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Worrying about the war and its consequences for political participation: gender analysis

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Abstract

This paper examines how worries about war affect the political participation of women and men in Ukraine. The analysis is based on secondary data from the seventh wave of the World Values Survey 2017-2020. By constructing linear regressions, I examined whether there is a correlation between the worries about the war and the political activity of women and men in Ukraine. This allowed us to see how the relationship between political participation and worries about war changed. Moreover, linear regression models were built for women and men separately. And also, I included variables which will allow me to measure the impact of having people to care in the models.

The results indicate that worries about war affect conventional political participation. This relationship is stronger for men than for women and may affect women with childcare somewhat more strongly. The research did not find an effect of worries about war on unconventional political participation.

This paper contributes to sociology and gender studies by offering an analysis of real, meaningful worries about war on the level of political engagement. Also, it is opening opportunities for further research in this area. The results of the study are important to academics, as well as policymakers and NGO workers. These results may help not only to develop the field of knowledge but also to develop more effective strategies for engaging women and men in political participation.

Keywords: worries, war, political participation, gender, Ukraine.

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Introduction

Political participation of citizens is a feature of a democratic country. It is through policy that states regulate their existence. The nature of citizen participation varies from country to country. In some countries, elections are the most popular form of expression of their will, while citizens in other countries do not shy away from civic and protest activities. It is important to study political participation in different countries precisely because they are all different. By studying and comparing them, it is possible to determine which practices and strategies are best for developing democracy and confronting challenges in the countries and in the world.

Researchers study political participation from different angles. For example, they often study the level of citizens' participation in political life (Neshkova & Kalesnikaite, 2019), motivation to participate (Lee & Schachter, 2019), ideological beliefs (Berti, 2019), other social factors that influence involvement (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017; Persson, 2013; Desposato & Norrander, 2009; etc.), the impact of technological tools on political participation (Böhle & Riehm, 2013) and much more. All these aspects are important for building a complete picture of how political participation takes place in different countries. Because despite existing cultures of political participation, exogenous shocks can alter the way people choose to participate.

In this paper, I would like to focus on how the perception of a possible war in Ukraine affects the political engagement of women and men in Ukraine. The impact of anxiety on political participation has been studied before (Wagner & Morisi, 2019), but the war in Ukraine allows to study this issue not hypothetically, but in a real case where people worry about a possible invasion every day. In the following text, I will explain in more detail why I chose this topic, country, and why I decided to focus on gender differences.

Research issue

In this section, I will try to motivate why I chose this topic and the research question. I will also focus on why it is important to consider gender differences. And I will also discuss why I chose Ukraine as the focus of my research.

Worries about possible war and political participation

The interest of this paper is to investigate how worries about possible war affect political participation. War is a serious tragedy. It is accompanied by human casualties, material damage and consequences for society. War is a sufficiently influential phenomenon that may reformat the behaviour either individuals or society as a whole (Vetter, 2007). War may have important political, social, and economic consequences and influence people's thoughts and values (Barceló, 2020; Modell & Haggerty, 1991; Chupilkin & Kóczán, 2022; Vetter, 2007). It is a serious threat to people's lives and well-being. It may cause negative emotions that disrupt identity and self-concept (Turner & Stets, 2005, 24). In turn, people may seek to rebuild their identity through political engagement. So, I may suppose that worries about a war can destroy people's self-image and lead to greater political engagement.

More strikingly, war is such a shocking phenomenon that the mere thought of it (without a real threat) may cause worry, anxiety, and distress (Murthy & Lakshminarayana, 2006). Emotions are often the basis for political action (Erhardt et al., 2021). Therefore, I would like to focus on whether the worries of a possible war can lead to citizen action and influence citizens' political engagement.

The relevance of considering gender differences

As mentioned earlier, I would like to add a gender dimension to the research. Below, I will describe the state of gender equality and female political participation. This should have given an idea of the overall picture. But I would also like to argue why the consideration of gender differences is relevant in this study. In my opinion, it is relevant for several reasons.

First, gender may influence the way people perceive the threat of war and how they respond to it (Stevens et al., 2021). For example, research shows that women may experience war differently than men and their sense of security may be more affected by the threat of war (Stevens et al., 2021). Therefore, research on gender differences in perceptions and reactions to war can help to understand how people with different gender identities relate to war and how this affects their political participation.

Second, research on gender differences can help understand why women may be less active in politics during wartime. This may be influenced by cultural or structural factors that shape women's gender identity (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, 88). I would like to focus on one aspect of these factors, namely caregiving. I will show further that care work can be an obstacle to women's political participation in peacetime. I would like to focus on whether it is also an obstacle in wartime and explore whether having children (or other people to care for) and the responsibilities of caring for them can be an obstacle for women who want to be active in politics during wartime. Research on gender differences in political participation can help identify similar factors that affect women's political participation in wartime.

Thus, I want to include the gender dimension in this paper to deepen the understanding of the phenomenon under study.

Reasons for focusing on Ukraine

To explore how political engagement may change because of the worries of a possible war, this paper focuses on the experience of Ukraine. I chose this country because the Ukrainian case is unique today. Ukraine is one of the European countries facing a real threat of war during the last decade. Since 2022, Ukrainian citizens have been experiencing a full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation. But in fact, military operations on the territory of Ukraine have been going on since 2014 (on the territory of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea). Although the hostilities took place only on a part of the territory of Ukraine and not all citizens were directly affected by them, Ukrainians are aware

of what is happening in that region (Fund “Democratic Initiatives”, 2014). The fact that for eight years the war has been literally next door has given some Ukrainians a clearer idea of what war is and that its real threat exists (Fund “Democratic Initiatives”, 2022). This experience of Ukrainians will allow to study not an ethereal idea of a possible full-scale invasion of the country, but a more formed and clear worries.

Thus, research on the relationship between the worries of possible war and political activity is needed to see how strongly emotions of anxiety can guide citizens' political actions. Gender difference will help to understand how these relationships differ according to gender identity. And whether women are less politically active due to cultural and structural factors in society (on example of caregiving). This study may be useful for shaping public opinion and developing political strategies in times of escalating conflict. For example, such research can help political parties or non-governmental organizations develop programs aimed at engaging more people in political life in times of escalating conflict to use politics as an additional tool of defence against invaders. If more citizens are involved in political activity, they will be able to express their pro-Ukrainian position and will more clearly and unambiguously. Through their participation, they will be able to prevent the existence of pro-Russian ideas or politicians who undermine Ukraine's sovereignty.

Research question

Thus, in this study, I would like to investigate the impact of worries about possible war on the political activity of women and men in Ukraine. This is the goal of my work. To achieve this goal, I need to answer the following research question: *how does a high level of worries about a possible war in Ukraine affect the participation of women and men in political activities?*

To elaborate on the topic, it is also appropriate to answer the sub-questions:

1. Is there a correlation between the worries about the war and the political activity

of women and men in Ukraine? 2. How does the relationship between political participation and worries about war change if I take into account the impact of having people to care?

Background

In this section, I will describe why I am interested in the gender differences in political participation. To do so, I will try to describe gender inequality in general, as well as female political participation. I will also focus on Ukraine separately. In order to explain in more detail, the peculiarities of politics and political participation in Ukraine.

Gender inequality

Gender equality is on the agenda in many countries. The UN defines it as the fifth Sustainable Development Goal (United Nations, 2022, 36). Gender equality is important because it ensures rights and opportunities for all people, regardless of their gender. It supports the idea that women and men have equal opportunities in all areas of life. Gender equality also helps to reduce discrimination and violence. This contributes to economic growth and development and ensures greater resilience and stability in society (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Yearbook, 2015). Gender equality is key to creating a fair and equal society.

The Global Gender Gap Index is one of the tools that measures the level of gender equality in countries around the world. This index considers various indicators such as education, health, economic activity, and political participation, and allows comparing the level of gender equality between countries. Today, the gender equality index varies from country to country. According to the World Economic Forum (2022), in 2022, the global gender gap was only 68.1%¹. Some

¹ This percentage indicates how much equality between women and men has already been achieved, to what extent they have the same statistical indicators on a set of factors. The percentage is formed

countries show good results in achieving gender equality (Iceland - 90.8%), but other countries, especially those in war or conflict, have much worse results.

Ukraine also participates in the Global Gender Gap Report. In 2022, it ranks 81st (in 2021 it was 74th, in 2020 it was 59th, and 48th in 2006) of 146, and the gender gap in the country has been overcome by 71% (World Economic Forum, 2022, 346). In four dimensions, Ukraine's performance is as follows: economic participation and opportunities - parity achieved by 71%; education - parity achieved by 100%; health and survival - parity achieved by 98%; political opportunities - parity achieved by 15%.

