The roots of Arab Islam as a state identity

A numismatic approach to the emergence of Arab Islam as a public identity in the Near East during the rule of 'Abd al-Malik (685-705 C.E.)

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Abstract

The ideas and interests of how to move forward with the new religion and its new caliphate during the first century of Islam, were often varied and were in conflict. In the year 77 A.H (696-697 C.E.), the first Islamic Dinar was minted as a part of a wider state reform. Its abstract art and focus on language and religion symbolized the start of a new state identity that influenced a later systematization of a proto-Sunni Islam. The new Islamic design however, stood at odds with the anthropomorphic and politically charged art in previous coins and in the private houses of the elite.

This thesis aims to better understand why the Umayyad Islamic and Arab identities started to become so intertwined in the presence of other alternatives during the emergence of Islam. To answer that, this thesis studies the development of Islamic art on four representative coins to illustrate the changes in state identity building between 685 C.E. and 705 C.E. The material is then used to study the Umayyad identity from three perspective. (1) Islam is looked at as an offshoot of Messianic Judaism, (2) the private and public buildings of the Umayyads are compared against the coins to discern the boundaries of a state identity projected to the masses and a personal identity of the Umayyad elite coloured by Judeo-Christian culture, then (3) a new emergence of Islam as an organized religion is studied from the perspective of the policies of 'Abd al-Malik.

The thesis finds a link between the development of a unifying state identity and 'Abd al-Malik's aim for legitimacy. To avoid a future threat to the Umayyad claim to the caliphal throne, 'Abd al–Malik's way out was several trials that reshaped the identity of the state, society, and religion.

Acknowledgements

A friend who was practicing to be a barista once told me, that one must do a thousand caffè lattes before it is recognised as a 'proper' caffè latte, and them as a 'proper' barista. That could have been true in some circles, but the attitude is universal, I thought. If this thesis was a caffè latte, it was not rewritten a thousand times, but was rewritten a few times.

Every time the cup is warm and foamy, a proper barista tries it, points towards a more appropriate method or flavour, and asks me to redo it. Many baristas, colleagues, and customers of general interest to the field would take a sip and leave their insights. In the process, both me and thesis moved a little step further with every interaction.

The writing of this thesis was not as straightforward, or as often, as one would have liked, but I hope that it led to a better product. I am a long way from calling myself a barista, but I am thankful to all the professors, colleagues, family, and friends who took the time and interest to guide through the endless ways of making coffee.

What started as curiosity towards some odd Islamic coins with icons on, turned into a much bigger project of studying the building new identities and the tossing of old ones. This thesis is but a fragment in the prospects of this study. The end is nevertheless inevitable and necessary for new beginnings.

The years spent in the Religious Roots of Europe (RRE) programme, were shaped by the contributions of many to whom I am sincerely grateful. The following might sound a like a cliché, but it really did take a village to raise this child.

1. Introduction

1.1. Overview and relevance of the topic

What is Islamic identity? This debated question has always been crucial among scholars as well as among the public. Since the dissolution of the Ottoman empire in 1922, official Islamic identity was left without a central authority to officially shape it. A call to revive Islamic unity and mend the fragmented caliphate was raised more in the Arab world than in Turkey and Iran, where Ataturk and Reza Shah worked to downplay religious influences.[1] Until recently, campaigns for Arab unity were raised and were sometimes dominant. However, the victors of the First Great War had a new model of nation-states in mind.[2] The creation of new nation-states modelled after the Westphalian sovereignty model peeked in the Near East right after the Ottoman withdrawal. By the end of the twentieth century until today however, the disintegration of Arab nationalism and of state nationalism in the Near East fuelled calls for secular democracy as well as calls to revive the Islamic political role. Waves of Islamic revival manifested in a variety of sub-movements. The spectrum of contemporary Islamic movements ranged from seeking to reintroduce religious rhetoric into the contemporary context, to trying to change the context to fit the religious rhetoric of a previous 'golden' era.

The question has mostly revolved around the definition of Islamic identity, its relation to national identities, and which voice is 'the' representative voice of Islam. I do not think that it is possible to undertake a quest to present one coherent form of contemporary Islamic identity, not even under a legitimate caliphate. What can be more fruitful is to discuss the mesh of Islamic identities that complement and rival each other.

In this research, I investigate the period when Arab Muslims began to promote their identity as a state identity for the first time, namely during the reign of the Umayyad 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwān (685–705). The official artistic adaptation during his reign could provide us with a revised understanding of identity within the political struggle in early Islam. Despite the tremendous difference between the seventh and twenty-first centuries, 'Abd al-Malik was influential on and similar to many contemporary aspiring political religious leaders. As a descendent of the Umayyad throne who spent his youth with the religious circle in Medina, he was simply a human who profited from his political and religious connections to introduce and impose his Arab Muslim identity as 'the' official identity for centuries.

The twenty years of 'Abd al-Malik's rule is as important to us today as it was to his contemporaries in Late Antiquity. The reference to the Rashidun, Umayyad, and Abbasid caliphates as a golden age has been frequently used in the rhetoric of today's Islamists and Arab nationalists. Both groups might choose opposing reasons to support their rhetoric of the glory of early Islam, but the unity of a nation that has been separated by all kinds of borders has been a common cause. The failings of Arab nationalists, during the 1960's-70's, to sustain a sense of unity and equality in the Middle East, can be a key reason for people to turn to political Islam for a solution. The campaigns of both the secular nationalists and religious Islamists however, projected the period of early Islam as a source of inspiration.

The relevance of the era of 'Abd al-Malik lies in its similarity to our contemporary Middle East. Moreover, the state identity foundations that were built during his era established a reference point for the contemporary Arab and Islamic movements. The Umayyad elite used their Arab and Muslim heritage to transform a failing Umayyad caliphate torn between civil

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[1] Nikki R. Keddie, "Is There a Middle East?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 4, no. 3 (1973): 268–9, accessed March 29, 2023, http://www.jstor.org/stable/162159.
[2] Keddie, "Is There a Middle East?" 268–9.

wars, legitimacy crisis, and foreign involvements, into a relatively stable and prosperous empire. This empire laid a reference point for theology, scholarship, and harmonious coexistence. Oversimplification by later historians contributed to an image of a model golden era. Of course, elements of unity and prosperity of Umayyad Arab Islam existed but it was largely a result of institutional privilege to Arab Muslims after gaining larger control of expanding lands and a strong army. What is often left out of the traditional narrative is that the support and expertise of non-Muslim communities was crucial to the implementation of the Umayyad project. Like today, identity was always evolving, but language and recognition of the ruler's religion were more stable features. In our case, a language reform by 'Abd al-Malik began a systematic process to introduce Arabic and Islam to everyone within the Umayyad borders.

'Abd al-Malik struggled with internal and external rivalry when he inherited the rule of vast lands that were inhabited by multi-ethnic and multi-lingual populations. However, while 'Abd al-Malik was almost done neutralizing his competition using force and diplomacy, he commenced a campaign of Arabisation of the state. This campaign was the earliest systematic effort, since the death of Muḥammad in 632, to impose an official identity on an Islamic state.[3] This campaign was also the first to use Arabic as the official language of an Islamic state, including non-Muslims within the borders, and thus leading to later fusion of Arab and Muslim identities.

1.2. Aim and research questions

Since intermittent periods of aniconism trended in Judaism and Christianity before it did in Islam, it seems odd that the Umayyads adopted aniconism when their contemporaries began to drop it. The fact that icons existed on Islamic coins suggests a relaxed attitude of early Muslim to secular images and suggests that public and secular aniconism started at least during the period of 'Abd al-Malik. Despite this apparent public shift to aniconism, the private spheres of the Umayyad elite did not seem to have made that shift. If this were to be true, it would stand against the general contemporary Islamic conservative assumption that absolute aniconism started much earlier. It would also open the possibility for the existence of an art that is less abstract, but still considered as Sunni Islamic.

Looking at the history of Islamic reforms, one cannot but notice two marginal but important periods that pushed Islamic thinking into a direction of defensive conservatism. The first is the Mongol invasion that ended the Abbasid caliphate in 1258, and the second is the colonial and post-colonial waves of secularism after the defeat of the Ottoman empire in 1918. The first produced a defensive and controversial Islamic reform led by Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), and the second period resulted in the emergence of Salafism whose religious reform was built on the work on Ibn Taymiyya.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the starting point of when caliphates began to adopt an Arab Islamic face. This is done by having another look at early Islam, as the reference point for most reformists, to try to discern the political aspect from the theological. The logic behind the study of art is that if the early Muslims used anthropomorphic images, then abstraction in art must be a personal or a political choice rather than an Islamic command. To apply this logic on the rest of early Islamic questions can challenge ideas that became traditional after historical accumulation. It can open the door to new possibilities that can bridge gaps in today's Muslim-Muslim and Muslim-non-Muslim relations, just like it did in the seventh century.

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[3] Luke Treadwell, "Abd al–Malik's Coinage Reforms: The Role of the Damascus Mint," *Revue Numismatique* 6 (2009), 1.

The main research question is why did the Arab and the Muslim identities became strongly associated even though non-Muslim Arabs and non-Arab Muslims were the majority?

To assess the relevance of my material to this question, I investigate what appears to be the foundation of a new identity developed in Damascus to accommodate an expatriated elite with their heritage and with the local culture. To understand and frame the historical complexity of Umayyad politics towards the diverse communities within borders and abroad, I look at the coinage as a case study, relate it to other tools of state identity, and ask several minor questions that can assist in answering the main research question.

- Why did the experimental stage of figurative Islamic art in coinage lasted from 292 C.E. to 296/7, while abstract Islamic art lasted for centuries?

- Why did figurative Islamic art last longer in the art of private Umayyad houses? Why did the Umayyad secure religious legitimacy in the presence of seemingly better qualified candidates?

- What is the connection between the persecution of Umayyad opponents and the identity presented on coins?

- Why did the Umayyad elite reimagine an Arab Muslim heritage and embed it in their state, when assimilating to the local Hellenic culture seemed easier?

- And why did the reforms of 'Abd al-Malik affect Islamic theology, when they appeared to centre on language and administrative state policy?'

1.3. The relevance of coins

Coins had access to virtually everyone within the Umayyad realm and were especially concentred among those who had a certain privilege and an influence within their society. The coinage of Umayyad caliphate during the seventh century, was also a contested issue. Shifting political borders and forgery meant that quality and imagery of the coins were important markers of legitimacy. A Muslim political leader from Ḥijāz had to find a currency that the Sasanian and byzantine influenced populations would accept to use. His work on the standardization of coinage in quality and art was one of the main pillars that shaped later Islamic coinage and art. He developed an Islamic style that became widely accepted by Muslims and non-Muslims a like.

Coinage during the reign of 'Abd al-Malik changed from being issued in local regions and abroad with diverse designs, to being issued by a central authority using anthropomorphic designs, to being issued by a central authority using what later was known as 'Islamic design.' Changes in the design of coins often conveys new messages from the state. And that is especially true about 'Abd al-Malik whose coins suggested responses to intra-Islamic and Byzantine confrontations.

1.4. Research overview

Since the thesis is divided into three parts, my overview of scholarship shall also be split accordingly. My topic starts with the historical background of the foundations that led to an Umayyad change of policy, in order to show how unlikely their success was. A qualitative and comparative study of the art on the issued coins then follows. The results are then analysed from several perspectives and crossed with other art forms to better understand the topic. I am looking at the change of style in coinage, and other art forms, as an echoing manifestation of the historical and theological change of Arab Islamic identity. To understand how Arab and Islamic

identities merged into one, a detailed understanding and interaction of history, art, and identity development is needed.

The focus on identity projected on art within the context of historical events seems to be lacking during a game changing era like 'Abd al-Malik's. Several quality papers and books are already published and cover various parts of my topic, but they do not seem to address why the early Arab Islamic public art quickly changed to aniconism. A diachronic analysis of early Arab Islamic identity that covers both the anthropomorphic and the abstract areas seems to lack, and that is what the thesis undertakes. As explained below, the thesis uses a diachronic, qualitative, and comparative study using several lenses while relying on scholarship based on western and Arabic academia.

1.4.1. Research on the historical context

For a historical overview, Mouhammad Suhail Ṭaqūsh[4] is used as a representative source for the historical narrative of Arabic academia due to the similarity of content among most Arabic sources. Ṭaqūsh however, offers a critical review of the Arabic scholarly narrative. In his study of the Umayyad history, he discusses historical events from a traditional perspective while being aware that the traditional Umayyad history had been written by anti–Umayyad historians during the Abbasid period.

The work of Chase's F. Robinson[5] is used for his comprehensive approach to history in relation to social and cultural factors, while being critical to early traditional sources. Jan's Hjärpe[6] and Fred's M. Donner[7] works share a similar foundation to that of Ṭaqūsh and Robinson but with a focus on intra-Muslim relations. Suliman's Bashear[8] book on the other hand, approaches the validity issues of early sources by using a literary approach to the sources instead of a historical one. Bashear's literary perspective is at odds with Robinson's suspicion of early texts. The missing historical context of Bashear's work however, is provided by Robinson, Ṭaqūsh, and the other scholars.

There is a limit in time and space to go into the chronicle of Dionysius I Telmaharoyo, the head of the Syriac Orthodox Church from between 818 and 845. However, His coverage of the history of 'Abd al-Malik in comparison with narrative of Islamic historians of the same period will be briefly looked at. Both sources share many similarities, but they cover different details concerning coinage and the reasons behind switching currencies. Dionysius mentions coins during the beginning of the era of 'Abd al-Malik that I have not seen anywhere else. These coins bear the name 'Abd al-Malik on one side and the name of Muḥammad on the other side, following the tradition of previous kings.[9]

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[4] *Mouhammad Suhail Ṭaqūsh, History of the Umayyad State (Beirut: Dār Annafā'es, 1988), 66-102.*

[5] Chase F. Robinson, "The Rise of Islam, 600–705," in *The Formation of the Islamic World: Sixth to Eleventh Centuries*, vol. 1, *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, ed. by Chase F. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[6] Jan Hjärpe, "Kalifatens Tid (662–1258)," in *Islam: en Religionsvetenskaplig Introduktion*, ed. by Susanne Olsson and Simon Sorgenfrei, 79–92. (Stockholm: Författarna och Liber AB, 2015).

[7] Fred M. Donner, "Muhammad and the Caliphate: Political History of the Islamic Empire up to the Mongol Conquest," in *The Oxford History of Islam*, ed. by John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[8] Suliman Bashear*, Arabs and others in Early Islam* (Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1997).

[9] Anonymous, "Extract from the Chronicle of AD 1234," in *The Seventh Century in the West Syrian Chronicles*, trans. Andrew Palmer (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), 204-5.

1.4.2. Research on the Near East numismatics of 685-705

According to western numismatic scholarship, the Umayyads and the Byzantines of the seventh century used coins as a platform to portray their symbols of power and as a physical reminder of their hegemony. The Umayyads, a growing power of an Arab Muslim elite, used the existing monetary system of their conquered populations, but mainly used Sassanid technology and Byzantine designs.

A recurring theme in western scholarship is the Byzantine and Sassanid influence on the emerging Umayyads. The influence is present chiefly in the use of Byzantine symbols in Arab-Byzantine coins, as it was later called, and the countermarking of existing coins with Islamic symbols, such as inscribing 'Bismillah' بسم الله on a Sassanid coin.

An expansive work was done by researchers affiliated with a series of discussions under the title of the 'Seventh Century Syrian Numismatic Round Table.' During these seminars, issues on what qualifies as Arab symbolism (for example Egyptian Arab-Byzantine coins had been neglected as Arab coins until recently since they did not include Arabic inscriptions), imitations, countermarking were discussed at length. Their work is used for most of the detailed numismatic discussion. The backbone of these studies are the encyclopaedic studies of Michael L. Bates,[10] whose work is used as a background to Arab-Sasanian, Byzantine, and pseudo-Byzantine coinage.

The works of Tony Goodwin,[11] and Ingrid and Wolfgang Schulze,[12] are valuable for their setting of terminology and for the analysis of the images on coins of the second period (692-696/7 C.E.). Luke Treadwell[13] focuses on the numismatic period of 'Abd al-Malik. In his research, Treadwell is one of few who cover every numismatic period of my topic while connecting them to their contemporary historical events. Most of the remaining numismatic research, though valuable, mostly focuses on one period or one design.

Expert voices in Arabic tend to be missing on the periods before the Islamic dinar, while more abundant after the Islamic dinar. Due to this imbalance, more space is given to the previous studies for numismatic discussions, while the studies in Arabic are used for general knowledge on the numismatic and historical developments after 'Abd al-Malik. The other reason for not relying on various sources in Arabic is often the overlapping of information and the limited original discussion for the time of 'Abd al-Malik.

Most of the scholarship in Arabic seem to agree on the technical details presented in western scholarship, however, the focus is not the same. Sources written in Arabic tend to omit the discussion about who had influenced who in the minting process. They tend to be more general in their approach and cover the changes in coinage only as one of the many components of the

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[10] Michael Bates, "Byzantine Coinage and Its Imitations, Arab Coinage and Its Imitations: Arab–Byzantine Coinage." *Aram* 6 (1994).

[11] Tony Goodwin, "The Chronology of the Umayyad Imperial Image Coinage: Progress over the last 10 years," *Arab–Byzantine Coins and History* (2012): 89–108, accessed March 17, 2023, https://www.academia.edu/14406427/;

And Tony Goodwin, "The Standard Terminology in SICA 1," in *Arab–Byzantine Coins and History*, ed. Tony Goodwin (London: Archetype Publications, 2012), 2–4;

And Tony Goodwin, "Standing Caliph Imagery Revisited," in *Coinage and History in the Seventh Century Near East* 5, ed. Tony Goodwin (London: Archetype Publications, 2017).

[12] Wolfgang Schulze, "Symbolism on the Syrian Standing Caliph Copper Coins," in *Coinage and History in the Seventh Century Near East* II, ed. Andrew Oddy (London: Archetype Publications, 2010).

[13] Treadwell, "Abd al–Malik's Coinage Reforms."

Umayyad identity. Arabic sources seem to share one narrative with minor differences here and there and are earlier than their western counterparts.

