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# **Effects of personal perspective on an individuals' moral intuition**

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## **Abstract**

Can we manipulate how morally permissible or unjustifiable someone finds a certain action by framing a dilemma in either a first- or third-person perspective? This online study aims to investigate this question through a between-group study. 42 participants, recruited through social media, on campus, and through snowballing, were divided into two groups and asked to rank nine different moral actions from fully morally permissible to fully morally unjustifiable, the only difference between the groups being the personal perspective framing. Although the analysis showed a small difference, where the first-person perspective group is on average slightly more restrictive in deeming an action morally permissible, the result is insignificant. We speculate that this is due to this study's shortcoming in isolating the intuitive part of the participants' moral judgment.

*Keywords:* Moral cognition, moral intuition, personal perspective framing.

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## Effects of personal perspective on individual's moral intuition

### Is moral intuition to be trusted?

What happens behind the closed curtains of the human mind and the mechanisms of its processes is not only a debate in philosophy and psychology, but also a hot topic in the fields of neuroscience, morality, and human reasoning research. Perhaps moral intuition is more complicated than simply being a direct extension of a person's gut feeling and that is what this study aims to dive into.

Paruzel-Czachura (2023) defines morality as the “obligatory concerns with others’ and our own welfare, rights, fairness, or justice, as well as the reasoning, judgment, emotions, or actions that spring from those concerns.” (p. 92) and in this study we adopt this definition. Additionally, Haidt (2001) proposed “*the social intuitionist model*” of moral cognition, identifying moral judgment as a quick intuition that can be complemented by a slower process of reasoning if needed. According to Haidt, moral intuition should be seen as a cognitive process similar to perception due to its automatic nature, rather than processes like reflection or reasoning. This model defines moral judgment as having two parts; one intuitive component consisting of an unconscious emotional process; and one slower conscious reasoning component. This approach defines moral judgment as an implicit, emotion-based, and unconscious process (Haidt, 2001). Likewise, Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001) examined the influence of engaging emotional processes on moral judgment. To do so, they used fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) as participants answered what they would do in two traditional moral dilemmas:

*The trolley problem:* a trolley is headed toward five people who will be killed if the trolley continues its course. The only way to save them is if you pull a switch that changes the course of the trolley to an alternative track, where it will kill only one person. Should you change the trolley's course and kill one person for the benefit of five others?

*The footbridge problem:* You are standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge, in between the oncoming trolley and five people. This time, the only way to save them is if you push the stranger off the footbridge onto the tracks, which stops the trolley. Should you push this stranger to his death for the benefit of five others?

Greene et al. (2001) state that although both dilemmas lead to similar consequences, most people classified the trolley problem as morally permissible but not the footbridge

scenario. The authors describe the idea of pushing someone affects subjects' emotional processes more than the idea of pulling a switch. The fMRI results revealed neural activities in two distinguished brain structures associated with these moral dilemmas. When answering the trolley dilemma, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was activated, a brain region associated with cognitive control and working memory. Whereas answering the footbridge dilemma led to neural activity in the amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, a system in the brain associated with emotion. Thus, the study found that differences in emotional engagement can influence people's judgment and lead to a tendency to perceive similar cases vastly differently (Greene et al., 2001).

Furthermore, Cushman, Young, and Hauser (2006) investigated whether moral decision-making is guided by conscious reasoning or intuition. For doing so, they examined three moral dilemmas: whether harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by inaction, whether harm intended as a means to a goal is worse than harm expected as a side effect of a goal, and whether harm caused by physical contact is worse than harm involving no physical contact. The results suggested that some of the moral principles are available to conscious reasoning, while others operate intuitively. This shows that there is an interplay between reasoning processes and intuitive emotional responses in moral judgment; proposing that moral judgment is accomplished by multiple systems. That is, moral judgments cannot operate by either conscious reflection or intuition systems alone but rely on a combination (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006).

Studies above are aligned with another well-known approach that can describe the human mind and give a clear understanding of reasoning and an individual's moral intuitions; the "*dual-process theory*" proposed by Kahneman (2003). According to Kahneman, cognitive processes such as judgment, reasoning, and decision-making can be divided into two systems; *system 1*: an implicit, and *system 2*: an explicit system that continuously interacts with each other. Similarly to Greene and colleagues, and Cushman and colleagues, this theory characterizes the implicit system as automatic, effortless, fast, intuitive, and unconscious; the explicit system is characterized as controlled, effortful, slow, conscious, and as using logical operation. This model suggests different ways in which these two systems are more likely to respond when a decision or judgment is made. System 2 is more likely to be activated: a) when a situation is complex or unfamiliar to the subject and requires more deliberate thinking; b) when system 1 is inconsistent and makes errors due to recognized bias; and c) when system 1 is incapable of providing any intuitive response. In general, system 2 is more likely to override the intuitive judgment produced by system 1 (Kahneman, 2003).

