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A Policy Analysis on Command Agriculture: An Attempt to Revamp Agricultural Production in Zimbabwe

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Abstract: Once the breadbasket of Southern Africa, Zimbabwe has undergone a radical transformation. Agriculture provides employment and income for the majority of the population in Zimbabwe. After the Fast Track Land Reform and its negative effects on the agricultural sector the government of Zimbabwe has employed a significant number of strategies to modernize its agriculture sector and again become the breadbasket of the African continent. This thesis explores the implementation of the Command Agriculture (CA) Program, and its attempt to increase agriculture production and food security in the country. The data collected for this research is via a literature review on the strengths and shortcomings of the CA program. It is then analyzed using a social policy analysis model by Karger and Stoesz (2006). Concludingly, the research question is studied using a theoretical framework based on Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) theory of extractive institutions. Thereof, this paper finds that programs such as the CA is compromised because of the country's political and economic institutions developed to extract income and resources from the mass population to the narrow elite.

Keywords: Zimbabwe, Command Agriculture, Agricultural Production, Policy Analysis, Extractive Institutions

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List of Abbreviations

CA	Command Agriculture
FTRLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Program
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
GOZ	Government of Zimbabwe
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe

1 Introduction

The World Bank (2019a) states that agriculture is the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy, as it plays a significant role for economic growth in the country. The sector accounts for 11 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and is the main source of livelihood, employment, and income for approximately 67 percent of the population (World Bank, 2019a). Thus, the role of finance in the agricultural sector has a great impact on national development. Following the implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Program implemented in 2000 the country witnessed a withdrawal of capital from financing agriculture (Shonhe & Scoones, 2022). Thus, the last 20 years the country has opted for alternative sources of finance and state supported programs. Still, the country has witnessed declining agricultural production while imports have steadily increased (Mazwi et al, 2019). Against this background, the government of Zimbabwe implemented the Command Agriculture (CA) program in the farming season of 2016 and 2017. However, the program has received different attitudes and critiques regarding the outcome and implications for the economy as a whole. As such, the present paper will examine the Command Agriculture programs strengths, shortcomings as well as its impact on agriculture production in Zimbabwe.

1.1 Research Problem

As various other countries on the African continent, Zimbabwe witnessed a period of colonization by the British which has had an immense impact on the development of the country. The era of colonization resulted in a systematic transformation of the agricultural sector which has had an impact on agricultural production as well as on the wider economy (Groves, 2009). Since the country became independent in 1980, it has undergone high levels of economic instability, import levels, poverty levels and food insecurity (World Bank, 2019b). Thus, finance in the country has become a critical question and government intervention has been apparent in order to revamp the sector as well as to finance agricultural activities (World Bank, 2020). However, the programs put in place have been subject of mismanagement and ineffectiveness which has led to their failure (World Bank, 2020). Subsequently, damaging the development of the agriculture sector and the economy as a whole.

The Command Agriculture program was implemented in the farming season of 2016-2017 aiming to increase domestic agricultural production and reduce food imports (Shonhe, 2018). While research has been conducted interrogating the CA program, there is a lack of research

regarding its impact on agricultural production. Furthermore, how elites and beneficiaries have had an impact on the operation of the program. Hence, this paper critically analysis the role of the state in the program and its impact on agriculture production, contributing to academia as a whole. Furthermore, the thesis contributes to policy design among developing countries aiming to increase agricultural production.

1.2 Aim and Scope

The primary goal of this study at hand is therefore to unravel the factors that led to the implementation of the Command Agriculture (CA) as well as impact on agricultural production in Zimbabwe. As such, the study will conduct a literature review to accumulate data and further analyze the data through a social policy analysis framework. Hence, to meet the objective of this research, the following research question will be answered in this paper:

Why is the Command Agriculture program failing to increase agricultural production in Zimbabwe?

The scope of this research is the particular case study of the Command Agriculture program in Zimbabwe. Firstly, the policy is central to the study as it will allow for a thorough reasoning of the issues surrounding the agricultural sector. An emphasis will be made on the issues within the historical context and the development of the program as a reason for why the program is failing to increase agricultural production. Secondly, agriculture is vital for the country's economy and is therefore a relevant setting in which to analyze policy. Majority of the population rely on the sector for income and livelihood, and thus improving the sector is vital for bringing national development. Thirdly, the paper focuses on the historical context of the program and thus limits the scope of the paper from the period of colonization until today as colonization market the beginning of the reconstruction of the agricultural sector.

This thesis contributes to the academia by adding a new perspective on the Command Agriculture program by connecting the historical context and the development of the country's institutions as one the reasons for why it is failing. Furthermore, the analysis and findings of this case provides valuable lessons on how to address agricultural production elsewhere. Therefore, the research is relevant for the Zimbabwean government, state employees, civil society and organizations which address issues in the sector of agriculture in Zimbabwe as well

as the challenges of extractive institutions. Ultimately, the issues discussed in this paper are vital for national development and relevant for research on efforts to increase agriculture production in other developing countries.

1.3 Outline of Thesis

This thesis will begin by providing some background information about the Zimbabwean agricultural sector along with its history of land reforms and the economic environment to put this study into context. The study will then go on to review the literature on the impact of first, the Fast Track Land Reform program and later the Command Agriculture Program, on agriculture production and the economy as a whole. Previous studies and their findings will allow for data in which this paper will analyze. Subsequently, the theoretical framework will be introduced, followed by the methodology of policy analysis employed to study the Command Agriculture Program. Then the findings of this research will be presented along with a discussion on the results aiming to analyze the data collected. Finally, the thesis will conclude with concluding remarks summarizing the findings along with implications for the agricultural sector and factors to be prioritized for future reforms.

2 Background

This section begins by studying the agricultural sector and thereafter justifying Command Agriculture as a consequence of the Fast Track Land Reform Program. Land redistribution in Zimbabwe devastated the agrarian economy which subsequently impacted farm productivity, production and thus, food insecurity. While many studies have covered this topic, this study roots the issues within the historical context and views the development of the policy as part of the reason for its failure.

2.1 Climate and Geography

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in the Southern Africa region with an area of 390 760 km² (Chikozho, 2010). The tropical country generally experiences a dry savannah climate, however, has a range of microclimates (Chikozho, 2010). The country has an abundance of arable land and fertile soils which have benefitted the country for centuries (Maikaki, 2010). Owing to, the diverse climate conditions the country is able to produce a wide diversity of crops and livestock including, maize, tobacco, cotton, coffee, tea, soyabean and wheat (FAO, 2012). Furthermore,

the agricultural sector is composed of both large and small-scale farming (Moyo, 2005). Small-scale farmers occupy more land yet are located in regions with more unreliable rainfall and less fertile land, than large-scale commercial farmers (Moyo, 2005). In addition, large-scale farmers largely focus on export production while small-scale are major producers of food (Moyo, 2005). However, as the country has been suffering from rain deficits and reduced soil fertility, a decline in crop productivity and production has been witnessed (FAO, 2012).