1.4.3. Research on identity formation during the era of 'Abd al-Malik

To analyse identity, I compare my discussion with the theory of Hagarism by Patricia Crone and Michael Cook.[14] Crone and Cook rely on archaeological findings and texts that are contemporary to early Islam. In their book they rewrite a history of early Islam that challenges the traditional Islamic narrative. Hagarism is the name of the religious movement that began with Muḥammad and that mirrored Jewish messianism. The messianic element continued after the death of Muḥammad with caliphs like 'Umar, according to Crone and Cook. However, Islam did not form until eighth century in Syria where the known version of the Qur'ān resulted from editing Judeo-Christian sources.

The work of Crone and Cook was criticized and could be outdated when used alone. When used as a complement to the traditional Arab Islamic sources however, it can offer a balancing factor and a healthy suspicion to context in which the traditional sources were written. It provides a narrative about early Islam exclusively told by non-Muslims which enriches the discussion. Cone and Cook point out that the traditional narrative of early Islamic history must be regarded as the narrative of the victor, and thus revaluated vis-à-vis archaeological evidence and narratives of the 'other.'

Using the analysis of art, and private and public identity by Garth Fowden,[15] offers more background to the analysis of coins as a part of other state tools. Fowden studies the art in Qusayr 'Amra as representative model for the private houses of the Umayyad elite. The figurative art found in private Umayyad houses seems to stand at odds with the abstract style that has dominated Islamic art. Fowden argues for the adaptation of the Umayyads as natives to the local Syrian culture. The Umayyads seemed to absorb the local culture without leaving any evidence that they brought their artistic style from Ḥijāz. The Umayyads seemed eager to experience the local art, but limitations were always emphasized to separate them from assimilating into their Judeo-Christian surroundings. Thus, an elitist community was formed that reimagined its heritage and projected its identity in private and public spheres, as Peter Webb[16] argues.

If the Umayyads used strikingly distinctive styles in their private houses and in public projects, like coins and mosques, then they must have had in mind different messages to different audiences. Regardless of how the Umayyads wanted to project their identity, intriguing evidence to the identity of later Islamic groups lies in the choice of preserving aniconism in coinage and public buildings. In the meantime, most of the figurative art that reflected Judeo-Christian influences had disappeared throughout the later Islamic caliphates.

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[14] Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, *Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

[15] Garth Fowden, *Qusayr 'Amra: Art and the Umayyad Elite in Late Antique Syria* (California: University of California Press, 2004).

[16] Peter Webb, "Identity and Social Formation in the Early Caliphate," in *Routledge Handbook on Early Islam*, ed. Herbert Berg (UK: Taylor & Francis Group, 2017).

To understand the dynamics of the Umayyad theological development I am helped by Abbas Barzegar[17] and Andrew Marsham.[18] Barzegar studies the formation of a "proto-Sunni" identity built on early Umayyad networks. Marsham's contribution lies in his use of collective identity and historical memory rather than theology and political to analyse the process of identity formation. The study of Umayyad networks, as well as collective identity and historical memory, can provide a more appropriate lens to look at the context where a chain of ḥadīth transmitters shaped the Umayyad theological development.

1.5. Method

While researching for literature, I could not find interaction between Western academic scholarship and Arabic academic scholarship, except their use of similar primary materials. A usage of diverse scholarship that study my topic from different perspectives is what the basic approach of the thesis. I think that it could be an added value since they tend to research associated topics but differ on the methods and motivations which at times results in two parallel narratives with minimal interaction. Voices that differ from the traditional Islamic narrative are used, without neglecting the traditional narrative.

1.5.1. Identity presented on official coinage as a point of departure

To investigate an identity in formation and experimentation, the thesis uses a diachronic, qualitative, and comparative approaches to the coinage and relevant artform. The thesis investigates the role coinage played to propagate a new identity during the reign of 'Abd al-Malik, while relating it to the historical and theological framework. It also draws a comparison to the coinage of his contemporary Byzantine Empire, especially under the rule of Justinian II (685-695 and 705-711 C.E.), as well as to art in public and private buildings.

The focus of the thesis is mostly on golden and silver coins instead of copper coins, since the use of different units differs in relation to extent of use and distribution.[19] The focus on golden and silver coins is therefore due to their higher value and symbolism. It is helpful to distinguish between Byzantine golden and Sasanian silver coins due to their varying levels of influence, craftmanship and in artistic presentation.

On the Byzantine side, identity portrayed on coins seem to portray Greek, Byzantine, imperial, Christian, and Roman identities. The Byzantine coins were the most uniformed during the seventh century.

The Umayyad coins portray Umayyad, Arab, and Islamic identities. Umayyad messages were prioritized to Arabic ones, and Arabic messages were prioritized to Islamic ones. The Umayyad style changed many times, but it seemed to convey similar symbolism, even if when the text was Greek, and the figure were Byzantine. The use of coinage as a public identity marker is therefore analysed, while looking at the other public and private identity markers.

Identity is used as the main lens while looking on the coins and while relating to the historical contexts of the material. The use of symbols to reflect an identity is treated as an appropriation of existing symbols rather than ownership. For instance, the complex appropriation of Byzantine, Arabic, Islamic, or power symbols by 'Abd al-Malik to reflect his authority can

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[17] Abbas Barzegar, ""Adhering to the Community" (Luzūm al–Jamā'a): Continuities between late Umayyad Political Discourse and "Proto–Sunni" Identity," *Review of Middle East Studies*, 49, no.2 (2016).

[18] Andrew Marsham, *Rituals of Islamic Monarchy: Accession and Succession in the First Muslim Empire* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009)

[19] Jere L. Bacharach, "Signs of Sovereignty: The "Shahāda," Qur'anic Verses, and the Coinage of Abd al–Malik," *Muqarnas: An Annual on the Visual Cultures of the Islamic World* 27 (2010): 3.

mean that such symbols are used and not owned by 'Abd al-Malik, even if he created a symbol from scratch. Thus, making the question of who influenced whom less relevant, since I am looking at different parties competing for dominance using a pool of available tools that all parties are taking from and contributing to. The focus is instead on why did 'Abd al-Malik began a process of Arabisation that affected the identity of the caliphate, and the public identity of the Umayyad elite especially.

To analyse the findings of the first two chapters, theoretical triangulation is used in the third chapter to form three perspectives for the analytical framework. (1) Islam as Judaism; an etic view of Islam as a branch of Messianic Judaism is used for the analysis of early Islamic identity. The theory of Hagarism by Crone and Cook[20] is used to assess the claims of an Islam of Samaritan influence being reformed in Umayyad Syria. (2) The personal choices of the caliph do not necessarily represent Islam; the work of Garth Fowden's[21] is used to investigate the social role of art, the issues of the public and the private, and of elite and commerce. Artwork on coinage suggested an idea on what Arabic Islamic identity was, but coinage was just a top-down manifestation of identity. Thus, the symbolism on coinage could be a control tool of the bureaucracy rather than representing this bureaucracy. A look at other semi– official and private artwork where the Umayyad elite has more space to express themselves, can give a better understanding of their personal identity. (3) Islam as Umayyad Arab Islam; the long-term influence of 'Abd al-Malik's reform, and his patronage networks, on forming a proto-Sunni identity is examined using Barzegar's[22] work and previous findings.

The underlying hypothesis of this thesis is that 'Abd al-Malik and his elite in the caliphate were battling out a civil war, a Byzantine threat, and had a changing mood of the population. To secure their rule and bring a state of peace and prosperity, the Umayyad elite had to work on administrative reform after and during their battles. They had to secure enough support from diverse population, therefore they had to unite their strongest supporters, i.e., Arab Muslims. A new unifying narrative had to be created after two civil wars, while ensuring that the practice of naming a successor by the living caliph will not be challenged again. Compiling the *ḥadīth* would probably be the most subtle but effective way of solidifying this new narrative. The by-products of this policy are to be seen in the public sphere, such as changes in coinage, public architecture, and theological development.

1.6. Terminology; Why calling the Umayyads as Umayyads could benefit the discussion more than calling them Arabs or Muslims?

I am aware of the complexity of the definition of an Arab. The definition is often tribal, and since the seventh century the religion of an Arab increasingly became Islam. A main argument in this thesis is that the Umayyads were one of many Islamic groups competing over influence over all subjects of the caliphates. In this context, the term 'Arab' would refer to the descendant of an Arab tribe. Arab tribes spread from Yemen to Syria and were predominantly Christian, Jewish, and Muslim.

The term 'Muslim' included all monotheists in early Islam. However, the meaning shifted during the Umayyads to exclude monotheists who did not follow the Quranic law or recognized Muḥammad as a prophet.[23] It is also interesting to note that in the beginning, the majority of those who converted to Islam where of Jewish and Christian backgrounds. After decades of

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[20] Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*.

[21] Fowden, *Qusayr 'Amra*.

[22] Barzegar, ""Adhering to the Community" (Luzūm al–Jamā'a)."

[23] Fred M. Donner, *Muhammad and the Believers: At the Origins of Islam* (Cambridge: The Belknap of Harvard University Press University Press, 2010), 203-4.

expansion however, the converts to the faith of Muḥammad were increasingly of neither Arab nor monotheistic background. I would therefore choose the later meaning of 'Muslim,' since my thesis focuses on the events after the change. By the term 'Muslim' I would refer to the confessor of Islam regardless of their tribe, language, or previous faith.

The manifestation of the Umayyad identities in relation to Islam was different in different contexts. Therefore, when discussing the multifaceted identity of the Umayyad elite, I mean the identity of the Umayyad elite only. To avoid misrepresentations, the Umayyad identity will be referred to as one of many Islamic identities, and not as the Islamic or the Arab identity. The same approach will be followed with other social groups.

Terms such as 'Arab Islam' and 'Arab Muslims' will be used to describe the public identity that emerged after the Arabisation reform of 'Abd al-Malik.

For the transliteration of Arabic words and names, a simplified version is adopted based on the system used by the International Journal of Middle East Studies.[24]

1.7. Summary of chapters

Judging on the coins of 'Abd al-Malik, I study the process that promoted his public image from a warrior-king to a Greco-Roman influenced emperor to a caliph who aimed to unite Arab Muslims. Three periods seem to emerge from classifying the coinage; these periods and the coins' artwork would be my guideline throughout the paper.

In the second chapter, I focus on the historical events and investigate why the Judeo-Christian heritage did not have a lasting influence on the Islamic identity, and why 'Abd al-Malik succeeded when his father lost the throne. I then discuss the effects of the Arabisation reform on the local elites and on the rest of the population, and why the Umayyad state survived despite a plague and a popular revolt.

In the third chapter, I take a closer look at four coins to study the style and symbolism during each period.

In the fourth chapter, I analyse the previous results while linking coinage to policy, art, architecture, and theology. I argue Crone and Cook's question "whence Islam?" and try to demarcate the formation of Islam as a set of beliefs and as an organised religion. I then then discuss social role of art and why the private sphere of the Umayyad elite contradicted with the public image presented in public buildings, coins, and the spirit of the Arabisation reform. I study another policy that echoed the unification theme portrayed on the public art. I discuss briefly the theological foundation laid by 'Abd al-Malik to insure a smooth and legitimate succession while keeping the state out of the divisive details of theological debates. Could these policies coupled with a focus to organise Islamic thought (e.g., gathering *ḥadīth* and employing major Islamic thinkers), produce a unifying proto-Sunni discourse that later Sunni theologians would build their work upon?

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[24] "IJMES Transliteration System for Arabic, Persian, and Turkish," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, accessed June 18, 2023, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-file-manager/file/57d83390f6ea5a022234b400/TransChart.pdf.

2. Why Islam became Arabic and iconoclastic? A study of the historical context that shaped state policy and identity

2.1. Introduction

The era of 'Abd al-Malik owes its uniqueness to its transformative struggles and reforms. Formative policies developed during an emerging Islam that led Muslims through a civil war, peace, and then a sense of an organised, united, and Arab Islamic identity. Playing on allegiances and fears of rival groups secured a victory for 'Abd al-Malik. A victory that then was fortified for centuries by revamping the bureaucracy of the first Arab Islamic state.

'Abd al-Malik's identity building project developed through three phases mirrored in his coinage, architecture, and an Arabisation policy. I will rely here on coinage as a mainframe and will focus in this chapter on the related historical events. Despite the apparent Greco-Hellenic influence on the Umayyad elite, they developed a state identity that replaced that Greco-Hellenic influence. My investigation will focus on how and why a new state identity was created.

In this chapter I will introduce the milieu, the mood of identity formations, and the stakeholders. Then I will attempt to analyse the three phases of coinage by linking them to the historical events of the same period. In the first period of 685–692 C.E. I will lay out the mood of the various movements that formed the mosaic of a growing Umayyad society and how they have interacted with the Umayyad elite. In the second period of 692–696/7 I will cover the larger reforms in public administration that laid a foundation for an Umayyad identity. In the third period of 696/7–705 I will discuss the second wave of rebellion and how it led the Umayyad elite into adopting an Arab Islamic identity that framed 'Abd al–Malik as the second founder of Islam.

2.1.1. Instead of Christianity or Judaism, why did the Umayyad identity adopt Arab Islam?

The second half of the seventh century held the fate of the Umayyads. They were a growing political power that struggled against regional empires, while facing various conflicts with internal rebel groups. The policy towards their newly acquired provinces was to appoint entrusted family and loyalists to govern, while keeping the native administrative body at work. In other words, the Byzantine administrative staff in the conquered Byzantine regions was barely affected during the beginning of the Umayyad conquest. Thus, the regional administrative systems were unscathed, and coinage was part of these systems.[25]

In short, early Islam was far from having a well-defined identity and a centralized state. The ruling elite were Arab Muslims, and yet to survive, they had to secure enough legitimacy through drastic measures. The population of the Umayyad Empire had significant Judeo-Christian and Greco-Hellenic heritage that attracted the Umayyads to a point of near assimilation. Arab Muslims were a minority under, and long after, the Umayyad rule, but they wielded a growing influence in public administration.[26]

'Abd al–Malik inherited an empire that was attacked by a Byzantine proxy of local Christians from the Syrian and Lebanese mountain ranges which threatened Damascus. To the Byzantines the Arab expansion was an existential threat that already conquered Jerusalem and sieged Constantinople, twice. The unlikely Byzantine survival of the Arab invasion influenced the political theology and the role of the imperial office throughout the seventh and eighth centuries. The looming risk urged a need to transform from an empire held by power networks into an

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[25] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 66-102.
[26] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 98-102.

empire with an identity that people can identify as part of. A revival of identity was an existential key[27] The Arab threat helped the institutional transformation of the late Roman Empire into the Byzantine Empire. One ideological effect was manifested by the iconoclasm conflict.[28]

By 692, the political role of the Byzantine emperor was getting more religious, the emperor was claimed as 'Christ's emperor.' The issuance of a new byzantine coin and the publication of the canons of the Quinissext Council, gave the emperor the status of a deacon. These events were symbolically crucial to the sacerdotaliztion of the imperial office.[29]

On the other side of the shifting borders, local revolts were brewing chiefly due to marginalization and to the reorganization of the Shiite campaigns. To devote himself to the internal front, 'Abd al–Malik signed a truce with the Byzantines. After gaining control of his internal front, 'Abd al–Malik revolted against the treaty with the Byzantines. The symbol of the revolt against the Byzantine emperor, was to pay the demanded yearly homage with coins minted by the Umayyads that copied the Byzantine coins. However, 'Abd al–Malik switched the Christian and Greek symbols with Islamic and Arabic ones. To mark the alignment of the Umayyad stars, 'Abd al-Malik paid his yearly tribute with his new Umayyad coins, the pseudo–Byzantine coins, instead of the official Byzantine coins. That stunt resulted in a row of competing new mints of Umayyad and Byzantine symbols, which ended with Justinian's II threat "to mention the prophet in a way the Muslims would not like."[30]

The real conflict, however, was that the Umayyad economy was developing beyond the dependency on the Byzantine coinage. The conflict further intensified when 'Abd al–Malik shifted from countermarking Byzantine coins to minting his own with his image as a ruler on these coins. Justinian II considered the image of 'Abd al–Malik as a direct threat since no one had the audacity to pose himself in the place of the Byzantine ruler. Few years later, 'Abd al–Malik started a reform to arabize the administration of his empire to include the production of aniconic Islamic coins.[31]

To have icons on coins did not seem to bother the people of Mecca and Medina. During a visit of 'Abd al–Malik they expressed the coins were fine, but it would have been better without images. On the other hand, there was a concern about the use of Islamic verses since the coins might fall on the ground or be in 'impure' place, and that they will be carried by non–Muslims who might not share the same reverence for Islam.[32]

The Umayyads' use of existing coins falls into a general policy of keeping the existing system of the conquered region. Already existing coins continued to be circulated in the Umayyad domain, but often were countermarked with an Arabic symbol. This practice in meaning

[27] Jan J. van Ginkel, "The Perception and Presentation of the Arab Conquest in Syriac Historiography," in *The Encounter of Eastern Christianity with Early Islam*, ed. Emmanouela Grypeou, Mark Swanson, and David Thomas (The Netherlands: Brill, 2006), 171–2.

[28] David Olster, "Ideological Transformation and the Evolution of Imperial Presentation in the Wake of Islam's Victory," in *The Encounter of Eastern Christianity with Early Islam*, ed. Emmanouela Grypeou, Mark Swanson, and David Thomas (The Netherlands: Brill, 2006), 45–6.

[29] Olster, "Ideological Transformation and the Evolution of Imperial Presentation in the Wake of Islam's Victory," 66–71;
A comparison can be drawn to the neighbouring Umayyad caliph whose rule was already fully political and sacerdotal, in addition to a growing monotheistic competition in theology, architecture, numismatics, and politics.

[30] Abd al–Raḥmān Fehmi, *Arabic Coins: its Past and Present* (Cairo: Dār al–Kutob, 1964), 36.

[31] Fehmi, *Arabic Coins: its Past and Present*, 36–43.

[32] Taqiyy al–Din Aḥmad bin 'Abd al–Qadir al–Maqrīzī, *The Book of Ancient and Islamic Coins* (Constantinople: Matba'at al–Jawāneb, 1298 AH/ 1880–1881 C.E.), 5–9.

resembles keeping the native bureaucracy headed by a 'trusted' Arab governor. The Byzantine affairs, however, did not seem to reflect that the Umayyads were following the steps of the Byzantine's style of identity portrayal. The Umayyads used the existing style to send messages of a competing dominance until they gained a degree of independence.

