It Takes Two to Tango:

Perceptions and Motivations Towards Campaign Clientelism in Zambia

Picture credit: UPND Zambia

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Abstract

Various studies on clientelism usually start from a common puzzle: Why is campaign clientelism widely practised by politicians even when they have no means of ensuring reciprocity from the voters? Similarly, why is campaign clientelism widespread amongst voters despite its numerous negative consequences on societies, democracy, and development? These puzzles have motivated my research, where I attempt to understand the perceptions and motivations of politicians and voters towards campaign clientelism in Zambia.

To address the research question, two forms of data collection methods were utilised, in-depth interviews with politicians at the local level and a survey of voters in densely populated areas (Lusaka and Kitwe). Theoretically, the thesis draws on the informational theory of campaign clientelism to understand the perceptions and motivations of politicians, as well as insights from social psychology to understand the voters' legitimation beliefs using the systems justification theory.

Results showed that politicians have various perceptions of clientelism, from believing clientelism is an unsigned agreement between politicians and voters as well as an act of moral responsibility. Politicians also had various motives for engaging in clientelism; careerism, or the need to impress party bosses with their organisational ability; and signalling electoral viability to clientelist-seeking voters and donors. On the other hand, most of the voters highlighted their need to maintain the status quo by stating their willingness to engage in future campaign clientelism. Voters also acknowledged that campaign clientelism was not beneficial to their communities, but they were not willing to support any future laws that would prohibit politicians and voters to engage in campaign clientelism.

Keywords: *Campaign clientelism, Information theory, mixed methods, System justification theory, Zambia.*

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Like many African democracies, it is almost a tradition in Zambia that after every general election, there are several petitions against the official election results, citing electoral malpractice: ranging from vote rigging, violence, vote buying and gift distribution during campaigns. Most of these petitions are raised by losing candidates and their political parties. In 2011 the ruling party in Zambia, the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) had gone to great lengths to hand out gifts and benefits to voters during campaigns for the general election. An act that is referred to as clientelism. Despite these efforts, the MMD ended up losing power to the opposition Patriotic Front (PF). Similarly, ten years later, in the 2021 general elections, the PF was labelled even more notorious and generous in distributing cash and other gifts to voters during election campaigns. Despite this gesture of sudden generosity, the PF lost the general election to the opposition United Party for National Development (UPND), who won with a record margin of over one million votes (Electoral Commission of Zambia, 2023). Several places where there was documented evidence of the ruling Patriotic Front distributing cash and other incentives to voters, were won by the UPND, while in other places, the PF won the elections.

The above dynamics highlight the non-linear connection between clientelism and results and the continued engagement in clientelism by both politicians and voters even though this engagement has not translated into victory for the politician or brought meaningful development for the voters.

To understand these dynamics, in this research, I attempt to understand the perception of both Zambian politicians and voters towards clientelism.

I make, through this research, both a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the literature on clientelism by attempting to understand the perception of

politicians and voters towards clientelism and the conditions or reasons which makes them continue to pursue clientelist relationships despite not providing any meaningful benefits to either party.

I will deliberately focus my research on campaign clientelism, which is clientelism that takes place during the campaign period before elections (Muñoz, 2019). I concentrated on this period because, firstly, this is the period when the cabinet is dissolved. All Members of Parliament (MPs), Mayors and Councillors are relieved from their political office and thus cannot distribute any gifts or services in their official capacity as public servants. Secondly, this period experiences a rise in the practice and, therefore, can be easily documented and translated as such.

1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION

My preliminary research questions for this study are;

1. What perception do politicians and voters in Zambia have towards the practice of campaign clientelism?
    a. What motivates politicians and voters in Zambia to engage in campaign clientelism?

1.3. OVERVIEW OF SUB-SAHARAN POLITICS

Sub-Saharan Africa saw a surge in multi-party politics in the 1990s; this meant increased political competition among political players vying for political positions. Caeteris paribus, this competition should translate into the competition of ideas and characters from politicians wishing to sell themselves to the electorates. However, several studies have argued that in addition to selling ideas to mobilise voters' politicians have often engaged in distributing gifts or simply put, "clientelism", (Bwalya, 2017; Afrobarometer, 2022). This is "the non-programmatic, conditional distribution of resources in return for political

support" (Lundstedt & Edgell, 2020, p. 3). Basically, it is transactions between politicians and citizens whereby materials are offered in return for political support. It is a form of political patronage in which politicians provide tangible goods and services in exchange for political support (Stokes et al., 2013; Wantchekon, 2003). Though having various definitions, the central characteristic of all the definitions is that electoral support is the currency clients (voters) use to pay back different types of favours and benefits politicians offer.

Studies on electoral clientelism, in general, have examined ways in which politicians use private resources and public goods to access support and influence elections. These studies have shown that clientelism is especially common in rural areas where poverty and lack of access to essential services are high (Bwalya, 2017; Gans-Morse, Sebastian, & Simeon, 2014).

The practice can be argued to have generally negative consequences, not only on democracy and governance but can have even more uncertain consequences for development and on the economy (Brieley & Kramon, 2020). Once elected to office, there is a risk; politicians will conduct distributive politics, which tends to benefit only or most of the people who voted for them and leave out those who did not vote for them. Arguably, a clientelistic dispensation of benefits gives the incumbent politician an advantage in elections, thus hurting political competition, an essential aspect of democracy (Bardhan, 2021).

Additionally, electoral clientelism also undermines the accountability relationship in a democracy in which voters hold elected officials accountable (Brieley & Kramon, 2020). This lack of accountability, in return, will lead to an increase in corruption and mismanagement of public resources since voters who benefitted from the politicians or still benefiting will be less willing to scrutinise and hold the politician accountable. Research has found that clientelism, especially individual electoral clientelism, is practised more in low-income countries around the world (Kramon, 2019, p. 435).

Debates have also centred on the effectiveness of clientelism, especially in political systems where the ballot is secret and protected (Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005). How do politicians ensure their votes are secured from the people they bought? Or ensure absenteeism from voting? Despite the non-guarantee of securing votes from the electorates, why do politicians continue to engage in clientelism? On the other hand, despite the various adverse effects on the voters, like the breakdown of the rule of law, reduced accountability for elected officials, and selective distributive development to corruption, why do voters continue to engage in clientelism?

Gans-Morse et al. (2014) provided insights into how clientelist strategies manifest during elections. They categorise four different varieties of clientelism that clientelist political parties use in different combinations: vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion (Bwalya, 2017, p. 1552). The research highlights the different forms of clientelism which can be practised depending on the social context of the place. Politicians can use either tactic, independently or combined, depending on the setting.

1.4. HISTORY OF ZAMBIAN POLITICS

Zambian politics has a rich history dating back to its independence in 1964. The country was originally a British protectorate and later a British colony until it gained independence as the Republic of Zambia. In the early years of independence, Zambia was ruled by the United National Independence Party (UNIP) under President Kenneth Kaunda. During this time, the country was characterised by a one-party system focused on socialist policies (Phiri, 2021).

However, from the late 1980s, culminating in 1990, Zambia experienced a sustained call to end the one-party political system. This wave of change is suggested to have resulted from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which aroused the Democratic Wind of change, first in Eastern Europe and later in Africa in the early 1990s (Phiri, 2021, p. 113). Eventually, these calls for plural politics led to

the reintroduction of multi-party politics. In 1991, Zambia held multi-party elections, which saw the ruling UNIP lose to the newly formed Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) (Baylies & Szeftel, 1992). This was not just a transformation of the political system, from one based on the supremacy of a political party to a totally new system where the will and consent of the people are the basis of power and legitimacy of government. It was a democratic revolution (Phiri, 2021, p. 114).

However, after removing the UNIP regime from power, the various interest groups that comprised the MMD began to look more towards their interests than those of the MMD. Accusations and counter-accusations led to resignations and the birth of new political parties (Phiri, 2021, p. 114). The formation of these political parties, which broke away from the MMD, signified the mixed fortunes of multi-party politics in Zambia. By 1996 there were over 37 registered political parties in Zambia, with only three (UNIP, NP and MMD) represented in the 1991-96 Parliament (Phiri, 2021, p. 114).

Fast forward, the last two decades, from the period 2001 to 2021, saw what could be argued as the first genuine heavily contested multi-party tripartite elections in the country, where different political parties have been competing over ideas, unlike the 1991 elections, where the focus was removing the long-serving UNIP government. Debate issues in Zambian politics have since shifted from removing an authoritarian regime to improving the people's freedoms and livelihoods. Especially in a country experiencing economic hardships with over sixty per cent (60%) of the population living below the poverty line (Habitat for Humanity, 2023), the campaign messages have focused mainly on tackling unemployment, the economy, corruption, and the promise to provide basic needs. Overall, Zambia's political environment from 2001 to 2021 has been relatively stable, with peaceful transfers of power and relatively free and fair elections.

However, there have also been concerns about the state of political practice and the level of corruption and mismanagement. Patterning to elections, incumbents have been accused of deploying strategies to create uneven playing fields and manipulate elections in their favour (Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018; Bleck & van de Walle, 2018). However, the reality is that all political parties in Zambia have, over the years, engaged in various types of clientelism to maximise the potential of being elected, from vote buying, turnout buying, and abstention buying (Bwalya, 2017, p. 1552). According to election reports for the periods 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016 and 2021, there have been numerous allegations of widespread electoral malpractice in Zambian elections, ranging from voter intimidation and harassment, voter bribery, voter suppression, manipulation of vote counts and misuse of state resources (The Carter Center, 2023).

Voter intimidation and harassment include the use of violence and threats to coerce voters into supporting a particular candidate or political party. Voter bribery involves using money or other incentives to influence voters to support a particular candidate or party. Voter suppression refers to efforts to prevent eligible voters from casting their ballots, such as removing voting materials or denying access to polling stations. Manipulation of votes counts includes the alteration of vote totals in favour of a particular candidate or party, while the use of state resources for political gain refers to the misuse of government resources, such as government vehicles or government-funded programs, to support a particular political party or candidate during an election (The Carter Center, 2023).

Despite the various reports on electoral malpractice in Zambian elections, especially during campaigns, it is worth noting that the Electoral Process Act no. 35 of 2016 section 107(1d) does not inhibit politicians from distributing personalised gifts and services to voters as long as they are not using public resources to do that (Electoral Commission of Zambia, 2016, p. 766). This could be argued to be one of the reasons why electoral malpractice remains a significant challenge in Zambian elections which has led to concerns about the integrity and

fairness of the electoral process, thereby risking undermining the credibility of the election outcome.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Campaign clientelism refers to the use of clientelist practices during election campaigns to mobilise and retain voters. There is a vast body of literature on campaign clientelism, with scholars extensively examining its prevalence, causes, and effects. Here, I will review some key findings and assumptions from various literature.

2.1 PREVALENCE OF CAMPAIGN CLIENTELISM:

Research has shown that campaign clientelism is particularly common in developing countries with low political organisation and information. For instance, a study by Kramon (2019) found that clientelistic practices were widespread in the 2007 Kenyan general election, with about forty per cent (40%) of the voters receiving electoral handouts during the campaign. Similarly, another research by Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) concluded that clientelism was prevalent in the 2006 Mexican presidential election, with parties using patronage and clientelistic networks to mobilise voters.

More research conducted by Afrobarometer (2022) indicated that nineteen per cent (19%) of Zambians, thirty-eight per cent (38%) of Kenyans and thirty-four per cent (34%) of Ugandans voters reported that they had been offered bribes in exchange for votes at least once in the respective countries. This statistic, of course, is highly under-represented as vote buying is the rarest of all clientelist strategies engaged parties accept to have taken part. Therefore, the relatively low prevalence of vote buying does not mean that clientelism is not a significant factor in election campaigns. Research has shown how in Zambia, candidates spend lavishly on high-cost strategies such as organising spectacular rallies and providing large quantities of campaign materials (Wahman, 2023).