## **Heuristics and framing effects**

Studies in psychology and neuroscience have long questioned the stability and reliability of our intuition by studying heuristics and framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), which can be defined as cognitive shortcuts, automatic strategies that help us make quick, easy decisions when we do not have access to all the necessary information to make a fully rational choice (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2015). Intuition can be affected by irrelevant external factors, for example how the situation is framed, the words chosen, or the perspective taken. Sinnott-Armstrong (2011) argued that instead of focusing on whether reason or emotion is the foundation of moral judgment, moral psychology should investigate the reliability of the beliefs themselves through framing effects. He claimed that reasoning depends on emotions, which themselves depend on cognitive reasoning. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, neither emotions nor reasoning is a reliable indicator. He suggests that using framing effects on moral judgments can reveal the reliability of these belief-forming processes; if they are less subject to framing effects, then they are more reliable, and vice versa (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2011). A popular example of simple yet powerful framing is how people are more likely to want to buy a lotto ticket if their chances are described as a 20% chance of winning rather than an 80% risk of losing, despite the meaning of the two being identical, pointing to an effect of the framing of the problem. Not surprisingly, moral intuition has been compared to optical illusions, both appearing spontaneously, strongly, and undeniably, while lingering in our experience even after deeper reflection. Petrinovich and O'Neill (1996) demonstrated the influence of various wording and framing effects on the response to moral dilemmas (Petrinovich and O'Neill, 1996).

One framing effect that has gained popularity in research is that of personal perspective, (i.e. if the situation is viewed from a first-person perspective (1PP) or third-person perspective (3PP)) which seems to have an effect on how moral decisions are made as well as the neural processes involved.

## **Neuroethics**

A central theory that could explain the effect of personal perspective framing is the *actor-observer bias*, which suggests that we attribute our own (actor) actions to external causes while we attribute other's (observers) actions to internal causes and hence tend to use different bases for assessment for 1PP and 3PP moral decisions.

Nadelhoffer and Feltz (2008) did a study looking at the actor-observer bias through the trolley problem with a 1PP and 3PP independent variable manipulation. They asked their subjects if they found it morally permissible to pull a switch in one of two conditions, 1PP (you

are an innocent bystander who happens to stand by the switch) or 3PP (“you” were replaced with “John”). The study found a dramatic effect of the actor-observer bias, showing that the participants evaluate their own or other’s actions hugely differently. 65% of the 1PP group found the action morally permissible while 90% of the 3PP group found the action permissible (Nadelhoffer and Feltz, 2008).

Likewise, neuroimaging studies have delved deeper into the mechanics of this effect and have shown differences in neural activation between 1PP and 3PP moral decision-making. Avram, Hennig-Fast, Bao, Pöppel, Reiser, Blautzik, Giordano, and Gutyrchik (2014) found that distributed over eight different moral situations presented in either a 1PP or 3PP perspective, 51% of the 3PP situations were judged as morally right, compared to 19% in the 1PP situations. They coupled the behavioral part of the study with an fMRI scan, as expected showing a vast amount of overlap between the conditions compared to during a non-moral decision-making task, but also some significant differences in neural activation between the 1PP and 3PP conditions. Overall activation was recorded primarily in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, and the 3PP condition stood out with additional activation in the visual cortex and hippocampus, possibly due to the hippocampus' role in inducing emotional responses and memory (Avram et al., 2014).

Correspondingly, the results of an fMRI study by Hirschfeld-Kroen, Jiang, Wasserman, Anzellotti, and Young (2021) showed that brain regions involved in the perception of harm to others respond differently in different situations, either when the participants were observing (3PP) or causing (1PP) harm. Further, they provided empirical support to the phenomenon of ‘*agent-regret*’ which has been explored in the philosophical literature, indicating that people tend to judge their own actions more harshly than when they would judge others in the same scenario.

Likewise, Berthoz, Grèzes, Armony, Passingham, and Dolan (2006) point to the possible anticipation of shame or guilt as mediated by the amygdala as an aspect of why subjects in the 1PP condition are more restrictive in what they deem morally permissible due to the potential anticipation of punishment or other forms of social retribution.

### **Aim of study and research questions**

Even though we might believe that we are moral agents, fair-minded and unbiased when it comes to making a judgment as an observer or a subject, empirical data seem to indicate that our moral intuition is not as reliable as one might think. This study aims to build on the existing literature comparing 1PP and 3PP framing with a new selection of various moral

dilemmas. We do not attempt to untangle the neural and psychological mechanisms of the actor-observer bias but will rather test the potential behavioral effect.

We base our hypothesis on previous studies and speculate that subjects in the 1PP condition will be significantly more restrictive in deeming the moral dilemmas permissible than subjects in the 3PP condition.