The agricultural possibilities and highly productive land have allowed the country to be self-sufficient as well as produce a surplus of exports and thus been cited as the breadbasket of Africa (Chikozho, 2010). However, in recent years the country has not been able to feed itself and instead been dependent on foreign aids (Maikaki, 2010). The country suffers from weak infrastructure, market distortions and policy mistakes which has hindered the productivity in the sector (IMF, 2020). Scholars argue that the decline in agricultural production began when the country became independent in 1980 and was severely compromised by the period of Fast Track Land Reform which was implemented in the year 2000 (Mazwi, et al 2019; Shonhe, 2018).

2.2 History of Land Distribution

In order to understand the current issues surrounding the agriculture in Zimbabwe, we need to examine the developments of the sector from the colonial era onwards. The period of British Colonization had a great impact on agriculture and the distribution of land in Zimbabwe (Groves, 2009). The British administration developed a centralized and dual agricultural system, confiscating land and moving the native population to low potential, communal areas (Brouwer, 2020). Moreover, white settlers controlled high-potential land suited to high value export-oriented farming of tobacco and maize while the native Zimbabwean population were relegated to areas of poor soil, inadequate rainfall, and weak infrastructure (Brouwer, 2020). The Land Apportionment Act was implemented in 1930, formalizing the system of racial segregation and division of land (Brouwer, 2020). The institutional system served the interest of the settler minority and British Empire (Groves, 2009). Shaw (2003) states that white commercial farmers which constituted for less than 1% of the population, occupied 45% of all agricultural land. Conversely indigenous Zimbabweans constituted the small-scale communal agricultural sector. Hence, resulting in the central and controversial issue of land distribution post-independence (Groves, 2009).

The country witnessed a colonial period, followed by a period of white minority rule, before the country became independent in 1980 and Robert Mugabe became the first prime minister of the racially divided country (Brouwer, 2020). Throughout, the first period of independence the Zimbabwean economy was diversified, the country had well-developed industries and capitalist firms which were primarily based on agriculture, mining, and manufacturing (Brouwer, 2020). The government invested in public services and infrastructure and therefore improved health and education sectors (Brouwer, 2020). Thus, the country was referred to as the breadbasket of Africa. However, despite the intention to improve the quality of life of the population, the structural inequality was still to a large degree still present (Brouwer, 2020).

To address the colonial inequalities and maintain power, Robert Mugabe, and the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) adopted several policies of land distribution. Towards the end of the 1990s the country witnessed economic decline and political disorder which drastically changed the nature of the agricultural system. The government was met with opposition and thus requested to change two parts of the constitution (Brouwer, 2020). First, grant more power to the president and secondly, allow the government to take ownership of land without compensation (Brouwer, 2020). The government lost the referendum, invoking a period of farm invasions and the implementation of The Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) (Matondi, 2012). The aim was to redistribute land to native Zimbabweans. However, land was acquired from white farmers during often violent and disorderly farm invasions which forced farmers off the land without compensation (Brouwer, 2020). Large-scale commercial agriculture was replaced with small-scale producers. The World Bank (2019a) argues that the increase in small-scale production has created challenges for increasing productivity as the sector is not able to acquire the potential of economies of scale. Moreover, farmers do not have the opportunity to lower cost by increasing production. The FTLRP and its outcomes has been a much-debated matter. However, what is clear is that the former centralized and dual agrarian system was left fragmented and agricultural production weakened (Brouwer, 2020).

2.3 Lost Decade of Zimbabwe

The African Development Bank (2011) has referred to the period between 2000 and 2008 as the Lost Decade of Zimbabwe. The FTLRP resulted in economic decline, political disorder and the structure of the agricultural sector witnessed a radical change and restructuring (Matondi,

2012). The links between agricultural production and manufacturing weakened, causing deindustrialization (Richardson, 2004). Shortages in production forced the country to depend on aid in the 2000s. The decrease in supply of agricultural raw materials resulted in a weakened manufacturing industry (Richardson, 2004). Moreover, following the radical land redistribution and reforms the country witnessed capital flight and the withdrawal of private financial support for a number of reasons (Mazwi et al, 2019). However, the main factor was the strong opposition to the FTRLRP by the United States, the United Kingdom, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Mazwi et al, 2019). The economic degradation reached its bottom in 2008 as the country experienced high levels of hyperinflation and external debt.

The World Bank (2019b) states that since the 2000s the losses in agriculture have been the primary reasons for several major events in the economy. The country has witnessed hyperinflation in 2008, a banking crisis in 2015, loss of independent monetary exchange rate policy, limited access to international capital, dollarization as well as public debt and liabilities (World Bank, 2019b). Moreover, environmental shocks such as drought have exacerbated the country's vulnerability and private investment in the country (IMF, 2020). Thus, the World Bank (2019b) claims that public expenditure in agriculture as well as in the economy continues to be influenced by the consequences of the FTLRP.

2.4 Finance in Agriculture

Financing agriculture has been a challenge for Zimbabwe since the land reform as the country experienced capital flight and a deteriorating economy. In the past 20 years a number of finance and subsidy programs have been introduced in Zimbabwe (World Bank, 2020). The World Bank (2020) claims that the objective has been to support small-scale farmers and large-scale commercial farmers as well as to improve farm productivity, accumulate capital and achieve food security post-FTLRP. However, more importantly, enhance political support among its supporters and land reform beneficiaries in rural areas (Mazwi et al, 2019). Thus, in past years the state has provided support such as the supply of fuel, credit facilities, price offers and crop inputs (Shonhe, 2018). Shonhe (2018) states that there are three intentions that can be detected in the governments run programs. First, enhancing welfare and food security by distributing seed and fertilizer to small-scale producers. Second, advancing the potential for large-scale commercial farming and production. Further, the third objective is electoral goals for the ruling party by politics of patronage and campaign programs. The World Bank (2020) thus states that

the failure of the programs put in place the last 20 years has been an effect of mismanagement, corruption, and ineffectiveness. Additionally, the programs have often resulted in high costs which have been higher than the value of outputs, hence resulting in losses (The World Bank, 2019b).

A financial option that has been present in the Zimbabwean agriculture sector is contract farming. According to Prowse (2010) contract farming could be understood as a model in which a firm provides inputs such as seed, fertilizer, credit, or extension and in return gains purchasing rights over the specified crop. Hence, the firm benefits from greater control over the production process and final product (Prowse, 2010). Shonhe and Scoones (2022) state that the state was heavily involved in the arrangements from colonial times onwards. However, since the 1980s contract farming has moved to be private initiated (Prowse, 2010). In Zimbabwe, however, the Command Agriculture program is an example of a state-led contract farming arrangement still present.

