The European Peace Facility - Understanding the EU's Approach to Security and Defense

Qualitative Content Analysis of the European Peace Facility and How It Aligns with the EU's Evolving Security and Defense Policy

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Abstract

In the last decade, the European Union (EU) has faced several different security challenges, such as terrorist attacks, military conflicts, and a refugee crisis, threatening the safety of its citizens and interests. This has contributed to the EU's desire to improve its security and defense capacity. As part of the solution, the EU established the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021, which provides financial and logistical support to EU military and civilian missions and other partner operations aimed at preventing conflicts, managing crises, and promoting lasting peace. This thesis investigates the underlying theoretical motivations that led to the EPF's establishment and discusses its connection to the EU's evolving security and defense policy through qualitative content analysis of key policy documents and speeches. The findings reveal that the EU's security and defense policy encompasses elements from multiple theoretical perspectives, with the liberal perspective being the most prominent. However, recent policy documents indicate a noticeable shift towards realism, driven by the changing global security landscape. The analysis of the EPF documents demonstrates that the facility aligns with the EU's current security and defense strategy and encompasses a mixture of theoretical ideologies. Overall, the establishment of the EPF marks a significant milestone in the EU's security and defense policy as it strives to become a powerful global actor capable of defending itself. The thesis highlights the theoretical motivations, ideological shifts, and broader implications of the EPF, contributing to a better understanding of this new instrument and its significance for regional and global security.

Keywords: European Peace Facility, EU's foreign policy, Military aid, Security, Qualitative content analysis

Words: 19,985

Abbreviations

ATT	**United Nations Arms Trade Treaty**
ASEAN	**Association of Southeast Asian Nations**
AU	**African Union**
BMTF	**Balkan Medical Task Force**
CFSP	**Common Foreign and Security Policy**
CSDP	**Common Security and Defence Policy**
DPRK	**Democratic People's Republic of Korea**
EPF	**European Peace Facility**
EEAS	**European External Action Service**
EU	**European Union**
MERCOSUR	**The Southern Common Market**
NATO	**The North Atlantic Treaty Organization**
OSCE	**The Organization for Security and Co-operation**
PfP	**Partnership for Peace**
TEU	**Treaty on European Union**
UN	**The United Nations**

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1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) faces several security risks, both within and outside its borders. In the last decade, it has confronted many issues, such as terrorist attacks, refugee and migration crisis, and military conflicts, threatening the safety of its citizens and interests worldwide (Biscop, 2019, p. 14; 32). To counter these threats, the EU has been investing in its military capabilities and establishing new mechanisms to protect itself and its allies. The creation of the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021, for instance, is a significant step towards enhancing the EU's ability to respond to crises and provide military aid to partner countries.

The European Peace Facility was suggested by the EU's former High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, as a means for the EU to plan and deploy its military missions and assistance measures more efficiently (Mogherini, 2017). Her speech in December of 2017 at the "Building on vision, forward to action: Delivering on EU security and defense" event emphasized the need for increased cooperation in security and defense, both within the EU as well as with its close partners. Mogherini presented the creation of the EPF as one of the ways for the EU to achieve this and overall strengthen the EU's security and defense capacities (Mogherini, 2017). The day later, on the 14th of December, the European Council seemingly agreed with Mogherini's suggestion as it requested a recommendation for a new instrument to be presented in the spring of 2018 (European Council, 2017).

The European Peace Facility came into force on the 22nd of March 2021 with the aim of enhancing the Union's ability to prevent conflicts, build peace and enhance international security by providing military infrastructure, training, and equipment to third states, regional/international organizations, or other actors such as armed forces (Council of the European Union, 2021i). Initiating the European Peace Facility represents a significant shift in the EU's approach to security and defense. First, it consolidates multiple mechanisms into one central facility. Secondly, for the first time, the EU can now provide lethal weapons to third parties (Council of

the European Union, 2021i). Allowing the provision of lethal weapons represents a departure from the EU's previous policy of restricting military aid to non-lethal equipment and technical assistance (Hamilton, 2022, p. 643). Based on this, the establishment of the EPF is likely to have considerable implications for the EU's role as a global actor and for its normative authority in armed conflicts and security situations (Hamilton, 2022, p. 643).

This thesis examines the theoretical and historical background that led to establishing the European Peace Facility. The assistance measures approved and deployed by the EPF are additionally analyzed. The EU's security and defense policy and theoretical alignment over the years will also be examined to better understand the topic. The wider aim is to examine how the EPF reflects the EU's broader security and defense strategy. Qualitative content analysis of key EU documents and speeches is used to fullfill these research goals.

1.2 Research Case and Aims

The European Peace Facility and its practical application are still at their starting stages, and with its establishment, there are still some unanswered questions about the morality and legality of providing lethal weapons to third parties and what normative values the EU wants to center itself on. The EPF could indicate the EU's growing willingness to take a more prominent role as a global security provider. Examining the EU's approach to security and defense over time allows the thesis to explore these topics and place the EPF into the broader context of the EU's foreign policy.

This thesis focuses on the underlying theoretical motivations that led to the establishment of the EPF and the deployment of assistance measures under it. By examining central policy documents, some broader conclusions are drawn on the theoretical alignment of the EU's security and defense policy strategy. These findings are then connected back to the EPF. The following research questions will guide the analysis:

RQ1: What were the main factors that led to the creation of the EPF, and how have these factors influenced the objectives and use of the facility?

RQ2: How does establishing the EPF reflect broader changes in the EU's approach to security and defense?

The first research question aims to illustrate the main reasons behind establishing the European Peace Facility and its main objectives. The analysis will mainly rely on the theoretical arguments for providing military aid. A theoretical framework based on previous research was constructed for this purpose and is used throughout the analysis section. The first research question also examines the assistance measures the EU has approved under the European Peace Facility. Here the focus is primarily on the stated motivations for providing assistance to the beneficiary and how this connects to the theoretical framework.

The second research question aims to examine how the the EPF connects with the EU's current foreign policy. By comparing EU documents and speeches on its security and defense policy from when the EU was first established to the more recent material, the thesis aims to draw some conclusions on whether the objectives of the EU's security and defense strategy have changed over time and where does the EPF fit in these changes. The theoretical framework also supports the analysis of this second research question.

Qualitative content analysis will be used to identify and categorize the key themes that emerge from the material. The theoretical framework will guide the coding process. The empirical material is derived from the EU's official policy documents and speeches regarding the European Peace Facility and the EU's security and defense policy. Through the analysis, the thesis aims to understand better the background and usage of the EPF and the EU's changing relationship with providing military aid and how it approaches security and defense.

2. Background

2.1 European Peace Facility

The European Peace Facility (EPF) was launched on March 22nd, 2021, by the European Union (EU) with the Council Decision CFSP 2021/509 (the 'EPF Decision') to enhance the EU's capability to support peace and security operations around the world (Council of the European Union, 2021i). The EPF aims to provide the EU with a comprehensive and flexible tool to support peace operations, including military missions, as well as strengthen its partners' military capabilities by providing their militaries with infrastructure, training, and equipment, including lethal weapons (Council of the European Union, 2021i; Deneckere, 2019, p. 4; Bilquin, 2022, p. 1).

The facility combines two financing pillars (*Operations* and *Assistance Measures*) into one instrument. Under Articles 42(4) and 43(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the Operations pillar finances those operational actions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that have some military or defense implications. The assistance measures pillar finances Union action for third states and regional or international organizations per Articles 28 and 30 of the Treaty on European Union targeted at strengthening military and defense capacities and supporting military aspects of peace support operations of the receiving parties (Council of the European Union, 2021i, Art 1(2)(a)-(b)).

The EU has authorized a total budget of €5.7 billion (in current prices, €5 billion in 2018 prices) to be used by the EPF for the Multiannual Financial Framework of 2021-2027. The use of financial resources increases gradually, with the annual ceiling first being €420 million for 2021 and then incrementally rising to €1.1 billion for 2027. The EPF budget is funded by member

states, who must make annual contributions based on a percentage of their gross national income. (Council of the European Union, 2021i). Compared to the situation previously, the EU has significantly increased its commitment to military aid through the EPF and its financial budget. (Deneckere, 2019, p. 4).

The Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 not only established the European Peace Facility but also repealed the Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/528, which established the Athena mechanism (Council of the European Union, 2021i). The Athena mechanism financed the common costs of EU military operations as well as other linked costs such as lodging, fuel, and medical services (Chevleski & Gligorova, 2018, p. 70-71). The EPF also bypasses the previously funded activities of the African Peace Facility, which allowed the EU to support African Union-led peace operations (Chevleski & Gligorova, 2018, p. 75). The Athena mechanism and the African Peace Facility financed operations mainly in Africa, which contributed to the creation of the European Peace Facility, as the EU wanted an instrument that would enable operations in several different parts of the world. In addition, the downside of these mechanisms was that they were relatively limited in flexibility and funding, ultimately leading to the creation of the EPF as an all-around more comprehensive system (Deneckere, 2019, p. 4; Furness & Bergmann, 2018, p. 3; Chevleski & Gligorova, 2018, p. 75). While both instruments of the African Peace Facility and the Athena mechanism were repealed and discontinued with the EPF decision, the decision states that the EPF will ensure continuity with all of the arrangements made under the earlier instruments (Council of the European Union, 2021i, Art 74(1)-(2)).

As of March 2023, the European Peace Facility has provided funding for Niger, Somalia, Jordan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Moldova, Balkans (Balkan Medical Task Force), and the African Union. In addition, the EPF has considerably directed military assistance to Ukraine, with a financial figure close to €12 billion as of February 9th, 2023. On December 12th, 2022, the Council agreed to increase the financial ceiling by €2 billion in 2023. The official assistance measure documents show that so far the EPF has been used to the provide both non-lethal and lethal equipment and supplies, provide financing for equipment, supplies, and services, support capacity building of beneficiary's militaries, offer

training and advice, and establish training centers (see bibliography on empirical material for sources).

Altogether, the European Peace Facility (EPF) is considered a crucial advancement in the EU's mission to improve its peace and security capabilities with the objective of giving the EU a unified tool with increased independence in its peace operations, enabling it to react more efficiently to emerging peace and security issues and support its partners. (Furness & Bergmann, 2018, p. 2; Serrano de Haro, 2020, p. 72).

2.2 The Evolution of Military Aid and the Motivations Behind It

Military aid (or military assistance) refers to providing military hardware, equipment, personnel, training, and expertise to a foreign country by another country or international organization (Lanoszka & Becker, 2022, p. 3). Providing this kind of assistance is not a new phenomenon, as different empires from centuries ago relied on providing military aid to keep hold of their territory. Similarly, during colonialism, the colonial outposts commonly received assistance in order to increase their military capacity (Jowell, 2019, p. 6). The more modern form of military aid has its roots in the Cold War period, as the Eastern and Western blocs battled each other in proxy wars worldwide. During this time, it became the norm to send technical advisers, training packages, entire battalions, and significant amounts of military equipment and financial support to the countries at the front lines (Jowell, 2019, p. 6).

President Harry S. Truman initiated the USA's non-wartime military assistance by asking Congress to approve his plan of providing long-term arms aid to Latin America, the Philippines, and China in 1946. He also requested authority to send military advisers to other countries whenever he thought the national interest would benefit from such assistance (Pach, 1991, p. 7). In Latin America, the USA's military aid and arms provision aimed at standardizing the military equipment across the Western hemisphere as well as decreasing the risk of European military missions in the region after the Second World War. The US also wanted to ensure a positive image of the USA in this region in case another global conflict arose (Pach, 1991, p. 30). As the

Soviet-American relationship became more antagonized, President Truman, as well as the State, Navy, and War departments of the US government, called for a more comprehensive military aid program in 1947 in order to increase the American influence overseas and combat the Communist expansion (Merrill, 2006, p. 32–33). This ideology became known as the 'Truman Doctrine,' which aimed to provide political, military, and economic assistance to democratic nations under threat from authoritarian forces. In the first stages of this doctrine, military equipment and military and diplomatic experts were provided to Turkey and Greece to enhance their capacity to resist Communist pressure (Merrill, 2006, p. 35). As the Cold War continued, other countries threatened by communism received similar aid at later stages (Merrill, 2006, p. 36).

The Soviet Union similarly engaged in providing military aid to several countries during the Cold War, mainly in the developing world, intending to erode Western influence and offer an alternative source of arms, capital, and technical services (Cooper & Fogarty, 1985, p. 54; Kirshin, 1998, p. 38). During the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided military aid to a) Soviet allies, b) developing countries with a socialist orientation or an anti-imperialist policy, and c) non-governmental political forces that were engaged in internal armed struggles against dictatorships or pro-imperialist states (Kirshin, 1998, p. 39). The Soviets exported arms for defensive purposes and avoided arms export to parties that would use them to attack others, with fear that this would destabilize the region (Kirshin, 1998, p. 40). The Soviet aid was mainly motivated by political goals, with the Soviet Union wanting to fill the vacuum left by the colonial powers and increase their influence and image around the world (Kirshin, 1998, p. 40). They found that, in most cases, providing arms was the easiest way to do this because, while many countries could obtain economic assistance from non-communist sources, military equipment was harder to come by (Cooper & Fogarty, 1985, p. 55). For the receiving countries to quickly master the weapons, Soviet military advisers and experts were additionally sent. Their goal was to teach the domestic forces how to exploit, use and maintain arms and military equipment. In the long run, this advice also helped establish training units and colleges in the countries receiving aid (Kirshin, 1998, p. 52).

