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Right, Left or Both?

**Analyzing Populist Frames in the National
Consultations of Viktor Orbán's FIDESZ Party
between 2011 and 2023**

Anna Dorina Szabó
Master in European Affairs
May 2024

Abstract:

Viktor Orbán's FIDESZ is often referred to in academia as a right-wing populist political party. However, stemming from Hungary's history of being dominated by outside powers and having been under communist rule for fifty years, this thesis argues that the nature of FIDESZ's communication strategy could be heavily influenced by left-wing populist ideals. This thesis seeks to investigate populist arguments used in national consultations, which are referendums periodically sent out to each household via post, asking the opinions of people on the newest social issues on the party's agenda. The questions in the consultations are often manipulated in a way that they would deliver the desired result through which the party can legitimize its political actions. The narratives used in consultations show a nuanced picture of the ideological characteristics of FIDESZ's communication strategy. The research question is thus the following: *What is FIDESZ's ideological profile in its communication in national consultations between 2011 and 2023?* The theoretical framework of this thesis applies the ideational approach to populism to formulate the hypothesis used in answering the question. Through qualitative content analysis of the populist frames used in national consultations, the findings illustrate how the party applies both left-wing and right-wing populist narratives almost equally in national consultations. This indicates that FIDESZ uses narratives in national consultations regardless of their ideological components, focusing only on framing social issues in a way which would result in popular support from society.

Key words: Hungary, FIDESZ, populism, framing, national consultations

Word count: 19.756

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1. Introduction

1.1. The Ideological Puzzle: Hungary's National Consultations

This thesis seeks to illustrate how the Hungarian FIDESZ (*Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége*) party frames its questions alongside the characteristics of left- and right-wing populism in their regularly released national consultations, sent out to every household. The aim of national consultations is to draw attention to the most pressing issues in Hungarian society and to gain political legitimacy through their result. The narratives used by FIDESZ in national consultations have been in constant change in the timeline between 2011 and 2023, however there are some recurring themes along which arguments can be categorized.

On many occasions, Viktor Orbán's FIDESZ party is used as an example of a right-wing populist party in contemporary literature on the rise of populism in Europe (Gandesha, 2018; Iliakova & Tushev, 2020; Csehi, 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Rogers, 2019; Csehi & Zgut, 2020; De Vries et al., 2021; Szebeni & Salojärvi, 2022). FIDESZ has been openly critical of immigration (Csehi & Zgut, 2020), portrays itself as the protector of traditional conservative values in Europe (Benczes, 2016; Norris, Inglehart, 2019) is fearful of losing national sovereignty and increasingly nationalistic (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Viktor Orbán, 2023). Consequently, it is quite striking how the 2023 national consultation on the new Sovereignty Act heavily relies on narratives which would traditionally be associated with left-wing populism.

According to Cas Mudde, populism is a 'thin-centered ideology' (Freedon, 2006) that believes society to be separated into two groups, the 'pure people' and the 'corrupt elite', where politics should be an expression of the general will (Mudde, 2004; Copelovitch & Pevehouse 2019). Populism as a 'thin' ideology needs to be combined with other ideologies, therefore it can appear both in left- and right-wing forms (Stanley, 2008).

FIDESZ fits the characteristics of a right-wing populist party (Pytlas, 2018; Iliakova & Tushev, 2020), however I argue that stemming from the country's communist past (Benczes, 2016), more emphasis should be put on the possible left-wing populist influence on the government's communication. Previous literature has drawn attention towards left-wing populist tendencies of political parties in Central-Eastern Europe (Benczes, 2016; Engler et al.,

2019). The thesis's aim is to illustrate this phenomenon, by examining the narratives FIDESZ is using in national consultations.

While literature is abundant on populism in Hungary (*see above*), very few articles analyze the arguments in national consultations in-depth, and even if they do, they usually concentrate on only one consultation, instead of examining all of them at once (Demeter, 2019; Melegh et al., 2019; Svensson et al., 2022).

In the present case, national consultations are referendums containing questions, which are orchestrated in a way, that they would deliver a biased result, in favor of the ruling party's narrative (Pállinger, 2022). Since 2010, there have been 13 consultations. Svensson points out that the results of the referendums do not really have any binding effects on Hungarian politics, they rather only serve as an illusion that ordinary citizens have a say in government affairs, which plays into the populist agenda of the FIDESZ party (Svensson et al., 2022).



Figure 1: Billboard depicting Ursula von der Leyen and Alexander Soros, November 2023

“*We should not dance the way they whistle*” – reads the billboard as seen on *Figure 1*, promoting the national consultation of 2023, depicting Ursula von der Leyen and Alexander Soros. The referendum, released in November 2023, contains 11 yes-or-no questions relating to the new Sovereignty Act, which has entered into force in March 2024 (Tóth, 2023). According to the ruling party's communication, the aim of the Sovereignty Act is to protect Hungarian politics from outside influences, therefore reducing the possibilities of political parties and media outlets to receive funding from abroad. A Sovereignty Protection Office has

been created in the framework of the law, which has the right to investigate anyone who is accused of endangering the sovereignty of Hungary (Magyar Közlöny, 2023; Cseke & Nagy, 2023). Critics fear that this could potentially be used to target opposition parties and independent media outlets (Miller, 2023).

Based on the analysis of the 2023 national consultation, I deduct three broad categories the arguments used in questions can be sorted into. In the first category, Hungary is framed as a *welfare state*, acting only in the financial interest of its citizens, which is often contested by the European Union. The second category frames Hungary as a *protector* of the nation and traditional values. The third category relates to Hungary being a *colony* of the European Union, where they are subject to double standards and oppression. More details on the frames the government uses to situate Hungary in the questionnaires will follow in the methodology section of this thesis.

1.2. Objectives

This thesis seeks to study the nature of populist narratives used in national consultations between 2011 and 2023. Although the national consultations in their current form were first released in 2010, this particular questionnaire was not accessible online, therefore the analysis begins from 2011. The presence of both right-wing and left-wing populist arguments are examined, which can provide a unique glance into the FIDESZ party's communication strategy.

The investigation the thesis seeks to carry out can lead to a new interpretation of populism in Hungary by closely examining the ideological components the government uses to frame social issues in consultations. National consultations provide ground to illustrate that Viktor Orbán's FIDESZ party's communication may not be solely right-wing populist. Examining FIDESZ, and whether the influence of both left- and right-wing populism are present in its political communication, can contribute to further research on populist parties in countries with similar historical backgrounds, mainly in Central-Eastern Europe.

Therefore, my research question is the following: *What is FIDESZ's ideological profile in its communication in national consultations between 2011 and 2023?*

1.3. Overview

The thesis is structured as follows. First, an introductory background will be presented on what constitutes left- and right-wing populism, which will be followed by literature on populism in Central-Eastern Europe and then in Hungary. Moving on, the theoretical framework of the ideational approach to populism will be introduced and explained. This will be followed by the presentation of national consultations, on which the analysis will be done in later parts of the thesis. The methodology section of this thesis provides an introduction to framing and the frames that will be used to code national consultations, as well as an overview of the coding protocol, data collection and the limitations of this analysis. Textual qualitative content analysis will be used as the method of this study, conducted on national consultations in a coding software. Finally, this will be followed by the analysis of results, which will include an answer to what these findings mean in relation to the research question and the hypothesis.

2. Exploring Left- and Right-Populism: A Literature Review

This thesis examines the communication strategy of FIDESZ, focusing on the left- and right-wing populist arguments used by the ruling party in the national consultations. In order to be able to differentiate between the two, this chapter will commence with a summary of what constitutes left- and right-wing populism. The differences in literature between the two wings will be then applied to Central-Eastern Europe, followed by an introduction to the Hungarian case, where both left- and right-wing populist narratives can be successful tools in gaining popular support due to the country's unique historical experiences.

2.1. Populist Paradigms: Left vs. Right

This thesis applies Cas Mudde's definition of populism, where populism "*is an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people*" (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Populism is a 'thin-centered' ideology, therefore it can only provide answers to crucial political questions, if it is accompanied by a host ideology, either from the political left or right (Stanley,

2008; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Ideology significantly shapes how political parties relate to various subdimensions of liberal democracy (Huber & Schimpf, 2017). However, independent of their host ideology, there is one thing that all populists agree on: they are not satisfied with the current political elite and establishment, because the corrupt elites are working against the interest of the ordinary people (Huber & Schimpf, 2017; March, 2017; Ostiguy & Casullo, 2017).

The difference between left- and right-wing populist parties will be illustrated in this thesis based on who they see as the *enemy*, the *people* and what they mean by *general will*.

Antagonism is one of the key features of the communication of a populist party (Ostiguy & Casullo, 2017). Populist leaders need to emphasize that they can protect the people from risks of instability and disorder (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). In terms of defining the *enemy*, right-wing populism personalizes the enemy and transforms the insecurity and anxiety of its voters into fear to gain support (Pytlas, 2018; Hawkins et al, 2019; Sata & Karolewski, 2019). Right-wing populists seek to protect the members of their group from external enemies on a cultural ground, defining terrorism, migration or left-liberal values as threats from the ‘others’ (March, 2017; Gandesha, 2018).

Left-wing populists attribute their voters’ insecurity to processes which have led to the erosion of the welfare state. Left-wing populists blame social structures for injustices (Otjes & Louwse, 2013), trying to protect the people from the corrupt, capitalist elite who tries to exploit them (Huber & Schimpf, 2017; Gandesha, 2018).

Another important component of Mudde’s definition of populism is the *people*. Populists attribute great value to group conformity, emphasizing the importance of the ‘Us’ (Norris & Inglehart, 2019), the ‘pure people’ (Otjes & Louwse, 2013). Left-wing populism is an inclusionary ideology, addressing several groups of people, who are threatened by the elite (Gagnon et al., 2018), while right-wing populism is exclusionary (Otjes & Louwse, 2013; Gandesha, 2017; Huber & Schimpf, 2017; March, 2017; Ostiguy & Casullo, 2017). Right-wing populist parties focus on identity, defining the members of their groups based on a cultural, nativist base (Ostiguy & Casullo, 2017; Pytlas, 2018; Macaluy, 2019). Instead of referring to the citizens of a given country as ‘people’, they imagine a ‘heartland’ of the worthy, who can be members of their constructed group (Otjes & Louwse, 2013; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017).

Populists claim that they represent the “will of the people” in a political system, where the elite has failed to act in the interest of the citizens and does not recognize the real problems they

face (Otjes & Louwarse, 2013). They are the only legitimate source of political authority, since they have been elected by the people, and they work for the people (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Therefore, populists usually support direct democratic mechanisms, such as referendums (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017).

Groups of people in a country who feel neglected by new modern political developments can be prone to vote for a populist party, because they believe that through the election of their preferred leader, their interests would finally be considered (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Meyer & Wagner, 2020). Traditionalists have suffered from long-term demographic shifts and rapid social change, which has resulted in the erosion of the world they once knew. They therefore seek an answer, that populists seemingly could provide (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Left-wing populists see the struggle of ‘the people’ to be rewarded with a better, more inclusive future, while right-wing populists long for the pure, ‘golden’ past (Ostiguy & Casullo, 2017; Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

2.2. Populism in Central-Eastern Europe

This section illustrates how the unique historical experience of the Central-Eastern European (CEE) region provides ground for the development of new forms of populist parties. Some view these as centrist-populist parties, while others have drawn attention to the emergence of anti-establishment political movements in the region, which have the sole aim to fight against the current elite, without any specific political ideology (Engler, 2020).

The CEE case provides a unique glance into how populist parties evolve in a society (Pytlas, 2018). Countries in this region, despite their growing economies and their EU membership, have provided a fruitful ground for populism to flourish (Norris & Inglehart, 2020). National political contexts are strongly shaped by regional developments, therefore populist actors in a specific region or time period can be very similar, such as radical left-wing populists in Latin-America, or a growing number of right-wing populist parties in Europe (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017).

Categorizing populist parties into either right- or left-wing branches of populism can prove to be rather difficult in CEE, therefore literature often coins them as centrist-populist (Engler et al., 2019; Engler, 2020). The communist regimes in these countries have provided the people with more economic equality than the current system, but also suppressed public dissent. After the regime change, political parties advocated for free markets and democratic openings (Marks

et al., 2006) and the population was hoping for a smooth transformation from communism to liberal democracy. However, in many countries, people have realized by the early 2000s that the salvation promised by the regime change never actually came (Csigó & Merkovity, 2016; Engler, 2020; Enyedi & Whitefield, 2020). High unemployment rates, economic instability and systemic financial insecurity characterized the next two decades after the democratic transition (Engler et al., 2019).

Populist parties in the region, riding on the dissatisfaction of the population, call for a ‘real’ revolution, which would finally oust the current democratic elite, who are accused of belonging to the old communist leadership (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Pytlas, 2018; Sata & Karolweski, 2019). Naturally, populist actors emerge in societies where historical legacies give ground to this phenomenon. In former communist countries the common people have already lost their trust in the ruling elite, therefore convincing them once again that they have made the ‘wrong choice’ gives leverage to populism (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017).

People in CEE are accustomed to the politicization of socio-cultural conflicts, traditionally associated with left-wing populism, as well as to right-wing populist threat narratives and framing of a collective identity (Engler et al., 2019). Therefore, anti-establishment rhetoric in the region can be detected across the ideological spectrum, with a high number of populist parties not located in the ideological extremes (Engler et al., 2019).

Engler asks the question of whether it is the ideology itself which attracts voters, or the anti-establishment nature of parties themselves (Engler, 2020). She points out that instead of taking into account ideology, people tend to “protest vote” against the current establishment, therefore centrist anti-establishment parties in CEE can attract disappointed voters from either the left or right. These parties are more aligned with the mainstream in terms of ideologies (Engler, 2020). The Hungarian example she brings forward is LMP (*Lehet Más a Politika*), which currently defines itself as an environmentalist party (LMP, 2023). However, I believe Viktor Orbán’s FIDESZ party cannot be regarded as a centrist anti-establishment party, since ideology has an important role to play in party communication.

Combining elements of different ideologies gives populist parties in the region the opportunity to resonate with a wider array of voters. Political parties, which cater to the losers of the transition between communism and liberal democracies therefore usually promote the exact opposite of free market and democratic opening: economic equality and traditional authoritarianism (Marks et al., 2006). These people, united by their disappointment in the new liberal-democratic capitalist system, might vote for parties who provide them with a sense of

nostalgia. Some are motivated by the aim to defend traditional values in an increasingly cosmopolitan world, and some are seeking protection from the state against the negative effects of market forces (Marks et al., 2006; Ptylas, 2018). Thus, the mix of right-wing nativist arguments and advocacy for left-wing economic policies can be a successful strategy for populist parties in CEE (Engler et al., 2019).

2.3. Populism in Hungary

In order to understand why the Hungarian case of populism is worth researching, this section will provide a glance into how Viktor Orbán's populist regime works, how FIDESZ defines the *people* and the *enemy*, and how they are able to mobilize their voters. Attributing blame to an outside power is one of the cornerstones of the current government's strategy (Csehi, 2019). This section will also explore how Hungary's history can provide an explanation to how these narratives have developed over time.

While scholarly work on the unique case of populist parties mixing right- and left-wing populist arguments in Central-Eastern Europe exists, these concepts are rarely applied to the FIDESZ party, which is often categorized as a right-wing populist party (*see above*).

Viktor Orbán was an emblematic actor during the 1989 revolution. However, as the years progressed, FIDESZ has slowly transformed itself from a liberal into a conservative party, recognizing the political vacuum in society in the early 2000s caused by failed expectations of democratization and economic stability after independence. In 2010 the right-wing, traditionalist FIDESZ party successfully portrayed itself as an alternative to the previously failed socialist government, leading to its first two-thirds majority in parliament (Gallo, 2021), followed by three more (Portfólió, 2022).

Orbán has been open about his plans to build an 'illiberal democracy' (Viktor Orbán, 2014) justified by the populist promise that he represents the 'will of the people' (Sata & Karolewski, 2023). However, in reality, FIDESZ ruling the country for fourteen years with absolute majority has led to the erosion of rule of law and democratic values (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Demeter, 2018; Sata & Karolewski, 2023).

Creating the illusion of a constant struggle between the 'corrupt elite' and the 'pure people' is a crucial component of Orbán's political success (Csehi, 2019). The *people* constructed by FIDESZ is an exclusionary group, a characteristic, that the literature associates with right-wing populist parties (Otjes & Louwerse, 2013; Gandesha, 2017; Huber & Schimpf, 2017; March,

2017; Ostiguy & Casullo, 2017). The group identity of people in favor of the government has been made stronger by simple messages depicting a polarized world order (Sata & Karolewski, 2019), separating voters from democratic politics and manipulating them based on their emotions, through which they ultimately exclude the critics of the regime from the community of the *people* (Sata & Karolewski, 2023). The group of ‘pure people’ consists of Hungarians, who are fighting for the sacred well-being of the nation by protecting traditional values (Bajomi-Lázár & Horváth, 2013; Iliakova & Tushev, 2020). The group of ‘Hungarians’ excludes ethnic and racial minorities, immigrants and social groups deviating from what is perceived to be ‘traditional’ (Enyedi & Whitefield, 2020).

When examining how the ruling party frames the *enemy*, a mix between left- and right-populist practices can be seen. By periodically reconstructing the *enemy* and identifying new threats to the Hungarian state through media campaigns, FIDESZ successfully avoids the ‘populist trap’ of them becoming the ‘corrupt elite’ in the voters’ eyes and has been able to maintain a durable political system (Csehi, 2019).