## **Methodology**

### **Subjects**

Due to restricted time and resources, we have gathered subjects primarily through our social media accounts, snowballing, and also through putting up posters around Lund and Gothenburg Universities. Two subjects were removed from the 3PP final data set due to apparent unseriousness; this was evident from the written motivations. The remaining sample was  $N = 42$  subjects between the groups, 27 women and 15 men. The 1PP group is slightly bigger, with 24 subjects, 19 of whom were women and 4 of whom were men, the average age in this group was 29.2 ( $SD = 11.6$ ) years. The 3PP group is somewhat smaller, consisting of 18 subjects: 8 women and 10 men with an average age of 30.7 ( $SD = 8.64$ ).

### **Materials**

Based on the literature surrounding framing effects and moral intuition and specifically the Avram et al. (2014) study, we have developed nine moral scenarios, which are all worded in either a first- or third-person perspective and accompanied by a scale of 1-8 of how morally permissible or reprehensible a certain action would be. The scale score was designed between 1-8 to “force” subjects to take a stand, omitting a neutral option; this is done in order to challenge subjects’ intuition.

Through a between-group study, we compared the means between the 1PP and 3PP groups using a Google Forms online questionnaire. The forms were in Swedish in their entirety. We developed two versions of the nine moral dilemmas (see Appendix A). The first one contained the written scenarios and the participants were asked to imagine that they were in the described situation (1PP) and faced with an action plan. The second version contained the same moral dilemmas with the difference that the participants were presented with the scenario as observers, (3PP), meaning they were asked to imagine if someone else, e.g. Simon or Ella, performed a moral action. The design of morally permissible and not permissible dilemmas was inspired by the ethical everyday life scenarios, which were set to make it easier for subjects to imagine themselves or someone else in those situations rather than deep and violent dilemmas in which participants, for example, have to decide whether killing one of their children for the benefit of the family or the village is morally justifiable.



We developed these nine scenarios with the intention of gauging a broad picture of a person's moral intuition and including dilemmas that vary between being social, economic, environmental, and health-related in nature. They also vary by being self-focused, i.e. would you cause moderate to severe inconvenience or psychological harm to another in order to fill your own needs; or outwardly focused, i.e. would you hinder another person from doing something morally shady by sacrificing your own convenience or social relationships.

## **Procedure**

After a small pilot study with eight people, we gathered subjects through flyers in places around Lund and Gothenburg Universities with one of two QR-codes linking directly to the forms. Additionally, we recruited participants through our personal social media accounts and snowballing. The data collection took place during the period (23/11-13/12 2023). Subjects were asked to participate alone, read the scenarios thoroughly, and answer the questions quickly following their intuition.

Depending on which QR-code participants scanned, they were taken to either the 1PP or 3PP survey. Subjects were asked first to read the introduction and ethical information (see Appendix B), and then informed consent was obtained as a prerequisite to continue. However, since giving away the research question might affect the answers, the introduction did not reveal to the subjects that there would be a comparison between 1PP and 3PP. Instead, it informed the subjects that we have set out to study moral intuition and explained in detail that they will be presented with nine moral dilemmas and asked to judge how morally permissible they find a certain moral action on a scale of 1-8 where 1 was fully morally acceptable and 8 fully morally reprehensible. After giving consent the participants could click to the next page which gathers the demographic variables of age, gender, and occupation.

Following these introductory two pages were ten pages of moral dilemmas in the form of short written scenarios, the pages were separated from each other. Each of the nine scenarios began with a short backstory written in a few sentences and concluded by describing an action that constituted a moral dilemma. Subjects were asked to rank how morally permissible or not morally permissible their intuition found the action. Additionally, they were asked to briefly motivate their answers with a short-written motivation at the bottom of the same page. This text motivation can give us a clue as to if the participants stayed true to viewing the dilemma from the stated perspective, or if for example the 3PP participants automatically moved into a 1PP, placing themselves into the actor role. Succeeding the dilemmas, the participants are met with a final page consisting of a voluntary evaluation where we asked the participants to rate whether they thought the chosen dilemmas were good in testing their moral intuition.

## **Ethics**

Since the data collection has taken place entirely online and we have not collected any personal information we can guarantee anonymity for all subjects. Furthermore, the nature of the study means that we did not handle any sensitive personal information. Prior to starting, all subjects received information about the study, their anonymity, that we did not trace any answers to them personally, and their right to terminate their participation at any time.