Of course, the index takes into account a limited range of indicators and it is impossible to say that equality, for example, in education has been fully achieved, but in general, a certain trend can be seen. In Ukraine, as in the world, the index of equality between men and women is lower in the economic and political spheres. It can be assumed that a large number of gender stereotypes and prejudices will relate to these areas. It can also be seen that Ukraine's performance in the rankings is gradually deteriorating over time. This may be due to a number of different factors. Including the war.

Neglecting the principles of gender equality leads to women having fewer opportunities than men. This can manifest itself in various areas, such as labour, education, politics, etc. Women currently face low wages (Eurostata, 2023) and overtime involvement in unpaid domestic work (World Economic Forum, 2022, 7), a “glass ceiling” in employment in traditionally male-dominated jobs, such as politics (Folke & Rickne, 2014, 4). These are not the only challenges women face daily.

Female political participation

Women's political participation is a complex topic. It is important either consider the experiences of different groups of women or consider the different forms of

based on many factors in four main fields: Health and Survival, Educational Attainment, Economic Participation and Opportunity and Political Empowerment.

marginalization that may shape women's political participation. Social factors such as age, education, ethnicity, motherhood, and rural/urban differences can affect women's political participation (Páez-Bernal & Kittilson, 2022).

According to the Global Gender Gap Index, the level of women's political participation is only 22% (World Economic Forum, 2022). Gender inequality in political participation is reflected in the fact that women have fewer opportunities to participate in the political process compared to men (Folke & Rickne, 2014).

National parliaments and other authorities are often predominantly composed of men. According to the European Parliament, in 2022, only 39.3% of members were women (European Parliament, 2022). In many countries, this number is even lower (European Parliament, 2022). This means that women are less represented in decision-making and are largely unable to influence policies that affect their lives.

Gender inequality can also manifest itself in election campaigns, where women may face stereotypes and discrimination based on their gender (Anzia & Bernhard, 2022, 1559). Women may have less access to campaign funding (Ballington & Kahane, 2014, 306-307), media attention (Ballington & Kahane, 2014, 313), and may be less included in political discussions and debates (Ballington & Kahane, 2014, 308).

The same situation exists in Ukrainian politics. Ukraine, as a part of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, has its own characteristics in the field of gender equality, which differ from the experience of European countries and the United States. Although European/ American and Ukrainian women face similar challenges, such as double work, limited access to education and low levels of political involvement, the historical context is slightly different.

In 1917, Ukrainian women received the right to participate in elections and to be elected to political representative bodies, which was a significant step in the direction of gender equality. However, it is worth noting that women still faced exclusion from most public affairs, including political life, due to the high level of dual burdens of work and home.

Ukraine, like other Eastern European countries, went through a difficult transition period after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which affected the development of gender equality. Many women have become active participants in the political process and held important positions in the state. Today, the situation with gender equality in politics in Ukraine is gradually changing. Women hold high positions in the government, parliament, local authorities, and civil society organizations. For example, in 2019, women accounted for more than 21% of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which is a relatively high figure (Slovo i dilo, 2021). However, despite some progress, women's political participation in Ukraine still falls short of full equality with men. At some levels of government, particularly at the level of local councils, women's participation remains quite low. In addition, women are more likely to face stereotypes and discrimination in politics.

These gaps exist not only because of sex (biological characteristics). After all, gender identity is not reduced to sex (Griffin et al., 2021, 293). Gender identity is shaped and maintained by cultural and structural factors produced by society itself (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, 88).

Cultural factors such as media, literature, art, and religion can influence what roles are considered acceptable for women and men (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, 29). For example, in many cultures, politics is considered a “masculine” role, while “feminine” roles include motherhood and household care (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, 33). This can lead to women being less interested in politics and less likely to be elected to positions of power. Women face the so-called “glass ceiling”.

Structural factors also play an important role in shaping gender identity. For example, laws and regulations related to gender equality can influence how people perceive different roles in society. In some countries, legislation establishes quotas for women in politics, which ensures greater participation of women in decision-making and increases opportunities for them to be nominated for the position.

In general, cultural, and institutional factors may have a strong influence on the formation of gender identity and the subsequent activities of people in accordance with their gender identity.

Gender inequality still exists in various areas. This includes political participation. There are a few reasons for this. It is important to study them because this inequality of opportunities has an impact on the quality of women's lives. By studying them, I can understand the reasons that hinder women's political activity or, on the contrary, stimulate it. It can also answer the question of how gender roles, stereotypes and norms affect the political participation of women and men. It can help to find ways to change gender stereotypes and norms to encourage greater female political participation. Thus, this is the reason for my desire to dive into the gender distribution of political participation.

Ukrainian context

To understand more clearly the peculiarities of women's and men's political participation in Ukraine, it seems necessary to provide a description of the Ukrainian context. The Constitution of Ukraine enshrines the right of Ukrainians to political, civic and protest activity. Of course, these are not the only forms of participation defined in the country's legislation, but these are the forms enshrined in the country's main legal document, Constitution.

Ukraine is a relatively young country. It became an independent sovereign state on August 24, 1991 (The Verkhovna Rada, 1991). From that moment on, the country began to develop its own society, laws, and political institutions. Currently, Ukraine is a republic (The Verkhovna Rada, 1996a, Ar. 5). It is constitutionally defined that the source of power is the people (The Verkhovna Rada, 1996a, Ar. 5). It is the people who, through the developed procedures, should influence the way the government is formed, and the country develops. The Constitution explicitly enshrines elections and referendums as the forms of political participation of the people (The Verkhovna Rada, 1996a, Ar. 69). It also stipulates that people's will can be expressed through other forms of direct democracy (The Verkhovna Rada, 1996a, Ar. 69). These forms are not defined in more detail in the Constitution. However, the Constitution of Ukraine stipulates that to protect their rights and freedoms and satisfy their interests, the people may influence the state through

political parties and public organizations, which they may unite in (The Verkhovna Rada, 1996a, Ar. 36). It also stipulates that those who work “have the right to strike to protect their economic and social interests” (The Verkhovna Rada, 1996a, Ar. 44).

However, even though the legal framework provides Ukrainians with the opportunity to influence on what is happening in the country, people do not often use these opportunities.

As I mentioned earlier, political participation in Ukraine consists mainly of voting and referendums. Referendums are not a widespread practice of expressing the will of the people in Ukraine. Only two all-Ukrainian referendums have been held since 1991. The first (1991) was on Ukraine's independence and the second (2000) was on the reform of the public administration system. The results of the second referendum were never implemented by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Several local referendums were also held, but all before 2000.

Elections are a much more common practice. According to the Constitution of Ukraine, Ukraine holds elections of the President of Ukraine, elections of people's deputies of Ukraine, and local elections (The Verkhovna Rada, 1996b, Ar. 3). In 2019, Ukraine held presidential and parliamentary elections. The total turnout was 63% (in first round of presidential elections), 61% (in the second round) and 49% respectively (Protsyuk & Horbal, 2020).

Only a small number of citizens consider themselves involved in active civic engagement. In 2013-2018, this percentage was 8-10% (Fund “Democratic Initiatives”, 2019). Of course, there are different forms of civic activity. Not all of them are define in Ukrainian legislation. In 2018, 18% of Ukrainians were engaged in volunteer activities (Fund “Democratic Initiatives”, 2019). And in 2020, 8% of Ukrainians were involved in the work of public committees, 6% participated in public hearings and 4% participated in peaceful assemblies, 5% were ready to file complaints about infrastructure issues and 4% initiate or sign electronic petitions (Fund “Democratic Initiatives”, 2020). But again, I see a tendency that the level of civic engagement is rather low and there are no significant differences between groups of women and men who participated in it.

This section contains information that provides the reader with a deeper understanding of the context related to the topic of this study. The information contained in it serves to improve the perception and understanding of the further presentation of the conducted research. The purpose of this section is to provide a more detailed description of the facts, data and background information related to the research topic in order to facilitate the reading and understanding of the following sections of the work.

Disposition

In this section, attention will be focused on the positioning of this study in the formulations of the philosophy of science. The level of research will be described, as well as the relationship between theory and empirical data.

Level of the research

Therefore, this study investigates a worrying of people and is a micro-level study. Micro-level research is the analysis of an individual in their environment (society), which has certain characteristics. Such researches explore how economic, social, or political phenomena influence on a person.

In the case of this study of the impact of worries about the war on the political participation of women and men in Ukraine, the social problem will be considered at the level of the whole country. The impact of a wide range of socio-political factors on the political participation of the Ukrainian nation will be analysed. But despite I deal with large population of Ukrainians, I investigate how phenomena of war (worrying about it) influence on a people and their actions/attitudes in a political field.

This research will be conducted as a secondary quantitative study. Secondary research is a research method that involves using existing data that has been previously collected by someone else, rather than collecting new data (George,

2023). I use the existing data set of the World Values Survey 2017-2022 (seventh wave). Based on the data from it, a statistical analysis will be conducted.