The *enemy* has been given multiple faces and names during the campaigns of the government in the last fourteen years. One of the cornerstones of Orbán’s power is the notion that he is constantly fighting and protecting the nation from a recreated list of threats (Melegh et al., 2019; Rogers, 2019; Sata & Karolweski, 2019). FIDESZ’s enemies have changed over the years from the International Monetary Fund, to refugees, then the European Union, the LGBTQ+ community or George Soros (Demeter, 2018; Melegh et al., 2019; Szebeni & Salojärvi, 2022). While fear of immigration and liberal values is traditionally associated with right-wing populism, deep-state narratives, such as blaming George Soros for the demise of Hungary, or scapegoating international organizations and the capitalist system, resemble the communication tactics of left-wing populist parties (Copelovitch & Pevehouse 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

Although in theory, populist leaders are not exempted from voters punishing them for bad decisions (Meyer & Wagner, 2020), FIDESZ has been successful in avoiding this trap by scapegoating the EU. Despite Orbán’s soft Eurosceptic approach (Ágoston, 2023), it is not in Hungary’s interest to leave the EU, since the EU membership is crucial for its economy (Enyedi & Whitefiled, 2020) and the Hungarian society has generally positive attitudes towards the European Union (European Commission, 2023).

“I would only like to remind you that after 1990, the community that I lead both won and lost elections, and so allow me to tell you (...) that we are not in need of any lectures about the

character of democracy” (Viktor Orbán, 2013). According to Orbán, the EU uses a top-down elitist approach in decision-making, instead of listening to what the people actually want (Enyedi & Whitefield, 2020). FIDESZ communicates that the current regime in Brussels has failed the Hungarian people and that the ideological gap between Western and Central Europe is increasingly growing (Ágoston, 2023).

Populist leaders speak for the *will* of the common people (Mudde, 2004). Viktor Orbán, as a direct representative of the *people*, often supports his narrative by relying on organizing ‘peace marches’ or holding national consultations. Viktor Orbán uses the results of national consultations often as arguments against EU policy as well, signaling that the “Hungarian people have already decided against them” (Magyarország Kormánya 2024a), through a process which is alien to Western democracies, “where politicians do not ask for the opinion of people” (Pállinger, 2022; Mikola, 2023).

2.3.1. Outlook on Hungarian History

The Hungarian historical legacy shows that democracy and rule of law were already weakly rooted in civil society to begin with (Enyedi & Whitefield, 2020). Hungary’s communist past has largely affected the way the current government operates, and how they relate to their voters (Enyedi & Whitefield, 2020). Benczes calls the current regime ‘goulash populist’, stemming from the term ‘goulash communism’, often used to describe Hungary under János Kádár (Benczes, 2016). ‘Goulash communism’ refers to the Hungarian political system in the 1960s and 1970s, when citizens have lived relatively well compared to the population of other communist countries. The unemployment rate was low, the economy was seemingly flourishing, and people have received social benefits, giving the illusion of high standards of living. However, what most people did not know at the time, was that all of this was a façade, sponsored by loans from abroad, leading to massive structural problems later (Valuch, 2001; Benczes, 2016).

“The historical lesson of (the revolution of) 1956 was that a socialist government should keep people satisfied in material respects and avoid periods of dissatisfaction” (Kornai, 1982, p. 105). The current government seems to be stuck in a vicious cycle deriving from the communist tradition: instead of overarching reforms in the state’s welfare system, they deliver short-term solutions, which are only enough to momentarily satisfy the voter and get their support. Voters sacrificing their political agency in favor of short-term economic well-being

was an important characteristic of the Kádár regime (Benczes, 2016; Csigó & Merkovity, 2016; Enyedi & Whitefield, 2020). Taking into account the country's communist past, narratives, which frame the *enemy* as the capitalist, corrupt and imperialist elite, who endanger the economic stability of Hungary can be parts of a successful communication strategy in the country, where some generations have been exposed to the exact same rhetoric before (Csehi & Zgut, 2020).

In terms of communication, politicians have noticed that some demographic groups in Hungary, especially the older generation which is used to political communication being reduced to catchy slogans during communism, are more perceptive to simple and straightforward answers to their problems than others. Some can be less interested in politics beyond understandable, but overstretched ideas, that they can apply to understand social issues (Csigó & Merkovity, 2016).

“We did not let Vienna dictate us in 1848, we did not let Moscow dictate us in 1956, and we won't let Brussels or others dictate us now” – declared Viktor Orbán after his first electoral victory in the 2010s (Viktor Orbán, 2011). Hungary's communist past goes hand-in-hand with the stubborn persistence of historical traumas in society (Gandesha, 2018), such as the constant struggle for national sovereignty (Copelovitch & Pevehouse 2019). Hungary prides itself for having been the ‘bulwark of Europe’ for centuries, protecting Christianity and Western Europe from the Mongol and Ottoman invasions (Berend, 2022). However, instead of being rewarded for its ‘sacrifices’, Hungary's historical experience is overshadowed by the gloomy past of domination by outside powers (Csehi & Zgut, 2020).

Hungary has been blindsided by the ‘winners of history’ during the Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920, when Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and half of its population (Berend, 2022; Tarján, 2024). Despite the fact that more than a hundred years have passed since, the Hungarian population has not been able to process the trauma of Trianon (Berend, 2022), as it is still actively present in political dialogue. In 2022, Viktor Orbán was seen wearing a scarf depicting the map of ‘Greater Hungary’ at a football match, which caused outrage in neighboring countries (HVG, 2022).

Portraying Hungary as a victim of rivalry between powerful countries, national pride and grieving a once lost ‘Greater Hungary’ are common narratives of Hungarian right-wing parties (Berend, 2022; Szebeni & Salojärvi, 2022). FIDESZ managed to organize its voter base alongside the nostalgia for the ‘golden past’ (Norris & Inglehart, 2019), creating a homogenous

voter base which is increasingly skeptical of outsiders' influence in Hungarian politics (Szebeni & Salojärvi, 2022).

3. Theoretical Foundation

3.1. Ideational Approach to Populism

There are four popular approaches to populism in academia: the ideational, organizational, cultural and discursive approaches (Sharlamanov, 2022). Organizational populism concerns itself with how populism can have an effect on business organizations (Cailleba, 2021). Cultural populism can be differentiated from the other approaches based on its emphasis on race, ethnicity, religion and identity (McGuigan, 1992).

The discursive approach, coined by Ernesto Laclau, sees populism as a logic, or a discourse, which is not bound to social or ideological elements, it can be regarded as more of a structural approach. The discursive approach believes that there is a certain logic, or a way of discourse associated with how populist ideas are structured, regardless of ideology (Laclau, 2005). This approach would also fit the analysis conducted as part of this thesis, since official government texts will be examined in detail, and the logic used behind developing populist narratives over time is an essential component of the research. However, since my research focuses on how the political communication of FIDESZ can be situated on the spectrum of left- and right-wing populism, having its focus on ideology and less so on discourse, the ideational approach was the most applicable out of the four to the case investigated by the thesis.

The ideational approach focuses on populism's ideas, which, when expressed in leaders' rhetoric have an impact on their political behavior, as well as on the way people are mobilized to support populist forces. The ideational definition of populism has three main characteristics: a Manichean struggle; a homogenous and virtuous community of the 'people'; and the corrupted "elite" (Hawkins et al., 2019). The ideational approach sees populism as having a chameleonic nature, allowing it to take on various ideological forms that align with the social grievances most relevant in a particular community (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017).

Populist ideas can be conceived as sets of beliefs that are widespread across the voter base, which must be activated by the appropriate social context and the rhetoric provided by populist leaders. Citizens who sympathize with populist attitudes need interpretative help to be able to successfully apply these ideas to the circumstances around them. Even if the demand for populism exists at the level of individual citizens because of the social context, populist

behavior needs to be triggered by politicians through framing (Hawkins et al., 2019), which will be later elaborated on in 5.2.

In terms of context, the failure of democratic representation can create a demand in the population for populist narratives (Hawkins et al., 2019). However, people might not interpret this failure in a populist way, therefore politicians framing the problems appropriately is necessary to catalyze populist attitudes in society (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). This can be done by attributing the blame for crises to the elite, invoking in- and out-group identities or relying on emotional triggers (Hawkins et al., 2019).

The ideational approach argues that culture and material interests are deciding factors when it comes to citizens' preferences, determining which ideological variation of populism they feel the closest to (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Citizens with populist attitudes do not only support a given political force because they are populist, but also because it resonates with their ideological positions (Hawkins et al., 2019).

3.2. Expectations

Applied to the Hungarian case, it is apparent that stemming from Hungary's past, dissatisfaction with political representation of mainstream parties exists in society. FIDESZ provides an answer to people's concerns and is able to frame social issues in a way that exploits populist attitudes in society in order to gain political support (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). This thesis will focus on the narratives the ruling party uses to manipulate its voter base by examining the national consultations.

According to the ideational approach, populism also attaches itself to a host ideology (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). The thesis argues that in order to interpret social issues in a way which appeals to the Hungarian population, FIDESZ might benefit from borrowing narratives from both the left and right ends of the political spectrum in national consultations, making Hungarian populism rather a mix between the two. This is contrary to popular belief in academic literature, categorizing FIDESZ into the right-wing populist branch, as mentioned above.

My hypothesis therefore is the following: *The Hungarian FIDESZ party displays right-wing and left-wing populist ideologies in national consultation texts across 2011-2023.*

4. Case selection: Hungarian National Consultations

During FIDESZ's time in office between 2010 and 2023, only two actual referendums were initiated in Hungary, one in 2016 on the EU's migration quotas, and one in 2021 on the "Child Protection Law", both triggered by the government party (Mikola, 2023). Both referendums were invalid, because they didn't reach the necessary quorum of 41.32%, defined by Hungarian law (Pállinger, 2022). Even if FIDESZ prides itself for listening to what the people want, they have made it almost impossible for opposition parties or citizens to initiate referendums by changing the rules in 2011 when adopting the new Fundamental Law (Enyedi & Whitefield, 2020; Pállinger, 2022). Instead, they have launched thirteen national consultations since 2010, which have become increasingly oversimplified versions of referendums, containing polarized narratives and inaccurate representations of problems and their solutions (Mikola, 2023). The decision-making in Hungary is in the hands of an uncontested government, who only wishes to gain legitimacy through the questionnaires (Oross & Tap, 2021).

In today's democracies, referendums are the most widely used examples of institutions trying to encourage citizens to participate in politics directly and to strengthen the representative system (Colombo & Hanspeter, 2020; Oross & Tap, 2021). However, citizens often fall victim to elite manipulation, who tend to use referendums for strategic reasons, such as consolidating the power of their government (Colombo & Hanspeter, 2020; Pócza & Oross, 2022). Elites can control what topics are being voted on, how the campaign is shaped, what information is provided to the people and what arguments are used to influence citizen's decisions. The mass media has a critical role in this process (Colombo & Hanspeter, 2020).

Populists see themselves as the embodiment of the citizens' voice, who want to give control back to the people (Pócza & Oross, 2022), therefore referendums can be an effective way for populist parties to gain public support. Populists, instead of emphasizing the need to educate people on a given topic, so they could make well-informed decisions, view voting as a check on the elite (Colombo & Hanspeter, 2020; Enyedi & Whitefield, 2020; Oross & Tap, 2021).

National consultations in Hungary aim to mobilize FIDESZ's voter base, collect supporter data, shape the public agenda and legitimize the government's political actions by demonstrating popular support through the results of the questionnaires (Mikola, 2023). National consultations, even if they serve as substitutes to actual referendums, cannot be

classified as such, because they lack the necessary methodological tools. They do not live up to the standards of impartiality, transparency and accountability (Mikola, 2023).

The evaluation process of national consultations is completely in the hand of the government therefore the results of consultations should be taken with a grain of salt (Oross & Tap, 2021; Pócza & Oross, 2022). For instance, in 2015, the government offered the opportunity for the first time for voters to send back their national consultation questions via an online platform instead of post. However, the online platform did not collect computer IP-addresses, therefore one person from one computer could have filled out the questionnaire multiple times by using different email addresses, leading to false and untraceable results (Lengyel, 2021). In addition, the government often does not even wait for the official results of the consultations before they move forward with a given political decision (Oross & Tap, 2021). For instance, the Sovereignty Act was voted on in parliament in 2023 December (Tóth, 2023), only one month after the national consultations were sent out on the topic. The results of the consultation were only published in mid-January of 2024 (Magyarország Kormánya, 2024b).

The first national consultation was initiated by FIDESZ in 2005, when they were in opposition. The aim of the first consultation was to differentiate themselves from other parties by emphasizing their openness to listen to the voice of the people (Oross & Tap, 2021). The results made it evident early on that Hungarian citizens attribute great importance to their standard of living (Meghallgattuk Magyarországot Nemzeti Konzultáció, 2005), an issue area which would become one of the main topics of latter national consultations (Pócza & Oross, 2022).

From 2010 onwards, national consultations were sent to citizens via post asking for their opinions on various predetermined topics (Enyedi & Whitefield, 2020; Oross & Tap, 2021; Pócza & Oross, 2022; Ágoston, 2023). Consultations were tools to determine people's attitudes towards certain topics as well as reinforcing legitimacy behind already planned political decisions (Oross & Tap, 2021; Pócza & Oross, 2022). There was no room for lively debates regarding the questions, which had a negative effect on inclusivity (Mikola, 2023). As a result of this, mainly FIDESZ supporters were the ones who filled in the questionnaires, which is also shown in the results. 80-90% percent of respondents agreed with government policies in 2010, which confirmed a pre-existing consensus among FIDESZ voters (Pócza & Oross, 2022).

National consultations have lost their deliberative character over the years, turning into mere strategic tools of the government (Oross & Tap, 2021; Pócza & Oross, 2022). Four consultations were released between 2010 and 2012 as seen on *Table 1*, each of them containing

multiple-choice questions and some open-ended questions. These included a mix of controversial questions designed to gauge public sentiment, policy suggestions that implied the ‘correct’ answer, and universally agreeable low-profile questions (National Consultation 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Pócsa & Oross, 2022). In comparison, the following nine national consultations released between 2015 and 2023 were completely different in nature, they contained only ‘yes or no’ questions where it was automatically implied which box the voter is expected to tick (Oross & Tap, 2021; Ágoston, 2023; Mikola, 2023). As seen on *Table 1*, there is a clear divide between national consultations before and after 2015. After 2015, national consultations have become dichotomous, leaving no room for nuances in people’s opinion.

Table 1: List of All National Consultations (Pócsa & Oross, 2022; Pállinger, 2022; National Consultation, 2023)

Title (Year)	Number of Questions	Type of Questions
National Consultation (2005)	10	9 multiple choice questions, 1 open ended question
National Consultation on the Pension System (2010)	5	4 multiple choice questions, 1 open ended question
National Consultation on the New Constitution (2011)	12	12 multiple choice questions (4 options)
National Consultation on Social Policy (2011)	10	10 multiple choice questions (4 options)
National Consultation on Economy (2012)	16	16 multiple choice questions (3 options)
National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism (2015)	12	Yes/No questions
National Consultation titled “Let’s Stop Brussels!” (2017)	6	Yes/No questions
National Consultation on the Soros Plan (2017)	7	Yes/No questions
National Consultation on the Protection of Families (2018)	10	Yes/No questions
National Consultation on the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020)	9	Yes/No questions
National Consultation on the Opening after the Pandemic (2021)	7	Yes/No questions

National Consultation on Life After the Pandemic (2021)	14	Yes/No questions
National Consultation on Brussels Sanctions (2022)	7	Yes/No questions
National Consultation on the Protection of Sovereignty (2023)	11	Yes/No questions

Most research on national consultations focus on one questionnaire, instead of an overview of all previously released ones (Demeter, 2019; Melegh et al., 2019; Svensson et al., 2022). The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate through the examination of national consultations between 2011 and 2023 how FIDESZ's communication strategy has evolved by potentially using both left- and right-wing populist arguments.

5. Methodological Framework

To test the empirical validity of the thesis's theoretical expectations, the analysis of the national consultations will be done by investigating the different left- and right-wing populist frames the Hungarian government uses to justify political action. In order to investigate the issue at hand, the thesis applies the method of textual qualitative content analysis using frames to the national consultations released by the government between 2011 and 2023. Coding will be conducted manually with the help of a qualitative content analysis software, MAXQDA.

5.1. Ontological and Epistemological Considerations

The ontology of this thesis, which concerns itself with what constitutes reality, is constructivist, meaning that social phenomena and the meanings attributed to them are continuously accomplished by actors. The social order is under constant change and in the state of continuous revision. Social reality is an ongoing construction of actors, instead of circumstances which would otherwise constrain them (Cupchik, 2001). Epistemology refers to how knowledge is generated. This thesis is interpretivist in its nature, since it aims to grasp the subjective meaning of social action (Capper, 2018). The theoretical basis of this thesis is the ideational approach to populism, as elaborated on in *Section 3*.

5.2. What are Frames?

Frames “*provide meaning to an issue and suggest how to understand it*” (Sloothuus, 2008, p. 3) and framing refers to the “*process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue*” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104). Frames are employed by political actors in their communication to make sense of a given issue in society in a way that it benefits them politically (Pytlas, 2018; Oxley, 2020). They influence how an individual perceives a situation and can influence one’s political opinion (Oxley, 2020). Frames provide the central story line that bring meaning to the unfolding current events (Hobolt, 2009).

