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Cultural backlash to globalization and right-wing power:

Import competition shaping sexual beliefs in Western Europe

by

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Abstract. Does economic globalization impact sexual beliefs, contributing to the rise of right-wing parties? Although voters may not discern threats from trade shocks, individual economic insecurity theoretically impacts cultural attitudes and sparks a backlash towards outgroups, in turn contributing to right-wing candidates that campaign leveraging intolerance. Considering that scholars provide evidence for import competition strengthening support for right-wing parties, this study accounts for the peculiarities of European Parliament elections and their electoral outcomes of 2019. To test these hypotheses, I use rich individual-level survey data, the Eurobarometer 91.4, and construct the measure of import competition per worker (IPW) using trade data from Eurostat Comext from 2015 to 2019, normalized and weighted by regional employment conditions retrieved from ARDECO. I provide a novel modification to the instrumental variable strategy to rule out endogeneity and specify the 2SLS estimation based on recent literature. The analysis presents estimates showing that imports from BRICS and low-income countries affect in different magnitudes attitudes towards same-sex, transgender, and intersex relationships. Estimates are positive and robust, thus opposing a causal cultural backlash mechanism for the case of Western European sexual beliefs. The novel evidence suggests that they are not leveraged by right-wing candidates to the European Parliament, and heterogeneity tests allude to country-specific processes to be determined in future research. Additionally, effects are concentrated among ingroup members of society, slightly stronger for males, while sexual minorities notably display positive attitudes driven by globalization shocks.

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1 Introduction

Nativism and populism have recently emerged as a prominent characteristic of various Western democracies. Nativism is characterized by a belief in the superiority of one's own culture and a fear of cultural or demographic change, and it is often associated with right-wing populist movements and politicians, such as Donald Trump in the United States and radical right parties in Western Europe (Moffitt, 2018). Upon these definitions, economists and political scientists have argued over whether the emergence of anti-globalization movements in Europe and the US is due to cultural backlash or economic insecurity. The 'cultural backlash' phenomenon has highlighted animosity toward immigrants and minorities among largely white, uneducated voters, citing status anxiety as the primary driver of populism (e.g., Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Mutz, 2018). Nonetheless, the effects of Chinese competition on the labour market are significant, long-lasting, and widespread (Acemoglu et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2014; Autor, Dorn & Hanson, 2013a). According to Inglehart and Norris (2017) and Inglehart (2018), the ensuing economic uncertainty may catalyse a cultural reaction and cause fierce ingroup loyalty, rigorous adherence to group norms, and rejection of outsiders, such as racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities. This could thus increase support for right-wing politicians who run for office by appealing to out-groups and capitalising on nativist sentiments (Ferrara, 2023).

The 'economics' side of the argument, on the other hand, has concentrated on the importance of individual economic insecurity (e.g., Algan et al., 2017; Guiso et al., 2017) and vulnerability to various globalisation shocks, such as migrant and refugee populations as well as global trade and capital flows (e.g., Rodrik, 2018). Through the division of labour and cooperation in trade, international trade and industrial globalisation allow developed and developing economies to take advantage of their comparative advantages to advance technology, facilitate industrial innovation and upgrading, and increase productivity and consumer welfare (Feenstra & Weinstein, 2017; Lin & Monga, 2013).

In addition to being favourable to many nations worldwide, globalisation is also an inevitable outcome of changes in production structure brought about by developed economies' drive of capital's highest possible returns. Such production structure changes resulted in both the industrialisation of emerging nations and the deindustrialisation of rich

countries in terms of industrial composition (Ferrara, 2023; Lin & Xi, 2022). Through the development of high-tech industries and the financial sector with increased investment and technological advantages, developed countries have upgraded in global value chains and transferred low value-added, labour-intensive industries to developing countries (Antràs & Helpman, 2004). This research has evaluated the degree to which competition from imports from other countries, particularly China, has impacted local labour markets locally, favouring the development of protectionist and radical politicians in Europe and the US (e.g., Autor et al., 2020; Ballard-Rosa et al., 2021; Colantone & Stanig, 2018a, 2018b; Dippel, Gold & Heblich, 2015).

The industrial revolution ushered by globalisation has redistributive consequences among various industries and areas within a nation, other than to solidifying economic growth and improving general wellbeing. The consequences of imports on domestic industries could jeopardise social stability in both developed and emerging nations (Bussmann & Schneider, 2007; Stiglitz, 2003) and appear to have a negative impact on the labour market. The welfare loss in these regions might give rise to xenophobic and anti-globalisation political inclinations if the government does not alter policies in reaction to these import shocks and compensate the affected groups (Colantone, Ottaviano & Stanig, 2022; Colantone & Stanig, 2018a).

Political economy literature generally views left-wing parties as the main political opponents against globalisation (Milner & Judkins, 2004; Stokes, 1999) and focuses on the effects of globalisation on developing countries from the perspectives of resource dependence, infant industries, social inequality, and ethnic conflicts (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007; Tybout, 2000). However, in Western developed nations, anti-globalisation political forces have also become more powerful in recent years. These forces typically manifest themselves as right-wing populist parties and politicians (Colantone, Ottaviano & Stanig, 2022). The National Rally of France, the Freedom Party of Austria, and the Dutch Party for Freedom are just a few examples of far-right parties in Europe that have emerged as powerful opponents of globalisation. The percentage of seats held by far-right parties in parliament has increased from 3.8% to 12.8%, while their acceptance rating in Western European elections has risen from 5.1% to 13.2% (Inglehart & Norris, 2016).

1.1 Aim and scope

To study the causal relationships between globalisation and right-wing populism from the perspectives of economic shocks and cultural shocks, this paper presents recent literature that frames the concept of right-wing populism, highlighting the interaction of globalization exposure with homo-transphobic populism into voting behaviour, in the contest of the European Union. Even before the current populist wave, studies examining the political effects of Chinese import competition have repeatedly demonstrated that trade exposure benefits candidates and parties at the right end of the political spectrum. The debate in the literature suggests that the import of goods from developing nations because of globalisation and the influx of immigrants from developing nations as a result of geopolitical and cultural globalisation have posed formidable challenges to the governance capacity of developed nations (Lin & Xi, 2022).

Numerous factors make the emergence of populism among the member nations of the European Union significant. According to Spolaore (2013), the EU represents a historically unique attempt at supranational union. Incorporating the "periphery" nations of Southern and Eastern Europe into the European democratic model has been successful in maintaining the peace (Gill & Raiser, 2012). However, the financial crisis has revealed flaws in the structure of European political and economic institutions. According to Algan et al. (2017), Europeans seem dissatisfied with regional and EU institutions and politicians. Additionally, this change in trust reinforces the emergence of political extremism. Authors such as Autor et al. (2020) Ballard-Rosa et al. (2021), Colantone & Stanig (2018b), Dippel et al. (2016), and Feigenbaum & Hall (2015) have evaluated the extent to which local labour market effects of competition with foreign imports, especially from China, have favoured the rise of protectionist and radical candidates in Europe and the US.

Research on the political effects of Chinese import competition have repeatedly demonstrated that, even prior to the recent populist surge, candidates and parties on the right end of the political spectrum benefit from trade exposure. The reason behind this, though, is still not entirely clear, as previous literature that studies cultural backlash mechanisms is scant, testing the long-term period effect leading to a shift towards populist parties across Western Europe. This research provides additional insight among the existing literature, as there is little to no previous research testing the relationship between import exposure and discriminatory attitudes

in the context of a European Parliament election. Voters may not frequently be able easily determine the origins of the local economic threats posed by trade shocks since the distributional implications of trade integration may be challenging to understand (Rho & Tomz, 2017). But the consequences of Chinese competition on the labour market are significant, long-lasting, and widespread (Acemoglu et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2014; Autor, Dorn & Hanson, 2013a, 2013b). In this sense, the following hypothesis is tested:

Hypothesis 1: *Exposure to economic globalization on individuals in Western European regions affects individual cultural and social attitudes.*

According to Inglehart and Norris (2017) and Inglehart (2018), the ensuing economic uncertainty may catalyse a cultural reaction and cause fierce ingroup loyalty, rigorous adherence to group conventions, and intolerance of outsiders, such as sexual minorities. Hence, a second hypothesis is explored:

Hypothesis 2: *Individuals in Western European regions impacted by economic globalization hold worse attitudes towards outgroups and turn to right-wing parties.*

The study employs a similar empirical approach to that of Ferrara (2023), employing data on attitudes towards sexual outgroups from the Eurobarometer 91.4 of 2019. Moreover, the empirical analysis determines the effect of two measures of regional (i.e., Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics Level 2, or NUTS-2) exposure to import competition from BRICS and low-income countries, following the seminal contribution of Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013a) and a similar formulation of Lin and Xi (2022).

1.2 Outline of the thesis

The empirical analysis is conducted through econometric analysis, using an adaptation of the Instrumental Variable (IV) model of Ferrara (2023) and Lin and Xi (2022) that has already been deployed extensively in previous research (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2016; Colantone, Ottaviano & Stanig, 2022; Milner, 2021), based on the seminal works of Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013a) on import competition per worker.

The focus of the study is on how exposure to imports affects perceptions of sexual in-groups and out-groups. I provide evidence that voters were sensitive to local import competition per

worker. However, positive coefficients of import exposure affecting attitudes towards sexual minorities do not support the causal relationship for a cultural backlash in sexual attitudes, which theoretically contributed to the share of right-wing votes in the European Parliament election of 2019. The estimations are robust to different exporter countries in manufacturing and across sexual outgroups. This novel finding suggests that, in these elections, voters in Western European regions exposed to competition from imports in manufacturing do not seem to turn to right-wing candidates leveraging negative attitudes towards sexual minorities. Estimates from heterogeneity tests allude to other characteristics varying upon the respondents' nationality, although results are not driven by any particular one. Further heterogeneity tests indicate that they are more concentrated among in-group members of society, while the respondents' gender plays a limited role. Notably, sexual minorities also seem to react positively to trade exposure, as the LGBT+ struggle has transnational, globalised roots, apparent also in mainstream/institutional Pride parades and events, and echoes in both national and European contexts.

The study is organised as follows. The section 2 named 'Context' provides a background picture in which the study is set, covering the relevance of European Parliament elections, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and other sexual identity minority (for convenience, henceforth named LGBT) groups, and contemporary economic globalization. Section 3 'Literature review' covers academic publications that investigate right-wing and populist platforms and determinants, as well as related works on attitudes and characteristics of the LGBT collective. Chapter 3.3 'Theoretical framework' reviews the appropriate theoretical framework that the study is based upon, linking cultural and economic factors. Section 4 'Data' describes the data sources and preparations. In section 5 'Empirical Methods' the econometric methodology and specifications are defined. Section 6 'Methods' presents the estimations of the effect of regional competition from imports, originating in BRICS and low-income countries, on individual attitudes towards sexual outgroups, as well as heterogeneity tests conducted in Chapter 6.2. The final section of the study lays down closing remarks and suggests pathways in further research.

2 Context

International trade is a key activity for the European Union (EU). The majority of goods, services, currency, and its population are able to move across and exchange goods freely within the EU's single domestic market, which is made up of the 27 member states. Beyond its borders, it is the greatest exporter of manufactured goods and services, as well as the largest market for imports for more than 100 nations. International trade is an essential component of the EU's policymaking because it is the largest trade bloc in the world and aims to liberalise trade globally (Achievements and Benefits | European Union, 2023). In fact, EU international trade more than doubled between 1999 and 2010, and it currently represents over 30% of the EU's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

The member nations' foreign trade policies fall under the control of the European Union, which also acts as their representative when negotiating contracts. The European Union (EU) has pursued an active trade policy over the past 20 years, establishing a variety of bilateral trade treaties that set up an agreed-upon set of favourable trading conditions between particular countries or groups of countries and being heavily involved in negotiations at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (e.g., Doha Round, Agreement on Trade Facilitation, Trade in Services Agreement) (Leblond & Viju-Miljusevic, 2019). Morevoer, the EU's trade policy was significantly altered by the Lisbon Treaty, improving the role of the European Parliament (EP) in formulating EU foreign policy. In fact, the EP and Council are now equally responsible for creating the rules that will be used to implement the unified foreign and security policy. Accordingly, the Lisbon Treaty increased the EP's authority over traditional bilateral trade agreements as well as over unilateral EU trade policy (Woolcock, 2010).