The linking between theory and empirical data

Within the framework of the relationship between theory and data, I define this research as deductive (theory-driven) research. Deductive research is based on a predefined theory (Bhandari, 2022b). It is conducted from the general to the particular, from theory to empiricism. In deductive research, the researcher, after defining a general theory, tests it on the basis of observations, experiments or other research methods. In deductive research, theory precedes empirical research and serves as a framework for formulating hypotheses. In the following, I will reveal the theoretical concept based on which I will put forward hypotheses for further research.

It is worth noting that some of the concepts I use will be to some extent data-driven. Since I will use the existing data set of the World Values Survey 2017-2022. I can only take from it the variables that exist in it. Despite this, I still define this study as theory-driven, because the variables that I will select for the study will still be based on the theory that I will describe earlier.

Previous/ relevant research

In this section, I would like to focus on preliminary studies of women's and men's political participation in Ukraine in three dimensions of engagement: political, civic, and protest engagement. And also open up the importance of impact of anxiety on participation.

Political participation in Ukraine

The general downward trend in election participation dates to the 2000s (Protsyuk & Horbal, 2020). In the 2020 local elections, an even smaller number of citizens participated, namely 37% (Slovo i dilo, 2020).

Nevertheless, I may see that Ukrainian society is characterized by the phenomenon of political absenteeism (“voter evasion during elections” (Gavrylovska, 2017, 14). In addition to the objective factors of political absenteeism (illness or physical incapacity), other factors are also widespread in Ukraine. For example, Ukrainians often demonstrate their protest by not participating in elections. They do not believe that they can change anything because of the high level of corruption and the possibility of election fraud (Kornievskyy et al., 2022, 105).

According to data of the Central Election Commission there are no differences in the electoral behaviour of women and men in Ukraine too. This does not contradict global trends. Carreras (2018) describes that gender differences are more often found in non-electoral behaviour than in electoral behaviour. Non-electoral behaviour is civic and protest activities.

Ukrainian scholars are currently conducting the main research on voting. After all, referendums are not common and have not been held for quite some time. Ukrainian sociologists study election participation from different angles. For example, they study the level of voter participation at different levels (national, regional, local), as well as among different population groups (by age, gender, social status, etc.) (Clem, 2014; Ivanchenko, 2019). They also study the reasons that motivate citizens to participate in elections, as well as the barriers that prevent them from participating in the electoral process (Svitaylo, 2014; Polegkyi, 2018). And they study how Ukrainians perceive the elections, their opinions on how they were held, how fair and honest elections were (Kuzio, 2005). In addition, they study many other aspects.

I would like to pay special attention to studies that combine the topics of political participation and war. There are not many such studies in Ukraine. One of these studies considers elections as a tool of hybrid warfare. Buchyn & Kitsiak (2020) note that through elections, aggressor states can support favourable candidates or political parties, influence certain categories of the population, conduct information propaganda to discredit the institution of elections and its results in the country, use the institution of international election observation to

achieve the goals of hybrid warfare, and conduct direct cyberattacks on electronic and communication systems used in the victim state to organize elections and count votes. All of this is done to destabilize the victim country, to strengthen the influence on the situation in the country that has become the object of hybrid warfare through elections. Such studies are not related to the topic of my interest, but they provide additional insight into the context and issues.

But the Ukraine-Russia war is not the only one in the world. For example, Blattman (2009) shows in the case of Uganda that violence (including during war) leads to a significant increase in voting participation. At the same time, violence does not affect non-political participation. The political legacy of violent conflict is a topic of interest in this study. The author presents evidence that suggests a link between past violence and increased political engagement of ex-combatants. The study focuses on northern Uganda, where rebel recruitment has created a situation of quasi-experimental variation in terms of who is recruited through abduction.

The findings suggest that abduction leads to a significant increase in voice and community leadership among survivors, primarily due to the high levels of violence they have witnessed. Interestingly, abduction and violence do not seem to affect non-political participation. These patterns challenge conventional theories of participation, such as elite mobilisation, differential costs, and altruistic preferences.

Overall, this study sheds light on the complex relationship between violent conflict and political behaviour. It opens new avenues for exploring existing understandings of how people respond to and participate in politics after violent conflict.

Stevens (2015) argues that left-wing politicians pay a higher price as a result of war than right-wing politicians. This study focuses on the effects of war as a factor influencing elections and how these effects differ for right and left-wing leaders. The study argues that war coincides with the reputation of right-wing governments but contradicts the reputation of left-wing governments. Thus, war requires a shift in priorities away from domestic issues that the public usually expects left-wing governments to address.

The article suggests that the impact of war on the perception of right-wing and left-wing leaders is different. It suggests that war is a greater temptation for left-wing supporters to switch to an incumbent under a right-wing government than for right-wing supporters to switch to a left-wing government. To test these arguments, the researchers examine the war in Iraq and elections in the United States and the United Kingdom.

The results of the study confirm that the leader of the left, Tony Blair, faced higher political costs because of the war, as the perception of his trustworthiness became central to the assessment of his leadership. Conversely, positive perceptions of strength became central to assessments of right-wing leader George W. Bush. In addition, the war had an asymmetric effect on supporters of opposition parties in the UK, resulting in higher costs for Blair.

Overall, the findings show that left-wing leaders bear a greater risk by engaging in war. The study highlights the complex relationship between war, leader perceptions and election outcomes, providing insight into how war affects the political landscape differently for right and left-wing leaders.

And Teigen (2006) demonstrates that previous military service increases the likelihood of regular participation in elections. From these studies, it can be concluded that war affects elections, voter turnout, and candidates in a variety of ways. The author analyses data from three decades of pooled national cross-sectional studies of men in the United States.

According to the study, prior military service has a significant positive effect on the propensity to participate in politics. Individuals who served in the military during World War II, the Korean War, and afterwards show a higher level of voter turnout than their peers who did not serve in the military. However, veterans returning from the Vietnam War had lower turnout rates than non-veterans.

The study also indicates that the influence of socialisation during military service competes with self-selection bias in explaining the increase in political participation among veterans. This means that not only do veterans themselves have a greater propensity for political participation, but the environment and social

influences resulting from military service also contribute to their more active participation in the political process.

Civic and protest participation in Ukraine

Protest activity in Ukraine is also not widespread. Some people know about the Orange Revolution of 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity of 2014. They started as protests against certain events in political life. But other than protest actions are not so popular in Ukraine. According to a study by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation (2015), only 18% of Ukrainians expressed their willingness to participate in possible protests, while 67% said they would not take part in such actions.

Let me also turn to sources that have studied civic engagement and war. Barcelo (2021) points out that there are short-term and long-term effects of war on civic engagement. The long-term effect of civic engagement can be determined by two key factors: resilience in individuals' relationships, which can arise from traumatic experiences, and changes at the community level, which include collective memory and institutional changes. Barcelo (2021) provides evidence that war experience increases civic engagement more than 25 years after the end of a conflict. He also emphasizes the positive impact of the conflict on citizens' adherence to participatory, expressive values. Although he examines the effect of the war itself, it can be assumed that strong feelings about possible war can also cause some of the above effects. There are other studies as well. For example, Skocpol (2002, 537) argues that U.S. wars have promoted civic vitality. Wilson & Ruger (2021) also clarify that the likelihood and intensity of group participation is higher among veterans. In fact, they have the highest level of civic participation (according to their study). That means people who have directly experienced war (no matter in what role) have higher civic engagement.

Speaking about the research on the relationship between war and protest activity, there are a lot of articles and studies that are related to anti-war protests. Anti-war protests do not take place in Ukraine now and was not popular before the

full-scale invasion began. Therefore, it is difficult to describe the relationship between worry about war and protest behaviour based on the literature. Mannarini et al. (2009) argue that two groups of factors can influence the intensification of protest behaviour. The first group of factors consists of a sense of collective identity, a sense of injustice, and collective efficacy. The second group of factors is more contextual and consists of the type of community participation (formal/informal), place of attachment, and others. Both groups of factors showed their significance. The first is somewhat stronger than the second. These factors will serve as a basis for further reflection on the nature of protest behaviour.

An important body of research on Ukrainian protest activity concerns the revolutions that took place in the country: The Orange Revolution (2004) and the Revolution of Dignity (2014). They are related to the war rather indirectly, but they show the protest participation of Ukrainians.

Yanovska (2018) analyses protest movements in Ukraine during periods of socio-political instability (in this case, revolutions). The study shows that most protests use conventional non-violent tactics. However, in periods of heightened tension or harassment by the authorities, the number of confrontational and violent actions may increase.

Ukrainian protest practices are usually aimed at achieving socio-economic goals, as well as protecting civil rights and freedoms. The protest events during the Revolution of Dignity are an example of this. The Revolution of Dignity was the first major non-electoral protest in Ukraine's history. Although the protesters' demands were for the resignation of key government officials, the protest campaign was not election related.