The development of the Umayyad identity as seen on issued coins throughout the rule of 'Abd al–Malik, could be linked to the rise and fall of other political ideas within and outside the Umayyad realm. 'Abd al–Malik's rule did not see a significant expansion of territory but rather uprisings that originated from the natives as well as members of the Umayyad house. Most of these uprisings used a form of religious ideology in the face of the Umayyads' theological interpretation of Islam. To survive, 'Abd al–Malik's policy was to unite as many people as possible. He worked on being the only recognised caliph by relying on co-optation as well as coercion.

The first monetary reform began a process of portraying the rise of a new power with an Umayyad identity. The process was possible due to relative peace and prosperity, but it also resulted in political and religious competition with the Byzantines and tempted local rebels to use coinage as field of influence. However, the peace soon came to be disrupted, and a second reform was introduced. The second reform was more successful in producing a design that could at least be neutral to Muslim rebels, the Islamic Dinar.

2.2. A period of coexistence and civil war (685-692 C.E.)

Figure 2.1. Approximate map of areas under Ibn al-Zubayr's control after the death of Mu'āwiya II (684).[33]

Coexistence here is not the term often heard in dialogue initiatives that aim for harmony and partnership among social groups. In this context, coexistence simply refers to living in the same space or under the same authority. In this context, several social groups fought for dominance over others at times, or to defend their land and property at other times. But the same groups

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[33] Source: "Second Fitna," *Wikipedia*, last modified February 28, 2023, accessed May 29, 2023, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Fitna.

had also preached harmonious coexistence and partnership when possible. Religion had the lion share of these conflicts as well as of calls for peace. Nothing is new to the contemporary reader, and neither to 'Abd al–Malik.

Figure 2.2. Arab-Sasanian dirham minted in the name of Ibn al-Zubayr in Fars in 690/91.[34]

'Abd al-Malik☐ inherited a throne with a questionable legitimacy, several fronts had to be won. Since the Umayyads' takeover of the caliphate, their control over the state concentrated in the army. The death of Mu'āwiya II (664 – 684) significantly weakened the Umayyad☐ rule to a point where the Umayyads were about to cease from the political sphere. Even Marwān bin Al–Ḥakam (623/626 – 685), the father and predecessor of 'Abd al–Malik, came close to betraying his family. Along with most Umayyad nobles, Marwān was about to give his loyalty to the new caliph in Mecca 'Abd Allāh bin al–Zubayr[35] (622–692) who exiled the Umayyads from Ḥijāz. Ibn al–Zubayr was a caliph whose governors collected taxes from region stretching from Persia to Egypt. He minted his own coins, had a legitimate legacy among early Muslims, and built an administration that resembled the later administration of 'Abd al–Malik.[36] In other words, Ibn al–Zubayr resembled an existential threat to the Umayyad house. 'Ubayd Allāh bin Ziyād[37] (died 686) convinced Marwān not to recognize Ibn al–Zubayr, but to nominate himself as a successor to Mu'āwiya II. 'Ubayd Allāh then succeeded to rally enough support from the Syrian tribes to coronate Marwān as the new caliph.[38]

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[34] Source: "Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr," Wikipedia, last modified April 30, 2023, accessed May 29, 2023, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abd_Allah_ibn_al-Zubayr.

[35] 'Abd Allāh bin al–Zubayr was killed by an expedition led by al-Ḥajjāj. See Anonymous, "Extract from the Chronicle of AD 1234," in *The Seventh Century in the West Syrian Chronicles*, trans. Andrew Palmer (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), §§129–30.

[36] Robinson, "The Rise of Islam, 600–705," 216–7;
And R. Stephen Humphreys. "Syria," in *The Formation of the Islamic World: Sixth to Eleventh Centuries*, vol. 1, *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, ed. by Chase F. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 518–9.

[37] 'Ubayd Allāh and his father Ziyād bin Abīh (622–673) were in politics and the army since the days of caliph 'Umar bin Al–Khaṭṭab (584–644). In his early years Ziyād supported caliph 'Ali bin Abī Ṭālib (601–661) against the rising Umayyads, but when the Umayyads took powers, Ziyād became an Umayyad by being declared as a brother of caliph Mu'āwiya I. And thus, Ziyād became an Umayyad as Ziyād bin Abī Sufyān who became eligible to inherit Abī Sufyān. 'Ubayd Allāh kept the allegiance of his father to the Umayyads and was later known, or rather infamous, for killing the family of caliph 'Ali. Both 'Ubayd Allāh and Ziyād had Arab–Sasanian coins minted to their names as governors.

[38] Hugh N. Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the 6th to the 11th Century*, 2nd ed. (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2004), 78–9.

Marwān died in less than a year, giving 'Abd al–Malik a throne and an army led by 'Ubayd Allāh. 'Ubayd Allāh was commissioned by Marwān to eliminate Ẓafar bin Al–Hārith[39] in Circesium east of Syria and then to expand and takeover Iraq.[40] In return, 'Ubayd Allāh was to be recognized as an Emir of all he conquers. However, Marwān died while 'Ubayd Allāh was still in Syria and 'Abd al–Malik informed him that the agreement is still valid and that he must continue his expedition to Iraq.[41]

Iraq was a strategic region for the Umayyads. It carried on the former Persian legacy and was a hub of politics and culture. The tense history between the Umayyads and the Shiite imāms however, made Iraq a stronghold for the opposition.[42] The core of the Shiite opposition was based in Kūfa, where until 683 'Ubayd Allāh was an Umayyad governor known for his ruthlessness.[43] The Shiites were declaring their regrets to failing to aid the family of 'Ali in the Battle of Karbalā'. They considered their uprising against the Umayyads as a revenge for the killing of Al–Ḥusayn bin 'Ali (625–680) at Karbalā',[44] and as a religious mission to make up for their previous failing.

The Shiite leaders in Iraq met and decided to march to Circesium in 684. They asked Ẓafar bin Al–Hārith to join them in fighting 'Ubayd Allāh for his role in Karbalā'. Ẓafar declined to join what he considered as a suicidal mission but offered a warm welcome and some advice to unite with the Meccan caliph Ibn al–Zubayr. The Shiite leaders refused to unite with Ibn al–Zubayr and marched to be massacred by the Umayyads in the Battle of 'Ayn al–Warda in 685. This battle deepened the schism and bloodshed between Iraq and Syria. This battle gave a main character of Shiite religious and political identities, which is the pilgrimage to the shrine of Ḥusayn. [45]

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[39] Ẓafar bin Al–Hārith was the chief of Banū 'Amir, a significant and old tribe. He supported Ibn al–Zubayr against the Umayyads, but later made peace with 'Abd al–Malik in 691.

[40] Syria and Iraq here are meant as a region rather than the contemporary states.

[41] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 70.

[42] Hjärpe, "Kalifatens Tid (662–1258)," 80–81.

[43] In 680 'Ubayd Allāh was one of the Umayyad leaders of the Battle of Karbalā' that became one of most tragic events in the Shiite memory until today.

[44] Robinson, "The Rise of Islam, 600–705," 215.

[45] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 70–72;

And Fred M. Donner, "Muhammad and the Caliphate: Political History of the Islamic Empire up to the Mongol Conquest," in *The Oxford History of Islam*, ed. by John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.

2.2.1. The civil wars

Figure 2.3. Territorial control by the contenders to the caliphate during the peak of the civil war (686).[46]

Two civil wars represented a strife to form a legitimate Islamic rule after the death of Muḥammad. As later seen with the Shiite–Sunni, as well as the Kharijite, conflicting interpretations, this period was the cornerstone to the conflicts of future generations. The politics of the late seventh century divided Muslim more than any differing interpretations of the main Islamic tenants.

The Kharijites believed in a legitimacy that stems from a conservative religious conduct. Leaders should be installed based on theological merit rather than lineage. The Kharijite's mindset appealed to enough people to keep the established authorities worried. However, failing to agree on one *imām* resulted in a fragmented movement.

The Shiites, being the followers of 'Ali, wanted the Muslim leadership to be restricted to qualified descendants of 'Ali. The Umayyads kept the caliphate to their heirs as well.[47] Unity to the Umayyads was essential if their throne was not threatened. Major Islamic decisions then ought to be agreed upon and voted out among the wider Muslim communities.[48]

The opposition also included groups that were ideologically connected with caliph 'Ali but were still distinct from the Shiites, such as the Alwites. Other groups were lumped together under the title of Kharijites who considered the Umayyad throne as illegitimate and had their own schools of puritan Islamic thought.

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[46] Source: "Second Fitna," *Wikipedia*, last modified February 28, 2023, accessed May 29, 2023, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Fitna.
[47] Robinson, "The Rise of Islam, 600–705," 215.
[48] Donner, "Muhammad and the Caliphate," 18.

A common dominator among the competing groups was having enough legitimacy to lead the emerging Islamic community. They shared similar qualifications such as following the Qur'ān and most of the established *ḥadīth*, and most importantly having *ṣaḥāba* among their ranks. The merit of each *ṣaḥib* correlated with their tribal and social closeness to Muḥammad.[49]

As the case with most ideological groups, the death of the founder transfers authority to those who were in the second tier. In Islam, it was the *ṣaḥāba*, the companions of Muḥammad, who became the authority whenever a dispute loomed. But what if the *ṣaḥāba* were in dispute themselves? Theoretically, they would meet, decide, and follow the majority's opinion. But when it came to their prophet's replacement, it got more complicated since their authority can always be challenged.

Naturally, leadership became a key dividing issue amongst the *ṣaḥāba* and their followers, especially when it came to the legitimacy of the *imām*.[50] The *ṣaḥāba* were also spread among distanced regions which made meeting trickier than when they were all in Mecca and Medina.[51]

As the empire was growing, the *ṣaḥāba* held key positions in administrations and in the army; thus, they were exposed to the political swamp in their pursuit of power. The term *ṣaḥāba* was a loose term that equates close companions with those who might had seen Muḥammad once in their lifetime.

The pursuit to inherit the Islamic leadership in the late seventh century paved the way for the emergence of the Sunnis, Shiites, Kharijites, and many others. These groups have played the Islamic scene until today. They were not in an organized formation back then as compared to the tenth century for example, but the events of the late seventh century were a Muslim parting of the ways.

2.2.2. What about Christian communities?

Local Christian communities were divided. Some regarded the Byzantines as a network of powers rather than representatives of God's kingdom, as claimed by the emperor. Thus, a Christian alliance with Umayyad rulers was seen as a political decision rather than a religious treason. With time, the Syrian orthodox community identified themselves as a neutral bystander to a war between two non–religious armies. In a Syriac fragment dated between 712 and 716, the new invading emperors were described as Arabs, rather than Muslims. To those Syrian Orthodox texts, Arabs were just another invader to the likes of Byzantines, Chalcedonians, and Romans.[52]

The split went as far as to claim that the Byzantine fall as a punishment from God for their theopaschite ideas, as the East Syrian monk Bar Penkāyē described it. However, the Arab's might during the 690's was seen as a political power that fulfilled a punishment for the Byzantine err, but that did not correlate with the religious righteousness of the Arab Muslims.[53]

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[49] Hjärpe, "Kalifatens Tid (662–1258)," 79–80.

[50] Daniel Brown, *A New Introduction to Islam*, 2nd ed. (Chichester, UK: Wiley–Blackwell, 2004), 181.

[51] Webb, "Identity and Social Formation in the Early Caliphate," 144.

[52] Van Ginkel, "The Perception and Presentation of the Arab Conquest in Syriac Historiography," 172–5, 182–3.

[53] Gerrit J. Reinink, "Political Power and Right Religion in the East Syrian Disputation between a Monk of Bēt Ḥālē and an Arab Notable," in *The Encounter of Eastern Christianity with Early Islam*, ed. Emmanouela Grypeou, Mark Swanson, and David Thomas (The Netherlands: Brill, 2006), 168–9.

On the other hand, other Christian communities, such as the Maradites, shared a mutual interest with the Byzantines. The Maradites were close to the Byzantine throne, were threatened by, and posed a threat to the Umayyads.

2.2.3. What did they have in common?

A common dominator among all the previous groups was the use of religion as a source for legitimacy. Religion was implicitly and explicitly omnipresent in their identity formation. Another equally crucial factor is politics, although politics can at times get downplayed to leave religion as a main front in battle.

An example is the support for the Battle of 'Ayn al–Warda that was more than just the Shiite base. New Muslims fought with the Shiites to be included on a par with Arab Muslims but claiming the caliphate to the house of 'Ali triumphed over the political rights of the non-Arabs. The inclusion of the Persian Muslims was only through the Umayyad's, Shiite's, or the Kharijite's interpretation of Islam.

During this period, no significant civil or secular Muslim group is found.[54] In peaceful times, the distinction between identities did not seem to exist. Islam was new and was an ideology that encompassed everyone and everything.

This division in religious identity, with the aid of a large army and carefully selected ruthless governors, seemed to work in favour of 'Abd al–Malik who managed to neutralize his bigger threats by bribes or in battle. The opposition seemed large and extensive but suffered a major weakness. It was a mosaic of fragments that coexisted but were certainly not in harmony. The Byzantine front was as fragmented at home and suffered a lack of support from many Christian groups. 'Abd al–Malik seemed to understand the contradictions among his oppositions, which at times he chose to be passive to allow conflicts to grow among them.[55]

2.3. A period of reform (692-696/7 C.E.)

Kūfa, the Shiite's stronghold, was retaken by the Umayyads after defeating most of the Shiite groups in 691. The Meccan caliphate ended with the killing of its caliph Ibn al–Zubayr in 692. And Syria was more secure from the Byzantines and their client guerrillas after signing a ten-year treaty with Justinian II in 689.[56]

Compared to the climate in 685 when 'Abd al–Malik claimed the throne; a new era of stability was about to begin. 'Abd al–Malik was not recognized as a caliph until the death of Ibn al–Zubayr in 692.[57] In 685, Arabia and Iraq were barely related to the Umayyad caliphate that they were close to gaining their independence. Similar separatist tendencies could have threatened other regions, like Egypt, Armenia, and Persia. The Umayyads had even less legitimacy in these distant, newly conquered, and decentralized regions.

The reliance on a web of freckle alliances made up of fighting tribes, was an expensive lesson learned during the civil war. The Umayyad policy of building a professional army made up

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[54] The only civil opposition I am aware of, is the one led by 'Abd al–Raḥmān bin al–Ash'ath in 700, but since it belongs to the third phase, I will discuss it later.

[55] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 69.

[56] The Kharijite conflict was still active until 697, but the Umayyads had the military advantage. The Kharijites posed a milder threat since their controlled areas were mostly in Arabia and briefly in southern Iraq, and did not therefore control bigger cities that could be seen as threat to the Umayyads.

[57] Robinson, "The Rise of Islam, 600–705," 216.

mostly from Syrian fighters ensured an effective rule for the short term, and a growing disparity between Syrians 'closer to power' and non–Syrians.[58]

After installing the army leaders that regained regions as governors of their conquered regions, 'Abd al–Malik had a capacity to focus on reforming the inherited decentralized system. The reliance on non–Arabs in government and religion was a concern.[59] He insisted that his sons learn Arabic grammar, saying to his adviser "no one should rule the Arabs except one who speaks their language."[60]

Powerful non–Muslims were causing a concern to the Umayyads, as well as non–Arab Muslims, *mawālī*. 'Abd al–Malik was reported to ask an eloquent man whether he is a *mawlā*.[61] While his sons tracked the *mawālī* by distinguishing between them and Arabs in the army records.[62] The *mawālī* had similar social–climbing opportunities as Arab Muslims, the main prized quality to the Umayyads was loyalty.[63]

The decentralized system gave tribal allegiances a large space to influence the Umayyad rule. Thus, a possibility was always present for future revolts in case of shifts in the balance of power like the revolts of 683–685. That threat therefore supported the idea of centralizing the institutions.

'Abd al–Malik succeeded in playing on the contradictions of his oppositions, and unsurprisingly his new system was to integrate the distant regions. His new system was merely another attempt by another caliph, albeit a successful one. Previous caliphs, like Omar and Mu'āwiya I, had already laid the foundation to institutionalize and centralize administrations. The result of the institutionalization of 'Abd al–Malik, however, was crucial to solidify the unity that had mainly been held by ideology.[64]

The institutional empire built by 'Abd al–Malik, lasted with a significant size and stability until the ninth century. In comparison the death of Mu'āwiya I, the first Umayyad caliph, was followed by religious and political collapse that led to a civil war.[65] The innovation of 'Abd al–Malik materialized through the Arabization of administration, centralization, and a monetary reform; a steppingstone to a unified institutionalization.[66]

2.3.1. From a local elite to a *Dhimmiyy*; from an Arab soldier to a local elite

A crucial reason for the popularity of 'Abd al–Malik's reforms is the comparison with his past. Along with a rapid expansion, ethnic and religious groups were included. The growing diversity created a need for the *Dhimmiyy* system to redefine the role of non–Muslims in administration, especially those with know–how inherited from the Sassanids and Byzantines. The distinction between non-Muslims and Muslims, however, was meant to 'other' the native elite. Their elitism suddenly became temporal until they convert or until a loyal Muslim is qualified enough. In the meantime, the growing number of conversions gave urgency to upscale

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[58] Robinson, "The Rise of Islam, 600–705," 218–9.
[59] Suliman Bashear, *Arabs and others in Early Islam* (Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1997), 40.
[60] Bashear, *Arabs and others in Early Islam*, 55.
[61] Bashear, *Arabs and others in Early Islam*, 56.
[62] Bashear, *Arabs and others in Early Islam*, 31, 117.
[63] Robinson, "The Rise of Islam, 600–705," 219.
[64] Donner, "Muhammad and the Caliphate," 18.
[65] Robinson, "The Rise of Islam, 600–705," 217.
[66] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 98;
And Robinson, "The Rise of Islam, 600–705," 215.

the organization of Islam, from collecting the *ḥadīth* to the development of an independent theological tradition that paved way for Sunni Islam.[67]

Almost all the earlier caliphs had to deal with opposition and schism among the emerging Muslim community, but not in the same intensity as 'Abd al–Malik. He was the first caliph that did not grow up among the first Muslims of Ḥijāz, and the first caliph to fortify the fastidious emergence of political Islam.[68] If Omar had failed in governance, it would have been a serious setback. But since most of the major *ṣaḥāba* were alive, they probably would have managed to move on. If Mu'āwiya I (605-680) had failed, the Muslim community might have been more united around an Imām from the family of Muḥammad, thus more legitimacy, and less schism. But 'Abd al–Malik's chances of being the caliph were almost futile if his father paid allegiance to Ibn al–Zubayr, the Meccan caliph, instead of backing out. When 'Abd al–Malik began his caliphate, his only capable allies were the Umayyad elite that was infamous for killing the family of 'Ali. Some of the same allies tried and failed to revolt against him. 'Abd al–Malik was the first second generation caliph.