2.5 The Command Agriculture Program

The government of Zimbabwe in the farming season of 2016-2017, introduced the Command Agriculture (CA) program. Initially, the program targeted medium and large-scale farmers with irrigation systems in high productivity areas, producing maize (Shonhe, 2018). However, by the end of the first season, the program expanded to include other beneficiaries, crops, and livestock (Shonhe & Scoones, 2022). The program currently targets sectors of domestic crop, livestock, and fisheries (ZDI, 2020). Farmers are provided with advanced loans in the form of supply such as seeds, fertilizers, chemicals, mechanized equipment, and electricity (ZDI, 2020). Moreover, the repayment is made by producing 5 tons per hectare delivered to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). The program thus aims to provide farmers with the means to produce a surplus and ensure food-sufficiency on both family and national level (ZDI, 2020).

Shonhe (2018) states that the financing of the program is complex and secretive. International and domestic finance together with local banks finance the program (Shonhe, 2018). The state and state-controlled actors involve the Ministry of Agriculture, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), Lands and Rural Development Board and the Grain Marketing Board (Mazwi et al., 2019). Moreover, private owned companies include the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe and

the petroleum company, Sakunda Holdings (Mazwi et al., 2019). However, the details of how funds are circled around are not transparent (Shonhe, 2018).

3 Literature Review

The literature review will begin by presenting the debate of how the last phase of land reform implemented in 2000 has impacted agricultural productivity followed by a discussion on the strengths and shortcomings of the Command Agriculture program in restoring this. The previous literature research both provides the background information that sets the research into an academic context and at the same time justifies the methodology adopted in the research.

3.1 The Controversy of Land Reform

The Fast Track Land Reform (FTLRP) was launched in the year 2000 and since then the country of Zimbabwe has witnessed a transformation of the agriculture sector which has been widely written about among scholars (Scoones et al, 2011; Matondi 2012; Moyo and Murisa, 2008). The aim of the program was to address the imbalances in land access after era of colonization (Scoones et al, 2011). However, the allocation of land under the FTLRP gained widespread international attention because of the governments forceful land takeover actions (World Bank, 2012). Following the implementation of the program the country witnessed a contraction in the economy as well as distinctive declines in agricultural production thus creating widespread food insecurity, which has been widely acknowledged among scholars (Moyo, 2004; Zikhali & Chilonda, 2011). However, there are opposing views as to the factors that account for such performance.

Loss in agricultural production could be attributed to the inexperience of relocated farmers and the failure of the technology adoption (Chavunduka & Vudzijena, 2021; Moyo, 2004, World Bank, 2012). Chavunduka and Vudzijena (2021) state that during land invasion, equipment was often stolen or vandalized, and the absence of strong institutions resulted in the lack of accountability. Moreover, as farmers in many cases lacked capital, the loss of equipment resulted in low and uneven access to farm machinery in the sector (World Bank, 2012). The situation was worsened because of shortages of seed, fertilizers, chemicals, and fuel (World Bank, 2012). Furthermore, a major constraint with the program brought up by several scholars

was the replacement of experienced farmers with less experienced farmers (Zikhali & Chilonda, 2011; Moyo, 2004). Moreover, the lack of expertise as well as shortages of electricity needed for irrigation systems has resulted in declining levels agricultural production (Chavunduka & Vudzijena, 2021).

The program was a major government undertaking and therefore, governance and institutional weaknesses were apparent (Matondi, 2012). Technical and administrative deficiency was also apparent as the government was not adequately prepared for the speed in which the program was implemented (Matondi, 2012). The government lacked sufficient resources to support new farmers and financial institutions were reluctant to lend support as there was a lack of collateral security (World Bank, 2019b). Furthermore, because of lack of political and economic stability, beneficiaries were not able to engage in productive agriculture. For example, frequent policy changes reduced the potential of productivity in the sector (World Bank, 2019b). In addition, another constraint was that the demand for extension services were not met (Zikhali & Chilonda, 2012). Hence, the absence of an intensive training program was a major negative factor that impacted agricultural production (World Bank, 2019b).

Moyo and Murisa, 2008 agree the poor performance of the agricultural sector following the FTLRP was due the use of human rights abuses, violence, and forceful takeover of land. This had an effect of undermining property rights which resulted in decreased investment in the sector (Richardson, 2004). In addition, resulted in sanctions imposed by the international community (Moyo and Murisa, 2008). The level of conflict and invasion discouraged stakeholders such as financial institutions and the private sector supporting organizations to invest which limited production (Matondi, 2012).

The question of who benefited from the FTLRP is highly debated. Moyo (2004) asserts that it was largely peasants that benefited from the redistribution of land while others argue it was individuals politically inclined towards the government who access the land. For example, Chavunduka and Vudzijena (2021) state that land reform transferred land to many farmers and brought them new livelihood opportunities and although substantial amounts of land were given to political elites, most of the land was delivered to small-scale farmers. Land allocations were also characterized by political patronage, with the process being biased towards ZANU-PF supporters (Scoones, et al). The ruling party and its affiliates coopted the institutions responsible for the assigning of land (Scoones et al, 2011). Consequently, many beneficiaries

were war veterans and political and business elites affiliated with the ruling party (Brouwer, 2020). Moreover, Chavunduka and Vudzijena (2021) claim that land reform resulted in areas being adversely affected by the overexploitation of natural resources. Certain beneficiaries of the FTLRP who pursued additional resources of livelihood, engaged in activities such as illegal mining and deforestation which has resulted in environmental degradation, soil erosion and water pollution (Chavunduka & Vudzijena, 2021)

According to the IMF (2020) the FTLRP has caused limited possibilities for economies of scale because of unsecure property rights and the difficulty in accessing financing as a consequence of the reforms. The process of land reforms led to the extinguishing of most property rights. Instead, land use rights were provided through 99-year lease contracts to individual landholders or statutory permits in order to occupy and use the land. However, because of governance challenges, rent seeking and politics the IMF (2020) argues it is common that farmers not being able to access their land for several years. In addition, the land can be revoked, and owners are not able to transfer land titles, thus are not able to use the land as collateral for accessing finance (IMF, 2020). The farmers with little experience combined with uncertainty of leases result in difficulties to access credit. As a consequence, without funding and finance makes it difficult for farmers to generate higher production levels and minimize costs (IMF, 2020).

3.2 Strengths and Shortcomings of Command Agriculture

The intention of the Command Agriculture Program to mobilize sustainable and affordable funding for the agriculture sector is commonly recognized amongst scholars (Tishakunda, 2018; Muzangwa, 2022; Dube, 2020; Tinashe & Munyardzi, 2019; World Bank, 2019b; Schonhe & Scoones, 2022). Muzangwa (2022) presents multiple intended outcomes of the program such as ensuring the provision of finance, empowering smallholder farmers, reducing imports and enhancing exports, among others. Tishakunda (2018) argues that the initiative has been viewed as an initiative to promote agriculture-based industries, hence creating job opportunities, and stimulating food, nutrition, and economic empowerment.