During the Cold War, United Nations also started doing some peacekeeping missions completing 12 of them between 1946-1970 (Segal, 1995, p. 66). During the early years of UN Peacekeeping, the main focus was maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing ground conditions. In support of ceasefires and limited peace agreements, these missions consisted of military observers and lightly armed troops monitoring, reporting, and building confidence on the grounds (Segal, 1995, p. 69). During the Cold War, the extent to which the UN's peacekeeping missions could go was quite limited since achieving consensus was problematic, as both the USA and Soviet Union were permanent members of the UN Security Council and had the power to veto any missions (Segal, 1995, p. 70).

Since the 1990s, there has been a noticeable shift in the nature and purposes of military aid (Cottey & Forster, 2004, p. 6). Throughout history, military cooperation and assistance have typically been driven by realpolitik, balance-of-power politics, and the pursuit of narrowly-defined national interests. In this context, states have engaged in defense cooperation and provided military aid to other states to counter or deter enemies, maintaining spheres of influence, supporting friendly regimes in suppressing domestic opponents or advancing commercial interests such as arms sales or trade relations (Cottey & Forster, 2004, p. 6). However, since the 1990s, military aid has significantly shifted as it is now more commonly employed to pursue more comprehensive foreign and security policy objectives. These objectives include using military cooperation to build beneficial relationships with former or potential enemies, promoting democratic civilian control of armed forces, and supporting partner states in developing the capacity to contribute independently to peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. For example, NATO has supported Eastern European states in developing their peacekeeping capabilities, while the US, UK, and France have supported African states in a similar manner (Cottey & Forster, 2004, p. 7-8).

Following the September 11th terrorist attacks in the USA, there was a shift away from new defense diplomacy and a return to the traditional realpolitik approach. The 1990s aid was motivated by references to human rights, democracy, and the defense of sovereignty, whereas the 21st century brought back the notions of national and international security (Cottey & Forster, 2004, p. 8; Zaum, 2013, p. 110). In order to combat terrorism, countries such as the US, UK, and

Australia increased military cooperation with and provided substantial military assistance to several countries, including the Central Asian states, Indonesia, and the Philippines, despite their poor records on democracy and human rights (Cottey & Forster, 2004, p. 8-9). In today's world, both of these types of approaches are used simultaneously, and countries and organizations have to balance between them (Tschirgi, 2013, p. 198).

2.3 The EU's Military Aid Policy Over Time

The European Union has an intricate history with the provision of military aid and military operations in general. Its approach toward foreign policy has evolved over time, reflecting changes in the political landscape, economic priorities, and global security challenges (Nováky, 2018; Biscop, 2019). In tandem with the EU's evolution from an economic and political union to a security and defense actor, its military policies have also evolved. Over time, the EU has provided varied types of military aid, ranging from training and personnel to logistical assistance. The EU's objectives for providing military aid have also shifted, reflecting its foreign policy goals and strategic interests (Nováky, 2018; Biscop, 2019; Schilde, 2017).

In the early years of the EU, the focus of the Union was to increase economic integration and political cooperation among European countries. Military aid or operations was not a priority, and the EU did not have a significant role in international security and defense matters (Biscop, 2019, p. 82). This was partly due to the fact that during the Cold War, the EU was reluctant to create its own autonomous framework or institutions for foreign and security policy cooperation and action. Most officials wanted to avoid doing anything that would appear to diminish their commitment to NATO, as the US-led alliance was the cornerstone of the EU's security and many member states were also members of NATO (Nováky, 2018, p. 2; Biscop, 2019, p. 82). This began to change after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Not only had the EU have more room to maneuver and deepen their European foreign and security policy cooperation, the Yugoslav wars additionally influenced the thinking that the EU should increase its capacity to deal with post-Cold War security threats independently and not solely rely on the US. The adoption of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 reflects this goal as the EU detailed a

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the first time, as well as stipulating provisions for development assistance to third countries (Nováky, 2018, p. 3; Biscop, 2019, p. 82; Gstöhl & Schunz, 2021, p. 15). The treaty also consolidated the Peterberg Tasks which included "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking" (Hill & Smith, 2000, p. 174).

The 2000s saw a further expansion of the EU's role in international security and defense. The 'European Security Strategy' was adopted in 2003 and designed to establish a multilateral and extensive approach to security (Gstöhl & Schunz, 2021, p. 17). In the early 2000s the EU also undertook its first military operations; Concordia in the FYR Macedonia (2003), Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003), and Althea in Bosnia–Herzegovina (2004). These early operations included the EU starting to engage more actively in providing military aid, sending troops for monitoring and peacekeeping, and training the local officials and forces (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 185).

In the 2010s the training aspect of EU's military aid expanded, with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations directly training the armed forces of third countries. These kinds of training missions for example were deployed in Somalia, Mali, and in the Central African Republic with the goal of increasing the capacity and efficiency of their national armies (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 203). In general, it can be said that in the last decade, the EU's provision of military aid has become a part of an integrated approach, with the focus being on addressing root causes rather than offering short-term peacekeeping and monitoring that was typical in the early 2000s (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 203).

The EU's objectives and capacity for providing military aid have broadened over time. It has moved from a supporting actor of the UN and NATO to more of an independent actor. As with the global military aid discussed in the previous section, the EU's aid has a myriad of motivations from human rights and ensuring the sovereignty of third countries to security and state building. The establishment of the EPF reflects the EU's current approach to military aid and foreign policy as it has increased both the budget and geographic target area of the EU's military aid and operations.

3. Literature review

Military aid has received a fair amount of academic interest. Much of the research into the topic of military aid concerns the evaluation of military aid programs by powerful countries such as the US (Sullivan et al., 2011; Kucera, 2012; Feickert, 2005; Biddle et al., 2018; Staniland, 2011; Darden, 2019), France (Utley, 2002; Gregory, 2000; Vasset, 1997), and the UK (Williams, 2001; Salt & Smith, 2005; Baynham & Mills, 1992). Some comparative studies have also been done that compare the varying approaches from different countries (Burgess, 2018; Berman, 2003). As a broad generalization, these studies have discussed why these military aid programs or operations have failed and what kind of complexities surround them. Kucera (2012), studying US military aid to Central Asia, has shown that the aid provided for the special forces units have been misused by the beneficiary governments (Kucera, 2012, p. 5). Similarly, Staniland (2011) has argued that the US military aid to Pakistan has been unable to re-balance the local military's role in politics. Instead, it has made them more robust and capable of interfering with non-military issues (Staniland, 2011, p. 137). Vasset (1997) has also highlighted that France's military aid to Africa has not increased the security of the recipient countries and, conversely, given more power and influence to local ruling elites, French military officers, and private security actors (Vasset, 1997, p. 165; 171-172). Sullivant et al. (2011) have examined how US military assistance affects the recipient state's behavior toward the United States and found that military aid does not lead to cooperation from the recipient state, and that somewhat counterintuitively, cooperating recipients will actually receive less aid (Sullivan et al., 2011, p. 276). Finally, Salt & Smith (2005) have argued that the British military aid targeting terrorism has suffered from the fact that achieving consensus on the implementation of the measures has been slow (Salt & Smith, 2005, p. 245-246). These studies illustrate that, especially in practice, military aid is often complicated and does not always lead to the wanted outcome. The US, and to a lesser extent other big and powerful countries, dominate the military aid literature. To this point, the thesis is relevant as it will focus on a less-researched aspect of EU military assistance that is currently evolving.

I will next expand on the literature that discusses military aid's role in international security and peacekeeping. Cottey & Forster (2004) have discussed the beneficial side of military aid. They find that military aid can be beneficial for peace and conflict management, for example, in how it enables 'strategic engagement' with one's former or potential adversaries. Military cooperation increases transparency and thus can offer reassurances to others that a state's military operates only defensively and has no offensive intentions (Cottey & Forster, 2004, p. 15-16). Cottey & Forster also note that modern military aid helps countries with no or only rudimentary national military forces modernize and develop their indigenous peacekeeping capabilities. They argue that this is beneficial for peace and conflict management as it can deter adversaries from attacking if they believe their chances of winning the battle are not strong (Cottey & Foster, 2004, p. 5). To this point, Dobbins et al. (2007) have argued that military interventions have successfully prevented conflicts in societies that are emerging from civil wars (Dobbins et al., 2007, summary: xviii).

On the other hand, there are also some significant concerns regarding military aid according to the literature. Lanoszka & Becker (2022) see that one major problem with military aid is that the donor country can not always be certain what the recipient country's political environment will look like in a couple of years. They note that there is always a chance that a previously 'friendly' state might go through a political change where, from the donor's perspective, not as favorable people are now in charge and free to use the provided equipment or build infrastructure as they wish (Lanoszka & Becker, 2022, p. 7). To this point, Berman (2003) has given the example of Africa, where there have been several coups d'états and political assassinations involving African militaries and individual soldiers. This would suggest that aid to armed forces runs the risk of being diverted to unintended use (Berman, 2003, p. 200). Lanoszka & Becker also view military escalation as a severe concern in connection to military aid. They argue that by providing the recipient with military aid, the donor can unnecessarily exacerbate the conflict by threatening the recipient's adversary. To this point, they suggest that in some cases, it might be better to provide solely defensive or non-lethal equipment to manage the conflict (Lanoszka & Becker, 2022, p. 7).

In the military aid literature, there is also a concern about the long-term effectiveness of military aid. Some researchers argue that military aid can create a dependency on foreign military support, leading to a lack of sustainable development in recipient countries since the focus is on security assistance rather than bureaucratic capacity building (Matisek, 2018, p. 269; Karlin, 2017, p. 112). To counter this problem, researchers such as Biscop (2019) have argued that military interventions or aid alone are insufficient. Instead, he states that a comprehensive strategy that encompasses political, economic, and security aspects of foreign action should be used in order to procure sustainable peace (Biscop, 2019, p. 83-84). As the European Peace Facility expands the EU's capacity to provide military aid as part of its wider strategy, the thesis contributes to the understanding of this kind of comprehensive strategy and the motivations behind it.

Finally, some researchers have also focused on the legal aspects of military aid (De Wet, 2018; Hamilton, 2022; Altamimi, 2022). De Wet (2018) has highlighted that international law does not have the means to prohibit military assistance to any country, even if the recipient has known to violate human rights laws (De Wet, 2018, p. 312) and Altamimi (2022) has described how the EPF is circumnavigating the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). A research article titled *Defending Ukraine with EU weapons: arms control law in times of crisis* from Hamilton (2022) is the closest to my thesis topics from the reviewed literature. Complementing Altamimi's paper, Hamilton's article examines the EU Council's decision to send lethal military aid to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility and whether this complies with international arms control norms. Hamilton highlights that the decisions taken during the Ukraine conflict will have long-term legal repercussions while also discussing broader concerns about the rule of law and the changing role of the EU in foreign interventions (Hamilton, 2022, p. 636). The thesis will add to this research on the EU's changing role as an security provider from a different perspective.

4. Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework for this thesis has been compiled from several strands of literature. The overarching aim of it is to explain what motivates actors' approach to security and defense policy, and what factors might motivate them to provide military aid to third parties as part of this policy. The theoretical arguments are mainly derived from international relations research, peace and conflict studies, security studies, and foreign/military/development aid research. The decision to include literature from multiple different areas of study was motivated by the difficulty of finding material that fit the aim of the framework perfectly from only one research area. Both broader theories (realism, liberalism, and constructivism), and more practical factors (humanitarian concerns, capacity building, and diplomacy) are discussed here and are part of the theoretical framework. The analysis sections offers more detail into each category with concrete examples.

4.1 Theoretical Motivations Driving Security and Defense Policy and Military Aid

> "States are responsible above all for the security and well-being of their own citizens. Why then would they provide their own scarce public concessional resources to promote, among other things, the well-being of people in other countries?"
>
> (Lancaster, 2008, p. 3)

The above quote by Lancaster highlights a question that has interested researchers for decades. The answers they have come up with are central to constructing this thesis's theoretical framework. The following sections discuss some of the most commonly put theoretical arguments on what factors guide foreign policy and encourage the provision of aid.

A realist lens of viewing interactions between states asserts that all states exist in an anarchic world order, where power, security, and survival guide their actions (Lancaster, 2008, p. 3). They see that no overarching authority can implement order among states. Because of this, rational action is to always act in self-interest and maximize one's relative power and distribution of capabilities (Wohlforth, 2017, p. 12; Charrette & Sterling-Folker, 2013, p. 93). Based on this, foreign aid is mainly provided as a way to increase the donor country's national power and security. It has been documented that while funding for USA's military aid decreased during the 1990s, the increased security concerns since 9/11 have substantially increased the amount of military aid that the US provides to its partners (Sandholtz, 2016, p. 1071; Lawson & Morgenstern, 2019, p. 3-4). This would fit the realist motivation of providing aid as means to improve one's security. It has also been argued that the first military operations launched by the EU were motivated by the aim of demonstrating to others its capability of acting autonomously and efficiently, thus illustrating its increased power (Nováky, 2018, p. 13-14).