To consolidate and centralize his rule, and to impose the legitimacy of the Marwanid house to the caliphal throne, language was crucial. The Arabs' focus on military often left gaps in the administration. These gaps were filled by locals who often did not know Arabic or were Muslims but already had an experience with the Sasanians or the Byzantines. Economically, the differences between the regions exacerbated in both tax laws and the interpretation of these laws.[69]

A key effect of the Arabization reform was the promotion of language itself to reflect identity as well as to changing bureaucrats to reflect political loyalty. The new requirement of knowledge in Arabic, meant a change in the personality of administration.[70] At the cost of the local elites, the Arab elite suddenly had less competition in their pursuit of civilian state positions. The dynamics of cultural influencing also changed. The cultural trends in Byzantium or the influence of the local churches would be countered with an Umayyad state identity that was growing in coherence.

2.3.2. While the Umayyads gained strength, how did the Byzantines respond?

In return for withdrawing the Maradites behind the Taurus Mountains, 'Abd al–Malik signed a ten-year treaty with Justinian II in 689.[71] In exchange for peace, a tribute of 365 thousand golden coins a year had to be paid by the Umayyads. After achieving a relative control on the ground due to the retreat of the Christian guerrillas as well as the crushing of Islamic rebellions, 'Abd al–Malik casted new gold coins that imitated the Byzantine design by transforming the Byzantine emperor into an Umayyad caliph, and the Christian cross into an Islamic staff of the prophet. After a relative stability, 'Abd al–Malik paid his tribute using the new coins to mark an end to the treaty and a new era of an independent identity building. The move also marked a new competitive phase with the Byzantine–Umayyad relations, where the Umayyads gained strength and territory over weakened Byzantines.[72]

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[67] Hjärpe, "Kalifatens Tid (662–1258)," 81.
[68] Robinson, "The Rise of Islam, 600–705," 214–5.
[69] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 99.
[70] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 99.
[71] Anonymous, "Extract from the Chronicle of AD 1234," §§127–8.
[72] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 91–94;
And Anonymous, "Extract from the Chronicle of AD 1234," §§135–136.

The new coins were probably just a symbol for ending the treaty. One can argue that the Umayyads paid the 365 thousand golden coins, while the Byzantines received the change in the design of the coins as a revolt.

The peace probably ended because of a breach by Justinian II that was met with a breach by 'Abd al–Malik's half-brother, Muḥammad bin Marwān (died 719/720) in Armenia. Justinian II was reported to exile the Cypriots and thus affecting their tribute payment to 'Abd al–Malik. The response was a raid into Byzantine territory ordered by 'Abd al–Malik.[73]

A conclusion can be reached about the influence of the Byzantine design on the new Umayyad coins. There is a truth in that if we think that 'Abd al–Malik minted his coins in this competing design as a message of independence from the Byzantines. Looking at later coins, however, provides murkier motive. The Byzantines provided well produced specimens and happened to be a neighbouring established empire. They were not the only one that used imperial and religious symbols in the way they did, The Romans and the Sasanians minted similar coins as well. The Romans and the Sasanians had deeper influences in other fields within the region as well. 'Abd al-Malik developed coinage in more than just design. He focused on size and weight uniformity as much as developing a classical design. He tried to develop his coins into a global currency of the best quality.

2.3.3. Why did 'Abd al–Malik choose coins?

Coinage was a new and highly valued tool to project the Umayyad identity. The other side of the Umayyad coin was to spread Islam through the promotion of Arabic. Having more people learning Arabic provided an exposure for the Qur'ān that reflected in a rising rate of converting to Islam.[74] It would not be farfetched to compare the effects of Arabization on Islam with Constantine's conversion on Christianity. 'Abd al–Malik did not change his identity in the way Constantine did, but he influenced aspiring locals to rise to high offices by adapting to the identity of the Umayyad elite. In both the Roman Empire and the Umayyad caliphate, the change affected the identity of elite. Both changes gave exposure and high status to Islam and Christianity, respectively.

The new coins were not only a declaration to the Byzantines and non–Arabs, but also to Arabs and Muslims. Let us take the coin of the standing caliph as an example. This coin fits perfectly as a power demonstration of the new system. The combination of Islamic symbolism with a militant image of the caliph on the coin could provoke non–Muslims and Muslims alike. The coin presented 'Abd al–Malik as having the religious legitimacy and the force to back it.

For 'Abd al–Malik, this period witnessed an immense show of power. The massive work to secure that power shows that he was aware of the vulnerability to future troubles. His monetary experiment seemed to succeed, but it escalated the provocation with the Byzantines. The combination of the imperial symbols with the religious symbols might have allowed him to use religion for legitimacy, but 'Abd al–Malik was not the only one who wanted the throne and had access to minting. Therefore, 'Abd al–Malik entered a new phase by replacing the imperial symbols with increasingly religious symbols, thus an upgrade of his minting strategy from using religion to monopolizing religion.

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[73] Anonymous, "Extract from the Chronicle of AD 1234," §§136.
[74] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 99.

2.4. A period of unity (696/7-705 C.E.)
2.4.1. The Byzantine front

After leading two campaigns against the Umayyads, Leontios (died 706) was imprisoned by Justinian II for failing on the Battle of Sebastopolis in 692. Leontios was not released until 695. When freed Leontios went back to the military as a *strategos* of Hellas. He successfully campaigned to overthrow Justinian II and replace him as an emperor. In 697 Leontios was overthrown by Apsimar (died 706) almost in the same way that he assumed power[75]. Apsimar, later called Tiberios III, a *droungarios* under Leontios's command who was known for containing the Umayyad threat. Apsimar mutilated Leontios and sent him to the Monastery of Dalmatou. In 706 both Leontios and Apsimar were executed by Justinian II who came back as an emperor in 705. In short, from the point of view of the Umayyads, the Byzantine front seemed agile for having two new emperors who were famous for their campaigns against the Arabs. But the rate of the Umayyad raids increased between 692 and 700, especially during the rule Leontios. The Byzantine raids declined and were limited under the same period. The most likely scenario can be that the Umayyads saw the conflict for the Byzantine throne as a weakness to be exploited.[76]

However, the advantage on the Umayyad front did not last long and was having its own existential threats. After a plague that spread in Syria in 697, 'Abd al–Raḥmān bin al–Ash'ath (died 704) started a four-year rebellion against the Umayyads in Iraq in 700. Both events halted the Umayyad expansion into Byzantine territories.[77] Since the elite was mostly concentrated in Syria and Iraq, the events carried more weight on the Umayyads. The rebellion had a substantial impact compared to its predecessors since it covered a larger area and was not inspired by religious strife.[78] One can conclude that the Umayyads' short-lived prosperity was threatened by local events that pressured the caliph to reunify the local front by redeveloping his policy.

2.4.2. The internal front; the opposition, the marginalized, and the plague

The brief period of stability and consolidation of power was rocked by new threats that differed from the events of 683–685. The new reforms aiming to centralize the administration and to sell the identity of the Umayyad elite to the masses, was not effective in the face of the plague in Syria and the popular revolt of Ibn al–Ash'ath in Iraq.

'Abd al–Raḥmān bin al–Ash'ath was different from his contemporary opposition leaders. Ibn al–Ash'ath, though not an Umayyad himself, served as a general as well as a governor in the service of the Umayyad house since 680 until his revolt in 700. In other words, he can be identified as one of the Umayyad elites that changed sides.

The conflict had its roots in 699 when the governor of Iraq, Al–Ḥajjāj bin Yūsuf (c. 661–714), sent Ibn al–Ash'ath on a heavily armed army to revenge the army lost in fighting Ratbil, the king in Kabul, in 698. This expedition coincided with the campaign of al–Ḥajjāj to crack down on the remaining political opposition in Iraq. It also important to mention that the personal relationship between al–Ḥajjāj and Ibn al–Ash'ath suffered, even though al–Ḥajjāj had appointed Ibn al–Ash'ath as a governor of Sijistan and as a leader of a significant army.[79]

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[75] Anonymous, "Extract from the Chronicle of AD 1234," §§139.

[76] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 93–94;
And Anonymous, "Extract from the Chronicle of AD 1234," §§139–41.

[77] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 93–94.

[78] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 87.

[79] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 86–87;

Ibn al–Ash'ath succeeded to force Ratbil's army into a retreat. Due to the difficulty of fighting in unknown mountains however, the Umayyads could not secure a victory. The Umayyad army decided to keep its small acquired territory and postpone its advance until they get used to the mountains. Al–Ḥajjāj refused and ordered Ibn al–Ash'ath to advance and defeat Ratbil immediately or be discharged. After receiving the order, Ibn al–Ash'ath called his troops to revolt seeing the order as a humiliation and as a suicidal mission to get rid of the troops who belonged mostly to opposition societies in Iraq. The troops sided with Ibn al–Ash'ath and marched back with him to Iraq to get rid of al–Ḥajjāj.[80]

When 'Abd al–Malik fought his enemies, he played on his opponents' weaknesses without forming a serious alliance with any of them.[81] Ibn al–Ash'ath on the other hand, went an extra mile and kept a line of cordial relations with his opponents. To protect himself before leaving Sijistan, Ibn al–Ash'ath had an agreement with Ratbil. Ratbil would be pardoned and exempted from taxes in case the rebellion bears fruit, and in case of losing Ratbil would provide an asylum to Ibn al–Ash'ath.[82]

Ibn al–Ash'ath then went on to exploit the unpopularity of the Umayyads among the locals of Iraq. The supporters of Ibn al–Ash'ath were mostly non-Arab Muslims, *mawālīs,* who probably knew the prisons of al–Ḥajjāj as well as his oppression of those with a darker skin tone.[83] One of the many *mawālīs* who joined the revolt of Ibn al–Ash'ath was the judge Kūfa, Sa'īd bin Jubayr (665–714). Sa'īd was removed from his post by al–Ḥajjāj after a protest from Kūfans for the appointment of a non–Arab.[84] The Umayyads were already unpopular due to their history with the house of 'Ali. The schism grew exponentially as the Umayyad's consolidated their power. To counter that. Ibn al–Ash'ath emphasized on the wage–gap between Iraq and Syria, the cruelty of al–Ḥajjāj, and the irreligiosity of al–Ḥajjāj, the caliph's appointee.[85]

'Abd al–Malik tried to construct a state identity to unify the different communities within his caliphate. Ibn al–Ash'ath on the other hand, tried to gather his loyalists around their animosity towards the Umayyad identity. The unpopularity was widespread enough to rally enough support from many communities in Iraq that disliked the Umayyads. The cruelty of al–Ḥajjāj came as unifying factor in the face of the Umayyads. The Iraqi support gave enough momentum to Ibn al–Ash'ath that he became the biggest threat to the Umayyads, especially to 'Abd al–Malik and al–Ḥajjāj.

Religious identity played a role to form a movement against the 'irreligious.' Having diverse religious identities and a call for economic and political rights, however, gave the movement of Ibn al–Ash'ath a secular aspect that put the new face of the Umayyad administration to test. The threat was real in the beginning of 701. In less than six months Basra and Kūfa fell to the troops of Ibn al–Ash'ath forcing al–Ḥajjāj to escape while waiting for support from Damascus.[86]

And Elton L. Daniel, "The Islamic East," in *The Formation of the Islamic World: Sixth to Eleventh Centuries*, vol. 1, *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, ed. by Chase F. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 485–7.

[80] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 86–87.

[81] Donner, "Muhammad and the Caliphate," 18.

[82] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 88.

[83] Bashear, *Arabs and others in Early Islam*, 41.

[84] Bashear, *Arabs and others in Early Islam*, 36.

[85] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 87–88.

[86] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 88–89.

In response, 'Abd al–Malik proposed an agreement that discharge al–Ḥajjāj and replace him with his half-brother and governor of Armenia, Muḥammad. Equal wages between Syria and Iraq were proposed, as well as naming Ibn al–Ash'ath as a governor to any region he wishes within Iraq. After the quick victories that were achieved, the movement of Ibn al–Ash'ath refused the agreement. To their misfortune, they soon were defeated by the Umayyad army forcing Ibn al–Ash'ath to flee into the protection of Ratbil. Ibn al–Ash'ath then committed suicide in 704 upon knowing that Ratbil agreed to surrender him to the Umayyads. After the failure of Ibn al–Ash'ath, several rebellions occurred but were not as effective.[87] In the meantime, al–Ḥajjāj went on with the same unequal treatment between loyalists and opposition.[88]

By linking the general mood of this phase with the introduction of the new Islamic Dinar, we can see that radical events were not faced with a radical change of policy, but rather with continuation of the reform of the previous phase. The focus on state identity was up scaled. However, the difference was a shift of the Umayyad state identity from imperial to religious. The caliph from after this phase onwards was to be portrayed as representative of religion rather than just an emperor. The state leader was to personify the religion.

The first specimens of the Islamic Dinar appeared as silver *dirhams* in year 78 Hijri (697/8 C.E.) in Kūfa and Armenia under the rule of al–Ḥajjāj and Muḥammad bin Marwān. Considering the accusations of irreligiosity by Ibn al–Ash'ath towards al–Ḥajjāj already in 699, a conclusion cannot be reached that the coin of al–Ḥajjāj was issued as a defence. It could have been a coincidence or an anticipation of the mood in Iraq, especially opposition that al–Ḥajjāj tried to dismantle tended to be more religious. It could also be a way for governors to mint their unique coins without visibly competing with the caliph, as in the case of the caliph's half-brother, Muḥammad bin Marwān.

Due to lacking the knowledge of why these coins appeared and due to the later adoption by Damascus in 79 Hijri, my conclusion is that the early *dirhams* were part of the experimenting phase rather than the last phase of the Islamic Dinar. It is more likely that the caliph's choice of the Islamic design in 79 Hijri, among other reasons, was connected to the movement of Ibn al–Ash'ath in the same year. The competition within the Umayyad house itself could also be another reason. Appropriating the Islamic design by 'Abd al–Malik could be seen as a way of recognizing key members of his rule who could have gained a more favourable public image, and thus becoming a threat.

2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I looked at the major historical events that formed 'Abd al–Malik's era considering the three phases of coinage during the same period. After a brief analysis of these event, echoing connections can be seen between the wars and rebellions that 'Abd al–Malik went through and their reflections on state identity portrayal through policy and mint. New gold coins could have needed years, or even decades, to reach most of the public, but the effect would be swifter if the intended audience were loyal and opposing people of influence. The treatment of different dominations differently could be helpful to note. Larger dominations like the gold *dinar* can carry higher symbolism than the silver *dirham*. Therefore, my investigation focused on the *dinar*.

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[87] Although the mood was never fully cordial, it took more than forty years for a rebellion against the Umayyads to succeed. The rebellion was the Abbasid revolution in 747–750 that started for similar reasons to that of Ibn al–Ash'ath, i.e., the unequal practices that were implemented by al–Ḥajjāj.

[88] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 88–89.

During the first phase (685-692), the Umayyads were under tremendous pressure from all fronts and were about to lose the throne. 'Abd al–Malik and his associates were dedicated to war and diplomacy. Thus, they had to rely on the system that already existed with basic cosmetic alterations. The Umayyad elite was heavily invested in the army, while the administration of the state was entrusted to experienced local elites. Winning most of his battles, made 'Abd al-Malik a feared army general that claimed the throne with almost no significant competition remaining.

A period of stability was the mood during the second phase (692-696/7). This stability was promptly used by 'Abd al–Malik to consolidate his rule and build a new identity that could deter the previous rebellions from recurring. The new state identity gave Arabs an advantage due to the Arabization of the administration. This policy was reflected in the new coins designed to portray the Umayyad identity using Arabic Islam as a symbol. The reform aimed to unify the regions and to centralize the institutions. On coins, 'Abd al-Malik was portrayed as an ambitious Umayyad caliph; an emperor-like caliph.

The Umayyads' authority was threatened during the third phase (696/7-705) by a plague in Syria and a secular mass rebellion in Iraq led by Ibn al–Ash'ath. The rebellion failed after four years of conducting the plight of inequality among regions as well as between Arabs Muslims and non-Arab Muslims. The Umayyads' response was brutal and did not address the causes of the rebellion, but rather on state identity. The failure of the rebellion was met with further suppression in Iraq and a continuation of the Arabization reform in the rest of the caliphate. In coinage, the policy reflected in adopting an overtly monotheist Islamic design and a removal of the Umayyad symbols. Thus, it can be said that in this phase the image of 'Abd al–Malik shifted from a use of religion to a monopoly of religion. 'Abd al-Malik was no longer an Umayyad ruler, but rather a monotheist Arab ruler.

3. The medium and the message; using numismatics to promote identity

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will examine four coins that highlight the development of Islamic ideas from generic adaptation into carving a unique path for Islamic art and identity. In 685-692 the appropriation of Byzantine and Sasanian coins was the norm, as well as a minting competition by rival societies. During the stability years of 692-696/7, the Umayyads were settled well enough to experiment with new coins. In 696/7-705, an Arab Islamic dinar that projected the Arabisation reform was a symbol of a new independent and competitive identity. The explicit use of the Qur'ān seemed like a declaration to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In twenty years, 'Abd al-Malik turned the caliphate from a throne contested by Muslims, into an attempt to an empire, and settled on the caliphate as a representative symbol of Islam. In these twenty years he set Islam on the path of becoming an organized religion.

These coins were one of the new fancy media of their era. The effects of owning and controlling the minting process can be equal in value to the introduction of the newspaper, radio, television, and internet platforms. Books and architecture were also fairly new to Ḥijāzi Muslims, but early Islamic numismatic is not as well studied and as accessible, therefore my wish to examine coinage during this formative period of Islam.

A competition of religious and political identities revamped the near east during 685–705 C.E. These identities competed and developed in areas that were shaped by the elite, such as coinage, architecture, policymaking, and theology. Gold coins were a medium that is precious, lasting and symbolically charged that projected the elite identity to the bearer.[89] 'Abd al–Malik, the second founder of the Umayyad caliphate,[90] led an uneasy road to the relative stability of his caliphate through an experiment in political and religious identities.