Onyskiv (2014) explores the phenomenon of civic mobilisation in Ukraine, particularly during the Revolution of Dignity. It argues that the Maidan events led to a new level of political participation in Ukraine and defined its main features, such as self-organisation, lack of a centralised governing body, awareness and mobility.

The conclusions of the article emphasise that previously people did not have sufficient motivation for active social and political activity. Such activity requires a

certain level of idealism, time and significant financial resources, especially when it does not bring personal benefits. However, the revolution changed this situation through civic mobilisation aimed at increasing the level of political motivation and engagement of citizens.

Civic mobilisation is particularly important when people are convinced that their own interests coincide with those of other citizens and that joint action can effectively improve their lives. Civic mobilisation helps to unlock the internal potentials of citizens and use them to improve various aspects of society that citizens are often unaware of.

Prokhorova (2017) continues to analyse the motivational aspect of the framing of the Maidan protests in the period from 2013 to 2014. Through in-depth interviews with Maidan participants, she identified a wide range of motivations that pushed activists to participate in the protests, and also provided a better understanding of their own understanding of motives.

Participants' motivations are directly related to the events on Maidan, and their interpretations change along with the transformation of the framing of the protest. Different people's motivations may differ depending on the stage of the Maidan at which they joined the events. Even for the same person, motives can change at different stages.

Motivations for participation in the Maidan events also vary depending on the role of the participant. Particular differences are noticeable during the violent confrontations between protesters and law enforcement officers. The motivations of those directly on Maidan may differ from those involved in organizing Maidan activities or providing assistance to the injured. Motives may include "if not me, then who" or revenge motives in the former case, while in the latter case there may be guilt motives.

The analysis showed that at the beginning of the protest, the motives of the participants were more specific and local, related to the country's foreign policy or the punishment of those responsible for beating protesters.

Impact of anxiety on political/ civic/ protest participation

The research on the impact of anxiety on political participation is quite important for this work. Because this allows us to preliminarily understand what trends exist in the study of the influence of emotions on political activity. For example, Baker (2020, 19) finds that people with high levels of anxiety show an increase in information-seeking behaviour when they feel anxious about the political situation. In her study, she also points out that people who have viewed more threatening political information express a greater desire to contact their representatives than people who have viewed little threatening political information (Baker, 2020, 23).

In another study, it was observed that anxiety has a greater impact on increasing political involvement among individuals with high internal political efficacy, while having minimal effect on those with low internal efficacy (Rudolph et al., 2000). This study focuses on the role of citizens' affective judgements in political behaviour. The authors argue that emotions are not homogeneous and can have different effects on political engagement. They complement previous studies that have shown that candidate anxiety stimulates political learning but does not affect participation in a political campaign.

The present study analyses the role of political efficacy as a moderating factor of anxiety on political campaign engagement. Internal efficacy, which reflects the perception of one's personal ability to successfully perform political actions, turns out to be an important mediator between anxiety and political participation. In particular, anxiety among people with high internal efficacy is found to contribute to political campaign involvement, while the effect of anxiety on participation among those with low internal efficacy is insignificant.

Valentino et al. (2011, 168) points out that anxiety does not increase involvement in all types of political activities, but only in less costly participatory actions². This article explores the role of emotions in citizens' political participation and focuses on the particular impact of anger. The authors note that previous research has focused mainly on the skills and resources that citizens possess in

² The author understands less costly participatory actions as talking to others about voting and wearing a button comprise. Because these kinds of activities require little effort and resources engagement (Valentino et al., 2011, 166).

relation to their political participation. Recently, however, more and more studies have focused on the short-term motivational forces that influence citizen mobilisation.

The authors use cognitive appraisal theory and the affective intelligence model to predict the role of different emotions in political participation. They suggest that anger will be a more mobilising factor than anxiety or enthusiasm. To test their hypothesis, the authors conduct a randomised experiment. The study finds evidence that anger has a particular impact on political participation. This is confirmed both in a controlled experiment and in an analysis of national opinion polls. Overall, the article demonstrates that studying the role of emotions, in particular anger, in political participation is an important aspect of understanding voter behaviour.

Theory and concepts

In this section, I will focus on the theory that will form the basis of my analytical part and several concepts that I already use in my work, but which I would like to clarify in more detail. Thus, I will explain what affective intelligence theory is and how it will become the basis for my further work, as well as concepts such as political participation, worries about possible war and gender.

Affective intelligence theory

Emotions have an impact on the level of political participation (Turner & Stets, 2005). The theory that I will focus on is affective intelligence theory. Scholars study the impact of different emotions - enthusiasm, sadness, anger, etc. - on political participation (for example, Marcus & Mackuen, 1993).

Weber (2019) described different types of social actions/ behaviour. He distinguished between instrumentally rational, value-rational, traditional, and affectual behaviour. Affective behaviour, according to Weber, is minimally understandable and meaningful because it is subject to the internal emotions of

social individuals. Affective intelligence theory is a continuation of social action theory. The theory of affective intelligence argues that an individual's emotions influence his or her political habits, as well as attention to new political information (Marcus et al., 2011, 323). Over the time of this theory's existence, scholars have taken different approaches to what emotions they study and how they are classified. I will focus on the emotions of anxiety and fear. Many researchers group these two emotions together in their studies (Wagner & Morisi, 2019, 4).

We are interested in these emotions because it seems to me that they are the ones that arise in people who think about a possible war in their own country. Scientists identify various causes of anxiety in individuals. For example, Todd et al. (2015) points out that people who experience or observe the situation, but not its outcome, are more likely to feel anxious. Tiedens & Linton (2001) point out that people tend to be anxious in situations over which they have no control. And Wagner (2014) emphasises that anxiety will increase if no clear external actor can be identified as responsible for the situation. It seems to me that anxiety about war can be caused by exactly the reasons described above.

Gender aspect in affective intelligence theory

One of the interesting aspects of affective intelligence theory is its relationship with gender. There are researches that suggests that women and men may display emotional intelligence and behaviour in different ways. Some researchers point out that men may be more assertive, self-determined, independent, and able to manage situations according to their needs (Ahmad et al., 2009).

However, it is important to keep in mind that reactions to different situations may be different for each person, regardless of their gender. Sometimes, differences in the levels of emotional reactions between women and men can be found, while in other cases, there may be no such differences. Therefore, in my study, I would like to compare gender differences in political participation caused by the worry about possible war. This will allow me to better understand how anxiety about a

possible war may affect the level of political participation of different genders participants.

It makes sense to consider gender differences not only in the context of emotional reactions. In fact, gender differences exist not only at the individual level, but also at the contextual level (Páez-Bernal & Kittilson, 2022, 14). The contextual level refers to the more social and institutional factors that shape differences. For example, Inglehart & Norris (2003) point to the impact of socio-economic change on socialisation. They argue that traditional perceptions of gender roles limit women's access to the public sphere, while more egalitarian views of gender empower women in this area and often break down artificial barriers between the public and private spheres. This suggests that, in addition to differences at the individual level, it will be worth considering differences at the contextual level (focus on caring for those closest to us).

Care work is “the work of looking after the physical, psychological, emotional and developmental needs of one or more other people” (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2016). In many countries, there is a stereotype that women are supposed to be the caregivers and take care of children, partners, and other relatives (Inglehart et al., 2022). In 2019, the share of time spent by men on unpaid work (as a percentage of total working time) was 19%, while for women it was 55% (World Economic Forum, 2022, 7). During the COVID-19 epidemic, the demand for care work increased even more due to the closure of kindergartens and schools. And now there is a high risk that the asymmetric demand for unpaid childcare work will continue to be imposed on women (World Economic Forum, 2022, 7).

Caregiving is a job that requires great skills and experience. And as may be seen from the statistics, it is women who invest more in this work than men around the world. But women are not always naturally inclined to caregiving. The role of caregiver is instilled in women through socialization in the family, where women are often expected to take care of household needs, children, and other family members (McAllum et al., 2021). Also, in most cultures, women are perceived as

“softer”, “more emotional” than men, making them more suitable for caregiving roles (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009).

Many women experience pressure to be caregivers (Guberman et al., 1992, 612). For example, they may be forced to change their career plans to meet the needs of their children or other family members. Hoffmann's theory of social expectations may explain why women are often forced into caregiving roles, especially in the context of children and caring responsibilities (Eisenberg & Morris, 2001). According to the theory, people form social expectations based on three key factors: roles, status, and situations.

Roles. There is a general expectation in society that women play the role of caregivers and are responsible for taking care of children and family. This arises from stereotypes and cultural norms that ascribe women to this social role. Expectations about women's roles influence how society perceives women and how they perceive themselves.

Regarding statuses. Women can be positioned in the social hierarchy as having a lower status, which can lead to the imposition of the role of caregiver. This is due to gender stereotypes and perceptions of women's role in society. As a result, it can be difficult for women to escape this role and take on other social functions that require more status or power.