The citizens of the EU members elect members of the European Parliament directly. The European Parliament, along with the EU Council, is a key institution for formulating laws, reviewing annual EU budgets, and making decisions regarding legislation pertaining to tariffs, monetary policies, market competition laws, environmental protection, information security, and immigration policies. Each member state's population determines how many seats are available in the European Parliament. Every five years, there are elections for the European Parliament. By using the proportional representation principle, the residents of each member

state directly elect their members to the European Parliament. According to the political preferences of their constituents, these MPs establish political parties in the European Parliament (Hix, Noury & Roland, 2007).

2.1 LGBT groups in the European Union

In Europe, particularly in parts of Central and Eastern Europe, legislation and policy are still ambiguous. It can be challenging to assess the impact of policies because they are not always properly implemented. For instance, new "propaganda" guidelines have made it more challenging for LGBT individuals to live their lives fearlessly in Russia, where homosexuality is not against the law. Although LGBT persons are permitted to serve openly in the military in every state of the European Union (EU), there may be variations in implementation and practise, similarly to the United States (Wilson, 2020).

Around the world, the process of legalisation differs noticeably, and it can be challenging to discern trends in the criminalization or decriminalisation of homosexuality among nations. Castration and public burnings were instituted as consequences for same-sex partnerships after Christianity became the predominant religion in Europe (Boswell, 1994). The first nation to remove references to homosexuality from its penal code was France, which did so in 1791. In areas ruled by France during the Napoleonic era, including the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium, homosexuality was legalised. A crackdown on LGBT rights has been linked to the emergence of dictatorships in Europe, such as the Nazi rule and Franco's Spain (Wilson, 2020).

Since many states in Europe decriminalised homosexuality by the 1990s, no country in Europe still has laws against same-sex relationships; Northern Cyprus was the last nation in Europe to do so in 2014 (Wilson, 2020). Compared to the six European countries that only permitted civil unions or marriage at the end of the 1990s, 29 of them now permit same-sex unions, making Europe one of the most advanced continents in this regard. Most European nations have passed laws outlawing "anti-gay" discrimination, with significant exceptions being the Vatican City, Belarus, and Russia (Wilson, 2020).

Through EU law and treaties, the rights of LGBT citizens have been fairly safeguarded by the EU. For instance, every country permits LGBT individuals to serve in the military, and

discrimination in the workplace has been illegal since 2000. Regarding efforts to enact legislation and policies pertaining to LGBT rights and against discrimination, the EU has a significant influence on its members. Without a question, the position of EU residents has improved with the introduction of shared measures to combat discrimination on several grounds regarding LGBT concerns. Conditionality of admission was used as a tool to sway change in candidate countries' treatment of minorities during accession talks with former socialist countries after 1989 (Wilson, 2020). Early on, the EU recognised non-marital unions, including same-sex ones, and granted partners in these unions the same legal protections as heterosexual couples (Resolution A5-0281 of September 4, 2003). The freedom of movement and residence within the borders of the member state are among these rights (Directive 2004/58/EC of April 29, 2004).

A key factor to consider is the legislative framework because it not only establishes what the state can and cannot tolerate, but it also has a significant impact on public opinion in particular nations (e.g., Hadler, 2012). The annual reports from the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights noted both advancements and losses in the protection of various groups' rights, including LGBTI individuals. The publication of 2018 offers insight into both the progress LGBTI people have made and the challenges they face in the EU. Several countries, including Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Portugal, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, have enacted national action plans to increase LGBTI people's safety, welfare, and access to opportunities. One of only two nations that forbid conversion therapy because of gender identity is Malta, which outlawed it in 2016 (Transgender Europe, 2017). Malta was the first nation in all of Europe to do so. Moreover, there has been an increase in support for universal gender self-determination. However, only a few Western European nations had adopted this strategy, while others had added nonbinary gender markers to their legal framework. The EU as well has advised member states to streamline legislation concerning legal gender reassignment, grounded in self-determination.

The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) is an organisation of high regard that gathers data on the treatment of LGBT populations around the world and produces annual reports. Wilson (2020) references two of these works: the State-Sponsored Homophobia (SSH) reports and the Rainbow Europe Review (RER) on Human Rights of LGBTI People. The necessity for European nations to take more action to safeguard

LGBTI people is emphasised in the 2019 SSH report. The authors draw attention to the fact that regional progress in both law and policy has stagnated.

The RER (ILGA-Europe, 2019) evaluated and ranked 49 nations based on the legal protections and social equality provided to LGBTI people. The countries were ranked from 0%, where there are flagrant violations of human rights and discrimination, to 100%, identifying both respect for human rights and equality. For LGBTI rights, Malta and Scotland came out on top, achieving over 90% in terms of constructive actions made during the previous 12 months. Malta is one of only five nations in the world whose constitutions are recognised as ensuring citizens' equality regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. The constitution of Sweden guarantees safeguards for its people based on their sexual orientation. The presence of progressive LGBTI legislation and policies in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and Finland also contributed to their high rankings. The RER results for Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Romania were among the worst (ILGA-Europe, 2019). The authors state that efforts to "push back" against some of the rights and advancements made by LGBTI people in Europe have slowed and that policy improvements have slowed down. Ultimately, populism and nationalism are found to impact the perception and attitudes toward LGBT individuals (Corrales & Kiryk, 2022; Ferrara, 2023) a phenomenon framed both theoretically and empirically in the following sections of this research.

Bulgaria withdrew its legal procedures for trans persons to change their name or gender marker in government documents, which the authors of the 2019 SSH report describe as an evident backslide on laws and policies preserving equality and human rights for LGBTI people (ILGA-Europe, 2019). Plans for advancing equality that Serbia and Kosovo had established were not renewed. According to the report, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey dropped in the rankings as a result of their governments' disregard for fundamental rights like the right to assemble and the protection of individuals who had tried to defend human rights. It also mentioned the recurrent impunity for hate speech by celebrities and religious authorities.

Pride marches and other public activities are still prohibited or not adequately protected by public authorities in low-ranking nations, and assaults on human rights advocates are also common. By considering laws in areas including equality and non-discrimination, legal gender recognition, hate crime, and civil society space, the Rainbow Index reports that Armenia, Turkey, Russia, and Monaco were among the countries with the worst rankings. Police raids against LGBTI people and political statements in support of unfair treatment are among the

problems mentioned. Poorly performing EU nations were Lithuania (21%), Latvia (16%), Poland (18%), and Latvia, which had the lowest score. Only 16 of the 49 rated countries received a score of over 50%, with numerous historically leading nations failing to make significant strides in the previous year (ILGA-Europe, 2019).

Special Eurobarometer surveys were conducted in 2015 and 2019, with the latter being used for the aim of this study, to evaluate trends and comprehend public opinion on discrimination across the EU. In 2019, it was discovered that 76% of respondents said lesbians and gay men should have the same rights as heterosexuals and 72% thought same-sex relationships were acceptable; both numbers climbed by 5% since the 2015 survey. When compared to a similar study conducted in 2006, 69% of respondents believed that same-sex marriage should be permitted. All EU nations experienced this rise in supportive attitudes towards same-sex unions, with Ireland experiencing the largest increase (38%) since the 1980s, when similar questions were first introduced.

2.2 Contemporary economic globalization

O'Rourke & Williamson (2002) found compelling proof that globalisation began in the 1820s, yet Steger (2020) attributes the beginning of *contemporary* economic globalisation to the gradual establishment of a new international economic order at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference. The conference attendees also decided to create legally binding guidelines for international economic operations in addition to making a solid commitment to increase global trade. It was up to each country to decide how permeable their borders were. Subject to its money exchange system, the Bretton Woods agreement permitted states to determine their own political and economic agenda, though it failed in 1971 when the US abandoned the gold-based fixed rate system. Steger (2020) refers to this time as the "golden age of controlled capitalism" because the welfare state was expanded with the help of high tax rates on the wealthy, and salaries increased in an environment characterised by successful firms, embracing Keynesian state interventionism. When it fell apart, conservative political parties ushered in a 'neoliberal' strategy that was heavily influenced by the classical liberal theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, later put into practise by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan. They campaigned for the removal of trade restrictions, capital flow restrictions, and other restrictions on the free market. The fall of communism in the Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991 further legitimised this new neoliberal economic order. Since that time, the three most important changes in relation to economic globalisation have been the internationalisation of trade and finance, the growth in the influence of multinational corporations, and the expanded function of international financial organisations like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (Steger, 2020).

International trade policy has evolved to reflect the need for reducing regulatory barriers to trade adopting strategic economic objectives (e.g., Bekkers et al., 2019), while attempting to reconcile non-economic objectives such as sustainable development (e.g., Copeland, Shapiro & Taylor, 2021; Francois, Hoekman & Nelson, 2022) or provisions negotiated upon human rights protected within the EU (e.g., Drieghe & Potjomkina, 2019). On the other hand, it has ignited the public's concern over how trade agreements might restrict the capacity of governments to intervene in society and the economy however independently (Leblond & Viju-Miljusevic, 2019), as well as an increase in demand for the 'inclusiveness' of civil society mechanisms (CMSs) into EU trade policymaking, albeit limited in practice (Drieghe et al., 2022).

Despite the net welfare advantages, both the public and the academic community recognise the "losers" of globalisation. Workers at companies that fail due to import competition, as well as those in regions with a high degree of sectoral specialisation, for example, face particularly high adjustment costs in the form of lost employment and wages (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2016; Autor, Dorn, & Hanson, 2013a), as well as worsening physical and mental health for exposed workers (Colantone, Crinò & Ogliari, 2019; Hummels, Munch & Xiang, 2016). Funke, Schularick & Trebesch (2016, p. 245) demonstrate that “financial crises put a strain on modern democracies. The typical political reaction is as follows: votes for far-right parties increase strongly, government majorities shrink, the fractionalization of parliaments rises and the overall number of parties represented in parliament jumps. These developments likely hinder crisis resolution and contribute to political gridlock.”

3 Literature review

Although they don't offer a comprehensive framework, some of the studies mentioned above make an attempt to answer similar research questions to this study. According to Autor et al. (2020), economic hardship can boost support for nativist politicians, and wedge issues—as opposed to trade policy stances—appear to be what motivate Republican voters. They provide evidence to back up this assertion by demonstrating that districts with a majority of white residents and trade-exposed districts are more likely to elect extreme Republican congressional candidates. Colantone and Stanig (2018a) demonstrate that exposure to import competition has a detrimental impact on sentiments towards immigration in the UK, which are then associated with the vote for Brexit. Additionally, Ballard-Rosa et al. (2021) offer proof that localised trade shocks from import competition raise the probability that British people will have favourable attitudes towards authoritarian values. Colantone and Stanig (2018c) demonstrate that when import competition becomes more intense in European regions, respondents become less pro-democracy, more pro-strong leadership, and more concerned about immigration, particularly the threat that it poses to local cultures.

In contrast to cyclical changes in unemployment, general equilibrium effects caused by Chinese import competition were sizable and extensively researched in the US case. Increased import exposure, according to Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013b, 2013a), results in detrimental local demand spillovers that lower low-skilled employment in non-manufacturing industries. Acemoglu et al. (2016), who examine whether adverse shocks to trade-exposed industries also harm shielded sectors, support this evidence. They discover that reduced demand for non-traded products and services magnifies the impact of import penetration on employment in local economies. Despite some reallocation, the overall impact is detrimental, long-lasting, and widespread (Acemoglu et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2013a, 2013b; Autor et al., 2014)

On the other hand, Ferrara (2023) contends that trade-related economic instability may influence cultural attitudes and support right-wing candidates for reasons that are still closely related to the economic beliefs of trade-exposed individuals. Another feasible theory that fits better with a purely economic approach is that economic insecurity makes people more afraid of competing with immigrants and other ethnic or racial outgroups for jobs, better pay,

or welfare benefits. Because of this, it is not enough to reject the null hypothesis that economic attitudes are what cause the association between trade shocks and candidate selection, even though there is a significant relationship between import exposure and unfavourable attitudes towards ethnic and racial minorities (Ferrara, 2023).