Regular exposure to a frame, and whether there are alternative sources of information available, can affect public opinion (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Models of information transmission imply that the actor who spends the most on propaganda and manipulation, thus the actor who is able to send the loudest signals can potentially dominate the debate (Chong, 1996; Chong & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2003). In this sense, it is not necessarily the strength of a frame which determines its success, but the frequency of exposure to it (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

However, strong and often repeated frames should not be confused with the ‘right’ solution to a given issue. In order to produce stronger frames, politicians might rely on exaggerations or even lies, manipulating voters based on emotions of fear and uncertainty. Strong frames are usually constructed on the lines of symbols, a shared group identity, as well as ideology (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

In an ideal context, citizens would be exposed to competing frames (Hobolt, 2009). However, in case of national consultations in Hungary this is rarely the case. If voters receive only one-sided messages in favor of a particular idea, they are more likely to adopt that position (Hobolt, 2009). FIDESZ’s almost complete control over the Hungarian media, that they use as their mouthpiece (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017), gives them the opportunity to define the narratives and the terms of debate however they please (Sata & Karolewski, 2023).

Elites usually frame social issues in a way that they only highlight some aspects of the perceived reality, enhancing salience in a way that it would advance a certain problem definition, interpretation or moral perception (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Thus, framing is a process through which elites can decide how information is produced structured and introduced to the public (Malik & Onguny, 2020). Frames help citizens to be able to navigate

in the flow of information, and for them to find the appropriate political alternative they want to vote for (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).

The literature on frames differentiates between two primary ways of constructing frames. The ‘importance change model’ portrays certain beliefs to be more important than others, which would in turn carry a greater weight in the final decision-making of the voter. (Chong & Druckman, 2007). The second type of framing is the ‘content change model’, which aims to introduce new information (Hobolt, 2009). Even if the individual has a pre-conceived idea about a given issue, the latter type of frame is able to put forward new arguments, that they have not considered yet, therefore altering their preference (Oxley, 2020).

Overall, one effective way to examine frames is to focus on elite communication (Chong & Druckman, 2007), in this case, on national consultations containing the latest interpretation of on-going political issues by the government (Sata & Karolweski, 2023). The framing process in these referendums includes identifying a problem, proposing a solution and assigning blame or responsibility (Lugosi, 2018). The exact frames which are investigated in this thesis will be introduced in the next section.

5.3. Three Main Frames used in the 2023 National Consultation

Closer examination of the eleven questions in the National Consultation on the Sovereignty Act of 2023 points to three main narratives around which the questions are organized. The aim of my investigation is to work in reverse, see how the three main frames in the 2023 national consultation have evolved throughout the years and how have national consultations eventually reached their final form today.

The three frames identified are the following: *Hungary as a welfare state*, *Hungary as a protector* and *Hungary as a colony of the European Union*.

Framing *Hungary as a welfare state* largely stems from its communist past, when elites would rely on foreign loans to maintain a certain level of living standards to avoid dissatisfaction in the population (Kornai, 1982). The focus on welfare is traditionally associated with left-wing populism (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). FIDESZ has introduced a large number of welfare policies since 2010, however these often only target their preferred societal groups, increasingly polarizing the society alongside income and ethnic lines (Lugosi, 2018). The ruling party prides itself for introducing reforms in the pension system, gaining support from the elderly population, as well as backing traditional families with at least three children

with tax reliefs, in line with their conservative agenda (Viktor Orbán, 2016; Lugosi, 2018). The welfare policies of FIDESZ are presented as reforms aiming to save the future of the nation.

In FIDESZ's Founding Charter, they emphasize how their overall goal is to increase welfare benefits, keep a steady employment rate and to make Hungary an economic leader in the Central-Eastern European region (FIDESZ, 1988). Viktor Orbán often emphasizes in his speeches that these reforms can only be done if Hungary succeeds in keeping its sovereignty. Therefore, in case a given welfare policy's existence is threatened by financial discrepancies, FIDESZ often resorts to blaming an outside enemy for these developments, in order to avoid societal dissatisfaction (Lugosi, 2018).

The first three questions in the 2023 national consultation all refer to Hungarian welfare policies, that will be potentially taken away by the EU. The titles of these questions are the following: "Brussels wants to abolish the living cost support system", "Brussels wants to abolish the interest rate-stop", "Brussels wants to abolish the Hungarian extra profit tax" (National Consultation, 2023).

Hungary's sovereignty and its traditional, right-wing values are crucial components of FIDESZ's communication. Viktor Orbán sees the current political arena as a power struggle between the liberal-cosmopolitan and the conservative-nationalistic forces (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). The FIDESZ government, as the *protector of Hungary*, is the only force which can save the population from the wave of new ideologies (Enyedi & Whitefield, 2020). FIDESZ has been critical of the LGBTQ+ community and immigration, both topics being central to their political communication. The questions focusing on these issues are titled in the following way: "Brussels wants to create migrant ghettos in Hungary as well", "Brussels provides financial compensations to Palestinian organizations, which have reached Hamas, leading to increased terrorism in Europe", "Brussels wants to abolish the child-protection law", "Brussels wants to send more weapons to Ukraine" (National Consultation, 2023).

The last category, *Hungary as a colony to the EU*, draws upon Hungary's historical past of being dominated by outside powers, promising Hungarian people that the country's sovereignty will not be disrespected again (Ágoston, 2023). Orbán has emphasized how he, as a freedom fighter, has the sole aim not to make Hungary a colony of the EU or any other outside power (Kustánczi, 2012). FIDESZ also believes that Hungary is entitled to receive money from EU funds based on historical, moral and economic reasons (Berend, 2022). Double standards, and the feeling of being treated as secondary citizens within the European Union are common narratives of the ruling party. The titles of the questions concerning the above mentioned issue areas are the following: "Brussels wants to send more money to Ukraine, meanwhile

Hungarians do not receive anything”, “Brussels wants to make Ukraine join the EU”, “Brussels wants to influence our sovereignty by sending money to Hungarian political figures”, “Brussels wants to send GMO Ukrainian wheat to Hungary, leading to the collapse of Central Eastern European markets” (National Consultation, 2023).

5.4. What is Qualitative Content Analysis?

The analysis of the national consultations is conducted with the method of qualitative content analysis. Qualitative content analysis is a “*research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systemic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns*” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1278). Thus, qualitative content analysis is an interpretative method, concerned with discovering meanings and motives in textual data. It goes beyond extracting the necessary content objectively, it allows researchers to interpret social reality in a more subjective manner (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009).

The research involves a systemic analysis of textual information, through which the researcher is able to uncover meanings which can only be found by reading ‘between the lines’ (Halperin & Heath, 2020). This allows the investigation of national consultations to not merely focus on frequency of textual elements present in the text, as in the case of quantitative content analysis (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009), but to look at how the narratives used by the government developed over time, and what underlying messages do they carry in relation to the nature of populism in Hungary. This methodological approach tries to discover the unique themes that relate to the meanings of given phenomena, instead of only producing statistical results, such as a theme’s occurrence in a text. Thus, the result of the thesis’s investigation will not appear as numbers, but rather as a description of how the social world is viewed in the documents under analysis (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). Naturally, the two methods, qualitative and quantitative content analysis can be combined, while the former investigates the patterns and underlying messages, the latter can illustrate how often they appear (Smith, 1975).

Qualitative content analysis requires a pre-determined data set, which in this case are the national consultations. Through the identification of categories of frames used by the government to influence voters, the coding process will begin (Halperin&Heath, 2020), which will be detailed in *Section 5.5*.

The documents used for research are imported into a computer-based qualitative coding program, where they are coded based on the three main frames presented in *Section 5.3.*, and

other frames or subframes on the line of left- and right-wing populism, which would be determined later during the coding process.

The coding will be done manually, however for the sake of transparency and the better organization of data, a software will be used. Computer assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) supports the examination of the development of themes and data analysis across cases (Gibbs, 2014). Computer softwares used for analysis have the purpose of supporting the researchers in the organization, management and coding of the textual data (Zhang & Wildemut, 2009). In order to analyze the textual data used for this thesis, MAXQDA will be used. MAXQDA is a qualitative content analysis program which allows for importing textual (or visual) data, assigning multiple codes or subcodes, using different colors and names, to these which are later retrievable, adding notes and memos to better understand and remember why a certain code was added to a segment of the text, depicting the relationship between different codes, making it easier to interpret results. However, MAXQDA is not an open-source software, therefore after the license has expired, accessing the data of this analysis can only be done by using the free software MAXQDA Reader, through which one can see the coded segments, however, cannot alter these.

The computer software is not coding automatically, the coding process is done by the researcher. MAXQDA is used merely as a tool for the researcher to be able to keep track of the data transparently, and to be able to assign and retrieve codes more easily than it would be on paper form. The software also allows the researcher to see the link between the different codes more vividly and to keep track of the evolution of interpretations of different segments (Zhang & Wildemut, 2009).

5.5. Overview of Coding Methodology

Coding means the identification of passages of text, and then labeling them based on what thematic idea of the research they represent. The process makes it possible for the researcher to retrieve and collect data effectively (Halperin & Heath, 2009). During the coding process, it is assumed, that the researcher knows the material prior to coding in order to be able to assign the appropriate categories during the process (Dombos & Zentai, 2012). As a Hungarian citizen, who is aware of the historical and political connotations certain questions might have in the national consultations, identifying frames relevant to the investigation will be done by bringing my own knowledge into the analysis.

In terms of coding, the three main frames will provide the basis of the analysis, but since it is a possibility that there have been other major themes used in past consultations which do not appear in 2023, I will be resorting to open coding in addition to the already existing three frames. Open coding allows for free interpretation of the text and the identification of new frames, without being constrained by a coding scheme decided upon beforehand (Gronemeyer et al., 2019). Open coding of frames is an inductive approach, which lets the researcher to view documents openly to reveal possible frames. However, working outside of a pre-defined coding protocol might prove to be labor intensive, and can only be implemented in case of smaller samples, and it is hard to replicate (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).

In order to ensure the reliability of coding, a coding protocol is needed, through which the target variables and categories are identified. Having a pre-determined set of rules makes sure that the researcher codes the text consistently, the same way every time. It should also be determined that the same code can be applied for a given word and also for expressions which imply the same meaning (Halperin & Heath, 2020).

5.5.1. Coding Across the Populist Spectrum

Codes will be organized on the lines of left- and right-wing populism. Left-wing populist narratives include references to a state's and the people's financial welfare, depicting international organizations, business men or multinational companies as the main enemy threatening the well-being of citizens (Gandesha, 2018). The frame "*Hungary as a welfare state*" encompasses all arguments which are done based on this narrative in the national consultations.

Another popular left-wing populist narrative is the reference to colonialism, and the constant fight for independence from imperialist states, whose aim is to constrain the given state either economically or politically, so it does not have the same opportunities as 'empires' to modernize itself and break out of the chains of dependence (Ostiguy & Casullo, 2017). The frame *Hungary as a colony of the EU* will refer to all cases when the government diverts blame to the EU in terms of Hungarians being treated as secondary citizens and being kept in the loop of serving an imperialist power on the expense of their own development either economically or politically.

Other left-wing populist arguments might include for example reference to cosmopolitanism, NGOs or international elites conspiring against the well-being of citizens. In

case these or other left-wing populist characteristics mentioned in *Section 2.1.* are used to frame social issues in national consultations, these will be coded separately from the two main frames and will be discussed during the analysis of the data.

In the 2023 national consultation right-wing populist arguments can be confined to one single frame: *Hungary as a protector*. Hungary is portrayed as one of the few remaining countries in Europe where traditional values, such as Christianity or national history are still celebrated (Gagnon et al., 2018; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Right-wing populist narratives can also include references to mass migration, terrorism, outlooks on a glorious national past, and endorsing the identity of the ethnically and culturally homogenous group (Gagnon et al, 2018) which will be reflected upon during the coding process of the national consultations.

The different enemies the Hungarian government names in the national consultations with the combination of framing a social issue will be coded to portray the nuances of FIDESZ's populist political communication. In terms of blame attribution, the Hungarian government is prone to combine left- and right-wing populist arguments with a particular scapegoat that can be accused of hindering Hungary's ability to reach its true potential and to deliver the results they have been promising to the people (Melegh et al, 2019). Some of these scapegoats can be directly associated with right-wing populism, such as immigrants or members of the LGBTQ+ community (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). While others are typical examples of left-wing populism, such as portraying George Soros as an international puppet-master conspiring against Hungary's well-being (Witte, 2018).

There are certain enemies which frequently reoccur in the ruling party's communication. FIDESZ often resorts to attributing blame to the previous government ruling Hungary between 2002 and 2010 with the leadership of Ferenc Gyurcsány and the Hungarian Socialist Party (Gallo, 2021), signaling that ruling the country based on left-wing ideologies cannot be successful (Viktor Orbán, 2023). In addition, the EU is often portrayed as either an organization of out-of-touch bureaucrats (Copelovitch & Pevehouse, 2019), who wish to force their views on the Hungarian people without ever taking in consideration the history, traditions and financial state of the country (Bajomi-Lázár & Horváth, 2013; Demeter, 2018).

Lastly, codes will be assigned to particular segments of the text according to the year they were published in. Through this the development of different narratives in the documents over time can be tracked.

One sentence can be assigned multiple codes. As an example, here is a sentence from the 2023 national consultation: "Brussels wants to abolish the child-protection law. There have

been constant attacks coming from Brussels on the Hungarian child-protection law. The European Commission has attacked the law even on the judicial level. Meanwhile, more and more news have emerged about aggressive LGBTQ propaganda targeting children” (National Consultation, 2023). This statement in *Question 10* in the 2023 national consultation would be coded using the following frame: it will be assigned the right-wing populist code of *Hungary being a protector*, referring to the government shielding the population from ideologies opposing traditional values. The statement would also be assigned with a code referring to it using the EU/Brussels as the scapegoat for the child-protection law’s controversial welcoming. Lastly, the code “2023” will be added to the statement to be able to track through time the emergence of this narrative in national consultations.

It can also happen that a statement contains multiple narrative frames, such as *Question 1* from the 2022 national consultation on Sanctions against Russia: “Brussels has decided to implement sanctions on oil. After the outbreak of the war, there has been a consensus, that the sanctions on Russia would not include the energy sector. Despite this, Brussels has decided in June to prohibit the import of oil or products containing oil coming from Russia. Hungary has fought to be excluded from this sanction, because years and billions of Hungarian Forints would be needed to replace Russian oil. The oil embargo would lead to supply chain problems in Hungary, as well as it would pose an immense threat to the economy” (National Consultation, 2022). This shows *Hungary as being a colony of the EU*, where decisions are being pushed onto the country without its own finances and needs being taken into consideration. But also, the frame of *Hungary being a welfare state* can be detected, since the statement shows how in order to not put pressure on the country’s economy and do not cause disturbances in supply chains, Hungary rejects the oil embargo to protect its current economic well-being. The code ‘EU/Brussels’ and ‘2022’ would be also assigned to this statement.

5.6. Data Material and Delimitations

This thesis will examine the following data set: twelve national consultations released in Hungary between 2011 and 2023. Samples for qualitative content analysis are collected purposely in a way to correspond to the research question directly (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). Collecting the data, thus all previous questions from all national consultations in the predefined time frame proved to be rather difficult.

The first national consultation in FIDESZ's current term was released in 2010, however the analysis will start with the second one instead, the first national consultation released in 2011. Despite intensive search for the 2010 national consultation online on official government websites, social media forums and news sites, I was not able to locate the original text of the questionnaire. The 2010 national consultation was only sent out to pensioners, who were asked about their quality of life. I have found a short summary of what type of questions the document contained, but this text is not worded in the exact same way the government used at the time, therefore losing the nuances in sentence formulation which would have been important for the analysis. Because of this reason, I have decided to exclude the 2010 national consultation from the coding process, even if logically, it would fit into the data set to be analyzed. It was published by FIDESZ after they have gained their first two thirds majority in parliament in 2010 and does use the same methods for collecting and evaluating answers as other consultations.

While the national consultations of 2011 and 2012 were available on the government's official website, consultations after 2015 were increasingly difficult to find online. Some of them I have only found on Facebook forums as pictures of the physical consultations themselves, and I had to type in all questions on them manually for me to have the text digitally in order to code more efficiently. Others I have not even found a picture of, but only a news article about the questions it has contained. For the analysis of the 2023 national consultation, I have used my own copy of the questionnaire which was sent to me through post in November 2023.

The unit of analysis are the all the questions in the national consultations. The introductory text is exempt from the analysis, since not every national consultation has one. The answers the questionnaire provides to the questions will not be analyzed, because most questionnaires provide a simple yes or no answer category. The only exception to this is the 2017 national consultation, where a lot of the arguments the government makes in connection to the European Union are provided in the answers therefore in this case these will also be coded.

Combining all national consultations between 2011 and 2023, there are 121 questions which will be coded according to the coding scheme described above. Each question can be assigned multiple categories to capture its true essence. A code will be assigned to parts of the text of any size in so far as it represents one theme (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009).