The vast literature on campaign clientelism has concentrated on poor societies or developing countries; however, I think cultural setup makes us see campaign clientelism in different ways. In developing countries, with Sweden being an example, various political parties, when conducting campaigns, were offering coffee and cookies; interesting to note is that the cost of one cup of coffee in Sweden is similar, if not more expensive to what politicians in places like Zambia pay an individual voter to turn out for a campaign rally.

2.2. EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGN CLIENTELISM:

Clientelism has been observed in many countries, with particular attention paid to developing countries, where patronage and information deficit play a pivotal role in campaigns. The studies have examined the consequences of campaign clientelism which include compromising the quality of democracy, and political participation, reduction in accountability and compromise to the provision of social welfare.

One consequence is that it undermines the principle of equal representation by giving an unfair advantage to particular groups or individuals (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). This, in turn, can erode trust in democratic institutions and, therefore, compromise the legitimacy of elections. Examples of lack of trust in the electoral process have been public knowledge, including in the 2007 Kenyan general elections and the last US presidential elections in 2016.

Clientelism has also been cited for causing a reduction in accountability. This reduction in accountability fosters corruption, as politicians tend to use public resources to provide particularistic benefits to their supporters. Analysing data from 19 Latin American countries, the research found that clientelistic practices were associated with lower levels of democratic accountability and institutional performance (Stokes, Dunning, & Nazareno, 2013). Clientelism breeds a cycle of corruption due to non-accountability, where politicians can misuse public

resources to build clientelistic relationships with voters, ultimately undermining democracy.

Another study by Kramon and Posner (2013), which focused on Kenya and political favouritism, found that clientelism increased voter turnout and support for the incumbent party but decreased the quality of representation. This, they argue, will make clientelist politicians prioritise the interest of clientelist-seeking voters over non-clientelist-seeking voters in the distribution of public goods and services, thereby reducing the quality of social welfare.

However, in contrast, some studies have credited clientelism to the effective implementation of social welfare services. A study found that clientelistic practices in Brazil were associated with higher levels of social welfare spending in poor municipalities (Stokes, Dunning, & Nazareno, 2013). In this scenario, politicians have used clientelism as a means of targeting resources to marginalised communities that are often neglected by the state. The counterargument to that may be that marginalised communities are usually the most populated, and politicians providing clientelist benefits to such societies may be efficiently investing in extensive voter support.

In conclusion, however, the consensus is that campaign clientelism is a pervasive phenomenon in many countries, which undermines the quality of democracy and governance, especially in developing economies. The phenomenon undermines principles of accountability, transparency, and development and perpetuates inequalities by favouring specific groups for social services over others.

Therefore, for researchers and lawmakers alike, a key to not only understanding and countering clientelism is also understanding that a range of factors, including poverty, weak democratic institutions, political parties, and cultural factors can influence it. This will be essential for developing effective strategies to eliminate this practice and promote democracy and governance.

2.3. CAUSES OF CAMPAIGN CLIENTELISM:

The general cause of clientelism can be argued to be the politicians' quest for power. However, that explanation is too simplistic and does not acknowledge other dynamics, like socio-economic, political, cultural and others, influencing clientelism. Various researchers have identified a range of factors that contribute to the use of campaign clientelism. One of the factors, as highlighted by Muñoz (2019), is the cost of campaign clientelism which is relatively cheaper compared to other types of clientelism, as it lasts only for a short period. For example, it is relatively more affordable to buy attendance of poor voters at a political rally as it is a one-off event.

As mentioned earlier, clientelism, in general, is more prevalent in societies that have weak political and information structures. Therefore, it is no surprise that several other scholars have equally pointed to the weakness of political institutions and the absence of effective regulations to monitor campaign finance as causes of campaign clientelism (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). In countries with a weak rule of law, transparency, and accountability, politicians may be more likely to engage in clientelism. This, in my opinion, is because the existing systems or lack of systems do not provide oversight of the electoral process, making it easier for politicians to engage in clientelism without the fear of accountability.

I do not disagree with the literature but added to this should equally be the role of political parties; political parties adopt candidates and, in many instances, sponsor or facilitate sponsorship for their candidates. Especially in setups with weak political institutions, which makes information distribution hard, political parties use campaign clientelism due to the informational value that it can provide.

Clientelism works best when there is an equal demand for it, and one of the reasons that determine this demand is the level of poverty. Stokes et al., (2013) rightly cited the high level of poverty and inequality in society as an incentive

for voters to support politicians who offer personalised goods and services. This factor indeed is linked to all the other factors as the country's state of the economy impacts the level of effectiveness of its institutions. In many developing countries, poverty is widespread, and most voters in the low-income bracket usually lack access to basic resources such as education, healthcare, and employment.

On the other hand, politicians exploit this inequality schism and offer voters resources in exchange for campaign turnout or votes. The strategies in such a socio-economic context are largely successful as poor voters may have fewer options to meet their needs and, thus, are more likely to accept the gifts.

Two aspects are slightly overlooked in the success of these strategies: firstly, the cultural aspects of reciprocity, where voters might feel indebted to politicians offering them personalised goods and services. Secondly, the mistrust between political authority and citizens, especially low-income citizens. They might feel that engaging in clientelism is the only way to ensure their survival.

2.4. TYPES OF CAMPAIGN CLIENTELISM

The literature on campaign clientelism identifies several clientelistic strategies that political candidates or parties use. These strategies include but are not limited to vote buying, turnout buying, and abstention buying (Gans-Morse, Sebastian, & Simeon, 2014, p. 415). The decision of the politicians or political party to adopt one strategy over the other or any combination of strategies depends on several factors, such as the cost of the strategy, political salience, ballot secrecy, compulsory voting, and political polarisation, amongst others.

I do not claim in this research to provide an exhaustive analysis of all types of clientelism, but instead, I will restrict my research to campaign clientelism, which is exclusively the distribution of benefits during election campaigns.

2.4.1. VOTE BUYING.

The concept of vote buying in clientelism literature suffers from conceptual ambiguity. However, one major characteristic is that if there is a distribution of cash or benefits contingent on the vote, then the act is within the purview of clientelism. According to various research, vote buying involves rewarding indifferent voters for switching their votes (Murugesan, 2020; Gans-Morse, Sebastian, & Simeon, 2014; Muñoz, 2019). This means gifts and benefits handed out to loyal party supporters would not qualify as vote buying under this context. It usually involves the exchange of cash and other personalised goods and services in exchange for votes. The strategy may be seen as unambiguously harmful to democracy, as the strategy interferes with free and fair elections and undermines political equality by allowing those with resources to buy votes of the poor (Gans-Morse, Sebastian, & Simeon, 2014).

Even though this strategy has often been documented in developing countries where there is widespread poverty and voters are more susceptible to bribery. Research has shown that vote buying has been widely practised for a long time despite it being illegal. It was widespread in the United States and Britain before the introduction of secret ballots at the close of the nineteenth century (Anderson & Tollison, 1990). This is a strategy that is used in many democracies despite its illegality, and it has been practised by both incumbents and opposition.

Politicians usually use intermediaries to distribute these benefits, usually just days or as close to the voting time as possible (Murugesan, 2020). The timing can have different logic, one of which is that voters are likely to remember the politician while voting when they are still enjoying the benefits from the politician. Another reason might be that politicians want to minimise the risk of spending on non-voters; therefore, the more time they have, the more likely they are to establish voters from non-voters.

Although there is no consensus on the assumption, scholars have argued that politicians are likely to engage in vote buying when there is a mandatory voting (Gans-Morse, Sebastian, & Simeon, 2014). This, then, might save political machines the trouble of sieving through voters and non-voters but can instead offer benefits to voters, most likely in areas where the politician or political party is not very popular.

But there is a dichotomy between what has been referred to as wholesale and retail vote purchasing when it comes to buying votes. Wholesale vote buying involves a group of voters who are provided with a promise or reward when votes are purchased in bulk. On the other hand, retail vote buying entails giving specific things to specific people (Bwalya, 2017, p. 1553). Because wholesale vote buying typically involves the promise of public goods. It is less frowned upon and less contentious than retail vote buying, which is seen as inappropriate since it rewards individual voters.

The difficulty with ascertaining exchanges of benefits for votes to potential voters makes it harder to establish and track individual clientelist practices, as the exchange of retail rewards tends to be in a covert manner (Bwalya, 2017). On the other hand, however, the distribution of wholesale rewards or references to such in electoral campaigns is more openly done and, therefore, easy to trace.

2.4.2. TURNOUT BUYING

Unlike vote buying, which involves the exchange of gifts with indifferent voters for votes, turnout buying, as the name suggests, does not require the voters to exchange their votes for the politicians' gifts. With turnout-buying strategies, politicians offer selective benefits to immobilised supporters in exchange for turnout at the polls or any other campaign event (Gans-Morse, Sebastian, & Simeon, 2014; Nichter, 2008).

The form of electoral support demanded by this type of campaign clientelism is turnout at rallies and other campaign events. Since benefits are usually distributed *in situ* while campaign activities are taking place, clients receive the goods offered by politicians only on the condition that they attend the event (Muñoz, 2019). This strategy involves less stringent monitoring requirements than vote buying, as gifts are usually offered during a political rally. Turnout buying is prevalent in conditions where candidates are voted through a popular vote of the majority and in conditions where the ballot is secret (Rauschenbach & Paula, 2019, p. 683).

The form of cost-benefit analysis in implementing voter turn-out buying is aimed at producing two possible primary outcomes: either to increase the turnout in the clientelist party's support base during the polls or, in the case of opposition strongholds, to induce abstention from voting or shifting electoral support to the party in power (Bwalya, 2017, p. 1552).

In both cases, the ultimate aim of the clientelist practising politician is to maximise their chances while reducing the opposition's chances. To increase turnout, politicians will offer cheaper benefits like alcohol, food or cash at campaign rallies just to entice voters to attend, as they are, in many instances, aware of the information benefits that arise from large crowds at campaign events.

It Is essential to mention that the theoretical mechanism of turnout buying involves distributing rewards to both voters and non-voters. Individuals who receive rewards for turning out might follow through and turn up at future events in anticipation of future dividends. However, for turnout buying to be effective, parties must explicitly target some individuals who were induced to vote in the previous election as these are likely to vote in the following election (Rauschenbach & Paula, 2019).

This assumption, however, raises questions about the effectiveness of turnout buying; if it largely benefits individuals who were likely to vote anyway, then the strategy might be argued not to be the most effective use of campaign resources. Furthermore, various studies have not reached a consensus on whether turn-out buying is an effective campaign clientelism strategy. A study by Bwalya (Bwalya, 2017), analysed the impact of the voter turnout buying program in Zambia between 2011 to 2015 and found that the strategy increased voter turnout but had no effect on the overall outcome of the elections.

Regardless of no consensus, one thing clear is that clientelist politicians ultimately hope for unilateral gratitude and not reciprocal exchange and expect that at least a certain number of grateful clients will vote for them (Muñoz, 2019, p. 19). Additionally, campaign clientelism, like many other forms, negatively impacts voters' perception of fairness and ultimately compromises the integrity of the electoral process as it can potentially undermine public trust in the process.

2.4.3. ABSTENTION BUYING AS A CAMPAIGN STRATEGY.

Like turnout buying, here politicians provide benefits to voters not to attend but to abscond from the campaign activities of the opposition. Generally regarded as "Negative vote buying", it rewards indifferent voters for not voting (Gans-Morse, Sebastian, & Simeon, 2014, p. 417). Even though the most appropriate term, especially in the context of this research, would be "negative turn-out buying" since the strategy only influences turn-out and not voting choices. Here politicians use rewards to demobilise the opposition voters.

Studies in the Philippines and Guyana indicated that politicians engaged in rewarding voters in opposition strongholds by busing them away from the voting stations as well as buying their voters' cards (Gans-Morse, Sebastian, & Simeon, 2014, p. 418). This strategy has been widely used in Zambia, even though most cases in Zambia were not through rewarding opposition voters for abstaining but

through the use of thugs and violence to intimidate voters from going to attend other political parties' campaign events and voting (Sishuwa, 2021).

