



FACULTY  
OF SOCIAL  
SCIENCES

## **The People's Protest**

**An exploratory case study of drivers for heightened levels of protest in southern  
Peru during the 2022/2023 protests**

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## **Abstract**

This thesis explores the underlying reasons for recent protests in Peru that began after the ousting of President Pedro Castillo in December of last year. The research is an explorative case study based on the thematic analysis of news articles. By drawing on decolonial theory, social movement theorising, as well as the concepts of identity and place, it examines the context of the protests and the reasons for heightened levels of protest in the southern regions of the country.

The findings demonstrate that the high proportion of campesino communities in the south of the country, the collective identity of Quechua and Aymara campesinos in particular, as well as place-based grievances rooted in coloniality, are factors that have contributed to the heightened levels of protest in this region. Furthermore, links to Bolivia are discussed in relation to the role former Bolivian President Evo Morales may have had in the protests. The thesis concludes by suggesting that further decolonial studies of social movements are needed in order to theorise non-Western protest movements such as this one.

*Keywords:* Southern Peru, protest, identity, place, decoloniality

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# 1 Introduction

Starting in December of last year, thousands of Peruvians started mobilising in large-scale protest movements calling for new elections and changes to the country's Constitution, following the ousting of the President. While spreading across the country, the protests reportedly originated and continued the strongest in the south of Peru. This is the starting point for this thesis, where I seek to explore the reasons for heightened levels of protest in southern Peru during the 2022/2023 protests. Through a decolonial lens, I draw on a social movements theoretical framework to examine and analyse the underlying drivers for protest. My analysis is structured through a thematic analysis of some of the media coverage of the protests, and I draw on the theoretical concepts of identity and place to discuss the findings. In this introduction, I explain the research problem in more detail and outline my research question, before laying out the structure of the thesis.

## *1.1 Research problem*

In this thesis I am exploring the contexts surrounding the recent protests in Peru that began in December of last year. In the following section I will go further in depth on the context of how the protests started, but essentially the starting point was the impeachment and ousting of President Pedro Castillo, which served as a catalyst for discontented Peruvians to take to the streets. Protesters have primarily demanded new elections and changes to the Peruvian Constitution, and the renunciation of Dina Boluarte, who became President when Castillo was ousted (CLACSO, 2023). Protest activity has been further fuelled by violent clashes with the police that have caused more than 60 deaths (Purizaca Moscoso, 2023).

My premise is that there are underlying reasons for why people are protesting that go beyond the call for new elections, and that have historical roots in the Iberian conquest and colonisation of Latin America. In particular, I am interested in the south of the country that has experienced heightened levels of protest, and a theme that I will explore in-depth in this thesis is the inherent divide between the capital city and the southern regions. The south of Peru holds the majority of Peru's natural resources, is the cradle of its agriculture and the centre of tourism activities. Simultaneously, the southern highlands are some of the poorest and most marginalised



regions of the country. Therefore, I take this as the starting point to exploring factors for why the south of Peru in particular has been mobilising in these protest movements.

My analysis is an inductive, explorative case study based on the thematic analysis of news articles, and I additionally make use of a variety of secondary data to contextualise as well as support my argument. This research draws on decolonial theory as well as relating the concepts of identity and place to social movement theorising.

### *1.2 Research question*

My overarching research question is *How can the heightened levels of social protest in southern Peru be explained in the context of the 2022/2023 protests?*

Additionally, I aim to answer a secondary research question which is *How can the protests be considered a social movement?*

### *1.3 Thesis outline*

My thesis is structured as follows. The following section provides an empirical background to the recent protests in Peru, looking at the sociopolitical context in which the protests are taking place. I do this by explaining the context around the election and ousting of Pedro Castillo, and how his removal has led to so much unrest in the country. Following this, I contextualise the internal divisions in the country and their historical roots. I also cover debates on indigeneity and the way in which indigeneity is perceived in Peru. I additionally review some of the literature on Peru as a 'protest state'. Next, the theoretical section outlines decolonial theory as the overarching theoretical framework and social movement theory as the theoretical framework that is used to understand the ongoing protests, with a focus on collective identity in particular, as well as geographical discussions on place in relation to social movements. Then I will outline my methodological approach, the primary and secondary data that I use, as well as thematic analysis as my analytical approach. Finally, the findings section seeks to explain and analyse the regional variations of protest within the country and I discuss how colonial processes of marginalisation and repression have led to the current situation.

## 2 Empirical background and literature review

### 2.1 Empirical background

Before I turn to the literature on divisions and protest in Peru, I first want to contextualise Castillo's presidency and the events that led to his ousting, as these are important to the context of the protests. Pedro Castillo was elected into office as President of Peru in 2021, narrowly beating his rival Keiko Fujimori. The election was characterised by high fragmentation, with 18 candidates in the primary round (Carrión, Zárate and Rodríguez, 2022). Castillo's voter base was rural and primarily concentrated in the southern regions of the country, which generally see the most opposition to Lima's centralism (Olmo, 2023a). His win was significant in a number of ways, having previously been a school teacher in a rural community and only the second President to be born outside of Lima since 1956 (O'Boyle, 2023). In fact, he became the first campesino President of Peru (Gurmendi, 2021). This fact is indicative of the deep divisions found in Peru between the elite of Lima leading Peruvian politics, and the majority of the population elsewhere, who do not usually have much representation in the government (Gurmendi, 2022). Campesinos have long felt excluded from Peruvian politics, and therefore the fact that 'one of theirs' was elected seemed like a historical moment and generated great hopes for change. These hopes were also reflected in Castillo's campaign slogan *no more poor in a rich country* (My translation) (Enfoque Derecho, 2021).

However, Castillo's presidency was rife with problems from the start and despite his distinct background, he was faced with corruption allegations just like the majority of Peruvian Presidents in recent years (Gurmendi, 2022; Morales Isla, 2022). His other great difficulty was that the Peruvian Congress, dominated by the opposition, was not on his side. From the beginning of his Presidency, they tried to delegitimize his election through claims of electoral fraud, and seeking to remove him under a constitutional rule when a President is 'morally incapable of ruling' (Gurmendi, 2022). In December 2022, Congress filed a motion of impeachment against Castillo, claiming increasingly evident links to serious acts of corruption (Redacción RPP, 2022) and that he had filled key government positions through corrupt deals (Gurmendi, 2022). In response, on the 7th of December, Castillo announced on national TV that he was closing Congress and establishing a government of exception, in what has been named an attempted coup (Morales Isla, 2022).

However, he had no backing from the police or the army (ibid.), and as a result of his coup attempt, Congress was able to successfully impeach him (Gurmendi, 2022). Subsequently, Castillo was arrested on the same day on counts of rebellion and abuse of authority (ibid.). His vice president Dina Boluarte was sworn in as the new and first ever female president of Peru. Following this eventful day, large scale protests erupted across the country.

## *2.2 Peru as a divided country*

In order to better understand why so many people took to the streets following Castillo's ousting, I will now review some of the literature contextualising the deep societal divisions that exist in Peru. These divisions are particularly pronounced between the capital city of Lima, and regions in the Andes mountains that are regarded as the most impoverished areas of the country. As the literature will make evident, the Spanish conquest and colonisation of Peru had deep implications for modern day divisions. Therefore, I will start with a historical overview of the establishment of the colonial order, before moving to present day divisions.

Before the arrival of the Spanish conquistadors, the Incan Empire was extremely influential in the Central and Southern Andes, providing a strong politically and militarily unifying force (ESSA, 2012). The city of Cusco in the southern Andes of Peru was the Inca capital. With Cusco at the heart, at its height the Incan Empire spread all the way to Ecuador in the north, and to the south through Bolivia and Chile and into Argentina (see Figure 1). While the Incan elite spoke their own language, the majority of the population of the Incan Empire spoke Quechua or Aymara. Rural Incas lived in small agricultural communities and the *ayllu*<sup>1</sup>, which included equality for all community members, was the basic unit of society (Harris, 2007); still an important part of Quechua worldview to this day.

The Incan Empire began to crumble with the arrival of Spanish colonisers in 1526 (Juif and Baten, 2013). As a consequence of the Spanish conquest and colonisation, over half of the indigenous population in Latin America was killed through a variety of reasons such as diseases, by the Spanish military or by being used as an expendable work force; and by 1600 less than 10% of

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<sup>1</sup> *ayllu* expresses a holistic Quechua worldview where *sumaq kawsay* (buen vivir) can only be achieved when there is harmony between the three *ayllus* that are (1) the sacred, (2) the wild, and (3) the people and the domesticated (Sayre, Stenner and Argumedo, 2017)




Figure 1: Map of Inca Empire. Source: Vivid Maps (2016)

the original population remained (Stenner, 2011). The colonial period also saw the establishment of hierarchical structures based on skin colour (ibid.). Other significant changes meant that Andean indigenous communities lost their lands and were forcibly integrated into colonial social, political and economic processes (ESSA, 2012). In the 18th century, a policy was introduced to achieve the extinction of subordinate languages and simultaneously, Incas were stripped of all traditional titles and the use of their languages and cultural symbols was banned (Stenner, 2011). These processes during conquest and the colonial era established two ethnic, class and geographic poles in Peru (McClintock, 1999). At one pole was the small Caucasian, relatively wealthy and Spanish-speaking population residing primarily in Lima and nearby coastal areas; and at the other pole approximately half of Peru's population that lived in the Andes, referred to derogatorily as Indians, who spoke Quechua or Aymara, and struggled to subsist. These populations were located largely in southern highland departments such as Cusco (ibid.), reflecting the heartland of the Incan Empire (see Figure 1).

When Peru gained independence from Spain in 1821, the overwhelming majority of Indigenous, mestizo and black population of the country was denied all possible participation in decisions about the organisation of the new state, while the small white majority assumed control (Quijano, 2000). For centuries, this continued with a small number of white elites based in Lima dominating the vast numbers of impoverished indigenous peasants in the Andes (McClintock, 1999). Historian Jorge Basadre (1978, in Arce, 2014b) has phrased this situation as there being two Peru's; the official Peru located in Lima, and the deep Peru where indigenous people live. These ethnic and economic inequalities and hierarchical power relations have continued and are deeply inscribed in the lives of people and nature of state and society, leading to sharp ethnic, class and geographical cleavages in the present day (McClintock, 1999; Ranta, 2016).

### *2.3 On indigeneity*

As the previous section has shown, a divide has been present in Peruvian society since colonial times, with rural indigenous populations being among the most impoverished. As this also plays a large part in the recent protest movement, I will in this section delve into some of the literature on indigeneity and its specific context in Peru.

To begin, a commonly cited definition of indigeneity is provided by Alfred and Corntassel (2005, p. 597), who have defined it as 'an identity constructed, shaped and lived in the politicised context of contemporary colonialism', with communities being 'indigenous to the lands they inhabit, in contrast to and in contention with the colonial societies that have spread out from Europe and other centres of empire'. Garcia (2020) further sees indigeneity as the articulated identity imposed and inhabited, contested and negotiated by different groups of people. The idea of 'indigenous' as a categorisation of people was created by colonisers based on physical features of native populations, as well as on language, dress and dietary habits, regardless of how these people may have identified themselves (Telles and Torche, 2019). In this sense, it is an identity imposed onto them, rather than an identity constructed by these populations themselves. The notion of racial categorisation also served European conquest in legitimating the sharp inequalities between the 'indigenous' population and colonisers, with the perception of colonisers 'natural superiority' over the 'backward' indigenous population (Babb, 2022). Over time this racist categorisation became embedded in sociocultural understandings as a natural societal classification (Telles and Torche, 2019).

There are inherent contradictions between Western perceptions of indigeneity and indigenous realities. Western audiences prioritise more ‘authentic’ forms of indigeneity over others, favouring depictions of indigenous populations who live in tribes, deep in tropical rainforests and who do not own modern technology (McDonell, 2015). Therefore, García (2008) argues that to encounter indigeneity is to explore how it is produced culturally and politically in a variety of social fields that involve a wide range of actors. One must keep in mind that, like race and ethnicity, indigeneity is a product of various historical and cultural encounters and is therefore not a neutral term. Instead, it is loaded with meaning. In the Peruvian context, colonial imaginations confine indigeneity to the rural with attached connotations of backwardness, poverty and racial inferiority (García, 2020; Babb, 2022), while simultaneously glorifying the indigenous population of the past. This has been prominently summed up in the phrase *Incas sí, indios no* (Incas yes, Indians no) (Mendez, 2000), which simultaneously reveres the Incas of the past while contemporary indigeneity is rejected.