5.7. Credibility and Potential Errors

Lincoln and Guba proposed criteria according to which interpretative work should be evaluated in terms of the quality of the research. These are credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. Credibility refers to transparent coding processes, as well as the researcher's prior knowledge and experience (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The coding scheme of this thesis is introduced in detail in *Section 5.5.1.*, while *Section 5.5.* refers to the researcher's Hungarian nationality and therefore her advantage to better understand the context the national consultations were written in. Transferability means that the researcher provides a rich enough data set or interpretation that other researchers can transfer to other contexts as well (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). As elaborated on in *Section 5.6.*, some of the national consultations used for this analysis were hard to detect online, therefore even the collection of the text of all questionnaires in one data set can prove to be useful for further research. Dependability refers to the coherence of the internal working process, while confirmability means that other researchers would also be able to confirm the findings of the analysis upon reviewing (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). During the analysis the researcher has been in accordance with the coding scheme and has organized the examined data in an online software, which can be accessed by other researchers as well when using the MAXQDA Reader software or buying the license as mentioned in *Section 5.4.*

Focusing on only national consultations narrows down the scope of the thesis, therefore it cannot provide an in-depth analysis of how the government uses left- and right-wing populist arguments in other forums. The thesis seeks to illustrate how these are being employed in national consultations only. The communication strategies of the government might differ based on other modes of promoting their objectives. Further research can be done on how left- and right-wing populist arguments can be mixed and used by FIDESZ in official speeches, mass media or other platforms of communication.

A potential source of error could be that since the original documents are used for coding purposes, these would only be available in Hungarian, no official English translation exists. Therefore, the research depends on the researcher's knowledge of the Hungarian language. There is a risk that an English translation would lack certain words, or grammatical cues, which provide further meaning to a statement in the original language. To avoid this, the coding was done on the original Hungarian text and only the results are interpreted in English.

6. Analysis and Discussion of Results

The analysis proceeds in the following way: national consultations are looked at in a chronological order. The questions which have received a populist frame are analyzed further in accordance with how they relate to the narratives present in the 2023 consultation and the left- and right-wing populist components of questions are examined. In addition, the timeline of how the three frames used for this analysis developed over time is discussed and the frames' relation to blame attribution is elaborated on. If the given national consultation contains a frame which is not present in the 2023 questionnaire, the new arguments are to be coded and reflected upon accordingly. These might also be very specific to the given national consultation, and the political context it was written in, such as the pandemic or the war in Ukraine.

Based on the analysis of the results, a tendency to mix left- and right-wing populist narratives in national consultations can be shown. Throughout the years the ruling party has determined which populist arguments are most successful in gaining political support from citizens, and then these are the ones reappearing in the 2023 consultation. The almost equal occurrence of left- and right-wing populist arguments in national consultations shows that instead of focusing on the left- or right-wing characteristics of framing an issue, FIDESZ uses narratives regardless of their ideological components in case they deem them efficient in persuasion based on their prior knowledge of how Hungarian society reacts to specific issues.

6.1. National Consultations in 2011

The analysis of the findings of this research starts with the year 2011. In 2011 two national consultations were sent out to the public. Combining the two, there were twenty-two questions, out of which six were assigned codes reflecting either left- or right-wing populist characteristics.

The first national consultation published in 2011 was on the new constitution the FIDESZ government has published in the same year. Orbán has argued that Hungary uses the same constitution as they have used before the regime change of 1989, only with a few amendments, therefore in order to truly demonstrate the independence of the country, a new constitution, or the so called "Fundamental Law" is needed. FIDESZ two-thirds majority in parliament has granted them the opportunity to formulate the constitution in a way which they preferred. This

was met with negative criticism from abroad, therefore the idea to initiate a national consultation on the topic was a way to consolidate public support for the new constitution.

In the questions of the consultation the government does not scapegoat international organizations or other actors, instead all twelve questions start with the following phrase: “Vannak, akik...”, which translates two “There are some who...”. Some questions also contain references to opposing opinions on a certain issue and then ask the Hungarian people to decide. The opposing standpoint is usually introduced by the following wording: “Mások szerint...”, or in English: “Others think, that...”. To demonstrate this, I will use *Question 3* as an example, which is worded in the following way: “There are some people who propose that the new Hungarian constitution should protect such shared values as the notion of family, order, home, work and health. Others think this is not necessary. What do you think?”

Questions 3,8,9,10 were assigned the right-wing populist code: *Hungary as a protector*. The consultation refers to the protection of traditional values (*Question 3*), Hungarians living abroad (*Question 8*), the land of Hungary including its nature, and species native to the country (*Question 9*) as well as farmland and water reserves (*Question 10*).

The protection of traditional values, as stated in *Question 3*, is a pivotal point of FIDESZ’s later communication, and is also present in the 2023 national consultation. However, instead of providing a vague summary to what values the ruling party deems worthy of protecting as seen in *Question 3* of the 2011 consultation, such as “family or order”, later consultations are more concrete. The 2023 consultation specifically refers to for example protecting society from harmful leftist ideologies (*Question 10*) and the influx of immigrants posing a threat to the survival of Hungarian culture (*Question 4*).

The importance of Hungarian nature in public debate and the mention of it in one of the first national consultations (*Question 9,10*) after FIDESZ has won the elections can be in connection with the issue of the Bős-Nagymaros dam. Hundreds of thousands of Hungarian people were protesting against the building of the dam in 1989 referring to environmental reasons. Protecting Hungarian nature and wildlife therefore has been a pivotal point in the eventual regime change in 1989 and has remained a symbol of the revolution ever since (Borbáth, 2022). Viktor Orbán, who was an important figure in 1989, could have reintroduced the protection of nature in the political communication of 2011 to signal FIDESZ’s distance from the previous socialist government. However, this narrative does not appear again in later consultations.

Question 8 introduces a narrative which, similarly to the previous one, is not revisited again in the 2023 national consultation. “There are some who propose that the new Hungarian

constitution should express solidarity and the sense of togetherness with Hungarians living outside the borders, while others think this is not necessary. What do you think?”. This question foreshadows the importance of the Trianon Peace Treaty and the glorious past for the FIDESZ government. The exact wording here is “határontúli magyarok”, which directly translates to “Hungarians living outside the borders”, however, only refers to Hungarians who live in those territories which used to belong to the Hungarian Kingdom. References to the unrightful Trianon Peace Treaty, Hungary’s unfair historical experience and the importance of solidarity with those who have been displaced are important components of the right-wing populist narrative of FIDESZ.

The second national consultation sent out to households in 2011 is titled “Social Consultation”. Instead of a right-wing populist narrative, this consultation is more in line with the previously determined frame of *Hungary as a welfare state*. In *Question 2* and *Question 8* Hungary is presented as a state who works in favor of the people, protecting their livelihood and aiming to be able to provide better living conditions.

Question 8 introduces the idea of an extra profit tax: “There are some who believe that the lobby of pharmaceutical companies should be broken, because they take out billions of forints from people’s pockets. Some believe that they force more expensive medicine on people only for their own extra profit. Others believe it is not necessary for the state to act against these companies”.

The question of the extra profit tax targeted against multinational companies comes up in the 2023 national consultation as well, in *Question 3*. “Brussels wants to abolish the Hungarian extra profit tax. The government has imposed taxes on those multinational companies, who have accumulated profit during the pandemic and the war. We expect them to be part of the shared burden of the country. However, Brussels wants Hungary to cancel this tax by the end of the year”. Accusing multinational companies of rising living costs and their lack of contribution to the state budget because of their sole focus on profit are common left-wing populist narratives. Instead of large companies producing profit, the people should benefit.

An interesting differentiation between the wording of the 2011 and 2023 question is how FIDESZ refers to itself. In 2011, the question refers to the Hungarian “state” being the one who wishes to save people from large companies’ hunger for profit, while in later questionnaires it is the “government”. “State” would refer to the whole political apparatus, while “government”, which only consists of FIDESZ, means that it is only the ruling party who would actually act in favor of the people.

6.2. National Consultation in 2012

The national consultation of 2012 is titled: “Consultation on Economics”. This consultation was a response to the recession and the Eurozone crisis, for example directly referenced in *Question 14*: “Many believe that it would be appropriate, if during the recession, those with a lower salary could receive their cafeteria money in cash.”

Out of the sixteen questions, only three were coded using populist frames. This shows that the purpose of early consultations was to inform citizens on new economic rules and regulations. By using the combination of “There are some...” and “Others believe...”, early consultations portray opposing opinions and provide people with the chance to choose between the two. Some questions in their formulation, however, can be biased towards one option over another, therefore national consultations of the early 2010s still cannot be considered completely independent of the government’s stance, even if the purpose of manipulation is less obvious.

Question 4 in the 2012 consultation is the first one so far which references the European Union: “There are some who believe that there should be an appropriate shared burden between the state, multinational companies, banks and the people, even if this is against the will of the EU. Others believe that banks and multinational companies should contribute less to the burdens of recession in order for them to be able to help the country’s economy move forward. What do you think?”. The Hungarian state, despite the EU’s opposing view, is in favor of forcing multinational companies to share the burden of the recession. Instead of the EU, multinational companies are still the main enemies according to the formulation of the question. Antagonizing the EU will become a crucial component of national consultations later on, with for example the 2023 consultation referring to Brussels in all eleven questions.

Question 6 and *Question 10* both are against multinational companies: “There are some who believe that the minimum wage should be constantly raised in order to secure the livelihood of Hungarian people. Others believe this is not necessary, because it would ruin the competitiveness of companies”. While in *Question 10*: “There are some who believe that the state should restrict those multinational companies which have a monopoly. Others believe it is not necessary to stand up against monopolies, it is normal that a big fish would eat a small one”.

Despite the frequent mention of multinational companies in 2011 and 2012, besides the previously mentioned *Question 3* in the 2023 national consultation, there is no direct reference to them in the latest questionnaire. Instead, the blame has completely shifted towards the European Union. The narrative of profit-seeking capitalist companies, despite being the most

often mentioned in earlier consultations, has been slowly abandoned throughout the years, and has been reduced to a less prominent frame only mentioned in connection to the EU. One reason behind this could be that the term ‘Brussels’ is less abstract than ‘multinational companies’, therefore it is easier to attribute blame to an enemy, which is not necessarily invisible. In addition, the government has started its massive media campaign against Brussels after 2015, therefore adopting this narrative into national consultations could have made it easier for them to mobilize voters who have been familiar with the message from being exposed to it via other platforms.

6.3. National Consultation in 2015

There is an obvious shift between consultations before and after 2015. The questionnaires have become much simpler, providing only Yes/No answers instead of multiple choices. Questions are more controlled and do not present two or more separate narratives anymore, they only provided one, to which people can answer either yes or no. Instead of using the combination of “There are some” and “Others believe”, often a clear enemy is defined in the questions, such as “Brussels”.

Although early national consultations contained pre-dominantly left-wing populist narratives, these were complemented in upcoming consultations by great emphasis being laid on Hungarian identity, migration and the opposition of ‘leftist’ ideologies, some of which components being completely new to the ruling party’s previously used array of right-wing populist arguments. The rise of right-wing populism in FIDESZ’s communication in national consultations could be explained by the overall right-wing shift in world politics demonstrated by, for example, Donald Trump being elected as US President in 2016.

In 2014, FIDESZ won a second election with a two-thirds majority in parliament. As a populist party winning the elections for the second time, FIDESZ needed to find a way to externalize the enemy, avoiding voters seeing them as the ‘corrupt elite’ that they were originally fighting against. The importance of the Eurozone crisis was fading, therefore the government needed to find a new crisis from which they could essentially ‘protect’ citizens. The migration wave hitting Europe in 2015 provided the perfect opportunity for them to build their newest political campaign upon. The 2015 consultation is titled: “National Consultation on Migration and Terrorism”.

Question 3, for the first time in a national consultation, directly attacks the EU: “There are some who believe that the ineffective way Brussels has dealt with migration is in correlation with frequent terrorist attacks. Do you agree with this opinion?”. This question’s aims to cause fear in the society, all the while assigning the entirety of the blame for the situation to the European Union.

Question 5 reintroduces the importance of the quality of living to Hungarian people, however this time, in connection with migration. Living costs were previously determined as deciding factors in what Hungarian people usually take into account when choosing a political force to support. However now, the traditionally left-wing populist angle of this issue area is supplemented by the right-wing populist opposition to migration. “Many opinions circulate on the question of migration. Some believe that migrants would endanger the jobs and livelihood of Hungarian people. Do you agree with this opinion?”

Question 6 perceives the European Union to be weak and ineffective and leads with the idea that perhaps a new leadership would be able to tackle these obstacles better in the future. Viktor Orbán often refers to himself as the only leader left whose intentions are truly in favor of European people. However, with the last European Parliament elections having been held in 2014, this question does not necessarily relate to FIDESZ’s concrete plans regarding elections. The intention of it is to introduce the EU as the main enemy into public discourse.

“Would you support the Hungarian government to counter Brussels’ permissive strategy and to implement stricter rules on migration?” – reads *Question 7*. This is the first question in national consultations so far which asks for direct permission to counter an EU policy. The European Union is yet again portrayed as a weak organization which cannot save European citizens from danger; therefore, the Hungarian government needs to act on its own. Here the frame *Hungary as a colony to the European Union* appears, drawing attention to how important it is to keep national sovereignty in case the EU can no longer perform its duties efficiently.

Question 12 proposes that the government should support Hungarian families and unborn children instead of immigrants. Two important right-wing populist arguments are connected here, the focus on traditional families and the opposition of migration. The government introduces a narrative in which the Hungarian identity could be endangered in the long run if more immigrants arrive to the country than babies are being born.

The 2015 consultation’s main themes are migration and terrorism, which are still pivotal points of the government’s communication strategy in 2023. “Brussels wants to create migrant ghettos also in Hungary. Brussels wants to decide instead of us who we want to live with, who we want to let in to our country. They want to force us to let in migrants to our country before

the evaluation of asylum-seeking documents. This way they want to create migrant ghettos in Hungary.” – reads *Question 4*.

Question 5 provides the perfect example to how quickly the Hungarian government is able to tie new crises to their already existing main narratives, in this case, using the threat of terrorism. While in 2015, terrorism appears in consultations in connection to the migration wave, in 2023, it is now linked to Israel and Palestine. Naturally, this is a unique case to the 2023 national consultation, however it shows how FIDESZ frames a current issue in favor of their own political agenda: “Brussels has given donations to certain Palestinian organizations, which now have reached Hamas. (...) A part of this donation has reached the terrorist organization Hamas. In Europe masses of migrants are celebrating the terrorist attacks in the Middle East, therefore because of the migration wave endorsed by Brussels, terrorism is also a threat in Europe today.”

6.4. National Consultations in 2017

The direct attack on Brussels in 2015 seemed to work for the government. As a result, the next national consultation released in April of 2017 is titled “Stop Brussels”.

Three of the six questions use the frame *Hungary as a welfare state*, but all of them in connection with how Brussels wants to have a say in Hungary’s economic policies and sometimes even rejects them outright. Therefore, the third frame in the 2023 consultation, *Hungary as a colony of the European Union* is also manifesting itself through the questions in 2017. The main message of these questions is that if it was not for Brussels, Hungary would have been able to enforce all previously promised economic reforms, making life easier for Hungarians.

One of the most typical examples of this is the living cost support the Hungarian government provides to subsidize the energy consumption of households. *Question 1* of both the 2017 and 2023 consultations are almost the same. “Brussels is preparing to take a dangerous step. They want to force us to cancel the living cost support. What do you think Hungary should do? Option A: We should protect the living cost support. Energy prices in Hungary should be determined in Hungary Option B: We should accept the plan of Brussels and let multinational companies decide upon energy costs”. The narrative of multinational companies reappears here after being completely left out of the 2015 consultation.

In 2023, however, multinational companies are no longer mentioned in relation to the living cost support. Here, the importance of another commonly used narrative, Hungarian people's better quality of life and the protection of families are more emphasized instead: "Brussels wants to cancel the living cost support. The European Commission wants to force us to cancel the living cost support. They say that "policies aiming to support people with paying energy costs should be slowly abolished". They want to cancel such a policy which helps Hungarian families spare 181 thousand forints [approximately 465 euros] every month."

Question 5 is about how the government has been able to create more job opportunities for people without listening to Brussels's suggestions, however now the EU wants to cancel all of these. In *Question 6* FIDESZ is determined to decrease taxes in Hungary, however, Brussels is constantly attacking Hungary because of this. These two questions are other examples of the government diverting blame to the EU and praising themselves for successful economic policies, correlating with the frame *Hungary as a colony to the European Union*.

Question 2 and *3* circle back to the topics of migration and terrorism, depicting again how central these narratives are to FIDESZ's communication. *Question 2* in the 2017 consultation is the following: "Lately terrorist attacks have been very common in Europe. Brussels wants to force Hungary to let illegal migrants into the country. What do you think Hungary should do? Option A: In order to ensure the safety of Hungarian people, illegal migrants should be put under surveillance until the authorities have decided upon their fate. Option B: We should let illegal migrants freely roam Hungary."

Question 4 introduces a new narrative which would later be the main focus of the national consultation in 2023: "More and more organizations funded from abroad have the aim to steer politics invisibly in Hungary. The operation of these endangers the sovereignty of Hungary. What should Hungary do? Option A: We force them to register what country or organization supports them, and what is the aim of their operation. Option B: We let them continue their risky operation without checking up on them". The 2023 questionnaire itself is titled "National Consultation on the Protection of Sovereignty", showing how this narrative, originating from 2017, is also a pivotal point of government communication nowadays.

The fear large organizations or other countries having a say in a country's operations is traditionally associated with left-wing populism. *Question 11* of the 2023 consultation refers to this narrative the following way: "They want to influence Hungarian politics with money coming from Brussels and "from overseas". Lately organizations from abroad have supported Hungarian political figures and activist groups with billions. This is how they want to achieve

Hungary changing its opinion on crucial issues. A lot of people think this is none other than political corruption”.