CHAPTER 3: THEORY

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Understanding the perceptions of politicians and voters towards clientelism will offer an understanding of why politicians and voters continue to engage in clientelism, despite there being no guarantee of voter cooperation in the voting booth due to the secret ballot, on top of its researched negative consequences.

It was important to study and understand the perceptions and motivations of politicians and voters for two main reasons. Firstly, politicians and voters may have different perceptions of what constitutes clientelism; some might view it as an acceptable part of political practice, while others might see it as detrimental to democracy, governance, and society.

Secondly, politicians and voters may have different incentives for engaging in or opposing clientelism. Politicians might engage in it to acquire power, while voters might engage in it as a way of their livelihood or expressing a political preference. Understanding these perceptions and incentives from politicians and voters can assist policymakers in developing crucial strategies that can effectively address the root cause of clientelism in different contexts.

To understand this phenomenon, I will utilise two theories, namely the Informational Theory of Campaign Clientelism (Muñoz, 2019)and the System Justification Theory (SJT) (Jost, 2018). Understanding the perception of both politicians and the voters towards clientelism cannot be fully explored by either theory independently, thus the utilisation of both.

The informational theory on campaign clientelism has a more significant focus on the political actors and has been utilised to understand perception (Kramon 2017;

Munoz 2019), reasons, and context (Szwarcberg 2015; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007) for clientelism; hence it will give us a better understanding of the perception of politicians towards clientelism as well as their reasons for engaging in the practice.

To understand voter perception towards clientelism, I will employ SJT theory which has been used to understand and explain the reason, perception, and tendencies of the disadvantaged towards social, economic, and political practices such as clientelism, which in the long run does not offer them any meaningful reward (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost 2018).

3.2. OVERARCHING THEORIES

This part is solely added to justify why it was essential to study the perceptions and motivations of politicians and voters. It does not in any way attempt to explain the perceptions or motivations of politicians and voters towards clientelism but instead gives credibility to the importance of understanding both.

Perception and motivation have been interlinked in different studies and theories. Firstly, the theory of Self -determination (Ryan & Deci, 2000), links perception and motivation by stipulating that humans have three basic psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. The fulfilment, or lack of fulfilment of these basic needs, is critical for optimal human functioning and well-being. It states that the perceptions humans have over the fulfilment or lack of fulfilment of basic needs can act as a motivation for humans to engage in certain social practices (Ryan & Deci, 2000).

Similarly, the social exchange theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978); opines that individuals engage in social interactions with others based on their perceptions of the benefits and costs of the exchange. Meaning individuals are motivated to engage in exchanges that they perceive beneficial or necessary to them.

Therefore, these scientific connections between perception and motivation were my justification for attempting to understand both perceptions and motivations in my research.

3.3. INFORMATIONAL THEORY OF CAMPAIGN CLIENTELISM

Munoz's (2019) informational theory of campaign clientelism has been built on Kramon's (2017) earlier informational theory of electoral clientelism. Kramon (2017) suggests that politicians engage in electoral clientelism to convince voters that they are redistributive types and electorally viable, conveying that they will have the will and opportunity to provide resources to the poor in the future (p.33). Munoz (2019) extends that understanding to the phenomena of campaign clientelism, that is, paying citizens for their attendance at large rallies, candidates demonstrate their strong electoral potential to the media, donors, activists, and voters. In essence, campaign clientelism combines many of the strategies of electoral clientelism, with its major significance being the time frame for the practice. It, therefore, refers to the use of clientelist methods during election campaigns to mobilise and retain voters (Muñoz, 2019).

In this way, this subtype of electoral clientelism "campaign clientelism"—is consequential in influencing vote choices (Muñoz, 2019, pp. 80-81).

Clientelist investments have an informational value, especially early in the campaign, by signalling candidates' electoral viability. At this point in the election, rather than buying votes, politicians are paying off voters to turn out at campaign events (Muñoz, 2019, p. 79). By highlighting the informational value of campaign clientelism in the context of low conventional information, I will use the theory to bring attention to the various benefits of campaign clientelism that might help understand both the perceptions towards clientelism and motivations of politicians to engage in clientelist practices.

My approach is particularly well suited for explaining campaign clientelism in the Zambian context of low political information and high uncertainty about

candidates. As has been documented elsewhere, lower levels of information reduce the importance of substantive predispositions on vote choice and emphasise expectations of electoral chances (Muñoz, 2019, p. 81). Since there is not enough information for voters to decide on, voters are influenced through large campaign rallies, which can give voters an indication of who is likely to win or lose.

The theory places campaign clientelism and competition at the centre of analysis. Buying participation at campaign events allows political candidates to overcome two fundamental hurdles to their election. Firstly, it enables politicians to ensure crowded campaign rallies, thus demonstrating their electoral viability to the broader audience of strategic actors (voters and donors) who watch these events or learn about them through other means, such as by word of mouth, radio, television, and newspaper reports (Kramon 2017; Muñoz 2019). This allows politicians to sell their candidature to a wider audience through non-clientelist appeals by trying to turn the fleeting hold they have on voters' attention into a longer-lasting commitment that will carry them through to election day. In other words, it allows the candidates to have a genuine audience with the voters, which can lead to other mutual political linkages between the candidate and the client.

Secondly, managing large campaign crowds makes politicians investable in the eyes of donors who wish to fund their campaigns, giving them a competitive advantage over fellow candidates (Kramon 2017; Muñoz 2019).

Both Kramon (2017) and Muñoz (2019) have highlighted different but interlinked factors in explaining clientelism by listing what they call *motivating factors*. These can be identified as independent drivers yet act in an interlinked way. These motivating factors driving candidates' engagement in campaign clientelism include demonstrating: 1. organisational potential; 2. popularity; and 3. electoral viability. I will use these as my framework to understand both perceptions and motivations of politicians towards clientelism.

3.3.1. CAMPAIGN CLIENTELISM AS A SHOW OF ORGANISATIONAL POTENTIAL

Political rallies remain an essential aspect of politics, especially in the era of social media and mass media, because they provide information on the mobilisation potential of the candidate to different members both within and outside the political party machine (Muñoz, 2019, p. 29). Within the party and for brokers (low-level politicians), especially since they are the ones who serve as local patrons who organise and mobilise voters through the distribution of goods and benefits, having large rallies remains an important aspect during campaigns.

Firstly, large rallies give politicians the opportunity to show their mobilisation capacity to senior party officials with a view to being promoted within the political party (Muñoz, 2019, pp. 29-30). For low-level politicians aspiring to become councillors, the promotion might mean being adopted on the party ticket to contest the local government position. This opportunity comes with more party funding and support. Secondly, rallies provide party bosses with information to monitor brokers' organisational reliability. Additionally, high turnout at rallies also signals the politicians' electoral strength based on the public display of their voter mobilisation capacity (Muñoz, 2019).

3.3.2. CAMPAIGN CLIENTELISM AS A SHOW OF POPULARITY

Several scholars contend that "public pledges, or the display of badges, party colours or signs", are more profitable to candidates than private promises of support (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, p. 15). Therefore, buying attendance at campaign events is electorally appealing for politicians, especially in the Zambian context where there is a low political organisation and cues like partisan affiliation may provide little information. High attendance increases the popularity of the politician through media coverage and street propaganda, and this will attract benefit-seeking actors to invest in the politician's campaigns.

Although the literature states that public resources are frequently used to finance the distribution of handouts during campaigns, private donations finance represents a sizable share of this distribution in several contexts (Muñoz, 2019, p. 35). These may include small to large businesses operating within the community, hoping to obtain future favours from the politician or political party.

3.3.3. CAMPAIGN CLIENTELISM AS A SHOW OF ELECTORAL VIABILITY

According to well-established literature on strategic coordination (Duverger, 1954; Leys, 1959; Cox, 1997), political actors can be understood as instrumentally rational actors who care mainly about influencing political outcomes, such as the composition of the government (Muñoz, 2019, p. 38). Turnout at campaign rallies may also inform donors and benefit-seeking activists about which candidates have electoral potential (Muñoz, 2019).

During elections, donors avoid wasting their resources and will always look to invest in the most profitable candidate where they expect victory and, therefore, a return on their investment. Similarly, strategic voters are unwilling to waste their ballot (Muñoz, 2019). Politicians know that voters are likely to vote for a candidate with a genuinely higher chance of victory than a candidate believed to have no chance of winning; thus, increasing attendance helps cement the idea in potential voters of the politician's electoral viability. Like other actors, the media equally tends to focus more on candidates who have promise or fare better than expected (Muñoz, 2019). Therefore, high turnout at electoral campaigns also provides cues to the media about candidates' electability.

In summary, campaign clientelism mobilises and persuades voters and strategic actors to support the most promising candidates. By signalling candidates' electoral viability, campaign clientelism can be indirectly argued to affect vote choices. Not only do handouts signal to voters that the candidate has organisational resources, but it mobilises turnout at rallies, which becomes a proxy for popularity.

3.4. SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION THEORY

As the saying goes, it takes two to tango. To understand what perceptions voters have towards the practice of campaign clientelism, and the follow-up question "What motivates voters to engage in campaign clientelism?" I will employ the system justification theory. Hence having already theorised the drivers of politicians' engagement in campaign clientelism, my focus here is on theorising the agency of clients and the critical role they play in maintaining clientelism.

A system justification theory was proposed three decades ago in social psychology to explain the participation by disadvantaged individuals and groups in negative stereotypes of themselves and the phenomenon of outgroup favouritism (Jost & Banaji, 1994). However, over the years, the theory has been used to account for a much more comprehensive range of outcomes, including attitudes and opinions about social, economic, and political issues; and political and religious ideologies (Jost, 2018, p. 1). Importantly, system justification theory has been used to explain why people support policies, practices and political leaders that are harmful to their interests (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, 2018).

Similarly, in this research, I intend to use the theory to try and understand why despite its highly negative consequences on the people and the communities, voters in Zambia have continued to engage in clientelism. I will seek to understand the voters' perceptions and motivations to engage in clientelism.

The theory suggests that people have a basic psychological need for stability, order, and predictability, which makes them inclined to defend and support the status quo, even when it is unfair or oppressive (Jost, 2018). It explains how people rationalise and justify existing social systems and hierarchies, such as economic, political, and cultural systems, through what the authors termed as tenets of SJT.

For this research, I will concentrate on three stated tenets of SJT: 1. Maintaining the status quo; 2. the palliative function and 3. existential, epistemic relational function.

3.4.1. MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO

The first tenet that has been alluded to earlier is that people are motivated (often implicitly rather than explicitly) to defend, justify, and bolster aspects of the societal status quo, including existing social, economic, and political systems, institutions, and arrangements (Jost, 2018, p. 4). Voter's engagement in clientelism might be driven by the justness and legitimacy of social, economic and political systems, and they perceive clientelism as an act that is acceptable and a necessary means of procuring resources for themselves that might otherwise be unavailable.

Several scholars have also shown evidence that not only do people engage in selective, biased information to make system-supporting conclusions (Jost, 2018, p. 4), but they are also willing to expend behavioural effort to maintain the legitimacy of the socioeconomic system (Ledgerwood, Mandisodza, Jost, & Pohl, 2011).

In the Zambian context, politicians may assist some community members by providing cash for food, children's education and medical or funeral expenses. Even though such acts can be classified as clientelism, for the beneficiary voter, it is improbable that they will view these gifts as an enticement to rally support for the politician. Even though it might influence their decision to attend the politician's campaign event or even vote for them. This is an important issue because some accept that system-justifying beliefs and ideologies may be internalised through a passive process of social learning but doubt that people are motivated to engage in system justification (Huddy, 2004; Owuamalam, Rubin & Spears, 2018a; Mitchell & Tetlock, 2009).