The 'Silent Revolution in Reverse' hypothesis was examined and implemented in Ferrara (2023), by considering a wider range of attitudes towards in-groups and out-groups, including religious (e.g., Muslims) and sexual minorities (e.g., homosexual men and lesbians). In this sense, this research attempts to replicate such framework adapted to the European case. However, it seems reasonable to assume that fears of economic competition are orthogonal to attitudes towards religious and sexual in-groups and out-groups. Economic concerns may mediate the relationship between economic insecurity and attitudes towards immigrants.

3.1 Determinants of the rightward shift and polarization

Radical right-wing platforms' rising popularity has sparked a vigorous discussion on the factors that led to this significant shift in the political climate of Western democracies. Research concentrating on the exposure to Chinese imports in Western nations has often highlighted a pro-conservative influence and given considerable cause for "economics" theories on the causes of right-wing populism.1 However, this research has not fully explained why this happens. The 'compensation hypothesis' (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1998; Walter, 2010) claims that import competition should lead net losers of globalisation to support left-wing parties through increased demand for social insurance and redistribution. As governments work to compensate potential globalisation losers for the risks associated with increased international competition and volatility, proponents of the so-called compensation hypothesis contend that globalisation results in the expansion of the welfare (Cameron, 1978; Katzenstein, 1985; Rodrik, 1998; Ruggie, 1982). There are essentially two parts to this argument: a demand-side component and a supply-side component. On the demand side, it contends that voters' desire for social protection rises as a result of globalisation. Governments meet this demand on the supply side by offering a more extensive welfare state (Walter, 2010). However, studies that show that globalisation has a pro-conservative impact in Europe highlight the possibility that those who lose out as a result of it may prefer protection over compensation, and demand trade restrictions rather than larger welfare transfers (Colantone & Stanig, 2018b).

According to one viewpoint, populist support can be characterised as a social psychology phenomenon that is a reactionary response to long-term processes of value change and subjective judgements of social status loss (Gidron & Hall, 2017; Inglehart & Norris, 2016). According to the 'culture backlash' concept, men, the elderly, people with low educational attainment, and traditionalists who perceive a decline in their relative social status will support populist parties the most (see Margalit, 2019). Inglehart and Norris (2016) provide evidence to support this claim by demonstrating that voting for populist parties is consistently predicted by anti-immigrant views, distrust of global and national government, support for authoritarian ideals, and left-right ideological self-placement. Similar to this, Gidron and Hall (2017) discover that voter support for extreme right-wing parties is consistently correlated with poorer self-attributed socioeconomic standing. According to Kaufmann, 2017), authoritarian tendencies can help to explain why American and British voters supported Donald Trump and Brexit, respectively. The most significant predictor of choosing Trump in the 2016 presidential election, according to Hooghe & Dassonneville (2018), is attitudes towards immigration and ethnic minorities. In addition, Mutz (2018) contends that variations in individual support for Republicans from 2012 to 2016 were largely unaffected by changes in financial status. Instead, shifting perceptions of national status—both in terms of US dominance in the world and white numerical dominance in the US—were what shaped political attitudes.

In this sense, Ferrara (2023) argues that welfare chauvinism may be the motivating factor behind the association between trade-induced insecurity and candidate selection, leading to anticipate that people exposed to imports will be against increased trade openness and in favour of welfare and social security, in line with a conventional OEP framework and the 'compensation hypothesis'. Generally, welfare chauvinism refers to public opposition to transnational welfare rights, whether in or outside of an EU environment. This indicates a preference for native citizens receiving more generous welfare benefits than immigrants (Kitschelt, 2007). It causes a 'free movement-welfare cleavage' between old and new member states by restricting support for cross-border welfare rights. At the EU level, this division drives intergovernmental political confrontation over social rights (Hjorth, 2016). According to Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016), populists who have a welfare-chauvinistic stance accuse the elite of denying worthy "natives" their welfare rights and blame non-natives for piling up excessive welfare claims. Populism may so adopt xenophobic scapegoating. The Dutch PVV, for instance, emphasised the costs of mass immigration in its manifesto from 2010: “The billions that are spent on additional prisons, extra police, extra

housing, extra care, extra education, and additional benefits need to come from somewhere. Who pays the price for the multicultural society? From whose wallet does the money come? From you, the ordinary, hard-working Dutch citizens who never asked for mass-immigration." (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010).

Additionally, Autor et al.'s (2020) research demonstrates a correlation between rising Chinese import penetration and rising Fox News channel market share, stronger ideological polarisation in campaign donations, and a relative increase in the likelihood of electing a Republican to Congress. They observe that the moves to the right in political ideology and voting behaviour are concentrated among non-Hispanic Whites, with no influence or the inverse among Hispanics and non-Whites. Finally, Bisbee et al. (2020) provide evidence of rising protectionism and xenophobia among American voters living in highly trade-exposed areas using data from the 2012 US Cooperative Congressional Election Study.

Another viewpoint places a strong emphasis on economic considerations, highlighting the electoral repercussions of long-term changes to post-industrial societies as trade integration, globalisation of finance and migration, and automation (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2017). Economic insecurity is a result of constrained real salaries and fewer work options in specific industries, especially for the most disadvantaged segments of society (Ferrara, 2023). According to the 'economics' argument, the most significant predictors of support for populist candidates and movements are personal economic insecurity (e.g., Guiso et al., 2017; Colantone & Stanig, 2016), and exposure to different sorts of globalisation shocks (Rodrik, 2018).

In the European context, using a panel of fifteen European countries between 1988 and 2007, Colantone and Stanig (2018b) uncover that voters in import-exposed areas are more likely to support extreme right-wing parties. According to this finding, they identify economic nationalism as the primary factor explaining the connection between import competition and extreme right-wing parties in Europe. Economic nationalism is defined as a combination of opposition to free trade and isolationism, laissez-faire on domestic economic issues, and a strong nationalist stance. In the 2016 referendum to leave the European Union, voters in British regions exposed to imports were disproportionately more likely to support Brexit, according to Colantone and Stanig (2018a).

Along with the polarisation of politics brought on by trade's redistributive effects, stagnant growth and economic downturn in developed nations also fuel voters' resentment of political establishment parties. Globalization in general and the EU in particular have been successful in promoting growth but have not done as well in sharing the gains. Large parts of society have felt left behind and have risen against the establishment, national, and European institutions. The recent vintage of populism unites far-right and radical-left politicians in their criticism of the continent's elites and of the cross-border integration that these elites represent (Algan et al., 2017). Voters in areas where local sectors are most negatively impacted by trade shocks are more likely to blame globalisation for the economic slowdown and support right-wing populist parties (Algan et al., 2017; Rodrik, 2011).

Due to the recent crises' significant effects on the European economy, populist and anti-establishment voting, and a crisis of political confidence, all occurred at the same time (Algan et al., 2017; Colantone and Stanig, 2018). Although there has been significant variety in unemployment dynamics among the EU core and periphery (typically associated with Germany and its neighbouring economies), as well as within countries, unemployment in the EU climbed from 7% in 2007 to 11% in 2013. In this regard, Algan et al. (2017) showed that increasing share of votes for anti-establishment parties, particularly populist ones, follow shifts in unemployment during the recession of 2007-2015, rather than its level in 2015, and they are significant indicators of the 'leave' (i.e., Brexit) vote of the United Kingdom. Marie Lechler (2019) uses regional, industry-specific labour shocks and individual-level Eurobarometer survey data from the years 1996 to 2014 to examine the effects of employment shocks on anti-EU opinion, finding that unemployed and low-skilled workers, the 'losers' of globalisation, present a higher level of the Euroscepticism and the support of populist politicians. Moreover, by supporting anti-establishment candidates, voters can also make the incumbent party answerable for its bad performance in terms of governance and subject it to electoral punishment (Barro, 1973; Hillman, 2010). These results might as well echo the studies regarding economic losses and self-reported well-being (Layard, 2005).

Researchers have been increasingly concentrating on how exposure to shocks in the global trade system affects election behaviour. According to Walter (2010), increased personal exposure is linked to a stronger demand for welfare benefits, which in turn fuels support for left-leaning parties in Europe. According to Margalit (2012), job losses due to trade in the US made it more difficult for incumbents to win elections in 2000 and 2004. In swing

states where low-skilled manufacturing employees compete with imports, Jensen, Quinn & Weymouth (2017) note that incumbent parties are more likely to lose votes when imports rise and exports fall. Additionally, Owen & Quinn (2016) offer proof that trade flows have an impact on the overall policy climate regarding the scope and size of government in the US. Numerous studies in this field have expanded upon the novel article by Autor et al. (2013a). They offer proof that Chinese import rivalry cost-intensively altered local labour markets in the US, resulting in increased unemployment, reduced labour force participation, and squeezed wages in areas with import-competing manufacturing companies. Feigenbaum and Hall (2015) demonstrate that representatives elected in districts with high import exposure are more likely to favour protectionist legislation.

Overall, researchers are becoming increasingly aware of these analyses in which cultural and economic factors may work together to determine social anxiety and support for extreme right-wing parties (Colantone & Stanig, 2018c; Gidron & Hall, 2017; Hopkin, 2017). I address the puzzle presented above using a comprehensive framework that aims to reconcile the perspectives of "economics" and "cultural backlash" based on this evidence, in a perspective congruent to the elaborations of Ferrara (2023). Theoretically, I attempt to get above what we believe to be a false and potentially misleading division between the economic and cultural causes of right-wing populism and nativism's popularity.

3.2 LGBT as a research focus

The literature on revisions to penal codes relating to homosexuality and so-called "sodomy laws"—laws prohibiting same-sex relationships—is scarce. According to Barclay, Bernstein and Marshall (2009), there has been a large global trend of decriminalisation following World War II, along with the adoption of more liberal attitudes towards homosexuality. They consider it significant because these developments occurred not only in Western nations but also as a convergence of change on a global scale. Their findings point to a global change in how people view who should have their rights protected and for what reasons. To address these needs, there was a shift away from concepts like "the family" and "the nation" and towards the person and "their" rights and freedom. Justice served as the overarching value. Emerging global cultural elements are those that are at play and have an international impact.

In Western Europe, views and laws have been described as intertwined (Hooghe & Meeusen, 2013). According to O'Dwyer (2018), this is not entirely true in Eastern Europe, which lacks a strong connection between tolerant sentiments and a progressive LGBT rights policy. The legacy of communism may contribute to the formation of attitudes, but according to O'Dwyer, the adoption of LGBT rights and subsequent membership in the European Union are greatly at odds with the prevailing social sentiments. Aksoy et al. (2020) demonstrate using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) between 2002 and 2016 that legal recognition of LGB rights correlates with statistically significant improvements in attitudes towards sexual minorities; in those nations with more progressive legislation, public opinion is more supportive. In their analysis of ESS data gathered between 2002 and 2008 from 20 countries, van den Akker, van der Ploeg & Scheepers (2013) discovered that where the legal institutions of marriage and adoption existed, social attitudes towards same-sex relationships were the most positive (Takács & Szalma, 2011; Takács, Szalma & Bartus, 2016).

It is acknowledged that while surveys like the European Values Study (EVS) supply rich data with which scholars can evaluate social attitudes, they lack questions that could gauge perceptions and nuances inherent of the Eastern European context (Doebler, 2015). Surveys can shed light on how and why attitudes towards LGBT people and their rights change. The Eurobarometer 91.4 of 2019 (European Commission, 2020) and the Rainbow Map (ILGA-Europe, 2019), reveal some interesting findings when comparing sentiments in Western and Eastern Europe. Lesbians and homosexual males should have the same rights as heterosexuals, according to less than 46% of people in the Baltic states, as well as Poland, Romania, and Slovakia in northeastern Europe. There were 11 nations where less than 50% of people agreed that same-sex relationships were acceptable and 11 nations where less than 50% believed same-sex marriage should be legal. While Latvia and Lithuania both exhibit high levels of homophobic sentiments, Lithuania's scores were notably high, highlighting the continued existence of major gaps between its close neighbours. The fact that people in Latvia have more liberal attitudes towards gender, and particularly the role of women in the home and in the workforce, than do people in Lithuania may account for a large portion of this attitude gap (Kuyper, Iedema & Keuzenkamp, 2013). Research has shown that cultural views of the family and gender roles continue to impact sentiments towards LGBT individuals in both Poland (2016) and Croatia (2019) (Golebiowska, 2016; Kamenov, Huić & Jelić, 2019).