The next national consultation was released in the same year with the title of “National Consultation on the Soros Plan”. This introduces yet again a new rival to the Hungarian government, the billionaire philanthropist George Soros. Soros’s role as an enemy is ideologically dual in its nature. He is accused of being part of a global conspiracy, a puppet master, who is trying to control world politics in a way that it would harm Hungary. The picture of an evil businessman being part of the world elite can be associated with left-wing populism. According to the questions however, George Soros’s aim is to flood Hungary and Europe with migrants, striving for a cultural change and the rise of cosmopolitanism. The aim that George Soros is described of having also corresponds with the right-wing populist fear of nations and traditions losing their relevancy.

Question 1 describes Soros’s alleged plan: “George Soros wants to convince Brussels that they should welcome one million migrants annually from Africa and the Middle East to the territory of the European Union, including Hungary. His goal has been for years to change Europe and European societies. (...) This is supported by the European Parliament, who endorse replacement mechanisms and the creation of migration routes”. In this scenario George Soros’s power is described to be so influential, that he even stands above the EU and its policies.

Migration is thus presented as part of an overarching global conspiracy, which has the aim to eradicate the different cultures and traditions in Europe. *Question 6* directly refers to this: “The aim of the Soros plan is to make European languages and culture disappear in the background in order to make the integration of migrants easier. George Soros has written about this in his book “Open Society” and believes in the failure of the nation state. (...) He has urged NGOs to become the sponsors of migration”. This is foreshadowing the government’s future crackdown on NGOs in Hungary, mainly targeting those organizations which have close ties to Soros, who now must declare whether the money they have received from abroad is over 7,2 million forints [approximately 18.500 euros] (2017/LXXVI.). The law, voted in favor of by the parliament in 2017 June, has created a hostile environment for NGOs, clearly aiming at restricting their political activities (Nyilas, 2017).

Question 7 tries to explain why the EU’s negative critique about Hungary is linked to George Soros. “Part of the Soros Plan is to politically attack countries, which are against migration, and to punish them. The biggest obstacles to the Soros plan are those governments which stick to national sovereignty and are against illegal migration. (...) Soros and multiple decision makers in Brussels are attacking us because of this reason. The European Commission

proposes that for each unaccepted immigrant, the government should pay 78 million forints [approximately 200.549 Euros]. For a sum like this, a Hungarian worker has to work for decades”. The government praises itself for standing up for national sovereignty, even if this in turn would mean being punished by the EU. The question of the financial well-being of a Hungarian citizen is mentioned here, trying to invoke the feeling of injustice in voters by pointing out that they have to work decades to accumulate the same amount of money that the European Commission is now demanding in turn for each immigrant that is not accepted into the country.

Although George Soros is not directly mentioned in any of the question in 2023, the campaign introducing the consultation depicts his son, Alexander Soros, being accused of pulling the strings of politics jointly with Brussels, as seen on *Figure 1*.

6.5. National Consultation in 2018

In 2018, as elections were coming up, FIDESZ started to focus on its image as being a family-friendly party, therefore the title of this year’s consultation is “National Consultation on the Protection of Children”. This has been partly in response to migration, since FIDESZ believes that the structural problems deriving from an aging society can be solved with more children being born instead of welcoming immigrants into the country, as articulated in *Question 1*.

The ideological tone of this questionnaire is right-wing populist, being heavily against migration, and supporting the traditional model of families. *Question 10* refers to the importance of a child having both a father and a mother, which would be later articulated in a controversial change in the Constitution in 2020, which now makes it very difficult for same-sex or single parents to adopt children: “ ... a child has the right to grow up in a family where they receive the loving care of both a mother and a father. Do you agree with the fundamental value that the child has the right for both a father and a mother?”.

This question is the first one so far after examining all previous consultations which signals FIDESZ’s negative stance against the LGBTQ+ community, which will become important in later campaigns. *Question 10* in the 2023 consultation refers to this as: “Brussels wants to abolish the child-protection law. Brussels has been continuously attacking the Hungarian child protection law. The European Commission has attacked this regulation. Meanwhile, more and more news report on the aggressive LGBTQ+ propaganda targeting children”.

Question 11 brings forward an enemy, which is constantly referred to in FIDESZ's other communication platforms, however rarely present in national consultations, the previous government: "In Hungary, the socialist-liberal coalition getting into office in 2002 has abolished the tax relief after children and other family related support. Many believe that one of the cornerstones of raising a child is for them to be in reliable and secure environment, therefore policies supporting families should only be amended by a two-thirds majority in parliament".

6.6. National Consultation in 2020

The next national consultation was released in 2020, asking people about the economic reopening of the country after the pandemic. Most of the questions refer to the pandemic, for example *Question 3* asking the opinion of the people about implementing stricter rules to protect the elderly living in care homes from the spread of COVID-19. However, besides asking the population about issues relevant to the pandemic, there are some narratives from older consultations which reappear here.

Question 6 accuses Brussels of not handling the outbreak of the virus properly and praises Hungarian authorities for being able to effectively counter the intensive spread of the virus. This again portrays *Hungary as a colony of the European Union*, where the EU's policies fail to meet the needs of citizens, and support can only be expected from the Hungarian government. *Question 7* reintroduces the reference to multinational companies: "The protection of Hungarian people's health and safety is more important than anything. This is the reason why the government has decided that the protection against the pandemic should not have any financial obstacles. Everyone has to share the burdens of this equally. Do you think that multinational companies and banks should contribute financially to the fight against the virus?".

George Soros is also a reoccurring enemy figure in this consultation, namely in *Question 10*: "In order to tackle the recession following the pandemic, Soros has come up with a new plan. He advises EU member states to take loans, which would be so expensive that the next few generations would have to pay it back (...) Do you support the plan of George Soros which would make Hungary be in debt for an indefinite amount of time?".

Question 11 refers back to the importance of protecting Hungarian sovereignty, fearing that international actors would infiltrate the economy: "Because of the recession caused by the pandemic, many companies in Hungary are going bankrupt. There is the risk that this would be

abused by international speculants, trying to acquire Hungarian companies with strategic importance”.

Question 12 and 13 revisit the topic of migration: “... according to the decision of the ECJ, even during the pandemic, migrants should be let into the territory of the country. This is in accordance with George Soros’s old plan to welcome one million new migrants annually into Europe”.

Question 13 asks for direct permission from the population for the government to go against policies decided upon on the EU level similarly to how it was first done in 2015. “Brussels is preparing to attack the Hungarian Constitution’s clauses on migration. They want to force us to change the migration-related regulations in our Constitution. Do you agree that even in case of an open conflict with Brussels, the Hungarian government should stick to the regulations against migration?”

6.7. National Consultations in 2021

The national consultation which was released in February 2021 is the first one that does not contain any populist narratives. These questions all refer to how the country should deal with the pandemic, how vaccines should be rolled out, whether to cancel the curfew, to reopen sport facilities and concert halls.

Only a few months later, in August 2021, the government released a new consultation titled: “On Life after the Pandemic”. *Question 1* already sets the tone of the entire questionnaire, indicating the return of the government’s strategy to gain support through fearmongering and making up threats coming from outside of the country. “There are some who believe that the world has changed in a lot of ways since the pandemic and a dangerous time period has started. Hungary needs to be strengthened in order to be able to tackle the new challenges. What do you think?”.

Question 2, 3, 4, 8 all frame Hungary as a welfare state. *Question 2* proposes that Hungary should raise the minimum wage, through which they could make sure that not only multinational companies, but also Hungarian people benefit from Hungary’s improving economy. *Question 8* proposes that Brussels wants to implement new taxes on multinational companies for environmental damages, which would in turn be paid for the Hungarian people through raising energy costs. This question mixes blame attribution to Brussels with the narrative of multinational companies transferring their payment duties to the ordinary people

and thus, directly endangering the economic well-being of Hungarians. All three of these are popular components of narratives in previous consultations as well.

Question 3 refers to how some of the welfare policies of the government, such as family support, should be put under constitutional protection, so it would be very difficult for future governments to abolish these. "Others believe this is not necessary, the price of the recession should be paid for by the people" - the threat of ordinary citizens having to pay back the debt that the recession has caused, and the government being portrayed as the savior of people trying to avoid higher living costs signals the remaining relevance of the narrative of Hungarian's economic well-being in 2021 as well.

Question 4, similarly to the 2018 consultation, references the previous government: "There are some who say that in order to strengthen Hungary, we have to strive for having the lowest work-related taxes in Europe. Others believe this is not necessary, and we should go back to how things were during the Gyurcsány government and raise the taxes." Although accusing the previous government of inefficiency is a central pillar of FIDESZ's communication on other platforms, such as billboards, speeches and media, this is only the second time so far during the analysis when the previous socialist government was referenced. National consultations seem to favor depicting enemies coming from the outside, such as Brussels and George Soros. Since many people cannot specifically describe what their level of influence is in Hungary, it is easier to attribute blame to them. The previous government is not referenced by the 2023 consultation, however similarly to Soros, the former prime minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány is mentioned in the campaign of promoting the consultation (Magyarország Kormánya, 2023).

Question 7 applies the frame of *Hungary being a colony of the European Union*, and yet again asks for the permission of Hungarian people for the government to take a stance against Brussels: "Brussels will abuse its powers after the pandemic has been over, and will start prosecuting our home, to force its will on Hungarians. There are some who believe that Hungary should stand up for its interests. Others believe that we should allow Brussels to do what they have been doing." This question being present in the 2021 national consultation might refer to the EU taking a harsher stance on Hungary that same year, therefore support from the people and vindication of Brussels in this situation is crucial to uphold the popularity of the government less than a year before the national elections in April 2022.

The George Soros narrative returns in *Question 9*, however, now it is connected to the Child Protection Law: "Organizations, sponsored by George Soros, have started a large-scale international attack on Hungary because of the Child Protection Law. This law prohibits the spread of propaganda containing sexual references to children in kindergartens, schools and

media. What do you think?”. In *Question 10*, the Soros plan, first introduced in the 2017 national consultation returns, warning that Soros will attack Hungary yet again after the pandemic, because Hungarians are against illegal migration.

Question 12 and *13* contain references to migration as well: “The bureaucrats in Brussels and the organizations of George Soros believe that in the years after the pandemic, migration should be sped up.” *Question 13* introduces the importance of a “migrantSTOP” after the pandemic since immigrants might carry unknown variants of COVID-19 with them. Migration is now linked to the pandemic, proving again how easily can FIDESZ shape a current political event in a way that benefits them politically by mixing it together with previous narratives known to be successful.

6.8. National Consultation in 2022

The 2022 national consultation was in response to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and is about the sanctions the EU was planning to impose on Russia. Hungary has taken a ‘pro-peace’ stance early in the war, however having no concrete proposals on the de-escalation of the war. They have tried to tone down attempts in the EU to counter the attack of Russia, deeming these ‘tools to escalate the war’.

Hungary has close ties with Russia as some of its dependence stems from historical reasons, for example up until the war, Hungary had purchased natural gas and oil from Moscow for decades. However, in the last couple of years, the relationship between Orbán and Putin has gotten increasingly friendlier, which might be one of the reasons behind Hungary’s heavy opposition of the sanction packages on Russia.

All six questions in the consultation encompass one specific area of the sanctions Brussels plans to impose on Russia. These are then all connected to arguments which would show the hardships European families would have to endure in case the sanctions would be implemented. For example, *Question 3* is formulated in the following way: “The sanctions from Brussels also concern raw materials. Brussels has prohibited the transport of solid fuels (like coal) from Russia. There is a ban on wood and steel as well, and they want to extend it to other raw materials. This measure has resulted in raising costs, which would further increase the pressure on families.”

Question 1 is about sanctions on oil, mentioning specifically that in case the sanctions would be implemented, it would lead to serious problems in Hungary’s economy. *Question 2* is about

sanctions on Russian natural gas, *Question 4* on nuclear heating elements, *Question 5* about the nuclear powerplant in Paks being endangered by sanctions since Hungary has made a deal with Russia for a second power plant to be built next to the previous one. *Question 6* is about the effects of banning Russians to enter the EU on tourism. These questions portray Brussels as the evil hegemon, who does not take into account the needs of Hungary and its people, and imposes whatever sanction they seem fit, without seeing the bigger picture. Brussels is therefore portrayed as a heartless empire, which treats Hungary as its colony.

Question 7 revisits one of the pivotal points in FIDESZ's communication strategy, migration. "Sanctions increase the prices of food; therefore, they lead to a new migration wave. Raising the costs of gas contributes to raising costs of produce of agricultural products (...), which would in turn increase the risk of starvation in developing countries. This would lead to an even bigger migration wave than before, putting pressure on the borders of the EU."

In early 2022, very soon after Russia has attacked Ukraine, the government has released huge billboards on which they were advocating for peace. FIDESZ using the potential threat of war as a pivotal point in their election campaign in 2022 was successful in mobilizing their voter base in such a way, that never-before-seen results were reached during the elections, resulting in yet another two-thirds majority in parliament. Advocating for peace and accusing the EU and opposition parties of being pro-war has proven to be such a successful communication tactic that it has become a reoccurring theme in FIDESZ communication, including national consultations. Out of the eleven questions in the 2023 consultation, four concern the war Ukraine.

6.9. Discussion of Results

Table 2: Results of Coding

			Results	Years	Results
Left-Wing Populism	<i>Hungary as a welfare state</i>		27	2011	6
	<i>Other Left-Wing Populist Arguments Not Captured by Coding Scheme</i>	NGOs	3	2012	2
		Soros conspiracy	12	2015	5
		Multinational Companies	6	2017	13
Right-Wing Populism	<i>Hungary as a protector</i>		35	2018	5
	<i>Other Right-Wing Populist Arguments Not Captured by Coding Scheme</i>	Reference to glorious past	1	2020	8
Mixed	<i>Hungary as a colony of the European Union</i>	Colonialism, EU portrayed as empire	16	2021	10
		Protection of National Sovereignty	11	2022	7
Enemies		EU/Brussels	34	2023	11
		George Soros	12		
		Previous Government	2		

Table 2 depicts the number of occurrences for each category in the analysis of the national consultations as well as the number of statements which fit into the coding scheme annually.

The 2023 consultation summarizes most of the narratives FIDESZ has been using in the last fourteen years. Prior to coding, these were sorted into three frames: *Hungary as a welfare state*, *Hungary as a protector* and *Hungary as a colony of the European Union*. All of these frames include the characteristics of either left- or right-wing populism.

However, after the coding of previous national consultations, the nuances between what constitutes each end of the populist spectrum have become less clear as seen on *Table 2*. This can be most particularly seen when examining the third frame, *Hungary as a colony of the European Union*, which can have a more left-wing, post-colonial undertone, while in other consultations the focus on national sovereignty makes arguments coded with this frame more right-wing populist. Thus, this frame, instead of being sorted into either left- or right-wing populism, is depicted as a *Mixed* category on *Table 2*.

Despite this, 48 questions (not including the ones coded with the frame *Hungary as a colony of the European Union*) were assigned left-wing populist codes, mainly referring to Hungary's role as a welfare state, protecting citizens from economic hardships and increasing living costs. There are other references to left-wing populist narratives as seen on *Table 2*, such as the conspiracy that there is a 'world elite' controlling everything from above, often associated with George Soros. In addition, questions which have aimed at accusing multinational companies and NGOs of being enemies of Hungary have been also assigned a left-wing populist code. Accusing multinational companies of hindering the economic well-being of citizens was

one of the pivotal narratives used in early consultations and is still present in later questionnaires. The dialogue on NGOs however has peaked in 2017, and after that its importance has gradually decreased, with only being vaguely mentioned in *Question 11* of 2023.

Hungary as a welfare state has been the most often reoccurring frame, with some of the earlier consultations, such as the one in 2012, completely focusing on questions on the quality of life of the population. This frame has been constant throughout the rest of the consultations as well, however later consultations, serving as rather summaries of previously mentioned narratives, combine the question of welfare with other issue areas. This is very well illustrated in later consultations when the welfare of Hungarian people is connected to the government's refusal of accepting the EU's decision to distribute immigrants between member states. The relevance of this frame may stem from the communist tradition, further elaborated on in *Section 2.3.1.*, through which political forces have learnt that the Hungarian society is willing to cooperate as long as their economic needs are being met. Left-wing populist arguments being present in national consultations in such a large number signals that at least in its communication strategy, FIDESZ may not be as right-wing populist as it might have been previously expected based on literature.

35 questions were assigned right-wing populist frames. The frame *Hungary as a protector* encompasses all arguments where the government wishes to protect Hungary from different threats in an increasingly hostile political environment. Here, the Hungarian government promises protection from harmful leftist ideologies, migration and the LGBTQ+ community. It paints the picture of a deteriorating world order, where Hungarians need to be very cautious of keeping their traditions and identities, otherwise they would feel the threat of extinction or being oppressed yet again by great powers. In addition to the protection of values which are referred to as traditional in FIDESZ's view, questions which have contained references to migration, terrorism and the glorious historical past were also assigned the right-wing populist code.