Liberalism in internal relations argues that democracy, economic freedom, and interdependency will positively affect global peace and security (Walker & Rousseau, 2017, p. 22). Liberal theorists argue that democracies tend to engage in fewer conflicts with each other for several reasons. Firstly, they prioritize peace and cooperation over initiating or escalating conflicts with others. Secondly, nations that engage in international trade are less likely to get into conflicts with one another. Lastly, democratic countries are more inclined to seek peaceful solutions through international organizations (Walker & Rousseau, 2017, p. 22). Related to foreign aid, liberalists argue that the provision of aid is motivated by aiming to increase cooperation among the different states. It sees aid as a way to build the capacity of other states in order to promote regional stability, thereby contributing to the global good (Lancaster, 2008, p. 4). Spreading democratic values and norms in institutions is valuable for liberal theorists, who argue that democratic states are more capable of solving disputes without using military force than non-democratic ones (Walker & Rousseau, 2017, p. 25).

Constructivism focuses on ideas and norms' role in shaping countries' policies. It argues that "norms shape actors' identities and preferences, define collective goals, and prescribe or

proscribe behavior" (Boekle, 1999, p. 1). Constructivist sees that international institutions not only make the coordination of actions easier but only can also encourage the establishment of shared identities and norms (Adler, 2013, p. 128). In contrast to rationalists' argument of self-interest, constructivists see actions being ruled by the logic of appropriateness (Boekle, 1999, p. 1). From this perspective, foreign aid can be seen as an extension of the current normative understanding that rich countries should provide poorer countries with some form of aid as it is "the right thing to do" (Lancaster, 2008, p. 4).

The humanitarian perspective argues that there is a moral obligation to help those in need whenever conflicts arise. It states that humanitarian crises must be promptly responded to, and vulnerable populations in conflict zones, such as refugees and internally displaced persons, deserve protection (Lancaster, 2008, p. 214). Following the UN's work, this type of organized international humanitarian action has seen increased funding and diversification in recent times as a growing number of NGOs and UN agencies have taken the commitment to respond to universal human suffering (Slim, 2018, p. 319). It is important to note that humanitarian action is not concerned with any broader goals of creating a political or social project. The aim is not to achieve peace, democracy, religious conversion, or promote socialism, liberalism, or conservatism, only to provide urgent help to those suffering (Slim, 2018, p. 324).

When it comes to foreign policy or aid provision, quite often there are some mentions of development and capacity building of other nations. Even when it comes to military aid, it is typical that the donor party mentions some aspects of capacity building or development of the receiving countries' militaries and institutions (Jowell, 2018, p. 10). Capacity building is by no means a new phenomenon, with, for example, 18th-century lawyer Emer de Vattel noting in his book The Law of Nations (1758) that if one nation seeks help with sciences and good laws, those with the knowledge should not keep it to their themselves (Glanville, 2018, p. 311). The same approach can be applied to the training measures of military aid. For example, a country with good knowledge of organizing its military should spread this information to those with weaker militaries. Capacity building and development (aid) are often motivated by the aim of preventing conflicts before they happen by empowering societies (Glanville, 2018, p. 311). In the long run,

this should lower the donor's security risk and other costs since the recipient party becomes more resilient to conflicts (Chandler, 2017, p. 436).

Diplomacy is also significant in foreign policy and can motivate aid provision. Donor countries can use aid to enhance their international standing, improve relationships with the recipient countries, and influence their foreign policy in any desired direction. Here, aid could, for example, be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations, with donors using it to secure political or economic concessions from recipient countries (Lancaster, 2008, p. 13). It is also a way of gaining political allies, which could help, for example, in the donor country receiving support in the United Nations or other international organizations' meetings and voting (Kirshin, 1998, p. 40).

As has been demonstrated, several theories have been used to explain what motivates countries' or organizations' approach to foreign policy and the provision of (military) aid. It should also be noted that some of these theories can overlap and thus are not mutually exclusive. Through analyzing the material, this thesis examines which of these reasons are the most prominent ones and what kind of changes can be observed over time.

4.2 Operationalization of the Theory

The above theoretical reasonings behind foreign policy choices and aid provision have been used to construct the initial theoretical framework of this thesis. Section 5.5 presents the coding guidelines that were developed from the initial theoretical framework. The final guideline is based on the theoretical framework and refined further based on the empirical material. While going through the empirical material, these guidelines were used to identify and categorize the theoretical motivations behind the EU's foreign policy agenda, the establishment of the European Peace Facility, and the assistance measures deployed under it.

5. Methodology

5.1 Ontology and Epistemology

Considering a study's ontological and epistemological positions is essential since this will guide the design of the research in how methodology, methods, and theory are selected, as well as how these connect. The chosen ontological and epistemological positions will shape the motivations for conducting the research in a certain way. They will also affect what the researcher expects can be claimed from the results (Marsh et al., 2017, p. 117; 195).

A researcher's ontological position refers to their assumptions about reality and what can be known about it. Essentially, it deals with the form of reality, what can be known about it, and how it is acquired (Marsh et al., 2017, p. 178; Bryman, 2008, p. 18). Generally, ontological positions can be divided into two strands of thinking: one that assumes that a 'real world' exists independent of our understanding and one that sees that reality is socially constructed (Marsh et al., 2017, p. 178). This study is based on constructivist ontology, acknowledging that no objective reality can be observed. The constructivist position assumes that human interactions and our interpretations of them actively construct reality and are at the center of knowledge generation (Marsh et al., 2017, p. 183; Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 10; Bryman, 2008, p. 19). This thesis believes that the EU's and other actors' position on providing military aid and the motivations behind the European Peace Facility are shaped by individuals' socially constructed perspectives based on social, political, and cultural processes. As such, no 'true' account of the EPF exists outside our perceptions and interpretations (Marsh et al., 2017, p. 183). The EU's values are defined by the culture and how the Union has historically organized. For example, the EU has traditionally seen itself as a normative power rather than forceful military power (Manners, 2006, p. 118). Because of this, the EPF as a military instrument might seem un-European to some individuals. Other personal or institutional values can similarly affect how the EPF is viewed and framed.

A researcher's epistemological position refers to what they assume can be known about the world and how this knowledge can be acquired. In the context of conducting research, epistemology guides what can be understood as evidence and how we can gather and analyze this evidence (Marsh et al., 2017, p. 178; 185; Bryman, 2008, p. 13). In most literature, three different epistemological positions, positivism, interpretivism, and critical, are recognized (Marsh et al., 2017, p. 184). The interpretivist position emphasizes the importance of subjectively understanding social action and what meaning these actions have for agents. This study will take the interpretivist position as it sees that understanding can be gained by acknowledging individuals' subjective perceptions and experiences. (Marsh et al., 2017, p. 190; Bryman, 2008, p. 16).

5. 2 Research Design

Guided by the chosen ontological and epistemological positions, qualitative content analysis has been selected as the method for this thesis. This will allow for highlighting how the EU and other actors have constructed reality around security and defence, and what kind of values they include in their communication in regard to the EU's military aid. The thesis is a single-case study of an institution aiming to gain an in-depth understanding of the European Peace Facility. The establishment of the EPF is a unique case and as such merits the analysis as a single case (Yin, 2015, p. 103). According to Blatter and Haverland (2012), case studies are especially suitable when the research includes a broad range of theories that need a diverse set of data to be tested and developed. Because of the large quantity, this data can often only be collected for a single case (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 7). As all empirical research is limited by resources, focusing on a single case allows the researcher to take a wider set of theoretical approaches into account and produce detailed analysis (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 8). These points are reflected in this thesis, as its theoretical framework does contain several different theories, and the empirical material mainly consists of highly detailed policy documents.

The lack of generalization of findings is often noted as a significant weakness of a single-case research design (Toshkov, 2017, p. 230; Vromen, 2017, p. 243; Bryman, 2008, p. 391). However, as this case focuses on an institution as powerful and significant as the European Union and a

newly established instrument such as EPF, I don't view the lack of generalization of the findings as an issue in this thesis. In addition, I do also see that the thesis gives a good indication of the broader EU's security and defense policy and that these findings can be applied to cases other than the EPF (Toshkov, 2017, p. 234).

Blatter and Haverland note that single-case studies often go hand-in-hand with an explanatory research design and questions (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 8). This is true in this thesis; the first research question aims to explain what motivated the establishment of the European Peace Facility and the assistance measures under it. The second research question, in turn, aims to explain how the EPF fits into the EU's broader security and defense policy.

The thesis employs a longitudinal design, in which cases or groups of cases are followed over time to gather data on growth, plot trends, or observe the effects of selected variables (Marczyk et al., 2005, p. 143). The longitudinal approach was chosen as one of the goals of the thesis is to examine how the EU approach's to military aid and security policy have changed over time. In particular, the thesis will analyze the changes in the theoretical alignment of the EU's security and defense documents. This will enable the establishment of the necessary background information to answer the second research question of how the EPF reflects EU foreign policy changes.

5.3 Research Method: Qualitative Content Analysis

Considering the aims of the study, the interpretivist epistemological lens, research questions, and available material for this thesis, qualitative content analysis was chosen as the method for this thesis. Content analysis entails a systematic analysis of a body of texts, debates, media broadcasts, protocols, art, or other material that might be considered texts (Krippendorff, 2003, p. 20). Through analysis, the aim is to draw replicable and reliable inferences from the data (Krippendorff, 2003, p. 18). As a method, qualitative content analysis is not a standardized mechanism with the same procedural model in every study. Rather, it can and should be

constructed specifically for each research project with the material and research question in mind (Mayring, 2014, p. 39).

Qualitative content analysis can be executed in several different ways, and the chosen method significantly affects the procedures and steps the researcher needs to take (Krippendorff, 2003; Mayring, 2014). While these steps vary, some commonalities and general descriptions of the process can still be found. Krippendorff has described several different actions taken while conducting content analysis. As a starting point, he highlights the need to unitize and sample data. Unitizing refers to selecting segments from the material that will be used for the analysis, while sampling is concerned with reducing all available material into a manageable amount of data (Krippendorff, 2003, p. 83-84). This is then followed by coding and reducing data into manageable categories. Next, inferences from the data can be drawn, and finally, the researcher can communicate the findings to the audience (Krippendorff, 2003, p. 83).

When it comes to unitizing, Mayring (2014, p. 51) highlights the importance of separating the text into segments rather than interpreting each piece of writing as a whole. The defined categories can then be applied to each segment, making the process systematic. According to him, segmentation should be done in advance of analysis, and the rules should be specified. This enables a second coder to apply the same procedure and conduct the analysis in the same manner. This makes it possible to test the findings and ultimately make them more reliable (Mayring, 2014, p. 51). In the process of unitizing, it is suggested that the coding unit, context unit, and recording unit are defined. The coding unit refers to the smallest element of the text that can be assigned to a category. This can, for example, be a word, phrase, sentence, paragraph, or page. The context unit determines the largest element that can be assigned to one category. The recording unit will determine segments of text that will be subjected to a specific category system. The context and recording units can be the same segment of text. However, the context unit can be broader as some background information can be included from another source than the document itself. For example, in a content analysis of interview answers, the interviewee's cultural or social background can be considered part of the context unit, while the interview script would be considered as the recording unit (Mayring, 2014, p. 52-53).

Using categorization in content analysis is advantageous as it enables others to conduct a reconstructed version of the study, and therefore makes the findings comparable. Through this, others can evaluate the reliability of the analysis (Mayring, 2014, p. 40). In qualitative content analysis, this categorization and summarizing of the material reduces the variety in the material to the parts that matter in order to find answers to the research questions (Krippendorff, 2003, p. 85). There are several ways to formulate these categories and assign coding units. One major distinction is made between deductive and inductive approaches. The deductive approach obtains the categories from a theoretical framework constructed based on prior research. The inductive approach, in turn, derives the categories from raw empirical data (Mayring, 2014).

After the coding is finalized, inferences from the data are drawn. During this process, the goal is to connect the empirical material to what it means, entails, and causes (Krippendorff, 2003, p. 85). After coding and analysis, the findings and their significance are narrated to the audience in a comprehensible way (Krippendorff, 2003, p. 85). Krippendorff has pointed out that all these steps do not need to be carried out linearly. Rather, it is quite typical to have iterative loops where some parts are repeated as means to improve the quality of the research (Krippendorff, 2003, p. 85).

5.4 Selection and Sampling of Material

The empirical material for this thesis comes from publicly available EU documents and speeches that concern either the topic of the European Peace Facility or the EU's defense and security strategy. The overall timeframe is from 1993 until March 2023. This timeframe was selected as I wanted to include the EU's defense and security strategy from when the EU was established to the presence. This will give the most comprehensive understanding of how the EU has constructed its perception of defense, security, and its role in it over time. As the EPF was first officially mentioned in 2017, the timeframe for the material regarding the EPF is from 2017 until March 2023. As this timeframe is relatively long, sampling the material is crucial in order to use available time and resources in an efficient way. The thesis uses the purposive sampling method which selects material based on its qualities. This deliberative choice is guided by the aim of finding material suited to answer the research questions (Etikan et al., 2016, p. 2).