Research overwhelmingly suggests that the presence of democracy and robust democratic institutions in a country increases the likelihood that its citizens will be exposed to novel ideas and viewpoints, increasing tolerance among the populace. In their analysis of data based on mixed-methods research from approximately 80 countries gathered over many years, Adamczyk & Pitt (2009) identified three key elements that are thought to affect the acceptance of same-sex partnerships internationally. The potency of democratic institutions, the degree of economic growth, and the religious makeup of the communities where people reside make up these elements. Hadler (2012) found that key determinants of homophobia or tolerance included economic background, political history, and the existence of international organisations that can affect national attitudes.

The general level of prosperity, the average per-capita income, and the sentiments of the populace towards LGBT persons and their concerns for their rights all show a clear association. There is a greater likelihood of acceptance when an economy is relatively prosperous, income levels are high, and income inequality is relatively low; on the other hand, attitudes towards LGBT people are more negative in economies with lower incomes and high unemployment (Andersen & Fetner, 2008; Hadler, 2012; Kuyper, Iedema & Keuzenkamp, 2013).

Lastly, Adamczyk (2017), Adamczyk & Pitt (2009) and Stanislas (2016), people in extremely impoverished communities are more likely to be worried about obtaining the necessities of life, such as food and shelter. As Wilson (2020) explains, these scholars demonstrated that this collective attitude discourages differences among individuals, while encouraging people to think and enact similar attitudes. In fact, individuals from poorer states are more likely to perceive homosexuality as a serious social issue since LGBT people do not adhere to the mainstream family customs (Wilson, 2020). Using data from the EVS, Eurobarometer, and ESS, Smith, Son and Kim (2014) hypothesise that some ex-communist nations that score poorly in LGBT acceptance are those that have relatively low levels of economic development. This, coupled with pre-communist religious customs, seems to have contributed to the demonization of LGBT individuals in some 21st-century instances to foster nationalist feelings (Sandfort, 2005, 2005).

3.3 Theoretical Approach

The fundamental premise of normative trade theory is that there are benefits from trade. Its foundation is the argument of general revealed preferences (Dixit & Norman, 1986). It makes intuitive sense that commerce creates new opportunities without eliminating existing ones. People still have access to the old opportunities if they do not like these new ones because they are still available. Therefore, free trade cannot make their situation worse. In the most intrinsic situation, individuals become unconcerned with either autarky or free commerce (Colantone, Ottaviano & Stanig, 2022). Even though global specialisation has increased the overall welfare of the participating countries, Pareto improvement is not always the result of trade shocks because their welfare effects vary across regions and industries (Autor, Dorn & Hanson, 2013a; Verhoogen, 2008). The first mechanism put forth by Ferrara (2023) is consistent with the 'compensation hypothesis' (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1998; Walter, 2010) or a conventional open economy politics (OEP) viewpoint, such as that advanced by Feigenbaum and Hall (2015). According to this perspective, trade shocks alter people's economic perspectives and lead to a rise in their demand for protection or redistribution (Colantone & Stanig, 2018b). Voters in import-exposed regions will choose a candidate based on her position on economic policy. They will favour the candidate who is generally more protectionist if they prioritise protection over redistribution more. On the other hand, if they wish to have more access to social security and welfare benefits, they will favour the candidate running on a more fervent redistributive platform. There shouldn't be a significant relationship between trade exposure and voting when competitors have comparable views on economic policy. As a result, those who are exposed to imports will have more unfavourable attitudes towards global commerce and/or more favourable attitudes towards redistribution, and they will vote for candidates who share their need for protection.

In a parallel perspective of economic theory, Lin and Xi (2022) developed a framework based on Rogowski's (1987) model of land, labour, and capital, in an effort to pinpoint the two ways that trade influences election outcomes. First, those who gain from trade will continue to favour free trade, while those who lose out on benefits due to trade will demand trade protectionism, furthering the division within the political system. Second, as trade grows, those who stand to gain from globalisation will strive to convert their economic advantage into political advantage in order to exert more political influence, which fuels increasingly heated disputes between opposing groups (Lin and Xi, 2022). In fact, the developed economies of the

European Union (EU) countries import mostly manufactured items that require a lot of labour. The consequence of importing items with a high labour component from developing nations would result in lower salaries for manufacturing workers in European nations. Therefore, in areas where the manufacturing sector employs a sizable portion of the local labour force, right-wing populist parties that support de-globalization will enjoy greater support (Autor et al., 2020; Colantone & Stanig, 2018b).

The second mechanism is a result of the 'culture backlash' theory and the 'economics' viewpoint conciliation. The analytical distinction between economic insecurity and cultural backlash theories may be partially artificial, as noted by Inglehart and Norris (2016), Gidron and Hall (2017), and Inglehart (2018), and further elaborated in Inglehart and Norris (2017). If structural changes in the workforce and social trends in integrated markets exacerbate economic insecurity, and if this in turn sparks a negative backlash among traditionalists against cultural shifts, then these elements may be connected through an interactive process (Ferrara, 2023). Ferrara (2023) draws inspiration from recent studies that examine the complex ways that economic hardship affects the political preferences and actions of various racial subgroups of the electorate (e.g., Autor et al., 2020; Green & McElwee, 2019) in order to strengthen the validity of their claim. They adhere to the justification put forward by Baccini and Weymouth (2021), arguing that deindustrialization may cause an acute political response among white voters due to the threat that economic restructuring poses to concepts of dominant group status that are crucial to white identity, drawing on findings from social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel, 1981). Similar to how trade shocks influence individual views, gender differences also play a part in this process. Men make up the vast majority of employees in the manufacturing sector, which includes highly exposed industries to trade (Baccini & Weymouth, 2021, p. 7). Altogether, the results of Ferrara (2023) highlight trade-induced economic hardship as a significant factor for the cultural backlash.

The "Silent Revolution in Reverse" is how Inglehart and Norris (2017) and Inglehart (2018) refer to this dynamic process altogether. They contend that cultural backlash explains why some people support right-wing populist movements and that falling economic stability, which catalyses cultural backlash, explains why support for these movements has increased over the past thirty years. They postulate that "the groundswell of support for populists ultimately reflects economic insecurity, but its immediate cause is a backlash against rapid cultural changes" (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 452). This is because they contend that

increased economic insecurity catalyses processes of cultural backlash. Ferrara (2023) deems reasonable to assume that persons who have had more exposure to foreign cultures will have more culturally conservative beliefs and vote for candidates that favour marginalised groups including racial, racial, religious, and sexual minorities.

The 'Silent Revolution in Reverse' concept may be able to analytically address the way in which import competitiveness influences voting behaviour in Western democracies for at least two reasons (Ferrara, 2023). First, the bulk of the people finds it difficult to understand how trade integration will affect distribution. Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) and Rho & Tomz (2017) both demonstrate how trade policy opinions frequently diverge from what mainstream economic models anticipate. This may be true for people who are more directly exposed to trade shocks due to the complexity of the import competitiveness phenomenon. Thus, it appears implausible that people in import-exposed areas would select their most favoured candidate based on her economic policy stance if the relationship between material self-interest and trade preferences is poor (Ferrara, 2023). This study considers party votes collected at the European Parliament (EP) elections, in which their members do not partake in domestic policymaking, thus strengthening the validity of this argument for the following empirical testing.

Second, localised economic shocks brought on by import competition may encourage scapegoating, leading to a "cultural backlash." Political science and sociological studies have already drawn attention to the role that economic hardship plays in scapegoating. Numerous studies have linked individual and collective economic conditions to racial prejudice and hostility towards immigrants (e.g., Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Citrin et al., 1997; Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Semyonov, Raijman & Gorodzeisky, 2006). Additionally, studies on ethnic collective action have hypothesised that rising resource competition leads to ethnic political mobilisation (e.g., Hechter, Friedman & Appelbaum, 1982; Olzak, 1994). This is also in line with recent studies that have examined the links between populist platforms and a variety of non-trade-related economic shocks, including automation (Anelli, Colantone & Stanig, 2019; Bó et al., 2019), austerity (Fetzer, 2019), layoff notices (Dehdari, 2022) and income losses (Gidron & Mijs, 2019).

By addressing a wider spectrum of attitudes towards in-groups and out-groups, including sexual minorities (such as homosexual and transgender), testing the "Silent Revolution in Reverse" concept becomes more systematic. Although economic worries may act as an intermediary between views towards immigration and economic instability, it can

be inferred that worries about economic rivalry are unrelated to beliefs about sexual in-groups and out-groups (Ferrara, 2023).

Gender-based disparities may be a significant element influencing cultural reactions to trade shocks since gender determines relations of power and hierarchy in the establishment of the working class (Baron, 1991). The impacts of import penetration on attitudes towards racial, religious, and sexual outgroups and ingroups vary across different social groups holding different levels of relative power and position, according to their theory regarding trade-induced cultural grievances. They contend that non-Hispanic white and male voters are primarily responsible for or concentrated among the effects of import competition on cultural beliefs. This is due to the argument made by (Baccini & Weymouth, 2021, p. 7) that the detrimental economic and social effects of trade shocks may undermine white men's established expectations in places that are susceptible to imports and threaten their privileged position as the dominant group.

4 Data

In order to examine the effects of regional exposure to trade on attitudes, this paper uses NUTS-2 regions as its research units[1]. There are few data about NUTS-3 regions under the European statistical system, and the size of NUTS-1 regions makes it challenging to quantify the impact of various economic and social factors on election outcomes. This research selects NUTS-2 regions since they contain a wealth of pertinent data as well as distinct regional characteristics. This section is divided in several chapters upon the main data source since many were employed in the construction of the variables.

4.1 Individual-level survey data

This study is particularly focused on values towards sexual outgroups, and the questions posed by the Eurobarometer 91.4 survey offer exceptional insight into nuances of discrimination, compared to other surveys like the European Social Survey, deployed in the individual-level empirical testing of several other papers that this research follows (e.g., Colantone & Stanig, 2018b; Milner, 2021; Lin & Xi, 2022). Such questions are posed in the survey section ‘Discrimination in the European Union’. I consider all three questions posed on attitudes towards same-sex, transgender, and intersex couples, following the strategy of Ferrara (2023) that however can consider only the ones towards same-sex individuals from American National Election Studies surveys. Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics of the individual-

[1] NUTS, or nomenclature of territorial units for statistics, is an abbreviation for *nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques*. For statistical purposes, the NUTS classification system is a geocode standard for referencing country subdivisions. Since the European Union created and oversaw the regulation of the standard, it specifically addressed all the EU's member states. In agreement with each member nation, Eurostat creates a hierarchy of three NUTS levels for each EU member nation; some of the levels' subdivisions may not necessarily match to the nation's administrative divisions. The three NUTS levels' typical population sizes are as follows, according to the EU rule that created the NUTS system (rule [EC] No. 1059/2003): NUTS 1, between 3 million and 7 million; NUTS 2, between 800,000 and 3 million; and NUTS 3, between 150,000 and 800,000.

level variables retrieved from the Eurobarometer 91.4, including a rich set of demographic controls, using population size weights. Each observation is geocoded regionally at the NUTS-2 level, of which version may vary and were converted accordingly to version 2013[2].

Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics: individual-level survey variables.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Attitude: same-sex couples	12898	1.976	3.324	-4	5
Attitude: transgender couples	12446	1.041	3.469	-4	5
Attitude: intersex couples	12195	1.203	3.445	-4	5
Political interest	13687	.67	.47	0	1
Gender (male)	13687	.49	.5	0	1
Age	13687	52.359	18.271	18	98
Years of education	13527	14.179	6.754	0	84
Outgroup member (sum)	13687	.107	.309	0	1
Sexual minority member	13687	.02	.138	0	1
Religious minority member	13687	.036	.185	0	1
Ethnic minority member	13687	.025	.155	0	1

The respondents are asked to provide a score in the scale from -4 to 5 to state their values towards social groups. I rely on these set of questions to construct the main independent variables of the empirical analysis. Dummy variables, namely political interest, gender (male), outgroup member status, and sexual, religious, and ethnic outgroup member status, take value 1 if the individual corresponds to the description, and 0 otherwise. Together with age and years of education, these are the variables constructing the demographic controls vector X_i, as described in Chapter 5.2 'Main Specification'.