'Abd al–Malik campaigned for a popular identity that was distinct enough to keep his elite from over–blending with the locals. The Umayyad caliph took Damascus as a capital and commissioned close relatives to govern the conquered regions.[91] The Umayyad elite occupied the top of the hierarchy but did not get too involved in the daily administration of their regions. To the Umayyads, the sensible approach was to keep harmless former administrators who had the technical knowledge.[92] This policy resulted in relatively decentralised regions that preserved earlier languages, bureaucracy, and identities.[93]

Compared to their contemporaries, the Muslims offered more freedom of faith and demanded less taxes. The decentralisation seemed like a useful policy for the emerging caliphate until the era of 'Abd al–Malik, since it allowed the Umayyads to look like benevolent conquerors that came to deliver the locals from the oppression of other locals or neighbouring empires. It also allowed the Umayyad elite to focus on military campaigns within their shifting borders and abroad.

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[89] Reinink, "Political Power and Right Religion in the East Syrian Disputation between a Monk of Bēt Ḥālē and an Arab Notable," 153.

[90] Sāmi bin Abd Allāh bin Aḥmad al–Maghlūth, *Atlas of History of the Umayyad State* (Riyāḍ: Al–'bekan Library, 1432 A.H./ 2010–2011 C.E.), 117;
And Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 66–9.

[91] Encyclopædia Britannica, 15ᵗʰ ed., s.v. "Abd al–Malik" (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 2010), 14–5.

[92] Robinson, "The Rise of Islam, 600–705," 214.

[93] Treadwell, "Abd al–Malik's Coinage Reforms," 1–2.

'Abd al–Malik was known for bringing a relative stability by uniting Islamic movements, and for introducing a centralized form of administration that used Arabic as a language and Islam as an identity.[94] Islam here means Umayyad Islam and more specifically, an organized version of Islam brought by an Umayyad elite that united with or persecuted other Islamic movements.

The reign of 'Abd al–Malik could be divided into three periods where religious identity and public policy intertwine with coinage. This chapter will be an overview of coinage under these three periods. My goal is to focus on four coins that represent twenty years of transformation from having no unique currency to producing an Islamic dinar that has been influencing Islamic coinage until our day. The trial phase in between, can be a brief and rare moment of norm defying Islamic art during the formative years of Arab Islamic identity.

3.2. When in Byzantium do like the Byzantines; Veni 685–692 C.E.

Centuries of Persian and Byzantines competition over the Near–East for centuries left its mark in the daily life, as well as in politics and in military. The pool of religious and political identities was in abundance. The Muslim elite mostly hailed from Arabia, if not Quraysh. They spoke Arabic and practiced a form of Islam. Their identity related to that local to their region, and carried Syriac–Aramaic, Coptic, Pahlavi, Armenian, Kurdish, and Greco–Latin influences. Besides the few failed coups from within the Umayyad house, the communities that opposed the Umayyads were abundant.[95] The competition of the Kharijites and Ibn al–Zubayr, who also minted their own coins, pushed the Umayyads into recognizing coinage as field to project their political and religious identity.[96]

Due to the decentralized administration, especially that of minting, it is not possible to have assign a representative coin for this period, but rather representative genres. The main two genres are related to the two big empires, the Sasanian, and the Byzantine empires. Smaller genres originated from almost any group that was able to mint a coin; and they were many.

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[94] Encyclopædia Britannica, s.v. "Abd al–Malik," 14–5.

[95] Ṭaqūsh, *History of the Umayyad State*, 66–9;
And Encyclopædia Britannica, s.v. "Abd al–Malik," 14–5.

[96] Qatari bin al–Fujā'a (died c. 698–699), a Kharijite leader who led an uprising against 'Abd al–Malik, issued Sasanian coins with a countermark of *Amīr al–Mu'minīn*, a title that was used to address that caliph and that meant 'the leader of believers;'
And Stefan Heidemann. "Numismatics," in *The Formation of the Islamic World: Sixth to Eleventh Centuries*, vol. 1, *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, ed. by Chase F. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 654–6.

3.2.1. Arab–Sasanian coins

Figure 3.1. Umayyad Caliphate coin at the time of Mu'āwiya II bin Yazīd. MRW (Marw) mint; "Abd Allāh bin Khāzim, governor." Dated AH 64 (AD 683/4). Arab-Sasanian style bust imitating Khosrau II right; bismillāh and three pellets in margin; c/m: animal left in incuse/ Fire altar with ribbons and attendants; star and crescent flanking flames; date to left, mint to right.[97]

In the Sasanian influenced region (modern Iraq and Iran) the Umayyads issued what is now called Arab–Sasanian coins. The issued coins were mostly silver *drahms* (Middle Persian), or *derhams* (Arabic). Since the Sasanian coinage was integrated into the Umayyad minting system, the early Umayyad coins where often similar to the Sasanian's regarding the use of Sasanian imperial symbols, religious Zoroastrian symbols and Pahlavi script. The difference came in the addition of an Arabic text such as the name of the Umayyad governor or an Islamic countermark such as 'in the name of god,' *bism Allāh*. Arab–Sasanian coins cannot be described as copies, but another form of Sasanian coins since they were manufactured by the same craftspeople upon Umayyad request.[98]

Examining these coins points to an important level of decentralization that kept the caliph from the soft tools of influence. Although the governors of the eastern region, as other Umayyad governors, gave their loyalty to the caliph, they also enjoyed a relative independence from Damascus. By inscribing their names, the governors represented their region more than the caliph. A stark difference was the pseudo–Byzantine coins where it was the caliph who got to be featured. In theory, the difference alludes to the caliph as a governor of the north–western region as well as an 'arch–governor' of the rest of Umayyad caliphate.

3.2.2. Pseudo–Byzantine Coins

West of the Euphrates, Byzantine, Roman, Hellenistic, and Christian influences thrived and Pseudo–Byzantine coins circulated. Pseudo–Byzantine coins were a copy of Byzantine coins and bore Greek and Latin legends. In an Umayyad context these legends were lacking an apparent Umayyad meaning.[99]

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[97] Source: "Mu'awiya II," *Wikipedia*, last modified March 23, 2023, accessed May 29, 2023, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mu%27awiya_II.

[98] Encyclopaedia Iranica, s.v. "Arab–Sasanian Coins."

[99] Goodwin, "The Standard Terminology in SICA 1," 2–4.

A detailed and accurate mapping of the distribution of these coins might prove impossible due to the lack of clear and fixed borders for coins, and due to the absence of any central or national currency. The precious metals were themselves an international currency. Sasanian silver *drahms* and Byzantine gold *solidi*, for instance, were already circulated in Mecca and Medina during the emergence of Islam. It was natural for the Umayyads to use them in the newly conquered Sasanian and Byzantine regions.[100] Producing new coins that were too different by an emerging power could risk its public recognition. Currency after all is only as strong as its issuer. Issuing coins can boost a state identity, but there must be a degree of legitimacy for that to take effect.

A lack of clear borders and standards of legitimacy in usage and in production is a challenge when classifying several coins. One curious example is an imitation of the Sicilian *folles* of Constantine IV that seems to bear the Pahlavi legend *Martān Shāh* (King of Men).[101] This imitation was probably struck by the Maradites, a Maronite pro–byzantine guerrilla thought by Theophanes to be active in the Lebanese mountains in 676–677.[102]

Along with the existence of several Umayyad minting houses, during the early years of 'Abd al–Malik coins varied in design, language, and minting place. The Umayyads might have been the most active minters for their time and place, but the Maradite coin, and few others, would also suggest that not only the Umayyads were minting within their borders.

The Maradite coin could be classified as Pseudo–Byzantine, or less likely as Arab–Byzantine, but cannot be considered as an Umayyad as the case with Arab–Sasanian coins. Like the Arab-Sasanian coins, the Maradite coin was not produced by the Umayyads. The Maradite coin could exemplify the Umayyad–Byzantine relation that tended to compete more than the Umayyad–Sasanian relation. The Umayyads trusted Sasanian coin-smiths to continue their operations within the Umayyad caliphate but did not offer the same trust to their Byzantine colleagues. The Umayyads preferred to strike their own Byzantine copies despite the loss in quality, and therefore the public recognition.[103]

3.2.3. Why not Arab–Byzantine or pseudo–Sasanian?

The previous Maradite coin was an odd example, but it shows how terminology can be fluid in a numismatic study of this period. To consider the Umayyad partnership with Sasanian minters and the caution from the Byzantines, however, would give merit to the term Arab–Sasanian more than pseudo–Sasanian due to the collaboration and the borrowing of style. Byzantine coins might have been used by the Umayyads, but they did not seem to be endorsed into the Umayyad identity. This Umayyad-Byzantine caution gives more credit to the term pseudo–Byzantine due to the limited partnership. The Umayyads issued copies of the Byzantine coins but with less vigour when compared to the Sasanian ones. And when the Umayyads edited the Byzantine design into an Umayyad one, they did not simply inscribe the name of the governor and *bism Allāh,* as the case with Sasanian coins. The Umayyads replaced the Byzantine emperor and the Christian cross with the Umayyad Caliph and staff of Muḥammad, as we shall see in the next phase.

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[100] Bates, "Byzantine Coinage and Its Imitations, Arab Coinage and Its Imitations," 381.

[101] Goodwin, "The Standard Terminology in SICA 1," 3;
And Goodwin, "The Chronology of the Umayyad Imperial Image Coinage," 95.

[102] Goodwin, "The Chronology of the Umayyad Imperial Image Coinage," 95.

[103] There seem to be no information of why the Umayyad trusted Sasanian coin-masters more than the Byzantine's. When compared to other parts of the bureaucracy, educated Byzantine staff were common. Linking this issue to later reforms, it can be safe to assume that 'Abd al–Malik had a plan of increasing the numbers of Arab Muslims in public offices since he took over the throne.

3.3. The making of an Islamic symbol; Vidi 692–696/7 C.E.

The second phase started with the coinage reform of 692 led by the caliphal minting house in Damascus. It started as an experiment in declaring the rise of the Umayyad identity. The experiment tried to project a stronger political power and an even purer monotheism in the hope of enhancing the legitimacy of the caliph. Pictures of the caliph along with other figures, as well as the use of Arabic, were common during this phase. The reform increased the centralization of the Umayyad minting industry that gave the emerging identity a sense of uniformity. The new coins were meant to replace the Byzantine coins and were given new manufacturing standards that allowed them to circulate by piece instead of weight. This new standard was introduced to ease transactions and conversion of units.[104] For us, contemporary readers, the essential value of this new identity was the brief state use of icons that was followed by a period of state aniconism lasting until the end of the Ottoman caliphate in 1922. The years of 'Abd al-Malik have been seen as a main reference point for Arab and Muslim traditionalists.[105]

Figure 3.2. Obverse of a Standing Caliph gold dinar of 75 A.H. (694-695 C.E.), Arabic legend: 'bism Allāh la ilāha illa Allāh waḥdahu Muḥammad rasūlu allāh' – in the name of God, there is no god but God, He is alone; Muḥammad is the messenger of God.

Reverse of the Standing Caliph gold dinar of 75 A.H. (694-695 C.E.), Arabic legend: 'bism Allāh ḍuriba hadhā al–dinār sanat khamsa wa sab'īn' – in the name of God this dinar was struck in the year five and seventy.[106]

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[104] Treadwell, "Abd al–Malik's Coinage Reforms," 1–2.
[105] Heidemann. "Numismatics," 655–6.
[106] Source: "Dinar or," *Wikipedia*, last modified May 14, 2023, accessed May 29, 2023, https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dinar_or.

Figure 3.3. Gold solidus of Justinian II of 685-687.[107]

Stylistically, the new Umayyad coin bore resemblance to the Byzantine's. Both coins were classified as a gold *solidus*. They carried an imperial image that was supported by religious symbolism on the obverse, and a religious image supported by a slogan and a mint mark on the reverse. But let us take a closer look.

The new Umayyad coin was one of many that varied in imagery, but not in style. Compared with earlier Umayyad coins, the quality of this coin reflects a significant development in production. The increased quality could reflect better equipment and relative prosperity. This period was relatively stable on the local and the Byzantine fronts. This capability could also be a reason the Umayyads did not integrate Byzantine coin-smiths like their Sasanian colleagues. In this case, the Umayyads seemed like they already had the know–how, resources, and did not want to integrate their competitor. They were capable and independent enough.

To hypothesise that the Umayyad coin used a Byzantine style as a template to project Umayyad identity, we could notice that Islam at that time did not have a major symbol like that of the cross in Christianity and the menorah in Judaism. Both Byzantine and Umayyad coins shared a similar design. The Byzantine coin presented Justinian II carrying crosses, but 'Abd al–Malik carries a sword and/or a whip instead.[108] Religious symbols were stripped from the central figure and symbols of war and order are displayed with a standing position. Religious symbolism was not replaced however, it moved to encircle the standing caliph. The two crosses on the obverse were replaced with an abstract symbol of Islam, the *shahāda*, which replaced the name of the emperor. On the obverse, the caliph embraced the image of a soldier–king who ruled within a religious frame, while the emperor embraced the image of a priest–king who ruled in the name of religion.

The reverse is almost completely parallel except for the central cross that was replaced with the staff of Muḥammad. This choice was probably not as haphazard as it seemed since both the cross and the staff are charged religious symbols. Both symbols are associated with earthlings who had highest religious authority before their followers, i.e., Jesus and Muḥammad. Naturally, the interpretation of these symbols carried a different weight to each target group. The staff was not as charged as the cross, and the cross does not share the same meaning to Christians and Muslims. The Qur'ān did not even believe that Jesus was crucified, after all.

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[107] Source: "Byzantská říše v době Herakleiovců," *Wikipedia*, last modified December 1, 2022, accessed May 29, 2023, https://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byzantská_říše_v_době_Herakleiovců.
[108] Goodwin, "Standing Caliph Imagery Revisited," 119.

By analysing the two sides of the coin, a conclusion about 'Abd al–Malik's will to project defiance can be reached. The legend of 'Abd al-Malik paying his tribute to Justinian II with these coins to mark an end for their treaty can be true. It stood clear that 'Abd al–Malik's new coin replaced imperial Byzantium and Christianity with caliphal Umayya and Islam. Such a rare period in state funded Islamic art did not last for long, however. The year 77 Hijri (696/7 C.E.) marked the final year for the Standing Caliph gold coins paving the way for a second monetary reform and the Islamic dinar.[109]

3.4. Painting identity with words; Vici 696/7–705 C.E.

Figure 3.4. Gold dinar of 'Abd al Malik struck in 77 A.H (696-697 C.E.).[110]

Experimenting with coinage ended as abruptly as it started after introducing what we now call the 'Islamic dinar.'[111] The new design became a reference to Islamic and pseudo–Islamic coinage for centuries.[112] Featuring an abstract design, Arabic calligraphy, and aniconism, the new dinar represented our contemporary stereotypes about Islamic art. The new design was an Umayyad display of a monotheistic belief that is purely written. The Arabic script symbolised the importance of literacy as the first command in Qur'ān (*surah* 96).[113]

The design of the Islamic dinar was loaded with religious symbolism that took over the previous political representations. These religious designs soon became an optimal medium to spread the new monotheistic faith among the public. The new design was even more challenging to Christian clergy that had to address it within their own congregations, and then take it to the public sphere.[114] The legends and the outer ring of inscriptions were kept in their earlier place.

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[109] Schulze, "Symbolism on the Syrian Standing Caliph Copper Coins," 335.

[110] Source: "Dinar (moeda)," *Wikipedia*, last modified January 16, 2023, accessed May 29, 2023, https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dinar_(moeda).

[111] The same design was used for the silver *dirhams*. From now until the end of the thesis, I will refer to the epigraphic design on both the golden *dinar* and the silver *dirham*s as the design of the Islamic dinar.

[112] Treadwell, "Abd al–Malik's Coinage Reforms," 2.

[113] Sheila S. Blair and Jonathan M. Bloom, "Art and Architecture: Themes and Variations," in *The Oxford History of Islam*, ed. by John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 223–4.

[114] Reinink, "Political Power and Right Religion in the East Syrian Disputation between a Monk of Bēt Ḥālē and an Arab Notable," 154.

However, a closer look at the obverse, we can notice that the *Shahāda* had been expanded in wording and in space. The first *Shahāda* that proclaimed the oneness of God occupied the centre of the coin in larger letters, while the expanded second *Shahāda* proclaiming that Muḥammad is the prophet encircled the coin.

The reverse of the coin kept the outer ring where the minting's place and year were inscribed and added a *surah* from the Qur'ān, or 93% of a *surah*. The inscription at the centre resembled *surah* 112 and omitted the first word. The *surah* is an expanded form of the first *shahāda* where it starts with commanding the reader to "say that God is one, eternal, neither begets nor born, nor has an equal." The coins omitted the verb 'to say' and just said it.

In comparison with the cross on the Byzantine coin, this quotation from *surah* 112 seems a more appropriate challenge to the cross than the previous staff of the prophet.[115] The staff could stand as a physical symbolic parallel, but it lacks the emotional charge that the cross had acquired. An abstract Qur'ānic statement of monotheism that stood against the Christian belief in Trinity, could be as charged for a Muslim audience as the cross for a Christian audience. In this sense, the reverse of the Islamic dinar could be seen as a continuation in style when compared to the previous phase or to the Byzantine style but with a developed technique. In other words, the message did not change, but was told differently.

Another issue was that challenge to reconcile the Byzantine and the Sasanian audience. Although the Umayyad iconographical coin could be treated as familiar in Syria, they were strange to those used to Sasanian coins. 'Abd al-Malik had to produce a design that can be accepted by the different regions, as well as to achieve a relative uniqueness. The epigraphical coins were thus a bold decision to counter that dilemma. A clear text can deliver a clearer message than a collection of images and symbols.[116]

To conceptualize an understanding of the relations between the emerging Islam, its emerging abstract art, and their contemporaries, it useful to use Michael Young's[117] critique of Stefan Heidenreich's essay "Abstraction with and without Modernism." Young critiqued Heidenreich's four definitions of abstraction. When applied to the materials studied in this thesis, their theories help us relate the abstraction of art that the Umayyads sponsored to the underlying political, historical, moral, and philosophic ideas.