Telles and Torche (2019) argue that in Latin America, language is commonly used as a classifier of indigeneity. In this sense, all speakers of Quechua and Aymara could be classified as indigenous along with the numerous languages in the Amazon region. However, many speakers of indigenous languages do not identify as indigenous, which will be discussed in the following paragraph, and at the same time there has been a decline in the use of indigenous languages so that some people may identify as indigenous but not speak an indigenous language (ibid.). Instead, García (2008) argues that place and place-making are central to Peruvian indigeneity. Here, place-making refers to processes by which certain spaces become enshrined as homelands (Akhil Gupta, 1992, in García, 2008). The cultural landscapes of the Amazon and the Andes are rich and complex sites of place-making which in this sense could be a marker of indigeneity.

Telles and Torche (2019) have further related debates around indigeneity to mestizaje, or racial mixing, where indigenous people may assimilate and become mestizo through speaking Spanish and moving to urban areas, thereby becoming ‘modern’. In other words, the mestizo identity constitutes ‘a cultural and racial synthesis that epitomises the normative national identity to which indigenous people can assimilate’ (Telles and Torche, 2019, p. 1545). Yet, just as the mestizo identity is promoted as modern and quintessentially national, indigenusness at the same time becomes denigrated as backward (ibid.). For example, in the context of the Peruvian Andes, Orlove (1998) comments on the proximity to earth as a marker of indigeneity, embodied by those whose

homes have dirt floors, who farm the land and wear rubber-tire sandals, unlike the lives of mestizos dwelling in towns who are far removed from the dirt and earthiness of rural residents. This sort of racist portrayal further serves to stigmatise and denigrate these Andean indigenous populations, and leads to a situation where urban Peruvians regard those as backward who are easily identified through their language, traditional dress and sandals (Babb, 2022), just as has been the case historically.

In Peru, there is the additional dimension that the term ‘indigenous’ is connoted with those indigenous populations living in the Amazon but not those of the highlands (Garcia, 2020). This is due to reforms in the 1970s that saw the replacement of the denigrating term *indio* with *campesino*, reflecting an ideological orientation that favours class over race (Telles and Torche, 2019). This occurred in the context of the agrarian reform during the so-called Peruvian Revolution, that saw the government expropriating landowners of their large colonial-era haciendas and distributing the land among indigenous cooperatives, while simultaneously encouraging these to abandon their indigenous identity (Jima-González and Paradela-López, 2021). Hereby, the term *campesino*<sup>2</sup> became the new term to describe Andean indigenous populations. The term *campesino* refers to specific sectors of Peru’s indigenous population that are rural, live in the Andean highlands with small-scale farming as the primary subsistence activity. This has meant that many who could be considered indigenous in the sense that they speak indigenous languages or have other ‘indigenous traits’ such as identifiable clothing, instead identify themselves as *campesino* (Garcia, 2020). However, Cusicanqui (2012) argues that due to the term stemming from the word *campo*, or countryside, and its association with a livelihood based on farming, it excludes the Quechua and Aymara speaking populations in cities, who instead are more likely to refer to themselves as *mestizo*.

## 2.4 Peru as a ‘Protest State’

Having contextualised societal divisions and debates surrounding indigeneity, I will now review some of the literature surrounding protest in Peru in order to contextualise the 2022/2023 protests. As is the case in many Latin American countries, in Peru protest is a prevalent means of expressing

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<sup>2</sup> In English language literature, *campesino* is usually translated to peasant, however I am choosing not to use this term as I personally perceive it to be pejorative and have negative connotations. Therefore going forward I will use the term *campesino* unless I am directly referencing literature that uses the term peasant

dissatisfaction with the government. In this sense, Peru can be seen as a so called ‘Protest State’, a term used by Moseley (2018) in the title of his book on protest in Latin America. To begin, a commonly cited definition of protest is that of Tilly and Tarrow (2006, in Moseley, 2018, p. 39), who define it as the use of disruptive, extra-institutional techniques by actors who seek to make a particular claim, in which governments emerge as targets, initiators or third parties of those claims.

As a region, Latin America has the highest rates of social inequality in the world, involving income inequality as well as unequal access to public goods and political decision making (Burchardt and Dietz, 2014). Some reasons for inequalities can be connected to globalisation, including the trend of privatisation that has seen the loss of social safety nets and subsidies put into place during periods of state-led development (Almeida and Ulate, 2015). Under the Washington Consensus, countries like Peru adopted structural adjustment programs that opened the region up to foreign investment, as well as accelerated the privatisation of state enterprises and services (Ranta, 2016; Smart, 2020). In Peru this occurred during the 1990s, in particular with the implementation of a neoliberal Constitution in 1993, that sought to establish a legal framework for the implementation of neoliberal policies (Fajardo, 2002). This also led to great expansions of the extractivist development model (Bebbington 2015; Svampa, 2019). In line with this, Former President Alan García has portrayed Peru’s countryside as ‘a space to be colonised in order to extract and profit from the natural resources embedded in the fields and forests thought of as occupied by technologically backward indigenous and mestizo small-scale farmers who are, quite simply, in the way’ (Bebbington, 2009, p. 13). Subsequently, Peru has seen rising numbers of conflicts in opposition to extractivism, with mobilisations against resource extraction being the most common type of protest in Peru today (Arce, 2014b). Opposers to extractivism highlight dramatically worsening inequality, and while Lima and urban coastal regions have prospered, rural highland and Amazonian regions have been left further behind despite being the areas where most natural resources are located (Eaton, 2017). While neoliberal extractivism is the reason for a number of localised resource conflicts, conflict in Peru goes far beyond localised issues as I will demonstrate with the 2022/2023 protests.

Historically, Peru has been characterised by unstable democracies, constantly transitioning between democratic and military governments during the 20th century. Governments have been extremely unstable, and Peru’s first 50 years of independence saw 33 presidents, the majority of whom were military officers that usually collaborated with the elite (McClintock, 1999). Political



parties have historically been weakly institutionalised, therefore political elites set policies to advance the interests of their own circles rather than the nation as a whole, which only led to the endurance of cleavages in society (ibid.).

Presently, Peru is still characterised by weak political parties, with Arce and Vera (2022) highlighting the poor quality of parties and representative institutions, and the ensuing electoral volatility. Furthermore, the country has had six presidents since 2016 (Marcelo, 2022), and the political landscape is dominated by a broad variety of political outsiders with little or no experience in government (Arce and Vera, 2022). This helps explain the emergence of protest as a vital form of political expression of discontent, as weak political parties make it impossible to achieve desired outcomes through institutional channels and create incentives to use protest as an instrument to influence those in power and effect political change (Arce, 2014a; Moseley, 2018). Therefore, Moseley (2018, p. 9) maintains that it is ‘the ineffectiveness of formal democratic institutions in many Latin American contexts, which are often characterised by high levels of corruption, executive dominance, and weakly institutionalised party systems, that reduces citizens’ faith in formal vehicles for representation’. This is one reason for high levels of protest mobilisations in Latin American democracies such as Peru, compared to Western countries that typically have a greater reliance on, and confidence in, political institutions.

According to Himley (2017), Peru presents an intriguing case for studying protest movements. This is because, compared to its neighbouring countries, research often portrays Peru as an example of political quietism, with low levels of protest mobilisations that remain scattered and of little national importance in comparison with national-level movements of its neighbouring countries Bolivia and Ecuador, which have received much more scholarly attention (Arce, 2014a). However, protest action is rife in Peru and in 2020 the country had the sixth-highest number of anti-government demonstration events in the Latin American region (Goos, 2020).

In studying protest in Peru, two broad cycles can be observed since Peru’s transition to democracy in 1979 (Congress, 2023). One was during the early 1980s that saw the proliferation of protest during a period of economic decline and increasing political violence, with the second wave beginning after the turn of the century during a period of economic expansion (Almeida and Ulate, 2015). Toche (2003, p. 136) views this wave of protests in Peru as a social movement that is exhausted in its immediate demands, that has developed away from politics and is more focused on

social issues. Almeida and Ulate (2015) see protests as geographically dispersed throughout the country and centred on specific regional demands of the populations, usually related to extractive activities or against elected officials and outcomes of elections. Yet, Arce (2014a) argues that the subnational dispersion of protests should not underestimate the effects that these mobilisations can have on national politics. Miller (2000, p. 15) additionally argues that there is a lack of literature on the interactions of local mobilising efforts with broader-scale processes. I believe that the grievances of impoverished populations have culminated in the 2022/2023 protests that have a place-based context but have successfully mobilised on a much larger, national scale, as I will demonstrate below.

In Bolivia and Ecuador mobilisation of indigenous organisations has played an important role in securing constitutional reforms which have incorporated ethnic demands (Fajardo, 2002). However, historically, indigenous identities in Peru have not seen the same politicisation as in neighbouring countries, and have instead been undervalued and described as marginal (García, 2008; Felix, 2008). Even though indigenous and campesino people make up a significant percentage of Peru's population, the country has historically seen a lack of political representation of these nations (Jima-González and Paradela-López, 2021), and an absence of nationally organised indigenous movements (Raymond and Arce, 2013). Fajardo (2002) argues that this sort of mobilisation has been absent due to the context of political violence that has affected Peruvian campesino communities in recent history. This has been attributed by Jimá-González and Paradela-López (2021) to the actions of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), that worked to repress indigenous identities and severely compromised alternative politics in Peru's rural areas. Sendero Luminoso was a Maoist armed guerrilla group that came to prominence in the southern Peruvian highlands around Ayacucho and started a civil war that lasted over a decade and resulted in more than 70,000 mainly campesino casualties (Svampa, 2021; McClintock, 2001; Jimá-González and Paradela-López, 2021). Violence disproportionately affected those living in rural regions of the south, as this was where Sendero Luminoso had established its stronghold, and two-thirds of those killed were Quechua speakers (Arce, 2014b). Therefore, campesinos may not have collectively mobilised due to fears of repercussions. However, Raymond and Arce (2013) argue that in recent years, indigenous activists have become more politically active and organised and have brought their issues to the attention of political parties.

The majority of protest movements in Peru are nonviolent, and are focused on disruptive protest such as road blockades, but when violence does occur it is usually at the hands of police, most commonly in forms such as use of tear gas, rubber bullets as well as live ammunition, and beatings (Almeida and Ulate, 2015). This police repression during protests demonstrates that citizens' right to free expression and protest is not well protected (Denissen, van Dun, and Koonings, 2004). State repression of protest mobilisations is a form of political control with the purpose of preventing or diminishing direct challenges to social, cultural and political power of the State (Almeida and Ulate, 2015). The criminalisation of protest (Svampa, 2006) has involved the dismissal of protesters as criminals and even terrorists, with this discourse being used to justify the use of force by the State against protesters despite their constitutional right to protest (Cuba and Salcedo, 2017). I will also demonstrate the criminalisation of protest during the 2022/2023 protests, both in some of the perceptions on those protesting, as well as in the use of violence by the police that has led to the death of at least 49 protesters (Purizaca Moscoso, 2023).

Arce (2014a) argues that studies of protest have a tendency to generalise a country's protest movements, concealing significant heterogeneity and complexity within countries, which is problematic when there are large variations in patterns of mobilisation across subnational boundaries. To demonstrate this, he found that departments situated in the southern highlands of Peru experience more protest than other regions (ibid.). In line with this, Almeida and Ulate (2015) analysed various datasets on protests in Peru and also found the southern region to be the geographic area with the greatest number of mobilisations. Therefore, as argued by Arce (2014a, p. 14), 'the Peruvian case represents an ideal laboratory to explore the factors that influence the variation of popular contention across space and time'. This is the starting point for this thesis, that also demonstrates heightened levels of protest in southern Peru during the 2022/2023 protests, but builds on this to explore the reasons for heightened levels of protest in the south.

### **3 Theoretical framework and key concepts**

#### *3.1 Coloniality and decolonial theory*

Decolonial perspectives are counter-hegemonic insofar as they are articulated from below and alongside social movements, and ought to be ethically committed to those who have been historically excluded (Fúnez-Flores, 2022, p. 172).