In designing our dilemmas, the local Ethics Committee guidelines were followed, and we did not use any dilemmas involving any risk of psychological harm or discomfort to the study participants. Therefore, any kind of dilemma related to killing or harming someone, such as the trolley problem was avoided. Additionally, much of everyday moral judgments consist of simple principles, rather than unusual problems. Although classic moral dilemmas in which the outcome is based on the consideration of whether to kill or save someone are important, we aim to use potential moral dilemmas related to scenarios we encounter in everyday life that challenge our moral intuitions. Correspondingly, Sunstein's (2005) view the use of moral dilemmas such as the sacrificial and exotic problems associated with the trolley problem or the footbridge problem as important in revealing the underlying structure of moral judgments. However, these types of dilemmas are rarely if ever encountered in ordinary life and therefore less relevant in researching everyday moral intuition (Sunstein, 2005).

## **Results**

Jamovi (version 2.3.21.0) was used in the data analysis. An independent samples t-test was performed to compare the moral intuition of participants subjected to a first- or third-person framing of nine moral dilemmas (see Table 1). For the dependent variable, a mean of all nine dilemmas from each person was combined into an average score per participant. The alpha level was set at .05. The results did not show a significant difference in how morally permissible the actions were found when looking at the means over all nine dilemmas between the 3PP group ( $M = 3.77$ ,  $SD = 0.864$ ) and the 1PP group ( $M = 3.31$ ,  $SD = 0.654$ );  $t(40) = 1.959$ ,  $p = 0.057$  (see Figure 1). The t-test pointed to a small difference between the groups, where the 1PP participants are on average slightly more restrictive in deeming an action morally permissible than the 3PP participants, as predicted in our hypothesis, although the p-value is slightly above the alpha level at  $p = .05$ .

Subsequently, nine separate t-tests were conducted to see if any single one of the dilemmas provided a significant difference in how morally permissible an action was deemed based on if the situation is framed as 1PP or 3PP. Only one of these tests, dilemma three showed a significant result,  $t(40) = 2.420$ ,  $p = 0.020$ . However, the data of this particular dilemma was

not normally distributed and did not attain homoscedasticity ( $p = 0.03$ ) and was thus not acknowledged as a significant result.

**Table 1**

*The independent sample t-tests to compare the moral intuition between 1PP and 3PP participants*


	<i>t</i> -value	df	p
Dilemma 1	-1.03	40	0.31
Dilemma 2	0.99	40	0.32
Dilemma 3	2.42 <sup>a</sup>	40	0.02
Dilemma 4	0.12 <sup>a</sup>	40	0.91
Dilemma 5	-0.63	40	0.53
Dilemma 6	1.95	40	0.06
Dilemma 7	0.17	40	0.86
Dilemma 8	0.71	40	0.09
Dilemma 9	1.56	40	0.13
Combined all means	1.96	40	0.06

*Note.*  $H_a \mu_1 \neq \mu_2$

<sup>a</sup> Levene's test is significant ( $p < .5$ ), suggesting a violation of the assumption for equal variances

**Figure 1**

*A graph showing the participants' mean responses in the 1PP and 3PP group*



*Note.* The scatter line illustrates moral permissibility evaluations in both conditions.

In the 3PP group (N = 18), a total of 162 data points were collected over the nine scenarios. To conclude each dilemma the participants were asked to provide a short voluntary comment or motivation for their ranking. The prime purpose of this was so that we could evaluate if the 3PP subjects gave their answers with a third-person perspective in mind or if they automatically would fall into a 1PP, imagining themselves in the situation. 160 such answers were recorded, 105 of which are clearly 3PP coded, using wording like “she should...”, “Johanna should...”, “he ought to...”, 55 of which are neutrally worded, often in very brief sentences, where no pronouns are used but the participant refers to general principles. None of the answers suggested that the 3PP participant had adopted a 1PP stance.

### **Discussion**

This study did not find any significant difference in how morally permissible a set of moral actions were deemed based on whether the action was presented in a 1PP or 3PP. The result does not support the hypothesis that individuals' perspective influences their moral intuition when faced with moral dilemmas in ordinary situations, where it is not very difficult to imagine oneself. The limited sample size and small difference in mean values between the

groups translates to poor statistical power, signifying that the design and execution of the study are lacking in construction and resources. The sample size of  $N = 42$  divided into two groups is inadequate when we are dealing with a somewhat confounded and most definitely complex topic such as moral intuition. Additionally, the recorded mean differences are very small, with 0.46 data points on an 8-point scale. It is possible that personal differences and other aspects of the dilemmas and the way they were framed affected the participants' choices more than the personal perspective framing. Since our result is very close to being significant one can speculate that a larger sample size and thus better statistical power might have been effective in balancing out the many inevitable variables like these adding noise, allowing the study to isolate the independent perspective variable in a more successful manner. In a small study like this one, there is a high probability that some other factor, or combination of factors, other than personal perspective has had a greater impact on the final result than the independent variable. Therefore, we cannot distinguish whether the personal perspective affected the subject's intuition based on these results and the hypothesis that subjects who have a 1PP will be more restrictive in evaluating a given moral action than subjects who evaluate others is not supported.