As with all other motives in psychology, the strength of system justification motivation is expected to vary according to situational and dispositional factors. These factors include exposure to system criticism, challenge, and threat. This, according to research, can increase system-justifying responses and may consist of the stereotypical differentiation of advantaged groups (Jost, 2018, p. 5). In Zambia,

it's not uncommon for voters, especially in the lower income bracket, to refer to politicians as bosses, sir, or even chosen to be leaders by God.

While the longevity of a system also influences the system justification, the longer a system has been in place, the more likely people will justify its existence as part of their tradition (Jost, 2018, p. 5). Eventually, people are likely to justify social, economic and political systems to the extent that they feel powerless or dependent on those systems. (Jost, 2018).

3.4.2. PALLIATIVE FUNCTION

System justification can make people feel better about the societal status quo. People want to hold favourable attitudes about themselves and their group, and one way of doing that is by accepting the status quo that leads to their lived inequality (Jost, 2018, p. 11). Suppose people feel good about the status quo. In that case, there is a likelihood that they will not attempt to change that status quo and will not hold any official perpetuating injustice accountable.

Similarly, inequality, in my opinion, enhances clientelism; firstly, it's cheaper for politicians to offer low-cost personalised benefits to voters in the low-income gap than it is to offer personalised benefits to middle or high-income voters: Therefore, clientelism is a way that both the politician and the client avoid tackling the question of development and inequality, the client will also want to believe they have control over their decisions and therefore, will not want to engage in beliefs that takes away their agency to make decisions. Thus, both will get gratification through gifts and personalised benefits for the voter, while the politician will get less accountability.

At the same time, the emotional 'benefits' of system justification come with a cost in terms of decreased potential for social change and the remediation of inequality (Jost, 2018). For example, poverty begins to be viewed as laziness, while corruption and clientelist acts are seen as clever enough to benefit from the failed system.

3.4.3. EPISTEMIC, EXISTENTIAL, AND RELATIONAL NEEDS

Thirdly, I will concentrate on the tenet that proposes that system justification addresses, subjectively, if not objectively, some underlying epistemic motives to minimise precariousness and ambiguity, existential motives to assuage threat and insecurity (Jost, Ledgerwood & Hardin, 2008a; Jost 2018, p.13).

Several scholars argue that to truly challenge the status quo, to engage in sustained forms of protest, one must be willing and able to accept uncertainty, potential threats to one's safety and security, and the risk of being alienated from others (Jost, Becker, Osborne, & Badaan, 2017a). For the Zambian voter, to change the cycle of clientelism, which leads to inequality and perpetuates more clientelism, the voter must be willing to not participate in clientelism and hold politicians accountable.

However, not participating and attempting to hold politicians accountable has no guarantee of favourable change. The dilemma will, therefore, be an attempt to change the status and risk not benefiting from ongoing clientelism or continuing to benefit from future clientelist practices. An example would be the dilemma of not having any cash guarantee in your pocket to feed your family. This might appear a more daunting ordeal than having assured access to benefits to cover one's basic needs for a day or two at the expense of not fighting for change.

Therefore, people might be reluctant to fight clientelism by refusing to participate in clientelism because participating in clientelism guarantees benefits while fighting clientelism does not.

3.5. CRITIQUE

Like any other theory there, criticisms of system justification theory have been expressed over the years. However, I take solace in acknowledging that criticism of any theory not only helps build a theory but is as inevitable as breathing.

The most common critique is that SJT is merely a passive reflection of social reality (Owuamalam, Rubin, & Spears, 2018a). However, this argument drastically misrepresents the psychology of system justification. This argument trivialises and seriously mischaracterises problems of social, political, and economic inequality and underplays the various ways in which inequality is perpetuated and legitimated in society (Costa-Lopes, Dovidio, Pereira, & Jost, 2013).

Even though, in some cases, system justification may be passive, many people strongly oppose it and are indifferent to it. Similarly, even though clientelism is widely practised, there are still many pockets of people in society who are opposed to the act.

3.6. ALTERNATIVE THEORY

In choosing my theory, I am aware that competing theories can be utilised to understand the perception of voters and politicians towards clientelism.

The closest alternative theory explored was Burns & Roszkowska's (2016) Rational Choice Theory, which is focused on a few determinants of individual choices; and methods of aggregating social behaviour based on the decisions of individual actors.

The theory has been useful in adding theoretical and empirical knowledge to explain perceptions and motives for engaging in clientelism (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). These studies, however, were conducted in contexts of highly institutionalised political systems with high availability of information to the voters.

The central assumption of rational choice is that the actor knows all available alternatives and chooses the best action or means to achieve her ends based on expectations about future consequences or outcomes of her choices (Burns & Roszkowska, 2016, p. 196). This is impossible in the Zambian context, where there

is low political organisation at the grassroots. Hence, there is insufficient access to useful information for the voters to make entirely rational decisions.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

4.1. INTRODUCTION

This research aims to understand the perceptions and motivations of politicians and voters towards campaign clientelism. To answer my research questions, I have selected the case of Zambia for a couple of reasons; Firstly, Zambia has a history of competitive elections with regular power turnover. This has created an environment where political players have been motivated to use various campaign tactics, including providing material benefits, such as food or cash, to potential supporters to get an advantage over opponents.

Secondly, Zambia embodies all the characteristics of democracies with widespread clientelism, such as a lack of established political machines and a low-income country. Thirdly, the country recently held its elections, giving me easy access to the field as I thoroughly understand its social, political, economic, and cultural dynamics. Therefore, selecting Zambia as my case study was a logical choice.

Additionally, my choice to concentrate on the towns of Lusaka and Kitwe is based on the fact that these are the most populated cities in the country. Both cities are also the most cosmopolitan in the country, a situation that eliminates factors like tribes and chiefs having a significant influence on the voters' decisions to support any political candidate.

I consciously decided to focus on local-level politicians (Councillors) due to the accessibility of politicians at that level and because local-level politicians are more in touch with the community and are, therefore, the ones directly approaching voters to engage in clientelism. Additionally, their manifesto and strategy are based on the broad political party manifesto and strategy.

I will use a mixed-method research design, defined as

> "An approach to research in the social, behavioural, and health sciences in which the investigator gathers both quantitative (closed-ended) and qualitative (open-ended) data, integrates the two and then draws interpretations based on the combined strengths of both sets of data to understand research problems" (Creswell, 2015, p. 19).

Specifically, I will combine survey data from voters and in-depth interviews with local-level politicians to capture both actors' perspectives and motivations.

I conducted in-depth interviews with local politicians and random interviews, that is, a survey with local voters. I utilised purposive sampling for local politicians interviewed and random sampling for conducting the survey.

I decided to conduct in-depth interviews with politicians for a couple of reasons. As earlier noted, in-depth interviews allowed me to access nuanced data and understand the meanings that politicians give to their experience through things like the emphasis on certain words or facial expressions and gestures. Secondly, given the nature of the research topic and my need to obtain valuable information, I needed to create a rapport and trust between the politicians and myself by creating an environment where the politicians felt free to express themselves. This could not have been achieved through a survey or questionnaire.

Retrospectively, I decided to survey voters because I understood that to get a clear picture of voters' perceptions and motivations, I needed a large sample size. In the available time frame, conducting in-depth interviews with 241 respondents was impossible. Additionally, surveys were a logical alternative to allow for the standardisation of the questions and answers received from the respondents.

4.2. DATA COLLECTION

My data was obtained directly through interviews and surveys from politicians and voters. Collecting data through interviews and surveys is not uncommon for mixed-method research. Since this design is a concurrent triangulation design, quantitative and qualitative data were obtained simultaneously. I acknowledge that the two data types differ and take different but equally important roles (Creswell, 2015).

Qualitative methods enabled me to ask general questions, fostering deeper discussion and understanding of the phenomenon. In contrast, quantitative methods allowed me to ask specific questions and measure variables to facilitate finding answers.

4.2.1. INTERVIEWS WITH POLITICIANS

Any research has the most power when the choice of methods is deliberate and where interviews are one of the chosen methods (Arksey & Knight, 1999, p. 2). I had given full thought to the aim of the research and the type of interviews I would use. These decisions, in return, helped shape the potential meaning of my findings.

Therefore, to answer the question regarding the perceptions of politicians towards clientelism, I decided to conduct open-ended or unstructured interviews with politicians.

It should be noted that the individuals categorised as "politicians" are exclusively those who have held or are currently holding political office at the local level between the years 2020 and 2022 and have actively participated in local-level elections during that same time frame. This information is crucial to avoid any confusion or misinterpretation.

The table below depicts the characteristics of interviewed politicians.

	Pol. 1	Pol. 2	Pol. 3	Pol. 4	Pol. 5	Pol. 6	Pol. 7	Pol. 8	Pol. 9
Gender	Male	Male	Male	Male	Male	Male	Male	Male	Male
Location	Lusaka	Lusaka	Lusaka	Lusaka	Lusaka	Kitwe	Kitwe	Kitwe	Kitwe
Position	Coun.	Former Coun.	Coun.	Coun.	Coun.	Coun.	Coun.	Coun.	Coun.

Table.1: Demographic of politicians.

Key: *Coun. = Councillor.   Pol. = Politician.*

Since I was not interested in measuring the level of clientelist engagements from politicians, in-depth interviews provided an avenue to understand the complexity of clientelism from the social, economic and political aspects, which provided a reasonable basis for answering my follow-up question of why politicians continue to engage in clientelism.

My approach was to ask questions guided by the motivating factors of my theory but also remain flexible in the approaches used to explore them (see Appendix 1 and 2). I encouraged my informants to be open and spontaneous and to speak about the issue in question using language and ideas of their own rather than anything imposed by myself. Depending on the part of the community I was interviewing from, I let informants respond in any language they felt comfortable in. I adopted a more passive and less directive role. This allowed me to gather a wealth of qualitative data, which helped generate more profound insights into both perceptions of politicians towards clientelism and why they continue to practice it.

It is worth mentioning that even though I would have appreciated the diversity in my respondents, all the politicians were male.

4.2.2. SAMPLING AND ACCESSING POLITICIANS.

For interviews, to successfully answer my research question on understanding the perceptions and motivations of politicians towards clientelism. I targeted politicians at the local level (councillors). I decided to concentrate on councillors for two main reasons; they are the bridge between high-ranking political party officials and the community grassroots and therefore are aware of both the party hierarchy and the community's perception towards clientelism.

Secondly, being low-ranking political office bearers means they do not have as much scrutiny from the media and public as any high-ranking political player. This means they are likely less resistant to divulging their opinions and political party stance on clientelism.

I had interviews with a total of nine (9) politicians who were selected through a purposive sampling procedure. Since I aimed to gain access to data, sources and contexts that would allow me to develop an empirically and theoretically grounded argument (Mason, 2018). I decided to conduct purposive sampling. Firstly, due to the limited number of politicians willing to talk about clientelism, I had to select individuals who were already familiar with me either through previous interactions or through referrals from other informants they trust. Three of the nine politicians had previous interactions with me; one was a classmate in primary school, the other was a schoolmate at university, and the third lived in the same neighbourhood as I did for two years.

Secondly, considering the timeframe for data collection, I had to strategically select respondents whose schedules could accommodate the limited time available. The interviews were conducted in different places; two were in a restaurant, six were in the politicians' offices, and one was in a car.

The common concerns over purposive sampling are its vulnerability to researcher bias and low external validity due to its failure to provide a generalisation (Andrade,

2021, p. 87). However, I acknowledge that every research, including this one, has an element of bias. To minimise this bias, I created a set of questions based on the research aim, which enabled me to eliminate anyone who did not fit the criteria. Questions like; is the respondent a politician? Are they politically active at the local level? Have they participated in the previous election? Have they held local political office in the period 2020-2022? These questions were used as a guide to ensure I selected respondents who would provide the needed information.

4.2.3. SURVEYING VOTERS

My decision to conduct a survey was based on the reasoning that to get a concrete idea of the voter's perceptions and motivation to engage in clientelism, I needed a larger sample size compared to politicians. Bearing in mind the shallow depth of surveys, it was imperative that I surveyed as many respondents as possible until I achieved data saturation as a basis for measuring data sufficiency. I designed my survey using Google Forms and recorded the responses electronically. I engaged 4 other university students as data collectors to ensure that I collected sufficient data within my limited period.