Heidenreich's theory essentializes the abstraction of art into main four ideas. Abstraction to Heidenreich is "First, to subtract or take away; it has a negative relationship to something bigger. Second, something had to previously exist – abstraction is anterior to a precedent. Third, abstraction is a refinement that subtracts the superfluous and consolidates the essential, thus a moral dimension. Fourth, abstraction is a process, a movement, not a trait or a style."[118]

Abstraction to Young on the other hand is: First, almost a substitution that produce tension in the artwork. Second, aesthetic abstraction can stand on its own without one being required to be familiar with the previous stage, it disrupts the logical relation with its background. Third, abstraction alters the essential and has no clear ethical stance. Fourth, abstraction can be process, a movement, not a trait or a style.[119]

The process is often valid upon the reception of the artwork. The time used to reflect upon the abstraction is the process that gives a new perspective to the matter in hand. It offers a

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[115] Treadwell, "Abd al–Malik's Coinage Reforms," 17–8.
[116] Treadwell, "Abd al–Malik's Coinage Reforms," 21-3.
[117] Young, "The Aesthetics of Abstraction," 133.
[118] Young, "The Aesthetics of Abstraction," 133.
[119] Young, "The Aesthetics of Abstraction," 133-6.

'defamiliarization' of what became natural. Thus, abstraction exposes the underlying structure. It does not provide knowledge by itself but could develop a sense of seeking knowledge.[120]

The abstraction of an existing form of art, can be interpreted as an opposition to the traditional style according to Young. Abstraction is used to reduce an artistic expression into its essential values, to reform a message, to set oneself unique, or to draw attention. Abstraction is used to induce a reflective approach to the existing model. It is not necessarily a presentation of new ideas, but an antithesis to the traditional ideas at hand. These ideas can often transcend from art into morality, politics, and religion. The abstraction as an antithesis makes the new art, another step of development rather than its purely unique style.[121]

A notable change was the absence of any symbol that related to the ruler, the Umayyads.[122] The Umayyad Islamic dinar became the Islamic dinar. The Arab Marwanid caliph, of the Umayyad line of Quraysh, left himself and his family out of the official mint to make a place for Islam. This move was rare in early Islam as well as other traditions. It was unexpected, especially for 'Abd al–Malik who spent most of his rule fighting rebelling groups, almost a decade of building landmark mosques under his family's name, and several years of coinage in an imperial style. 'Abd al–Malik was suddenly presented like a second founder of Islam. He even provided a humbler image when compared to the byzantine emperor and his relations with other churches. In a sense, there is a truth in all that. 'Abd al–Malik did develop a more organized and centralized structure of governance that spread on various levels; politics, coinage, administration, and religion.[123] Like Muḥammad, 'Abd al–Malik managed to develop from ruling his group to ruling everyone else.

The new design, along with other reforms, helped wash the image 'Abd al–Malik into a benevolent ruler who revived Islam. The accusations of supressing other Muslim groups stuck more to the second level elite, especially to al-Ḥajjāj (661–714) who was infamous for cruelty. The Islamic dinar stuck to 'Abd al-Malik's name even when it was not his invention but that of the same second level elite. Early versions of the Islamic Dinar were minted in Armenia and Azerbaijan under the governorship of 'Abd al–Malik's half–brother Muḥammad bin Marwān (died 719/720), and in Kūfa under the governorship of Ḥajjāj.[124]

From the Byzantine side, the Umayyads wanted an independent monetary system that would effectively replace the *solidus*, among other currencies. The bid started as a challenge between 'Abd al–Malik and Justinian where each would issue a new coin to respond the previous opposing one. The coinage of the previous phase was mostly used in the competition between the Caliph and the Emperor. The phase of the Islamic dinar on the other hand, pulled out the personal competition and gave an abstract design that Muslims at large could also identify with. The switch to the Islamic Dinar could allow smaller competitions to fade in favour for the bigger competition. In other words, the new dinar could target several audiences the focus on local and regional political issues into broader religious issues. After all, Iraq came close to being lost and Syria was devastated by a plague which threatened 'Abd al–Malik's career, if not his life. To win the support of the Muslims, the competition had to be moved against other religions. Intra-Muslim conflicts were to be resolved, and Muslim were to set out as distinct from Christianity or Judaism.

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[120] Young, "The Aesthetics of Abstraction," 133-6.

[121] Young, "The Aesthetics of Abstraction," 133.

[122] Treadwell, "Abd al–Malik's Coinage Reforms," 17–8.

[123] Robinson, "The Rise of Islam, 600–705," 211—21.

[124] Treadwell, "Abd al–Malik's Coinage Reforms," 19.

3.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I looked at the three phases of coinage during 'Abd al–Malik's rule while briefly connecting them to contemporary events in other domains such as administration, religion, and politics. Naturally, demarcating the phases was not as clean cut as one wished for, despite the presence of coins with clear dating of changes. Reforms could take years to materialise, especially when implementing a sole official language on such expanding empire. Dating the phases was inspired by 'Abd al–Malik's rule from 685 to 705. The years between 692 and 696/7 (77H) represented the first and last known issues of the Islamic iconographical coins.

One thing to bear in mind though, was the targeted audience. Even when having mint houses in major cities, a coin would take years to reach the market. Due to its high value, a golden *solidus* or *dinar* might never reach most of the population. For this reason, high value coins could carry a special relation to the issuers and to those rich or powerful enough to influence the high policy of the caliphate, i.e., the Umayyad elite, their allies, and their rivals.

During the first phase of 685–692, 'Abd al–Malik was suffered rebellious religious groups at home and Byzantine raids on Syria and Armenia. The instability led 'Abd al–Malik to sue for a truce with the Byzantines in exchange for seizing Umayyad raids and a handsome yearly tribute to the Byzantine emperor. In coinage, the Umayyads were using the already circulated coins, mainly Sasanian *drachmas,* and Byzantine *Solidus*. Both minting styles were integrated on various levels and were reissued by the Umayyads with countermarks or reproduced as parallel copies.

The next phase of 692–696/7 became unique due the relative stability. This stability allowed 'Abd al–Malik to introduce a major reform that affected various levels of administration. This reform aimed for centralization and incorporated Arabic as the official language of state. The reform included coinage to create an independent Umayyad currency that mirrored the emerging Umayyad identity. The new coins were produced by the Umayyads and were fashioned in a style parallel to the Byzantine style. However, the new coins reflected a style that was Umayyad, Islamic, and Arabic.

The stability did not last for long, and the crises hit harder than before with a widespread civilian uprising in Iraq and a plague in Syria. With the help of Ḥajjāj and Muḥammad bin Marwān, 'Abd al–Malik managed to save his throne and reinstate stability. The major change was evident during 696/7-705 with a newer style in coinage. 'Abd al–Malik abandoned the imperial image and appealed to the unity of Islam. In other words, if the previous phase was an attempt to centralize administration, this phase was an attempt to centralize Islam.

We can fairly conclude that ideas such as monotheism, aniconism, and belonging were still in negotiation and have not been fixed to the public Islamic mind at least until 'Abd al-Malik. Efforts to create official theology by gathering the *ḥadīth*, establish schools, and employ imāms began a project that took centuries to materialize. It is early to claim a clear Sunni or Shiite identity during this period, but it can be safe to claim that if 'Abd al-Malik failed, organized Islam would have looked differently in the tenth century or even today. With the risk of over-simplification, 'Abd al-Malik's role in Islam can be compared to that of Paul and Constantine in Christianity. Like Paul, 'Abd al-Malik was a revered theologian who sat the path to establish a clearly written belief. He also carried the political influence like Constantine to implement his ideas and establish a unified sense of belonging.

4. From Messianic to organized Islam; Reinventing Islam in identity, art, and theology
4.1. Introduction

This chapter studies how Islam transformed under the Umayyads from a set of beliefs that can be regarded as a continuation of an Abrahamic monotheism, into an independent and organized proto-Sunni Arab Islamic religion. The symbolism in coinage and the aftermath of the Umayyad military campaigns can be understood as an integral part to the state building project, i.e., the Arabisation reform. In this chapter I build on the previous chapters and discuss the formation of the Umayyad Arab Islamic identity.

My point of departure is the first infusion of Arab and Islamic identities in state, and the tension between Hellenic and Meccan heritages in Umayyad identity. I aim to explore why and when did Islam emerge to be an independent movement? Why did 'Abd al-Malik use end up projecting two contradicting identities? And why did his reforms survive his death?

To answer these questions, I navigate through the stages of Umayyad identity formation, while comparing coinage to art and architecture, analysing the discrepancy between public and private Umayyad identities, and problematizing the effort to include the allegiance to the Umayyads into an Islamic theology that later Sunni thinkers have built their work upon.

For the contemporaries of 'Abd al–Malik, Islam was going into its third generation. The survival of Islam did not seem to be at risk. The new religion was expanding, especially in territories that posed a historic rivalry to the Roman and then Byzantine empires. The growing Umayyad caliphate absorbed the Persian territories and practically took over the role of protecting persecuted minorities.

As seen in the second chapter, the risk against the caliphate was not to Islam, but to Umayyad Arab Muslims. The threat to the Umayyad legitimacy did not come from the local Jews and Christians who were integrated within the fabric of the Umayyad elite and the popular masses. The existential threat came from the closer Muslim groups that were able to compete in theology, politics, and battlefield.

The Umayyads managed to neutralize most threats, but their victory in battles came at a dire cost to their status among Muslims. To increase the chances of survival of his dynasty, 'Abd al–Malik produced an image that projected the Umayyads as Arab and Islamic reformers.

After establishing their new Arabized bureaucracy, the Umayyads would embed themselves as an effective local empire and change their reception from just another conqueror. A strong Umayyad state identity can provide a chance of survival, even against a military defeat. An Arabization reform was the beginning of a process to shape loyal aspiring politicians.

4.2. Is it Hagarism, Messianic Judaism, or Islam?

By correlating the coinage with historical events, I would claim that Patricia Crone & Michael Cook's[125] conclusion that the earliest origins of Islamic theology are traced to the era of 'Abd al–Malik as unlikely, since 'Abd al–Malik did not produce many new ideas. What 'Abd al–Malik did was more to choose and implement a style of already existing theology using the power of the state institutions that he developed. His contribution was applied therefore more in influencing the execution rather than the invention.

My findings agree with the observation of Crone & Cook to say that the Umayyads navigated their Islamic identities in relation to the Jewish identity. In a similarity to any emerging group however, the Umayyads were establishing their identity by drawing inspiration from the

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[125] Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, 29.

established ones while keeping an air of uniqueness. They have related to the Christian identity to keep a distance from assimilating into Judaism. The Umayyads have also kept similar distance from the Christian identity in fear of assimilation.[126]

Looking at the recurring civil wars, I tend to agree with Crone & Cook on the role of 'Abd al–Malik in shaping Islam, but that role mainly influenced those who did not oppose the Umayyads, i.e., the core of the group that later came to be known as Sunni Islam.

Following up on Crone & Cook's approach by reading a perspective of Syriac sources, reveals more about the Syriac source. What looked like a flexible identity of early Islam, might not be an Islamic feature only. The Umayyad elite lived in the same place and almost same time where Jesus–believing Jews where still explaining how one can live according to Jewish laws while believing in Jesus as the Messiah.

Until at least the sixth century, 'Judaism' and 'Christianity' were still two versions of the same religion, Daniel Boyarin[127] discusses. The parting of the ways started around late first century to early second century. However, even if a clear separation of identity emerged, groups of Jesus–believing Jews and Jesus–believing Gentiles maintained their identity and did not part.[128]

The interpretation of Christianity by different Christian traditions, played a role within the churches that might have affected the Umayyad elite who employed Christian scholars for education and administration. Whether a follower of Rabbinic Judaism or a "son of the Covenant,"[129] being a true Christian did not necessarily contradict being a faithful Jew.[130] But what about being a true follower of Muḥammad who was declared as the last of protracted line of prophets? In conclusion, the Umayyads, especially after 'Abd al–Malik, seem to have manifested their identity vis–à–vis their Judeo–Christian milieu differently across private and public platforms. The Umayyads walked a fine line between belonging to the Judeo–Christian traditions while declaring a renewal of those traditions.[131]

4.2.1. Why an Umayyad Arab Islam?

To ensure legitimacy and smooth succession, 'Abd al–Malik had to increase his engagement in the day–to–day affairs of the empire, and to give a space to the growth of an Islamic theology that rhymes with the interests of the caliph.

Giving an Arabic face to the bureaucracy self-evidently, gave a privileged access to Arabs. Personal convictions of the staff did not seem to matter if cordiality to the Umayyads and to Islam were secured. The sudden transformation of this reform however, especially in the areas of previous unrest, meant a greater control to the Arab element in the elite. Non–Arab Muslims who fuelled most of the rebellions in the regions of Iraq and Persia, would have an even more

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[126] Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, 11–2.

[127] Daniel Boyarin, "The Close Call; Or, Could a Pharisee Be a Christian?" in *Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism* (California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 22–5.

[128] For a discussion on the parting of the ways see:
Magnus Zetterholm, "Politics and Persecution," in *The Formation of Christianity in Antioch: A Social–Scientific Approach to the Separation between Judaism and Christianity* (London: Routledge, 2003);
And Annette Yoshiko Reed and Adam H. Becker, "Introduction: Traditional Models and New Directions," in *The Ways that never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages*, ed. Adam H. Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007).

[129] A common name for a Christian in Syriac.

[130] Daniel Boyarin, "The Close Call," 22–6.

[131] The Umayyad private and public identities in art and architecture are discussed in the third part of this chapter.

limited role in direct governance. Thus, the effect of the reform can be interpreted as a collective punishment against the rebellion of non–Arab Muslims in Iraq and Persia.

In regions like Syria, Egypt, or even Armenia, Christian proxy groups loyal to the Byzantines posed a threat. However, the threat was manageable through negotiations with the Byzantines. The greater threat was the dominant local culture that was closer to Constantinople than to Ḥijāz. The fear of being engulfed by the local cultural was maintained by the size of Umayyad military, and by keeping cordial relations with local Christian and Jewish groups who would otherwise be persecuted under the Byzantine rule.

For the Umayyads, an Arabization of the state, could usher the locals to identify with and enrich the new culture instead of identifying with what the Umayyads did not control. The Umayyad elite, as seen in the early coinage and in their private homes, identified more with the culture in Syria than in Ḥijāz. However, maintaining the local culture while ushering it into an Arabic frame would give the Umayyads a wider margin against assimilation.

Officially, the Arabization reform did not include a direct Islamization of the bureaucracy, but the new transformation gave an advantage to Arab Muslims and to anyone who does not oppose the new identity. The public use of Arabic, however, was charged with Islamic symbolism. Indeed, in a society with a rising aniconism among religious communities, the use of language on coins to manifest religious symbolism was a highly abstract symbolism.

The Qur'ān could also benefit from a language reform, given the linguistic complexity of its text. Early trials for graphic symbols of Islam were as early as its emergence, but the rapid expansion and the emphasis on the use and memorization of the text meant more flexibility within the linguistic realm than within the visual one. Verses of the Qur'ān offered clearer communication of messages. The symbolism of images on coins for example could be clearly interpreted. After all, the 'Abd al–Malik used similar symbols to the already circulating imperial symbols.

The risk of disagreement over new figurative symbols for Islam, however, was higher than using the textual symbolism that were already agreed upon among Muslims. The use of Qur'ānic verses could also offer a platform to send messages while securing the high-handed position of the caliph as an Islamic reformer. The reform of the governance had to be successful and swift. Using new figurative symbols could be referred to as Islamic, but in practice the reference is more Umayyad than Islamic. On the other hand, Qur'ānic verses can mobilise a larger support while delivering the same message. The Umayyad had their military successes but lacked a similar hegemony over theology. The public use of aniconism, therefore, was more effective to win the support of other Muslims as well as Jews and Christians.

4.3. The mosque versus the palace; public and private identities

Figure 4.1. Abstract ornaments and calligraphy on the façade of the Dome of the Rock.[132]

Figure 4.2. Abstract ornaments and calligraphy inside the Dome of the Rock.[133]

Looking at the Umayyad identity in their private sphere, suggests a relaxed attitude of Umayyad Muslims towards the local cultural milieu. One can surely say that being an Umayyad

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[132] Source: "Dome of the Rock," *Wikipedia*, last modified May 25, 2023, accessed May 29, 2023, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dome_of_the_Rock.

[133] Source: "Dome of the Rock," *Wikipedia*, last modified May 25, 2023, accessed May 29, 2023, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dome_of_the_Rock.

Muslim meant an extension of previous Abrahamic legacies. One can be a Muslim and seek inspiration from Judeo–Christian sources. In fact, the absence of a solid Islamic theology made it necessary to look elsewhere for answers. In their private homes, the ways never really parted. An Arabized Islamic identity complemented the Abrahamic traditions.

The identity of the public sphere, manifested in coins and public mosques, and was at times executed by the same bureaucrats as Rajā' bin Ḥaywā (c.660-730). Both the coins of the third phase and the public mosques lacked a direct portrayal of the political leadership, i.e., the Umayyad elite. The religious identity manifested mainly using script and abstract art. Both coins and mosques were meant to be used by everyone. An Arabized Islamic identity was being assessed to unite and replace the identities of the different regions. In the new public Umayya of 'Abd al–Malik, the ways parted from Judeo–Christian traditions.

The public identity did not seem to negate the Judeo–Christian heritage either. It competed with and complimented it. Umayyad public portrayal of Islam presented a revised image of monotheism.[134] A manifestation of how not to manifest the image of the only god. Using Jerusalem as the accession place of 'Abd al–Malik in 685 and building the Dome of the Rock in 692, indicates the symbolic importance of city to the Umayyad elite.[135] Minting the new coins and building the Dome of the Rock on Temple Mount clearly stated the new Islamic competition to the monotheistic identities. The art commissioned in Dome of the Rock has been a first example on what mainstream Islamic art looked like.[136] Monotheism was already a familiar theme to the early Muslim identity. In fact, traditional early Islam started as a monotheistic movement against the local polytheism prevailing in Arabia.