Contrary to previous work on the nature of moral judgment (Avram et al., 2014; Nadelhoffer and Feltz, 2008; Hirschfeld-Kroen et al., 2021; Berthoz et al., 2006), our results do not show with any certainty that individuals' perspective influences their moral intuition in these scenarios.

The lack of a significant result can also be a signifier that there might not be any result to be found. A possible explanation for the lack of a significant result could be the more typical nature of the dilemmas chosen for this study, unlike the classic, more violent, more difficult, and more distant scenarios like the trolley or footbridge dilemma. We note that the differences in the design of moral dilemmas used in previous work may have deeply influenced subjects' perspectives and successfully manipulated their moral judgment. Although we predicted that individuals' perspectives could influence their moral judgment, the results of our study could be interpreted as follows: "If we decide that an action is morally permissible for someone else, then we can also judge that it is morally permissible for us to do the same, and vice versa." Although more, larger scale research is needed, this gives us some reason to investigate whether moral intuition in both 1PP and 3PP follows largely the same standards and is consistent with each other when dealing with everyday moral dilemmas.

Furthermore, our study was not able to identify the influence of the actor-observer bias as examined by Nadelhoffer and Feltz (2008). That is, we did not find any significant assessments of either attributing behaviors of others, 3PP, to internal bases or attributing own

behavior, 1PP, to external bases. Thus, we cannot identify if participants' perspectives can be attributed to some deeper discrepancy in the way they judge their own and other's behavior. On the contrary, based on the voluntary comments, we notice that sometimes subjects evaluated these moral dilemmas by imagining themselves being affected by the decisions made in the dilemmas, like "I wouldn't like that if it would happen to me", showing clear signs of empathy and consistency in moral judgment over perspective borders.

As has been shown crucial in previous studies (Cushman et al., 2006; Haidt, 2001; Greene et al., 2001; Kahnman, 2003), what we refer to as moral intuition, the emotionally based, intuitive, quick, subconscious part of our moral cognition is only a part of the moral cognitive function. This is the part that can be manipulated by emotional or heuristic suggestions and framing. This study relies on participants operating on that quick intuition rather than adopting careful thinking. Subjects were asked to participate alone, read the scenarios thoroughly, and answer the questions quickly following their intuition. However, the main weakness of this study is that we cannot verify whether this fundamental request has been fulfilled due to its online nature. Moreover, we note that after being asked to rank the morality of an action,, subjects were asked to motivate their answer, which might have led subjects to deeper reflection and reconsideration. Thus, changing their responses because they were asked to justify them, possibly affecting the results. The research suggests that heuristic systems take over when quick or low-effort decisions are required or we lack certain information to make a fully informed decision, as a result, our actions can be shaped by quick and irrational responses instead of conscious reasoning and careful evaluation. In this study, while setting out to capture the heuristic-based intuition, a weakness is likely the design which catered more to careful reasoning than intended.

As noted in the results, the short-written motivations of the participants in the 3PP condition suggested that the participants mentally remained in 3PP throughout their answering process, implying that the division between the perspectives we set out to investigate was clear.

In sum, when it comes to moral dilemmas that concern people's daily lives, the individuals' perspectives did not have a significant influence on moral judgments and intuition in this particular study. Nevertheless, we are unable to determine whether moral intuition, either in the first or in the third person perspective, is inspired by our instinctive feelings or careful reasoning. Although other studies have shown that moral intuition is subject to error and bias, our results do not reveal any significant influence of the framing effect, the actor-observer bias, or the agent-regret, although future studies with higher statistical power might produce other results.

## **Limitations**

As with any study in psychology, ours is not without its limitations. The small sample size is a glaring limitation in this particular study, making it hard to detect any possible differences. Furthermore, in designing this study, we opted for an online Google Forms questionnaire and the data collection took place via our own social media accounts and on the Gothenburg and Lund University campuses in order to reach as many people as possible within the limitations and restraints of time and resources. This method of recruitment has given us rather homogenous groups which has some clear limitations in allowing for generalisability to a larger population, which we do not attempt to do, although, none of the previous research we have encountered has drawn any attention to possible distinctions due to demographic variables. Since this was an online study, even though we did ask the participants to answer alone and independent of the influence of others, we have no way of verifying this due to the online nature of the study. Another limitation is when designing our dilemmas, we opted for a survey that in total would not take more than around ten minutes for the participants to finish, this compromised how comprehensive the scenario descriptions could be. More detailed, and a greater selection of dilemmas could have influenced our findings. Furthermore, the subjects' ethical views and moral perspectives were not assessed prior to this study, which may have affected how they responded to moral dilemmas.