Even though the topic of the government protecting Hungary from outside threats was previously mentioned in the first consultation of 2011 on the new constitution, it has only become an essential part of national consultations after 2015. There is an increase in right-wing populist arguments after 2015, when migration has become a hot topic in Hungarian politics. FIDESZ has always portrayed itself as a conservative party after 2010, but the way they approach right-wing issue areas has become increasingly radical after the migration wave, which can be seen in the shift in their communication in consultations. Previously, attacking immigrants or the LGBTQ+ community was not part of FIDESZ's agenda in national

consultations, however these have been referenced more and more as the analysis progressed. FIDESZ might have realized in the wake of right-wing populist leaders winning elections around the world after the recession, that focusing on issue areas, such as migration, previously not part of mainstream Hungarian politics, can be a successful communication tool and can mobilize voters whose political opinions were not represented by the government before. The tendency in the Hungarian population to have increasingly right-wing preferences is shown by the sudden rise of the Jobbik party around this time, which was much more radical on these topics than FIDESZ was at the time (Gallo, 2021). The sudden inclusion of these narratives into national consultations might have also been a response to FIDESZ's fear of losing their voter base to more radical parties.

Hungary as a colony of the European Union proved to be the most difficult frame to assign statements to. Overall, 27 questions were coded with this frame, keeping in mind that according to the coding scheme, one question could have been assigned multiple codes to be able to truly capture their essence. When directly mentioning the European Union, the statements in national consultations have two different undertones as seen on *Table 2*. They can regard the EU as an empire, trying to colonize all of Europe and by mobilizing the economic anxieties of voters, the EU can be portrayed as an elitist and capitalist organization in correspondence with left-wing populist narratives.

However, in some cases the focus of keeping the country's sovereignty does not always have a colonial undertone, it is rather a right-wing populist argument to keep the country independent from outside influence and striving for national sovereignty. Before coding, this frame was predicted to be left-wing populist in its nature, however as seen in the analysis, both left- and right-wing populist understandings of the same narrative were present in consultations. The double nature of this code in itself proves that FIDESZ as a party cannot easily be determined to be strictly either right- or left-wing populist. They seem to use both ideologies, and they shape their narratives in accordance with which combination of right- and left-wing populism do they believe to be most effective in pushing the right buttons of the Hungarian population.

The number of populist arguments coded has significantly increased throughout the years, reaching the highest number in 2017, when all 13 questions from both consultations from that year have been assigned a code. In 2012, 2 out of the 16 questions were assigned a populist code, while this number has changed to 5 out of 12 in 2015. In case the latest consultation in 2023, all eleven questions have received a populist code.

The frequency of some frames compared to others illustrate what issues in the Hungarian society can shift political opinions in the direction of the preference of the ruling party often based on the importance citizens attribute to their welfare, the fear of the unknown, and the fear to be dominated by outside powers yet again. Mixing and matching all these components in different forms in national consultations has become a strategy of FIDESZ, such as connecting migration with the welfare of Hungarians, or connecting George Soros with so called ‘LGBTQ+ propaganda’. The ruling party has the benefit of having had fourteen years to perfect their communication methods in national consultations and to determine what narratives (and the mixture of them) can mobilize voters.

The topics that national consultations touch upon have changed from one specific issue area to rather general summaries of different narratives. While the national consultation in 2011 only focused on the new constitution, the 2020, 2021 or 2023 consultations are touching on questions of welfare, migration, George Soros or war all at the same time. This shows how the importance of the content of the consultations has decreased over the years. The government’s aim in later years was not to ask for genuine deliberation on certain issues, but to inform citizens of FIDESZ’s current agenda and possibly gain political legitimacy through the number of ‘Yes’ votes on the questionnaires. The less specific focus of later consultations shows how FIDESZ has progressively abandoned elements which would make national consultations qualified to be regarded as real referendums. The real motivation behind consultations is to periodically remind the society of the narratives FIDESZ uses on other platforms to engage citizens in politics.

In terms of painting the picture of the enemies of Hungary such as Brussels or George Soros, there is an increase in occurrence of these in national consultations after 2015. In earlier consultations, through the phrase of “There are some...” the government has been able to make statements without directly attacking an entity. However, after the consultation on migration in 2015, FIDESZ has become way bolder in attributing blame to specific enemies, such as the European Union. This strategy seemed to have worked based on the increasing number of national consultations being sent back, which will be elaborated on later. Naming the enemy creates an entity in the eyes of voters that they can focus their hate towards instead of blaming the government for economic or political issues in the country. The EU has been named as an enemy 34 times, Soros 12 times, while a reference has been made to the previous socialist government only twice.

There is an interesting gap between 2012 and 2015 where no consultations were released. The shift in the nature of consultations between these two years is very noticeable. The 2012

consultation has kept its focus purely on economics, providing multiple answer options people could choose from, seemingly trying to trigger an actual dialogue on the topic or to at least inform citizens of the current economic policies going on. On the other hand, the 2015 questionnaire on migration provides no opposing opinions. The formulation of the questions is hostile, completely shifting the blame to Brussels, while this has not been the case previously.

The 2015 consultation was the first one which was filled out by one million people; leading to the government realizing the true potential in national consultations and has starting to use them purely as mouthpieces for their current political agenda. According to official government data, the consultation titled “Stop Soros” in 2017 was the most successful one thus far, with 2,4 million people sending the questionnaire back. Looking back at all consultations, it seems like the ones which contain either very extreme positions, such as the 2017 consultation on the Soros Plan, or the ones which summarize FIDESZ’s agenda are the most successful ones. This is shown again by the fact that the 2021 consultation about the pandemic, which did not contain any populist codes, was only sent back by 528.000 people, while the latter one in the same year foreshadowing a shifting world order where Hungary needs to be very cautious was sent back by 1,4 million voters (Hírklakk, 2022).

6.9.1. Overall Findings

Overall, the analysis shows how FIDESZ’s communication strategy cannot be strictly regarded as right-wing populist, a substantial part of arguments used in national consultations are indeed left-wing populist. The ruling party’s strategy’s success lies in their ability to shift the political conversation in a way that they know would appeal to a large chunk of voters, using both left- and right-wing populist arguments based on which can be more successful in political mobilization.

As Marks points out, political parties in Central-Eastern Europe can mobilize voters who have been disappointed in the new liberal-democratic capitalist system by promising protection from negative effects of market forces and defending traditional values in a cosmopolitan world (Marks et al., 2006). Thus, instead of going down the road of either left- or right-wing populist ideologies, FIDESZ cherry picks those arguments from both sides which they believe to have the biggest impact on the Hungarian society, including putting an emphasis on both welfare and identity politics. They have found the components which seem to work from both ends of the spectrum of populism and employ them in national consultations. One consultation can contain

arguments from both sides, as it is shown in later consultations, such as the one in 2023, or even one question can be formulated in a way that it includes left- and right-wing populist concerns as well.

Despite taking arguments from both sides, they still cannot be regarded as a centrist anti-establishment party based on the criteria Engler has articulated (Engler, 2020). Ideology is a central part of FIDESZ's communication, their sole aim is not only to counter the current establishment, but they attribute great importance to their ideological background and often highlight the values they stand by not only in political speeches, but also in national consultations.

The analysis illustrates how FIDESZ, in accordance with the hypothesis, display the characteristics of both left- and right-wing populism. Consultations possess a lot of right-wing populist qualities, however the number of left-wing populist arguments in the text cannot be disregarded. Orbán portrays himself as the champion of traditional values and positions himself with other right-wing leaders. However, it can be clearly seen through the distribution of the number of left- and right-wing populist arguments in national consultations that frames can appear from both ends of the spectrum depending on what they believe to resonate with the society. In order to do this efficiently, they have to be aware of the issues which have an effect on citizens taking into account history, welfare and traditions. They have been in Hungarian politics since 1989, during which period they have been able to master the perfect ideological mix in communication of right- and left-wing populism, which could keep them in power for an indefinite time period.

7. Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to analyze the ideological characteristics of populist frames present in national consultations released by the FIDESZ party. The theoretical framework was based on the ideational approach to populism which has allowed for the investigation of the presence of left- and right-wing populist narratives in national consultations through the qualitative content analysis of frames.

Having published thirteen national consultations, FIDESZ has been able to see which narratives are successful in triggering the population, and which narratives should be abandoned or remodeled. The government has realized that an effective way to distribute their agenda on the mass level is to use consultations, since these are then sent out to every household. These

consultations in their scope and language seem to target the average voter who might not even follow the current political discourse but could easily be influenced by the issue areas presented in the questionnaires.

Frames FIDESZ used in the national consultations are often simplified and serve as rather a summary of the broader understanding of its narratives. National consultations in their scope only provide enough space for the government to publish concentrated messages without providing a proper explanation to why they frame an issue in a particular way. National consultations summarize the main points FIDESZ makes on other forums and are also able to provide basic political cues for people, thus they are a good tool for FIDESZ to mobilize the voters who are not interested in politics beyond simple and catchy messages. These messages are then organized along the lines of those ideological components that FIDESZ believes to be the most effective when persuading voters.

Left- and right-wing populist arguments can be found almost equally in all examined national consultations between 2011 and 2023, which illustrates how FIDESZ, instead of emphasizing one given ideology in their communication, focuses on narratives from both ends of the spectrum that they believe to be effective in voter mobilization. In earlier national consultations left-wing populist arguments dominated the discourse and only after 2015 has the government started to implement an increasing number of right-wing populist narratives. In 2023 however, both left- and right-wing populism coexist in the consultation showing that even if throughout the years there have been periods where FIDESZ focused more on either one of them, both have a pivotal role in their communication strategy. The question of which narratives they employ merely depends on the political context the national consultations are released in, and what topics they believe to be effective in that given period to be used on society to gain support. Thus, FIDESZ's right-wing populist perception in literature can be contested based on their communication in national consultations.

Future research could shed light on the ideological components of FIDESZ's communication on other platforms as well, answering the question whether the case of national consultations mixing arguments from both ends of the spectrum is a unique case, or can it be applied to other forms of public dialogue as well. In addition, this thesis has collected the texts of all national consultations between 2011 and 2023 which data set can be useful in further research on other aspects of the consultations.

8. References

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Illustrations:

Figure 1 – Népszava. https://nepszava.hu/3216378_nyilt-tarsadalom-alapitvanyok-alex-soros-orban-kormany-magyarorszag-plakat-kampany

9. Appendix

9.1. Scan of 2023 National Consultation

NEMZETI KONZULTÁCIÓ

SZUVERENITÁSUNK VÉDELMEÉRŐL

KÉRJÜK, TÖLTSE KI A KÉRDŐÍVET!

1. Brüsszel el akarja törölni a rezsitámogatást.

Az Európai Bizottság arra akar minket kényszeríteni, hogy töröljék el a rezsitámogatást. Állásfoglalásukban azt írják, hogy „az energiátámogatási intézkedéseket fokozatosan meg kell szüntetni”. Egy olyan intézkedést akarnak eltörölni, amely havonta átlagosan 181 ezer forinttal csökkenti a magyar családok energiaszámláit.

ÖN MIT GONDOL ERRŐL?

- Továbbra is fenn kell tartani a rezsitámogatást.
- Nincs már szükség árszabályozásra az energiapiacra.

2. Brüsszel el akarja törölni a kamatstopot.

A banki kamatok az elmúlt időszakban nagyot emelkedtek. Ezért a kormány a családok védelme érdekében kamatstopot vezetett be, amely 300 ezer családot és közel 30 ezer vállalkozást véd. Brüsszel az úgynevezett országospecifikus ajánlásokban egyértelművé tette, hogy el akarja törölni ezt az intézkedést.

ÖN MIT GONDOL ERRŐL?

- A 2024-es évre is ki kell terjeszteni a kamatstopot.
- Brüsszelenk igazra van, ki kell vezetni az intézkedést.

3. Brüsszel meg akarja szüntetni a magyarországi extraprofitadót.

A kormány extraprofitadót vetett ki azokra a nagyvállalatokra, amelyek a járvány és a háborús válság idején jelentős extraprofitot halmoztak fel. Elvárjuk hogy ők is vegyék ki a részüket a közös teherviselésből. Brüsszel azonban azt akarja, hogy Magyarország idén év végéig szüntesse meg az extraprofitadókat.

ÖN MIT GONDOL ERRŐL?

- Fenn kell tartani az extraprofitadót.
- Nincs már szükség az extraprofit megadóztatására.

4. Brüsszel Magyarországon is migránsgettókat akar létrehozni.

Brüsszelben helyettünk akarnak dönteni arról, hogy kivel éljünk együtt, és kiket engedjünk be az országunkba. Kételesen akarnak minket, hogy már a menekültügyi kérelmek elbírálása előtt engedjük be a migránsokat az országba. Ezzel migránsgettókat hoznának létre Magyarországon is.

ÖN MIT GONDOL ERRŐL?

- Nem szabad engedni, hogy migránsgettók jöjjenek létre hazánkban.
- El kell fogadni a brüsszeli migrációs terveket.

5. A Brüsszel által palesztin szervezeteknek nyújtott támogatások a Hamászhoz is eljutottak.

Brüsszel az elmúlt években sok százezer euróval támogatta palesztin szervezeteket. A támogatás egy része a Hamász terroriszervezethez is eljutott. Európában bevándorlók támogatásáért ünneplik a közel-keleti terroráldozatokat, így a Brüsszel által ösztönözött bevándorlás révén a terrorizmus ma már Európát is fenyegeti.

ÖN MIT GONDOL ERRŐL?

- A terrorfenyegettség miatt Brüsszelenk be kell fejeznie a palesztin szervezetek támogatását.
- Brüsszelenk – függetlenül a terrorfenyegetettségtől – továbbra is támogatnia kell a palesztin szervezeteket.

6. Brüsszel még több fegyvert küldene Ukrajnának.

Brüsszel a kezdetektől fogva háborúpárti álláspontot képviselt, és fegyverszállítást sürgetett. Ennek megfelelően már eddig is több mint 5 milliárd eurót költött az ukrán hadsereg fejlesztésére. A legújabb javaslat szerint pedig további 20 milliárd eurót adnának Ukrajna felfegyverzésére.

ÖN MIT GONDOL ERRŐL?

- Fegyverszállítás helyett tüzszünetre és békére van szükség.
- Még több, uniós pénzből vásárolt fegyvert kell küldeni a hadszíntérre.

7. Brüsszel még több pénzt akar Ukrajna támogatására.

Az Európai Bizottság további 50 milliárd euróval akarja támogatni Ukrajnát. Mivel ez az összeg a jelenlegi uniós költségvetésben nem áll rendelkezésre, a tagállamoktól akarnak pluszforrásokat kicsikarni. Úgy kérnek Magyarországtól további hozzájárulást, hogy hazánk jó ideje nem kapja meg a neki szerződés szerint járó uniós pénzeket. Magyarország már eddig is sok milliárd forintot költött az Ukrajnából menekülők megsegítésére.

ÖN MIT GONDOL ERRŐL?

- Ne fizessünk többet Ukrajna támogatására, amíg a nekünk járó pénz nem kaptuk meg.
- Akkor is fogadjuk el a brüsszeli kérést, ha a nekünk járó pénzt továbbra sem biztosítják.

8. Brüsszel Ukrajnát is fel akarja venni az Európai Unióba.

Erősödnek az Ukrajna teljes jogú EU-tagságát szorgalmazó hangok, pedig egy hadviselő országról van szó. Ukrajna felvétele alapjaiban forgatná fel a jelenlegi uniós támogatási rendszereket. A jelenlegi szabályok alapján teljes jogú tagként Ukrajna kapná az uniós források jelentős részét.

ÖN MIT GONDOL ERRŐL?

- Még nem adottak a feltételek Ukrajna teljes jogú tagságához.
- Mindenképp támogatni kell Ukrajna teljes jogú tagságát.

9. Brüsszel be akarja engedni a génmódosított ukrán gabonát.

A háború kirobbanása után Brüsszel megnyitotta a határokat az ukrán gabonaszállítmányok előtt. Az intézkedésnek elvileg az volt a célja, hogy a szállítmányok eljussanak a világ szegényebb régióiba. A génmódosított ukrán gabona jelentős része azonban ehelyett elárastotta a kelet-európai országok piacait, és rendkívül nehéz helyzetbe hozta a térség termelőit. Magyarország megtiltotta az ukrán gabona behozatalát, de Brüsszel továbbra is azt akarja, hogy engedjük be a génmódosított ukrán gabonát.

ÖN MIT GONDOL ERRŐL?

- Minden lehetséges módon ki kell állni a magyar gazdákért, és biztosítani kell a magyar mezőgazdaság GMO-mentességét.
- Meg kell nyitnunk a piacunkat a génmódosított ukrán gabona előtt.

10. Brüsszel el akarja törölni a gyermekvédelmi törvényt.

Brüsszelenk folyamatosan támadják a magyar gyermekvédelmi törvényt. Az Európai Bizottság bíróságban is megtámadta a jogszabályt. Eközben egyre több hír lát napvilágot a gyermekeket célzó agresszív LMBTQ-propagandáról.

ÖN MIT GONDOL ERRŐL?

- Tovább kell szigorítani a gyermekvédelmi szabályozást.
- Brüsszel javaslata alapján enyhíteni kell a gyermekvédelmi törvényt.

11. Brüsszelenk és a tengerentúlról küldött pénzekkel akarják befolyásolni a magyar politikát.

Az elmúlt időszakban különböző külföldi szervezetek milliárdos összegekkel támogattak magyar politikai szereplőket és hozzájuk kapcsolódó aktivistacsoportokat. Így akarják kikényszeríteni, hogy Magyarország változtassa meg álláspontját a meghatározó kérdésekben. Sokak szerint ez nem más, mint politikai korrupció.

ÖN MIT GONDOL ERRŐL?

- Szigorúbban, akár törvényi szigorítással is fel kell lépni a külföldi befolyászszerzés ellen.
- A jelenlegi jogi szabályozás megfelelő.