Sūra 112, for example, declares God as having no offspring nor being born. The sūra was inscribed on the new coins, as well as the door of mosques in Egypt and at the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. While the first Umayyad caliph, Mu'āwiya, honoured the Christian sanctity of Jerusalem, 'Abd al–Malik honoured the Jewish sanctity of Temple Mount and contested the belief in the trinity.[137] To Christian clergy, that was a new apologetic challenge that needed to be refuted.[138] The responses during the 690's–710's were apocalyptic texts that demonised the Muslims and their doctrine, and apologetic texts that worked to polemicize and refute the Muslim claims.[139]

One of the classic apologetics is *the disputation between a monk of Bēt Hālē and a Muslim notable.* The notable works at emir Maslama's court. Maslama was believed to be 'Abd al–Malik's son. The text exchanges questions and answers and portrays the Umayyad perspective as having their political might as a reward from God for their religious righteousness. The monk refutes by listing all the kings in history, and the fact that most of them are pagan. The text

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[134] Reinink, "Political Power and Right Religion in the East Syrian Disputation between a Monk of Bēt Ḥālē and an Arab Notable," 153.

[135] Andrew Marsham, *Rituals of Islamic Monarchy: Accession and Succession in the First Muslim Empire* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 135.

[136] Sheila S. Blair and Jonathan M. Bloom, "Art and Architecture: Themes and Variations," in *The Oxford History of Islam*, ed. by John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 215–6.

[137] Humphreys. "Syria," 520.

[138] Blair and Bloom, "Art and Architecture: Themes and Variations," 224.

[139] Reinink, "Political Power and Right Religion in the East Syrian Disputation between a Monk of Bēt Ḥālē and an Arab Notable," 155–7.

accused the Umayyads of fearing conversion to Christianity, especially among the Arab elite, and therefore seeking legitimacy through political power.[140]

4.3.1. The artistic manifestation of Umayyad Arab Islam

Figure 4.3. (Left) Qusayr 'Amra: Fresco of Caliph Al Walīd II (709-744).[141]
Figure 4.4. (Right) Qusayr 'Amra: Fresco of a bathing woman.[142]

Figure 4.5. Qusayr 'Amra: Fresco in a *hammām*.[143]

[140] Reinink, "Political Power and Right Religion in the East Syrian Disputation between a Monk of Bēt Ḥālē and an Arab Notable," 158–69.

[141] Source: Qusayr 'Amra," *Wikipedia*, last modified May 18, 2023, accessed May 29, 2023, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qusayr_%27Amra.

[142] Source: Qusayr 'Amra," *Wikipedia*, last modified May 18, 2023, accessed May 29, 2023, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qusayr_%27Amra.

[143] Source: "Castelli del deserto," *Wikivoyage*, last modified January 16, 2023, accessed May 29, 2023, https://it.wikivoyage.org/wiki/Castelli_del_deserto.

During the early Umayyad rule, artisans in the Umayyad region reproduced what they already learned from Byzantine and Sasanian art to accommodate to their Umayyad patrons, Garth Fowden[144] argues. Even Arabs were either natives to Syria or regularly travelled there. They were thus no strangers to the artistic scene and trends that prevailed in Syria. It was not until the currency reform of 'Abd al–Malik however, that we saw reasonable evidence of an active involvement of the Umayyad elite in the portrayal of their own identity, or at least their public identity.[145]

Since the Arab Umayyad elite seemed to feel at home in Syria more than Arabia, and since their cultural background was connected to Syria, the discussion on who influenced whom becomes somewhat inappropriate as Fowden[146] argues. Arabs were as native to Syria as the Syriacs, Hebrews, Kurds, Byzantines, etc. Even the Arabs that migrated from Arabia, did migrate as either internal migrants within the borders of the same authority, or were following the footsteps of earlier sojourners between Arabia and Damascus.

Compared to how Umayyad Islam later developed, the images on the first coins of 'Abd al–Malik provided a rare public endorsement of iconism within what later became Sunni Islam. During this period, images were endorsed in public representation of the Islamic caliphate by 'Abd al-Malik, the son and successor of Marwān I, who was one of the ṣaḥāba and who was quoted in *Sahīh al–Bukhārī*, one of the highly regarded ḥadīth collections in Sunni Islam. Few years later, aniconism began to dominate the design of the Islamic Dinar and has continued to influence Sunni Islam until today.

The presence of these coins proves that at least for some time in the first century of Islam, images were not as harshly forbidden as we may perceive. The Qur'ān might forbid the worship of statues and icons, but it did not forbid the secular production and use of anthropomorphic art. In fact, throughout my research I have not seen any religious law that harshly forbids images with animate representations until the rise of Ash'arism in the tenth century. Moreover, within Muslim populations in regions that were less cordial to the Umayyads, like Persia, images of angels, prophets, ṣaḥāba, and other living beings have had been circulating since the rise of Islam.

'Abd al–Malik did announce his victories by initiating reforms and issuing coins bearing his figure holding a sword and a whip, but his reforms and coinage point that he wanted to reunify Islam under an Umayyad influence rather than creating a new religion. The aim was to revive and restructure rather than to create. Fighting armed minority groups like the Shiites, the Kharijites, or the Christians, would have been overlooked by 'Abd al–Malik's core support groups. It could also have been encouraged since it limited 'extreme' religious voices that stood against the 'unity' of Muslims. 'Abd al–Malik was thus portrayed as a unifier of Islam who at times had to be pragmatic in supporting Islam.

My argument, however, is that if images in early Islam were as harshly forbidden as after the rise of Ash'arism, the images on 'Abd al–Malik's coins would have created a scandal big enough to threaten 'Abd al–Malik and the future of his lineage. What we have instead is more than four years of several versions of these coins issued with minor opposition, and then a profound endorsement of the Islamic Dinar. Ignoring the imagery phase by later Arab historians would reflect their own perspective rather than that of 'Abd al–Malik.

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[144] Fowden, *Qusayr 'Amra*, 295.
[145] Fowden, *Qusayr 'Amra*, 291–5.
[146] Fowden, *Qusayr 'Amra*, 296.

4.3.2. Projecting identity through architecture; public mosques versus private homes

Coinage could provide hard evidence on how 'Abd al–Malik and the Umayyad elite wanted to project their identity. Relying on coinage alone to analyse the elite's identity, however, could be tricky since it is also a state instrument. Leaders in late antiquity had no distinction between the private and public. They were the state, even at home. A pragmatic politician like 'Abd al–Malik can be an exception though. Based on the contradictory art forms found, he probably kept his public and private identities apart.

The remains in Umayyad private homes might be scarce, but there is enough evidence to suggest that their private identity was closer in style to the iconographic coins than to that of the Islamic Dinar. In private houses like Qusayr 'Amra images of nudity, hunting, family, and kings were dominating the art within the home to suggest a continuation of the local artistic styles rather than the radical aniconism of the Islamic coins.

Despite the scarcity of Umayyad buildings, Fowden[147] argues that Qusayr 'Amra can serve as a representative specimen of its contemporary Umayyad courtly buildings. The extravagance in art and architecture was a physical embodiment of the common self–praise genre in Arabic poetry. A dichotomy of private and public art is not helpful, according to Fowden,[148] since the Umayyad rulers were too busy with their public life and were also curious at times to know if their audience would appreciate these elaborate art projects. Looking at the evidence from the Umayyads' artistic projects there is no evidence to suggest that they imported aniconism from Arabia.[149]

Three generations after the first migration, the use of the term *muhājirūn*, migrants, declined by the end of the seventh century, while the term Arab became more common. To adapt to their new identity as local Arabs, the Umayyad elite created their expatriate imagined community. They also pursued a shared culture that accommodated their Arab Islamic heritage within their local cultural milieu.[150]

On the other hand, the remains of public places[151] built by the Umayyad elite were the most famous and preserved in the region. These public places were limited to almost only grand mosques. Their style corresponded more to the epigraphic coins rather than the iconographic coins.

The Umayyad grand mosques and especially the Dome of the Rock were probably directed to Jews and Christians, as well as Muslims. The dome of the Rock was initially meant as a substitute for the Meccan Kaaba, which was held by the rival caliph, 'Abd Allāh bin al–Zubayr.[152] The Umayyad Mosque of Damascus was built next (or around) a basilica devoted to John the Baptist, while the Dome of the Rock was built on the Temple Mount. These bold

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[147] Fowden, *Qusayr 'Amra*, 170–1, 291.

[148] Fowden, *Qusayr 'Amra*, 291.

[149] Fowden, *Qusayr 'Amra*, 292.

[150] Webb, "Identity and Social Formation in the Early Caliphate," 143–4.

[151] Palaces and courts can be considered as a hybrid of a public space and private place. In this thesis I consider them as private places due to their function as a dwelling as well as their exclusive nature. A visitor could enter a court or a palace, but only by invitation or in an errand. Mosques and marketplaces can however present a clear example of the term public space.

[152] Blair and Bloom, "Art and Architecture: Themes and Variations," 265.

aniconistic works of architecture, shadowed the Qur'ānic call to the people of the book to go back to the original Abrahamic message that the Qur'ān corrects.[153]

Crossing the styles in architecture with coinage, we could see a clearer distinction of Umayyad public and private identities. The distinction was not as sharp as it is in today's politics when it comes to the personal ruler, but it is quite visible when it comes to the state.

Looking at the identity in the Umayyad houses, their style appears to tolerate iconography and Byzantine influence. The public identity of their state on the other hand, especially after the revolt of Ibn al–Ash'ath, saw a fresh style of Umayyad Islam that took place in mosques and on coins. A new state–backed identity of Islam had to be campaigned for to secure the survival of a centralized Islam after and during the end of the schism.

The new public Islam seemed unifying since it relayed on the most common part of Islam, the Qur'ān. The absence of imagery and the Umayyads on coins and in mosques, could also be unifying factor given the later popularity of the Umayyads. Instead of boycotting the public projects of the Umayyads, later generations seemed to embrace and preserve them. This preservation effort was not offered to the other styles of the same era.

The Umayyads, and especially 'Abd al–Malik, were later seen as builders of great mosques and of an enormous caliphate. The later preservation of the Islamic Dinar and of public places, in comparison with the iconographic coins and private homes that had been almost forgotten, shows that the Umayyad public identity was more successful in unifying enough Muslims to ensure the survival of the Umayyad house.

4.4. A proto–Sunni Islam; the formation of an organized theology

A living society is a main pillar for a sustainable emerging identity. 'Abd al–Malik's policies can be linked to the social building of loyal and unified communities. His dominating influence in theological communities was essential. The persecution of opposing Muslim groups might have eased the intra–Muslim competition, but his caliphal legacy would not survive without a solid contribution to theology. An effort to influencing consensus among scholarly networks was thus essential to a long-lasting effect of his reforms.

The political discourse and patronage networks that developed with 'Abd al–Malik was a reference for later Sunni thinkers reflecting on community and orthodoxy, as Abbas Barzegar[154] explains. Endorsing the rule of the community, i.e., *al–jamā'a*, as a theological authority while maintaining loyal networks, was crucial to provide legitimacy and political stability.

The Umayyads were key to the Sunni claim to orthodoxy. Networks of Umayyad scholars were part of a continuous and uncorrupted chain of scholars dating back to the days of the prophet. These networks of scholars represented the *umma,* nation, and *al–jamā'a,* the community, and provided the backbone to orthodoxy and Muslim collective identity.[155]

Due to the absence of a centralized ecclesiastical body in Islam, as the church was in Christianity, consensus to decide and interpret pressing issues was the way out. The conception and legitimacy of any proclaimed council has always been vigorously discussed and even

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[153] Robert Hoyland, "Early Islam as a Late Antique Religion," in *The oxford Handbook of Late Antiquity*, ed. Scott Fitzgerald Johnson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1058–9.

[154] Abbas Barzegar, ""Adhering to the Community" (Luzūm al–Jamā'a): Continuities between late Umayyad Political Discourse and "Proto–Sunni" Identity," *Review of Middle East Studies*, 49, no.2 (2016): 140–1.

[155] Barzegar, "Adhering to the Community," 142.

contested.[156] The Umayyads appear to have escaped this treacherous path by not getting directly involved in theological matters, but rather by indirectly framing it.

The *ijmā', theological consensus, was later adopted by Sunni scholars based on the Marwanid use of consensus among *al–jamā'a*, the group of scholars. The work of a*l–jamā'a* matched the goals of the state, by linking the Sunni identity to early Islam. It did so by maintaining the circles of *ḥadīth* transmitters; a social network that represented a *jamā'a* of pious scholars. These pious scholars were linked by their loyalty to the Umayyads first, and then by their knowledge. They provided the prototype to form theological exegesis, which was later known as the theological consensus, *ijmā'*.[157]

4.4.1. Loyalty to Umayyads is the key to Paradise! The centralizing the state through the centralizing of religion

The collective community, *al–jamā'a*, resembled the poster child of the Umayyads' emerging public identity, and was thus projected on to the masses. In fact, political and religious allegiances were treated as the same allegiance, *bay'a*. Adhering to the identity in formation, translated into an inclusion in the state, and in heaven. Sharing the same theology of *al–jamā'a* also meant better subliminal assurances for the afterlife.[158] Even though the *ḥadīth* allowed political neutrality during conflicts, those who reject the political authority or desert back to the desert had to deal with exclusion and accusations of apostasy.[159]

Although the Umayyads might appear independent from the religious discussion, many prominent *ḥadīth* transmitters owed their prominence to their career in the Umayyad court.[160] The concept of *al–jamā'a* can be seen as a cornerstone to the organizing of Sunni Arab Islam. The scholars during the Umayyads' period were less organized than their Christian colleagues, but the influence and knowledge of *al–jamā'a* would still be later received in a holiness close to the holiness of the Qur'ān. Their work to codify the religion, however, was much needed due to the low halakhic content in the early script and was still received as Islamic law instead of Umayyad law.[161] It was these networks after all, that would later assemble the *ḥadīth* and write the history of Muḥammad and early Islam.

A lack of a precise top-down definition of what *al–jamā'a* meant a margin of flexibility when compared to the Christian creeds. Looking at the history of rebellions, the Umayyads' chief concern was unity and political loyalty.[162] As long as loyalty was secured, the Umayyads seemed inclusive and open to fresh ideas. Their effort of getting away from the military into science, theology and culture showed a willingness to integrate and be the local community. The promotion of al–*jamā'a* could be regarded as a softer tool to promote the new identity that complemented the public approach of coins and architecture, i.e., it was targeted to approach Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

4.4.2. Systematizing the oath of allegiance; *al-Bay'a*

Although the Umayyads' political intervention to organize the religious debate was indirect at best, the use of religion to organise politics was more evident. 'Abd al–Malik and his Umayyad predecessors had been regularly challenged to the caliphal seat. Ibn al–Zubayr almost

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[156] Barzegar, "Adhering to the Community," 142.
[157] Barzegar, "Adhering to the Community," 143.
[158] Barzegar, "Adhering to the Community," 143-5;
And Marsham, *Rituals of Islamic Monarchy*, 96-7.
[159] Marsham, *Rituals of Islamic Monarchy*, 97-8.
[160] Barzegar, "Adhering to the Community," 146-52.
[161] Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, 29-30.
[162] Barzegar, "Adhering to the Community," 147-8.

ended the Umayyad claim, making it necessary that unity and legitimacy were secure, lasting, and inheritable.

The Umayyads used their public mosques as a ceremonial extension of the state. This can be seen by adjoining palaces to mosques and a place of accession ceremonies.[163] The ceremonies often lacked the involvement of an imām. The allegiance was directly between the communities, governors, and the Umayyad caliph who in turn was also the imām.[164]

In his claim to legitimacy, 'Abd al–Malik was a step ahead of his opponents by systemizing the *bay'a* process. His process downplayed the election of a caliph in favour of formalising the naming of the successor by the living caliph; a process that earned the Umayyads accusations of perverting the caliphate into *mulk,* autocratic kingship.[165] The origins of the formal Umayyad succession process are unclear, but Roman, Sasanian, and/ or Himyarite influences are probable. The process of naming the successor already started by the first Umayyad caliph, Mu'āwiya. 'Abd al–Malik's role was to integrate it in the state and to give it an Arab and Islamic face. Thus, securing the legitimacy of his heirs[166]

Like the Umayyads, the Kharijites and early Shiites used similar theological methods to legitimize their claim. Both followed an approach that opened the communities that did not inherit a long-established tradition.[167] The early Shiites had limited political activity however, their contribution was mostly known in theology, learning circles, and even bureaucracy.

On the other hand, the Kharijites were more exclusive by using a strong and unwavering rhetoric. The Kharijites were various groups that shared a frequent refusal of lineage in leadership[168] since 'Ali in 657. Their puritanical attitude however, rendered the groups a reputation of violent intolerance. To many Kharijites, everyone was a target to killing and accusations of apostasy, until they repent and join the group.[169]

4.5. Conclusion

Though unlikely, 'Abd al-Malik's reforms survived his death. The rapid territorial expansion coupled with being a minority among communities with established roots and fierce competition among Muslims leaders, gave an urge to part the ways and establish a new religious dogma. The Umayyad elite had to navigate between the Hellenic heritage that they liked and were surround with, and their assumed Meccan heritage that gave them an Islamic *bay'a* in the first place. The need to establish a new identity (-ies) that integrated them with local culture while securing the legitimacy of the caliphate gave a fertile foundation for an organized religion that ensured loyalty without the need for the caliph to be the imām. If the broader tenants of Islam were observed, the personal belief, even that of the caliph's, did not have to rhyme with the majority. The caliphal use of religion in propaganda while refraining from direct involvement in theology resulted in a murky separation between the religion and the state.

This murky separation even resulted in an apparent separation between the private and the public image. Looking at the contrasting identities presented on coins and mosques, and private palaces suggests another kind of differentiation. A class–based differentiation between the

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[163] Marsham, *Rituals of Islamic Monarchy*, 134–5, 138.
[164] Marsham, *Rituals of Islamic Monarchy*, 134–8.
[165] Fowden, *Qusayr 'Amra*, 171.
[166] Marsham, *Rituals of Islamic Monarchy*, 163–4.
[167] Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, 133.
[168] Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, 132.
[169] Marsham, *Rituals of Islamic Monarchy*, 100.

public elite who were able to access these private houses, and the general public who had better access to mosques and coins.

Mosques were a space for crowds, while houses were a place for invited guests, Mosques and coins are part of a propaganda, while houses were a place for relaxation and enjoyment of wealth. In the end, propaganda was actively used, but the tricky question is for whom? For the ruler, his family, his tribe, Arabs, Jews, and Christians, etc.?