The population of the various nationalities of the EU member states and additional EU citizens who are residents in any of the 28 Member States and are 15 years of age or older make up the universe. A multistage design is the basis for the sampling. The first stage involves the selection of units following a stratification based on the distribution of the country's resident population (in terms of metropolitan, urban, and rural areas), proportional to the population

[2] Several NUTS geocodes were converted to the 2013 version for consistency across observations, using the ARDECO NUTS Converter Tool, employing regional surface as the covariate for the transformations. Due to the mixed aggregation levels and versions of the NUTS geocodes in the Eurobarometer, the usage of this tool cannot rule out inconsistencies in geocoding and trade data transformation, since full compatibility is not guaranteed. If present, they may constitute a negligible part of measurement error. For further insight regarding the methodologies of the tool, see the webpage listed in the references. This conversion procedure was also employed by Milner (2021).

size, and to the population density. Each of the administrative regions in each nation serves as the source for these main sampling units (PSU). The second stage involves carefully choosing a group of addresses from each sampled PSU. Then, a respondent is chosen at random from each household using a system like the first birthday. These cross-section surveys, part of a wider time series of the Eurobarometer, are conducted on behalf of the European Commission under the responsibility of the Directorate-General Communication. The dataset is accessible online, maintained by GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences.

The following countries are included in the sample: Austria, Belgium, Western Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. Henceforth, they are referred to as 'Western Europe', and the sample size amounts to n = 13687. The choice stems from the restriction in trade data availability over time, which does not stretch until 1995 for most Eastern European countries, as discussed in the next Chapter of this research. Moreover, the analysis of Western Europe warrants similar recent development paths across countries, such that attitudes towards LGBT individuals and their institutionalization are often grouped (see Corrales & Kiryk, 2022; Wilson, 2020).

To address the broad spectrum of sexual out-groups using this dataset, we rely on the relationship between political interest and voter turnout. This empirical analysis uses the variable *polintr* as a proxy for political participation, the "political interest index", to restrict the sample to voters. It is adapted to display the value 1 if the person reports moderate to high interest in politics, and 0 for little to no interest. This indicator summarizes the questions the frequency of political discussion, in which the respondents report to engage among peers.

Voters' preferences fluctuate in response to societal and economic changes, and this affects how many votes a party receives (Carsey & Layman, 2006; Lee, Moretti & Butler, 2004). One of the most recurrent results from participation research is that political interest has a positive effect on political engagement (Blais & Gélineau, 2007; Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995; Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Smets & van Ham, 2013). Political interest is an incentive for political involvement because it has a motivational component (Prior, 2010). For example, according to Blais (2007, p. 723), "those who have developed a taste for politics are likely to vote and those who have no taste are inclined to abstain." Political interest is far more important than resources if the main objective is to explain voting turnout, admit even the supporters of the resource model, who place a strong emphasis on economic status, education, money, and skills (Brady et al., 1995, p. 283). Political interest is one of the eight most often utilised variables, according

to Smets and van Ham's (2013) thorough evaluation of 90 empirical studies of individual-level voter turnout in national elections published between 2000 and 2010. Political interest has a significant impact on voter turnout in 85% of the reviewed studies, and its average effect size, which behaves like a correlation, is 0.85. Furthermore, their meta-analysis demonstrates that political interest is among the small group of variables (along with age, education, party identification, and vote in previous election) with the strongest and most consistent effect. Even after adjusting for possible confounding factors like age and education, "the propensity to vote increases substantially and systematically as one's political interest increases," according to a recent comparative study that covered five countries and twenty-four national and regional elections (Blais & Daoust, 2020, p. 37).

4.2 Regional exposure to imports per worker

To assess the effects of economic globalisation (trade shocks) on an area, Autor et al. (2013) proposed the import exposure per worker index:

$$IPW_i = \sum_k \frac{L_{ik}}{L_i} * \frac{\Delta IM_{ck}}{L_{ck}}$$

where *c* stands for the nation, *i* for the NUTS-2 area, and *k* for the 'broad' manufacturing industries as outlined in NACE Rev. 2's statistical classification of economic activities. IM_{ck} denotes changes in imports from country *c* into industry *k* over the specific period. I concentrate on changes in imports from the nine representative low-income countries defined by Auer and Fischer (2010) (i.e., China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Mexico, Brazil, Malaysia, and the Philippines) and BRICS countries to EU countries, respectively, congruent to part of the strategy implemented by Lin and Xi (2022). This is because the trade shocks of the manufacturing industry from labour-intensive countries are within the scope of this study. We use the change in import between 2015 and 2019, given that the most recent European Parliament elections unaffected by the disruptions in labour and trade due to the COVID-19 pandemic took place in 2019.

In these terms, I normalise the change in import in nation *c*'s industry *k* with the sector's overall employment L_{ck} in 2015. We weight the standardised trade shocks with the ratio of the total employment in industry *k* in region *i* in 2015, L_{ik}, to the total employment L_i in that area in 2015 to avoid the effects of regional disparities in trade shocks. Finally, the total regional trade shock is calculated by summing the trade shocks of various industries. Descriptive statistics of the computed variable are presented in Table 4.2, where individuals are assigned to their NUTS-2 regional import competition per worker counted in the number of observations.

IPW_i (as well as the instrumental variable discussed in the next section) is an index calculated upon each trade values in Euros in manufacturing imports aggregated at NUTS-2 level[3], accessible on the Eurostat Comext platform 'Easy Comext', and regional employment conditions retrieved from the Annual Regional Database of the European Commission (ARDECO). The number of observations of each variable thus corresponds to the number of NUTS-2 regions of concern in this study. Trade values in the Euro currency for both periods were deflated using the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) in the Eurostat annual tables for the average index and rate of change.

Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics: import competition per worker (IPW) indices.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ipw from BRICS	123	3.836	5.616	-.396	28.82
IV ipw from BRICS	123	2.133	1.878	.054	8.658
ipw from low-income	123	5.061	7.65	.53	40.491
IV ipw from low-income	123	3.684	3.781	.179	18.706

According to this trade shock index, the variance in trade shock among regions may be wholly attributable to the variation in local industry structure after correcting for the disparity in employment among industries at the national level. In other words, trade shocks are more intense in areas where employment has become concentrated in sectors that rely heavily on imports. This index makes it possible to manage local manufacturing industry structure as well as local employment structure (Autor et al., 2020; Colantone & Stanig, 2018b; Lin & Xi, 2022).

[3] For the countries of Italy and Germany, the Eurobarometer survey has geocoded individuals by the NUTS-1 aggregation level. The import competition per worker for Italy and West Germany is calculated accordingly.

4.3 Geographic controls

This chapter presents additional geographic data (i.e., at the regional level), motivated by recent literature (Milner, 2021; Ferrara, 2023). These variables are included in the full specification of the model, as geographic control variables constituting the vector G_i. Table 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics of these variables, using population size weights.

Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics: regional controls.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
GVA in manufacturing	123	25010.438	33863.119	119.74	145795.51
Right-wing vote share	123	53.955	13.148	10.382	88.395

Following the assumptions of a Bartik instrument in Ferrara (2023), as discussed by Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin & Swift (2020), the empirical strategy also controls for eventual channels different than the ones theorized here, enacted by using industry shares as the instrument. It is difficult to ensure that pre-treatment changes in industry shares are unrelated to the outcome variables investigated in this study since the local economic structure of the places in which the participants live may impact their political, cultural, and economic opinions (Ferrara, 2023). I build regional control variables to take into consideration potential confounding factors to alleviate some of these identification concerns.

The strategy accounts for two potential catalysts through which the regional-level composition of the economy in productive activities might influence the attitudes under scrutiny. First, individual attitudes may be influenced by the relative importance of the manufacturing sector in the economy of the region, rather than being affected only by exposure to trade and import competition (Ferrara, 2023). To tackle this, I deploy the regional Gross Value Added (GVA) reported in the broad manufacturing sector *k*. It gauges how much a specific producer, business, or industry contributes to the overall gross domestic product. The dataset is accessible online and maintained by ARDECO.

Second, there may be a stronger predisposition towards conservative candidates and ideals in areas that are more exposed to import competition (Ferrara, 2023). Through their voting proportions in NUTS-2 regions during the 2019 European Parliament elections, this study also considers the political support for right-wing parties. Voters cast their ballots based on the economic and social realities even though the European Parliament elections are

regarded as a second-order election with less significance than national elections. According to previous studies (Hobolt & Wittrock, 2011; Reif & Schmitt, 1980), people are more likely to show their true political inclinations during elections because members of the European Parliament are not involved in domestic policymaking. This characteristic of the European Parliament elections enables a more precise assessment of the impact of trade shocks and socio-cultural shocks on voters' party preferences and lessens the effect of various national electoral systems on election outcomes (Lin & Xi, 2022).

5 Empirical methods

5.1 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable (IV)

As pointed out above, our goal is to estimate the effect of BRICS and low-income import competition on individual attitudes towards in-groups and out-groups in Europe, focusing on sexual minorities. To isolate the effect driven by the increase in low-income countries manufacturing supply since the early 2000s, we follow Autor et al. (2013a) and adopt an instrumental variables approach. This paper addresses the possible endogeneity of the trade shock with respect to electoral outcomes by instrumenting IPW_i using the growth in imports between years 1995 and 1999. The import exposure per worker in 1999, based off the one constructed by Lin and Xi (2022), is defined as follows:

$$IPW\_IV_i = \sum_k \frac{L_{ik}}{L_i} * \frac{\Delta IM_{ck}}{L_{ck}}$$

where k represents the manufacturing industries defined in NACE Revision 2, and ΔIM_{ck} denotes the difference in imports of country c in industry k between 1995 and 1999; and L_{ck}, L_{ik}, and L_i stand for the total employment of country c in industry k, the total employment of region i in industry k, and the total employment in region i, respectively. Motivated by earlier literature (e.g., Autor et al., 2020; Autor, Dorn & Hanson, 2013a; Colantone, Crinò & Ogliari, 2019), this instrument is meant to capture the variation in imports due to exogenous changes in supply conditions in low-income countries, rather than to domestic factors that could be correlated with electoral outcomes.

In this case, endogeneity may derive from demand shocks. For instance, voters would be more inclined to support the current government parties in the event of a positive demand shock and less likely to support the opposition or radical right parties. If positive demand shocks also result in larger imports from China, this could provide a negative bias in the regression estimates (Colantone & Stanig, 2018b). Again, our instrument addresses these concerns—and other potential sources of omitted variable bias—as we identify the effect of the import shock by

exploiting the variation in imports due to exogenous changes in supply conditions, rather than to country-specific domestic factors like aggregate demand.

On the other hand, the change in imports used in this Instrumental Variable differs from the one proposed by Lin and Xi (2022), which considers the changes in manufacturing imports during 2003-2007 and the employment conditions at the beginning of this sample period. These researchers argued that "during 2003-2007, the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis have not happened, so the populist parties have not taken advantage of the people's discontent with the ruling party to gain momentum" (Lin and Xi, 2022, p. 131). Although the Kleibergen-Paap F statistics reported by the authors do not indicate concerns of a weak instrument, their Instrumental Variable estimations present lower coefficients and higher standard errors than their Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations. This behaviour is inconsistent with the two-stage least square estimates of Autor et al. (2020) and Ferrara (2023) for the case of the United States, and with other similar instruments adopted in the works of Colantone & Stanig (2018) and Milner (2021) for the European context, as they have noted an increase in magnitude and more reliable estimations by standard errors.