Situations. Women may be assigned caregiving responsibilities due to specific situations, such as childbirth or family needs. In family relationships, there is often an expectation that women will be responsible for the care and custody of children, parents or other relatives. This may be the result of traditional family values and the division of family responsibilities.

This also may hinder their ability to participate in politics (Dersnah, n.d., 6). For example, if a woman participates in political meetings or sessions, it may be difficult for her to find time to care for children or elderly relatives who need constant supervision and care. This can lead to women with families and children opting out of politics or not being able to devote sufficient time and attention to it (Dersnah, n.d., 53). Women are often expected to prioritize their roles as caregivers over their political participation or career, while men are not subject to the same

expectations (Sharma, 2016). This may create barriers for women even if they are willing to mix their roles as caregivers and citizens/politicians, as they will face obstacles in the form of stereotypes (Dersnah, n.d., 53) and, consequently, social disapproval.

Concepts

In addition to the above-mentioned theory, I am also going to operate with several conceptual notions, such as political participation, worry about war, and gender. In fact, I have used these concepts above with the hope that the reader uses a common understanding of these terms, but at this point I would like to dwell on them and explain what I mean by them to make our understanding coincide.

So, political participation. Research on political participation is a broad and widely researched topic. As Brady (1999, 737) defines it, political participation is “action by ordinary citizens aimed at influencing some political outcome”. It is worth noting that these actions can be of a different nature. Van Deth (2014) notes that these actions should be voluntary, located in the sphere of government, state, politics and address certain public issues. For my work, it is also important to note that there are different modes of political participation. People can participate, i.e., act, in different areas of politics. Giugni & Grasso (2022, 27) distinguish between conventional and unconventional forms. Conventional forms of political participation mean actions related to voting or linked to political parties. Unconventional forms of political participation mean participation in protest activities (attending a street demonstration, a strike, sit-ins, blockades, occupations, etc.). For my study, I will also dive into modes of political participation. My division will be somewhat different from this theoretical one and will be based on factor analysis (see Methods and data).

Worries about a possible war. My understanding of this concept in this study is entirely based on empirical materials. Since I am using the existing World Value Survey 2017-2022 data set, the way this variable is defined and measured there is what I have stuck to. In the dataset, worries about possible war are measured by the

question “To what extent are you worried about the following situations? A war involving my country”. This question implies that this indicator will be measured through the respondent's own subjective assessment.

Gender. I mentioned earlier that I would like to address gender differences. There are different approaches to understanding and interpreting gender in the literature. In this paper, my understanding of gender is also interpreted by empirical material. In the World Value Survey 2017-2022, gender is measured by binary categories - women and men. I will use these categories in my work.

Data and methods

This study focuses on investigating how worries about possible war affect political engagement among women and men in Ukraine. For this purpose, I use the data set of the World Values Survey 2017-2022 (seventh wave) (Inglehart et al., 2022). I extract variables to form an index of political participation, as well as questions that reflect worries about the possible war and caregiving (example where I probably may see gender differences on contextual level). After that, I run an OLS regression to test whether the worry about a possible war is a truly significant variable that affects the political participation of women and men in Ukraine.

Dataset

The first thing I would like to focus on is the dataset. I use the seventh wave of the WVS, which was collected between 2017 and 2020. In different countries, the research was conducted in slightly different periods. In Ukraine, the field phase of the survey was conducted from 21 July 2020 to 17 August 2020. The total sample of the survey was 1289 interviews (the maximum margin of error is 2.7%, with a probability of 0.95 and without considering the design effect). This sample represents the adult population of Ukraine (aged 18 and older), including citizens and residents of the country who have lived in the settlement for at least two months. The sample represents the entire territory of Ukraine, except for areas of Donetsk

and Luhansk oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea that are not currently controlled by Ukrainian government (Akulenko et al., 2020, 9). The array is weighted by the original country weight (World Value Survey, 2020). The purpose of using weights is to reduce the impact of small deviations in the measurement result on the result for one or more parameters that are considered key to obtaining accurate and reliable data.

The fact that I am using an existing dataset imposes some limitations on my work. Firstly, the time of the study is before the start of the full-scale invasion in Ukraine. Secondly, to form indicators and create a regression, I can only use those variables that already exist in the array, i.e., have been previously identified by other researchers. Thirdly, as I defined earlier, the study does not include the occupied territories. In 2014, after the beginning of the Russian invasion, approximately 1 million citizens became internally displaced (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2015). And in 2015, 1 million 941 thousand were internally displaced (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2015). According to statistics in 2019, there are almost 370,000 people who have received the status of combatants and participated in the ATO (the anti-terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine that began in 2014) (Marceniuk & Kvit, n.d.). They were directly affected by the war. This may increase their level of political participation in relation to others. Unfortunately, these people are not marked in the data set in any way and therefore cannot be identified. Therefore, it is simply worth taking this into account.

Undoubtedly, there are advantages to using an existing data set. First, it allowed me to focus on the analytical part of the work. Because it is the analysis that became the focus of my attention, not research planning and fieldwork. Second, resources. Students' opportunities are quite limited, while the resources of the World Values Survey are much more extensive (both financial and human). Thanks to this, they conduct cyclical research and I have access to data on Ukraine. Since the country is currently at war, it would be very difficult to conduct both planning and fieldwork there now.

Index of political participation

To create an index of political participation, I selected variables from the dataset that could be suitable for creating an indicator of participation (see Table 4). I chose variables that reflect political participation in different forms, places, and levels of effort. The main variables relate to voting behaviour, civic behaviour, and protest behaviour.

TABLE 4. *The variables for political participation index.*

Vote in elections: local level
Vote in elections: national level
Political action: signing a petition
Political action: joining in boycotts
Political action: attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations
Political action: joining unofficial strikes
Social activism: donating to a group or campaign
Social activism: contacting a government official
Social activism: encouraging others to take action about political issues
Social activism: encouraging others to vote

Analysing the distributions of the selected variables, I can see that voting at both the national and local levels is a leader in the dimensions of political participation (see Table 5). This is true for both women and men. Approximately every second women or men always vote, and every third usually do this. There is no gender difference in these questions.

There are gender differences in civic engagement, but not in all of them. There are no gender differences in the ways of donating money and contacting a government official. Almost every fifth/sixth woman or man in Ukraine donates money. Every third could potentially do so. Slightly fewer people contact a government official. Every ninth woman and every seventh man (with no

statistically significant difference). Almost every second woman or man could potentially do this. But it is worth noting that in social activities, compared to voting, there is a very high percentage of people who say they will never engage in these types of activity (slightly less than half, both in the case of women and men). There is a gender difference in such civic activities as encouraging others to take action on political issues and encouraging others to vote. Women are more likely to say that they will not take these actions. At the same time, men are statistically more likely to say that they could be involved in such activities but have not done so before. In general, the percentage of people involved in such activities is quite low, less than 5% in all cases (see Table 5).

The involvement in protest behaviour is also not high, less than 15% in all cases. There are no gender differences in signing petitions. Nor are there any differences in attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations. Gender differences can be observed in joining boycotts. As in the case of some civic activities, women are more likely to say that they will not take these actions, while men are statistically more likely to say that they could. The distribution of joining unofficial strikes is interesting. Men are more likely than women to say that they have participated in strikes, while women are statistically more likely to say that they would never participate in an unofficial strike.

These distributions are quite captivating. They show that in almost all types of political participation, there is no significant difference between the activity of women and men in Ukraine. And in general, if I do not take into account voting, not many people are involved in political participation.

TABLE 5: *Variables for forming a weighted index of political participation of women and men.*

		Female	Male
Vote in elections: local level	Always	53%	51%
	Usually	36%	37%
	Never	11%	12%
	Total	742	508
Always		57%	57%

Vote in elections: national level	Usually	34%	32%
	Never	8%	12%
	Total	742	509
Social activism: donating to a group or campaign	Have done	19%	15%
	Might do	36%	35%
	Would never do	45%	50%
	Total	669	461
Social activism: contacting a government official	Have done	11%	15%
	Might do	48%	42%
	Would never do	41%	43%
	Total	676	478
Social activism: encouraging others to take action about political issues	Have done	4%	4%
	Might do	18%	24%*
	Would never do	78%*	72%
	Total	646	453
Social activism: encouraging others to vote	Have done	5%	4%
	Might do	19%	26%*
	Would never do	76%*	69%
	Total	653	460
Political action: signing a petition	Have done	14%	12%
	Might do	38%	39%
	Would never do	47%	49%
	Total	683	471
Political action: joining in boycotts	Have done	4%	5%
	Might do	22%	29%*
	Would never do	75%*	67%
	Total	656	474
Political action: attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations	Have done	8%	10%
	Might do	35%	37%
	Would never do	57%	53%
	Total	677	480
Political action: joining unofficial strikes	Have done	2%	7%*
	Might do	24%	28%
	Would never do	74%*	65%
	Total	650	460

Note: * There is a statistically significant difference between the groups and the observed percentage is significantly higher. The results are based on two-sided criteria with a significance level of 0.05. The criteria were adjusted for all pairwise comparisons in the row of each internal suitable using the Bonferroni correction. For some categories, the values in the columns are non-integer. They are rounded to the nearest integer before applying the proportion criteria to the columns.