My overarching theoretical approach is decolonial, as I argue that the current protests should be understood from a decolonial perspective, due to processes specific to a history of coloniality that cannot be understood through an application of theoretical frameworks developed by Western scholarship and in Western contexts. Therefore, I will demonstrate how the 2022/2023 protests are best understood from a decolonial perspective and how the structural reasons that have culminated in these protests are deeply rooted in coloniality.

Quijano (2007) has stated that with the conquest of Latin America began the constitution of a new world order that has culminated in a global power covering the entire planet, and a concentration of this planet's resources under the control and benefit of a small white/Western minority. This world order is still in place today, with Europeans and North American's being the principal beneficiaries (ibid.). Colonialism does not equal coloniality and while colonialism in the sense of direct domination by Europeans ended with independence, coloniality refers to the underlying logic of colonialism and lives on as the most general form of domination in the world, as can be seen in that the large majority of exploited or discriminated against are those of formerly colonised nations (Quijano, 2007; Mignolo, 2021). Coloniality also unveils the imperial dimension of Western knowledge in the past 500 years (Mignolo, 2011) that has led to its portrayal as universal knowledge, and the silencing of alternative knowledges (Quijano, 2007). Modernity and coloniality cannot be separated from each other as 'modernity' is deeply imbricated in the structures of European colonial domination over the rest of the world (Bhambra, 2014). In other words, modernity and coloniality are two sides of the same coin and modernity performs itself by hiding its darker underside that is coloniality (Fúnez-Flores, 2022). Eurocentricity also gave way to the imposition of racial criteria as a social classification of the world population, which was a way of

granting legitimacy to the relations of domination imposed by colonialism (Quijano, 2000; 2007), as I have discussed above.

In Latin America, colonisation was accompanied by a massive extermination of native populations who were used as an expendable labour force, leading to the destruction of entire societies and cultures such as the Inca (Quijano, 2007). This also worked to frame the remaining native population as a 'peasant subculture' through denigration of their languages and cultural practices (ibid.). Colonisers expropriated those cultural elements or discoveries of colonised peoples that would benefit the development of European capitalism, while repressing the colonised from their own forms of knowledge production and forcing them to learn the dominating culture, stripping them of their intellectual legacy (Quijano, 2000).

Decolonialism as a theoretical concept emerged from the work of (diasporic) South American scholars, such as Quijano, Mignolo and Escobar, and argues that coloniality started with the Iberian conquest of South America in the 15th century (Bhambra, 2014). Decolonial theory has its point of origination in the 'third world' and is a de-linking from major Western narratives (Mignolo, 2011). It is also a critique of postcolonialism that is more easily endorsed by Western intellectuals as it writes about the legacies of colonialism rather than confronting the lived realities of coloniality (Mignolo, 2011; Noxolo, 2017b). In this way, decolonial theory is a more radical challenge to the modern/colonial world order and is linked more directly with protest and confrontations with existing practices (Noxolo, 2017a). As Noxolo (2017a, p. 342) puts it, decolonialism is 'an epistemic challenge to colonialist thinking, with an emphasis on radical delinking from sources of ongoing inequalities that have deep historical roots in European imperialism but are continually re-staged and re-routed through continuing and deepening inequalities brought about through neoliberalism'. In other words, decolonialism is about delinking from Western worldviews that only serve to deepen the inequalities that have been built up on the basis of racism and Western superiority. Here, Noxolo (2017a) also makes evident the links between coloniality and neoliberalism in the sense that coloniality continues to impoverish formerly colonised populations through the neoliberal development model that has manifested itself through inequality and the exclusion of vast sectors of the population (Svampa, 2006). This is because neoliberalism is incompatible with alternative worldviews that are not based on economic growth, and hereby the proliferation of this Western development model shows the colonial underside of modernity.

Decolonial theory is heavily informed by everyday practices of indigenous peoples and Mignolo argues that the decolonisation of knowledge involves acknowledgement and recognition of those forms and practices of knowledge that have previously been denied by the dominance of particular ways of thinking, or supposed ‘universal knowledge’ (Bhabra, 2014; Mignolo 2009). Supposed universal knowledge has become hegemonic while systematically invalidating and excluding other knowledges from conceptual space that do not bend to Western epistemic regulations (Fúnez-Flores, 2022; Mignolo, 2021). In light of this, the decolonial turn encourages re-thinking the world from other perspectives, from Indigenous places and from marginalised academia in the Global South (Radcliffe, 2017).

### *3.2 Social movement theory*

‘Social movements are about the transformation of many of the practices of development and modernity, about the envisioning and reconstruction of social orders, perhaps alternative modernities or different modes of historicity’ (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992, p. 82)

I have chosen social movement theory as a starting point for the theoretical analysis of the 2022/2023 protests, but build on decolonial scholarship to argue that there is a lack of theorising from non-Western viewpoints. However, this sort of theorising is greatly needed to explain non-Western social movements such as the one under study. Therefore, as part of my decolonial approach, I outline established social movement theorising and attempt to build on it with the concepts of identity and place, that I argue are key to the context of my case study as well as to providing an alternative viewpoint on social movements.

The theoretical concept of a social movement has been defined by commonly cited Diani (1992, p. 13) as ‘a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity’. Social movements involve collective action, voicing demands for fundamental change in the political or economic arrangement of a society (Olzak, 2004). An alternative definition of a social movement is provided by Leitner et al. (2008, p. 157), who define it as ‘concerted, counter hegemonic social and political action, in which differently positioned participants come together to challenge the dominant systems of authority in order to promote and enact alternative imaginaries’.

Social movement theory attempts to explain the origins, growth, decline, and/or outcomes of social movements (Staggenborg, 2005). Two main approaches in social movement theory have been coined the (North) American, or resource mobilisation (RMT), and the European, or new social movement (NSM), theories (ibid.). RMT analyses the sociopolitical conditions that enable movement mobilisation and views organisation as critical to the emergence and maintenance of movements (ibid.). These kinds of social movements are characterised by traditional actors who struggled for control of the State, particularly the working class and revolutionaries (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992). Munck (2020) criticises RMT for its ethnocentric grounding in US realities and its subsequent lack of applicability to other contexts.

In this context, European theorists developed the NSM approach that read previous social movement theorising as dominated by a focus on class and labour struggles as opposed to other struggles (Almeida and Ulate, 2015), and are seen as challenging the State's economic and political models (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992). NSM scholars argue that the era of division of political space into two clearly demarcated camps of bourgeoisie and proletariat is being left behind, with a multiplicity of social actors establishing their presence (ibid.). NSM theory therefore shifts attention away from organised labour movements, emphasising the emergence of movements from everyday life (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Staggenborg, 2005). It explores new kinds of movements spanning from LGBTQ+ rights to environmental and indigenous movements. However, NSM theory has been criticised for its eurocentricity (Buechler, 2022; Munck, 2020).

As demonstrated, much social movement theory has been developed through studies of movements in Western countries, but research is increasingly conducted in other parts of the world (Staggenborg, 2005). In studying Latin America, there has been a tendency to import theory, such as mirroring Western views of the world and applying them to very different local contexts, resulting in a mismatch between theory and national reality (Munck, 2020; Buechler, 2022). Both RMT and NSM have been perceived as 'cultural imports' in the Latin American context and Munck (2020) has criticised their lack of applicability to a Latin American context. NSM theorists find most Latin American movements since the 1980s as novel in their aims, therefore requiring novel theorising to make sense of them (Almeida and Ulate, 2015). For this reason, Munck (2020, p. 27) argues, as part of the decolonial turn, the importance of developing a Latin American perspective that prioritises the actually existing social transformation processes on the ground.

Indeed, Latin America has generated internationally significant social movements and may provide global lessons on approaching the study of social movements (Munck, 2020). Almeida and Ulate (2015) contend that a combination of historically grounded political sociology and political economy approaches accounts better for theorising Latin American social movements. Here, explanations rooted in political economy focus on the structural and unequal relations in which people's lives are embedded, while the political sociology frame looks at characteristics of the movements (ibid.). Munck (2020, p. 29) further advocates for a 'cultural political economy perspective', where culture is interwoven with the political economy approach by adding an element of ascribing meaning to social life.

Almeida and Ulate (2015) link mass mobilisations in Latin America to the rise of leftist governments, where street politics have been converted into successful electoral outcomes, as seen through the first 'Pink Tide'<sup>3</sup> that saw the emergence of left-leaning regimes in many Latin American countries. However, Munck (2020) argues that there has been a decline of mass social movements and a shift toward direct protest action such as local uprisings. This is in line with Touraine (1987, in Escobar and Alvarez, 1992), who has argued that most forms of collective mobilisation in Latin America are not social movements per se, rather they are struggles for greater political participation. These are based largely on newly forged or newly activated collective identities and thereby quite different from class-derived material interests of earlier social movements (Almeida and Ulate, 2015).

In line with this, Munck (2020) argues that indigenous movements are seen to symbolise the new social movement ethos in Latin America. Yet, while indigenous movements have been commonly put in the category of new social movements, they in fact have long historical roots and may be incompatible with NSM theorising (Almeida and Ulate, 2015; Munck, 2020). Going off the prior debates, indigenous movements would be much better explained through theorising that is built on the local context. Felix (2008, p. 310) argues that indigenous movements have become 'important political actors in the resistance against processes of globalisation and homogenisation, advancing principles and proposals different from those of old social movements'. This demonstrates the need for alternative, decolonial theorising in order to make sense of indigenous

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<sup>3</sup> Pink Tide is the name given to the phenomenon of the emergence of leftist governments in a number of Latin America's countries, with the term first being used following the victory of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998 (Lievesley, 2009)



movements. Indigenous movements have placed the state under interrogation, questioning whether the nation-state as it has been constructed with its colonialist origins can properly represent all citizens (Munck, 2020).

In relation to indigenous movements, Munck (2020) has additionally highlighted peasant mobilisation as being at the forefront of recent social movements in Latin America. These movements represent localised everyday struggles for ethnic and social identity (*ibid.*). Munck (2020, p. 42) argues that while some analysts have predicted ‘the death of the peasantry’, we are actually witnessing a resurgence of rural based social movements. Escobar and Alvarez (1992) highlight peasant movements of an indigenous nature, that are characterised by demands for ethnic autonomy, class transformation and affirmation of citizenship. Peasant and indigenous movements are also in opposition to integration into the capitalist world economy, expressed mainly through opposition to mining and other extractive projects (Almeida and Ulate, 2015). Given the ethnic composition of the countries such as Peru, indigenous and peasant social movements have often been fused in practice (Munck, 2020). In Bolivia, mass mobilisations resulted in an peasant/indigenous movement that was able to craft a solid set of social and political alliances with non-indigenous sectors and saw large success in the landslide victory of Evo Morales and the constitutional declaration of Bolivia as a plurinational State (Munck, 2020; Almeida and Ulate, 2015).

Jima-González and Paradela-López (2021) have applied political opportunity theory in combination with identity-based approaches to a Peruvian context in order to explain the lack of indigenous mobilisation during the Sendero Luminoso period. Political opportunity refers to aspects of the political system that affect the possibilities that challenging groups have for effective mobilisation (Giugni, 2011). While the concept has been stretched considerably, much research has focused on the opening of ‘windows of opportunity’ that encourage collective actors to form a movement and engage in protest (*ibid.*). Proponents of political opportunity theory argue that collective action is more likely to occur when there is an opening in the political environment, such as a significant change in the existing power structure. Therefore this framework emphasises the importance of looking at political context in order to understand the dynamics of a social movement (Jima-González and Paradela-López, 2021).

Escobar and Alvarez (1992, p. 5) argue that in Latin America, identity-centred theories on social movements are most applicable, emphasising processes in which social actors constitute collective identities as a means to create democratic spaces for more autonomous action. Linked to identity, movements such as the one under study in this thesis show the increasing importance of place in the making of movements, that can no longer simply be seen as physical context for mobilisations, but needs to be understood as an integral element of social movement agency (Munck, 2020). Going off these arguments, I will now take a closer look at the role of identity within social movements, as well as geographical discussions on the importance of place in theorising movements.

### 3.1.1 Identity

Distinctive social identities are defined by what marks us as different from other groups (Reicher, 2004). There is a focus on collective action in the social identity tradition because it is only through collectivity that the powerless gain power and are able to effect change (ibid.). Collective identity is an important concept in understanding the participation of individuals in social movements as a shared sense of common identity makes individuals more likely to participate in collective action (Staggenborg, 2005).