A kérdőív visszaküldése ingyenes. Feladási határidő: 2024. január 10.
Feladás kiadó: Miniszterelnöki Kabinetiroda (1014 Budapest, Színház utca 1.)

9.2. Questions in National Consultations 2011–2022

2011a:

1. Vannak, akik szerint az új magyar alkotmánynak csak az állampolgárok jogait kellene deklarálnia, kötelezettségeket nem. Mások szerint a jogok biztosítása mellett a legfontosabb, a közösség iránti felelősségünket kifejező állampolgári kötelezettségeknek (munka, tanulás, honvédelem, környezetünk védelme) is helyt kell adni a dokumentumban.
2. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy az új magyar alkotmánynak korlátoznia kell az állam mindenkori eladósodásának mértékét, ezzel is felelősséget vállalva a jövő nemzedékekért. Mások szerint az alkotmánynak nem szükséges ilyen garanciát tartalmaznia.
3. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy az új magyar alkotmány olyan közös értékeket is vegyen védelem alá, mint a család, a rend, az otthon, a munka, az egészség. Mások szerint ez nem szükséges.
4. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy azok a szülők, akik kiskorú gyermeket nevelnek, az új magyar alkotmány értelmében valamilyen módon gyakorolhassák gyermekük szavazati jogát.
5. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy az új magyar alkotmány ne engedélyezze a mindenkori kormányok számára, hogy megadóztathassák a gyermeknevelés költségeit (azaz, a gyermeknevelés költségeit ismerje el a mindenkori adórendszer). Mások szerint erre nincs szükség, a mindenkori kormányok számára meg kell hagyni e költségek megadóztatásának jogát is.
6. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy az új magyar alkotmány vállaljon kötelezettséget a jövő nemzedékek iránt. Mások szerint nem szükséges az ilyen kötelezettségvállalás. Ön mit gondol?
7. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy az új magyar alkotmány közbeszerzésben való részvételt, illetve, állami támogatást csak olyan gazdasági társaság számára tegyen lehetővé, amelynek tulajdonosi szerkezete átlátható.
8. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy Magyarország új alkotmánya fejezze ki a határon túl élő magyarsággal való nemzeti összetartozás értékét, mások szerint erre nincs szükség.
9. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy Magyarország új alkotmánya védje a Kárpát-medence természeti sokféleségét, a csak itt honos állat- és növényfajokat, a hungarikumokat.
10. Vannak, akik azt gondolják, hogy az új alkotmánynak védenie kell a nemzeti vagyont,

különös tekintettel a termőföldet és a vízkészletet. Mások ezt nem tartják fontosnak.

11. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy Magyarország új alkotmánya tegye lehetővé a bíróságok számára a tényleges életfogytiglani szabadságvesztés kiszabását a kiemelt súlyosságú bűncselekmények esetében.

12. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy Magyarország új alkotmánya büntetés terhe mellett tegye kötelezővé a megjelenést annak, akinek az Országgyűlés valamelyik vizsgálóbizottsága meghallgatásra idézést küld.

2011b:

1. Vannak, akik szerint be kellene vezetni Magyarországon a védett kor intézményét, mert aki 55 éves elmúlt és elveszíti a munkáját, annak most alig van esélye újra elhelyezkedni. Mások azt mondják, nincs szükség a védett kor bevezetésére.

2. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy az állam szorítsa korlátok közé a közműszolgáltatók (víz, szemét, csatorna, gáz, villany, távfűtés) magánérdekeit: ne engedje, hogy extraprofitot szedjenek be és emiatt megfizethetlenné váljanak a rezsiköltségek. Mások szerint az államnak nem szabad beavatkozni a közműszolgáltató magánvállalatok árképzésébe. Megint mások azt mondják, csak azokat védje az állam a közműdíjak emelkedésétől, akik erre rászorulnak.

3. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy az ország segély helyett inkább munkalehetőséggel segítse a munkanélkülieket. Mások szerint a segélyezés a megoldás a munkanélküliség problémájára.

4. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy több nyugdíjat kapjanak azok, akik gyermeket vállaltak és neveltek föl, mert az is teljes értékű munkavégzés. Mások szerint éppen elég az, hogy a gyermekvállalás költségeit mostantól nem lehet megadóztatni.

5. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy az állam a szociális segélyt a rászorulóknak ne pénzben, hanem alapvető szükségleti cikkekben (pl. élelmiszer) adja. Mások szerint a szociális segélyt továbbra is pénzben kell folyósítani a rászorulók számára.

6. Vannak, akik szerint a deviza alapú lakáshittel rendelkezőknek állami segítséget kell nyújtani, hogy ne kerüljenek az utcára. Mások szerint az államnak nem kell segítséget nyújtani senkinek, aki nem tudja fizetni az adósságát.

7. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy ismét lehessen fölvenni deviza alapú lakáshitelt, mert az elmúlt évek történései alapján mindenki tisztában van a kockázatokkal. Mások szerint veszélyes lenne feloldani a deviza alapú lakáshitelek tilalmát, mert újra ugyanaz történe, ami korábban.

8. Vannak, akik szerint a gyógyszergyárak lobbiját meg kell törni, mert sok milliárdot vesznek ki az emberek zsebéből. Vannak, akik szerint a drágább gyógyszereket erőltetik rá a betegekre saját extraprofitjuk érdekében. Mások szerint nincs szükség arra, hogy a gyógyszergyártókkal szemben az állam föllépjen.

9. Vannak, akik szerint az egyéni számla alapján kiszámolt nyugdíj megállapításánál elsősorban a munkával eltöltött éveket kell figyelembe venni. Mások inkább a jövedelem arányában állapítanák meg a nyugdíjat.

10. Vannak, akik szerint az oktatási rendszert úgy kell átszervezni, hogy az állam közpénzből azokat a képzéseket támogassa elsősorban, amelyekkel valóban el is lehet helyezkedni. Mások szerint az oktatást nem kell a valós gazdasági igényekhez igazítani.

2012:

1. Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy a 20 főnél kevesebb embert foglalkoztató magyar vállalkozásoknak biztosítani kell az átalányadózás lehetőségét, mert így jobb eséllyel tarthatják meg alkalmazottaikat a válság közepette. Mások szerint nincs szükség a kis cégek ilyen módon történő megvédésére.

2. Vannak, akik szerint adó- és járulékmentessé kellene tenni a bérét azoknak, akik már nyugdíjba mehettek, de tovább dolgoznak. Mások azt mondják, nem kell segíteni a nyugdíjas korúakat, hogy a munka világában maradjanak.

3. Vannak, akik szerint a gyermekes családok szocpol támogatását ki kellene terjeszteni új személyautó vásárlására is.

Ön mit gondol?

4. Vannak, akik szerint továbbra is méltányos tehermegosztásra van szükség az állam, a nagyvállalatok, illetve a bankok és az emberek között akkor is, ha ez ellentétes az EU elvárásaival. Mások szerint a bankoknak és nagyvállalatoknak kisebb részt kell vállalni a válság terheiből, mert így tudják eredményessé tenni a gazdálkodásukat és segíteni a gazdaságot.

5. Vannak, akik szerint a magyar kormánynak kiemelten támogatnia kellene a nők, különösen a kisgyermekes anyukák munkába állását. Mások szerint erre nincs szükség, a kisgyermekes anyuka inkább maradjon otthon a gyermekével.

6. Vannak, akik szerint szükséges a minimálbér folyamatos emelése a magyar emberek biztonságos megélhetése érdekében. Mások szerint nincs szükség a minimálbér emelésére, mert az rontja a cégek versenyképességét.

7. Vannak, akik szerint adókedvezményt kellene kapniuk azoknak a cégeknek, amelyek új munkahelyeket hoznak létre. Mások szerint az adókedvezmény nem ösztönöz

munkahelyteremtésre.

8. Vannak, akik szerint az államnak több eszközzel, jobban kellene segítenie a fiatalokat az elhelyezkedésben. Mások szerint a fiatalok elég segítséget kapnak az államtól.

9. Vannak, akik szerint a munkanélküliség által leginkább sújtott területeken szabadvállalkozási zónák kialakítására lenne szükség. Külföldi példák bizonyítják, hogy az ilyen zónákban, ahol az új vállalkozások komoly adókedvezményt kapnak, gyorsan tudnak nagyszámú munkahelyet teremteni a helybelieknek. Mások szerint nem kell szabadvállalkozási zónákkal ösztönözni a munkahelyteremtést.

10. Vannak, akik úgy gondolják, az államnak vissza kell szorítania a monopóliumhelyzetben lévő nagyvállalatokat. Mások szerint nem kell föllépni a monopóliumok ellen; rendjén van, hogy a nagyhal megeszi a kishalát.

11. Vannak, akik szerint nem szabad megengedni, hogy a létfenntartáshoz szükséges szolgáltatásokat (víz, villany, gáz, szemétszállítás, távfűtés) biztosító cégek üzleti haszonra törekedjenek, ezért köztulajdonban kell tartani őket. Mások szerint helyes, hogy ezek a vállalatok profitérdekeltek.

12. Vannak, akik szerint az ország legnehezebb sorsú településein támogatni kell olyan szociális szövetkezetek működését, amelyek hasznos pénzkeresetet biztosítanak azoknak, akik korábban csak segélyekből ilyen megoldások.

13. Magyarország sokat tett eddig a bajba jutott devizahitelesek megmentéséért a kilakoltatási moratórium bevezetésével, a kedvezményes végtörlesztés és az árfolyamgát rendszerével, de vannak, akik szerint ez nem elég, további lépések szükségesek. Mások szerint nem kell többet tenni a devizahitelesekért.

14. Vannak, akik úgy vélik, méltányos lenne a válság idején, ha az alacsonyabb jövedelműek a cafeteriát készpénzben kapnák. Mások szerint a cafeteria-rendszeren nem kell változtatni, mert a bérkompenzáció elegendő segítség a kisebb keresetűeknek.

15. Vannak, akik szerint az lenne méltányos, ha az általános forgalmi adó érzékenyebb lenne, vagyis a létfenntartáshoz szükséges cikkek után alacsonyabb, a luxuscikkek után viszont magasabb áfát kellene fizetni. Mások szerint erre nincs szükség.

Ön mit gondol?

16. Vannak, akik szerint a kormánynak a válság idején is meg kell védenie a nyugdíjak vásárlóértékét. Mások szerint erre nincs lehetőség.

2015:

1. Sokféle véleményt lehet hallani az erősödő terrorcselekményekkel kapcsolatban. Ön mennyire tartja fontos kérdésnek a terrorizmus térnyerését (franciaországi vérengzés, az ISIS riasztó cselekményei) a saját élete szempontjából?
2. Ön szerint az elkövetkező években lehet-e terrorcselekmény célpontja Magyarország?
3. Vannak, akik szerint a Brüsszel által rosszul kezelt bevándorlás összefüggésben van a terrorizmus térnyerésével. Ön egyetért ezekkel a véleményekkel?
4. Tudta-e Ön, hogy a megélhetési bevándorlók törvénytelenül lépik át a magyar határt, és az elmúlt időszakban húszszorosára nőtt a bevándorlók száma Magyarországon?
5. Sokféle véleményt hallani a bevándorlás kérdésével kapcsolatban. Vannak, akik szerint a megélhetési bevándorlók veszélyeztetik a magyar emberek munkahelyeit és megélhetését.
6. Vannak, akik szerint Brüsszel politikája a bevándorlás és a terrorizmus kérdésben megbukott, és ezért új megközelítésre van szükség ezekben a kérdésekben. Ön egyetért ezekkel a véleményekkel?
7. Támogatná-e Ön a magyar kormányt, hogy Brüsszel megengedő politikájával szemben szigorúbb bevándorlási szabályozást vezessen be?
8. Támogatná-e Ön a magyar kormányt, hogy szigorúbb szabályokat vezessen be, ami alapján őrizetbe vehetők a magyar határt törvénytelenül átlépő bevándorlók?
9. Egyetért-e Ön azzal a véleménnyel, hogy a magyar határt törvénytelenül átlépő bevándorlókat a lehető legrövidebb időn belül vissza kell fordítani a saját hazájukba?
10. Egyetért-e Ön azzal, hogy a megélhetési bevándorlók, amíg Magyarországon tartózkodnak, saját maguk biztosítsák az ellátási költségeket?
11. Egyetért-e Ön azzal, hogy a bevándorlás elleni küzdelem legjobb eszköze, ha az Európai Unió tagországai segítik azon országok fejlődését, ahonnan a bevándorlók érkeznek?
12. Egyetért-e Ön a magyar kormánnyal abban, hogy a bevándorlás helyett inkább a magyar családok és a születendő gyermekek támogatására van szükség?

2017a:

1.Brüsszel veszélyes lépésre készül. A rezsicsökkentés eltörlésére akar kényszeríteni bennünket. Ön szerint mit tegyen Magyarország?

- Védjük meg a rezsicsökkentést. Ragaszkodjunk ahhoz, hogy a magyar energiaárakat Magyarországon határozzuk meg. (A)
- Fogadjuk el Brüsszel tervét, és bízunk a nagyvállalatokra a rezsidíjak megállapítását. (B)

2.Az elmúlt időszakban egymást követték a terrortámadások Európában. Ennek ellenére Brüsszel kényszeríteni akarja Magyarországot, hogy az illegális bevándorlókat engedjük be. Ön szerint mit tegyen Magyarország?

- A magyar emberek biztonsága érdekében felügyelet alá kell helyezni az illegális bevándorlókat addig, amíg a hatóságok döntenek ügyükben. (A)
- Engedjük, hogy az illegális bevándorlók szabadon mozoghassanak Magyarországon. (B)

3.Mára kiderült, hogy a Magyarországra tartó illegális bevándorlókat az embercsempészek mellett bizonyos nemzetközi szervezetek is törvénytelen tevékenységre ösztönzik. Ön szerint mit tegyen Magyarország?

- Az illegális bevándorlást segítő tevékenységeket – mint az embercsempészet és az illegális bevándorlás népszerűsítése – büntetni kell. (A)
- Fogadjuk el, hogy létezhetnek olyan nemzetközi szervezetek, melyek következmények nélkül buzdíthatnak a magyar törvények kijátszására. (B)

4.Egyre több külföldről támogatott szervezet működik Magyarországon azzal a céllal, hogy hazánk belügyeibe átláthatatlan módon beavatkozzon. Ezek működése veszélyeztetheti függetlenségünket. Ön szerint mit tegyen Magyarország?

- Kötelezzük őket arra, hogy regisztráltassák magukat, vállalva, hogy melyik ország vagy szervezet megbízásából, és milyen céllal tevékenykednek. (A)
- Hagyjuk, hogy továbbra is ellenőrizetlenül fejthessék ki kockázatos tevékenységüket. (B)

5.Magyarországon az elmúlt években azért volt eredményes a munkahelyteremtés, mert a saját utunkat jártuk. Brüsszel azonban támadja a munkahelyteremtő intézkedéseket. Ön szerint mit tegyen Magyarország?

- A magyar gazdaság jövőjéről továbbra is nekünk, magyaroknak kell döntenünk. (A)
- Döntse el Brüsszel, hogy mit kell tenni a gazdaságban. (B)

6.Magyarország elkötelezte magát az adócsökkentés mellett. Brüsszel most emiatt is támadja hazánkat. Ön szerint mit tegyen Magyarország?

- Ragaszkodjunk ahhoz, hogy mi, magyarok dönthessünk az adócsökkentésekről. (A)
- Törődjünk bele, hogy Brüsszel diktálja az adók mértékét. (B)

2017b:

1. Soros György arra akarja rávenni Brüsszelt, hogy Afrikából és a Közel-Keletről évente legalább egymillió bevándorlót telepítsen az Európai Unió területére, így Magyarországra is. Soros hosszú évek óta azon dolgozik, hogy megváltoztassa Európát és az európai társadalmakat. Célját más civilizációs háttérű embertömegek betelepítésével akarja elérni. Terve bemutatásakor így fogalmazott: „az előre látható jövőben az Európai Uniónak be kell fogadnia legalább egymillió menedékkérőt évente”. (Project Syndicate, 2015.09.26). Hasonló álláspontot képvisel az Európai Parlament is. A testület támogatta az áttelepítési programokat, valamint a bevándorlási útvonalak létrehozását (2015/2342. (INI))

2. Soros György brüsszeli vezetőkkel együtt azt is el akarja érni, hogy az EU tagállamai, így Magyarország is, bontsák le a határvédelmi kerítéseket, és nyissák meg a határokat a bevándorlók előtt.

A jól őrzött határok hatékony védelmet jelentenek az illegális bevándorlás ellen. Nem véletlen, hogy a Soros-tervnek fontos célja a határvédelmi kerítések lebontása. Így a határok megnyílnának az illegális bevándorlók előtt. A milliárdos úgy fogalmazott, hogy a „a mi tervünknek a menekültek védelme a célja, és a nemzeti határok jelentik az akadályt” (Bloomberg Business, 2015.10.30). Egyes brüsszeli vezetők is keményen támadták a határzárakat. A migrációügyi biztos idén júniusban kijelentette: nem jü megoldás, ha az uniós tagállamok kerítéseket húznak fel a külső határokon.

3. A Soros-terv része, hogy a nyugat-európai országokban összegyűlt bevándorlókat Brüsszel kötelezően ossza szét, különös tekintettel a kelet-európai országokra. Ebben Magyarországnak is részt kell vennie.