Official documents were mainly sampled and retrieved from Eur-Lex. Eur-Lex is an official site where European Union law and other public documents of the European Union can be found. The site has an advanced search function where filters based on author, keywords, dates, document language, document type, and theme, among others, can be applied. These varied ways to filter the available documents give the researcher an excellent starting point for selecting and sampling the material. This mechanism of finding sampling documents applies mainly to the EPF documents. When it came to documents on the EU's security and defense strategy, sampling directly from Eur-Lex proved problematic. Therefore a timeline detailing the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy over time was used to guide the selection process for this type of material (EEAS, n.d.). (see Appendix 2.3 for more information).

In addition to the official policy documents, I wanted to include speeches made by key EU members. This decision was motivated by my assumption that they would offer a slightly more colorful and informal type of communication. The speech transcripts were retrieved from the European Commission's press corner page. The site has an advanced search option that allows anyone to specify a document type, such as speech. It also allows anyone to further filter that material based on keywords, dates, policy areas, and college members. In the following section, I give a detailed account of how each piece of material was selected. The full list of selected policy documents and speeches is detailed in Appendix 1, whereas Appendix 2 gives specific account of how each piece of material was sampled.

5.5 Coding

Following Mayring's instruction, before starting the actual coding process, the coding units were determined (Mayring, 2014, p. 53). In this study, the coding units are paragraphs, while the recording units are either the whole policy document or a transcript of a speech. The context unit is otherwise the same as the recording unit, but factors such as year of publication and publisher/speaker's identity will be included if relevant. A paragraph was selected as the coding unit as this makes assigning categories to each segment of text feasible since some of the pieces of material are quite long. The analysis only considers relevant paragraphs, so some segments of

the documents and speech transcripts are not included. A paragraph was coded into all the relevant categories if it contained several different categories.

The coding follows the process suggested by Mayring (2014) for research that uses Deductive Category Assignment as its content-analytical method. These steps are illustrated in the figure below (adopted from Mayring, 2014, p. 96). This method is deductive, as the categories are largely predetermined based on previous research and the theoretical framework (Mayring, 2014, p. 97). The model suggests, however, that some changes can be made to coding guidelines and categories after some initial coding has occurred. As such, the initial theoretical framework doesn't entirely predetermine the categories and the empirical material can influence the final guidelines if necessary.

1 Research question, theoretical background

2 Definition of the category system (main categories and subcategories) from theory

3 Definition of the coding guideline (definitions, anchor examples, and coding rules)

4 Material run-through, preliminary codings, adding anchor examples and coding rules

5 Revision of the categories and coding guidelines after 10 - 50% of the material

6 Final working through the material, Likert scale application

7 Analysis

The first step is to formulate a clear research question and describe the theoretical background of the topic. These have been discussed in the earlier sections, so they will not be elaborated further here.

The second step focuses on establishing and selecting initial categories. These categories are derived from the theoretical background and previous research. It is also necessary to operationalize research questions into categories. Mayring notes here that not all categories must explicitly be found in the research literature, but they still need to be

backed up with theoretical argumentation (Mayring, 2014, p. 97). In relation to this thesis, this point is reflected in the way that the theoretical framework is based on arguments from multiple different strands of literature and arguments that might not directly apply to military aid or security and defense policy. Based on the theoretical framework, my initial categories were realism, liberalism, constructivism, humanitarianism, diplomacy, development, and economic motivations.

In the third step, initial ideas of coding guidelines are established. Here definitions, anchor examples, and coding rules are put down. In order to keep track of these, a table is formulated, containing the following four columns: Category label, category definition, anchor example, and coding rule. Definitions for each category are written based on the theoretical background. Anchor examples refer to specific examples of how theoretical arguments emerge from the material. The coding rules refer to how each possible unit of analysis will be coded and what indications there are for each category. The table helps the researcher in determining which category a certain coding unit should be placed into (Mayring, 2014, p. 97-98). The third step is done before looking deeper into the material, and therefore, some information might not be accurate. In order to refine these coding guidelines, the material will be read through in the fourth step. In addition to refining the coding guidelines, the fourth step also comprises preliminary coding (Mayring, 2014, p. 97-98). In this step, when I found a coding unit matching a category, it was marked as such in Nvivo.

Mayring recommends that when the coding guideline is completed (at least for the anchor examples) and around 10-50% of the material has been coded, the categories and coding scheme should be checked. This is the fifth step. In my case, I coded around 20-30% of the material before adjusting the coding guidelines. In this step, all category definitions and coding rules with respect to the research question are revised if necessary (Mayring, 2014, p. 98). In the case of this thesis, I made some minor revisions. The economic motivations category was removed as no coding units matched this category. The development category was expanded to also included capacity building as this theme continuously appeared in the material. The final table is presented below.

Table 1. Coding guidelines			
Category label	**Definition**	**Achor examples**	**Coding rule**
Realism	Emphasizes power and security as primary motivations for state behavior. States are motivated to provide aid when it serves their national interests, such as countering threats from other countries.	"The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory. Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders" (European Union, 2016, p. 7)	Mentions of regional security, EU's power and role as global actor, or cooperation as means of creating alliances.
Liberalism	Emphasizes the role of institutions and cooperation in shaping state behavior. States are motivated to provide aid when it helps to create a stable and cooperative international system or when enables them to promote liberal values such as democracy, rule of law, and human rights.	"European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to cooperating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies" (European Council, 2003, p. 1)	Mentions of human rights, democracy, rule of law, or cooperation as means of improving international relations.
Constructivism	Emphasizes the importance of social norms, values, and identities in shaping state behavior. States are motivated to provide aid when it reinforces their identity or when it helps to shape the international discourse around an issue.	"The EU is a norm setter and has been a consistent leader investing in effective multilateral solutions. With our crisis management missions and operations operating on three continents, we have shown that we are ready to take risks for peace and shoulder our share of global security responsibilities" (EEAS, 2022, p.14)	Mentions of promoting regional identity, shaping discourse or norms, creating European values, cooperation as means of mainstreaming norms and values.
Humanitarianism	Emphasizes the importance of human welfare and the alleviation of suffering in shaping state behavior. States are motivated to provide aid when it serves a humanitarian purpose, such as protecting civilians from violence	"The Council in particular expressed its concern that the gradual expansion of insecurity and its impact, of which civilian populations are the first victims, has exacerbated a situation of multiple crises, with unprecedented humanitarian consequences in the region" (Council of the European Union, 2022a).	Mentions of addressing humanitarian crises or protection civilians.

Diplomacy	Emphasizes the importance of negotiation and bargaining in shaping state behavior. States are motivated to provide aid as a means to get them to accept or argee to certain actions/behaviour.	"A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union" (European Council, 2003, p. 10).	Mentions of providing of withdrawing aid or cooperation as a bargaining tool.
Development/ Capacity building	Emphasizes the importance of empowering states, improving their capacity, and sharing knowledge in shaping state behavior. States are motivated to provide aid as a way to increase the capacity of institutions in other states.	"The overall objective of the Assistance Measure is to contribute to strengthening the capacities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova in order to enhance national security, stability, and resilience in the defense sector, in line with Union policy" (Council of the European Union, 2022j).	Mentions of increased capacity, sharing of knowledge, or sustainability.

In the sixth step, the material is worked through with the final table of the coding guideline. In this step, not only the coding units are assigned to categories but also the recording unit (Mayring, 2014, p. 98). Diverging from Mayring's approach slightly, I will not select the most fitting category for each policy document or speech. Instead, each recording unit is weighted based on their match to each category. Here a Likert scale of how much each theoretical argument is present in the recording unit is applied with the following options: very high focus, high focus, medium focus, minor focus, or absent. See the coding guide for the application of this Likert scale in Appendix 3. The Likert scale is mainly used as a supporting tool for analysis, rather than an end goal. As such results of it are not directly stated. The seventh and final step concerns the analysis and drawing of inferences (Mayring, 2014, p. 98). The analysis section presents my findings as well as their connection to the theory.

5.6 Positionality

In this section, I want to clarify some of my positions around thesis topics and how my background might have impacted them. As someone with a Bachelor's in Development Studies, I approach the topics of military aid, The European Peace Facility, and the EU's broader security and defense policy with a focus on their potential impact on the recipient countries and communities. With the background research for my thesis, I recognize that military aid can be necessary and beneficial in certain situations. However, I believe that it should be approved on a case-by-case basis after careful evaluation and distributed based on clear and transparent criteria. Furthermore, I see that any military aid should be a part cohesive long-term plan that targets more areas than just the military. I do view the establishment of EPF as mainly of positive thing, as the EU now has more of a global reach and hopefully can support long-term capacity-building in the recipient countries as a strong global actor.

As a European myself, I am likely to share many of the values of the EU. As the values underpin the EU's policies and initiatives, I might identify with and approve of them more than someone outside the EU would. I believe that the EU's core values form a foundation for efficient, sustainable, and ethical foreign policy, but that these values must be accompanied by a commitment to actively engage with other actors' perspectives, and with the acknowledgment that the EU's approaches might not work in other cases.

6. Analysis

This section summarizes the findings of the thesis. First, the EU's security and defense policy, its theoretical alignment, and how it has changed over time are discussed. Next, documents relating to the European Peace Facility are explored. Here the focus is first on the documents establishing the EPF and then on the documents that detail assistance measures approved under the Facility. Finally, the linkages between the EU's wider security and defense policy and the EPF are discussed. Several excerpts are included to give the reader a better understanding of the material. The findings are analyzed through the lens of the theoretical framework with explicit descriptions of how theories are supported or rejected.

6.1. EU's Security and Defense Policy

6.1.1. Fundamentals of EU's Security and Defense Policy

The European Union's security and defense policy reflects elements from several theoretical perspectives. Title V across the original Treaty on Union and its consolidated versions, the four selected major security and defense documents, and the selected 14 speeches most heavily align with liberalism, followed by realism and constructivism. Some references are also made to development/capacity building, humanitarianism, and diplomacy (see Figure 2. for a bar chart of the coding references per category). I will next expand on how each theoretical perspective is reflected in the EU's security and defense policy.

Figure 2. Coding chart of the EU's security and defense policy documents and speeches

As noted in the chart, the EU's security and defense policy documents most closely reflect the liberal perspective of international relations. In total 341 coding references were made to liberalism. Liberal theoretical alignment mainly shows in the way that cooperation and multilateralism, as well as consolidation of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, are emphasized in the foreign policy objectives.

A key indication that the liberal perspective is significant for the EU security and defense policy, is the substantial and repeating mentions of cooperating with other states and international organizations throughout the documents and speeches. In the documents and speeches international cooperation has been described as a "necessity" and "mutually beneficial", and as something that needs to be "reinforced" and "strengthened". It is also highlighted that many of the threats facing the EU, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

and climate change are transnational in nature, and therefore a coordinated response is required, as the following excerpt illustrates:

> "The international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on several fronts. Representation in the international institutions has come under question. Legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-making in multilateral fora made more efficient. This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions"

> (European Council, 2009, p. 25)

The US and NATO especially are seen as beneficial partners for the EU, with whom the EU has established strategic dialogue on topics such as disarmament and non-proliferation, countering hybrid threats, crisis management, and cyber defense. Other organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are also among the named partners that the EU should cooperate with. The excerpt below exemplifies the liberal aim of committing to partner up with like-minded actors:

> "One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship. Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world"

> (European Council, 2003, p. 9)

These excerpts highlight the liberal perspective on the importance of establishing and reinforcing cooperation and collaboration with one's partner states and organizations as means to "facilitate better lives for human beings" (Keohane, 2012, p. 127). The previously named countries and organizations are in no way an exhaustive list, as the documents and speeches identify several more partners with which the EU should establish or deepen their cooperation and partnership.

Another way in which the EU's security and defense policy reflects the liberal perspective is through its focus on promoting values such as human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. For example, in each version of the Treaty on Union, it is noted that one of the objectives of the EU's foreign and security policy should be "to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms". This objective is further elaborated in the wider security and policy documents. They argue that the EU and its member states are safer in a world of democratic states. This reflects the concept of *democratic peace*, first developed by Paine and Kant, which argues that democracies are less likely to engage in military conflict with each other. The rationale behind this is that democratic states rely on popular support and thus feel more accountable to their citizens to resolve conflicts peacefully. According to the theory, the spread of democracy should result in a more peaceful world, since democratic institutions facilitate transparency, political stability, and international cooperation (Walker & Rousseau, 2017, p. 23). Based on this, the EU's aim is to promote liberal values as the following excerpt illustrates:

> "We will therefore pursue tailor-made policies to support inclusive and accountable governance, critical for the fight against terrorism, corruption and organised crime, and for the protection of human rights. Repression suffocates outlets for discontent and marginalises communities. The EU will therefore promote human rights through dialogue and support, including in the most difficult cases. Through long-term engagement, we will persistently seek to advance human rights protection"
>
> (European Union, 2016, p. 25-26)

The excerpt, and the documents and speeches in general, highlight that the EU sees democratic institutions and protection of human rights as necessary pre-conditions for global peace and stability. Therefore, in order to increase security for the EU and its citizens, it is in the EU's best interest to promote these liberal values across the different parts of the world.