The source of funding for farmers has been highlighted as a benefit of Command Agriculture. The CA program provides farmers with agricultural inputs, thus gives farmers the opportunity to increase agricultural production of strategic crops (Tishakunda, 2018). Muzangwa (2022) states the scheme gives farmers access to farming inputs such as, fertilizer, herbicide, and fuel

as well as provides farmers with available buyers of their produce. Therefore, the CA lowers farming costs (Muzangwa, 2022). Furthermore, Tishakunda (2018) realizes that the loan agreement attracts minimal interest rates in addition to the repayment being in the form of produce. The contract states that farmers have to produce and deliver 5 tons per hectare to the Grain Marketing Board (ZDI, 2020).

Despite initial hopes for the program to improve food security it has faced many challenges. There are numerous obstacles hindering the adoption and success of the initiative. First of all, there are challenges regarding the conditions of the scheme (Dube, 2020; Tishakunda, 2018; Muzangwa, 2020; Tinashe & Munyaradzi, 2019). Dube (2020) recognizes that the contract gives the government responsibility in providing inputs, chemicals, fertilizer, and requisite technical support. However, it also grants the government through the military the right to inspect land, give instructions and guidance which shall be followed by the farmer. Therefore, the farmer is stripped out of autonomy and initiative in the whole exercise (Dube, 2020). Additionally, Dube (2020) argues that the state provides everything from inputs, equipment, and marketing, which is retrogressive to the development of the farmer, who can expect bailouts. Further, the contract reveals the production requirements which results in the government dictating the types of crops, volumes to be produces as well as the price at which the produce were to be sold (Tishakunda, 2018). Additionally, fiscal costs arise from default on inputs provided (World Bank, 2019b). The World Bank (2019b) stipulates that not all upfront investments by the government can be recovered in one harvest. Further, there is no enforcement mechanism to allow the government to recoup investment if the farmer defaulted (Dube, 2020). Therefore, the high default rates have severely compromised fiscal and budgetary planning with actual spending (Dube, 2020).

The conditions of the scheme stipulate that farmers have to facilitate the loan payment by surrendering a part of their yield to the Grain Marketing Board, a government parastatal (Tishakunda, 2018). Further, the government determines the price without considering variables such as the production cost or the price on the free market (Tishakunda, 2018). Hence, farmers are deprived farmers of the opportunity to sell agricultural produce in free market systems (Tinashe & Munyaradzi, 2019). Additionally, fiscal costs arise from the price wedge between the procurement prices, the amount paid by the government, and the sales price (World Bank, 2019b). The World Bank (2019b) contends that the Grain Marketing Board aims at setting procurement prices at import parity, in other words, the amount paid by the government

at the same price a purchaser can expect to pay for imported goods. However, the prices of imported goods are often lower than the price paid by the government and thus, the government provides a subsidy to farmers and consumers (World Bank, 2019b). This creates inefficiencies as one is able to buy commodities cheaply and sell back to the Grain Marketing Board at the official higher procurement price, as well as opens up for the possibility of selling illegally across borders (World Bank, 2019b). Even though, increasing the sales price would be an important step in restoring fiscal stability, it will have an impact on final consumers (World Bank, 2019b). Consequently, higher prices on staple crops such as maize will compromise food security among the population of Zimbabwe (World Bank, 2019b).

Another issue hindering Command Agriculture is the misappropriation of financial resources and rampant corruption (Tishakunda, 2018). Dube (2020) argues that the Command Agriculture program was implemented in an environment in which the parliamentary oversight role was limited. Further, he reasons that it is conventionally agreed that parliamentary oversight promotes and safeguards transparency which creates fiscal discipline as well as guards against corruption. However, Command Agriculture has been described as attempts by the government to take advantage of the rural population and accumulate political capital through patronage and rents (Dube, 2020). Further, Shone and Scoones (2022) argue that the program is highly politicized with military involvement, and its financing and beneficiary selection is not transparent. Shonhe (2018) claims that the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for the selection of beneficiaries, distributing inputs and collecting outputs which results in opportunities for patronage (Shonhe, 2018). Moreover, the individuals who have benefited from the program are mostly larger, often politically well-connected farmers (Shonhe & Scoones, 2022; Shonhe, 2018). Thereof, one of the weaknesses of the program is the selective distribution of inputs as a consequence of political influences and internal corruption (Muzangwa, 2022).

Lastly, Dube (2020) states that Zimbabwe's agriculture sector faces multiple challenges of investment. While the government increases investment in the command agriculture program through provisions of inputs, fertilizers and chemicals, efforts should also be made in other areas such as agricultural training and climate volatility (Dube, 2020). First, the nurturing of skills is required to address the agricultural challenges and success of the program (Dube, 2020). In addition, skill is needed to build climate proof agriculture from the effects of drought as climate change poses a huge risk to the sector (Dube, 2020).

4 Theoretical Framework

This section delves into the theoretical and analytical framework applied in this study to understand the reasons for the failure of the Command Agriculture Program. The theoretical framework will be based on Acemoğlu and Robinson's (2012) theory from "Why Nations Fail", where the relevant aspects will be explained and put into the context of this paper. Additionally, the study will be based on the policy analysis model of Karger and Stoesz (2006). However, the analytical framework will be further described in the methodology section, following the theoretical framework.

4.1 Theory of Extractive Institutions

In their book, *Why Nations Fail*, Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) explain a theory of economic development. The core of the theory implies that a country will be rich or poor depending on the quality of its political and economic institutions. Moreover, the differences between political and economic institutions are whether they are extractive or inclusive. As such, this paper will explain the relevant theoretical concepts and put them into context of this research.

4.1.1 Institutions

A fundamental argument to the theory of Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) is that economic success among countries varies because of their political and economic institutions. These institutions are defined as being either inclusive or extractive. Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) define inclusive economic institutions as institutions that encourage the mass population to engage in economic activity as well as create an environment for productivity growth and economic prosperity. In contrast, extractive economic institutions generate the opposite which is due to the fundamental factors that characterize them.

Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) explain that there are several central mechanisms of inclusive economic institutions. First of all, a feature of such institutions are secure property rights. An individual that expects its output to be stolen, vandalized, or taxed away has a limited incentive to work, invest or innovate because of the risks involved. Therefore, secure property rights fosters investment and productivity growth. Secondly, inclusive economic institutions encourage technology and education which subsequently generates prosperity. Improvements

in technology create more productive labor, land, and capital such as buildings and machines. Moreover, technology is linked to education as technology would be ineffective without workers knowing how to operate on the equipment and machines. Thereof, education and skills enable the adoption of technologies which consequently generates sustained economic growth. Lastly, central to these institutions are freedom to contract and exchange, the provision of law and order and public services. As the state enforces the system of law and provides public services, the state is an important actor for the establishment of inclusive economic institutions. More specifically, the state regulates and prevents fraud in addition, builds strong infrastructure and transportation networks so that goods can be transported. Thereof, the state has an important role for ensuring that economic activity can flourish. Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) state that institutions with the opposite features previously mentioned are extractive economic institutions. More concisely, they fail to meet the intentions of inclusive ones; encourage technological innovation and education, secure property rights and the provision of law and order. Instead, extractive economic institutions are structured to extract wealth and income from the majority of the population in society and benefit a few.

Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) define political institutions as institutions that determine the rules that will govern society. Political institutions can also be divided into those that are inclusive and those that are extractive. The difference concerns the factor concerning the distribution of power. Provided that power is distributed to a single individual or a narrow group who are able to enrich themselves at the expense of society, the political institutions are defined as extractive. However, if power is distributed broadly in society the institutions are characterized as inclusive. Another factor of political inclusive institutions is political centralization entailing that the state enforces law and order, public services, and incentivizes economic activity.

There is a strong relationship between economic and political institutions. Extractive political institutions allocate power to a narrow elite while extractive economic institutions are built on a system which extracts resources from the broader society. Hence, the two are intertwined and depend on each other. Political institutions enable the elites controlling political power to choose as well as structure future economic institutions with fewer constraints or opposing forces. In addition, extractive economic institutions enrich the same elites and their economic wealth and power in order to ensure political dominance. Consequently, inclusive economic

institutions do not support extractive political ones as they reduce the benefits of the elites because of the constraints of contracts, property rights and innovation.

4.1.2 Sustained Economic Growth

Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that extractive institutions hinder economic growth for two reasons. First of all, because of creative destruction. This term originates from Joseph Schumpeter and describes the dismantling of long-standing practices with improved innovations. For there to be economic growth, innovation and technological change is required which is accompanied by creative destruction as new innovations means dismantling of the old. The improvements in technology can create more productive labor, land, and capital such as buildings and machines which increases levels of production. However, innovation and creative destruction also destabilizes established power relations in politics and therefore elites in power wish to stop it to remain in control. Hence, technological innovations which could generate economic growth are often not present under extractive institutions. Secondly, the minority that dominate extractive institutions benefit from the privileges of income, power and resources which is relative to what could exist at the expense of the rest of the population. Thus, power is highly desired under extractive institutions and individuals fight to obtain it. As a consequence, the appeal to be in power under such institutions hinders economic progress.

4.1.3 Institutional Drift and Critical Juncture

Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) justify that the reasons for the existing institutional differences among societies around the world are a result of institutional changes. As economic, and political conflicts are resolved in different ways because of historical differences, the role of individuals etc., the small differences accumulate and create a process of *institutional drift*. Evidently, similar societies will slowly drift apart institutionally. Thereof, when a *critical juncture* arrives, a historical turning point, small differences that have emerged as a result of institutional drift may lead to societies that were quite similar to diverge. Hence, the world has witnessed different patterns of economic development and institutions.

4.1.4 Virtuous or Vicious Cycles

The reasons for why institutions today are inclusive, or extractive are because of history as once the different patterns of institutions are established Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) reason that they are inclined to exist which creates a *vicious cycle*. This is because when

political power is challenged and subsequently gained by a new group of elites, they are incentivized to maintain the extractive institutions. Similarly, inclusive economic and political institutions create *virtuous cycles*. Such institutions, distribute power broadly and can thus, not easily set up extractive institutions that solely benefits themselves. Yet, there are examples of country's breaking out of *vicious* and *virtuous cycles*. For example, there has been a pattern of extractive institutions in history, however, some societies have been able to break the model and gravitate towards inclusive institutions. Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) also state that institutional change happens by cause of interaction between institutional and *critical junctures* which are major events that upset the existing political and economic balance in society. Furthermore, *critical junctures* generate the potential for the structure of economies around the world to rapidly change.

4.2 Social Policy Analysis

Karger and Stoesz (2006) propose a model of social policy analysis which the analytical framework for this study will be based on. The model is divided into four sections and provides a set of questions which make it possible to systematically analyze the policy in question. The sections include (1) Historical Background of the Policy, (2) Problems That Necessitate the Policy, (3) Policy Description and (4) Policy Analysis. By understanding the historical background of the policy, one is able to identify historical problems that led to the implementation of the policy, set the policy within a historical framework, and understand the forces that were mobilized to support or oppose the given policy. Further, an examination of the problems that necessitated the creation of the policy is crucial to understanding the nature, scope and magnitude of the problem and evaluate whether the policy is appropriate. Policy description allows for a detailed explanation of the policy, its objectives and how it functions. The last section is the heart of policy analysis which engages a systematic analysis of the policy. The goals are evaluated as well as the viability of a policy which is measured based on political, economic, and administrative feasibility. Political feasibility implies assessing the public's opinions and perception of the policies feasibility. Economic and administrative feasibility relates to funding prospects as well as the effective implementation of the respective policy.

5 Methodology and Data

This section will discuss and justify the methods and data that is applied in this qualitative research. First, a policy analysis model by Karger and Stoesz (2006) will be explained as well as which part of the approach will be used and why. Further, the data section will justify the choice of deriving data through a literature review. Lastly, limitations to the research will be pointed out regarding the methodology and data.

5.1 Methods

The methodology in this paper is guided by Karger and Stoesz's (2006) approach to policy analysis. The framework provides a systematic model which can be used to examine and evaluate the Command Agriculture Program in Zimbabwe. The data will be derived through a literature review on the topic. Consequently, Acemoglu and Robinson's (2012) political economy theory on extractive institutions will be used to provide explanations and theoretical reasoning for the results gained from the analysis and thus, reasons for its failure in increasing agricultural production in Zimbabwe.

The Karger and Stoesz (2006) model for policy analysis provides an appropriate approach as the criterion would allow for an analysis on the impact the Command Agriculture program has had or could have had on agricultural production in Zimbabwe. The model provides a set of questions which make it possible to systematically analyze the policy. In this paper not all aspects of the framework are applied as this would exceed the aim of the study, therefore the model will be modified. The chosen questions that are relevant within the scope of this paper on agricultural production in Zimbabwe are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Structure of Questions Posed in the Study

Sub-Section	Operational Questions
Historical Background of the Policy	What historical problems led to the creation of the policy?
	How important have these problems been historically?
	What is the historical background of the policy?
	How has the original policy originated over time?
Description of the Problem that Necessitated the Policy	What is the nature of the problem?
	How widespread is it?
	How many people are affected by it?
	Who is affected and how?
	What are the causes of the problem?
Policy Description	How is the policy expected to work?
	What resources or opportunities is the policy expected to provide?
	Who will covered by the policy and how?
	How will the policy be implemented?
	What are the short- and long-term goals and outcomes of the policy?
	What is the funding mechanism for the policy?
Policy Analysis	Are the goals of the policy just and democratic?
	Do the goals of the policy contribute to a greater social equality?
	Do the goals of the policy positively affect the redistribution of income, resources rights, entitlements, rewards, opportunities, and status?
	Do the goals of the policy contribute to a better quality of life for the target population?
	Does the policy contribute to positive social relations between the target population and the overall society?