Within social movement theory, collective identity refers to the shared identity of a group, deriving from its common experiences and solidarities (Whooley, 2007). It can describe both imagined and concrete communities (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Snow (2001, p. 2) defines it as ‘a shared sense of ‘oneness’ anchored in real or imagined shared attributes and experiences’. Collective identity may be imagined rather than directly experienced, but can be expressed through cultural materials such as names, symbols, rituals and clothing (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). The theoretical concept of collective identity emerged in the 1980s within NSM theory and has become a central concept in the study of social movements (Whooley, 2007). NSM theory recognises that even if a collective identity is already present, it holds that this identity is ‘new’ when it is used to foster self-realisation (Jima-González and Paradela-López, 2021). In other words, while this identity may have existed prior to mobilisation, it is seen as ‘new’ when people begin to mobilise around it or on the basis of it.

Melucci (1995, p. 52) argues that ‘the concept of collective identity can contribute to a better understanding of the nature and meaning of emerging forms of collective action in highly differentiated systems’. Collective identity helps to explain the emergence of a movement as identity unites individuals into a cohesive unit and fosters group solidarity (Whooley, 2007). Melucci (1995) further argues that a certain degree of emotional investment is required in defining collective identity, which enables individuals to feel like part of a common unit. Additionally, a collective identity may have first been constructed by outsiders, but depends on some acceptance by those to whom it is applied (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Collective identity enables social actors to act as unified subjects and these can act as collective bodies precisely because they have achieved the process of collective identity formation (Melucci, 1995).

Collective identity can be seen from an internal and an external point of view, with an inherent tension between the definition a movement gives itself and the recognition granted to it by the rest of society (Melucci, 1995). In extreme examples, this can provoke conflict on the basis of internal and external discrepancies between the meaning of collective identity. Social actors will enter this conflict to affirm the identity that their opponent has denied to them which reinforces internal solidarity and collective identity (ibid.). As Melucci (1995, p. 48) puts it, ‘people feel a bond with others not because they share the same interests, but because they need this bond in order to make sense of what they are doing’.

While scholars have had a tendency to ascribe a single identity to a movement, many social movements face the challenge of the participation of diverse identities and must attempt to build solidarity across these identities (Whooley, 2007). The challenge for scholars is to understand how social movement actors ‘reciprocally identify with each other as part of a ‘we’ across ideological and organisational differences’ (Flesher Fominaya, 2018). In light of this, Flesher Fominaya (2018) argues that collective identity can be forged between heterogeneous actors through a common adherence to a series of autonomous principles.

Furthermore, ethnic movements base their claims on particular identity markers that include ancestry, language, a history of discrimination or other shared experiences (Olzak, 2004). For del Olmo Vicén (2003) ethnic identity is understood as a form of collective identity based on common social and cultural characteristics intrinsic to an ethnic group. In Latin America, people collect around these ethnic identities to express demands for expanded rights, emerging from

discrimination and exclusion from political and economic participation (Jima-González and Paradela-López, 2021). Jima-González and Paradela-López (2021, p. 197) argue that ‘the consolidation of a collective identity is the result of a dynamic social process that develops under certain conditions’, and therefore context must be taken into account, as well as the role of place in the making of a collective identity.

### 3.1.2 Place

Leitner et al. (2008) argue that geographic scholarship has been challenging social movement theorists to incorporate spatiality into their conceptualisations of social movements. Yet within the field of Human Geography, social movement theorising has been relatively new, and a direct engagement with the geographies of social movements only began in the 1990s (Routledge, 2022). Drawing on RMT and NSM theorising, geographers have been concerned with a lack of geographical engagement, arguing that geographical understandings are crucial to the interpretation of contentious action (ibid.). Economic and political processes in a country are articulated in geographically uneven ways that can explain variations in grievances and the trajectory of social movement development (ibid.). From a geographical perspective, movements act in space by taking to the streets or occupying land (ibid.), and movements are rooted in place-specific contexts, which underlines the importance of local identities in defining strategies of resistance (Miller, 2000). Place takes a central role, helping to explain why social movements occur where they do, and how the particularities of specific places influence the character of contentious action (Routledge, 2022). Therefore, geography matters in social movement theorising.

In Human Geography, place is defined by Agnew (1987) in terms of location, locale, and sense of place. Place as location is the geographical area encompassing the settings for social, political and economic processes; place as a locale is the setting in which social and organisational relations develop; and sense of place is the localised structure of feeling that gives people a sense of meaning (Nicholls, 2009). In light of this, place-based collective identification across space enables the establishment of strong sociocultural ties which can be drawn on to enable collective action and protest mobilisation (Routledge, 2022).

Svampa (2006; 2010) has argued that one constituent dimension of Latin American social movements is territoriality, which appears both as a space of resistance and as a site of

resignification and creation of new social relations (Munck, 2020). In relation to this, Nicholls (2009) argues that the territorial view highlights three ways in which place-based networks play distinctive roles in social movements. Thereby, place-based relations translate local attributes into meaningful political values, strengthen the cohesiveness of collective actors, and the solidarity derived from these place-based relations makes collective action possible (ibid.).

Geographical approaches to social movements also include a politics of scale (Routledge, 2022), where social movements are seen to operate at the intersection of various scales. Limitations of the localness of movements are overcome through scale jumping that turns local movements into regional, national and even global movements (Leitner et al., 2008). Hereby, place-based struggles can become embedded in different places at a variety of spatial scales (Routledge, 2022). As Routledge (2022, p. 5) argues, geographically, social movement networks can be conceived as convergence spaces, comprising place-based but not place-restricted movements, articulating collective visions that generate common ground, and facilitating spatially extensive political action by participant movements.

Escobar (2001) argues that while place as a theoretical concept has dropped out of sight in the recent globalisation craze, place-based practices are important sources of alternative visions and strategies for reconstructing local worlds. The inquiry of place within social movement theorising is important for renewing the critique of eurocentric theory-making, as this has marginalised place to the detriment of social formations in which place-based practices have continued to be important (ibid.). Escobar's (2001) critique is therefore not only a critique of eurocentric understandings of the world, but also of the theories on which we rely to derive such understandings. This again reiterates why new theorising on social movements is required, that draws on the local context and reality, in order to make sense of movements such as the one under study in this thesis.

## 4 Methodological approach and data selection

In this section, I outline my methodology in detail, covering the research methods, the data that I am making use of, as well as the analytical approach and ethical considerations. Overarchingly, my research approach is an exploratory case study, with the thematic analysis of news articles guiding my research. This is supplemented by other secondary data sources such as surveys and census data, and primary data from participant observation, with these multiple sources being triangulated. Additionally, I apply protest event analysis to a qualitative dataset on protest events in Peru in order to spatially map the distribution of protest activities during the 2022/2023 protests.

### *4.1 Methodological approach*

A case study is defined by Yin (2018) as an empirical method that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in-depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident. In other words, a case study is a suitable approach when wanting to understand a real-world case while assuming that such an understanding is likely to involve important contextual conditions (ibid.). Yin (2018) further differentiates between exploratory, explanatory and descriptive case studies. My case study approach is exploratory, with the aim of gaining an extensive, in-depth description of the social phenomenon. Case studies often engage in thick description and detailed observational evidence, as well as relying on multiple sources of evidence that converge in triangulation (ibid.). These commonly include documents, archival sources, interviews and observations. The detailed qualitative accounts produced in many case studies not only help explore real-life environments, but also help explain the complexities of real-life situations (Zainal, 2007).

Previous research on social movements has used very different approaches and methodological pluralism dominates the field (della Porta, 2014). Due to the dynamic nature of social movements, scholars have promoted using triangulation, or multiple data sources and collection methods, when conducting research (ibid.). The term triangulation refers to the use of multiple research methods and types of data to analyse the same problem, painting a more holistic picture of complex phenomena (ibid.). In other words, triangulation uses multiple sources that corroborate the same finding (Yin, 2018). By utilising multiple methods, data sources or

observations, scholars can better account for and overcome the limits and biases inherent in studies that employ a single method (della Porta, 2014). For my research approach I am also triangulating, with the thematic analysis of news articles being triangulated with findings from participant observation during my time in Peru during the first two months of protests, in addition to secondary surveys and census data. My research design is termed by della Porta (2014) as exploratory sequential, which essentially entails inductively creating a hypothesis that is tested through data.

#### *4.2 Primary and secondary data collection*

##### 4.2.1 News articles and other data

There can be a tendency in social scientific research to place documents at the margins of consideration, being viewed as mere props for real action that takes place through talk and behaviour (Prior, 2011). However, textual materials are representations of the essence of our lived world (Aitken, 2005) and can be extremely useful sources. As stated by Yin (2018, p. 156), ‘our record-keeping society means that documentary information is likely to be relevant to every case study’. Document analysis is particularly applicable to qualitative case studies and intensive studies producing rich descriptions, and it is often combined with other research methods as a means of triangulation (Bowen, 2009). Documents can provide context, background information and historical insight which helps researchers understand the historical roots of specific issues and can indicate the conditions that impinge upon the phenomena under investigation (ibid.). Documents can also provide supplementary research data as well as verify findings or corroborate evidence from other sources (ibid.). In particular, news media are central aspects of popular culture and with the proliferation of the internet have become nearly universally accessible (Altheide and Schneider, 2013). This has also made them more widely available for analysis in qualitative research.

For this case study, I primarily use a sample of news articles reporting on the Peruvian protests, and complement these with additional secondary data from censuses and surveys, as well as primary material from participant observation. Sampling of news articles was purposive (Bryman, 2012), with articles being chosen due to their relevance to the research question. Regarding the sampling, as the protests are recent and do not cover a very large time span, it made more sense to use a broad sample of reporting from different media outlets rather than focusing on the reporting from specifically selected outlets, as there would not be enough material available

from only a few select media outlets. Additionally, I am trying to gain a broader picture of the main themes spoken about in general news reporting, rather than looking at the discourse of any news outlet in particular. Therefore, I am using articles on the Peruvian protests from multiple online news outlets. Articles were selected based on a google search of the protests. I am using both English and Spanish media reports from a variety of international news sources in order to gain more variety. I selected a total of 20 articles from various different news outlets, with 10 articles in English and 10 in Spanish. I felt this sample size to be sufficient as it led to data saturation and I believe further articles would not have added any significant new insights, as news reporting tends to repeat itself quite a lot even across different news outlets. A list of the selected news articles can be found in the bibliography.

A further part of my document analysis includes the use of surveys that have been conducted countrywide on the political opinions of people. The Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP) is a research centre carrying out studies in Peru, focusing on social change, power and democracy (IEP, 2023). IEP carries out monthly public opinion surveys at a national level on the current political situation in Peru. The major advantage of these surveys for my thesis is the regional distinction that allows me to contrast regional variations in political opinions. I make use of the content of the survey results to complement and enrich the findings from the news articles.

I am also contextualising using the National Census carried out by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) in 2017. INEI is responsible for carrying out an official countrywide population census every 10 years which provides valuable information about various characteristics of the population. The 2017 National Census was the first census to include a question about self-identifying ethnic identity and also saw a census on campesino communities being held for the first time (INEI, 2017). I am using data from the census to provide context, as well as the census on campesino and indigenous communities to visualise the spatial distribution of these communities within the country.

Finally, I make use of a quantitative dataset to geographically map the distribution of protest events during the 2022/2023 protests in Peru. ACLED is a publicly available dataset that collects information on protest events around the world. Data is available to the city/village level which allows for a precise mapping of protest locations and geographical distribution across a given region. ACLED data collects information on six types of events, but I filtered the data to only



include protests which according to ACLED are public demonstrations in which the participants are not violent (Raleigh et al., 2010). For the purpose of this thesis, I chose to only map those protest events that occurred from 7th December of last year, when Castillo was removed from office, until the end of March of this year which was the most recent data available at the time of analysis. I believe that the dataset provides me with adequate data to spatially map these events.

#### 4.2.2 Participant observation

Because my case study takes places in a real-world setting, this allows for direct observations as providing a source of evidence (Yin, 2018). Participant observation plays a major role in the study of social movements (Munck, 2020). Its purpose is to view and understand events through the perspective of the people one studies and combined with other methods for triangulation, can produce rich data (della Porta, 2014). In social protest research, participant observation can prove very useful for systematic enquiries of elementary forms of collective behaviour, but in itself cannot comprehend the points of view of the people who protest (ibid.).