I created a semi-structured questionnaire, where parts of the questions had fixed answers, and some parts had an option of listing opinions (see Appendix 3). The survey comprised fourteen (14) questions, and each interview took approximately four (4) minutes on average. The survey questions were written in English; however, the questions were also read out in various local languages depending on the respondent's language preference. It was impossible to pre-write the questions in a local language as Zambia has 74 different languages, thus my decision to write them in English.

Besides the obvious advantages of surveys gathering data from a large population, they are also valuable at ensuring the respondent does not get off topic when answering the question. Another reason for employing the survey was that the data

from the respondents were so precise and therefore provided me with very little room for subjectivity in interpreting the results.

4.2.4. SAMPLING AND ACCESSING VOTERS FOR THE SURVEY.

I needed to get a sample representative of a wider population. To do that, I needed to select a sample that is representative of the total empirical population I wished to study, in the sense that the sample displayed characteristics in similar proportions and patterns to the total population about which I was to make generalizations (de Leeuw, 2008, p. 60). My criteria for sample selection were that respondents needed to be, firstly, a Zambian older than 16 years of age, which is the legal voting age in Zambia and does not require parental consent to be interviewed. Secondly, respondents needed to come from low-income localities since they are the most populated areas and naturally the logical targets for politicians who want to attract more voters.

The following two figures highlight the general demographic of the respondents:


**Fig.1**: Respondents' demographics by gender and age.

	Female	Male	Other	Prefer not to say
■ Formal employment	11	13		
■ Informal employment	9	8		1
■ Prefer not to answer	2	4		1
■ Self employed	49	36		
■ Student	30	19	1	3
■ Unemployed	31	17		2

Fig.2: Respondents' demographics by gender and occupation.

NB*: Informal employment, for this research, is defined as all jobs in unregistered and or small-scale, private unincorporated enterprises. Examples include street vendors, marketeers, small kiosks, house helps and others.*

Despite the positive side of surveys, I encountered challenges of my own, apart from the general weaknesses like inflexibility, lack of potential depth and the requirement of large samples, which makes the process very time-consuming and costly (de Leeuw, 2008). Having an electronic questionnaire meant I needed an internet connection all the time to record my responses. However, internet services in Zambia were not the most effective as, on several occasions, we would have to reload the page and start the interview. This led to some respondents opting out of the interview because of the time taken, which meant we had to devote more time than planned to complete the surveys.

However, I made an informed decision to conduct the survey electronically based on the resources saved in terms of time and money for printing and the convenience

of only having to carry a smartphone instead of a bag full of papers during interviews.

Secondly, many respondents expected a token of appreciation and every time; we had to explain that we were students doing this research for entirely academic purposes and, therefore, not able to give any gifts.

There is also the issue of representative random sampling being superficial and not facilitating the exploration of social processes through nuance, complexity and details (de Leeuw, 2008). I overcome this obstacle by ensuring the validity and reliability of the method through triangulation. The validity of my methods was ensured by creating face validity, which is the extent to which the measure is subjectively viewed by knowledgeable individuals as covering the concepts (Sirkin, 2011, p. 11). This was done by having discussions with fellow current and past students of social sciences who reviewed and tested my questions and topics in the questionnaire and question guide. At the same time, reliability has been achieved by the use of the standard Google forms, which are likely to produce similar results if tested in a different locality in Zambia.

4.3. THE VALUE AND LIMITATIONS OF FIELDWORK.

In any research, an essential feature is choosing the suitable method (Flick, 2014, p. 15). Like any other research, my methodology choice was determined by the structure and the aim of my study (Leavy, 2017). I decided to conduct fieldwork because I believed it would enable me to understand the people's experiences that may not be seen as important but belong to the implicit structures of their lives (Blommaert & Dong, 2010, p. 3).

Asking questions about how people perceive clientelist practices and why they are willing to participate or not participate assisted in collecting data that helped answer the proposed research questions and gave other valuable insights not foreseen in the research plan. For example, I would not have picked up understanding society's attitude towards reciprocity had I not put myself amongst the respondents in their

community. Conducting fieldwork created a human connection between myself and the people.

Borrowing from Hymes (1981), occurring in an argument about the need for analytic attention to '*behavioural repertoire*' – the actual range of forms of behaviour that people display and that makes them identifiable as members of a culture (p.84). Data collected through field research can increase the knowledge and awareness of the social, political, economic, and cultural dynamics, leading to insightful information that could have otherwise been overlooked, neglected or misunderstood. I, therefore, felt compelled to study the Zambian people's experiences and reality by interviewing them in their own spaces. Unsurprisingly for me, it was not until I was in the field that the structure and scope of my research became clearer.

However, field research is still subject to obstacles. My biggest challenge was time management, as the process to be meaningful requires a lot of devoted time. I had to be disciplined to follow my routine of having to interview at least one respondent every day, especially for surveys but still be flexible enough to adapt to the schedules of my politicians.

Secondly, the people's everyday life in Zambia did not adjust to my research plan. Unfortunately, there is no known solution to this obstacle apart from the researcher adapting to the situation. The only way forward was to adapt my plans to the rules of everyday reality. This involved deciding what time to conduct interviews, morning, afternoon, or evening; all these times had different challenges.

For instance, I realised that people in the markets were less willing to be interviewed during certain times, such as month-end, morning, midday, and evening rush, as this was when their businesses were busiest; therefore, I had to decide to conduct my interviews during non-peak hours which are usually the hottest time of day.

4.4. DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURE

To analyse my data, I will examine each data set separately before I bring both data sets together. I will use thematic analysis of the qualitative data to look for patterns in the meaning of the data to identify themes on top of the themes already identified in the theory (Fugard & Potts, 2019, p. 3). To analyse the quantitative data, I will then employ descriptive statistical analysis.

The results for each data set will be reported separately in the result section of the report. Then integrate the databases in the discussion section, which will combine quantitative and qualitative data through procedures of a side-to-side comparison (Cresswell, 2014, p. 580).

4.5. ETHICAL ISSUES

Ethical concerns arise throughout every research project. "researchers will want to engage in detailed thought and planning around issues that tend to concern Ethics Committees, like; the risk of harm to participants; informed consent and coercion; privacy, confidentiality and anonymity; as well as issues such as institutional risk and researcher safety" (Mason, 2018, p. 85)

4.5.1. RISK OF HARM TO PARTICIPANTS

In social science research, harm can take various forms, ranging from *"Psychological distress, discomfort, social disadvantage, invasion of privacy or infringement of rights"* (Israel, 2015, p. 124). This standard may seem straightforward, but it can be challenging to interpret in specific cases.

It is difficult as an individual to know or recognise if your question or line of inquiry is causing any psychological discomfort to a respondent; however, understanding the social and cultural atmosphere of Zambia was an added advantage as I had an idea of what can be appropriate and inappropriate questioning. I acknowledged that in itself was not a guarantee that my questions would not risk any psychological

distress, especially talking about a subject that could be considered morally wrong if not illegal. Therefore, I deliberately added an option of not answering any question that any respondent was uncomfortable with.

4.5.2. INFORMED CONSENT

During data collection, it was essential that I obtained informed consent from all my respondents, that is, both politicians and the voters interviewed through the survey. I ensured I presented myself and explained the nature and purpose of my research, and an assurance that their identity would not be exposed publicly; finally, I asked the respondent again, with the given knowledge if they were still willing to be interviewed. The disclosure ended up in a few people withdrawing from the interview by stating they do not engage in politics on religious grounds. However, the majority of the people decided to go ahead with the interviews. It is also worth mentioning that all informed consent was obtained through *word of mouth* partly because asking for written consent would have been met with suspicion considering the topic of my research.

4.5.3 PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMITY

Maintaining privacy and confidentiality after a study is completed is another way to protect subjects, and the researcher's commitment to that standard should be included in the informed consent agreement. Procedures to protect each subject's privacy, such as locking records and creating special identifying codes, must be created to minimise the risk of access by any unauthorised person (Chambliss & Schutt, 2019, p. 80).

As mentioned earlier, when obtaining my informed consent, I assured all respondents that their identities would not be available to the public. For politicians, I assured them that no external access would be granted to the interviews, and in any unfortunate event that an unauthorised individual gained access to the interviews, all respondents would be given pseudo names to mask their identity,

and the information is stored on a cloud that needs a two-way verification system to access. As for respondents through the survey, there is no way that anybody can tell who provided any information as the survey design deliberately left out a section which would require the names of respondents.

4.5.4. ETHICS DURING DATA ANALYSIS

My role as a researcher can never be eliminated in this research. Admittedly, analysts' subjectivity is an inherent problem in social science research, including this one, but can be reduced to acceptable levels. Being Zambian I had an inherent bias on the topic, but I however managed to curtail my own bias to minimum levels. To achieve that, I worked within the integrity and ethical guidelines to contribute to the existing knowledge on clientelism. My research attempts to attain consideration of analytical transparency, provide knowledge, access to data, production transparency, and existing evidence that links my presented data and analysis to conclusions. This is one of the crucial aspects of the social science research (Halperin & Heath, 2017, p. 164).

CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS

To analyse the in-depth interviews, I will conduct a thematic analysis with the help of NVIVO software, which will assist me in highlighting recurring themes on top of the already established themes in the interview guide. At the same time, results from the survey will use a combination of Excel and NVIVO to highlight recurring themes arising from the semi-open questions of the survey questionnaire.

5.1. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW FINDINGS:

While clientelism has been intensively studied in comparative politics from very different theoretical perspectives and angles, I felt it was still imperative to conduct a study to try and understand why campaign-based electoral clientelism is rampant in settings like Zambia without well-organized political machines to ensure

reciprocity from the voters as well as despite the documented lack of returns in the last three of Zambia's general elections. To understand more, the in-depth interviews were structured around the main motivating factors of clientelism.

This approach produced expected themes, which are topics that are discussed in theory and were expected to come out from the research, as well as unexpected themes, which are themes that have not been covered by the theory but instead arose from the data.

Figure 3. below shows an overview of prevalent themes from the interviews on the topic of clientelism.


Fig.3: Illustration of themes.

5.1.1. DEMONSTRATING ORGANISATIONAL POTENTIAL TO SENIOR POLITICIANS

Multi-party politics everywhere around the world is competitive, and political players will use various strategies to gain an advantage over the opposition. Zambia indeed is no exception. Political parties understand the importance of brokers to the

success of the party at the grassroots and, therefore, to a large extent, rely on their ability to mobilise local voters. The dilemma is that low-income communities are blessed with multitudes of people willing to become political party patrons. This, in return, brings high competition within the party for the individuals to stand out as the most reliable candidate.

In my interviews with politicians, the most common answer to the question, "Why was having large crowds at your campaigns so important that you had to give people handouts to achieve that?" was that we have a duty to work for the party. The members are aware of the competition. Besides, brokers realisee that rallies are very useful tools for publicity, especially in the mass and social media era because they provide information to different members within and outside the party machine. Well-attended rallies give party brokers the opportunity to show their patrons that they can mobilise voters with a view to promotion.

One of the respondents stated that;

> **Pol.5**: "*When a member of parliament, the president or any high-ranking party official is visiting our area or close to our area, we were told that we must bring as many people as possible; the section or community chairperson who brings the most people to the gathering will be rewarded. There were rewards for first place, second place and so on. Sometimes we had to take people on buses and take them to the next town on request of MPs in that town just for them to show off that they are liked and for them to impress the president and the secretary general.*"

Brokers are also aware that there is a plethora of aspiring candidates to replace them if they do not deliver to the party's expectations. Their commitment or effort to organising the party does not come for free because the more they deliver in terms of campaigns through door-to-door or campaign gatherings, the more money they make or, the more opportunities they will have in the party. Another respondent replied to the above question stating that;

Pol.2*: "People by nature like feeling important and talking about my own party. We had a system where; we divided the community, and each section had a chairperson. To impress the bosses, the section chairperson will want to look more organised than his colleagues."*

The above sentiments were not an isolated occurrence, all the respondents, in one way or another, acknowledged that having large crowds was important to show off to the senior party leaders.