The main limitation of this study might be the inability to isolate the participants' quick, emotional intuition when answering and might instead have triggered deeper more reflective reasoning, thus erasing some of the emotional automatic response. This is likely due to the dilemmas chosen, and the length and complexity of them. Shorter, less detailed dilemmas might have been more conducive to generating an intuitive response, but in doing so also sacrificing some of the relatability and believability of the scenarios.

## **Future research**

We have high hopes for the future of moral cognition research, especially studies looking at the type of "every day", and somewhat relatable moral dilemmas. As aforementioned, the main limitation in the design of this study seems to have been the inability to fully isolate the automatic emotional intuition rather than letting careful reasoning take over. However, for a better understanding of the effects of personal perspective on an individual's moral intuition, it would be productive for other studies to use other methodologies or designs that, possibly through time pressure, force the participants to rely on their initial intuitive responses. Although we do see potential in this field of testing everyday situations, possibly through other modes of delivery, for example, visual dilemmas from a first- or third-person

perspective could exacerbate the difference in perspective while giving a more true-to-life experience for the participant. Additionally, pretesting and thus accounting for the participant's moral identity through a set of moral questions could facilitate the accounting for the effect of personal differences. Finally, it seems to be beneficial for future studies to increase the number of subjects.



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## Appendix A

### Moralisk intuition frågeformulär:

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#### **Demografiska frågor:**

1. Vad är din könsidentitet?
  - Kvinna
  - Man
  - Annat
  - Vill inte uppge
2. Hur gammal är du?
3. Vad är din huvudsysselsättning?
  - Studerande
  - Anställd
  - Egenföretagare
  - Inget
  - Annat/vill inte uppge

#### **First-person framing:**

1. Föreställ dig att du är på väg hem en eftermiddag och hittar en plånbok på marken. När du öppnar den hittar du ett ID samt flera kreditkort och ganska mycket kontanter. Det finns ingen annan ute på gatan. Du har nyligen stött på ekonomiska svårigheter och pengarna skulle kunna lösa några av dina problem. Du kan välja mellan att försöka hitta personen, lämna plånboken orörd där du hittade den eller behålla så mycket pengar du behöver.

För dig att behålla pengarna är:

- a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)
  - i. Vad skulle du göra i den här situationen? Motivera kort varför du har valt att agera på det sättet.

2. Föreställ dig att din bästa vän är åtalad för att ha rånat en butik. Han lovar att han är oskyldig men har inget alibi och det ser ut som att han kommer åka dit utan det. Han ber dig vittna om att han varit hemma hos dig den kvällen trots att det inte är sant. Du tror på din vän och vill gärna hjälpa honom men tycker att det känns lite fel att ljuga i rätten. Att ljuga och säga att vännen var hemma hos dig är:

- a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)
  - i. Vad skulle du göra i den här situationen? Motivera kort varför du har valt att agera på det sättet.

3. Föreställ dig att du precis tagit examen. En vän från din klass berättar att han har sökt en tjänst i ett välkänt företag och frågar dig om han kan använda dig som referens på sitt CV. Du läser på om företaget och inser att det är perfekt för dig och ansöker om samma position. För att maximera din chans att få jobbet kan du underdriva din väns kompetenser lite när företaget ringer upp dig som referens. Att underdriva din väns kompetens för att öka dina egna chanser att få jobbet är:

- a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)
  - i. Vad skulle du göra i den här situationen? Motivera kort varför du har valt att agera på det sättet.

4. Det kom en stor nyhet om att ett populärt snabbmodeföretag som säljer lågpriskläder har ljugit om att de återvinner gamla kläder. I verkligheten dumpas kläderna utanför olika städer runt i Afrika och bidrar markant till nedskräpning i

området. Föreställ dig att du tycker väldigt mycket om företagets kläder och vill gärna fortsätta handla från dem. För dig att fortsätta handla från företaget är:

- a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)
  - i. Vad skulle du göra i den här situationen? Motivera kort varför du har valt att agera på det sättet.

5. Tänk dig att du har två bröder, Adam och Gustav. Adam är entusiastisk över en ny affärsmöjlighet: han har köpt flera kilo proteintillskott och gymtillbehör som han tänker sälja vidare till andra personer och hoppas tjäna mycket pengar på. Adam vill övertyga Gustav att han också borde investera. Du, som har hållit dig utanför situationen, funderar på att varna Gustav för det Adam beskriver och vara uppmärksam på pyramidspel. Om du inte gör något finns det en stor risk att Gustav kommer förlora mycket pengar. Men om du lägger dig i kommer din relation till Adam påverkas hårt. Att inte varna Gustav är:

- a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)
  - i. Vad skulle du göra i den här situationen? Motivera kort varför du har valt att agera på det sättet.