The EU's security and defense policy also reflects the realist perspective in several ways. This was the second most common category with 248 mentions. As discussed in the theory section, realism as a theoretical perspective, emphasizes the influence that national (or regional) interests, power, and security have in international relations (Wohlforth, 2017). All of these aspects are mentioned throughout the different documents and speeches. Firstly, we can discuss the aspect of partnerships with other actors again. While the liberal perspective views collaboration as necessary in order to find and carry out common solutions to transnational threats, realists see strategic partnerships and alliances as a way to balance the power against other actors (Waltz, 1979, p. 118), or bandwagon with stronger states as means to improve one's security and power (Schweller, 1994, p. 71-73). From this view, the EU's strategic partnerships with the United States, NATO, among the member states, and other countries in Europe and beyond are done in order to increase its security by pooling resources to improve the capability of the alliance to act and respond to attacks against itself.

The realist perspective of power is also highlighted in the EU's security and defense policy documents and speeches, acknowledging that sometimes military action and demonstration of force are necessary. It noted in the documents and speeches that it is vital for the EU to increase its power among the other actors. Especially the later documents argue that the norms of the EU's foreign policy, such as dialogue, diplomacy, and multilateralism, need to be backed up with some actual power (EEAS, 2022, p. 6). The speeches and documents indicate that military and civilian means should be used in tandem to accomplish the EU's foreign policy goals. While the EU is not interested in abandoning its more liberal values, it does (especially in the 2022 Strategic Compass) argue that the EU military power is a crucial factor for its security and survival, and thus there should be an effort to invest in it. Power is additionally referenced in connection to a wider understanding of the EU's capabilities among other actors:

"In this highly confrontational system, the EU and its Member States must invest more in their security and defence to be a stronger political and security actor. Despite the progress we have achieved over the past years, there is a major risk of being outpaced by our competitors: a lot remains to be done for the EU to raise its geopolitical posture. This is why we need a quantum leap forward to develop a stronger and more capable European Union that acts as a security provider"

(EEAS, 2022, p. 15)

The reference to "being outpaced by others" and "raise its geopolitical posture" implies a desire to increase the EU's power and influence, which is commonly noted as a realist aim (Wohlforth, 2017, p. 12). It could be argued that the EU's efforts to develop its own military capabilities through the European Defense Fund and the European Peace Facility are driven by the realist perspective that the EU needs to be able to defend itself and project power beyond its borders. By strengthening its military, the EU seeks to ensure that it can defend its interests against potential adversaries. The following excerpt from a 2018 speech reflects the above aims:

"But if we are to be credible, if the Europe is to live up to its role as a security provider, it needs to make sure that it retains a modern, competitive and innovative defence industrial base strengthening Europe's strategic autonomy. There is therefore a clear link between the competitiveness of our defence industry, its innovative potential and our capacity to ensure our own security. There is no genuine security unless it is backed-up with cutting edge military capabilities which are superior to any systems available to potential adversaries"

(European Commission, 2018)

The documents and speeches do also indicate that much of the EU's action overseas is motivated by its aim of improving its own security by preventing the spread of conflicts elsewhere. The EU's efforts to stabilize its neighborhood through its European Neighborhood Policy reflect this concern. To this point it is noted that "today, the EU is surrounded by instability and conflicts

and faces a war on its borders" (EEAS, 2022, p. 18) and that "by helping our neighbours we help ourselves" (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006). This illustrates how the EU's assistance for others can be driven by a realist recognition that instability in other countries, especially in its own 'neighborhood', can have direct implications for the EU's security. Based on this, preventative and active engagement is recommended to be part of the EU's security and defense policy (European Council, 2009, p. 40).

When going through the security and defense documents, one repeating observation was that quite often, the realist and liberal perspectives overlapped, and needed to be coded into both categories. Mainly this was the case when there were mentions of security concerns for EU's citizens or the importance of defending oneself (realism), but then the importance of cooperation with others and international organizations was highlighted as part of the solution (liberalism), as is the case in the following excerpt:

> "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are a persistent threat, as witnessed notably by the DPRK's and Iranian nuclear programmes, the repeated use of chemical weapons and the development and fielding of new advanced ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles. Both Russia and China are expanding their nuclear arsenal and developing new weapon systems (. . .) Safeguarding the global prohibition of chemical weapons is a shared global responsibility. We will therefore continue to support in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons"
>
> (EEAS, 2022, p. 22)

Moving on to constructivism, it can be observed that the documents and speeches reflect constructivist elements in their approach to security and defense, with a total of 157 coding references. Constructivism posits that the identities and preferences of actors are influenced by norms and values, which establish collective objectives and dictate acceptable or unacceptable behavior (Boekle, 1999, p. 1). Based on this, it guides the EU's understanding and construction

of norms such as human rights, democracy, peace, and the rule of law as well as how these values should be concretely implemented.

The influence of constructivism is evident for example in the 2016 version of the EU's security strategy, where it is noted that the EU's "interests and values go hand in hand" (European Union, 2016, p. 13), that the EU should "live up to the values that have inspired its creation and development" (European Union, 2016, p. 15), and that the EU and its external action "will be guided by a strong sense of responsibility" (European Union, 2016, p. 8). In these quotes, the constructivist perspective is heavily present. For example, the EU helping others described as a "responsibility" can be understood as part of the normative understanding that the EU is an organization that has a duty to help others and think about how it engages with them. The documents and speeches also discuss the exact definitions of different norms, for example, what is meant by fostering democracy, human security, and building peace. As such, they are actively constructing and re-constructing the shared norms and values of the Union.

In connection to this, the documents and speeches reflect constructivism in the way there are various mentions of establishing a common vision and principles to which every member state should commit to. Furthermore, it has been argued that the EU, rather than member states alone, should be the one to take action:

> "In challenging times, a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts together. This is even more true after the British referendum. We will indeed have to rethink the way our Union works, but we perfectly know what to work for. We know what our principles, our interests and our priorities are. This is no time for uncertainty: our Union needs a Strategy. We need a shared vision, and common action"
>
> (European Union, 2016, p. 3)

"Action at the EU level is the only effective approach. The EU represents the best mechanism for its peoples and countries to negotiate the challenges ahead: protecting our interests; promoting our strategic goals; and consolidating a rule based international order for the future"

(Ferrero-Waldner, 2006)

The language used in the first excerpt, such as "a strong Union is one that thinks strategically" and "our principles, our interests, and our priorities" suggests a focus on establishing and enforcing shared European practices, ideas and values. Here the focus is less on the why should the EU act, but rather in which manner. This "manner of behaviour" is a key aspect separating constructivism from the other theoretical perspectives, as this is more heavily guided by norms and values. The second excerpt also illustrates a similar ideology. It argues that action at the EU level and a common EU approach is more successful than if each member state has its own strategy.

Similar to liberalism and realism, the constructivist perspective does also value cooperation with others but approaches this differently in emphasizing the role of international norms. From a constructivist perspective, the success of distributing ideas across borders determines the structure of the world. If every international actor had the same beliefs and understanding of what is appropriate conduct of behavior, the world would be more orderly and stable (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 894). This thinking is part of the EU's foreign policy as it does partner with like-minded countries and international organizations such as the UN. The goal of this is to create a shared normative understanding of values and future policy directions. Furthermore, the Union is interested in mainstreaming its values and norms at a global level. These aims are illustrated in the following excerpts:

"We must also systematically mainstream human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institutions. This Strategy is underpinned by the vision of and ambition for a stronger Union, willing and able to make a

positive difference in the world. Our citizens deserve a true Union, which promotes our shared interests by engaging responsibly and in partnership with others"

(European Union, 2016, p. 11)

"The European Union played a strong role in ensuring that the 2030 Agenda was both comprehensive and far-reaching. And we are equally determined to play a leading role when it comes to honouring our global pledges"

(European Commission, 2017a)

Several mentions of 'mainstreaming' EU values were mentioned in the speeches and documents. This is an indication of the EU's aim of promoting the values and norms it has constructed across the world. The second excerpt highlights how the EU not only had an active role in constructing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development but also aims to promote the Agenda's ideas and values by leading the fulfillment of the development goals. In general, the idea of constructivist promotion of values and norms in institutions is to get others to adopt similar values and norms and, through this, create common practices (Adler, 2013, p. 128).

In summary, constructivism has a significant role in the EU's security and defense policy. It argues that the EU's action should be guided by the values it sees important, the aim should be to transform the global system to better reflect these values, with the help of like-minded partners who should be included in this process.

Coding references to the Development/Capacity building category were quite frequent, with 53 mentions throughout the documents and the speeches. In these references, the importance of the security-development nexus was mentioned several times. For example, in 2006, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the former Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, stated that "security can best be attained through development, and development through security. Neither is possible without an adequate level of the other" (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006). The speeches and documents also connect low levels of human and economic development to

fragility and non-existence of peace (European Commission, 2017a). These views highlight the commonly adopted position of the policy documents and speeches that development and security are connected. Therefore, in order to achieve security, the EU should adopt a holistic approach. This approach avoids relying solely on military or humanitarian action after a conflict has already transpired and instead focuses on development, long-term engagement, and preventative action. The concept of peacebuilding, first emerging in the 1990s, is central to this line of thinking as it considers issues such as poverty and the socio-economic development of individuals vital for establishing the foundations for sustainable peace rather than only states' military power (Tschirgi, 2013, p. 197). State building and improving institutions, in addition to peacebuilding, are regularly mentioned throughout the documents, as is the case in the following excerpt. It also shows how individuals are put at the center of the EU's development action:

> "From a development perspective, we need to keep our eyes on the key prize: the long-term development of partner countries, and the expansion of opportunities for people – especially girls and women, to live a decent life and have their basic needs met. And linked to this, to build-up strong, viable democratic institutions that serve their citizens"
>
> (European Commission, 2016)

The development/capacity building category has some strong links to both liberal and realist perspectives. Quite often, mentions of development were connected to helping partners achieve stronger (democratic) institutions, thus ensuring adherence to human rights and the rule of law. These, as mentioned earlier, are core liberal values. Also, it was clear that part of the motivation for development and capacity building was also connected to preventative action, thus linking development to the EU's security. As improving the EU's security is in its interests, development/capacity building can also be connected to realism. This 'double-coding' partly explains the high count of coding references to realism and liberalism compared to Development/Capacity building.

The humanitarianism category mainly contains mentions of the need to protect civilian populations or improve the capability to contribute to solving global crisis situations. In total, 27

coding references to this category were made. Within the category, it is, for example, noted that assistance packages are given in order to improve to beneficiary's capacity to protect civilian populations (EEAS, 2022, p. 26) and that the EU needs to invest in improving their ability to undertake rescue and evacuation as well as disaster relief tasks (EEAS, 2022, p. 27). These examples illustrate the humanitarian perspective, which argues that vulnerable groups deserve protection in humanitarian crises and conflicts (Lancaster, 2008, p. 214). While the EU shares this perspective, it also highlights that this kind of action is insufficient and needs to be supplemented with more long-term and preventative measures.

The diplomacy perspective appears the least in the EU's security and defense policy documents and speeches with only 17 mentions. The narrow definition of what counts as diplomacy in my coding guide definitely contributed to this low count. Still, there are a couple of cases where diplomatic-style negotiations were mentioned in the documents and speeches, in particular when the EU's support or aid was used as a bargaining tool, as is the case in the following excerpt:

> "A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union"

> (European Council, 2003, p. 10)

This excerpt shows how the EU is using diplomacy and the possibility of assistance as means of influencing other nations foreign policy to a desired direction (Lancaster, 2008, p. 13). While the constructivist perspective values partnerships with like-minded actors, the diplomacy perspective guides how the EU should handle relationships with countries that have different interests and objectives than the EU.

In conclusion, the European Union's security and defense policy reflects elements from several theoretical perspectives, but most heavily aligns with the liberal perspective. The aims of the EU's policy goals vary but ultimately its foreign policy targets ensuring the security of the EU and its citizens, as well as contributing to global peace and stability. Strengthening the EU's capacity to act autonomously now also with military power, fostering partnerships and cooperation, promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, mainstreaming crucial values, and building up the capacity of other countries, are some of the ways the EU aims to achieve this. In the next section, I will expand on how these aims and the theoretical alignment have changed over time.

6.1.2. EU's Security and Defense Policy Overtime

Over time, some changes in the theoretical alignment of the EU's security and defense policy can be observed (see Figure 3). For this chart, only the four major EU security and policy documents were selected (European Council, 2003; European Council, 2009; European Union, 2016; EEAS, 2022). This decision was made as these four documents have relatively the same structure and length, making them easily comparable. Including sections from the speeches or the Treaties on European Union could have distorted the results; therefore, these were not included.

Figure 3. Theoretical alignment of the EU's security and defense policy over time

In general, the results indicate that the EU has recently adopted a more realist perspective and that this coincides with the fall of the liberal perpective. Another notable change that can be observed in the documents is the giving of more space for constructivism, capacity building, humanitarianism, and diplomacy up until 2016 and then decreasing it in 2022. These changes, with examples, are discussed more in the following sections.