The legacy of 'Abd al-Malik could be the neutralization of the most divisive issues of his age. His alliances, victories, and relative prosperity could have worked as long as he lived but his promotion of Islam was long lasting. 'Abd al-Malik used religion in coinage and mosques, without boldly portraying himself or his heirs. The same policy was adhered in systemizing the theology. A smooth succession was allowed due to him promoting the scientific collection of the *ḥadīth* as well as history of Muḥammad, while developing a ceremonial oath of allegiance. Even after the defeat of Umayyads by the Abbasids, the issue of naming the next caliph by a living one was not as harshly contested as in the formative years that preceded 'Abd al-Malik.

The Umayyads used various tools to create a unifying identity under their political banner. The Umayyad identity consisted of sub–identities that were prone to be indistinguishable. The clearest lines found where between the private and the public; the individualistic and the communal. Publicly, the Umayyad leadership merged as a military might out of a civil war over political influence and over shaping the emerging Islam. Islam started as an Abrahamic religion, which made it part of the Judeo-Christian traditions of Syria as well as the tribal traditions of Arabia. 'Abd al-Malik began his career as part of these conflicting influences but went a step further to produce an Arab Islamic identity that proved popular among his supporters. The new identity continued to be a symbol of independence from Judeo-Christian influences, as well as the ambitious imāms who aimed to overthrow state-religion through radicalisation (e.g., Kharijites) or catholicisation (e.g., Shiites).

The introduction of the Islamic Dinar in 696/7, the erection of public mosques, the Arabisation reform, and the promotion of theology, served as tools to fortify the Umayyad Arab Islamic identity for centuries to come. These tools emphasised the weight of Arabic language of the Qur'ān and slowly pushed it as the new lingua franca. They toned down explicit political ambitions and tied political credit to the serving of absolute monotheism and of Islam.

Looking at the homes of some of the Umayyad elites, suggests a private identity that was at odds with the public state identity. The Umayyads were known to enjoy the Hellenic culture more than that of their Ḥijāzi ancestors. The social circles, high-ranking staff, artists, and teachers were mostly Judeo-Christians. The art commissioned in their homes was as influenced by Roman and Hellenic culture as in most of non-Muslim Syria. Although such discrepancy is note-worthy, one cannot equate this private life with their public projects. After all, the audience and scale of Dome of the Rock was different than a house of a general.

The use of *al–jamā'a* gives another light to the civil wars with Shiites and Kharijites of that era. It gave a theological aspect that contributed to absolving the Umayyads from the sin of fighting other Muslims. Contributing to the legitimacy of excommunicating those who rebelled against the collective census.

The rule of *al–jamā'a* can in fact be traced back to the days of Muḥammad and the first caliphs.[170] The system that traditionally chose caliphs by a vote from the elite and then installed him by forming a covenant, strengthened the legitimacy of the caliph. The caliphs represented the Islamic *umma* in a capacity similar and only inferior to that of Muḥammad. Thus, political

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[170] Qur'ān 42:38; and Qur'ān 3:103.

rebellion from the covenant would also be treated as a religious rebellion. The main difference to the Umayyads is that each of the early caliphs had a different process of naming the successor. The Umayyads contribution, was the expansion of the concept from being a semi–democratic council that elected caliphs and discussed essential issues, to an institution that the entire Sunni theology would later be built upon.

5. Conclusions

The aim of this thesis was to examine why did the Umayyad caliphate adopted a new official identity that merged Arab and Islamic identities into one. The goal was to better understand the emergence of a duality of a state-sponsored Arab Islamic identity during the era of 'Abd al-Malik. It has analysed an emerging Islamic art that the Umayyad caliphate chose to represent itself with. The Arabisation reform and establishment of Islamic coinage during this period gave an insight into the identity that the Umayyads were trying to project. A diachronic, qualitative, and comparative approaches has been used to investigate the coinage while connecting to its historical context, coinage of its contemporary rival entities, as well as art in grand mosques and private houses of the ruling Umayyad elite.

To form an analytical framework of the evolution of Islamic identities, theoretical triangulation has been used. (1) Islam as Judaism; using the theory of Hagarism by Crone and Cook, Islam has been analysed as a continuation of Messianic Judaism. The theory has been used to assess the claims of an Islam of Samaritan influence being reformed in Umayyad Syria. The found material suggests that 'Abd al-Malik had a significant role in shaping the systemization of Islam, but not enough evidence is found to suggest that he created Islamic theology. Elements of Islamic theology preceded him but seemed scattered and diverse. His role was to make a balance. If the caliph assimilated into a Judeo-Christian culture, he could have risked his legitimacy as the successor of Muḥammad. If the caliph chose a puritan approach, he could lose the local political networks to secure his empire; a mistake that ended the rule of his predecessor, Ibn al–Zubayr. The way out was to include Arabs in the administration of the state, while appearing as Islamic reformer by unifying the identity through politics, art, and theology.

(2) The personal choices of the caliph do not necessarily represent Islam; Qusayr 'Amra, a book by Garth Fowden's has been then used to investigate the social role of art, and the issues of the public and the private. The private houses of the ruling elite were an extension of the state. The role of a caliph did not end once he stepped in his home. He kept staff and could still receive work related visits. When looking at the artwork, it appeared more anthropomorphic and less abstract in comparison with that on coins and in grand mosques. This would suggest a tolerance of secular anthropomorphic art in early Islam. The Islamic design which was first championed on the Islamic dinar could be explained as a goal rather than a real-time representation. The tendency to abstraction in Islamic art could be explained by a choice of later generations to ignore the anthropomorphism during and before 'Abd al-Malik's era, rather than his intended choice.

(3) Islam as Umayyad Arab slam; Berzegar's "Adhering to the Community" has been used to assess the role of the identity reforms in the making of a proto-Sunni identity. 'Abd al-Malik's next step to consolidate his legitimacy, was a calculated distance from religion. By not being too direct in his involvement on representing Islam, it was easier for him to be seen as a unifying figure while being able to get away with naming a successor with impunity.

In conclusion, 'Abd al–Malik struggled with internal and external rivalries, after he inherited the rule of vast lands inhabited by multi–ethnic and multi–lingual populations. The way out was a series of experimentations that redeveloped the identity of the state, society, and religion. After achieving a sense of stability using force and diplomacy, he commenced on a campaign of Arabisation of the state that helped the survival of his ideological interpretation and offspring's grip to power. This campaign was the earliest systematic effort, since the death of Muḥammad (c.570–632), to impose an official identity on an Islamic state.[171] A new narrative

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[171] Treadwell, "Abd al–Malik's Coinage Reforms," 1.

had to be weaved to avoid a future civil war while securing the integration with the local communities. A new identity had to be formed to unify Muslims and keep an open door to non–Muslims. The abstract, aniconic, and unpolitical style of the Islamic dinar presented an image that took changed the focus on 'Abd al-Malik's legitimacy. This campaign was also the first to portray Arabic as the official language of an Islamic state, including non–Muslims within the borders, and thus setting the way part from the Judeo-Christian heritage and to a later fusion of Arab and Muslim identities.

Why the Arab and the Muslim identities did became closely intertwined even though non–Muslim Arabs and non–Arab Muslims were always significant groups?

After the threat of losing the Caliphal throne and the division of the emerging Islamic Caliphate, the Umayyads expanded their concentration from the military into the bureaucracy of the ruling regime. After gaining a relative stability through their military, the Umayyads launched the first state–backed effort to create a public identity of the Islamic caliphate. The Umayyads' use of Arabic Qur'ān and lack of political representation in public state tools, signalled a unifying aspect against the accusations of being kings instead of caliphs. The abstraction on the other hand, helped in carving a unique identity that can be recognized by post byzantine and post Sasanian communities.

For non–Muslims, the Arabization was in practice associated with Islam. Coinage presented an Islamic identity written in Arabic and grand mosques were designed by the same Islamic designs. In practice, Arabisation presented a chance for the Umayyads to put down their swords and integrate in the state and society.

To Muslims who concentrated in the east, Arabisation was the beginning of decades of collective punishment against rebelling regions. Most of the rebellions came from the previously Sasanian regions. These movements either presented a differing interpretation of Islam or were waged for socioeconomical reasons. Arabisation was just another hindrance to give the Umayyad Arab Muslims a competitive edge.

The Arabisation reform must not be taken in isolation. Early Islam was a mosaic of groups that differed on the person of the caliph and stood at different lengths from the Judeo-Christian heritages. 'Abd al–Malik set a precedent in building an Arab Muslim state identity that lived for centuries, despite his short-lived era. 'Abd al-Malik ventured using various tools to save his legitimacy. The side effect was laying a groundwork that his successors maintained resulting in the Arab Islamic public image. Despite the emergence and fall of dozens of Islamic states until the Ottomans, only a handful did not adopt Arab Islam as their state identity.

Until today, we tend to associate Islamic art with geometric lines and the intertwined Arabic calligraphy, while tending to forget the iconographic Islamic art as a rare exception. The sustained features are probably the choice of the later Muslim generations to readopt the same Umayyad Arab Islam as in portrayal of their public identity. In today's Middle East, Islamic identity was diluted during the pan–Arab period of the 1960's–1980's. However, Islamic, and national identities are resurfacing on the expense of Arabism in the 2010's. As long as we keep rebounding between Islamic and Arab identities, we will still be mirroring the major legacies of the Arabisation reform of the 690's (i.e., preserving the state authority to Arab Muslims).

Why was the public Islamic iconographical stage short-lived?

There is no direct evidence to answer this question. However, looking at the later stage and a comparison with public and private art in the Umayyad architecture could be a hint. As discussed in chapter three, the figurative stage in coinage carried similar characteristics to the art in the Umayyad private houses, even well after 'Abd al–Malik. It was closer in style to the local Judeo–Christian art, but with a political Umayyad twist.

The aniconic style was closer to that of public buildings. A style that indirectly politicised Islam against Judaism and Christianity. It limited the mention of the Umayyads and carefully presented the 'true' monotheism of Islam.

Coins could be seen as a public tool, just like a grand mosque. In theory, everyone used them. As a representation of the state to the masses, a sense of uniformity was especially needed after the civil war. The art private houses and courts kept true to the Hellenic influence that the Umayyads seemed to feel home at. Two opposing identities thus formed where the distinction manifested in class and a separation between the role of the caliph and that of the king.

One can argue that precious coins are more used by the elite rather than the public, therefore there is no need to treat them as a public tool. Such a statement could be true if the figurative art were restricted to the precious coins. But the minting project was ambitious to create an independent Umayyad coinage system. Coins became therefore a public tool.

One must also consider the cost of minting and the possibility of counterfeiting when styles are changed as frequently. Before the centralization of minting, it was relatively easy for a governor to select a circulated foreign coin, modify it, and issue it as a local coin. By the 690's, coinage became a large institution that tamed the experimental spirit.

Finally, the Umayyad elite succeeded in retaining their authority, but they were not the only political contestants. Limiting the over–representation of the Umayyad political face in public, helped the image of 'Abd al–Malik to rise from a political competitor to a unifier of Islam. The concentration on Islamic rhetoric and the sponsorship of theological development showed, at least to the supporting base, that he was a caliph and not a king.

Why did iconography last longer in private art?
Private Umayyad houses were used as a workplace as well a place to welcome visitors making them a semi-public place. However, they should not fall under the same public category as a mosque. A mosque small or grand was open to everyone, while a house of a high official was more selective of its visitors. A visitor to a private house was also more likely to be accompanied with someone from the house while gazing at the murals at home. This companion had the chance to talk about the artistic choices and even relate to the taste of the visitor. Guiding a visitor through the artwork could also be a way to assess the reception of the Hellenic art. The open nature of a mosque or a coin could not provide the same margin for interpretations.

Art in private houses, as the name suggests, was private. Even if the owner of the house was a high official that receives errands at home, his artistic choices did not necessarily mirror that of the state. The choices might not even be made by the patron, but by local artists who were doing what they used to do before the Arab Muslim expansion. The widespread use of figurative art in Umayyad houses suggests that the Umayyads were more comfortable in this milieu than with abstract Ḥijāzi art.

Why are coinage and the persecution of Umayyad opponents connected?
To the emerging Islamic state, coinage was a superior and simple technology that had yet to be utilized. The Umayyads were not the only ones who tried to give their image a prominence in the hearts and purses of the public. The Umayyad's support was strengthened by choosing an identity that can attract the most, standardizing the weights of the coins to ease transactions, and closely monitoring the process through centralization. While using diplomacy and the military against opponents, the Umayyads also focused on the soft powers of state and theology to boost their legitimacy to prevent future uprisings.

5.1. Coins and identity formation in three stages

The changes in minting styles during the rule of ‘Abd al–Malik suggests three separate phases of development. This development echoed the development within the structure of the Umayyad bureaucracy and its effort towards a unifying identity. The lines separating the three phases were murky at best. When it came to private identity of the Umayyad elite versus Umayyad state identity, it was even less clear as argued in chapter three. The reference here was the dates inscribed on coins since it was more tangible as evidence when compared with historical narratives.

In the first stage of 685-692, I discussed the historical element in the second chapter, where ‘Abd al-Malik reclaimed a lost throne after a civil war among the Muslims, and a risky front with the Byzantines. The third chapter looked at the state of the state by evaluating the coins of that period. The Ḥijāzi Arabs were not involved in the bureaucratic administration and kept the existing systems of each region. In relation to identity, the fourth chapter found a mosaic of beliefs of equally merits to the throne of the caliphate. After the death of Muḥammad, no one could fill the gap to give sense of a unified identity. Without the sword and the potential of the new religion, Arab Muslims lacked a clear identity.

The Umayyad appropriation of exiting state tools in 685-692 suggests a lack of interest by the earlier Islamic rulers. Internal and external threats were too immediate to invest in soft powers that would project a unique Islamic identity. Theologically and culturally moreover, Muslims were not thinking far from their contemporary Jewish and Christian communities. If the inter-Islamic schism was to be considered as a fight among siblings, then the competition with Jews and Christian ought to be seen as a fight among cousins. Until this point, Muslims were trying to convince their neighbours that Muḥammad was only complementing the revelations of Moses and Jesus. Many of the early Muslims came from an Abrahamic heritage which blurred the boundaries.

During the stability of 692-696/7, the second chapter found a development of new coins that resembled the Byzantine's. The coins resembled the independence of the Umayyads from being a tribute paying kingdom to the Byzantines while embarking on state building project, i.e., Arabisation. In the third chapter, we could see that although the emerging identity contested the Byzantines, the art form was remarkably similar. Indeed, as found in chapter four, the Hellenic culture that dominated the region found a home in the private Umayyad homes. With the involvement in state building, a Hellenic influenced Arab Muslim identity started to emerge.

After failing to produce a unifying identity, the years 696/7-705 witnessed a new period that managed to form a lasting Arab Muslim identity. Fear of assimilation into Judaism or Christianity as well as the resurfacing of rebellions pressed ‘Abd al-Malik to develop another way out as seen in chapter two. The new epigraphical art symbolized by the Islamic dinar, analysed in chapter three, delivered an art that (1) was easier to comprehend by the post-Byzantine and post-Sasanian regions, (2) drew focus to the ideology rather the person of the leader; thus, a unifying aspect, and (3) presented a way out of the Abrahamic tension; instead of presenting Muḥammad against Jesus, abstract monotheism became the focus. The development of the Islamic dinar mirrored similar projects, as found in chapter four. A separation of public and private identities developed to indulge in the cultural needs as well as safeguarding the Ḥijāzi legitimacy. The promotion of theological development was the long-lasting identity former for Arab Islam. With a minimal involvement from the caliph, scholarly networks began the work of collecting and evaluating the written and oral Islamic thought. The continuation of their work developed centuries later into the mainframe of Sunni theology. Using state, art, and theology Arabic and Islam infused to be two sides of the same coin.

5.2. Evaluation and limitation of research

The meta use of scholarship allowed a thorough analysis of the three stages from various vintage points. The use of numismatics, history, and art deepened the understanding of the underlying factors of the Umayyad identity formation. The multi-lingual and multi-disciplinary use of sources proved also challenging when reconciliation their different focuses.

The limited access to coins and art in private houses, as well as the limited written record about them posed a challenge. The work of Fowden and of Crone and Cook provided sources and a perspective that lacked in traditional scholarship. If more coins or houses were to be unearthed, the understanding of that period might differ.

5.3. Further research

Due to the rapid rise and fall of contemporary states, polarization of society, as well as the rise of digital identity, it would be interesting to use the findings of this study to understand and influence current trends.

By analysing the art produced in early Islam for example, we can see that social aniconism was one of many political choices. Islam prohibited the worship of icons, but the use of icons by the companions of Muḥammad proves the acceptance of their secular use, even those of Greco-Roman influence. The criticism against these images appeared to be personal and class-based rather than theological, i.e., the deputy of God's prophet was acting like a king.

Likewise, this approach can be used to reform the current theology by revaluating the religious values and understanding the influence of the later generations on interpreting the classical text. How to navigate a society as a minority without losing one's identity or be driven into seclusion can be interesting to study. The attribution of traditions to theology can be filtered and revaluated by looking back to understand the underlying reasons for historical choices.

A further study of non-Umayyad art during and before 'Abd al-Malik would be a next step to discover the many sides of the emerging Islam.

For further and background readings, the works of Nāheḍ Abd al-Razzāq, Abd al-Raḥmān Fehmi, al-Karmali al-Baghdādi, and for a Shiite perspective see Mūsā al–Ḥusayni al-Māzandāni[172], offer a valuable overview of the developments in Islamic and Arab numismatics after 'Abd al-Malik.

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[172] Nāheḍ Abd al–Razzāq, *Coinage and History Writing*, Series of the Simplified Historic Encyclopaedia (Baghdād: Dār al-Sh'ūnu Thaqāfeyya al–'āmma, 1988);
And Nāheḍ Abd al–Razzāq, *Arab and Islamic Decorative Arts* (Amman: Dār al–Manāhij, 1429 A.H./ 2009 C.E.);
And Abd al–Raḥmān Fehmi, *Arabic Coins: its Past and Present* (Cairo: Dār al–Kutub, 1964);
And Anstās Marie al–Karmali al–Baghdādi, *Arab Coins and Numismatics* (Cairo: Al–Matba'a al–'sriyya, 1939);
And Mūsā al–Ḥusayni al–Māzandāni, *History of Islamic Coins,* 3rd ed. (Beirut: Dār al–'Ulūm. 1408 A.H./ 1988 C.E.).

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