Having selected questions and analysed them, I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to ensure that all components could be included in the index (see Table 6). Confirmatory factor analysis is a statistical method used to test whether a set of variables can be explained by a smaller number of latent variables that are hypothesized to exist in the underlying variables. In the context of index development, confirmatory factor analysis can help to confirm that the selected variables do indeed measure the same underlying construct or concept.

By conducting confirmatory factor analysis, it is possible to assess the extent to which the observed variables are consistent with the underlying theoretical model. If the results of confirmatory factor analysis confirm the hypothesized model, it means that the selected variables are a valid and reliable measure of the underlying concept. And conversely, if the results of the confirmatory factor analysis do not support the hypothesized model, this indicates that the observed variables may be a poor measure of the underlying concept.

In my case confirmatory factor analysis showed that the theoretically identified questions should be divided into two components. These components better describe the phenomenon of political participation. This division is in line with the theory described in the previous sections that political participation can be divided into conventional and non-conventional forms of political participation (Giugni & Grasso, 2022, 27). Therefore, I decided to create two indexes of political participation for further analysis: conventional, which includes voting behaviour, and unconventional, which includes civic and protest behaviour.

TABLE 6. *The variables for political participation index: factor analysis.*

	Unconventional	Conventional
Political action: joining in boycotts	,789	-,073

Political action: attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations	,780	,041
Political action: joining unofficial strikes	,770	-,043
Social activism: encouraging others to take action about political issues	,756	-,026
Political action: signing a petition	,732	,065
Social activism: encouraging others to vote	,713	,006
Social activism: contacting a government official	,677	,054
Social activism: donating to a group or campaign	,610	,154
Vote in elections: local level	,023	,961
Vote in elections: national level	,031	,959

Note: Factor selection method: principal component method. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization. The rotation converged in 3 iterations.
Source: Pooled WVS/EVS, 2017–2022.

For constructing the indexes, I considered whether all types of activities require equal commitment and time. For example, participation in a boycott is an indicator of higher engagement than donating money. Accordingly, I decided to make the indicators of political participation weighted. I assigned weights based on theoretical ideas (see Table 7).

The weighted index of convention political participation consists of only two indicators - voting at the national and local levels. Scientists explain that voting requires at least a minimum level of awareness of the candidates. Due to the inherent populism of Ukrainian politics, presidential or parliamentary elections receive more publicity than local ones (Karpyak, 2020). Therefore, participation in local elections would indicate greater political awareness and a more deliberate vote. Therefore, I assign a coefficient of two to those who participated in local elections and a coefficient of one to those who participated in national elections (see Table 7).

TABLE 7: *Codes and weighted coefficients for a weighted index of conventional political participation of women and men.*

		Values	Weighting coefficient
Vote in elections: local level	Always	1	2
	Usually	0,5	
	Never	0	
Vote in elections: national level	Always	1	1
	Usually	0,5	
	Never	0	

The weighted index of unconventional political participation consists of a larger number of indicators. I have divided them into four categories based on my own experience of how much resources (financial, time, etc.) this type of activity takes up in Ukraine and how dangerous it is. Thus, the coefficient of four (the highest) was assigned to such types of activities as joining boycotts, attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations and joining unofficial strikes. The coefficient of three was assigned to contacting a government official. The coefficient of two to donating to a group or campaign and signing a petition. Finally, the coefficient of one was assigned to encouraging others to take action on political issues, encouraging others to vote (see Table 8). Based on these analytical ideas, I assigned values and weights to the questions and created two indices - conventional and unconventional political participation.

TABLE 8: *Values and weighted coefficients for a weighted index of unconventional political participation of women and men.*

		Values	Weighting coefficient
Social activism: donating to a group or campaign	Have done	1	2
	Might do	0	
	Would never do	0	

Social activism: contacting a government official	Have done	1	
	Might do	0	3
	Would never do	0	
Social activism: encouraging others to take action about political issues	Have done	1	
	Might do	0	1
	Would never do	0	
Social activism: encouraging others to vote	Have done	1	
	Might do	0	1
	Would never do	0	
Political action: signing a petition	Have done	1	
	Might do	0	2
	Would never do	0	
Political action: joining in boycotts	Have done	1	
	Might do	0	4
	Would never do	0	
Political action: attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations	Have done	1	
	Might do	0	4
	Would never do	0	
Political action: joining unofficial strikes	Have done	1	
	Might do	0	4
	Would never do	0	

Thus, having formed the indexes, I got the following picture (see Table 9). The level of conventional participation is above average. There is no statistically significant difference between the scores of women and men. In contrast, the level of unconventional participation is very low. But there is no statistically significant difference between the groups either. So, in general, Ukrainians can be described as people who periodically vote in elections but do not participate in civic or protest activities.

TABLE 9. *Political participation index (mean) for women and men in Ukraine.*

	Female		Male	
	Mean	St. dev.	Mean	St. dev.
Conventional participation – 3-point scale	2,16	0,98	2,11	0,99
Unconventional participation – 3-point scale	0,21	0,42	0,25	0,51

Note: There is no statistically significant difference between the groups. The results are based on two-sided criteria with a significance level of 0.05. The criteria were adjusted for all pairwise comparisons in the row of each internal suitable using the Bonferroni correction. For some categories, the values in the columns are non-integer. They are rounded to the nearest integer before applying the proportion criteria to the columns.

Independent variables for OLS regressions

It is the indices described above that I are going to use as dependent variables for building regression models. As independent variables, I will include worries about a possible war and variables on the having children and marital status (having family members to take care of). The choice of these variables is justified by the fact that I would like to see whether individual (worries) and contextual levels (family/caregiving) have different effects on the political activity of women and men in Ukraine.

In general, the scores on these questions do not differ statistically for women and men (see Table 10). The majority are worried about a possible war in the country. Both women and men are mostly married or have a partner. The situation with children is somewhat more uncertain. There is a statistically significant difference between women and men who do not have children. Men are much more likely to have no children.

TABLE 10. *Descriptive statistics.*

		Female	Male
Worries: A war involving my country	Very much	71%	66%
	A good deal	23%	25%
	Not much	5%	7%
	Not at all	1%	2%
	Total	763	519

Marital status	Married	62%	64%
	Living together as married	5%	5%
	Divorced	7%	7%
	Separated	1%	1%
	Widowed	17%*	4%
	Single/Never married	8%	19%*
	Total	758	517
How many children do you have?	No child	18%	31%*
	1 child	37%*	28%
	2 children	38%	35%
	3 children	6%	6%
	4 children	0,4%	0,2%
	5 children or more	1%	0,4%
	Total	765	524

Note: * There is a statistically significant difference between the groups and the observed percentage is significantly higher. The results are based on two-sided criteria with a significance level of 0.05. The criteria were adjusted for all pairwise comparisons in the row of each internal suitable using the Bonferroni correction. For some categories, the values in the columns are non-integer. They are rounded to the nearest integer before applying the proportion criteria to the columns.

I use the above variables to build a linear regression. I use the conventional and unconventional indexes as dependent variables, and worries about a possible war, having children and marital status as independent variables.

I also want to include several control variables. As control variables I choose age, type of settlement and education (see Table 11). The inclusion of control variables in a study helps to increase its internal validity, i.e., to reduce the influence of variables that may distort the results. This will allow me to establish a correlation between the variables of interest and avoid bias in the analysis (Bhandari, 2022a). The control variables I have chosen to have an impact on the level of conventional political activity of Ukrainians. This has been revealed in the works of Zasadko & Tronstad (2018), Reznik (2014), Yeftieni (2014).

TABLE 11. *Descriptive statistics of control variables.*

		Female	Male
Age recoded (6 intervals)	15-24	6%	9%*
	25-34	19%	17%
	35-44	23%	20%

	45-54	16%	19%
	55-64	15%	17%
	65 and more years	22%	18%
	Total	765	524
Urban/Rural habitat	Urban	67%	66%
	Rural	33%	34%
	Total	765	524
Education level (recoded)	Lower	12%	9%
	Middle	22%	25%
	Upper	66%	66%
	Total	760	518

Note: * There is a statistically significant difference between the groups and the observed percentage is significantly higher. The results are based on two-sided criteria with a significance level of 0.05. The criteria were adjusted for all pairwise comparisons in the row of each internal suitable using the Bonferroni correction. For some categories, the values in the columns are non-integer. They are rounded to the nearest integer before applying the proportion criteria to the columns.