McCurdy and Uldam (2014) point out that participant observation is not an impartial window, rather it is influenced by our relations with the research subjects and our interpretations of what we observe. Political bias, whether preconceived or developed during the research, can also influence interpretation and reporting of observations (ibid.). This is one of the reasons why I only use this method to complement and supplement the analysis of news articles, rather than drawing too many conclusions from the observations alone. This is a common approach, with many researchers using participant observation without making it the central piece of their methodology, for example when using it in the preliminary phases of their research (della Porta, 2014). This is the case in my research, where I went out to observe some of the peaceful protests in Cusco in December and January, in the early stages of my research design. These observations have provided me with specific knowledge on the protests that occurred in Cusco at this time that I can make use of to support further findings and arguments, but they do not take a central role in my analysis by themselves.

When conducting participant observation, there can be differing degrees of involvement of the researcher, from the complete observer who is detached from the research cohort, to the complete participant who becomes wholly absorbed in the researched community (della Porta,

2014). This is related to the distinction between covert and overt research, where a covert researcher hides his researcher status and an overt researcher makes his research intention clear (McCurdy and Uldam, 2014). Additionally, the researcher is also positioned on the insider/outsider continuum (ibid.). In my case, I experienced the protests as a complete observer, in both a covert and overt manner, being covert when simply observing the ongoing protest activities, but more overt when I spoke to some of the protest participants, as I made my research intentions clear to them. I also entered the field as a complete outsider, without experience on these types of protest movements and additionally due to my nationality and ethnic outsider position, that can be considered within the insider/outsider positioning (ibid.).

### *4.3 Analytical approach*

I chose thematic analysis as my analytical approach. Thematic analysis provides a flexible research approach due to its theoretical freedom, and can provide a rich and detailed account of data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis focuses on the generation of themes from the data under investigation. It is a method for systematically identifying, organising and analysing patterns of meaning across a dataset (Braun and Clarke, 2012). These patterns of meaning can be semantic, or obvious meanings in the data, or they can be latent, the assumptions that lie behind what is explicitly stated. By focusing on meanings across a dataset, this allows the researcher to make sense of collective meanings and experiences (ibid.). Identified themes can be analysed to support or challenge existing theories relating to the topic under investigation. Analysis involves describing the themes and interpreting how they relate to the wider literature and theories in answering the research question (Hawkins, 2017). Researchers often make use of thematic analysis when investigating a phenomenon for which little prior understanding exists (ibid.). This works well with my research, as the specific case is new and therefore not well researched.

A theoretical, deductive thematic analysis provides a detailed analysis of specific aspects of the data, rather than a rich description of the entire dataset at hand (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This works best for my case study as I want to look at specific themes covered in the news articles in order to answer my research questions. Therefore, I chose to code deductively, as my themes were chosen to fit within my theoretical framework. In this sense, I already had some ideas about potential themes in mind before starting the coding process, both from the contextualising literature and from my own observations. I used the coding software NVivo for my coding process as this

allowed for easily grouping codes under themes. The codes that I have come up with are semantic, meaning that they refer to explicit or surface meanings rather than latent, underlying ideas (ibid.). After reading through the news articles I started writing down some initial codes. As I continued reading through the articles and doing the first round of coding I was able to gradually add more codes until I felt that I had a sufficient overview of the key issues spoken about in the selected news articles. When conducting a thematic analysis, codes need to be flexible and able to be modified as the analysis progresses, with the analysis concluding through the identification of a saturated set of themes across the data (Neuendorf, 2019). When I felt like my codes were saturated, in the sense that no new codes were emerging, I clustered similar codes together, collating them into potential themes. These themes corresponded to the main thematic areas covered in the news articles that became evident through the coding, as well as my observations and contextualising literature. The corresponding codebook can be found in the appendix (Appendix 1).

The chosen themes each aim to capture something important in relation to the overall research question (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In my case, I ended up with five main themes that directly address my research question and engage with my theoretical framework. These are (1) the organisation of the protests, (2) geographical variations in protest activity across the country, (3) causes for protest, (4) demographics of protesters, and (5) foreign influences in the protests. These themes are taken as the basis for the structure of the analysis section, with each theme being discussed and analysed in turn. The themes and subsequent analysis are enriched by the findings from the additional data that I have described above, as well as my participant observation.

In addition to the thematic analysis, I used the ACLED dataset on protest events (Raleigh et al., 2010) to create a spatial visualisation of the distribution of protests. Protest event analysis (PEA) is a key methodological innovation that emerged within the social movement field (della Porta, 2014). It is a type of quantitative content analysis used to systematically assess the amount and features of protest across various geographical areas and over time (ibid.). Most research using PEA presents quite simple descriptive statistics such as mobilisation levels, but it can be combined with various other techniques, and generated data combined with different research designs (ibid.). I applied PEA to the ACLED dataset instead of creating my own dataset, which is common with this method. I mapped the locations of protest events provided by the dataset using the mapping software Mapbox, in order to see whether protest events correlated with my hypothesis that the majority of protests were occurring in the south of the country.

#### *4.4 Ethical considerations*

In terms of ethical reflections on the methods and materials of my research, I do not see many concerns as I am basing the majority of my analysis off publicly available data. I did undertake some covert participant observation in Cusco on a number of days. Researchers have defended partially covert research in contexts where it is difficult to negotiate their presence as researchers due to the physical setting or the number of people involved (Israel, 2015, p. 97). This is the case in my research, where it would have been impossible, and more importantly incredible disruptive, to seek consent from those I was observing, who were partaking in protest movements throughout the centre of Cusco. Furthermore, I only use these observations to speak about general characteristics of the movement and I do not identify the actions of individual people. Additionally, during my participant observation I had some informal conversations with people who were involved in the protests, to whom I made my research intentions clear and from whom I received oral consent to use their statements in my research, but again I am keeping these people anonymous and do not use any identifying features in the analysis, rather just talking about their viewpoints more generally.

I do want to ethically reflect on my positionality as an outsider in doing this research. Reflexivity demands critical reflection not only on the knowledge produced but also on how that knowledge is generated (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004), in other words, reflection on the research outcome as well as process. I spent half a year living in Cusco and working with rural community members outside of the city, therefore I believe I have somewhat of an idea of the lived reality of the struggles these people face in their lives. However, I will never know the full extent of this and will never be able to relate to these struggles by nature of being a white woman from Europe and having all the opportunities and privileges that come with this. Therefore, while I can talk about the vast inequalities in Peruvian society and demonstrate these in a number of ways, I cannot experience these myself and can only talk about them from the position of an outsider.

While writing with a decolonial perspective in mind, I additionally need to be very self-reflective and acknowledge my position in Western academy, as there are material conditions of experience out of which decolonial writings emerge that I do not and cannot share, and I have to acknowledge the risk of the radical power of decolonialism becoming domesticated and disconnected in Western academic spaces from the concrete experiences and struggles in which it was originally grounded, as arguably has happened to some extent with postcolonialism (Noxolo,

2017a; Fúnez-Flores, 2022). In this research I have made use of literature and viewpoints from non-Western spaces and applied them to established theorising on social movements. Yet my aim is not to make my own theorisations about decolonialism, but rather highlight the need for further decolonial theorising that I have encountered during this research.

## **5 Findings and analysis**

In this section, I present the findings from the secondary materials, which are sorted according to the emergent themes that are based on the thematic analysis of news articles. Each theme contributes to answering my research question, which is *How can the heightened levels of protest in southern Peru be explained in the context of the 2022/2023 protest?*. Additionally, the thematic discussion *5.1 Organisation of protest* seeks to answer my secondary research question, *How can the protests be considered a social movement?*. The themes are analysed in light of the theoretical framework, drawing on different discussions from social movement theory, identity, and place, as well as positioning the analysis within the decolonial framework. I additionally make use of the supplementary material from surveys and opinion polls, as well as my own observations.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, I explore the organisation of the 2022/2023 protests in light of social movement theory. Next, I map the geographical variations of protest to highlight the spatiality of the protests and the importance of territoriality and place. Finally, I look at the explanations for the heightened levels of protest in the south. These explanations are divided into the direct as well as underlying causes for protest, the polarisation of society, the demographics of those who are protesting, and the role of foreign influences in driving the protest. I theoretically engage with the findings by drawing on the concepts of identity and place in particular.

### *5.1 Organisation of protest and the formation of a social movement*

In this section, I take a closer look at the organisation of the protests as spoken about in the news articles, and supplement this with the findings from my participant observation. Here I apply discussions from social movement theory in order to answer my sub-question, which is *In what ways can the protests be considered a social movement?*. I am asking this question as it is relevant

to my decolonial approach. There has been a tendency to apply North American and European social movement theorising to a Latin American context and I argue along with Munck (2020) that there is a need for Latin American theorising in order to make sense of the Latin American context. I therefore attempt to combine what I believe are the key theoretical concepts important to these protests, which are identity and place, with social movement theorising in order to explore from a decolonial perspective how the protests can be considered a social movement.

Before going into the organisation of protests, I first outline the acts of protest, as protest action can take many forms, as well as the common demands that are shared by protesters, as these hint at the underlying reasons for protest. Acts of protest have mainly consisted of marches and road blockades (Olmo, 2023a; Murillo, 2023; Gamarra, 2023). Roadblocks are easily implemented yet have great impact in Peru, that typically rely on roads to transport goods as well as for travel, and roadblocks can therefore cause much disruption. Other acts that have overall been much less common but have received much news coverage are destructive acts such as setting fire of buildings and invading airports (Olmo, 2023b; O'Boyle, 2023; Murillo, 2023; Taj, 2023). The demands of protesters have been described in very similar ways in the majority of news articles. The common demands are Boluarte's resignation, new elections, the closure of Congress, and a new or modified Constitution (Redacción Gestión, 2023; Sánchez, 2023; Reisman, 2023; del Aguila, 2023; Lynch, 2023), with some protesters additionally demanding Castillo's release from prison (Olmo, 2023b; O'Boyle, 2023; Calanche, 2023; Coronel, 2023; Šerić, 2023). In general, what protesters want is to see systematic political change in their country (O'Boyle, 2023) and sectors that have long felt marginalised want to feel represented by the state and in politics (Gurmendi, 2023).

#### 5.1.1 The protests as a social movement

There is significant variation in the news articles on whether the 2022/2023 protests constitute an organised movement or whether they are spontaneous instances of protest with little organisation behind them. Articles speak of social mobilisations (Redacción Gestión, 2023; Agenda Estado de Derecho, 2023), a large popular movement (Coronel, 2023), a new pluricultural social movement (Coronel, 2023), a protest movement (Gamarra, 2023; Šerić, 2023), and a popular movement turned political (Lynch, 2023). As described in one of the articles (Coronel, 2023), some protesters see the 2022/2023 protests as the beginning of a new, pluricultural social movement, where the campesino masses have finally risen up against neoliberalism to construct a new Peru for

the people. However, other articles share different views, seeing the protests as spontaneous (Gurmendi, 2023; Lynch, 2023), in terms of a lack of clear leadership (Šerić, 2023), no central organisation or coordination (Coronel, 2023), and without a unanimous set of grievances (Calanche, 2023).

Therefore, I now try to answer the question of whether these protests can be considered a social movement, applying discussions from social movement theory. To answer this question, I first go back to Diani's (1992, p. 13) definition of a social movement as 'a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity'. Taking the first part of this definition, the 2022/2023 protests are a network of interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and organisations, who broadly have collected under the campesino identity. These individuals are engaged in a political conflict based on this shared collective identity, which I argue to be the conflict for greater representation and participation of indigenous and campesino communities in Peru, who feel marginalised and repressed based on their identity. In this sense, I believe the 2022/2023 protest to fit Diani's (1992) definition of a social movement.