In this sense, the Instrumental Variable introduced in Lin and Xi (2022) might be affected still by endogeneity from demand shocks and domestic policy changes, since it does not reproduce an ameliorating behaviour, while maintaining the characteristic of IV of being a rather less efficient estimator than OLS. In fact, I argue that the authors might not have excluded the sources of endogeneity mentioned above, i.e., demand shocks and domestic policies. Milner (2021, p. 2298), in their time series data, displays through the following figure that manufacturing imports shocks relative to GDP from both China and low-wage countries began to appear "only around 2000".



Figure 1. Imports from China and low-wage countries over time. Source: Milner (2021)

As it appears, an IV that uses a sampling period 2003-2007 might be already affected by endogeneity that stems from unobserved demand and domestic policy changes related to the sudden increase in manufacturing imports. I instead make use of the change in imports between 1995 and 1999. Such strategy has led to greater magnitudes and reliable estimates in terms of standard errors, exemplified in the following sections of this research.

5.2 Main specification

The empirical strategy focuses on the European case of the relationship between the regional-level import exposure, accounting for local employment conditions, and attitudes towards sexual out-groups. In the main specification, adapted for the Eurobarometer case from Ferrara (2023), Y_{it} denotes alternative (ordinal approximations of) continuous outcome variables that capture attitudes towards sexual outgroups. At the regional level, we so estimate linear regressions of the following form:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 IPW_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 G_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where IPW_i is the BRICS or low-income import penetration per worker in NUTS-2 region i, calculated as the change in manufacturing imports between 2015 and 2019 normalized and weighted by local employment conditions and manufacturing industry structure, as the endogenous covariate to be instrumented. X_i is a vector of demographic controls consisting of gender (as a dummy variable taking value 1 if the respondent is male and 0 otherwise), age, years of education, and outgroup status (as a dummy variable with value 1 if the respondent is part of a minority group in terms of ethnicity, skin colour, faith, sexuality, disability, or other minorities, and value 0 otherwise). G_i is a vector of geographic controls that include the Gross Value Added (GVA) in the broad manufacturing sector, and the right-wing vote share in the European Parliament 2019 elections.

The first-stage regression model of the instrumental variable is defined as:

$$IPW_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 IPW\_IV_i + \gamma_2 X_i + \gamma_3 G_i + \mu_i$$

where IPW_IV_i is the instrumental variable of BRICS or low-income import penetration per worker in NUTS-2 region i, calculated as the change in manufacturing imports between 1995 and 1999 normalized and weighted by local employment conditions. The other variables are the same control vectors mentioned in the full specification.

5.3 Limitations

Since the regression model errors are independent across clusters, but correlated within clusters, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the NUTS-2 level, and observations are weighted by Eurobarometer population weights. Testing for heterogeneous effects among different Western European nationalities does not result in a sufficiently large number of clusters to allow for cluster-robust statistical inference, as such estimation tends to over-rejection and estimates biased towards zero (Cameron & Miller, 2015). To this end only, the analysis of Table 6.2 implements heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors to account for the misspecification and does not account for the political interest voter proxy to preserve precision of the estimates in terms of standard error for small sample sizes. The heterogeneity

tests by gender and minority groups, found in Appendix A, do include the full specifications above.

Before presenting the results, it is important to observe that the use of individual-level survey data allows us to study how the attitudes of each Eurobarometer respondent are affected by our treatment variable, namely regional-level import exposure. The chosen strategy for the index is limited to the period from 2015 leading to the European Parliament election of 2019, so it might not distinguish pre-treatment levels of a globalization backlash. In this sense, this empirical analysis might not be able to test fully the hypothesis of a trade-induced cultural backlash, hence it is more precisely a limited attempt to disclose evidence for socio-cultural mechanisms in the recent surge in voters for populist and right-wing parties during the European Parliament elections of 2019.

Large-scale national sample surveys like the Eurobarometer 91.4 might not be perfectly suitable to set out reliable analyses for sub-national areas (Moretti, 2023). On the other hand, since import exposure is quantified on a relatively wide geographic level (i.e., NUTS-2 statistical regions), there is a discrepancy between the level of the outcome and the level of the treatment. Because this study draws conclusions about people's views, based on the traits of the group they belong to, it may lead to ecological fallacy problems (Ferrara, 2023). I recognise these limitations in our identification technique and advise caution in providing a causal interpretation of the data, even though previous seminal contributions have relied on a similar study design (e.g., Colantone & Stanig, 2018a, 2018b).

6 Empirical analysis

This section presents the empirical results of the baseline model, estimated with OLS, and the implementation of the Instrumental Variable through two-stage least squares (2SLS). The analysis proceeds first by discussing novel evidence in Western Europe of trade-induced effects on sentiments towards same-sex, transgender, and intersex outgroups. Then, the study takes into consideration relevant differences in nationalities and respondent groups from the Eurobarometer survey. Hence, it presents heterogeneity tests, disclosing as well suggestive evidence of a trade-induced cultural backlash in several Western European countries alone.

6.1 Results

Table 6.1 presents both ordinary least-square (OLS) and the second stage of two-stage least square (2SLS) estimations, in which each panel distinguishes an independent variable regarding reported attitudes towards sexual outgroups. Columns (1) to (4) display regressions with the manufacturing import exposure per worker index from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) to Western European countries as main dependent variable; columns (5) to (8) consider instead manufacturing imports from nine representative low-income countries (Auer and Fischer, 2010). First stage regression results for all 2SLS estimations of Table 6.1 and complete second-stage regression tables are accessible in Appendix B.

Table 6.1. Import exposure and attitudes towards sexual minorities – second stage.

	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) OLS	(6) 2SLS	(7) 2SLS	(8) 2SLS
Panel A: Voter attitude towards same-sex								
ipw_BRICS	0.0656***	0.2460***	0.2350***	0.2248***				
	(0.0177)	(0.0758)	(0.0736)	(0.0705)				
ipw_lowinc					0.0553***	0.1067***	0.1015***	0.0960***
					(0.0106)	(0.0228)	(0.0219)	(0.0210)
Demo ctrl			✓	✓			✓	✓
Geo ctrl				✓				✓
N	8672	8672	8578	8578	8672	8672	8578	8578
R^2	0.0106	-0.0694	-0.0172	0.0133	0.0144	0.00196	0.0505	0.0718
Panel B: Voter attitude towards transgender								
ipw_BRICS	0.0655***	0.2017***	0.1905***	0.1909***				
	(0.0179)	(0.0634)	(0.0605)	(0.0603)				
ipw_lowinc					0.0481***	0.0860***	0.0808***	0.0804***
					(0.0121)	(0.0204)	(0.0191)	(0.0188)
Demo ctrl			✓	✓			✓	✓
Geo ctrl				✓				✓
N	8387	8387	8293	8293	8387	8387	8293	8293
R^2	0.00923	-0.0307	0.00793	0.0250	0.00951	0.00360	0.0394	0.0533
Panel C: Voter attitude towards intersex								
ipw_BRICS	0.0611***	0.2015***	0.1917***	0.1916***				
	(0.0174)	(0.0639)	(0.0615)	(0.0610)				
ipw_lowinc					0.0458***	0.0848***	0.0803***	0.0797***
					(0.0116)	(0.0200)	(0.0190)	(0.0185)
Demo ctrl			✓	✓			✓	✓
Geo ctrl				✓				✓
N	8248	8248	8153	8153	8248	8248	8153	8153
R^2	0.00829	-0.0355	0.00238	0.0217	0.00889	0.00243	0.0379	0.0535

Notes: Observations are weighted by population size weights. The sample is restricted to voters only, proxied by political interest. The model in column (3) includes controls for gender, age, years of education, and outgroup (minority) status. The model in column (4) includes regional controls at NUTS-2 level for Gross Value Added (GVA) of the broad manufacturing sector, and right-wing vote shares in the 2019 European Parliament election.
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustering on NUTS-2 regions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

In column (3) and (7), demographic controls slightly attenuate the magnitude of the coefficients, which remain statistically significant. In column (4) and (8), I add geographic controls to address concerns about potential confounding factors at the regional level, improving the explanatory power of the models and without compromising the precision of the estimates. Thus, the full specification controls for gender, age, years of education, outgroup (minority) status, Gross Value Added (GVA) in the broad manufacturing sector, and right-wing vote shares in the 2019 European Parliament elections. The F-tests for the joint significance of all variables (not reported) have p-values ≤ 0.05 without controls, and p-values ≤ 0.001 when including all control variables.

Consistent with Autor et al. (2020) and Ferrara (2023), in column (2) and (6), the two-stage least squares estimate is larger in magnitude, reflecting the notion that unobserved demand shocks may mitigate the supply-driven effect of increasing import exposure. As pointed out

above, this suggests that the modification in period to the instrument, as discussed previously, improved the efficiency of the 2SLS estimator and addressed endogeneity issues. The estimates of the variable of concern, import competition per worker (IPW), are robust to the choice in importer countries. Agreeing with Milner (2021), the results are not driven exclusively by one or a set of countries, but rather imports from 'low wage' countries more generally. Notably, the effect of import exposure per worker from BRICS countries is stronger than the one considering nine representative low-income countries (i.e., China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Mexico, Brazil, Malaysia, and the Philippines). Hence, these results suggest the importance in studying different types of "globalization shocks", rather than focusing on one country such as China. The Sanderson-Windmeijer F statistics for weak identification, which in this case of a single endogenous regressor and cluster-robust statistics are equivalent to the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic, are reported in Table B.1 and do not disclose concerns of weak instruments. Column (2) displays a negative R^2, although the estimate is usually not of concern in previous literature. Without demographic and geographic controls, the model appears to be a poor fit of the data. These characteristics appear to catalyse strongly other factors in shaping the socio-cultural attitudes of the respondents. Not only do these controls provide meaning to an analysis estimated with a diverse sample of individuals, but it seems also that the specification for imports from BRICS countries necessitates controlling for confounding factors in the productive role of the local manufacturing sector and the political inclinations.

The results shown in Table 6.1 disclose the presence of significant effects of import exposure per worker on attitudes towards sexual outgroups. However, this measure positively impacts the attitudes reported in the Eurobarometer towards same-sex, transgender, and intersex minorities in Western Europe as a whole. Specifically, individuals living in import-exposed statistical regions display positive opinions towards homosexuals, transgenders, and intersex people. This novel finding is robust to the choice in exporter countries, either BRICS or nine low-income countries, and across different sexual outgroups, and does not reproduce a similar negative impact in attitudes reported in the US case analysed by Ferrara (2023).

More specifically, these findings do not support the hypothesis that trade exposure has increased support for right-wing parties in the European Parliament elections of 2019 by negatively affecting attitudes towards sexual outgroups. In fact, holding everything else equal, an increase in one standard deviations in import competition per worker from BRICS countries is associated with an average improvement in attitudes towards sexual outgroups by 0.19-0.22 units. On the

other hand, *ceteris paribus*, an increase in one standard deviations in import exposure per worker from low-income countries is associated with an average improvement in attitudes towards sexual outgroups by 0.08-0.10 units.

In this sense, there is no evidence to sustain the hypothesis of a trade-induced cultural backlash attitudes towards sexuality among Western Europeans. This finding is consistent with the idea that people find it difficult to recognise the causes of economic adversity as well as the distributional effects of free trade (Rho & Tomz, 2017). While there evidence that import-exposed individuals lean towards right-wing parties (Milner, 2021; Lin & Xi, 2022) and economic nationalism (Colantone, Ottaviano & Stanig, 2022; Colantone & Stanig, 2018b), the findings in this study does not provide evidence for the postmaterialist thesis (i.e., where existential security is found to impact attitudes) and for the interactive process known as 'the Silent Revolution in Reverse', in which "the groundswell of support for populists ultimately reflects economic insecurity, but its immediate cause is a backlash against rapid cultural changes" (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 452).

A tentative explanation might be that voters choose party candidates to the European Parliament election that either do not uphold socio-culturally conservative policies (Lin and Xi, 2022) or rather focus on economic policy than economic insecurity, considering as well that European Parliament candidates should not be involved in matters of domestic policymaking (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011). Individual reactionary inclinations towards "technologies of othering," that is, strategies for asserting dominance over (inferior, undeserving, demasculinized) out-groups, are in fact forms of extreme nationalism (Slootmaeckers, 2019).