As shown in the chart above, the realist ideology has a big increase in 2022 as rose from 12% of the 2009 Security document reflecting realism to 22% in the 2022 document. The foreword of the 2022 Strategic Compass already gives us some indications for the reasons behind this increase as it claims that the EU is going to adopt a more realist perspective in its security and defense policy moving forward. To this point, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission Josep Borrell states in the foreword:

> "The war against Ukraine proves that Europe is even more in danger than we thought just a few months ago, when the first draft of this Strategic Compass was presented. At stake are the very principles upon which international relations are built, not least those of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. History is accelerating once again. This crisis has made it even clearer that we live in a world shaped by raw power politics, where everything is weaponised and where we face a fierce battle of narratives. All these trends were already happening before the Ukraine war; now they are accelerating. This means that our response must accelerate too – and it has. We have taken rapid actions across the spectrum and broken several taboos along the way: unprecedented sanctions, massive support to Ukraine including, for the first time ever, financing the delivery of military equipment to a country under attack and building a wide international coalition to support Ukraine and restore international legality. We now need to ensure that we turn the EU's geopolitical awakening into a more permanent strategic posture. For there is so much more to do"
>
> (EEAS, 2022, p. 4)

Several aspects of this excerpt reflect the realist perspective. The notions that "Europe is even more in danger than we thought just a few months ago" and "At stake are the very principles upon which international relations are built" indicate that, at least in the mind of Borrell, the security and principles of the EU are under attack and should be defended. The reference to 'raw power politics' also highlights the realist understanding of the world that is anarchic and where every state is in competition with each other and thus only interested in improving their own national interests (Lancaster, 2008, p. 3). Based on this, it could be argued that the EU views some of the more liberal measures ineffective or at least insufficient and contributing to the fall of liberalism in the documents.

The excerpt also mentions the breaking of the taboos, including the delivery of military equipment. This is a reference to the EPF as it enables this kind of assistance from the EU to third parties for the first time. This breaking of a taboo then indicates a change in the EU's position on security and defense. This change is clear if we look at the earlier statements. For example, in the European Commission's speech from 2017, it was stated that: "EU funding, in very exceptional circumstances, to support military actors in pursuit of development objectives" but that "this is absolutely not about funding recurrent military expenditure, like arms and ammunition, or training armed forces for combat" (European Commission, 2017a). Compared to an excerpt from another speech from 2022, there is a significant difference in the approach to military power: "The credentials of being a big economy and a strong democracy are not enough by themselves to defend our way of life. We have been harshly reminded that this also requires access to some hardcore military power" (Šefčovič, 2022). These excerpts show that recently the EU has been more willing to engage and invest in the military aspect of its foreign policy.

Later on in the foreword of the Strategic Compass of 2022, Borrell indicates that the EU has been previously too focused has been on discussion rather than action:

> "I have been convinced that we must be ambitious, because the fast-worsening strategic environment is forcing us to act. But equally that we should be result oriented and avoid our usual European tendency to go for conceptual or institutional discussions. It is often easier to talk - and disagree - in abstract

terms, than it is to act and agree on how to do things in concrete terms. This attitude we cannot afford"

<div align="right">(EEAS, 2022, p. 6)</div>

This could be taken as an indication that the constructive perspective is being pushed aside for the realist perspective. This shift is also illustrated in the chart. The situation described by Borell could be taken as an example of the joint-decision trap within the EU, where a change is not likely as each member state has its own national interests, and therefore consensus for any kind of change or reform is difficult to achieve. This can lead to the status quo staying, even if this is suboptimal for the majority of the member states (Falkner, 2011, p. 3). Falkner has argued that crises (such as the war in Ukraine) are powerful motivations for escaping these decision traps and can result in the EU taking more action (Falkner, 2011, p. 8). It does seem that the actions Russia has taken (both in 2014 and 2022), have at least somewhat influenced the EU's aim of adopting a more realist perspective that includes taking concrete action, now also with military equipment. Other factors such as the Arab Spring and the resulting wars in the Middle East and North Africa, terrorism attacks in the 2010s, the refugee and migration crisis as well as the increase of China's influence in the global arena have also been named as influencing factors for the EU to update its strategy (Biscop, 2019, p. 14; 32).

The rise of the realist perspective within the policy objectives is also reflected in how the EU's relationship is discussed in relation to the US, NATO, and other partners, with the recent documents and speeches more aggressively arguing for increasing the EU's own initiative and role in taking action, whereas the earlier documents framed EU more as a partner to other security providers. For example, in the introduction of the A Secure Europe in a Better World document from 2003, it is stated that: "The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO" and that "Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world" (European Council, 2003, p. 1). These excerpts would indicate that the goal of taking responsibility was more of an objective rather than an actual reality in 2003. In contrast, a 2020 speech and the 2022 Strategic Compass frames the EU's role a little differently with statements such as: "it is Europe who should take the initiative" (Von der Leyen, 2020) and "We will also create EU

Hybrid Rapid Response Teams (...) We will ensure synergies and explore further avenues for counter-hybrid cooperation with NATO" (EEAS, 2022, p. 34). In the foreword of the 2016 document, Mogherini also notes that "the Strategy nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union" (European Union, 2016, p. 4). It is quite clear that the more recent excerpts see the EU taking a more active role in the arena of international security though not discounting the value of the partnership with the US, NATO, and other international partners either.

Outside of the rise of realism and the fall of liberalism, the chart also indicates that in 2016, constructivism, capacity building/development, humanitarianism, and diplomacy were given more space in the policy documents than in the other years. This is partly explained by the fact the 2009 document is largely just an extended version of the 2003 document with an added report of the result of the 2003 European Security Strategy so far. On the other hand, the 2016 document is its own work with more room to restructure and add the points the EU wanted to make during that time. In order to confirm variance in the diplomacy and humanitarianism categories more documents should be included in the analysis. In the four strategy documents, only 12 coding references to diplomacy and 16 coding references to humanitarianism were made, and because of this analyzing any possible trends is difficult.

When it comes to references to constructivism, it is quite clear that the 2016 document (and to an extent the 2022 document), discusses the manner of doing things more than the earlier documents. Also, the later two documents go into detail about what is meant by some concepts such as *comprehensive approach, women in peacebuilding,* and *counter-terrorism,* and in some cases note that these should be redefined. For example, it is stated that "The EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, and foster human security through an integrated approach" (European Union, 2016, p. 10) and that "the meaning and scope of the 'comprehensive approach' will be expanded" (European Union, 2016, p. 10).

The high account of the capacity building/development category in 2016 is influenced by the several references to 'resilience' which were coded to this category. It seems that the previous liberal aim of democratization has been at least partly replaced by building other states' resilience

with 34 references to 'resilience' in the 2016 document compared to zero in the 2009 document. According to the 2016 Global Strategy document "states are resilient when societies feel they are becoming better off and have hope in the future" (European Union, 2016, p. 26). However, the document does not clearly define the actual operationalization of resilience.

In summary, the EU's security and defense policy has somewhat shifted in ideology and approach over time, as seen in its policy strategy. Recently, the EU has adopted a more realist perspective in response to the worsening global security situation. Factors such as Russia's actions, the Arab Spring, terrorism attacks, the refugee and migration crisis, and the increase of China's influence have seemingly contributed to this shift. While the liberal ideology have decreased, it should still be remembered in the 2022 document there were close to similar amount of references realism (90) and liberalism (78). Therefore, the theoretical alignment of the EU's security and defense policy is still largely liberal. Until 2016, there was a growing emphasis on constructivism, capacity building, humanitarianism, and diplomacy. However, in 2022, this focus has decreased as realism has taken up more space in the documents. The rise of the realist perspective within the policy objectives is additionally reflected in how the EU frames its relationships with the US, NATO, and other partners, with a recent shift towards increasing its initiative and role in taking action. Overall, the EU's evolving security and defense policy reflects the changing global security environment and the EU's efforts to adapt to new challenges.

6.2. European Peace Facility

6.2.1. The Guiding Principles: Establishing the EPF

To start the analysis process on the European Peace Facility, I first looked at the two general EPF documents: the EPF proposal (Council of the European Union, 2018) and the EPF decision (Council of the European Union, 2021i). I wanted to look at these documents separately from the documents detailing the approved assistance measures, as these two documents give the best information on the overarching theoretical background in establishing the EPF and its objectives.

In contrast, the assistance measure documents are more context-dependent and practical in nature and thus give different results.

The first proposal of the EPF from 2018 has many similarities to the final 2021 Council decision on the EPF. It could be said that the final decision is just an extended, more detailed version of the proposal. In both of these documents, the perspective of realism (16 mentions) was highly prevalent, with liberalism (11), constructivism (9), and capacity building also getting several mentions (9). In turn, no direct references to humanitarianism or diplomacy were made (see Figure 4.).

Figure 4. Coding references of the EPF proposal (2018), and the EPF decision (2021)

The European Peace Facility reflects the realist perspective mainly in it is recognition that military power is a key aspect of foreign policy and that states (or regional organizations) often are prepared to use force to protect their interests (Waltz, 1993, p. 46). In the case of the EPF, this notion doesn't only include the EU itself but also its partners and their military capability. To this point, in the EPF proposal, the following intended objective is noted:

"Broader actions of a military/defence nature in support of CFSP objectives: at present, the capacity to engage in such actions is limited, in particular as regards capacity building activities for military actors, and the provision of military training, equipment and infrastructure. Current provisions on Capacity Building of military actors in support of Development and Security for Development (CBSD) as set out in the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, provide for actions which mainly pursue objectives in the field of development. The Facility will be able to finance capacity building activities in support of third countries' armed forces in pursuit of CFSP objectives"

(Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 2)

This excerpt highlights that in 2018 when the proposal was published, there were limiting factors in how the EU could engage with its partners. During this time, actions taken by the Union were largely constrained to the development field rather than military aid. Now with the EPF, military aspects of capacity building of partner countries can be supported from multiple sides "combining security, training, provision of equipment and direct military assistance, with the aim of delivering a full, comprehensive engagement in theatre" (Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 2). It should still be noted that the EPF is only part of the EU's approach, and 'civilian' measures and development continue to be very much part of the EU's foreign policy.

While not directly stated, the EPF is motivated by the realist understanding that by supporting partner countries and regional organizations in conflict areas, the EU can help stabilize them and prevent them from becoming a security risk for the member states. To this point, the Facility is argued to contribute toward "strengthening the ability of partner countries to prevent and respond to crises, and contribute to their resilience" (Council of the European Union, 2021i, (18)). Overall, the two documents on establishing European Peace Facility reflect the realist perspective in their focus on increasing the EU's and its partners' military power, combating security risks, and acting thus in the name of the EU's own interests.

Liberalism was the next most common category found in the documents. Mostly, mentions of peace support operations, preservation of global peace, and conflict prevention were coded into this category. Additionally, the documents emphasize the EPF's aim of establishing and maintaining partnerships with others which reflects a liberal commitment to international cooperation as means to achieve global peace and security.

From a constructivist perspective, the EPF reflects the idea that international relations are socially constructed and that values and norms should be considered when interacting with other actors (Adler, 2013, p. 121). To this point, the documents note the importance of human rights and gender equality as values guiding all actions under the EPF. In general, the two documents also highlight that the EU has established various laws and strategic frameworks, serving as guidelines for its members and partners to follow and promote. These values and norms can change over time. For example, providing lethal military equipment has gained acceptance within the EU and is now part of the EPF. The above points reflect the constructivist perspective that norms and values are not only abstract ideas but concrete factors shaping the behavior of actors in the international system (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 899–900).

Finally, there were also mentions of capacity building as an objective for establishing the EPF. It is stated that assistance measures should be actions that "strengthen the capacities of third States and regional and international organisations relating to military and defence matters" (Council of the European Union, 2021i, Art 1(2)). This quite clearly indicates that the EPF should be used as means for improving the beneficiary's military capability. As the following section on the assistance measures shows, this objective is regularly mentioned in the documents detailing specific assistance measures and their aims.

6.2.2. Use of the Facility: The Objectives of the Assistance Measures

When it comes to the assistance measures that have been employed under the EPF until March of 2023, some common themes can be identified (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Coding references of the EPF assistance measure documents

First, as mentioned previously, it was clear that capacity building aims are a strong motivator for the EU to deploy assistance measures. All of the assistance measure documents made some references to enhancing the capacity of the beneficiary to prevent conflicts in their regions or defend their territory For example:

> "The objective of the assistance measure is to enhance the capacities of the
> Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) to ensure the national security and stability
> of Jordan through the enhancement of its military medical services,

engineer brigades and operational units in charge of securing its borders, and thereby better protect civilians in crises and emergencies."

(Council of the European Union, 2023a, Art 1(2))

The above excerpt not only shows how capacity building is central to the EPF's objectives but also gives an example of how the capacity building aim is often connected to humanitarian reasoning. In 22 of 25 assistance measures documents, there were coding references to humanitarianism with the majority of these having the specific phrase of 'thereby better protect civilians in crises and emergencies'.

While these kinds of mentions were coded under the capacity building and humanitarianism categories, they share some commonalities with the realist ideology. While it is not directly stated, it could reasonably be assumed that if the regions outside of the EU increase their capacity to better prevent, manage, and respond to conflicts, this also lowers the security risks for the EU. Through the EPF and capacity building, there seems to not only be an effort to increase security for the partner countries and their civilian populations but also indirectly for the EU by preventing the spread of conflict or security risk. One way that the assistance measures reflect this aim and the realist ideology, was the mentions of fighting against terrorism through the assistance measures. By providing the equipment and/or training, the EU not only balances the power against terrorist groups but also lessens the risk of terrorist attacks on the European continent.