Source: *The Model for Policy Analysis by Karger and Stoesz (2006: 29)*

5.1.1 Limitations of the Method

Conducting a literature review will not yield objective results and one could does not contribute any new knowledge. The literature selected and results gained regarding the impact of the Command Agriculture program on agricultural production will be interpreted by the researcher. Therefore, the policy guidelines by Karger and Stoesz (2006) are used as a method to correctly examine the program and its consequences. In addition, the analytical framework conducted will also to a degree reflect the researchers understanding. Yet, the study has developed an analytical and theoretical framework to discuss the data collected from the literature review and add to the literature in the field.

5.1.1 Data

The paper will collect data through a literature review which will form the basis of the policy analysis framework. The data is derived from scientific journal articles, published books on the topic, and reports from multinational organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The literature reviewed has been derived using the google scholar database. In order to access journal articles and books regarding the Fast Track Land Reforms impact on agriculture the keywords, “Fast Track Land Reform”, “Zimbabwe” and “Agricultural Sector” were used. The reform was implemented in the year 2000 followed by a period of economic degradation and hyperinflation which reached its height in 2008 and thus a debate has risen regarding the correlation between the two. This paper has therefore, limited the search to include papers from 2008 and onwards to take this factor into consideration. Similarly for literature derived regarding the CA program used the keywords, “Command Agriculture” and “Zimbabwe”. The articles derived were published after the implementation of the program, from 2016 and onwards. Various journal articles were excluded from the study because of the limitation of the scope and timeframe of this paper. The selected literature has been carefully reviewed in order to draw accurate conclusions regarding the impact of the FTLRP and CA on agricultural production in Zimbabwe

5.2.1 Source Criticism

This paper derives its data through various journal articles, published books and reports conducted on the Command Agriculture program. The data is hence, collected from scholars and organizations that view the initiative from different views and positions which provides a nuanced picture of the program. This paper does not review an official government document

of the program as the government has not published this to the public. This could bring a potential limitation to the paper, as the research is based on the findings of other researchers. However, at the same time the study avoids potential political bias inherent in state documents as governments tend to provide the public with a positive picture of their countries.

6 Analysis

This section will systematically analyze the Command Agriculture Program based on the analytical framework and aim to determine the factors that have resulted in the government of Zimbabwe failing to increase agricultural production. The theoretical framework will argue that Acemoglu and Robinson's (2012) theory on extractive institutions applies to the case of CA in Zimbabwe.

6.1 Historical Background

In the Karger and Stoesz (2006) policy analysis framework the first subsection concerns the historical background of the policy. By understanding the context in which the Command Agriculture Policy was set and the problems that led to the creation of the policy, helps to explain the evolutionary nature of the policy. This analysis will therefore review the issues that the Zimbabwean agricultural sector has been facing in the past, how they have evolved over time and the interaction of institutional structures that have been present since colonization.

To understand the historical development of the CA program it is important to understand the interaction of economic and political institutions in Zimbabwe's history. As discussed in the background section of this paper, Zimbabwe was colonized by the British which had a great impact on the agricultural sector and more specifically on the distribution of land. The British administration created a dual agricultural system relocating the native Zimbabwean population to low potential communal areas while British settlers were entitled high-value commercial farming areas (Brouwer, 2020). This created a racially segregated system which allowed the settlers to draw out wealth from the population and resources available. Hence, the period of white minority rule provides a clear example of a powerful group trying to maintain the current economic system which benefits them, through politics.

When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, the same pattern of economic and political extractive institutions that enriched a few at the expense of the masses reproduced itself. The issue of land redistribution became highly controversial and several policies as well as land reforms were set in place to address the structural inequalities (Groves, 2009). However, at the end of the 1990s the ruling party faced political opposition and proposed to change the constitution (Brouwer, 2020). The change would entail that the state would be able to take ownership of land without compensation and would grant more power to the president, a significant feature of an extractive political institution (Brower, 2020). Moreover, the government lost the referendum concerning the change of the constitution and invoked a period of more radical approach of farm invasions (Matondi, 2012). The government in 2000 implemented the Fast Track Land Reform Program which redistributed land to native Zimbabweans, forcing white farmers off the land without compensation (Brouwer, 2020). Thereof, the dual agricultural system was broken, however, agricultural production weakened, and the Zimbabwean economy was shattered. However, the narrow group of elites monopolized resources and sustained its power. Since the implementation of the FTLRP political power has continued to be in the hands of a narrow group of elites with limited motivation to improve the quality of life or encourage economic progress. Instead, their concentration has lain in extracting income and sustaining power.

A variety of finance and subsidy programs have been introduced in the country in order to improve farm productivity, increase production and achieve food security since the year 2000. However, corruption, mismanagement and high costs have resulted in the failure of a number of the previous programs put in place (World Bank, 2020). This is connected to institutions which are rooted in the past creating a *vicious cycle*. More specifically, the periods in Zimbabwean history have shown different patterns of extractive institutions from the white minority rule to independence and a new group monopolizing resources and political power. Such institutions construct elites who are incentivized to maintain extractive institutions for their own benefit at the expense of the rest of society hence, contributing to a *viscous cycle*.

6.2 Problems that Necessitated the Policy

The second subsection concerns the problems that led to the creation of the Command Agriculture Program. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, agriculture is the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy. The sector plays a significant role for economic

growth and is the main source of income and employment for the majority of the population. Yet, the sector has undergone profound structural changes since independence in 1980, as a consequence of land redistribution and reforms. After the FTLRP several subsidies and policies have been put in place to address the issues of low domestic agricultural production. The Command Agriculture Program evidently attempts to tackle the same issue. However, the historical context and institutional structure in which these policies take place have resulted in the country failing to increase agricultural production.