5.1.2. POPULARITY AND VIABILITY.

The theory places popularity and electoral viability as two separate motivating factors. However, during data collection, most respondents viewed them as going hand in hand, and their responses combined the two. For that reason, I have decided to analyse both themes as one.

In one instance, a respondent narrated how the area member of parliament in his area, who is also his boss, has done nothing to develop the community. However, he still attracts some of the largest crowds.

Pol.7*: "If you look at ba MP besu (our MP), he has not done anything to develop this place: not even a bit, but he still pulls some of the largest crowds in the country. He always tells me; my young man, politics is a numbers game. Whenever he visits, he gives us money and foodstuffs to distribute in the constituency and spread the word that the gifts are from him. Finally, when he comes, there will be thousands of people chanting his name because they got something and others because they want more handouts. People will be happy with a ZMK20 (USD1) and forget that where they live, the sewage is blocked, so they end up not asking any real questions."*

Politicians were aware that even though the majority of voters attending the rallies are there for particularistic gifts and benefits, there is always a small portion of genuine voters amongst the crowd to whom they can appeal.

> **Pol**.*7: "Because of poverty and hunger, people will show up when they know you are giving them money. I had campaign meetings in my ward where some people would show up very drunk. I knew they were not interested in whatever I was saying; they were only waiting for the ZMK 20 at the end of the meeting. But still, a few people would come up to me and tell me the real problems the community was facing, like crime and blocked drainages."*

Politicians also buy large turnouts to assure themselves not only of crowded campaigns but also of media publicity and visibility. Furthermore, as supported by research, campaign clientelism, especially turnout buying, is a form of information that most affect the electoral fortunes of politicians (Muñoz, 2019, p. 33). It helps the candidates establish electoral viability to voters, donors and opponents.

> **Pol**.*1: Politics is about numbers. If you can manage to have a large crowd, your opposition will be scared of you. Smaller opposition parties approached us to form a coalition by withdrawing from the election, and instead, they campaigned for us. In return, of course, we helped them campaign in wards (areas) where we were very doubtful that we can win.*

Politicians also stated that showing popularity leads to electoral viability, which can attract donors or well-wishers to fund their campaigns.

> **Pol**.1: *"Businesses and people are free to contribute to our campaign, but we don't promise them anything in return. I think businesses donated because they thought I was a good candidate and the people needed to be represented properly. Besides, some of them were my friends I have known for all my life and were just business partners."*

Even though no respondent acknowledged that they deliberately wanted large crowds because they hoped for funding from private businesses, they admitted that their campaigns had received donations from private businesses within their communities and beyond. Some instead referred to them as partners in development, who were only trying to support the candidate they felt the voters wanted.

Politicians engage in campaign clientelism because it provides them with other informational benefits than votes. However, during my interviews, a few themes emerged that were not highlighted in theory and were, therefore, unexpected.

5.1.3. CLIENTELISM IS AN UNSIGNED PATRON-VOTER AGREEMENT.

One of the frequent responses I received from my interaction with politicians was that the phenomenon is expected to happen. Below are some of the responses I received indicating clientelism as an expected occurrence.

Question: Who initiates clientelism? The politician or the voters?

> **Pol.**2: *"Depending on where you are, you see it from a different perspective. If I promise you a bag of fertiliser, that will give me your support, and eventually, it will give you your fertiliser, so it is a win-win situation. It's almost an unwritten agreement because both parties walk away happy. Even though it is not guaranteed that the person will vote for you because you won't monitor how they vote anyway."*

> **Pol.**5: **"***Sometimes voters take advantage of the situation; when they know you are vying for office, they will come to you, asking for financial assistance. They would ask for children's school fees a month before elections, and we are forced to give them money because of our ego, and we have to maintain the image that we have a giving heart*.**"**

> **Pol.**6: *"But you know politics, especially during elections, is very competitive; if you don't give the people something, at that same time your opponent is giving them something, then definitely they will not attend your meeting."*

The fact that all respondents acknowledged that it was something expected, even without being asked, was of great interest to me.

5.1.4. CLIENTELISM FROM A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

Moral responsibility was something that all the respondents alluded to; they all hinted at how distributing gifts to poor or low-income voters was also done in the spirit of sharing and helping the less privileged. One respondent stated:

> **Pol.**9: *"Sometimes it comes from a humanitarian perspective. An example during my door-to-door campaigns, I would come across female-headed households, or where the husbands are drunkards and can't provide for the family. They would complain that they have not had any meal for two days. As a leader in their community, to show leadership, I have to give them something, even if it's from a humanitarian point of view."*

The above statement was not an isolated one as another respondent narrated how they came across funerals several times during his door-to-campaign handing out t-shirts and money. He stated how he had to make pledges sometimes to buy the coffin or burial space or even sponsor the whole funeral, which includes food for three days, which is usually the average time a funeral procession takes in Zambia.

5.1.5. VOTERS' IGNORANCE ABOUT THE CIVIC DUTIES OF COUNCILLORS

Politics precedes economics; progressive politics precipitates economic opulence, and retrogressive politics fosters economic impedance and redundancy. The

ignorant voters, who are the critical mass, know this but don't understand it. This assumption was highlighted in at least six interviews with politicians. One respondent stated:

> **Pol**.*3: "Another thing has been the misinterpretation of the role of a civic leader. People don't have the civic education to understand the role of a councillor and therefore end up bringing personal problems to you just because you are a leader."*

Another narrated how politicians like himself usually complain about the voter's personalised expectations of the councillors and misunderstanding their role. He, however, stated how despite politicians like him complaining about this misunderstanding, if he meets voters and they ask for favours, he will still give it to them because it might turn into support. He quoted voters from one of his encounters which, after receiving benefits from him during his campaign, stated;

> **Pol**.*8: "Imagine him helping us now before it's even his responsibility imagine what he will do when he becomes a councillor".*

Whether politicians perpetuate this ignorance or not, one thing for certain is that it leads to the election of inept political leaders.

Several respondents also narrated how the majority of the voters in low-income areas do not care about government policy and are not interested in the technical explanation of their economy. Their interest during campaigns is solely the benefit from personalised gifts and services.

> **Pol**.*7: "Depending on the area, people don't want to hear about party manifesto or government policy, they want personalised relationships.*
> *The unfortunate part of politics is that there is nothing for free. 3/4 of the people attending our meetings are hoping to get handouts for alcohol or food. because for them, issues like inflation or GDP are not something they relate to."*

Politicians take advantage of this lack of interest by low-income voters in tangible development issues, which to some degree, rids the politicians of accountability from the voters. That, coupled with the high poverty rates, ensures that very few voters will resist the promise of gifts just for attending a campaign rally, even if they know that will not guarantee any vote.

5.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

In this part, gathered data is being analysed in relation to the second theory of systems justification. I will display frequency distribution charts concerning key questions linked to the theoretical tenets of; maintaining the status quo, palliative function and epistemic, existential and relational tenets. The frequency distribution charts will then be discussed in the discussion section in relation to the theoretical themes.

5.2.1. VOTERS' ENGAGEMENT IN CLIENTELISM TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO.

The following charts highlight the responses to questions regarding voter historical engagement and opinions on their future engagement in clientelism.


Fig.4: Voters' previous engagement in clientelism.

Fig.5: Voters' opinions on future engagement in clientelism.

The charts correspond to the first tenet of SJT, which states that individuals engage in system justification to maintain the status quo (Jost, 2018). The first chart shows that the two highest age groups to have engaged in clientelism previously are those in the age groups 26-35 years (25%) and 36-45 years (22%), who are more likely to have voted in more than one election. The second chart also highlights that in comparison to the first chart, the percentage of first-time voters (age group 16-25 years) who engaged in past clientelism has increased from 10% as compared to their likelihood to engage in future clientelism to 18%.

5.2.2. CLIENTELISM AS A PALLIATIVE FUNCTION.

The following tables represent voters' responses to the usefulness of campaign clientelism and whether they think it's okay for them to engage in clientelism.

Voter response	Count of response	Percentage
No Total	196	81%
Prefer not to answer Total	12	5%
Yes Total	33	14%
Grand Total	241	100%

Table.2: Voters' response to whether clientelism benefits the community.

Voter response	Count of response	Percentage
No Total	101	42%
Prefer not to answer Total	19	8%
Yes Total	121	50%
Grand Total	241	100%

Table.3: Voters' response to whether it was right for voters to engage in clientelism.

The above two tables attempt to explain the second tenet of SJT, which opines that system justification can be used to make people feel better about the societal status quo. People want to hold favourable attitudes about themselves and their group, and

one way of doing that is by accepting the status quo that leads to their lived inequality (Jost, 2018, p. 11).

Table 2. highlights that 81% of the voters feel that the distribution of gifts and benefits by politicians during campaign periods is not beneficial to the communities; however, when questioned whether *it was right for voters to accept gifts or request gifts and other benefits from politicians during election campaigns;* only 42% of the voters thought it was not right for voters to engage in clientelism (table.3). Voters in this instance can be argued to have the need to feel good about themselves therefore, not willing to see their role in clientelism as wrong.

5.2.3. CLIENTELISM AS AN EPISTEMIC, EXISTENTIAL, AND RELATIONAL FUNCTION.

The following graph depicts voters' responses to whether they are willing to combat clientelism from the politicians.


Fig.6: Voter willingness to combat clientelism.

The graph below describes the expectations of the voters from their political leaders. This was achieved by highlighting the top five most frequently used answers to the question; what do you expect from your elected officials?


Fig.7: Voter expectations from elected political leaders.

Both Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 explain voter engagement in clientelism as an epistemic, existential, and relational function. The tenet also addresses the individuals' fear of uncertainty or precariousness that comes with change. Individuals willing to challenge the status quo must be willing to accept the uncertainty.

The data shows that only 35% of the voters were willing to change the status quo by supporting any future law prohibiting politicians from engaging in campaign clientelism (see fig.6).

5.3. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:

The research was to understand the perceptions and motivations of politicians and voters in Zambia towards clientelism. Data were collected from 9 politicians through in-depth interviews and a survey of 241 voters.

From the in-depth interviews, politicians highlighted several things to express their opinions on clientelism. They believe clientelism is an unsigned agreement between the voter and the politicians, and therefore, both parties expect the other to engage in the practice. Additionally, most politicians believed acts of kindness are

misconstrued as clientelism; they perceive distributing gifts and benefits to voters during campaigns as part of their moral responsibility, as some of the recipients are indeed in need of assistance. Lastly, politicians believe that their voters are not knowledgeable enough about the civic duties of politicians, and that is part of the reason why voters expect personalised gifts and handouts instead of development.

As I was also trying to understand their motivations for engaging in clientelism. All the interviewed politicians acknowledged how the need to advance their political careers is one of the significant factors. They stated the need to prove their organisational potential to the party hierarchy. Lastly, all respondents stated that showing popularity and electability is another vital part of their motivations to engage in campaign clientelism.

Voters, on the other hand, had different perceptions of clientelism compared to those of politicians. For voters, clientelism was perceived as something that had been practised before them and will be practised after them, it is the order of the day, and they are, therefore, just maintaining the status quo. Over seventy per cent of the surveyed voters agreed to have previously engaged in clientelism and were likely to engage in clientelism in the future.

The data also revealed that part of the motivations for the voters to engage in clientelism was the lack of belief that politicians can deliver meaningful development. Therefore, using clientelism as a palliative function. Despite eighty-one per cent (81%) of the voters acknowledging that clientelism was not helpful for the communities, only twenty-three per cent (23%) felt it was wrong for voters to engage in clientelism.