So, based on the two indices and several variables I described above, I built regressions. In the next section, I will elaborate on it more and describe the results.

Analysis

To test whether the worries about possible war affects the level of conventional political activity of Ukrainians, I estimate models for women and men separately (see Table 12 and Table 13). The models will use linear regression to identify the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The regression coefficients in the table indicate how the dependent variable changes with each factor. First, I include as an independent variable only the variable of interest, i.e., the variable “worries about a possible war”. Next, I will add control variables such as age, type of settlement in which the respondents live, and education. Lastly, I add two more variables that I have chosen to consider the social noumena of care, having children and marital status. I will compare each model with the next, and I will also compare models for women and men.

Metrics for comparing regression models

My main task is not just to describe the models, but to compare them. To compare models, I will be comparing measures that indicate the accuracy and adequacy of the model – R^2 , adjusted R^2 , standard error of estimate, F-statistics, positive regression coefficient and standardized beta coefficients.

R^2 is a measure that indicates how well a model explains the variation in the dependent variable. The higher the R^2 value, the better the model explains the variation in the dependent variable.

Adjusted R^2 is a corrected version of the R^2 in a regression model that considers the number of dependent variables and the number of independent variables included in the model. This is important because when new independent variables are added to a model, R^2 always increases, even if the added variables are not statistically significant. The adjusted R^2 , on the other hand, considers the number of variables and the number of observations, which allows for a more accurate assessment of the significance of the included independent variables. Thus, compared to R^2 , adjusted R^2 may be a more objective measure of the accuracy of a regression model.

Standard error of estimation - this indicator indicates how accurate the model's predictions are. The lower the value of the standard error of estimate, the more accurate the model's predictions.

F-statistic is an indicator that indicates the statistical significance of the model. The higher the F-statistic, the more statistically significant the model is.

Positive regression coefficient (B) is the coefficient, which shows how many units the dependent variable changes by when the independent variable changes by one unit, provided that other variables remain constant. The B-coefficient is used to predict changes in the dependent variable based on specific values of the independent variable.

Standardized beta coefficients (Beta) - these indicators indicate how the dependent variable changes when the independent variable changes by one standard deviation. The greater the standardized regression coefficient is above or below zero, the greater the impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable.

The standardized beta coefficient is used to compare the impact of different variables on the dependent variable in different models.

The impact of worries about war on the conventional political participation: worries with no control variables

First, I will consider the model that includes only worries about a possible war as an independent variable. For women (see Table 12), the model shows a significant positive correlation between worries about a possible war and conventional political engagement, as indicated by a positive regression coefficient (B) of 0.314 and a standardised beta coefficient (Beta) of 0.206, respectively. The coefficients of determination R^2 and adjusted R^2 are 0.042 and 0.041, respectively, indicating a low explanatory power of the model. This means that only 4.2% of the variation in conventional political participation can be explained by changes in the variable “worries about war”.

In the model for men (see Table 13), there is also a positive correlation between worries about war and conventional political participation, as indicated by a positive regression coefficient (R) of 0.333 and a standardised beta coefficient (Beta) of 0.24, respectively. The coefficients of determination R^2 and adjusted R^2 are 0.058 and 0.056, respectively, which also indicates a low explanatory power of the model. Only 5.8% of the variation in conventional political participation can be explained by changes in the variable of my interest. But for social phenomena when one-point increase in the worry on a 3-point scale leads to 0.3 increase means that phenomena make an impact. And it is enough to take it into consideration.

The results of these two models indicate that the level of conventional political activity depends on “worries about war”. In the model for men, the coefficient of determination R^2 is higher than in the model for women. This means that the relationship between the level of conventional political activity and “worries about war” is slightly stronger for men than for women. Also, the beta coefficient for men (0.24) is higher than for women (0.206), indicating that a one-unit change in the factors has a greater impact on the level of conventional political

participation for men than for women. However, both models are statistically significant at a high level of significance ($p < 0.001$), indicating that there is a statistically significant relationship between conventional political engagement and “worries about war”, regardless of gender.

Thus, I can summarise that both regression models demonstrate a relationship between conventional political engagement and “worries about war”. However, the relationship between these variables is weak, as the coefficients of determination are quite low. In addition, the results of the model for men show a slightly stronger relationship between these variables than the results of the model for women.

The impact of worries about war on the conventional political participation: worries with control variables

Next, I add control variables – age, type of settlement and education. The addition of new variables to the models allowed me to get a more complete picture of the relationship between the level of conventional political activity and the worries about war for men and women.

For women (see Table 12), age, type of settlement and education are significant variables that reflect the relationship between them and the level of conventional political activity. In particular, the variable “age” is significant, showing that younger women are more conventional active in politics than older women. The variable “type of settlement” has a value that suggests that women living in rural areas are more likely to vote. The variable “education” is also significant, which may indicate that women with higher levels of education are more active in conventional political life.

For men (see Table 13), age and type of settlement are also significant variables, but the role of education is much smaller. This may indicate that men may have a greater commitment to conventional political activity, regardless of their level of education. Trends related to age and type of settlement among men mirror those among women.

TABLE 12: *The impact of worries about war on the conventional political participation, 2017–2022: female*

	Model 1.1: worries with no controls			Model 1.2: worries + control var.			Model 1.3: worries + control var. + custody var.		
	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig
Worries about war	,314	,206	***	,313	,207	***	,322	,210	***
Age (years)				-,012	-,201	***	-,012	-,201	***
Type of settlement				-,412	-,199	***	-,417	-,201	***
Education				,236	,115	***	,223	,108	***
Children							,100	,039	
Marital status							,063	,030	
R ²	,042			,120			,124		
Adjusted R ²	,041			,115			,117		
F-statistics	32,228			24,281			16,800		
p	,000			,000			,000		

Note: The models are based on OLS regression analysis using the pooled WVS/EVS, 2017–2022, in Ukraine. The figures are unstandardized (B) and standardized (Beta) coefficients representing the impact of the independent variables on the conventional political participation scale (three-point), where high equals most active. Model 1 includes worries about war without any controls, where a positive coefficient denotes women more politically active (in traditional way) if they worried about the possibility of war. Model 2 includes worries about war with social controls for age (scale), type of settlement (dummy variable: urban = 1), education (dummy variable: high education = 1). Model 3 includes worries about war with social controls and custody controls, the latter including having children (dummy variable: have children = 1), marital status (married or cohabiting = 1). Sig. *.05, **.01, ***.001. All models were checked by tolerance and VIF statistics to be free of multicollinearity problems.

Source: Pooled WVS/EVS, 2017–2022.

TABLE 13: *The impact of worries about war on the conventional political activism, 2017–2022: male*

	Model 2.1: worries with no controls			Model 2.2: worries + control var.			Model 2.3: worries + control var. + custody var.		
	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig
Worries about war	,333	,240	***	,318	,231	***	,308	,224	***
Age (years)				-,018	-,291	***	-,016	-,258	***
Type of settlement				-,293	-,141	***	-,274	-,132	***
Education				,003	,002		-,018	-,009	
Children							,101	,046	
Marital status							,160	,075	
R ²	,058			,177			,187		
Adjusted R ²	,056			,170			,177		
F-statistics	30,801			26,565			18,681		
p	,000			,000			,000		

Note: The models are based on OLS regression analysis using the pooled WVS/EVS, 2017–2022, in Ukraine. The figures are unstandardized (B) and standardized (Beta) coefficients representing the impact of the independent variables on the conventional political participation scale (three-point), where high equals most active. Model 1 includes worries about war without any controls, where a positive coefficient denotes men more politically active (in traditional way) if they worried about the possibility of war. Model 2 includes worries about war with social controls for age (scale), type of settlement (dummy variable: urban = 1), education (dummy variable: high education = 1). Model 3 includes worries about war with social controls and custody controls, the latter including having children (dummy variable: have children = 1), marital status (married or cohabiting = 1). Sig. *.05, **.01, ***.001. All models were checked by tolerance and VIF statistics to be free of multicollinearity problems.

Source: Pooled WVS/EVS, 2017–2022.

After adding the three new control variables to each of the models, I can see changes in the regression coefficients and significance of the variables. In the model for women, I can see that the coefficient for the variable “worries about war” remained virtually unchanged. This indicates that this variable is likely to be significant on its own. The coefficient of determination has increased from 0.042 to 0.12, which means that this group of variables explains 12% of the variation in conventional political participation among women, which is a marked improvement.

In the model for men, I see that the coefficient for the variable “worries about war” again remained almost unchanged. The coefficient of determination increased from 0.058 to 0.177, meaning that this group of variables explains 17.7% of the variation in conventional political participation among men, which is also a marked improvement.