6. Föreställ dig att du behöver ett läkemedel som är svårt att få tag på i Sverige och som hade inneburit flera månader i leveranstid. Din vän som bor i USA kan enkelt hitta medicinen och ta med den när han kommer på besök nästa vecka. Men då kommer han behöver ljuga för tullen vilket medför en liten risk. För dig att be din vän om han kan ta med din medicin är:

- a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)

- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)
  - i. Vad skulle du göra i den här situationen? Motivera kort varför du har valt att agera på det sättet.

7. Föreställ dig att du fick ditt drömjobb i ett välkänt och respekterat företag och du efter lite tid lyckades bygga goda relationer med dina kollegor och din chef. En dag märker du att viss viktig information har missrepresenterats i årsrapporten. Efter att ha grävt djupare kommer du fram till att din chef är inblandad i korruption. Du kan avslöja sanningen, men din chef kommer inte bara förlora sitt jobb utan antagligen hamna i fängelse, och du kommer bli utfrysad från arbetsplatsen, eller så kan du behålla sanningen för dig själv. Att inte anmäla din upptäckt är:

- a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)
  - i. Vad skulle du göra i den här situationen? Motivera kort varför du har valt att agera på det sättet.

8. Föreställ dig att det är Jul och du kunde ha åkt hem till din familj och firat, men du kände att du var tvungen att stanna i studentlägenheten och plugga hårt inför ett viktigt prov som kommer avgöra om du får ett stipendium och kan plugga vidare det du älskar. Under provet ser du din nära vän kopiera svar från ett gömt papper. Du vet att du måste få bäst betyg i klassen för att få stipendium och funderar på om du ska anmäla din vän men vännen kommer då veta att det var du som anmälde. Att anmäla din bästa vän för fusk är:

- a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)

- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)
  - i. Vad skulle du göra i den här situationen? Motivera kort varför du har valt att agera på det sättet.

8. Föreställ dig att du är ute och fikar med några vänner när du råkar se din pappa med en annan kvinna. Du blir förskräckt och konfronterar honom. Han blir jätteledsen och rädd och menar att det var ett misstag och ber dig att inte säga något till din mamma eller din 6-åriga syster. Du vet att mamman hade velat skilja sig om det kom fram och vill inte splittra familjen. Att inte säga något till din mamma är:

- a. 1 (Helt moralisk förkastligt)
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)
  - i. Vad skulle du göra i den här situationen? Motivera kort varför du har valt att agera på det sättet.

**Tredje-person framing:**

1. En eftermiddag är Johanna på väg hem och hittar en plånbok på marken. När hon öppnar den hittar hon ett ID samt flera kreditkort och ganska mycket kontanter. Det finns ingen annan ute på gatan. Johanna har nyligen stött på ekonomiska svårigheter och pengarna skulle kunna lösa några av hennes problem. Hon kan välja mellan att försöka hitta personen, lämna plånboken orörd eller behålla bara så mycket pengar hon behöver. För Johanna att behålla pengarna i situationen är:
- a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)
  - b. 2

- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)

i. Vad tycker du att Johanna bör göra i den här situationen? Motivera kort varför du tycker så.

2. Evas bästa vän är åtalad för att ha rånat en butik. Han lovar att han är oskyldig men har inget alibi och det ser ut som att han kommer åka dit utan det. Han ber Eva vittna om att han varit hemma hos henne den kvällen trots att det inte är sant. Eva tror på sin vän och vill gärna hjälpa honom men tycker att det känns lite fel att ljuga i rätten. För Eva att ljuga och säga att vännen var hemma hos henne är:

- a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)

i. Motivera kort hur tycker du att Eva bör agera i den här situationen.

3. Louise har precis tagit examen. En vän från hennes klass berättar att hon har sökt en tjänst i ett välkänt företag och frågar om hon kan använda henne som referens på sitt CV. Louise läser på om företaget och inser att det är perfekt för henne och ansöker om samma position. För att maximera sin chans att få jobbet kan hon underdriva sin väns kompetens lite när företaget ringer upp henne som referens. För Louise att underdriva sin väns kompetens för att öka sina egna chanser att få jobbet är:

- a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6



g. 7

h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)

i. Motivera kort hur du tycker att Louise bör agera i den här situationen.

4. Det kom en stor nyhet om att ett populärt snabbmodeföretag som säljer lågpriskläder har ljugit om att de återvinner gamla kläder. I verkligheten dumpas kläderna utanför olika städer runt i Afrika och bidrar markant till nedskräpning i området. Många tycker väldigt mycket om företagets kläder. Att fortsätta handla från företaget är:

a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)

b. 2

c. 3

d. 4

e. 5

f. 6

g. 7

h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)

i. Hur tycker du att folk bör agera på en sådan nyhet?