Lastly, they perceived clientelism as having an existential and relational function. Despite the majority of the voters acknowledging that clientelism was not beneficial for their communities, the majority of the voters were not willing to support any law that would prohibit voters and politicians from engaging in clientelism.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION

As the title suggests, "It takes two to tango", I will interpret the results of the findings from both data sets together. That is mixing data collected from the politicians with that collected from the voters.

6.1. PERCEPTION TOWARDS CLIENTELISM:

Results have highlighted various perceptions towards campaign clientelism from both politicians and voters alike.

6.1.1. THE UNSIGNED AGREEMENT.

All nine politicians were of the perception that clientelism during election campaigns in Zambia is an unsigned agreement; they believe the voters expect them to distribute personalised goods and services. Politicians know other politicians are doing it, and therefore, campaigning without giving any handouts can be characterised as political suicide.

This perception from politicians can be supported by the voter's willingness to engage in campaign clientelism. The perception holds firm when measured against the voter's acknowledgement of having previously engaged in clientelism and their willingness to engage in future clientelism.

This scenario indicates that clients create the demand which politicians are happy to satisfy, while the opposite is equally true. Voters feel they can easily ask for money from a politician to take their child to school or money for food but do not ask wealthy local business people for similar help. This indicates that the voters expect politicians to be generous, especially during elections.

On the other hand, the fact that politicians feel the need sometimes to use personal funds to attend to these problems to maintain an image as the generous kind

indicates that they expect the demand and are willing partners in fulfilling that demand.

Politicians take advantage of the lack of resistance from voters to clientelist goods and services. On the other hand, voters also realise politicians only visit their communities during election campaign periods, which is once every five years in the Zambian context. Therefore, it is safe to speculate that every election period is a time to benefit before being abandoned for another five years. They, therefore, take advantage and utilise their power as voters to demand personalised benefits for their attendance. Even though momentarily both sides come out as winners, voters are the real losers in the transaction.

6.1.2. AN ACT OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.

Believing the distribution of personalised gifts and services during election campaign periods was an act of kindness was not a surprising response. Especially since Zambia is a Christian nation, the act of giving or helping the less privileged is seen as noble to most citizens, regardless of the motive.

In general, all respondents had instances in which they claimed their distribution was beyond politics. Even though they claimed the actions to be from a moral perspective, the issue of reciprocity questions those actions. Research states that clientelism in the absence of well-organized political machines can be controlled by reciprocal psychological obligation (Lawson & Greene, 2014).

Instincts of reciprocity can be argued to cause people to feel indebted to those who provide them with gifts, services, and favours. This provision of personalised gifts or help to voters by politicians during campaigns has the potential to create a feeling of indebtedness and gratitude among voters. Politicians, like many others, realise that reciprocity and the feeling of indebtedness are hard-wired in humans. To support the reciprocity assumption, survey results indicated that seventy-three per cent (73%) of the surveyed voters had attended a campaign rally only after receiving

gifts. A further sixty-two per cent believed there was nothing wrong with politicians distributing personalised goods and services during election campaigns.

However, looking at the timing of these humanitarian gestures, there is a reasonable suspicion that these actions were not a mere coincidence but a deliberate and shrewd attempt to gain political mileage.

6.1.3 MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO

Testing the SJT theory of maintaining the status, a set of questions were asked to determine the voters' willingness to participate in past, current and future acts of clientelism. Jost (2018) states that people usually feel the need to maintain the status quo, especially if that practice is perceived as part of the culture of that society.

The survey indeed revealed that seventy-four per cent (74%) of the surveyed voters had engaged in clientelism (see fig.4). Asked whether they are likely to engage in clientelism in the future, seventy-eight per cent (78%) of them stated their likelihood of engaging in future clientelism (see. Fig.5). Although the increase is just 4% per cent, what is interesting is that the age group of first-time voters from 16-25 years are the ones who are primarily responsible for that increase, which can be reasonably argued as them following what has already been an ongoing practice.

This increase in that specific age group can be explained due to clientelism being perceived as part of the political culture of Zambia, in which they, as young voters, are just playing their role. This argument also ties in or compliments the politician's perception of clientelism as an unsigned agreement, which is perceived as part of the political culture, and everyone expects to play their role.

6.1.4. CLIENTELISM SERVING A PALLIATIVE FUNCTION

Drawing from theory again, the research also set to understand if voters perceived clientelism as a palliative function. SJT opines how people will accept the status quo as a way of dealing with inequality (Jost, 2018, p. 11). The research first highlights the voters' acknowledgement of the consequences of clientelism, where eighty-one per cent (81%) of the voters stated clientelism was not beneficial to their communities (see table.2). This is a surprising contrast if you compare it with over seventy per cent (70%) of the voters who willingly engaged in clientelism and are willing to engage in future campaign clientelism (see fig. 4 and 5).

Here the voters may see campaign clientelism as something that serves a palliative function for them by providing immediate assistance in the form of personalised gifts and services for those in need.

For struggling voters, these types of personalised benefits can provide them with short-term relief from financial problems. However, research has shown that these benefits are usually temporal and cannot address the root causes of the systematic issues that perpetuate poverty and inequality. This, of course, is something that at least eighty-one per cent (81%) of the voters acknowledged during the survey.

The palliative tenet also highlights how individuals want to hold favourable attitudes about themselves (Jost, 2018, p. 11). The survey showed that only 42% of the voters felt it was wrong for them to engage in campaign clientelism. This might be because most of them don't want to accept or acknowledge that they are involved in an activity that is not noble. Besides, it is common for voters, especially in low-income neighbourhoods, to refer to politicians as bosses or ba mwiine (the owner). Additionally, it is also not uncommon for leaders (politicians included) to be referred to as chosen by God, a belief that stems from Christianity which is the largest religion in Zambia.

Though done for different reasons, both politicians and voters might have a certain moral aspect to their perceptions of clientelism, with voters believing they have to reciprocate. This thought process to view and justify clientelism as a necessary act to serve a palliative function justifies the practice, thereby reducing feelings of discomfort and cognitive dissonance that may arise from perceiving social inequalities and injustices.

6.2. MOTIVATIONS FOR ENGAGING CLIENTELISM

Various motivating factors arose from the research from both the politicians and the voters.

6.2.1. VOTER IGNORANCE

Politicians believed the ignorance of the voters towards the civic duties of elected councillors made them have personalised expectations because that is what they thought political leaders should do.

This may have much deeper root causes than what can be divulged in this paper. This may be due to low education levels in low-income areas, a lack of trust in the system that voters have lost interest in understanding how it works, or the quality of civic education or lack thereof in the school curricula. Regardless of the reason for this lack of knowledge, one thing made certain from the interviews was that politicians believed that most voters do not understand the role of councillors.

This assertion was in parallel with the voters' opinion on the benefits of clientelism in their community, with over eighty-one per cent (81%) stating that personalised gifts and services received from politicians during campaigns do not benefit their communities. Furthermore, when asked about their expectations of elected political leaders, and their most important issues in society, the most common responses coming from voters were; economic stability (76 times), delivery on campaign promises (62 times), ending careerism (48 times), fighting corruption (39 times),

and improving education (27 times). These responses reveal that contrary to popular perceptions among politicians, voters have reasonable knowledge and understanding of the role of civic leaders.

However, politicians for expedience are willing to take advantage of this perceived voter ignorance.

6.2.2. CAREERISM AND ORGANISATIONAL POTENTIAL.

As stated in various research, campaign rallies also provide party politicians with an opportunity to showcase their organisational potential to party bosses (Muñoz, 2019). This statement was supported by all the politicians interviewed.

In settings like Zambia, low-income communities are blessed with multitudes of political party supporters willing to become party patrons; this, in return, creates high competition within the party for individuals to stand out to party bosses as the most reliable candidate. The lower-level politicians, therefore, for fear of being outperformed by other competitors and also gain trust from the party hierarchy, engage in clientelism to ensure they have higher campaign turnouts.

This perception that they need to please party bosses is not a one-way perception. Senior party members also want to identify local-level politicians who can mobilise support from the community. Muñoz (2019) also supports this assumption by stating that campaigns provide bosses with information to monitor the low-level politicians' (broker) capacity to mobilise voters. Logically, Members of Parliament (MPs) and Mayors will want to work with candidates who can mobilise the community for the party; instead of wasting resources on candidates who can't. Party bosses look at the brokers' success in mobilising the crowd before they can invest more in which low-level politicians, they will give their support.

This is even more evident in the Zambian context: contesting elections as an independent candidate is very costly, and therefore many candidates wish to contest on a political party ticket. If lucky, they are adopted to stand on the party ticket,

which means for every campaign the candidate is conducting in the community, they are also campaigning for their party and their mayor and MP.

Potentially, this leads to an ever-ending practice of clientelism; if the high-ranking politicians find it useful, the likelihood is that they will not make any serious attempts to come up with legislation to combat the practice.

6.2.3. POPULARITY AND ELECTORAL VIABILITY

As stated earlier, even though the theory places popularity and electoral viability as two individual motivating factors. The perception from politicians suggested they view them as the same.

The motives to engage in campaign clientelism are interconnected; similar to showing the organisational ability to the party, brokers also need to show popularity not only to the voters but to clientelist-seeking donors and the media. Literature states that apart from public funds, private donations are frequently used to fund campaign clientelism (Muñoz, 2019, p. 35). Even though campaign clientelism is short-term and cheaper to invest in, unlike long-term clientelism, these private donors do not want to waste their resources; they deliberately avoid investing in individuals who are not electorally viable.

To seek campaign funding, politicians know that donors make donations to candidates who establish electoral potential and whom they deem worthy of their support. This gives the politician added motivation. The more they seem viable and popular, the more financial support they will likely attract from donors and other clientelist-seeking partners. From this perspective, information on the relative support of competing candidates is a precondition for the donors to behave strategically in reaction to electoral incentives. One way to gauge a viable candidate is through their popularity.

Even though no respondent acknowledged that they deliberately wanted large crowds because they hoped for funding from private businesses, they admitted that

their campaigns had received donations from private businesses within their communities and beyond.

On the other hand, strategic donors may fund campaigns to gain interest representation, extract rents, or obtain public contracts once the election is over (Muñoz, 2019). This is particularly true for Zambia, where running markets such as the collection of daily trading levies and garbage collection is the local government's responsibility; donors can hope that their funding will lead to future contracts to control the market and collect garbage within the cities.

Conversely, strategic voters are unwilling to waste their ballots on hopeless candidates. Thus, they frequently vote for candidates ranked second or lower in their preference ordering but are better positioned in the polls (Muñoz, 2019). On the other hand, when several political candidates are distributing gifts and benefits during the same campaign period, a lot of the voters might not care about policy outcomes or the manifesto of the politician but will instead attend a campaign event to get gifts. This is a strategy that can be argued to be successful. Results from the survey not only highlighted that over 70% (see. Fig. 4) of the voters had previously engaged in campaign clientelism but that they had either attended a campaign rally because of the gifts or that they were likely to attend future campaigns where they were expecting to receive gifts. (see. Fig. 5).

6.2.4. CLIENTELISM SERVING EPISTEMIC, EXISTENTIAL, AND RELATIONAL NEEDS.

Emerging from theory, the survey attempted to find out how campaign clientelism can serve epistemic, existential and relational needs. SJT proposes that some underlying epistemic motives minimise precariousness and ambiguity; existential motives to assuage threat and insecurity (Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008a; Jost 2018, p.13).

From the survey, it must be noted that no feedback suggested there were any epistemic benefits to the voters for engaging in campaign clientelism; this could be due to the socioeconomic dynamics of the communities where most of them feel they need money for food and basic needs rather than knowledge.

However, the responses highlighted what could be construed as serving existential and relational needs. Despite eighty-one per cent (81%) of the voters acknowledging clientelism was not helpful to their communities (see Table 2), only thirty-five per cent (35%) stated the willingness to support any future law that would inhibit politicians from engaging in clientelism (see. Fig. 6).