As noted in the chart, liberalism was the second most common category within the assistance measure documents. One reason for this is the aim of equipment interoperability as a motivating factor behind approving a handful of assistance measures. In most cases, the motivation behind this is to increase the capability of the beneficiary to partake in the global effort in peacekeeping and conflict management, as illustrated by the following excerpt:

"By equipping the medical units of the non-EU Armed Forces participating in the BMTF with the needed equipment and material, the Union would

strengthen the military medical capabilities of the Western Balkan countries involved and reinforce a multinational military medical unit that could potentially support military aspects of peace operations beyond the region, and contribute to achieving NATO capability targets and partnership goals under Partnership for Peace (PfP)"

(Council of the European Union, 2022k, (3))

This aim of interoperability has a connection to the liberal perspective, as it puts high importance on interdependence and transnational institutions in international peacekeeping. In general, the assistance measure documents also make several references to cooperation and partnership, which were coded to the liberalism category and largely explain the high count of coding refrences to liberalism.

Liberal ideology also shows in how the assistance measure documents repeatedly reference the core liberal values. The documents, for example, note that a beneficiary should "implement a gender and human rights policy in support of the mission" (Council of the European Union, 2021h, Art 1(5)) and that part of the mission is to "assess their compliance with human rights law and international humanitarian law" (Council of the European Union, 2021h, Art 1(3)(d)). These notions indicate that the EU is interested in promoting its core values abroad and making other actors subscribe to the same value system.

A couple of references were made to the constructivism category. The coding units in this category mainly refer to the aim of converging foreign and security policy to a similar one of the EU, as the following excerpt shows:

"The Union and the Republic of Moldova are to intensify their dialogue and cooperation and promote gradual convergence in the area of foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy (CSDP)"

(Council of the European Union, 2022j, (4))

This indicates the constructivist perspective (in addition to liberalism) as it highlights the EU's aim to work together with Moldova to create a shared understanding and implementation of the foreign and security policy. The notion of intensified dialogue also shows the EU's willingness the listen to the other side and construct the policy together rather than forcing the EU's model directly on its partners. This aim of converging security policy was mentioned when the assistance measure was initiated in the neighborhood countries of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.

It was typical that the assistance measures link several different motivations to being part of the same objective. For example, capacity building, humanitarianism, and liberalism were often linked. Firstly, this indicates that actors' theoretical motivations for foreign policy often overlap and can sometimes be quite challenging to distinguish. Secondly, I would argue that it shows the EU's aim of achieving multiple goals by one measure.

In general, I would say that the documents on assistance measures are much more practical in nature compared to the overarching EPF documents or the EU's wider security and defense policy. This of course fits what the different kinds of documents aim to accomplice with the assistance measures focusing on the specific objectives of each mission while the EPF documents describe the more overarching goals of the Facility. I also assume that the difference in the content and the purpose of the two categories of documents also explains why the general EPF documents are more geared toward realism while the assistance measure documents favored liberalism.

6.3. Connecting Security and Defense Policy to the EPF

The establishment of the European Peace Facility was already foreshadowed in the 2003 European Security Strategy document, which stated that the EU should "bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programs and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments" (European Council, 2003, p. 13). This excerpt highlights that the EU had already recognized the

benefits of creating a central instrument years before suggesting the EPF. The security and defense policy documents and speeches express a similar ideology of streamlining the EU's actions and operations. The EPF has achieved the military aspect of this goal by combining several instruments into one. This, at least theoretically, should allow the EU and the member states to improve their capability and capacity to act in the field of military aid.

The thesis section 6.1.2 on the EU security and defense policy over time has discussed the EU's recent shift toward realism. The EPF can be viewed as a reflection of realist arguments from a couple of different sides. First, the EPF can be seen as an effort to enhance the EU's ability to project power and assert its interests on the global stage. By developing its capacity for military support, the EU is on the road to becoming a more autonomous actor that is less reliant on others. This autonomy should make acting in the name of EU interests more uncomplicated. Secondly, the earlier sections on realism have discussed how the EU argues for strategic partnerships among the member states as a way to increase its collective power. The EPF is an example of this. Previously, if member states wanted to provide military aid, they had to do it alone or with partners other than the EU. This also put the financial burden solely on that member state. Now with the EPF, the financial burden can be shared, and all actions can be coordinated, which should at least partly fulfill this policy objective from 2016:

> "We will pursue our priorities by mobilising our unparalleled networks, our economic weight and all the tools at our disposal in a coherent and coordinated way. To fulfil our goals, however, we must collectively invest in a credible, responsive and joined-up Union"
>
> (European Union, 2016, p. 10)

Thirdly, the earlier sections have discussed how the EU is interested in investing in its own security by improving the capacities of other countries and regions. Previously, much of the EU international aid was aimed toward Africa, but the EPF will enable cooperation with other regions and countries. Crucially for the EU's security, this includes the 'neighborhood' countries. The importance of the Union's neighborhood is reflected when looking at the targets of the assistance measures. So far, the EPF measures have been initiated either in African countries

such as Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Rwanda, and Niger or in the EU's neighborhood in countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Lebanon, Jordan, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Based on this, it can be argued that the realist aim of increasing security in one's periphery is being executed with the assistance measures.

In the earlier sections and in the policy documents and speeches on the EU's security and defense, it is noted that quite often, realist and liberal objectives overlap and that in order to achieve long-lasting results, civilian and military measures should complement each other. The EPF is part of this integrated approach, as detailed in the 2022 Strategic Compass:

> "While the Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument remains the main financial tool to support security and stability abroad and should be used as much as possible, the European Peace Facility will enhance our efforts to help build defence capacity, complementing our CSDP crisis management efforts. We also need to better link military assistance with civilian capacity building"
>
> (EEAS, 2022, p. 57)

This excerpt illustrates that the assistance measures employed under the EPF are not meant to be used in isolation but as complementary to other EU policies and measures. Therefore, while the documents on the EPF are not highly reflective of liberalism, it does fit into the EU's broader security and policy strategy that does reflect these liberal ideologies. Also, as the EU can dictate the terms of the assistance measures and lead the mission, the EU can promote its liberal core values of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights throughout the assistance measures. The liberal aspect of international cooperation is also unlined in both the foreign policy documents and speeches as well as in the EPF and assistance measure documents.

The development/capacity building is frequently mentioned in the security and defence policy documents and speeches, as well as in the EPF and assistance measures documents. Based on this, it is relatively straightforward to see how the assistance measures reflect the development/capacity building aspect of the EU's foreign policy. Capacity building, mentioned

in each assistance measure document, connects to the emphasis on improving resilience in the recent policy documents. For example, in the 2022 Strategic Compass, it is stated that the EU "will also support our Eastern partners in building resilience by using different tools, including through assistance measures" (EEAS, 2022, p. 56). By investing in the capacity of partner countries through assistance measures, the EU is contributing to their long-term stability and resilience which is one of the aims of the current security and defense policy.

Humanitarianism is another important aspect of the EPF, as the majority of the assistance measures' stated objectives make some references to improving the beneficiary's capability to protect the civilian populations and/or respond to conflicts. Therefore it can be argued that the EPF is filling the EU's policy goal of "promoting and advancing human security and the respect of and the compliance with International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the protection of civilians" (EEAS, 2022, p. 28).

Finally from a constructivist perspective, the EPF can be seen as a means to construct the EU's identity as a capable and powerful security actor. Through the EPF, the EU is autonomously engaging in the area of military aid, and because of this I would argue that it is the process of creating and confirming norms and values that might not have previously had. Moreover, the EPF can be seen as an instrument to promote and mainstream 'EU values' in the beneficiary countries. As such, the EPF can be used to establish common practices and norms also with countries outside the EU.

In conclusion, the establishment of the European Peace Facility (EPF) aligns with various aspects of the EU's broader security and defense policy. It highlights the EU's aim to improve its own capacity to act as a global security provider that is capable of acting autonomously as well as in close cooperation with others. By consolidating some of the earlier instruments into one central funding mechanism, the EPF can more effectively target the broader policy goals of building resilience in the beneficiary countries, increasing the security for the Union and its citizens, and contributing toward responding to humanitarian crises and conflicts around the world. The EPF is also a representation of the EU's recognition that security, development, and military capabilities are all interconnected, as it broadens the EU's foreign action from civilian

measures to now also military measures. Through the EPF, the EU not only strengthens its operational capabilities but also asserts the values and norms it has constructed in the international arena. It reinforces the EU's identity as a norm-promoting actor that can through the assistance measures create common practices with foreign countries. As the EPF continues to be used, it will be crucial to assess its impact, adaptability, and effectiveness in promoting peace, security, and resilience both within the EU and beyond its borders.

7. Discussion

The European Peace Facility (EPF) encompasses various theoretical perspectives, which influence its operational aspects and ideological underpinnings. In this section, I will expand on the interrelations between the six different perspectives and discuss how these interactions are reflected in the EPF.

First, we can look at the relationship between realism and liberalism, as they are prominent across all the material. As demonstrated in the earlier section, there are several ways the that the EPF reflects realist ideology. An indication of this is the EU's clear interest in gaining power, improving its military capability, and enhancing the security of the Union. However, while this is true, it can also be observed that broader security and defense policy nor assistance measure documents have abandoned the liberal values the EU was built on. Based on this, I would suggest the EPF is part of the EU's emerging hybrid approach, where realism becomes the central ideology but is also underpinned by liberal motives. Here, whether a policy strategy, assistance measure objective, or a single document itself leans more toward realism or liberalism, both of these aspects are present - even if they are not directly stated.

The interplay between realism and liberalism within the EPF also impacts the presence of humanitarian, constructivist, and development/capacity-building ideologies. Historically, liberal perspectives have closely been aligned with these three ideologies, with the emphasis of liberal foreign policies often being on establishing international norms, protecting civilian populations, and building 'good' institutions. However, as realism gains prominence, there appears to be a decrease in the prevalence of constructivism and some aspects of development/capacity building. Instead, at least in the case of the EPF, a more narrow form of capacity building, directly linked to military aid and the beneficiary's military capacity, is being developed to fulfill the EU's realist objectives. The humanitarian ideology is still very much present in the assistance measure documents. Perhaps, the numerous mentions of 'protecting civilian populations' in these documents are used to justify the provision of lethal weapons, which went against the EU's

values and norms not too long ago. If the end goal of the assistance measure is this 'noble' cause, it might make it more tolerable for those previously in opposition.

The diplomacy ideology is very much absent in the EPF, and assistance measures documents. As noted previously, this is primarily related to the narrow definition of this category in my coding guidelines. With the different approach to what counts as diplomacy, the analysis would likely produce a different outcome. The absence is also likely to be influenced by the fact that we have no knowledge of which assistance measures the EU decided not to approve. We can speculate that there have been some cases where actors have asked for EU assistance but have been turned down. Alternatively, it might be the case that some of the beneficiaries have had to fulfill certain conditions in order to receive the aid. Therefore, the EPF and its assistance measures may have been used as a negotiation tool even though this information is not publicly available.

Overall, the EPF's ideological landscape reflects the complex dynamics between different perspectives where it is challenging to define rigid categories. Further research is necessary to explore the evolving nature of interactions between the different ideologies and understand the reasons behind the prominence of particular perspectives and the fall of others.

8. Conclusion

This thesis has discussed the theoretical motivations that guided the establishment of the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the objectives of the assistance measures. Furthermore, the thesis has reviewed the EU's evolving security and defense policy and shown how the EPF reflects the EU's current policy strategy. The thesis has provided relevant insights into the theoretical alignment of the EU's security and defense policy and its connection to the EPF by examining key policy documents and speeches.

The main findings indicate that the EU's security and defense policy overall reflects elements from several theoretical perspectives, but it most heavily aligns with the liberal perspective. However, the most recent policy documents show a noticeable ideological shift toward realism. The literature and the empirical material suggest that this is due to the changing global security environment, which has been influenced by factors such as Russia's military actions in Ukraine, the Arab Spring, terrorism attacks, the refugee and migration crisis, and the increase of China's influence. This shift is reflected in the policy objectives, with a decrease in emphasis on constructivism, capacity building, humanitarianism, and diplomacy, as procuring security and power for the EU has become more critical.

The analysis of the EPF documents shows that the facility does reflect the EU's current security and defense strategy. From the realist perspective, it increases the EU's strategic autonomy as a capable security provider. It also allows the EU to enhance its security by investing in the recipient countries' resilience. Capacity building and humanitarianism are often noted as the motivators behind approving assistance measures. Additionally, liberalism is evident through the EU's emphasis on partnerships and promotion of core values. Overall, the EPF represents a blend of theoretical arguments for providing military aid, reflecting the complex nature of the EU's approach to peace and security.

While this thesis discusses important theoretical alignments and operational aspects of the EPF and the EU's security and defense policy, there are limitations to this research. The analysis

relies on qualitative content analysis of policy documents, which may not capture the full extent of EU actions and decision-making processes. Additionally, the study is limited to subjective coding by one person, and thus a different researcher might get different results.