However, Touraine (1987, in Escobar and Alvarez, 1992) has argued that most forms of collective mobilisation in Latin America are not social movements per se, rather they are struggles for greater political participation. Despite the sociopolitical environment having changed significantly since Touraine made this argument, with the great expansion of the extractivist development model, I believe it to still be relevant today as I argue that one of the main causes for the protests is precisely such a struggle for greater political participation. This is seen for example in the demands for a new, plurinational Constitution. However I argue that this does not mean that it is not a social movement. Escobar (2001) has critiqued the commonly drawn on understandings and theories for their eurocentricity. Decolonial approaches confront and challenge these existing practices (Noxolo, 2017a). In this sense, these struggles for greater political participation can be seen as place-based practices that are important sources of alternative visions and strategies for reconstructing the world order (Escobar, 2001). In light of this Leitner et al.'s (2008, p. 157) definition of a social movement, as a counter-hegemonic action challenging dominant systems of authority in order to enact alternative imaginaries, might be better suited. This definition fits better within a decolonial framework, re-thinking the idea of social movements from alternative, counter-hegemonic perspectives (Radcliffe, 2017). I believe that in this definition, struggles for greater

political participation can be included as a constituent part of social movement formation that aims to challenge dominant systems of authority. In this sense, being articulated from below and committed to those who have been historically excluded (Fúnez-Flores, 2022), and directly confronting existing practices (Noxolo, 2017a), this definition provides a decolonial perspective to approaching the study of social movements. I will now continue to see how different theoretical discussions on social movements can be applied to my case study.

I believe this movement to fit best into a collective identity framework within social movement theory. Reicher (2004) argues that it is through collective identity that the powerless are able to gain power and effect change. Therefore, I argue that collective identity plays a big part in the mobilisation of campesinos during the 2022/2023 protests. Jima-González and Paradelo-López (2021) also argue that collective identity is key in analysing these types of movements as participants already share a latent collective identity based on ethnicity. Individuals sharing a sense of common identity are more likely to participate in collective action (Staggenborg, 2005), and I believe that this was key to the emergence and sustenance of this protest movement.

Jima-González and Paradelo-López (2021) apply a combination of theories on collective identity with political opportunity theory in their research on how Sendero Luminoso impacted the (lack of) Indigenous mobilisation in the 1980s. I believe this approach could work well in this case too. Combining collective identity with political opportunity theory would mean that individuals come together under a collective identity and make use of an opening in the political system to mobilise. In my case study, this could be applied as follows: Castillo's ousting opened up a 'window of opportunity' (Giugni, 2011) that allowed the aggrieved campesino population to come together under a collective identity to form a movement and engage in the protests that have been occurring since December.

As Munck (2020) has argued for a need for Latin American perspectives on social movement theorising, I here want to draw on some alternative, more place-based discussions of social movements. I do this as Escobar (2001) has critiqued the marginalisation of *place* in eurocentric theorising, which has been detrimental to social movement formations where place-based consciousness has continued to be important. Drawing off place-based discussions also underlines the importance of localised identities in defining strategies of resistance. Culture and ethnicity influence a community's sense of place and this plays a role in shaping the perception of



political opportunities (Routledge, 2022). This sort of context-based analysis of social movements seeks to understand geographically uneven modes of the exercise of power, which works to generate particular terrains of resistance (ibid.). Applied to my case study, I believe the campesino identity is distinctly bound to place, and in particular the sense of place of campesino communities. Castillo, had such a campesino identity that went through a spatial transformation when he was transformed from campesino to president of Peru. This opened up the perceptions of political opportunities for campesino populations of Peru, with their sense of place being expanded from smaller-scale place-based struggles to far greater spatial scales. Therefore, the movement emerged from particular places but was enacted on a national scale. As Routledge (2022) has argued, social movement networks can comprise of place-based but not place-restricted movements, which I have here tried to demonstrate in the context of the Peruvian protests. I will now expand on how protests were organised, from local and regional actions to the operation at national scale.

### 5.1.2 Organisation of protest

The organisation of the protests is described on different levels by the news articles, with the involvement of local rural organisations such as campesino community organisations, and neighbourhood associations (Coronel, 2023), as well as evolving from regional organisation to national coordination as seen with *la toma de Lima*<sup>4</sup> (the takeover of Lima) (Lynch, 2023). The protests are also described as having a clear political agenda, in comparison to regional mobilisations of recent years, and are unprecedented in national history (Lynch, 2023).

A number of articles speak of the organisation behind the protests, such as *la toma de Lima*, that was organised by a number of diverse collectives and organisations in the rural south (Olmo, 2023b), that enabled protesters to travel in buses from mainly southern rural areas to Lima (Coronel, 2023). I also made observations about the preparations for these trips in Cusco in January. From my observations in December and January in the centre of Cusco, I concluded that the majority of protests happening in the city of Cusco consisted of people from communities outside of the city from all over the department of Cusco, who travelled to the city specifically to take part in the protests. This occurred in an organised fashion, with many communities travelling to the city on

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<sup>4</sup>*la toma de Lima* was a development within the 2022/2023 protests, when in January protesters began to collectively travel from southern regions of the country to the capital city of Lima in order to voice their demands in the place where political decisions are made (Olmo, 2023b). It has been described as being against neoliberalism and the political elite and has been highlighted as significant for its nationally unified demands (De Gori, 2023).

the backs of trucks or or in *colectivo* vans, and many others also walking. While there were road blocks installed by others participating in the protests on all major roads going out of the city, vehicles with the specific purpose of transporting protesters were allowed to cross these blockades. When marching in the city, protesters would usually display a banner representing their community at the front of the parade (Figure 2).



Figure 2: Protesters marching in Cusco. Source: Authors own (2023)

While in December, protesters travelled to the capital cities of their departments to make their voices heard, in January there was a scalar shift, that saw protesters travelling to Lima, with this movement being coined *la toma de Lima*. This was because demands were not being met and protesters hoped to have more of a voice if they travelled directly to where the government was making its decisions. These trips involved renting buses to transport protesters, and donation boxes were set up in one of the main squares near the centre of Cusco, to help fund these trips to Lima (Figure 3). Trained lawyers were present before the departure of these buses, advising protesters on their rights and how they should act in the case of detention. I was surprised at the amount of volunteers present to help protesters, in organising, offering advice, as well as the provisioning of food through community *ollas* (Figure 3). In this sense, there was much organisation involved in coordinating protest activities at a local scale.



Figure 3: Community *ollas* providing food to protesters in Cusco, and donations taken to help protesters travelling to Lima. Source: Authors own (2023)

Leitner et al. (2008) have argued that social movements use various mobilities such as bus rides traversing space, to transform their spatio-temporal conditions of possibility. Just as in their research, here too the choice of bus rides traversing the country towards the centre of national political power is symbolic as well as strategic. This form of mobility enables protesters from different locales to link up in place, enforcing a sense of shared political identity and solidarity (ibid.). Additionally, social movements operate at the intersection of scales, and this act of mobility has engaged protesters in scalar jumping, shifting the scale of local and regional movements into a national one (Leitner et al., 2008; Routledge, 2022). This is clearly demonstrated in mobilities such as the movement of protesters from small communities to regional cities such as Cusco, with a later shift to the national scale embodied in *la toma de Lima*.

## 5.2 Geographical variations in protest activity

The majority of news sources highlight significant geographical variation in protest activity, with the epicentre in the south of Peru. Overall, ‘the south’ was one of the codes that came up the most during the coding process. This supports my hypothesis that there are vast regional differences in Peru that account for regional variations of protest activity. The vast majority of news articles speak about the south being the epicentre of the protests, or the place where the protests started. Yet while

the south is highlighted as the origin and epicentre of protests, a few of the articles speak about protests occurring across the country, in at least 12 of Peru's 25 departments (Lynch, 2023; del Aguila, 2023).

In order to see the actual distribution of protests across the country, I used the data from the ACLED dataset to map the geographical variation of protest, creating a spatial visualisation of the protest events. Figure 4 shows the countrywide distribution of protest events beginning on 7th December 2022. It broadly confirms the findings from the news articles, that protests have occurred across the country, but being most heavily focused in the south. In particular, the area close to the border to Bolivia stands out. This is the department of Puno, and I will get into the significance of its proximity to Bolivia further below. Figure 4 additionally shows that the protests have occurred mainly along the Andes mountain range and the coastal areas to the west of it, while Amazonian areas to the east have seen much less protest.




Figure 4: Recorded protest events, 7 December 2022 - 31 March 2023.

Source: Authors own, based on data from ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010).

I believe that this spatial visualisation of the protests makes it clear that the protests are bound with place and that there is a certain territoriality to them. This further shows the importance of place within social movement theory for explaining the making of movements (Munck, 2020). Place can no longer simply be seen as physical context for mobilisations, but needs to be understood as an integral element of social movement agency. Geographical discussions on social movements have highlighted the central role of place in shaping the claims, identities and capacities of mobilisations, helping to explain why social movements occur where they do (Routledge, 2022). In this case, place is one of the most important concepts in explaining the protest movements.

Svampa (2010) has argued that one constituent dimension of Latin American social movements is territoriality, which appears both as a space of resistance and as a site of resignification and creation of new social relations (Munck, 2020). Territorial, place-based relations translate attributes into meaningful political values, strengthen the cohesiveness of collective actors, and the solidarity derived from these place-based relations makes collective action possible (Nicholls, 2009). By mapping out the locations of protest instances, I have attempted to highlight the importance of place, and that place matters to the participation in protest. I argue that place has played one of the most crucial roles in mobilising people, which can be seen in the emergence of protests from campesino places, to the endurance of protests in distinct places such as around Puno.

### *5.3 Causes for protest*

I have divided the causes for protest found in my thematic analysis into two groups. These are immediate causes for protest, as well as underlying structural causes.

#### 5.3.1 Immediate causes for protest

Going off the findings from the news articles, I believe that there have been two stages to these mobilisations, the immediate protests after the ousting of Castillo, and the continuing protests fuelled by police violence. Immediate causes for protest spoken about in the majority of articles are Castillo's failed coup and removal, with further fuel added to the fire through the repression and brutality by the police force (Coronel, 2023; Taj, 2023). In 1999, McClintock wrote that Peruvians frequently place all their hopes for the country on one leader, which seems to not have changed much as I believe this was the case with rural campesino populations who hoped for representation

and political change under Castillo's presidency. However, despite great hopes among campesino populations, during his presidency he had done little to advance the positioning of 'his people' in society. Actually, indigenous organisations condemned his government for trying to weaken bilingual education, with teachers assigned to indigenous areas not needing to be proficient in the respective languages (Gurmendi, 2022). Yet despite having had little significance in bringing about political change, since Castillo's removal from office, sectors of the population that saw him as a like-minded campesino began protesting in his defence (Gurmendi, 2022; Taj 2023). In reality, during his time in office Castillo was never able to mobilise people in the way that they mobilised once he was gone (Olmo, 2023a). After feeling like they might finally be heard, Castillo's ousting was a harsh blow for campesino communities for whom this meant that the country's elite had restored their power (Stefanoni, 2023), yet again reducing these communities to the marginalised populations of the southern highlands.

When conducting participant observation in one of the main squares where protesters congregated to rest and eat, I spoke to some of the people involved in the protests to hear their views about the situation. Castillo was symbolically significant for these people because they felt like he was one of them, of the people. As one of the people I spoke to put it: *'In some way, Pedro Castillo is a symbol of our society, because if we look at ourselves in the mirror, if we look at our parents and grandparents, we clearly see Pedro Castillo. Therefore we identify with and feel represented by Pedro Castillo'* (My translation). Castillo was therefore so significant because he was perceived as being one of the people, and as representing the campesino identity in Peruvian national politics (Sánchez, 2023; del Aguila, 2023; Gurmendi, 2023). Therefore, collective identity ties to Castillo served as a catalyst for the protests.

These are the immediate causes that explain why the protests occurred at this moment in time. Political opportunity theorists argue that collective action is more likely to occur when there is an opening in the political environment, such as a significant change in the existing power structure (Jima-González and Paradelo-López, 2021). In the case of the Peruvian protests, this theoretical framework can be applied to explain the emergence of these protests. With Castillo winning the presidency, campesinos had great hopes for better political representation and subsequent change. With his ousting, hope for change through a formal vehicle diminished, thus creating an opening for creating change at the grassroots level through protest.

Continuing protests were fuelled by police violence and the outrage over the many deaths of people involved in the protests, including the Ayacucho and Juliaca massacres where 8 and 19 people, respectively, were killed during protests (Redacción EC, 2022; Olmo, 2023b). These events, as well as further deaths and instances of police violence, subsequently led to the villainisation of Castillo's successor, Dina Boluarte. The polarisation of views on Castillo as a like-minded campesino and Boluarte as a villain is indicative of the polarisation of society.

While the immediate causes explain why the protests occurred at this moment in time, structural causes better explain the scale of the protests. Therefore I will now turn to the underlying causes for protest that are rooted in the polarisation of Peruvian society.