In general, the model for men has a slightly higher coefficient of determination ($R^2=0.177$), meaning that war experiences, age, settlement type, and education explain more variation in attitudes towards conventional political participation among men than in the case of women ($R^2=0.12$).

Thus, the addition of variables allowed me to get a more complete picture of the factors that influence the level of political participation for men and women. However, these models have limitations, as they are based on a model with a limited number of factors. Also, other variables may influence the level of activity that were not included in my model.

The impact of worries about war on the conventional political participation: worries with control variables and custody variables

Now I will add several factors to the model to demonstrate whether caregiving (for children or a partner) is a significant factor that affects the level of conventional political participation. I also want to see how the coefficient of “worries about war” changes when these two factors are added.

The regression coefficients for the variables of “worries about war”, age, settlement type and education have hardly changed compared to the previous model for either women or men. The coefficients for the variables having children and marital status are not statistically significant, so I can conclude that these variables do not have a major impact on conventional political activity for both women and men.

When comparing the models with each other, I can see that the model for men has a higher coefficient of determination (R^2), which means that it explains a larger part of the variation in the dependent variable (level of conventional political participation) than the model for women.

In the models for both genders (see Table 12 and Table 13), the variable on possible war has a rather significant impact on the dependent variable, i.e., people who worry about a possible war are more politically active in conventional way. When new independent variables were added to the models, the coefficients for the variable “worries about war” changed. In the model for women, the coefficient increased from 0.313 to 0.322, i.e., remained almost unchanged. In the model for men, the coefficient decreased from 0.318 to 0.308, which may indicate that men react less sensitively to war-related experiences when other factors (presence of a partner or children) are included. But even with all the control and custody variables included, I see that worrying about a possible war remains a significant factor influencing the level of conventional political activity for both women and men. However, it is worth noting that the explanatory power of the models and the coefficients are different for women and men, which highlights the difference in behaviour between women and men.

The impact of worries about war on the unconventional political participation

One way to engage in political participation is through conventional political activity, which includes actions related to voting. However, in addition to this type of political engagement, there is also unconventional political engagement, which

TABLE 14: *The impact of worries about war on the unconventional political activism, 2017–2022*

	Model 1: Female			Model 2: Male		
	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig
Worries about war	-,043	-,065		-,022	-,030	
Age (years)	-,001	-,028		,001	,020	
Type of settlement	,072	,080	*	,164	,153	***
Education	,102	,115	**	,090	,083	
Children	-,017	-,015		,085	,076	
Marital status	-,034	-,038		,050	,045	
R ²	,026			,043		
Adjusted R ²	,018			,031		
F-statistics	3,298			3,728		
p	,003			,001		

Note: The models are based on OLS regression analysis using the pooled WVS/EVS, 2017–2022, in Ukraine. The figures are unstandardized (B) and standardized (Beta) coefficients representing the impact of the independent variables on the unconventional political participation scale (twenty-one-point), where high equals most active. Models include worries about war with social controls social controls for age (scale), type of settlement (dummy variable: urban = 1), education (dummy variable: high education = 1) and custody controls for having children (dummy variable: have children = 1), marital status (married or cohabiting = 1). Sig. *.05, **.01, ***.001. All models were checked by tolerance and VIF statistics to be free of multicollinearity problems.

Source: Pooled WVS/EVS, 2017–2022.

includes participation in protests, demonstrations, strikes, blockades, and other forms of social and protest activism.

In my work, I also pay attention to unconventional political engagement (see Table 14). To examine this type of political engagement, I conducted linear regression analyses to determine whether the perception of a possible war in the country affects the unconventional political engagement of women and men in Ukraine.

The results showed that the worry about war has no effect on this type of political engagement, neither among women nor men. This may be because unconventional political participation is more related to domestic policy issues than to foreign policy issues. It is also worth noting that other factors that I did not choose as controls for the regression models, such as education level, socioeconomic status, and political beliefs, may influence citizens' unconventional political engagement.

Thus, in my study, I investigated the impact of the worry of a possible war on the political engagement of women and men in Ukraine, both conventional and unconventional. According to my findings, worries about war have an impact only on conventional political engagement, in particular on participation in elections. This relationship is stronger for men than for women and may begin to affect women who are caregivers. However, unconventional political engagement, such as participation in protests, is not affected by worries about a possible war.

Conclusions and discussion

Based on the research question and the sub-questions presented, I examined the relationship between anxiety about a possible war in Ukraine and political engagement of women and men. Political engagement was divided into conventional (voting) and unconventional (civic and protest activity).

To answer research questions, a quantitative regression analysis was conducted using data from the seventh wave of the World Values Survey. This allowed me to examine the relationship between worries about war and political engagement while controlling for other relevant factors. In the case of my work, I

defined them as control factors (age, type of settlement, and education) and custody factors (those that demonstrate the presence of family members to take care of).

The analysis showed that concern about the war in Ukraine affects conventional political engagement, such as voting in elections, but does not affect unconventional political engagement, such as participation in protests and others. This link is stronger for men than for women and may begin to affect women who are caring for children. It is important to note that the relationship between war-related anxiety and political engagement is complex and depends on other factors such as age, type of settlement, education, and others. The models show the impact of having a caregiving job on worries about war, but not on political engagement directly.

These results fit into the framework of affective intelligence theory. Affective intelligence theory suggests that emotions play an important role in decision-making and behaviour (Marcus & Mackuen, 1993). The results of the study show that worries about a possible war may have a significant impact on political behaviour, including participation in elections, and that this relationship is stronger for men than for women. This finding supports the idea that emotions, such as fear or anxiety, can influence how people engage in political activity.

In addition, the study found that the impact of worries about war on political participation may be stronger for women who have childcare responsibilities. This is consistent with the idea that people's personal circumstances (that may be defined by social structure of society) may influence their decision-making processes and behaviour.

However, the study also found that worries about war do not affect unconventional forms of political participation. This confirms the findings of scholars who indicate that anxiety is more likely to drive conventional participation than unconventional participation. Although most of the studies I have cited are about the impact of the war itself, I see that the trends are also true for worries about the war - worries influence political activity.

My study confirmed previous research on the impact of war worries on political participation to some extent. It was found that this impact is more

noticeable on conventional political activity than on unconventional political activity. Given the duration of the worries about war, which lasted for 8 years at the time of the study, the long-term consequences of this influence were established.

In terms of conventional political engagement, there is an increased level of involvement among Ukrainians. The worry about war is associated with increased political engagement. This study did not focus on the experiences of military or internally displaced persons, but rather on the general experiences of women and men. However, these results may serve as a basis for further research in this area.

Different results were found in the case of unconventional political engagement. In my study, there was no association between the level of political participation and worries about war. However, previous studies have looked at specific types of protests or civic engagement, such as anti-war protests. Such activities were only a part of my index of unconventional political participation or were not included at all (due to the absence of such variables in the dataset). Therefore, my results are more general and not aimed at assessing a specific type of activity. The findings of this study point to the importance of further research into specific types of unconventional political activity and their relationship to the worries about war. More detailed research in this area may reveal additional aspects of this interaction and expand our understanding of the impact of war on political participation.

Also, the findings of this study may have important implications for policymakers and organizations working to promote political participation in Ukraine, especially in the context of ongoing conflict and insecurity. By understanding the factors that influence political engagement in this context, policymakers and organizations can develop more effective strategies to engage women and men in political processes and contribute to the resolution of specific issues.

The results of this study are important, but they only cover a small part of the overall picture. Many other aspects can still be studied. There are several possible avenues for further research in this area.

Firstly, it is possible to investigate how other factors, such as political preferences, cultural region, and income, influence the relationship between worries about a possible war and political engagement. Since I have chosen only a few factors as control variables. Also, more attention could be paid to the fact that the social roles of women and men in society are different and how this affects the relationship between war anxiety and political activism.

Secondly, it could be investigated whether concerns about other global issues, such as climate change or the epidemic, affect political engagement.

Thirdly, I think it is necessary to also pay attention to specific types of unconventional political activity, such as volunteering or fundraising, in the future to determine whether concerns about a possible war affect these activities. Although in my study I found that in general, war worries do not affect unconventional political activity. But I considered unconventional activity as an index, a group of activities together. Perhaps a more focused study of certain types of unconventional activity will reveal a connection.

Fourthly, it is worthwhile to study the difference between the experiences of Ukrainians who have directly faced war since 2014 and those who have not. It is possible that this characteristic strongly influences the level of political engagement.

In addition, a comparative analysis with other countries could be conducted to see if there is a link between war anxiety and political activism in different cultural and political contexts. While not all other countries have the same experience with war as Ukraine, comparative results would reveal other aspects of the relationship between worries about war and political engagement.

Thus, the topic of the relationship between experiences of war and political activism turned out to be extremely interesting and multifaceted. I have covered some of its aspects in this paper, but the topic still requires further research.

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