To further advance the understanding of the EPF and the EU's evolving security and defense policy, future research should consider complementary methodologies to provide deeper insights into decision-making processes and policy implementation. It is important to note that the EPF is still a relatively new instrument, and its effectiveness and impact are yet to be fully assessed. Critical analysis and evaluation of the EPF's implementation and outcomes in the years to come will be crucial in comprehensively understanding its role within the broader EU security and defense strategy.

The establishment of the EPF represents a significant milestone in the EU's security and defense policy as it is taking steps to establish itself as a powerful global actor more capable of defending itself. This shift is likely to have significant consequences for the security of the entire region and beyond. Therefore understanding the theoretical motivations, ideological shifts, and broader implications of the EPF will be crucial now and in the future.

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Council of the European Union. (2021g). *Council Decision (EU) 2021/1210 of 22 July 2021 on an assistance measure taking the form of a general programme for support to the African Union under the European Peace Facility in 2021.* Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021D1210&qid=167960610 5525

Council of the European Union. (2021h). *Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1143 of 12 July 2021 on a European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique).* Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021D1143&qid=167960610 5525

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European Union. *Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007*. (2007). 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.

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Ferrero-Waldner, B. (2006, May 30). The EU's role in protecting Europe's security. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_331

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Šefčovič, M. (2022, May 30). Speech by Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič at the European School of Management and Technology in Berlin on how the EU can be a positive force in a rapidly transforming world. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_22_3365

Urpilainen, J. (2022, May 4). Speech by Commissioner Urpilainen at the European Parliament plenary debate on "Threats to stability, security and democracy in Western and Sahelian Africa". European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_22_8109

Von der Leyen, U. (2020, November 10). Speech by President von der Leyen at the EU Ambassadors' Conference 2020. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_2064

Appendix 1 - Empirical material

1.1 General EU Documents

Name of document	Year	Selected sections	Available at
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)	1992 (Enforced 1993)	TITLE V – Provisions on a common foreign and security policy	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A11992M%2FTXT
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Amsterdam)	1997 (Enforced 1999)	TITLE V - Provisions on a common foreign and security policy	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:1997:340:TOC
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Nice)	2001 (Enforced 2003)	TITLE V - Provisions on a common foreign and security policy	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2002:325:TOC
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Lisbon)	2007 (Enforced 2009)	TITLE V - Provisions on a common foreign and security policy	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:TOC

1.2 EU Policy Documents Regarding the European Peace Facility

Name of document	Date of publishing	Author	Available at
COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2023/384 of 20 February 2023 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Jordanian Armed Forces	20.02.2023	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023D0384&qid=1679605296028

Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/231 of 2 February 2023 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces trained by the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine	02.02.2023	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023D0231&qid=1679606105525
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ESTABLISHING AN INSTRUMENT FOR PROVIDING SUPPORT TO UKRAINE FOR 2023 (MACRO-FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE +)	14.12.2022	European Parliament, Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CONSIL%3APE_71_2022_INIT&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2444 of 12 December 2022 on a European Union military partnership mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger)	12.12.2022	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D2444&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (EU) 2022/2353 of 1 December 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to strengthen the capacities of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina	01.12.2022	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D2353&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2356 of 1 December 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Lebanese Armed Forces	01.12.2022	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D2356&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2355 of 1 December 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to strengthen the capacities of the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania	01.12.2022	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D2355&qid=1679606105525

Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2354 of 1 December 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique	01.12.2022	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D2354&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2352 of 1 December 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Georgian Defence Forces	01.12.2022	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D2352&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2245 of 14 November 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces trained by the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine with military equipment, and platforms, designed to deliver lethal force	14.11.2022	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D2245&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 on a European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine)	17.10.2022	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D1968&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1236 of 18 July 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Nigerien Armed Forces	18.07.2022	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D1236&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1093 of 30 June 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova	30.06.2022	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D1093&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/906 of 9 June 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to strengthen	09.06.2022	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D090

the capacities of the Balkan Medical Task Force			6&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/667 of 21 April 2022 on an assistance measure taking the form of a general programme for support to the African Union under the European Peace Facility for the period 2022-2024	21.04.2022	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D0667&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/339 of 28 February 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces	28.02.2022	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D0339&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/338 of 28 February 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility for the supply to the Ukrainian Armed Forces of military equipment, and platforms, designed to deliver lethal force	28.02.2022	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D0338&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2135 of 2 December 2021 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces	02.12.2021	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021D2135&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2134 of 2 December 2021 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Georgian Defence Forces	02.12.2021	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021D2134&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2136 of 2 December 2021 on an Assistance Measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova	02.12.2021	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021D2136&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2137 of 2	02.12.2021	Council of the	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/l

December 2021 on an Assistance Measure under the European Peace Facility to support the armed forces of the Republic of Mali in conjunction with the EU Training Mission in Mali		European Union	egal-content/EN/TXT/?uri =CELEX%3A32021D213 7&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2032 of 19 November 2021 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support military units trained by the EU Training Mission in Mozambique	19.11.2021	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/l egal-content/EN/TXT/?uri =CELEX%3A32021D203 2&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (EU) 2021/1923 of 4 November 2021 on an Assistance Measure under the European Peace Facility to support capacity building for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina	04.11.2021	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/l egal-content/EN/TXT/?uri =CELEX%3A32021D192 3&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (EU) 2021/1210 of 22 July 2021 on an assistance measure taking the form of a general programme for support to the African Union under the European Peace Facility in 2021	22.07.2021	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/l egal-content/EN/TXT/?uri =CELEX%3A32021D121 0&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1143 of 12 July 2021 on a European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique)	12.07.2021	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/l egal-content/EN/TXT/?uri =CELEX%3A32021D114 3&qid=1679606105525
Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 (EPF Decision)	22.03.2021	Council of the European Union	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/l egal-content/EN/TXT/?uri =CELEX%3A32021D050 9
Proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with the support of the Commission, to the Council	13.06.2018	Council of the European Union	https://data.consilium.eur opa.eu/doc/document/ST- 9736-2018-INIT/en/pdf

of 13/06/2018 for a Council Decision establishing a European Peace Facility			

1.3 EU Policy Documents Regarding the EU's Defense and Security Policy

Name of Document	Date	Author	Available at
The EU Strategic Compass	20.12.2022	European Economic and Social Committee	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-0_en
Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy	02.06.2016	European Union	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0_0.pdf
European Security Strategy - A secure Europe in a better world	19.10.2009	The European Council, General Secretariat of the Council	https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world/
A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy	12.12.2003	The European Council	https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/pages/document/secure-europe-better-world_en

1.4 EU Speeches

Title of Speech	Speaker	Date	Available at
Speech by Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič at the European School of Management and Technology in Berlin on how the EU can a positive force in a rapidly transforming world	Maroš Šefčovič (Vice-President of the European Commission)	30.05.2022	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_22_3365
Speech by Commissioner Urpilainen at the European Parliament plenary debate on "Threats to stability, security and democracy in Western and Sahelian Africa"	Jutta Urpilainen (European Commissioner for International Partnerships)	04.05.2022	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_22_8109
Speech by President von der Leyen at the EU Ambassadors' Conference 2020	Ursula von der Leyen (President of the European Commission)	10.11.2020	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_2064
Seeking security coherence for growth and prosperity	European Commission	12.11.2018	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_18_4042
Press statement by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the signing ceremony of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration with Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary-General of NATO and Donald Tusk, President of the European Council	Jean-Claude Juncker (Former President of the European Commission)	10.07.2018	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_18_4446
"The security-development nexus: a pillar of sustainable peace" at the International Conference "Future of	European Commission	7.12.2017	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_18_3302

Peace			
Opening speech at the high-level meeting on security and development - a critical nexus, UNGA (New York, 19/09/2017)	European Commission	19.09.2017	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_17_5696
The event of the Overseas Development Institute, "Europe in the world: promoting peace and security" (London, 26/01/2016)	European Commission	26.01.2016	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_16_5249
Joint press conference by High Representative/ Vice-President Federica MOGHERINI and Commissioner Johannes HAHN on European Neighbourhood Policy Review.	Federica Mogherini (Former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) Johannes Hahn (Former Commissioner on European Neighbourhood Policy Review)	04.03.2015	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_15_4553
Strengthening Europe security and defence sector	José Manuel Durão Barroso (Former President of the European Commission)	04.03.2014	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_177
Speech on women, peace and security	Catherine Ashton (Former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission)	09.09.2010	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_10_417
Making the difference – strengthening capacities to respond	Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Former European	03.06.2009	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/e

to crisis and security threats	Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy)		n/speech_09_284
The EU's role in protecting Europe's security	Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Former European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy)	30.05.2006	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_331
EU's role in international security	Siim Kallas (Former Vice-president of the European Commission responsible for Administrative Affairs, Audit and Anti-Fraud)	29.09.2005	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_564

Appendix 2 - Sampling of the Material

2.1 General EU Documents

To begin my sampling, I knew I wanted to include the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and its later consolidated versions. This decision was taken as the TEU is one of the most central documents for the EU and includes the main provisions of its external action and the external elements of its internal policies (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 16). The first version of the Treaty on European Union (also known as the Maastricht Treaty) was agreed upon in 1992, and enforced in 1993. The TEU has been consolidated three times: in 1999 (Treaty of Amsterdam), in 2003 (Treaty of Nice), and most recently in 2009 (Treaty of Lisbon). As the thesis aims to observe changes over time, all versions of the TEU are included. The Treaties on European Union touch upon several different topics, and as such, the scope of the whole document is too wide for analysis. Therefore further sampling was needed. A decision was taken only to include Title V - Provisions on a common foreign and security policy since this section was thought to be most closely related to the thesis aims and the research questions.

2.2 EU Policy Documents Regarding the European Peace Facility

Next, I sampled official EU policy documents regarding the European Peace Facility. As a core document, Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 (EPF Decision), was chosen to be part of the material without sampling. The decision details all the central factors of the EPF in terms of the research aims of the thesis. This includes information on the establishment, scope, objectives, strategic priorities, and orientation of the facility.

To start the next steps of sampling, I started filtering documents on Eur-Lex. For the keyword, I used European Peace Facility or EPF (it is possible to choose two different keywords/terms and specify their relationship to be and/or/not). The time range was set from Jan 1, 2017, to Mar 1, 2023, and the language of documents to English. To further limit the number of documents,

corrigenda, and consolidated versions were filtered out. Other filtering options were left unchanged/empty.

This search query gave me 227 results, and thus further sampling was needed. This was done manually. When looking through these results, it became apparent that several approved assistance measures were part of the research result. As such all assistance measure documents was determined to have valuable information and considered for the sample. In the interest of limiting this material, amendments to earlier decisions on assistance measures were not included. In total, 25 documents on approved assistance measures were included in the final sample. These documents contain background information, establishment, objectives, scope, duration, implementation, monitoring, control, and evaluation of each approved measure. Therefore they give good examples of how the EPF has been used in practice, and what motivations were given for these assistance measures.

In addition to the 'EPF' decision and the approved assistance measures, the proposal for the EPF from 2018 was also selected as part of the sample as it details the EU's preliminary arguments for why and in what format the EPF should be established.

2.3 EU Policy Documents Regarding the EU's Defense and Security Policy

EU policy documents regarding its defense strategy were sampled next. As mentioned earlier, sampling using Eur-Lex's search function proved difficult. The main concern was that the initial search query produced more than 1500 results, but still gave no usable documents from earlier years. Because of this, a timeline of The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) published by the European External Action Service was used as a guideline for which documents to choose instead (EEAS, n.d.).

The timeline highlights three major documents (outside of the Treaty on European Union) that lay out the EU's security and defense policy; A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy (2003, revised versions in 2009, and 2012), A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (2016), and A Strategic Compass for Security and

Defence (2022). All of these, except the 2012 version of the European Security Strategy were chosen to be part of the final sample to complement Title V of the TEU. The 2012 document was excluded as it contained largely the same information as the 2009 version.

2.4 EU Speeches

The European Commission's press corner page's advanced search was used to sample relevant speeches. I started by selecting the following filter options; I specified the document type to be a speech; and selected the following policy areas: A stronger Europe in the world, Borders and Security, Defence, Foreign affairs and security policy, European neighborhood policy, Humanitarian aid and civil protection, and International partnerships. This search query returned 100 results. A second round of queries was done with a policy-type speech, the keyword "security", and specifying that the keyword should only appear in the title. This gave me 132 results. Both queries were manually sampled further. The purposive sampling was based on the study's aims and research questions. In addition, I aimed to balance the material in terms of the year of publication so that not all speeches are from the same time period. Based on this, 14 speeches fitting the criteria were identified and chosen. They address topics such as the nexus between development and security, the new security and defense package, EU-NATO cooperation, financing development, European Neighborhood policy, and the EU's role in European security (see Appendix 1.4 for the full list of selected speeches).

Appendix 3 - Likert scale coding guide

Code	Qualitative guide	Quantitative guide
Very high focus	Is the core message, several explicit mentions throughout text	80-100% of coding units assigned to this category
High focus	Is mentioned regularly but not the core message	50-80%
Medium focus	Does appear in the text, less explicitly	20-50%
Minor focus	At maximum couple of mentions	0-20%
Absent	Does not appear	0%