### 5.3.2 Underlying causes for protest and polarisation of society

Structural causes are spoken about much more in the articles as opposed to the immediate causes. The protests are based on long-standing discontent (Murillo, 2023; Pozzebon, 2023) and polarisation (Redacción Gestión, 2023; del Aguila, 2023). This includes feelings of inequality (Taj, 2023), discrimination (Murillo, 2023) and racism (Calanche, 2023; Coronel, 2023; Olmo, 2023a). One of people that I spoke to summarised this as follows: *'This protest has its roots in that the campesinos have realised that they have been abandoned'* (My translation). The demographic that is protesting consists of those who for the longest time have been marginalised or silenced, those who are asking for equality and justice. This makes clear the widespread belief, mentioned in some of the articles, that the Peruvian political system excludes a large sector of the population (Gamarra, 2023), with origins in colonialism that constructed the Andes and Amazon regions as areas rich in resources to be exploited by the elite (Agenda Estado de Derecho, 2023). In this sense, the colonial world order is still active in Peru and is legitimised through colonial views on development that work to exploit nature and the racialised inhabitants of these resource-rich areas.

Causes for the protests are also linked in one of the news articles to neoliberalism and the 1993 Constitution (Lynch, 2023), as well as extractivism of natural resources (Lynch, 2023). This is also supported by the views of some of the people that I spoke with during my observations of the protest activities in Cusco, who mentioned neoliberalism as a reason for why they were protesting, with neoliberalism perceived as being against the people. This is closely tied to the 1993 Constitution that is embedded in neoliberalism. Therefore, people perceive the Constitution as being



purely about privatisation and enriching the elite, while exploiting the populations that live in resource-rich areas. This explains why people are also protesting for a new Constitution. Grievances are based on political and economic exclusion and I argue that the established colonial system is a source for the ongoing inequalities. Therefore, linking with decolonial scholarship, these protests can be seen as challenging and confronting the colonial world order in the sense that protesters are wanting to constitutionally move their country away from neoliberalism to include alternative perspectives.

One of the main emerging themes from the thematic analysis was the polarisation of society. Peruvian society is deeply polarised, with the southern regions being among the most marginalised and poor. I believe this to be one of the most important reasons for explaining the protests and in particular for why southern regions are protesting. Peru is a highly unequal country and its centralism means that Andean and Amazonian regions have hardly benefited from the economic boom (Redacción Gestión, 2023; Murillo, 2023). This is reflected in the wide gap in living standards between the capital city and the south of the country in particular (Redacción Gestión, 2023; O'Boyle, 2023; Olmo, 2023a). One of the articles summarises this gap, and the marginalisation of the south, as follows: *'The state has never invested sufficiently in the south, not in schools, not in hospitals or in any other public institution'* (My translation) (Olmo, 2023a).

Some articles speak about the internalisation of the colonial system (Sánchez, 2023; Agenda Estado de Derecho, 2023), with the Andes seen as Lima's colony (Gurmendi, 2023). This supports Quijano's (2007) argument that coloniality continues to be dominating, exploiting and discriminating formerly colonised societies. In Peru, coloniality has led to deep ethnic cleavages and the marginalisation of rural and indigenous people (del Aguila, 2023; Murillo, 2023; Gamarra, 2023; Gurmendi, 2023). The political and economic decisions being made in Lima are completely out of touch with the realities of millions of people in the country. One of the people I spoke to phrased it that *'we have to understand that Lima alone is not Peru'* (My translation). Yet Lima continues to dominate, while campesino and indigenous populations continue to live in poverty and be exploited by the colonial system.

Differences between industrialised and mostly white and mestizo urban areas, and agricultural indigenous rural areas are made evident in the census data. According to the National Census (INEI, 2017), around 21% of Peru's population live in rural areas and 69% of rural



inhabitants dedicate themselves to agriculture for their livelihoods. The majority of campesino communities are located in the southern departments of Puno, Cusco and Ayacucho (ibid.). Campesinos make up around 10% of the Peruvian population, with the greatest number of campesino communities speaking Quechua (69%) or Aymara (9%) (ibid.). People who speak a native language as their first language (Quechua, Aymara or an Amazonian language) are more affected by poverty than those who primarily speak Spanish, with around 32% of people speaking an indigenous language being classified as poor compared to 24% of those who speak Spanish (INEI, 2022). Geographically, Andean rural areas experience the highest poverty levels with 44% of the population being classified as poor (ibid.). Furthermore, 60% of the country's extremely poor are located in the Andean highlands (ibid.). This makes evident some of the deep inequalities in the country.

The divisions, inequalities and marginalisation, that polarise Peruvian society can further be seen through the clear regional differences in political opinions. As spoken about above, the south was one of the regions with highest levels of support for Castillo, in whom they had placed great hopes for representing their interests (O'Boyle, 2023; Murillo, 2023). The findings from the IEP surveys further support this. In an IEP survey during the 2021 elections (Zárate, 2021a), 58% of those in the south said they intended to vote for Castillo, the highest percentage countrywide. This was because they thought he would bring about political change (Zárate, 2021b). In terms of evaluating Castillo's presidency just before his ousting, in general he did not have high approval rates at 26% countrywide, however the centre and south of the country most approved his presidency at around 40% of the population with 23% disapproving, compared to 12% of people approving Castillo in Lima and 60% disapproving (Zárate, 2022). When asked if people would participate in protests in favour of moving forward elections or in favour of ex-President Castillo, the south was both times the region where the highest amount of people would participate, with 86% in the south participating in a protest to move forward elections and 63% protesting in support of ex-President Castillo (ibid.). Lima scored lowest for both, with 60% hypothetically protesting to move forward elections and only 23% protesting in support of Castillo (ibid.). When Dina Boluarte assumed presidency in December 2022, 71% of the Peruvian population was in disagreement with this decision, with 84% of people in the south making it the region where people were most dissatisfied (ibid.).

Finally, the news articles showed further polarisation through the racism that has been experienced by protesters. Some of the news articles spoke about the numerous ways in which protesters had experienced racism (Agenda Estado de Derecho, 2023), being named in derogatory ways (Sánchez, 2023) or discriminated and insulted for their clothing (Sánchez, 2023). Protesters have also been portrayed as terrorists (Gurmendi, 2023). The IEP survey from January (Zárate, 2023) shows that in Lima, as many as 38% believe that violent groups and groups with connections to terrorism make up the most important actors in the protests, whereas only 14% in the south believe this. When talking about internal and external viewpoints of collective identity, Melucci (1995) argued for the existence of an inherent tension between the definition a movement gives itself and the recognition granted to it by the rest of society. In this case, certain sectors of society have worked to villainise the protest movement, giving protesters a collective terrorist or criminal identity. This external viewpoint of the protests' collective identity can stigmatise all those that share this identity and lead to further polarisation of society.

#### *5.4 Demographics of protesters*

Going off the previous section and the racism experienced by protesters, this next theme takes a closer look at the demographics of protesters for explaining heightened levels of protest in the south of Peru.

The news articles most commonly describe protesters as being campesino or indigenous. Overall, the English language sources in particular include the term indigenous when referring to the recent protests (Calanche, 2023; Gamarra, 2023; Collyns, 2023). However based off my previous discussion on indigeneity, those sectors of the population primarily active in the protests would not describe themselves as indigenous, rather as campesino. As touched upon in 5.2 *Geographical variations in protest activity*, Figure 4 has shown much less protest occurring in Amazonian regions of Peru. For me, this echoes the debates on indigeneity that I have attempted to outline previously. According to the way Peruvian indigenous self-identify and are described as according to the Census (INEI, 2017), those living in the Andes are campesino, while those living in the Amazon are indigenous. The map below (Figure 5) from the 2017 Census on campesino communities (INEI, 2017) also shows the distribution of communities according to the indigenous language that is most commonly spoken. It shows a very large proportion of campesino communities being concentrated in the southern parts of the country who speak primarily Quechua

(light red), and Aymara (dark red), with campesino communities further up the coast speaking primarily Spanish (yellow). I argue that this map broadly correlates with the map on the geographical distribution of protest events (Figure 4). In comparison, I have also included a map (Figure 6) on indigenous communities and the languages spoken by them, which shows a very different distribution of communities when compared to Figure 4, that is much more affiliated with Amazonian regions of Peru. These communities are mainly concentrated in areas that did not see much protest activity during the 2022/2023 protests. Therefore I argue that this demographic of the Peruvian population does not identify with the protests, despite arguably sharing grievances such as marginalisation and exclusion. However, they do not share the campesino identity which I argue is one of the key factors in mobilising people in the protests, which helps explain why Indigenous communities in Amazonian areas have not been mobilising.




Figure 5: Campesino communities registered by main language spoken.  
Source: INEI (2017)




Figure 6: Indigenous communities registered by main language spoken.  
Source: INEI (2017)

I believe the core of this protest movement to be rooted in the campesino identity. Therefore, identity matters in these protests and especially collective identity. Campesino protesters share a collective ethnic identity by identifying as campesino and are able to mobilise around this identity to express demands that are based in the discrimination and exclusion of the very identity that is being mobilised around. As Jima-González and Paradela-López (2021) argue, in NSM theory, even if a collective identity is already present, this identity is ‘new’ when it is used to foster self-realisation. In this case, while the campesino identity is nothing new, it is new in the context of the protests in the sense that campesino populations are collectively mobilising around this identity.

I believe that the comparison between these two maps in itself clearly signals that the protests can be identified with campesinos much more than with indigenous populations of Peru. Crucial to understanding this is the the particular distinction in Peru between campesino and indigenous communities, that foreign, in particular Western, news sources may not be aware of. This may explain why a lot of the news articles referred to the protests as being indigenous. However, it is interesting to observe that while many of the English language news articles referred to protesters as indigenous, many of the Spanish language news sources do not use the term indigenous as much when referring to the protesters, instead more commonly referring to them as campesinos (Olmo, 2023b; Redacción Gestión, 2023; Coronel, 2023; Lynch, 2023). Perhaps there is a greater awareness between the distinction in the Spanish language news due to greater familiarity with the region.

Going off my own observations, the majority of protesters in Cusco were not from the city but were campesinos from surrounding small communities. These communities had organised marches toward Cusco’s Plaza de Armas, or main square. One of the first big protest days saw thousands of campesinos from communities all over the department of Cusco rallying in the city. Some of the communities organised for trucks to bring them to the city, while others walked for hours before reaching the city. Campesino communities in the department of Cusco are typically Quechua speaking and based off the earlier discussion, can be classified as indigenous. They are those of the Peruvian population who feel abandoned by the political elite in Lima. One person I spoke to in Cusco summed up the centrality of the demography of these protests as follows: *‘There has to be a real change. This real change in Peru will not come from the middle class, the students, the educated. The real change will be made by the rural, the campesino brothers once they reach government. Therefore, I consider for this change to happen, our Aymara, Quechua, and modern*

*Andean brothers have to reach government and realise this government with the wisdom of the people, with the wisdom they have inherited from our ancestors*'. (My translation)

As the protests progressed, other demographics also became more active as some of the news articles describe, particularly student groups when the protests shifted towards *la toma de Lima* (Olmo, 2023b; Murillo, 2023; Calanche, 2023; Stefanoni, 2023). Whooley (2007) highlights the participation of diverse identities in a social movement, who must attempt to build solidarity across these identities. Flesher Fominaya (2018) argues that collective identity can be forged between heterogeneous actors through a common adherence to a series of autonomous principles. In this case, particularly in Lima, student groups may not share a collective identity based on ethnicity with the campesino protesters, yet they share common demands on the basis of which these groups can build a collective identity with campesino protesters.

### *5.5 Foreign influences*

Further, the protests lost intensity in most of the country from February but continued in certain zones of the south, in particular in Puno (Coronel, 2023; Šerić, 2023). The government has also declared a state of emergency primarily in southern departments (Collins, 2023; Taj, 2023). Here, I expand on some of the reasons of why the protests have continued to be so persistent in the region close to Bolivia, and the claims that foreign influences may play a part in this.

Some of the news articles mention claims made by the Peruvian government of the involvement of foreign interests in the protests (Calanche, 2023; Agenda Estado de Derecho, 2023; Šerić, 2023). In particular, news sources frequently talk about Bolivia in relation to the protests. This occurs in two different ways, either in how similar protest movements in Bolivia inspired the protests in Peru (Coronel, 2023; Gamarra, 2023), or more commonly in terms of the direct role of Bolivia in the Peruvian protests (Coronel, 2023; Olmo, 2023a).