Since the FTLRP Zimbabwe has experienced low levels of agricultural production which are rooted in Zimbabwe's extractive economic institutions. The country has witnessed economic decline, political disorder and the agricultural sector has undergone a radical restructuring (Matondi, 2012). During land invasions, equipment was often stolen or vandalized (Chavaunduka & Vudzijena, 2021). As the presence of extractive institutions encourages wide scale looting of what should be public property, and theft and fraud resulted in low and uneven access to machinery. Furthermore, the restructuring of land has resulted in the agricultural sector alternatively being dominated by small-scale production which presents negative implications for productivity levels and large-scale production (World Bank, 2019a). In addition, it resulted in the limitation of property rights which has limited investment and innovations in the sector (Richardson, 2004). If property rights are not enforced incentives to work and innovate are low due to the risk of the rewards taken away from them. Thus, the sector is not able to acquire the potential of economies of scale, as small-scale farmers do not have the same option to lower costs by increasing production.

The FTLRP resulted in the relocation of experienced farmers with inexperienced ones and the failure of technology adoption (Chavaunduka & Vudzijena, 2021). The government lacked sufficient resources to support new farmers and financial support was limited as there was a lack of collateral security (World Bank, 2012). This set a constraint on economic growth which again could be linked to extractive institutions. Innovation and technological change are almost always accompanied by creative destruction. However, creative destruction destabilizes established power relations and is thus not popular among elites in power. Thus, investment in technology and training programs have been absent and set a hinder for economic growth and production in the sector.

Capital flight and the downward spiral of the economy since 2000 has resulted in the recurrent challenge of financing agriculture (Mazwi et al, 2019). Capital flight and isolation was due to sanctions imposed from the international community due to human rights abuses (Matondi, 2012). Other events include hyperinflation in 2008, a banking crisis in 2015 as well as public debt and liabilities which have given rise to the vulnerability of economic and climactic shocks (World Bank, 2019a). These are secondary effects faced because of the measures taken by elites to maintain power. The lack of investment under extractive institutions has resulted in the lack of resilience to drought and a safety net for the people throughout years when rainfall is low. Thereof, Zimbabwe is vulnerable to frequent drought periods, resulting in reduced national production.

To conclude, the agricultural sector has undergone a systematic transformation since the period of FTLRP which has caused an economic downward spiral and low levels of agricultural production. Against this background the government implemented the Command Agriculture program in the farming season of 2016 and 2017.

6.3 Description of Policy

The third section of the policy analysis is a detailed explanation of the policy. The section will provide descriptions of the CA programs goals, opportunities as well as how it is expected to work, and the individuals covered by it.

The CA program was introduced in the 2016 and 2017 farming season through Statutory Instrument 79 “Agriculture Marketing Authority” (Command Agriculture Scheme for Domestic Crop, Livestock and Fisheries Productions) Regulations, 2017. The program was introduced with an aim of increasing agriculture production, development and improve food security (ZDI, 2020). By providing farmers with support in terms of seeds, fertilizers, equipment and electricity, beneficiaries are anticipated to deliver five tons per hectare to the Grain Marketing Board. Thereof, repayment of advanced loans is aimed for farmers to attain a surplus of produce and ensure food security for both the consumption for the family and nationally (ZDI, 2020).

The question of who the program covers, and benefits is highly politicized and have been a subject for debate among critics. Originally, the program targeted medium-scale farmers with

functioning infrastructure and specialized in maize. However, the program advanced to other sector as well as included other beneficiaries after the first season (Shonhe & Scoones, 2022). Thereof, currently targeting sectors of domestic crop, livestock, and fisheries production the program is meant to benefit farmers. However, the involvement of the state, financing and the selection of beneficiary has not been transparent (Shonhe & Scoones, 2022). The theory of Acemoglu and Robinson's (2012) suggest that the lack of parliamentary oversight is a characteristic of extractive political institutions. Thus, is one of the reasons for the program failing to increase agricultural production.

To sum up, the Command Agriculture program aims at supporting farmers with input supplies in order to enhance agriculture production and ensure food security. In return farmers are expected to deliver output to the GMB who sell the produce on the open market for a lower sales price. Hence, the subsidy intends to avoid increasing prices for the final consumer and ensure food security. This suggests that the enormous amounts of product moving through one state agency is a recipe for elites skimming from the top. Moreover, as the program has experienced high default rates and is running out of money, it suggests some of it has gone missing (Dube, 2020). Either through government employees selling some of the produce privately or through other mechanisms.

6.4 Policy Analysis

By breaking down the relevant literature on the Command Agriculture program, it can be determined that there are number of obstacles that hinders the success of the initiative. However, the central issue roots in the prevalence of Zimbabwe's extractive institutions.

First of all, it can be argued that the conditions of the scheme are preventing the program from achieving its goals. The contract, developed under economic institutions is structured by the elite to extract resources from the mass population. Even though the contract of the program ensures that the government provides inputs and assistance, this also gives them the right to inspect land, give orders as well as dictate volumes and crops to be produced (Tishakunda, 2018). The farmer also becomes reliant on government support and thus, not inclined to gradually become independent and self-sufficient. Hence, limiting the farmers development, freedom, sovereignty and subsequently the incentive to invest and innovate. Farmers are also obligated to deliver part of their produce to the GMB and are thus, deprived from the

opportunity to sell on the open market (Tinashe & Munyaradzi, 2019). Thereof, the economic institutions develop an extractive system in which the government expropriates resources of the many and suppresses the functioning markets so that it only benefits a few.

The characteristics of extractive political institutions established in this respect are that elites in power mollify supporters through subsidies to maintain power while sapping resources and preventing innovation. Moreover, as the government determines the price paid for the farmers output which is set to be higher than the price of imported goods, the price wedge results in a fiscal cost (World Bank, 2019b). Thus, the government provides a subsidy to farmers which results in inefficiencies in addition to investments made by the government not being recovered (World Bank, 2019b). The high default rates are prevalent which has a negative impact for fiscal and budgetary planning (Dube, 2020). Ultimately, by implementing subsidies which cause economic inefficiencies in the country the government continues to sustain political power and continues extracting income.

The Command Agriculture program was implemented under extractive political institutions in which parliamentary oversight was limited. This has resulted in misappropriation of resources and widespread corruption (Dube, 2020). A distinctive feature in extractive political institutions is the prevalence of power distributed to a narrow group of elites that are able to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of the population. This component is recognized under the Command Agriculture program as it has been argued that the government has taken advantage of the rural population and accumulated political power through patronage and rents (Dube, 2020). The complex system of financing the CA program and details of how funds are circulated has not been transparent (Shonhe, 2018). The state has mediated in the selection of beneficiaries which have often been elites within the bureaucracy, army or in leadership positions (Shonhe & Scoones, 2022). Moreover, the state has been involved in the distributing of inputs and collecting of outputs which has arguably resulted in opportunities for patronage (Shonhe, 2018). Hence, the program has allowed for the draining of resources and income from the state toward a very few connected people.

Zimbabwe has observed low levels of investment and weak infrastructure in the agriculture sector which hampers the success for the Command Agriculture program (IMF, 2020). The literature review reveals that skills and climate proof agriculture is needed to provide sustainable economic growth in the sector. However, as mentioned earlier in this paper,

innovation and technological change accompanied by creative destruction is not popular among elites in power under extractive institutions. Thus, according to the theory of Acemoğlu and Robinson's (2012) for the country to witness economic prosperity the country needs to transition from extractive to inclusive institutions.