5. Leila har två bröder, Adam och Gustav. Adam är entusiastisk över en ny affärsmöjlighet: Han har köpt flera kilo proteintillskott och gymtillbehör som han tänker sälja vidare till andra personer och tror han kommer tjäna mycket pengar på. Adam vill övertyga Gustav att han också borde investera. Leila, som har hållit sig utanför situationen, funderar på att varna Gustav för det Adam beskriver och vara uppmärksam på pyramidspel. Om hon inte gör något finns det en stor risk att Gustav kommer förlora mycket pengar. Men om hon lägger sig i kommer relationen till Adam påverkas hårt. Att inte varna Gustav är:

a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)

b. 2

c. 3

d. 4

e. 5

f. 6

g. 7

h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)

i. Motivera kort hur du tycker att Leila bör agera i situationen.

6. Peter behöver ett läkemedel som är svårt att få tag på i Sverige och har flera månaders leveranstid. Hans vän som bor i USA kan enkelt hitta medicinen och ta med den när han kommer på besök nästa vecka. Men då kommer han behöver ljuga för tullen vilket medför en liten risk. För Peter att be sin vän ta med medicinen är:

a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)

b. 2

c. 3

d. 4

e. 5

f. 6

g. 7

h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)

i. Motivera kort hur du tycker att Peter bör agera.

7. Walter har precis fått sitt drömjobb i ett välkänt och respekterat företag och har efter lite tid lyckades bygga goda relationer med sina kollegor och sin chef. En dag märker han att viss viktig information har missrepresenterats i årsrapporten. Efter att ha grävt djupare kommer han fram till att chefen är inblandad i korrupktion. Walter kan avslöja sanningen, men då kommer hans chef inte bara förlora sitt jobb utan antagligen hamna i fängelse, och Walter kommer bli utfryst från arbetsplatsen, eller så kan han behålla sanningen för dig själv. För Walter att inte anmäla sin upptäckt i den här situationen är:

a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)

b. 2

c. 3

d. 4

e. 5

f. 6

g. 7

h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)

i. Motivera kort hur du tycker att Walter bör agera:

8. Det är Jul och Simon kunde ha åkt hem till sin familj och firat, men han kände att han var tvungen att stanna i studentlägenheten och plugga hårt inför ett viktigt prov som kommer avgöra om han får ett stipendium och kan plugga vidare det han älskar. Under provet ser han sin nära vän kopiera svar från ett gömt papper. Simon vet att han måste få bäst betyg i klassen för att få stipendium och funderar på om han ska anmäla sin vän men vännen kommer då veta att det var Simon som anmälde. För Simon att anmäla sin fuskande vän är:

- a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)

i. Motivera kort hur du tycker att Simon bör agera.

9. Ellen är ute och fikar med några vänner när hon råkar se sin pappa med en annan kvinna. Hon blir förskräckt och konfronterar honom. Han blir jätteledsen och rädd och menar att det var ett misstag och ber Ellen att inte säga något till sin mamma eller sin 6-åriga syster. Ellen vet att mamman hade velat skilja sig om det kom fram och vill inte splittra familjen. För Ellen att inte säga något till sin mamma är:

- a. 1 (Helt moraliskt förkastligt)
- b. 2
- c. 3
- d. 4
- e. 5
- f. 6
- g. 7
- h. 8 (Helt moraliskt acceptabelt)

i. Motivera kort hur du tycker att Ellen bör agera.

## Appendix B

Vi är två studenter på den psykologiska institutionen på Lunds Universitet som just nu arbetar på en kandidatuppsats med fokus på moralisk intuition.

Deltagandet i den här studien är helt frivilligt, det innebär att du kan när som helst avbryta genom att stänga ner webbläsaren.

Du är helt anonym och all data analyseras endast på gruppnivå, vilket innebär att svaren kan inte kopplas till dig som person. Svaren kommer inte användas i annat än utbildningssyfte. Vi kommer inte samla in några personuppgifter.

Studien tar ungefär 10 minuter.

Du kommer bli ombedd att läsa 9 olika korta moraliska dilemman och baserat på din intuition avgöra om du tycker att en handling är moraliskt acceptabel på en skala från 1-8. Inget svar är rätt eller fel utan välj det alternativ du tycker passar bäst.

Vi ber dig göra studien ensam.

Tack för ditt deltagande! Om du har några frågor kan du hör av dig till oss:

- e-post: [sa1516mo-s@student.lu.se](mailto:sa1516mo-s@student.lu.se)
- e-post: [pe8083ol-s@student.lu.se](mailto:pe8083ol-s@student.lu.se)

Genom att fortsätta samtycker du till att delta i studien och bekräftar följande:

- Du är minst 16 år gammal
- Du har fått information om studien
- Du förstår att ditt deltagande är helt frivilligt och du kan avbryta deltagandet när som helst utan några konsekvenser
- Du har möjligheten att ställa frågor

Sara & Petra