This could be explained by the fear of voters falling into precariousness. Campaign clientelism offers them a guarantee to access personal benefits and basic needs for a certain period, which in return offers voters a sense of security and stability. While for some who may wish to have lasting relationships with clientelist politicians, this offers them a route to connect with politicians and other clientelist-seeking voters in their communities.

Therefore, deciding to combat clientelism, voters must be willing to be faced with the uncertainty of how they will meet their basic needs if they decide not to engage in clientelism. This fear of uncertainty can be stated to play a role in voters' motivation to engage in clientelism.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

The nature of clientelism in settings like Zambia, with a low political organisation, entails that politicians cannot monitor voters to fulfil their end of the bargain. Likewise, the adverse effects of clientelism entail that voters do not benefit from the practice, yet both politicians and voters actively engage in campaign clientelism. Therefore, my research aimed to understand the perception and motivation of politicians and voters towards clientelism by attempting to answer the following questions.

1. What perception do politicians and voters in Zambia have towards the practice of campaign clientelism?
   a. What motivates politicians and voters in Zambia to engage in clientelism?

7.1. SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FINDINGS:

Like many researchers (me included), research on clientelism starts from an assumption that it involves a quid pro quo with credible commitments. However, despite some of the findings fitting the expected findings drawn from theory, such as campaign clientelism being a means to showcase organisational potential by low-level politicians, it is also essential for high-level politicians as it aids them in monitoring the organisational capabilities of low-level politicians, which then becomes an important basis for selecting whom to adopt, whom to support and fund for local electoral positions.

Further, the research also highlighted how campaign clientelism is an essential tool for politicians to showcase popularity and electoral viability. By having largely attended crowds, politicians indicate to the voters and clientelist-seeking donors, that they have a higher chance of being elected and may therefore affect voting decisions and funding decisions from donors who may not be willing to invest in candidates with a low probability of success.

Similarly, the research uncovered some interesting perceptions, both expected and unexpected. It highlighted some perceptions of how politicians viewed campaign clientelism as an unsigned agreement between the politicians and the voters. Therefore, politicians were only fulfilling the demand that was already there. Additionally, unexpected were the perceptions that politicians believed they engaged in campaign clientelism out of their moral responsibility as local leaders; to them, the timing that this morality was showcased during election campaigns was merely a coincidence.

Further, politicians also believed the majority of the voters were ignorant about the politicians' civic duties. They stated that the ignorance, coupled with a lack of understanding of national affairs by voters, led to increased engagement in clientelism because that's the only thing most voters understood.

To complement the results obtained from the politicians, the research obtained interesting results from the voters' perspectives and motivations. Coming from theory, results indicated that voters tended to maintain the status quo, continuing the act of campaign clientelism, with results amongst voters between 16 years to 25 years showing an increase of eight per cent (8%) from voters who previously engaged in clientelism and those who thought they would engage in future campaign clientelism. The overall results for this category also showed an increase of four per cent (4%) (see fig. 4 and fig. 5).

Voters' responses also supported the theory's assumption that voters engage in selective bias to feel good about themselves. Responses indicated that at least eighty-one per cent (81%) of the voters agreed that clientelism was not helpful for their communities; however, only forty-two per cent (42%) felt they were wrong to engage in clientelism.

Lastly, despite voters' acknowledgement of the negative effects of campaign clientelism and listing of their expectations from elected politicians, only thirty-five per cent (35%) showed a willingness to support any future law prohibiting voters and politicians from engaging in clientelism.

7.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS:

This research and its findings potentially have several implications that can contribute to the study of clientelism not only in Zambia but the broader clientelism research in several ways:

Firstly, the study of perceptions and motivations of politicians and voters towards clientelism can contribute to a better understanding of the nature of clientelism in

Zambia through knowing how both sides perceive clientelism as well as knowing their motivations for engaging in the practice.

Secondly, understanding the perception and factors that motivate these actors can help policymakers and institutions, such as the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ), develop effective strategies to address clientelism. Understanding what politicians and voters view as clientelism can help the ECZ and other civil society organisations conduct information dissemination campaigns at various levels to educate the public and political parties on what should be allowed and not allowed during election campaigns.

Similarly, understanding the motivation or conditions such as high poverty can assist other government wings in strategically tackling issues such as unemployment and citizen empowerment schemes.

On a broader scale, the research can be used for comparative research on clientelism by analysing how clientelism in Zambia can compare to clientelism in other countries. This may help to identify patterns, similarities and differences in the practice across different contexts. Additionally, the study can potentially contribute to developing or improving existing theories on clientelisms with regard to understanding perceptions and motivations, as well as the combined use of political science theories and psychology theories that bring insights on inequality legitimation.

Overall, researching politicians' and voters' perceptions and motivations towards campaign clientelism in Zambia can help advance our understanding of this pervasive political phenomenon and provide quality insights that can inform policy interventions to combat the adverse effects of clientelism on democracy, governance, accountability and development.

7.3. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

7.3.1. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Despite the advantages of purposive sampling, collecting data from politicians through this method has limitations: it allowed me to conduct only a limited and small number of in-depth interviews, which implied that the results could not be generalised. Alternatively, using techniques such as a survey to collect data from the politicians would have produced results that could be generalised but not as nuanced.

On the other hand, if I conducted in-depth interviews with the voters, I would have gathered more detailed accounts of their experiences and potentially reached a different conclusion.

My use of both in-depth interviews and a questionnaire survey to collect my data meant I could not ask the same questions; even though I maintained the topics and themes for both interview guides, asking the same questions to politicians and voters would have potentially brought out slightly different results, such as unexpected outcomes to the ones presented.

7.3.2. FUTURE RESEARCH

The research results have revealed that campaign clientelism is a widely practised phenomenon, despite the non-guarantee of success and non-beneficial to politicians and voters, respectively. The practice has a detrimental effect on democratic processes and undermines the principles of equal representation and accountability.

The demographic of the survey, as well as the responses from respondents, indicated that lack of civic education was among the drivers of campaign clientelism. It would be interesting for future research to understand how the knowledge schism in civic education affects clientelism and how it can be bridged.

Secondly, it would be beneficial to conduct another research which can also cater for in-depth interviews with the voters. I believe this would help highlight many unexpected outcomes as their responses would not be limited primarily to those provided in the questionnaire.

This would help equip policymakers not only to understand the challenges of combatting clientelism but also be beneficial in formulating effective and representative policy.

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Introduction:

The aim of this research is to understand the perceptions and motivations of politicians and voters in Zambia towards campaign clientelism:

The interview guide is divided into two sections; the first section guides the in-depth interviews with politicians and the second section guides survey questions for voters.

The in-depth interview aim is to capture the perceptions of politicians and voters towards clientelism as well as capture their motivations for engaging in clientelism.

Step 1: Collect consent to participate in the interview, if necessary, to be recorded as well.

Part 1: Guide for in-depth interviews.

Politicians' motivations for distributing gifts and specialised benefits to voters during election campaigns.

- Why do you distribute gifts to voters during election campaigns?
- Do party bosses expect you to have large crowds at your campaign rallies?
- Do you think publicity helps you get more votes or more campaign donations from businesses?

Politicians' perceptions towards the distribution of gifts and personalised benefits to voters during campaign periods.

- Who initiates the distribution (voters or politicians)?
- What, in your opinion, do you think drives voters to accept your gifts?
- Do you believe the gifts distributed during campaigns are helpful to the communities?

Part 2: Guide for questionnaire survey

Voters' willingness to continue engaging in clientelism.

- Have you attended any political rallies because you have received gifts from a politician?
- Are you likely to attend a campaign rally because there are gifts being given at the rally?
- Did you vote for any politicians because of their gifts and the benefits offered to you?

Voters' selective justification

- Is it okay for voters to accept or request gifts and other personalised benefits from politicians during election campaigns?
- Is it okay for politicians to give voters gifts and other personalised benefits during election campaigns?

Voters' Willingness to combat clientelism.

- Do you feel the gifts and personalised benefits politicians offer voters during election campaigns positively impact the community?
- What are the most important things you expect from elected officials?
- Can you support a law prohibiting politicians from giving voters gifts and personalised benefits during election campaigns?

APPENDIX 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS QUESTIONNAIRE

Politicians' motivations for distributing gifts and personalised benefits to voters during election campaigns.

1. Have you distributed gifts and personalised benefits to voters during your election campaign?
2. Why did you distribute the gifts?
3. Why are huge crowds important for your campaigns?
4. Do party bosses expect you to distribute gifts to voters during campaigns?
5. Why, in your opinion, do you think they expect or not expect you to distribute any gifts to voters?
6. In terms of competition within and outside the party, how do you think this contributes to the practice?
7. Is publicity important to your election campaigns? (if so, why?)
8. Do you think people eventually voted for you because of the handouts you were giving them?

Politicians' views towards distributing gifts and personalised benefits to voters during election campaigns.

9. Were people (voters) expecting gifts during campaigns when you went out to campaign?
10. Why, in your opinion, do you think so? (Who initiates the act or who sets the trap?)
11. What, in your opinion, do you think drives voters to accept your gifts?
12. Do you believe the gifts distributed during campaigns are helpful to the communities?
13. Is it a fair representation then to say you engage in the act because you want people to see that you are giving kind?

Part 1: General information.

1. Gender:
    a. Male
    b. Female
    c. Other

2. What is your age group (in years)?
    a. 16–25
    b. 26–35
    c. 36–45
    d. 46 and above

3. What is your level of education?
    a. None
    b. Primary
    c. Secondary
    d. Tertiary
    e. University
    f. Prefer not to answer.

4. What is your occupation?
    a. Student
    b. Unemployed
    c. Self-employed
    d. Informal employment
    e. Formal employment
    f. Prefer not to answer.

Part 2: Campaign Clientelism.

5. Have you received a gift from a politician during election campaigns?
    a. Yes

b. No

c. Maybe

d. Prefer not to answer.

6. Have you attended any political rallies because you have received gifts from a politician?

    a. Yes

    b. No

    c. Maybe

    d. Prefer not to answer.

7. Are you likely to attend a campaign rally because there are gifts being given at the rally? (*Gifts may include: Money, employment, T-shirts, alcohol, Citenge, Food, and Donations to the community, etc., within 3 months before the elections*)

    a. Yes

    b. No

    c. Maybe

    d. Prefer not to answer.

8. Did you vote for any politicians because of their gifts and the benefits offered to you? (*Gifts may include: Money, employment, T-shirts, alcohol, Citenge, Food, and Donations to the community, etc., within 3 months before the elections*)

    a. Yes

    b. No

    c. Maybe

    d. Prefer not to answer.

9. Is it okay for voters to accept or request gifts and other personalised benefits from politicians during election campaigns? (*Gifts may include: Money, employment, T-shirts, alcohol, Citenge, Food, and Donations to the community, etc., within 3 months before the elections*)

    a. Yes

    b. No

c. Maybe

d. Prefer not to answer.

10. Is it okay for politicians to give voters gifts and other personalised benefits during election campaigns? *(Gifts may include: Money, employment, T-shirts, alcohol, Citenge, Food, and Donations to the community, etc., within 3 months before the elections)*

    a. Yes

    b. No

    c. Maybe

    d. Prefer not to answer.

11. Do you feel the gifts and personalised benefits politicians offer voters during election campaigns positively impact the community? *(Gifts may include: Money, employment, T-shirts, alcohol, Citenge, Food, and Donations to the community, etc., within 3 months before the elections)*

    a. Yes

    b. No

    c. Maybe

    d. Prefer not to answer.

12. Can you support a law prohibiting politicians from giving voters gifts and personalised benefits during election campaigns? *(Gifts may include: Money, T-shirts, alcohol, Citenge, employment, Food, and Donations to the community, etc., within 3 months before the elections)*

    a. Yes

    b. No

    c. Maybe

    d. Prefer not to answer.

13. What was the most important reason you voted for your candidates? *(Up to 5 keywords)*

14. What are the most important things you expect from elected officials? *(Up to 5 keywords)*