Similarly, these findings might suggest that populist party candidates to the European Parliament are not inclined to the demands of conservative Christians in terms of the so-called 'gender ideology', i.e., any movement supporting non-heteronormative sexualities and gender expressions (Corredor, 2019), while instead national candidates need to put more effort into gaining the support of religious conservatives (Corrales & Kiryk, 2022). Conservative Christians will demand the denial of gender ideology from populist secularists. Populists frequently acquiesce, taking on the role of cultural and political crusaders ready to fight against secular, contestatory feminism in support of Christian family values (Fea, 2018, p. 8; Kidd, 2019, p. 147). In fact, the word "gender" has come to stand in for a wide range of imagined and undesirable "infiltrations of the national body" (Butler, 2021). This is like how populists

perceive threatening infiltrations of the national polity, such as immigrants, imports, globalisation, and technocrats (Corrales & Kiryk, 2022). While conservative religion has frequently opposed globalisation in recent years (Appleby, Cizik & Wright, 2010), Cremer (2021) found that some conservative religious people are actually repulsed by the extreme illiberalism of populists, suggesting that they may have some “religious immunity” against their extreme policies.

Kuyper, Iedema & Keuzenkamp (2013) note that in addition to economic disparities between countries as factors in explaining variations in attitudes throughout Europe, economic inequalities within countries are also a significant determinant of intolerance; tolerance is predicted in countries that are economically thriving and in which citizens are included relatively equally in economic growth. Based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS), Hooghe & Meeusen (2013) discovered that people were more inclined to support the right of "gay" persons to live their life freely if they were satisfied with democracy and had a higher per capita income.

All in all, these results together highlight a non-negligible effect of trade in manufacturing imports on individuals, although the ongoing economic hardship does not seem to have triggered a cultural backlash in attitudes towards sexual minorities, but rather the opposite in Western Europe. Hence, other socio-economic and political mechanisms might be attributable to the rightward shift in votes during the European Parliament elections of 2019, which they might vary upon the respondents’ country of residence or demographic characteristics. In the next section of this study, heterogeneity tests are performed as an attempt to identify the individuals among whom these shifts in values is concentrated.

6.2 Heterogeneity tests

This section explores the presence of heterogeneous effect of regional exposure to competition from manufacturing imports on attitudes towards sexual outgroups. The split-sample considers all three dependent variables, since they are significantly affected by trade exposure.

Firstly, the sample is restricted to each nationality, in order to test whether individual attitudes might change across Western European countries when treated with a trade shock, showing

where positive attitudes are most concentrated. Table 6.2 reports the estimated impacts of import competition on individual attitudes by reported nationality, deploying the full 2SLS specification, and considering as main dependent variable the manufacturing exporters to each Western European country whom the greatest impact on values can be attributed, namely BRICS countries. Each panel highlights each of the respondents' nationalities and estimates corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (1) to (3), namely attitudes towards same-sex, transgender, and intersex relationships.

Table 6.2. Heterogeneity in import exposure and attitudes towards sexual minorities by nationality.

Outcome vars:	(1) Attitudes towards same-sex	(2) Attitudes towards transgender	(3) Attitudes towards intersex
Panel A: Austria			
ipw_BRICS	-13.7100***	-5.6063	-2.2154
	(3.501)	(3.510)	(3.573)
N	916	884	876
R^2	0.0758	0.0709	0.0819
Panel B: Belgium			
ipw_BRICS	-6.1907***	-2.9547**	-2.5898**
	(1.134)	(1.285)	(1.220)
N	999	989	983
R^2	0.0509	0.00841	0.0135
Panel C: West Germany			
ipw_BRICS	0.3601	1.0400**	0.9417*
	(0.394)	(0.509)	(0.482)
N	914	837	842
R^2	0.0559	0.0388	0.0412
Panel D: Denmark			
ipw_BRICS	-0.2005	0.1872	0.3318
	(0.222)	(0.300)	(0.296)
N	899	849	815
R^2	0.0394	0.0673	0.0575
Panel E: Spain			
ipw_BRICS	0.2309**	0.2649**	0.2482**
	(0.0984)	(0.109)	(0.107)
N	947	903	877
R^2	0.125	0.0908	0.108
Panel F: Finland			
ipw_BRICS	-0.2667**	-0.1510	-0.2243*
	(0.115)	(0.120)	(0.119)
N	897	867	846
R^2	0.0919	0.0520	0.0718
Panel G: France			
ipw_BRICS	-0.1051	-0.8417**	-0.4577
	(0.265)	(0.335)	(0.320)
N	957	903	879
R^2	0.0318	0.0270	0.0248
Panel I: Greece			
ipw_BRICS	0.1401	0.2759	0.3120

	(0.218)	(0.199)	(0.204)
N	1001	978	978
R^2	0.109	0.0977	0.0830
Panel L: Ireland			
ipw_BRICS	-2.0460***	-1.3371*	-1.3677*
	(0.612)	(0.709)	(0.714)
N	952	936	920
R^2	0.0709	0.0345	0.0523
Panel M: Italy			
ipw_BRICS	-0.5761	-0.5889	-0.2597
	(0.359)	(0.370)	(0.376)
N	970	954	940
R^2	0.0759	0.0649	0.0480
Panel N: Netherlands			
ipw_BRICS	0.0123	-0.0086	-0.0163
	(0.0160)	(0.0217)	(0.0208)
N	975	963	929
R^2	0.0150	0.00207	0.00753
Panel O: Portugal			
ipw_BRICS	-0.0928	-0.1037	-0.1304*
	(0.0658)	(0.0683)	(0.0696)
N	912	862	863
R^2	0.108	0.0591	0.0500
Panel P: Sweden			
ipw_BRICS	-0.0218	0.1832	0.4518*
	(0.170)	(0.276)	(0.270)
N	955	914	856
R^2	0.0644	0.0348	0.0490

Notes: Observations are weighted by population size weights. The models in all three columns include controls for gender, age, years of education, and outgroup (minority) status.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

By reducing the sample to each nationality, Table 6.2 discloses mixed effects of trade exposure on attitudes towards sexual minorities, such that the results in the previous section do not appear to be driven by heterogeneous effects in nationality. In fact, excluding the imprecisely estimated effect of import competition in Austria, countries facing higher import competition in manufacturing relative to the others show instead deteriorating attitudes towards sexual minorities when restricting samples by respondents' nationalities, especially within countries such as Belgium, Finland, and Ireland, with relatively large confidence intervals at the 95% level consistently below zero in the case of Belgium ($CI_{(1)}$ = (-8.4133, -3.968); $CI_{(2)}$ = (-5.474, -0.4353); $CI_{(3)}$ = (-4.9811, -0.1986)). Beyond the scope of this research, these results provide suggestive evidence of a non-negligible shift in values in specific Western European countries, particularly for Belgium and Ireland, that does not correspond to the direction estimated for Western Europe as a whole, and as such it calls for further investigation within the societal consequences of trade shocks and globalization.

Second, this study considers social and demographic characteristics that might disclose heterogeneous effects of import exposure on attitudes towards sexual minorities, accessible in Appendix A.

Table A.1 explores the presence of heterogeneous effects by respondent group, similarly to the methodology of Ferrara (2023) and adapted to the relevant groups of the whole Western Europe distinguished in columns (1) to (4), namely in-group members, sexual minorities, religious minorities, and ethnic minorities. Again, the estimates make use of the full 2SLS specification, while accounting for the manufacturing exporters to each Western European country whom the greatest impact on values can be attributed, namely BRICS countries. Consistent with our expectations, estimates of the impact of trade exposure on values towards sexual minorities are attributable to most of the sample size, which does not identify in any outgroup (i.e., in-group members), as shown by the precision of the estimates of column (1) consistent across all attitudes expressed. All the other coefficients do not achieve sufficient statistical significance and are not precisely estimated, such that contrary to Autor et al. (2020) and Baccini and Weymouth (2021), group-based ethnic and racial identities do not seem to contribute to the political reaction to economic shocks. A notable exception is found among sexual minorities that seem to be sensitive to trade shocks, displaying a relatively precise positive direction estimated in attitudes towards same-sex relationships ($p = 0.025$; $CI_{(2, A)} = 0.0182, 0.27$), such that trade exposure has impacted positively attitudes towards their same collective. This finding agrees with Ayoub (2016) in the fact that "[v]isibility for LGBT people often has its roots in transnational sources", by analysing the increasing role of European politics and transnational examples and practices in local movements, including the access to advocacy networks and strategies, but also asymmetrical relationships between leader and follower states or regions. Moreover, it is consistent with Domínguez Ruiz (2019) in their case study of Madrid's LGBT Pride and the 2016 *pregón*, and its paradoxical duality of politics and festivity in queer practices. In fact, Madrid Orgullo (MADO) is the alliance organizing Madrid's official Pride parade and events that have global and European resonance. As mentioned by the researcher, Eric Olson's study is particularly useful in identifying the factors characterizing contemporary Pride events: "[g]lobalization, the increase in heterosexuals as event attendees (as allies and spectators), a focus on niche markets with the pride umbrella, and the increased use of sponsorship" (Olson, 2017, p. 5). However, the alliance between activists and entrepreneurs, despite being effective and reproduced in other instances across Europe, has spurred debate on commodification and activism (Enguix, 2017; Nicolás Ferrando & Córdoba Pérez, 2014;

Shangay Lily, 2016), such that explicit opponents/alternatives emerged (e.g., Madrid's *Orgullo Crítico*, which links queer identity and theory, and notions of intersectionality) (Domínguez Ruiz, 2019).

Finally, this study explores the presence of heterogeneous effects by individual gender identity, reported in binary form, by restricting the sample to males and females respectively.

Table A.2 presents the estimates of this analysis, significant and precisely calculated in both genders and all reported attitudes. In the same fashion as the previous heterogeneity tests, they are calculated using the full 2SLS model specification, and deploying the trade shock as the import competition per worker from BRICS countries. Partially in agreement with Ferrara (2023), these results appear to confirm that male participants, in column (1) are slightly more sensitive to imports exposure, such that magnitudes are larger than females, in column (2), for all the questions on values towards sexual outgroups.

7 Conclusion

This research has attempted to investigate the mechanism connecting localised trade shocks from BRICS and low-income import competition to the success of conservative candidates in Western Europe in an effort to balance the ‘economics’ and ‘cultural backlash’ perspectives on the development of right-wing populism. We hypothesised that trade-induced economic insecurity catalyses a ‘cultural backlash’ and causes higher in-group cohesion and rejection of outsiders, building on the "Silent Revolution in Reverse" framework (Inglehart, 2018; Inglehart & Norris, 2017). The empirical strategy involved the regional import competition per worker index from Autor et. al. (2013a), including a modification to the instrumental variable strategy from Lin and Xi (2022), and the model specification is based on the works of Ferrara (2023). The main dependent variables constructed are regressed on attitudes towards sexual outgroups, possibly more statistically independent to individual beliefs regarding the economy. The results are estimated first using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), as a basis for the computation of Two-Stages Least Squares (2SLS) coefficients.

The analysis aims to demonstrate causal effects. As trade and other globalisation flows typically affect areas differently and pooling nationally obscures these discrepancies, I employ regional-level data to investigate the impact of these flows in greater detail. The usage of geographic controls alleviates potential confounding factors from the structure of the local economy and political inclinations. The individual data is accurate since it includes individual-level traits that are known to influence voting behaviour. The use of an instrumental variable also alleviates endogeneity worries. Clustering the standard errors by region implies more conservative estimates. The objective is to eliminate as many potential confounders as feasible. The precise causative process is not established, although economic disparities frequently point out many other psychological aspects that make the policies of far-right parties more appealing to affected people, such as increased tolerance for authoritarianism and scepticism for established institutions.

