 2010a, Ebrahim 2012, Zuma 2014), showing its willingness and capability to act as a bridge-builder. Furthermore, South Africa has strategic relationships with other emerging powers through groupings such as BRICS, which might be useful as a bridge-builder. South Africa may impact world order by facilitating cooperation that aligns with its interests both as an emerging middle power and an African representative.

#### 6.4.3. Champion for the Poor and Underdeveloped

As a developing country, South Africa advocates for the importance of development and fighting poverty. Peace and security are seen as crucial for economic and social development (Media Statement 2010a, Ebrahim 2012). South Africa expresses critique against the developed world, as it has created unequal and unjust power relations between the North and the South, and positions the UN as one of the institutions that must address this problem (Zuma 2017, Pandor 2019). Furthermore, South Africa is devoted to reversing the impact of underdevelopment and colonialism, especially in Africa (Zuma 2016). South Africa expresses its commitment to managing these challenges through multilateralism (Media Statement 2010b, Pandor 2019). In a changing global environment, South Africa and its growing influence may generate an opportunity to favor this agenda in multilateral forums. As the most powerful organ within the UN, the Security Council is seen as the ultimate way to ensure that the fight against racism, poverty, and underdevelopment continues with legitimacy. South Africa, with its own transformation from an isolated state under apartheid to an emerging middle power with global recognition, may become a voice for the poor and

underdeveloped in Africa and the global South. South Africa is presented as successful in its progress, for instance, referencing its economic development during the last decade, its progress of the Millenium Development Goals, and that together with the African Union, South Africa has created a socio-development blueprint for African states (Media Statement 2013b, Zuma 2014 Ramphoso 2018). South Africa as a permanent member of the UNSC, might alter international order and give more attention to issues relating to developing countries, such as fighting poverty and underdevelopment, as these are both key issues in South African foreign policy and important responsibilities of the UN.

### 6.4.3. Advocate for Justice and Morality

Morality and correcting injustice are central to South Africa's argument to reform the Security Council. The structure of the UNSC is seen as a historical injustice against Africa (Zaayman 2015, Media Statement 2017). Excluding a billion people's voices in the UN's most powerful organ is unjustified (Ebrahim 2012, Zuma 2015, Matjila 2018). In its argumentation, South Africa acts as a voice for the marginalized and a voice for justice. It is stated an obligation to humankind and the marginalized majority to reform the Security Council (Matjila 2019a). The UN has the moral authority and legitimacy to correct global injustices and should act as a beacon for the oppressed and marginalized people (Zuma 2014, Ramaphosa 2018). South Africa recognizes its own historical and moral responsibility to fight for human rights, such as fighting racism, xenophobia, and global inequality (Zuma 2011, Zuma 2014, Zuma 2017), which might suggest it fits as a permanent member of the UNSC ready to deal with these global issues. Furthermore, multilateralism is clearly visible in South Africa's foreign policy as it is argued that world peace and security are not a responsibility restricted to an elite club (Mamabolo 2015). It is argued an irony that major defenders of democracy who are permanent members of the UNSC sit comfortably in an undemocratic and unrepresentative structure (Zuma 2012, Mashabane 2013). Those who oppose the reform of the UNSC are argued to be on the wrong side of history, indicating the morality aspects of the reform (Mashabane 2013). Reforming the Security Council would be morally good and a way to correct historical injustice, which are responsibilities applied to both the UN and South Africa. South Africa, as a champion of democracy and marginalized people and fighting racism and xenophobia, could be seen as an advocate for justice and morality, which is needed to restore the legitimacy of the UNSC.



## 7. Discussion

This thesis helps to understand why emerging middle powers turn to international societies such as the UN in times of change. Their need for influence and order as middle powers is fulfilled in multilateral forums and international societies as these allow their voices and claims to be acknowledged, which is recognized both by the English School of thought and the study of middle powers (Buzan 1993: 347, Langa & Shai 2020:65). As international order is changing, Brazil and South Africa seek to reform international global society to match the reality of today and advance the interests of new powers, such as development and Southern solidarity. Today the UNSC is the most powerful inter-governmental organ in international relations, and it is an international society where power is unevenly distributed. The UNSC and its permanent members would be argued to have a “collective hegemonial authority” to constitute legitimate behavior regarding peace and security (Gaskarth 2017:293). Therefore, the changing world order might present momentum for emerging powers to seek new positions, such as permanent members of the Security Council, which will ensure influence on the agenda. The permanent representation in it represents the opportunity for Brazil and South Africa to consolidate their roles as influential actors in global governance and secure their ability to enhance the interests of the global South. Still, this thesis shows that the position as an emerging middle power from the global South has been embodied differently in Brazil and South Africa.

Brazil and South Africa enact similar roles related to the developing world and building bridges in international relationships. Brazil and South Africa identify as developing countries with successful development backgrounds, so the role of a voice for development may be seen as natural. While both countries favor Southern interests and solidarity, there seems to be a difference in levels. Brazil is seen as a role model for others and powerful enough to be a voice for the developing world. On the other hand, South Africa tends to lay its argumentation closer to the people, defending people in poverty and those experiencing underdevelopment, with a particular focus on Africa. There is a similar observation when looking at the role of a bridge-builder. Acting as a “mediator” and emphasizing cooperation

in international relations are connected to the position as a middle power (Van der Westhuizen 2013:91), but Brazil and South Africa embody this differently. Brazil describes itself as able to bridge differences between major powers within the Security Council and an open country able to cooperate in many multilateral forums. South Africa may also act as a bridge-builder in a similar manner; both countries are, for instance, members of IBSA and BRICS, yet South African officials often push for South Africa's important contribution to the cooperation between the UNSC and the AU. South Africa seems to act within two separate international societies more clearly than Brazil, and the regional one may be primary since it has a strong connection to South African identity and culture.

Furthermore, South Africa enacts a role as a regional representative, while Brazil may aim to achieve a more global role as a committed and capable actor. Why South Africa has a stronger regional connection in global contexts may have several explanations, but becoming a regional leader is a way for South Africa to establish itself as a great power (Alden & Shoeman 2013:112, 114). South Africa is still depending on African support, especially in its pursuit of a permanent seat at the UNSC (Langa & Shai 2020:65). In contrast, Brazil has a stronger regional dominance looking at size, population, and activity in multilateral forums, which may enable Brazil to reach for more global goals and ambitions. Both countries are clearly arguing for being responsible and ready to take the leadership position in international society, which a permanent seat in the Security Council would mean, yet their arguments differ. Brazil's arguments are more rational and focus on performance, resources, and capabilities, while South Africa's arguments emphasize justice, fairness, and morality.

The conclusion that can be drawn from this thesis is that the rise of the global South has altered international dynamics and provided an opportunity for emerging middle powers to impact global order further and achieve new positions. The position as a middle power may seem static with given attributes, yet there are various roles a middle power may enact, which this thesis has shown. While Brazil and South Africa are emerging middle powers that strongly support and need multilateralism, they are also reformists. Reforming the most powerful organ in international society, the UN Security Council, will consolidate a new global order and indicate that Brazil and South Africa are global powers. Brazil and South Africa present themselves as capable and ready, as they are demanding a seat at the table.



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