Concerning how protest movements in Bolivia may have inspired those in Peru, parallels could be drawn due to the similarity of demographic compositions, where in Bolivia campesino mobilisations saw large successes in bringing Evo Morales to power. As argued by Munck (2020) and Almeida and Ulate (2015), in Bolivia, the campesino movement was able to craft a solid set of social and political alliances with non-indigenous sectors and saw large success in the landslide

victory of Evo Morales and the constitutional declaration of Bolivia as a plurinational State. While undoubtedly Castillo was no Morales in that he failed to bring about significant change to the country while he was in office, the mobilisations among campesinos following his ousting show the discontent of these sectors of the population and their desire for change. According to one article, Morales has claimed that some Peruvians have told him *'we will rise up like you'* (My translation) (Agencia EFE, 2023), hinting at how mobilisations in Bolivia could have directly inspired sectors of the Peruvian population.

In terms of Bolivian involvement in the Peruvian protests, more specifically involvement of Evo Morales in inciting protests, this is a narrative that has come up quite frequently in the news articles. Significantly, the government has banned former Bolivian President Evo Morales from entering Peru on suspicion of influencing the protesters (Calanche, 2023; del Aguila, 2023; Gamarra, 2023; Olmo, 2023a; Stefanoni, 2023). Morales has allegedly been active in southern regions of Peru, in particular around Puno but also in Cusco, interfering with Peru's internal affairs (Calanche, 2023), and promoting *RUNASUR*<sup>5</sup>, a project aiming to unite Indigenous peoples across the Andes and promoting a process of decolonisation (Gamarra, 2023; Olmo, 2023a).

Puno is important in this context as it is the region of Peru home to the majority of the country's Aymara population, as seen in Figure 5. It is argued that this sector of the Peruvian population is much closer to its 'Aymara cousins' across the border in Bolivia, especially in comparison to the Peruvian elite in Lima (Olmo, 2023a; Gamarra, 2023). For this reason, there has also been talk about a movement for independence of this region. For example, one of the articles includes the following quotation: *'For the first time there is talk about permanently breaking with Lima'* (My translation) (Olmo, 2023a). This could also explain why Puno has seen the most protests and why protests have persisted here when other regions have quietened down. Reasons for why protests are most persistent around Puno may also be found in questions of identity. While by the end of February, protests had begun to lose some momentum in Quechua regions, they continue in full strength in Aymara regions (Cabanillas, 2023), which, as shown in Figure 5, are those southern regions directly on the border to Bolivia. Here I believe that it is their Aymara identity that is driving the protesters.

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<sup>5</sup> RUNASUR was announced by Morales in 2021 as a regional integration mechanism that aims to unite Indigenous peoples, campesinos and worker movements of Latin America. Its main objective is the construction of a plurinational America that is incompatible with capitalism, imperialism or colonialism (Peoples Dispatch, 2021)

In this case, the Aymara collective ethnic identity explains the close ties with those who share this identity across the border in Bolivia, while the mestizo elite in Lima are greatly distanced from this identity. Melucci (1995) argues that a degree of emotional investment is required in defining collective identity, which makes individuals feel like they are part of a unit. In the case of Peru's Aymara population, they share the collective campesino identity with their predominantly Quechua-speaking counterparts, but with further emotional investment in the territoriality of the border region that separates them from their Bolivian 'cousins'. These Bolivian counterparts have in the past been able to successfully mobilise for a plurinational constitution among other things, and this may be providing additional motivation for those that share the Aymara ethnic identity in addition to the campesino identity. This Aymara identity is deeply rooted in place, transgressing the space of the Peruvian-Bolivian border. These place-based relations give the Aymara identity a significant meaning, which has resulted in collective action that has been more enduring in the territorialised Aymara regions than in other parts of the country. I believe this shows that, as argued by Escobar (2001), place can be extremely important in theorising and explaining social movements.

## **6 Discussion and conclusion**

I will now conclude by connecting together the different themes from the analysis. To reiterate, my research question is *How can the heightened levels of social protest in southern Peru be explained in the context of the 2022/2023 protests?*, with a sub-question of *How can the protests be considered a social movement?*

To answer the research questions, I made use of social movement theory, in particular through approaches using theories of collective identity, as well as more geographical discussions of place. I have also approached the question from a decolonial perspective to demonstrate the need for decolonial approaches to social movement theorising. As understood from the analysis, there are a number of interrelated factors that explain the heightened levels of protest in southern Peru during the 2022/2023 protests.

The demographic of the protesters is one explaining factor. As I have shown based off news articles and my own observations, the protests appear to be primarily a campesino movement. Additionally, based off historical contextualisations and contemporary census data, I have demonstrated that there is a high density of campesino communities in the southern regions of the country. Therefore, if the protests are a campesino movement and the campesino communities are in the south, this could certainly be a factor for heightened protest in the south. However, as Figure 4 has shown, there are campesino communities all along the Andes mountain range, so why are those in the south in particular seeing heightened mobilisation?

This is where place comes into the debate and I have argued that there are factors particular to the south of Peru that have converted it into the epicentre of the protests. The south has particular place-based grievances in that it is the region that is most marginalised and has some of the highest levels of poverty in the country. I believe these inequalities to have colonial origins that play out in the modern day through neoliberalism. Historically, the southern Andes of Peru were the heart of the Incan Empire, whose people became subject to cultural, political and economic domination by Spanish colonisers. This domination has continued into the present day, embodied in the marginalisation of these regions, whose only value is portrayed to be in its natural resources, which are extracted to feed the modern worlds' hunger for economic growth. This process portrays the underside of modernity that constitutes an ongoing colonial order, as argued by decolonial scholars through the modernity/coloniality matrix.

Aside from the deep divides and colonial processes that have made the south into the impoverished and marginalised region it is today, another factor that helps explain heightened protests in the south is the matter of identity, specifically collective identity. The south is the region home to the majority of the country's Quechua and Aymara speaking populations. Here I argue that it is not only the campesino identity, but the campesino identity combined with a Quechua and Aymara identity that protesters collectively organise under. While the campesino identity has been one identity that people across the country have mobilised under, the Quechua and Aymara collective identity has provided an additional mobilising factor. This identity can be seen to mobilise people due to colonial processes of racialisation that have served to doubly marginalise these people through the suppression of their languages and cultural expressions. This has led to stigmatisation of Quechua and Aymara campesinos in the current day, while simultaneously there exists a reverence of Peru's Inca heritage for a global audience. However, Castillo and his promises



for change spoke to these populations in particular, who felt they finally had someone they could relate to in the national political arena. When he could not deliver, Castillo nonetheless served these populations in organising collectively to try and bring about change by their own means, which adds to explanations of why the south has experienced heightened protest mobilisations.

The Aymara identity takes on a further dimension of significance when considered in relation to the border and the closeness to Aymara populations in Bolivia, who are linguistically, socioculturally and geographically much closer to the Peruvian Aymara population than those Peruvians who govern the country in Lima. Here, I have used theories of collective ethnic identity to explain why the region around Puno in particular established itself as the epicentre of protests, as can be seen in the geographical visualisation of the protests in Figure 4. I have argued that the Aymara identity is a place-based identity that is emotionally tied to a border-transgressing territoriality. Having seen how mobilisations in Bolivia have led to a plurinational constitution may therefore provide additional significance for Peru's Aymara population who have not been able to share such a success, but whose identity provides a deep interconnectedness that cannot be broken by a border.

Significant linkages to Bolivia are additionally made when discussing the potential direct role of Bolivia in the protests that has been spoken about in the news articles, which can also help explain the high levels of mobilisation in the south of the country. This is because former Bolivian President Evo Morales has been active in the south of Peru in promoting RUNASUR, and is claimed to have helped fuel separatist thinking around Puno in particular, which may have heightened peoples' propensity to mobilise. For this reason, the Peruvian government declared Morales a *persona non grata*. Morales may certainly have had reasons to try and mobilise campesino populations in Peru and strengthen the project of RUNASUR. However, I also believe that banning Morales from entering Peru may be a strategy of scapegoating and blaming an outsider for the country's problems, instead of confronting the reality of how the complete polarisation of Peruvian society may have led to the current situation. In this sense, Morales and his actions in Peru are not the problem, rather the problem is the proliferation of a political and economic system deeply rooted in coloniality, that does little to change the marginalised status of campesino populations of Peru, especially those that are doubly repressed in their Quechua and Aymara identities. This makes the coloniality of modernity evident.

In terms of answering my sub-question, I have engaged with theoretical discussions on social movements to explore the ways in which social movement theory can be applied to the protests. As has been argued in the theory section, as part of a decolonial approach, there is a great need for Latin American theorising on social movements, rather than applying theories developed in the North American and European contexts to a Latin American reality. My approach argues that place and identity are two important theoretical concepts in the study of protest movements such as the one under study in this thesis, which could be developed with further decolonial theorising.

In conclusion, I believe that all of the above factors together provide a coherent explanation for the heightened levels of protest in southern Peru during the 2022/2023 protests. Coloniality, identity and place are the crucial theoretical concepts that play into the explanations that I have developed in this thesis. Therefore, I believe there is a great need for decolonial scholarship that theorises the development of social movements such as this one from the bottom-up, in order to make sense of such contexts rooted in coloniality, and in order to provide alternatives.

As this is a context specific case study, the findings from this research cannot be generalised or applied to a different context. However, my aim has been to make evident the structural reasons that give the south of Peru a high propensity to protest, so my findings may be useful to other studies on this specific region. While I have included the role of Bolivia and Morales in my analysis, the scope of the research did not allow me to go too in depth on this. I believe that this could provide a fruitful area of study for future research, specifically in terms of the Aymara population that transcends the border. A place-based approach to the Puno region could go much more in depth on the Aymara population of Peru that is separated from its Bolivian counterparts due to the border. In this conclusion I have also hinted at the concept of the border that itself stems from colonial practices. Before the Spanish invasion of Latin America, the Incan empire spread throughout the continent and country borders were drawn up only as part of the colonial process. Therefore, this could also make for a highly interesting further research, looking at the impacts of colonial processes of border-making on the Peruvian Aymara population and how this relates to their propensity for collective mobilisation.

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## 8 Appendix

### Codebook for the thematic analysis

Name	Example	Files	References
<b>causes for protest</b>			
immediate causes for protest	sparked by the ousting of former President Pedro Castillo last month	7	7
structural and underlying causes for protest	grievances of protesters are all but new; they reflect a system that has failed to deliver for over twenty years	14	22
<b>demographics of protesters</b>			
mobilisation of campesinos	el pueblo y las comunidades campesinas se movilizan (the people and the campesino communities are mobilising)	6	9
mobilisation of indigenous	it has shown the mobilising capacity of Indigenous people	5	9
other demographics	discontent is spreading into new sectors, including university students	6	13
<b>foreign influences</b>			
role of Bolivia and Morales	Morales has been blamed by the Peruvian government for stirring up the protests - indeed he has now been banned from entering Peru	7	14
<b>geographical variations in protest activity</b>			
across the country	se han producido protestas en todo el país (protests have taken place across the country)	5	6
the andes	the Andes mountain range has become the epicentre of antigovernment protests	2	2
the south	a wave of protests with its epicentre in the south of the country	16	29
<b>organisation of protest</b>			
acts of protest	roadblocks, marches and confrontations	8	9
demands of protesters	protesters are demanding Boluarte's resignation, Congress' closure, a new constitution and Castillo's release	17	32
lack of organisation	the demonstrations have no clear leadership nor a unanimous set of grievances	5	11
organised protest movement	estas protestas, en extensión e intensidad son inéditas en la historia nacional y tienen una agenda claramente política (these protests, in terms of extent and intensity, are unprecedented in national history and have a clearly political agenda)	8	19
<b>polarisation of society</b>			

Name	Example	Files	References
division, inequality, and marginalisation	Peru is a highly unequal country: power and financial resources tend to be concentrated in the hands of a white urban elite, while a significant indigenous rural minority suffers from racism and a lack of economic opportunity	12	29
racism against protesters	es importante también señalar el racismo contra quienes protestan (it is also important to note the racism against those who are protesting)	4	5
regional differences in political opinions	the south had supported Castillo and prior left-wing options, even when none of them seemed to make a dent into the power of Lima's elites	9	16