To conclude, an analysis of the CA thus suggests that the conditions of the scheme, the role of the government as well as the widespread corruption are all reasons for why the program is failing. Thereof, the program is not just and democratic and does not contribute to greater equality among the population of the country as the program favors the elite. Moreover, the CA has been criticized by the public as it is perceived to be corrupt and politically influenced. Let alone, the program does not contribute to positive social relations between the target population and the overall society. Moreover, for agricultural production to increase in Zimbabwe, the country needs strong institutions and sustainable and transparent policies. The institutions in which the Command Agriculture program has been implemented can be characterized as extractive. The system allows for the draining of resources from the state towards a very few connected people. They appease supporters through subsidies to maintain power while sapping resources and preventing innovation. Since these factors have not been taken into account in the recent CA program, the program is failing to achieve its goals of increasing agricultural production and is further damaging the potential for economic growth in the sector.

7 Discussion

This section will answer the research question posed in this study and thus aim to understand why the Command Agriculture program is failing to increase agricultural production. The factors described in the analysis part of this paper align with the theory posed by Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) of extractive institutions.

Since the era of colonisation in Zimbabwe, the country has shown different patterns of extractive institutions. Colonisation provides a clear example of a powerful minority of white settlers operating to maintain the economic system that benefited them as they were able to extract wealth and resources from the country. Post-independence a new group of elites monopolizing resources and political power was established. The government of Zimbabwe and the elites in power implemented land reforms to sustain their political power and gain influence among the

rural population. Consequently, The FTLRP resulted in small-scale production, limitation of property rights, little investment and innovation which prevented the potential of economies of scale. The extractive institutions prevalent since the period of FTLRP has contributed to economic decline, political disorder, and the radical restructuring of the agricultural sector which have impacted agricultural activity in the country. The country has experienced a *vicious cycle*, in other words has been stuck in a pattern of extractive institutions in which incentivises a handful of elites to maintain in power and extract resources from the masses. Thus, hampering economic growth as well as the attempts to increase agricultural production through policies such as CA.

The Command Agriculture program has faced several obstacles because of the extractive institutions in place. Firstly, the failure of technology adoption and education among farmers has set a constraint on economic growth which can be linked to extractive institutions. The fear for creative destruction has set a hinder for economic growth and production in the sector and for the success of the program. Secondly, the measures taken by elites to maintain power have resulted in events such as human rights abuses during farm invasions because of the ruling governments ambition to gain support among rural farmers after the distribution of land post-independence. Thus, the country experienced capital flight and isolation due to sanctions imposed by the international community and thus resulted in lack of investment in the sector. Again, having an impact on the vulnerability to frequent drought periods which thus reduces national production. Thirdly, the lack of parliamentary oversight and the lack of transparency in the financing and selection of beneficiary in the program has resulted in the expropriation of resources which only benefit a few. Moreover, through programs such as Command Agriculture the movement of large amounts of product through one state agency results in the opportunity for corruption. In addition, subsidies are able to mollify supporters to maintain in power whilst extracting resources and preventing innovation as farmers are not able to become independent from the state.

To conclude, the extractive institutions in which Command Agriculture has been implemented has resulted in the program failing to increase agricultural production. The program has instead allowed for the extraction of resources and income towards a narrow group of elites and hampered the possibilities for economic growth in the agricultural sector, which impacts the lives and incomes for the majority of the population.

8 Conclusion

8.1 Research Aim and Findings

To conclude, this paper has aimed to highlight the factors that led to the implementation of the Command Agriculture program and its impact on agricultural production in Zimbabwe. The objective was hence to derive data through a literature review and analyze the findings through the social policy method of Karger and Stoesz (2006). The analytical framework used in this paper allows for an analysis of the historical background as well as the issues that necessitated the implementation of the program. Thereafter, to answer the research question of why the program is failing to increase agricultural production this paper has based its arguments on the theory of extractive institutions by Acemoglu and Robinson's (2012).

With the utilization of the two frameworks and the data collected via a literature review concerning the FTLRP and the CA program, it can be concluded that the failure of the program lies at the heart of the country's extractive institutions. Political and economic institutions in Zimbabwe since the era of colonialism have extracted resources and income from the masses and instead allocated it among a narrow group of elites in power. This has had implications for investments, innovations, and economic activity. Moreover, limited the possibilities for productivity growth and economic prosperity. Thereof, programs such as CA in which the government plays an important role is compromised and its aim of increasing agriculture production is failing.

8.2 Implications

The Command Agriculture program is still in place and has been stepped up to include other sectors and crops in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the beneficiaries and a handful of elites established because of extractive institutions is benefitting from the resources, political capital and outputs generated by the program and its subsidies, instead of benefiting the society as a whole. The consequences of this on the agricultural sector is the lack of investment and development of the sector which subsequently effects economic growth. Furthermore, the program was intended to increase national production and hence, increase food security and limit the dependency of imports. However, public expenditure will not be efficient as long as extractive economic and political institutions are in place.

8.3 Future Reforms and Research

This paper found that the extractive institutions hinder economic growth and activity in Zimbabwe. Therefore, for future reforms to be successful the government of Zimbabwe needs to build inclusive political and economic institutions which allow for programs such as CA to work efficiently. Moreover, the role of the state and state agencies in the CA program have been the at heart of the issue. Thus, the inclusion of the private sector and private investment in the agricultural sector remains important for future policies.

In terms of future research on this topic, a suggestion is to thoroughly investigate the actors involved in the CA program. Further analyze the financing and movement of inputs and grain through CA as this has not been transparent. In addition, as this paper is based on a qualitative approach, a suggestion is to examine data through a quantitative perspective by investigating for example, productivity levels. Moreover, a method in which data is collected through interviews could be add a new approach to the study. This paper aims to illustrate the impact of the program on agriculture production, another suggestion is to investigate the impact of the program on individual farmers or farming communities. For example, investigate the programs impact on well-being or food security among farmers.

8.4 Chapter Summary

In section 1, this paper introduces the research problem of agricultural production and the financing of agricultural activities which has led to the implementation of the Command Agriculture program. Section 2 provides background information regarding the issues concerning the agricultural sector and its history of land distribution. Section 3, presents literature and empirical studies on the FTLRP as well as CA. In section 4, the theoretical framework is presented consisting of a theory of extractive institutions and a social policy analysis model employed in this research. Section 5 provides an explanation of the research design consisting of methodology and data. In section 6 the data is analyzed through the social analysis model to research the programs historical context and development. Lastly, section 7 and 8 present the findings, conclusions, and implications for further research.

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