Regional exposure to import competition across Western European individuals is shown to significantly shape attitudes towards same-sex, transgender, and intersex relationships, irrespective of the globalization shock employed in the estimation. However,

coefficients are positive and robust, such that individuals residing in imports-exposed areas display better views towards all sexual outgroups. This novel finding suggests that candidates to the European Parliament elections of 2019 may not have a motivation to compete electorally by focusing specifically on sexual outgroups in neighbourhoods exposed to imports. Hence, these results may constitute evidence against the postmaterialist thesis and the 'cultural backlash' mechanism for Western Europe as a whole. The effects are driven by in-group members of society that are not part of any minority and slightly more predominant among male individuals. Notably, trade-exposed sexual minorities might also contribute to the improvement in attitudes towards same-sex relationships, consistent with the transnational roots of the LGBT struggle, and the characteristics of mainstream Pride events and parades. Additionally, I highlight that the presence of mechanisms at play in cultural attitudes may vary upon the respondents' nationality, such that it may represent a cause of concern for countries such as Belgium and Ireland, as well as an opportunity for future insight of within-country characteristics.

In sum, this study provides fresh insight into the connections between import competition and Western European voting patterns. Additionally, the results highlighted the importance of considering different sources of import competition on European regions, as well as research on economic globalization shaping attitudes that are relevant to the cause of democratic systems. In this sense, this study may add to the scant literature tackling the material conditions in which the LGBT collective is found and struggles with. Even if we are unable to determine whether candidates in import-exposed regions satisfy pre-existing political demands or exacerbate turmoil in society, these results suggest that the individual impact of political signals and party platforms is an attractive pathway in further research.

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Appendix A – Further heterogeneity tests

Table A. 1. Heterogeneity by respondent group.

	(1) In-group members	(2) Sexual minorities	(3) Religious minorities	(4) Ethnic minorities
Panel A: Voter attitude towards same-sex				
ipw_BRICS	0.2518***	0.1441**	0.0641	0.0773
	(0.0829)	(0.0642)	(0.0721)	(0.130)
N	11368	255	466	317
R^2	0.00738	0.156	0.0281	0.0618
Panel B: Voter attitude towards transgender				
ipw_BRICS	0.2197***	0.0808	0.0250	0.0469
	(0.0743)	(0.0681)	(0.0568)	(0.101)
N	10945	253	455	309
R^2	0.0141	0.0937	0.0186	0.109
Panel C: Voter attitude towards intersex				
ipw_BRICS	0.2200***	0.0850	0.0382	0.1367
	(0.0748)	(0.0761)	(0.0616)	(0.0898)
N	10712	250	448	306
R^2	0.0120	0.0610	0.0155	0.122

Notes: Observations are weighted by population size weights. The sample is restricted to each respondent group in the corresponding column. All the models include controls for gender, age, and years of education, as well as controls at NUTS-2 level for Gross Value Added (GVA) of the broad manufacturing sector and right-wing vote shares in the 2019 European Parliament election.
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustering on NUTS-2 regions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A. 2. Heterogeneity by gender.

	(1) Male	(2) Female
Panel A: Voter attitude towards same-sex		
ipw_BRICS	0.2565***	0.2345***
	(0.0851)	(0.0751)
N	6252	6504
R^2	-0.00451	0.0239
Panel B: Voter attitude towards transgender		
ipw_BRICS	0.2257***	0.1982***
	(0.0781)	(0.0665)
N	6039	6262
R^2	0.00118	0.0286
Panel C: Voter attitude towards intersex		
ipw_BRICS	0.2283***	0.1992***
	(0.0816)	(0.0666)
N	5928	6124
R^2	-0.00245	0.0269

Notes: Observations are weighted by population size weights. The sample is restricted to each respondent group in the corresponding column. All the models include controls for gender, age, years of education, outgroup (minority) status, as well as controls at NUTS-2 level for Gross Value Added (GVA) of the broad manufacturing sector and right-wing vote shares in the 2019 European Parliament election.
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustering on NUTS-2 regions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix B – Complete main estimations

Table B. 1. First-stage results of the 2SLS regressions in Table 6.1 and Table B.2.

	(2)	(3)	(4)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dep. vars:	ipw_BRICS	ipw_BRICS	ipw_BRICS	ipw_lowinc	ipw_lowinc	ipw_lowinc
Panel A: Voter attitude towards same-sex						
ipw_iv_BRICS	2.1397***	2.1459***	2.1495***			
	(0.483)	(0.486)	(0.483)			
ipw_iv_lowinc				1.9704***	1.9754***	1.9727***
				(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.171)
d_gender		-0.0192	-0.0312		0.0364	0.0217
		(0.0907)	(0.0854)		(0.0685)	(0.0606)
age		-0.0038	-0.0031		-0.0051*	-0.0042
		(0.00375)	(0.00378)		(0.00307)	(0.00302)
educ		-0.0182	-0.0133		-0.0366***	-0.0306***
		(0.0123)	(0.0115)		(0.0111)	(0.0106)
d_outgroup		-0.0720	-0.1328		-0.0502	-0.1125
		(0.217)	(0.204)		(0.199)	(0.176)
gva_k			-0.0000***			-0.0000***
			(0.00000365)			(0.00000360)
rightvote			-0.0199			-0.0231
			(0.0192)			(0.0181)
N	8672	8578	8578	8672	8578	8578
SW F (1, 122)	19.64	19.51	19.79	129.04	129.60	133.09
Panel B: Voter attitude towards transgender						
ipw_iv_BRICS	2.1435***	2.1501***	2.1514***			
	(0.484)	(0.487)	(0.485)			
ipw_iv_lowinc				1.9708***	1.9758***	1.9726***
				(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.171)
d_gender		-0.0153	-0.0333		0.0382	0.0170
		(0.0913)	(0.0870)		(0.0678)	(0.0611)
age		-0.0029	-0.0024		-0.0044	-0.0038
		(0.00394)	(0.00396)		(0.00324)	(0.00319)
educ		-0.0198	-0.0144		-0.0377***	-0.0312***
		(0.0125)	(0.0117)		(0.0111)	(0.0106)
d_outgroup		-0.0875	-0.1363		-0.0655	-0.1149
		(0.224)	(0.209)		(0.206)	(0.180)
gva_k			-0.0000***			-0.0000***
			(0.00000369)			(0.00000367)
rightvote			-0.0195			-0.0228
			(0.0192)			(0.0180)
N	8387	8293	8293	8387	8293	8293
SW F (1, 121)	19.60	19.47	19.64	129.69	130.21	133.36
Panel C: Voter attitude towards intersex						
ipw_iv_BRICS	2.1316***	2.1379***	2.1397***			
	(0.487)	(0.490)	(0.488)			
ipw_iv_lowinc				1.9652***	1.9700***	1.9670***
				(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.172)
d_gender		-0.0198	-0.0372		0.0388	0.0184
		(0.0892)	(0.0850)		(0.0662)	(0.0600)
age		-0.0032	-0.0027		-0.0046	-0.0040
		(0.00400)	(0.00401)		(0.00330)	(0.00324)
educ		-0.0190	-0.0132		-0.0363***	-0.0294***

	(0.0123)	(0.0114)		(0.0110)	(0.0104)	
d_outgroup	-0.1238	-0.1695		-0.0990	-0.1447	
	(0.224)	(0.210)		(0.207)	(0.182)	
gva_k		-0.0000***			-0.0000***	
		(0.00000370)			(0.00000368)	
rightvote		-0.0195			-0.0229	
		(0.0192)			(0.0180)	
N	8248	8153	8153	8248	8153	8153
SW F (1, 122)	19.18	19.05	19.21	127.15	127.62	130.73

Notes: Observations are weighted by population size weights. The sample is restricted to voters only, proxied by political interest. Columns numbering refers to the 2SLS models estimated in Table 6.1 and Table B.2.
The Sanderson-Windmeijer first-stage F statistic is the F form of the same endogenous regressor F-test reported, and it also corresponds to the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic, since the model consists of a single endogenous variable and statistics are cluster-robust.
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustering on NUTS-2 regions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B. 2. Import exposure and attitudes towards sexual minorities - complete outputs.

	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) OLS	(6) 2SLS	(7) 2SLS	(8) 2SLS
Panel A: Voter attitude towards same-sex								
ipw_BRICS	0.0656***	0.2460***	0.2350***	0.2248***				
	(0.0177)	(0.0758)	(0.0736)	(0.0705)				
ipw_lowinc					0.0553***	0.1067***	0.1015***	0.0960***
					(0.0106)	(0.0228)	(0.0219)	(0.0210)
d_gender			-0.6423***	-0.6307***			-0.6619***	-0.6480***
			(0.102)	(0.102)			(0.100)	(0.101)
age			-0.0216***	-0.0225***			-0.0216***	-0.0227***
			(0.00314)	(0.00322)			(0.00307)	(0.00311)
educ			0.0716***	0.0657***			0.0756***	0.0685***
			(0.0125)	(0.0116)			(0.0127)	(0.0115)
d_outgroup			-0.3460*	-0.3067*			-0.3687**	-0.3370**
			(0.187)	(0.170)			(0.186)	(0.167)
gva_k				0.0000*				0.0000
				(0.0000036)				(0.0000033)
rightvote				0.0232				0.0268
				(0.0164)				(0.0171)
Demo ctrl			✓	✓			✓	✓
Geo ctrl				✓				✓
N	8672	8672	8578	8578	8672	8672	8578	8578
R^2	0.0106	-0.0694	-0.0172	0.0133	0.0144	0.00196	0.0505	0.0718
Panel B: Voter attitude towards transgender								
ipw_BRICS	0.0655***	0.2017***	0.1905***	0.1909***				
	(0.0179)	(0.0634)	(0.0605)	(0.0603)				
ipw_lowinc					0.0481***	0.0860***	0.0808***	0.0804***
					(0.0121)	(0.0204)	(0.0191)	(0.0188)
d_gender			-0.4573***	-0.4446***			-0.4741***	-0.4600***
			(0.113)	(0.109)			(0.112)	(0.109)
age			-0.0214***	-0.0217***			-0.0214***	-0.0218***
			(0.00361)	(0.00353)			(0.00360)	(0.00349)
educ			0.0714***	0.0678***			0.0746***	0.0700***
			(0.0126)	(0.0116)			(0.0127)	(0.0116)
d_outgroup			0.0913	0.1268			0.0760	0.1051
			(0.187)	(0.176)			(0.186)	(0.173)
gva_k				0.0000**				0.0000**
				(0.0000032)				(0.0000031)
rightvote				0.0132				0.0165
				(0.0187)				(0.0193)

Demo ctrl			✓	✓			✓	✓
Geo ctrl				✓				✓
N	8387	8387	8293	8293	8387	8387	8293	8293
R^2	0.00923	-0.0307	0.00793	0.0250	0.00951	0.00360	0.0394	0.0533
Panel C: Voter attitude towards intersex								
ipw_BRICS	0.0611***	0.2015***	0.1917***	0.1916***				
	(0.0174)	(0.0639)	(0.0615)	(0.0610)				
ipw_lowinc					0.0458***	0.0848***	0.0803***	0.0797***
					(0.0116)	(0.0200)	(0.0190)	(0.0185)
d_gender			-0.4388***	-0.4261***			-0.4565***	-0.4428***
			(0.116)	(0.111)			(0.115)	(0.111)
age			-0.0220***	-0.0223***			-0.0220***	-0.0225***
			(0.00404)	(0.00386)			(0.00403)	(0.00382)
educ			0.0672***	0.0631***			0.0704***	0.0654***
			(0.0119)	(0.0112)			(0.0120)	(0.0111)
d_outgroup			-0.0592	-0.0252			-0.0776	-0.0510
			(0.226)	(0.200)			(0.229)	(0.202)
gva_k				0.0000***				0.0000**
				(0.0000029)				(0.0000027)
rightvote				0.0139				0.0174
				(0.0175)				(0.0180)
Demo ctrl			✓	✓			✓	✓
Geo ctrl				✓				✓
N	8248	8248	8153	8153	8248	8248	8153	8153
R^2	0.00829	-0.0355	0.00238	0.0217	0.00889	0.00243	0.0379	0.0535

Notes: Observations are weighted by population size weights. The sample is restricted to voters only, proxied by political interest. The model in column (3) includes controls for gender, age, years of education, and outgroup (minority) status. The model in column (4) includes regional controls at NUTS-2 level for Gross Value Added (GVA) of the broad manufacturing sector, and right-wing vote shares in the 2019 European Parliament election.
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustering on NUTS-2 regions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$