Soros György az alábbiakat írta a bevándorlók szétosztásáról: „ha ez nem lesz egy állandó és kötelező eleme a közös uniós menekültügyi rendszernek, akkor az össze fog omlani (Financial Times, 2015.07.26). 2015-ben Brüsszelben döntés született arról, hogy első lépésként Magyarországnak 1294 bevándorlót kell befogadnia. 2016-ban az Európai Bizottság már arra tett javaslatot, hogy korlátlan számban lehessen szétosztani a bevándorlókat. (IP/16/1620). Soros György javaslatával egybehangzó módon feláll az uniós Menekültügyi és Migrációs Ügynökség is, amely tovább gyengíti a nemzeti hatáskört a bevándorlás kérdésében. Ha a betelepítési kvóták életbe lépnek, a magyaroknak már nem lesz beelszólásuk abba, hogy kivel élnek együtt a jövőben.

4. A Soros-terv alapján Brüsszelnek arra kellene köteleznie minden tagállamot, így Magyarországot is, hogy minden bevándorlónak fizessen 9 millió forint állami segílyt. Soros szerint jelentős összegeket kellene költeni a bevándorlókra. „Az EU-nak biztosítania kellene menedékkérőnként évi 15 ezer eurót az első két évben, hogy fedezze a szállást, az egészségügyi ellátást, az oktatási költségeket – és hogy a menekültek befogadását vonzóbbá tegye tagállamoknak” (Project Syndicate, 2015.09.26.). A milliárdos szerint ezt az összeget hitelből kellene előteremteni. Soros úgy gondolja, hogy a hitelek visszafizetéséhez adóemelésre van szükség: a milliárdos emelné az ÁFÁ-t, valamint a benzinfogyasztást és a turizmust terhelő adókat. Soros tavaly Brüsszelben azt is javasolta, hogy az EU a migrációs

válság megoldása érdekében csökkentse a közép-európai országoknak járó mezőgazdasági és kohéziós támogatásokat.

5. Soros György azt is el akarja érni, hogy a migránsok enyhébb büntetést kapjanak az általuk elkövetett bűncselekményekért.

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Soros György jelentős összegekkel támogat olyan szervezeteket, amelyek segítik a bevándorlást, és védik a törvénytelenégeket elkövető bevándorlókat. Ilyen például a Helsinkai Bizottság, mely a határzár tiltott átlépése kapcsán azzal érvelt, hogy „aggályosnak tekinthető a jogellenes belépéssel kapcsolatos súlyos jogkövetkezmények alkalmazása”. Egy másik Soros-szervezet, az Amnesty International többször is követelte annak az Ahmed H-nak a szabadon bocsátását, aki kövekkel támadt a határt védő magyar rendőrökre, és ezért elítélték. Az Amnesty még kártérítést is fizettetne a magyar állammal.

6. A Soros-terv célja, hogy az európai országok nyelve és kultúrája háttérbe szoruljon annak érdekében, hogy az illegális bevándorlók integrációja hamarabb megtörténjen.

Soros György „A nyílt társadalom” című könyvében arról írt, hogy a „nemzetállamok tekintélyének hanyatlása üdvözölendő fejleménynek minősül”. Soros arról is nyíltan beszélt, nem szabad feladnunk meggyőződésünket, hogy a migráció jót tesz Európának. Felszólította a nem kormányzati szerveket (NGO-k) és a vállalatokat, hogy legyenek a bevándorlás szponzorai. Arról is beszélt, hogy a kontinensnek végre aktív lépéseket kell tennie a nyílt társadalmak kialakítása érdekében. Egyes európai országokban a multinacionális cégeknél már ma is önként eltávolítják az európai keresztény szimbólumokat, hogy azok „ne sértsék a bevándorlók érzékenységét”.

7. A Soros-terv része, hogy politikai támadást indítsanak a bevándorlást ellenző országok ellen, és kemény büntetésekkel sújtsák őket.

A Soros-terv végrehajtásának legfőbb akadályai azok a kormányok, amelyek kiállnak a nemzeti függetlenség mellett, és fellépnek az illegális bevándorlás ellen. Soros György ma még azért nem tud évente egymillió bevándorlót Európába hozni, mert vannak olyan kormányok, amelyek tiltakoznak ez ellen. A magyar kormány eleget tesz a schengeni megállapodásnak, amikor megvédi a határokat és kerítést épít, így nehezítve a Soros-tervvégrehajtását. Soros és több brüsszeli döntéshozó ezért támadja hazánkat- Az Európai Bizottság javaslata szerint azoknak a tagállamoknak, amelyek nem vesznek részt a betelepítési programban, minden bevándorló után 78 millió forintos büntetést kellene fizetniük (2016/0133. (COD)). Ez akkora összeg amelyért egy magyar munkavállaló évtizedekig dolgozik.

2018:

1. Európa és Magyarország jelentős problémája a népességfogyás. A brüsszeli bürokraták szerint a népességcsökkentést bevándorlók betelepítésével kell orvosolni. Brüsszel ezért akar állandó betelepítési mechanizmust és európai bevándorlási ügynökséget, amely menedzseli a

folyamatos migrációt. Mi azonban úgy gondoljuk, hogy a bevándorlás helyett a gyermeket nevelő családok fokozott támogatására és a gyermekvállalás ösztönzésére van szükség.

2.Jó, ha a gyermekek úgy nőnek fel, hogy látják a szüleiket munkába menni. Magyarországon ez nem mindig volt így. A kormány célja a munka és a család egyensúlyának megteremtése. A magyar állam ezért kötötte a családtámogatásokat munkavállaláshoz, ami hozzájárult ahhoz, hogy hazánkban 2010 óta javul a gyermekvállalási kedv, és ezzel párhuzamosan 12 százalékról 4 százalék alá csökkent a munkanélküliség.

3.Kutatások szerint a magyar fiatalok több gyermeket szeretnének, mint ahányat végül vállalni tudnak. A gyermekvállalás ideje is egyre későbbre tolódik. Sokak szerint ennek oka, hogy a fiatalok számára komoly anyagi kihívást jelent önálló életet kezdeni, és családot alapítani. A fiatalokat ezért jelentős összegű, akár 5-10 millió forintos kamatmentes életkezdesi kölcsönrel kell segíteni abban, hogy ha szeretnének, akkor korábban is vállalhassanak gyermeket.

4.Komoly feladat egy édesanya számára, hogy egyszerre teljesítsen otthon és a munkahelyén. Kiemelt figyelmet érdemelnek azok az édesanyák, akik több gyermeket is nevelnek, és emellett a munka világában is helytállnak. Sokak szerint érdemes megfontolni, hogy a legalább három gyermeket felnevelő, és emellett munkát is vállaló édesanyák erőfeszítéseit Magyarország életre szóló támogatásokkal ismerje el.

5.Egyetért-e Ön azzal, hogy a legalább három gyermeket vállaló édesanyáknak kiemelt támogatást kell adni? Igen/ Nem

6.Magyarországon nagy számban élnek olyan édesanyák, akik a munkában töltött évek után négy, öt vagy több gyermeket is nevelnek. Legalább négy gyermekről gondoskodni felér egy teljes állással. Éppen ezért megfontolandó, hogy ezen édesanyák esetében az állam magasabb anyagi juttatással is elismerje a főállású anyaság intézményét.

7.Sokak szerint fontos, hogy a gyermekvállalást követően a szülők, ha szeretnének, mihamarabb visszatérhessenek a munkahelyükre. A kormány ezt vette figyelembe, amikor 2014 elején életbe léptette a gyed extrát. Ennek lényege, hogy a gyed és a gyes folyósítása mellett már korlátlanul lehet munkát vállalni. Sokak szerint további eszközökkel is támogatni kell a gyermeküket nevelő anyák munkavállalását.

8.A beteg, önellátásra képtelen gyermekek otthoni gondozása elismerésre méltó szolgálat. Szeretnénk megbecsülni azokat, akik tartósan beteg gyermeküket otthonukban ápolják. A kormány ezért döntött arról, hogy a gyermekek otthongondozási díja (gyod) januártól havi bruttó 100 ezer forintra nőjön. A cél az, hogy ez a támogatás 2022-re elérje az akkori minimálbér összegét.

9.Gyermekeinkre egyre több veszély leselkedik, hiába tesznek meg mindent a szülők védelmük érdekében. Magyarország Alaptörvénye szerint „minden gyermeknek joga van a megfelelő testi, szellemi és erkölcsi fejlődéshez szükséges védelemhez és gondoskodáshoz” A kormány fontos feladatának tartja, hogy időről időre áttekintse a gyermekvédelem

magyarországi helyzetét és szigorúan fellépjen a gyermekek egészségét, fejlődését veszélyeztető jelenségek ellen.

10.A gyermekek érdekei sokszor háttérbe szorulnak. Magyarország Alaptörvénye úgy rendelkezik, hogy a „szülők kötelesek kiskorú gyermekükről gondoskodni”. Sokak szerint ezt ki kell egészíteni azzal, hogy a gyermeknek joga van családban, lehetőség szerint az anyja és apa szerető gondoskodása mellett felnőni.

11.Magyarországon a 2002-ben hatalomra jutott szocialista-liberális koalíció eltörölte a gyermekek után járó adókedvezményt és más családi támogatásokat. Sokak szerint a felelős gyermekvállalás egyik előfeltétele a kiszámíthatóság és a biztonság, ezért kétharmadok védelemben kell részesíteni a gyermeket nevelő családoknak járó támogatásokat.

2020:

1.A járvány újabb hulláma esetén Ön az alábbi javasolt intézkedések közül melyiket támogatná?

2.A koronavírus-járvány a világ sok országában az egészségügyi rendszer összeomlását eredményezte. Magyarországon sikerült a járvány terjedését lelassítani, ezzel időt nyertünk, hogy az egészségügyi rendszert kellően felkészíthessük. Ugyanakkor egy újabb járványhullám veszélye továbbra is fennáll.

3.A járvány alatt az idősotthonok vannak leginkább kitéve a fertőzés terjedésének. A magyarországi járvány minden negyedik áldozata idősotthon lakója. A fővárosban található Pesti úti idősotthonban több százan betegedtek meg, és közülük nagyon sok idős ember vesztette életét.

4.A járvány következtében az egész világon készlethiány alakult ki egészségügyi eszközökből és védőfelszerelésekből. Magyarország sikeresen szerezte be ezeket az eszközöket külföldről, és elkezdte a hazai gyártást is.

5.A járvány miatt egyik napról a másikra kellett átállni a digitális tanrendre. Ez az intézkedés azt a célt szolgálta, hogy a tanulók biztonságban legyenek, de ne kelljen megszakítani a tanévet. Mindez nagy erőfeszítést igényelt a tanároktól, diákoktól és a szülőktől is. A sikeres átállásért mindenkit köszönet illet.

6.Brüsszel járványügyi szervezete, az Európai Betegségmegelőzési és Járványvédelmi Központ (ECDC) a járvány kitörésekor nem észlelte a közelgő veszélyt. Az uniós hivatal a vírusfertőzés kockázatát még az első európai haláleset napján is „mészkeltnek” nevezte. A magyar illetékes szervek ezzel szemben időben megkezdték a felkészülést a védekezésre. Az operatív törzs 2020. január 31-ével megkezdte munkáját – akkor, amikor Európában még nem észleltek megbetegedéseket. A járvány időben való észlelése és védekezésre való felkészülés érdekében.

7.A magyar emberek egészségének és biztonságának védelme mindennél fontosabb. Éppen ezért a kormány úgy döntött: a járvány elleni védekezésnek nem lehet pénzügyi akadálya, és a terhek viseléséből mindenkinek ki kell vennie a részét.

8.A koronavírus-járvány súlyosan érintette a világ összes gazdaságát. Magyarországon is gazdasági visszaesés várható, bár kisebb mértékű, mint Nyugat-Európában. Vannak, akik úgy gondolják, hogy a magyar gazdaság talpra állításához előnyben kell részesíteni a magyar termékek, magyar szolgáltatások vásárlását, és népszerűsíteni kell a magyar turizmust.

9.A világjárvány nemcsak az egészségünket, hanem a munkahelyeinket is veszélyezteti. Ezért a kormány úgy döntött, hogy annyi munkahelyet hoz létre, amennyit a vírus elpusztít. A munkahelyek védelmét szolgálják a beruházási támogatások, a képzési programok és az adócsökkentések is.

10.A koronavírus-járványt követő gazdasági válság kezelésére Soros György új tervvel állt elő. Ebben azt javasolja, hogy az Európai Unió tagországai vegyenek fel hatalmas kölcsönöket (örökkötvények), amelyek után generációkon keresztül, örökre kamatot kellene fizetni. A szakértők szerint ez adósrabszolgaságba taszítaná a nemzeteket.

11.A járvány okozta gazdasági válság miatt sok vállalat került csődközeli helyzetbe. Fennáll a veszélye, hogy ezt kihasználva nemzetközi pénzügyi spekulánsok stratégiai magyar cégeket próbálnak megszerezni.

12.Az Európai Bíróság határozata szerint jogellenes a bevándorlókat a magyar határon felállított tranzitónában várakoztatni. A döntés értelmében járványveszély idején is be kell engedni a migránsokat az ország területére. Ez az ítélet egybevág Soros György migrációra vonatkozó régi tervével, amely szerint Európába mindenáron évi egymillió bevándorlót kell beengedni.

13.Brüsszel arra készül, hogy megtámadja a magyar alkotmány bevándorlással kapcsolatos szabályait. Arra akarnak kényszeríteni bennünket, hogy megváltoztassuk Alaptörvényünk migrációt tiltó intézkedéseit.

2021a:

1.Egyesek szerint a járványügyi korlátozó intézkedéseket fokozatosan, lépésről lépésre fel lehet oldani. Mások szerint ezt csak a járvány végén, egy lépésben lehet megtenni.

2.Azok, akik beoltatják magukat vagy átestek a betegségen, védettségi igazolványt kapnak. Vannak, akik támogatják, hogy az ilyen igazolvánnyal rendelkezők felmentést kapjanak egyes korlátozó intézkedések alól.

3.Vannak, akik szerint – amint a járványügyi helyzet engedi – az első lépések között enyhíteni kell az este 8 óra utáni kijárási tilalmat.

4.Vannak, akik szerint – amint a járványügyi helyzet engedi – az első lépések között újra kell indítani az éttermeket és a szállodákat is, szigorú biztonsági szabályok betartása mellett.

5.Vannak, akik szerint – amint a járványügyi helyzet engedi – az első lépések között újra kell indítani a sportlétesítményeket (pl. uszodákat, tornatermeket, konditermeket), szigorú biztonsági szabályok betartása mellett.

6.Vannak, akik szerint a rendezvények, koncertek, fesztiválok, illetve sportesemények látogatását meg kell engedni azoknak, akik védettségi igazolvánnyal rendelkeznek. Mások szerint ezeket az eseményeket nem szabad megrendezni vagy látogathatóvá tenni, amíg a járvány véget nem ér.

7.Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy a járvány elmúltáig Magyarország területére csak olyan külföldiek léphessenek, akiket beoltottak vagy rendelkeznek védettségi igazolvánnyal.

2021b:

1.Vannak, akik szerint a járvány után a világ sok tekintetben megváltozott, egy veszélyesebb korszak kezdődött. Magyarországot meg kell erősíteni, hogy meg tudjon felelni az új kihívásoknak.

2.Vannak, akik azt mondják, Magyarország megerősítését a minimálbér megemelésével kell kezdeni. A minimálbért 200 000 forintra kell emelni, mert ez is biztosítja, hogy a gazdasági növekedésből ne csak a vállalatok, hanem a magyar emberek is részesüljenek. Mások szerint erre nincs szükség.

3.Vannak, akik azt mondják, Magyarországot úgy lehet megerősíteni, ha alkotmányos védelmet adunk a családtámogatásoknak, a munkát terhelő alacsony adóknak és a nyugdíjaknak, hogy a válságok alatt egyetlen kormány se vehesse el azokat az emberektől. Mások szerint erre nincs szükség, a válságok árát fizessék meg az emberek.

4.Vannak, akik azt mondják, Magyarország megerősítéséhez fontos lenne, hogy arra törekedjünk, Európában Magyarországon legyenek a legkisebbek a munkát terhelő adók. Mások szerint erre nincs szükség, vissza kellene térni a Gyurcsány-korszak politikájához, és emelni kellene a munkát terhelő adókat.

5.Vannak, akik azt javasolják, hogy ha sikerül a kormánynak a gazdasági növekedés mértékét 5,5% fölé emelni, akkor a gyermekeket nevelő szülők kapják vissza a 2021. évben befizetett adójukat (az átlagbér adószintjéig), mivel ők viselték a legnagyobb terhet a járvány alatt. Mások szerint erre nincs szükség.

6. Vannak, akik szerint a hitelmoratóriumot 2021 szeptemberétől jövő év júliusig meg kell hosszabbítani, hogy azok a családok és vállalkozások, melyek rászorulnak, továbbra is felmentést kapjanak a hitel visszafizetése alól. A bankok szerint erre nincs szükség, a hitelmoratóriumot meg kell szüntetni, és mindenkinek törlesztenie kell.

7. Brüsszel a járvány után újra vissza fog élni a hatalmával, eljárásokat indít hazánk ellen, hogy rákényszerítse a magyarokra az akaratát. Vannak, akik azt gondolják, Magyarországnak vállalnia kell a vitákat, és ki kell állnia érdekeiért. Mások szerint Magyarországnak engednie kell Brüsszelnek.

8. Brüsszel új adókat akar ránk kényszeríteni, hogy a multinacionális vállalatok által okozott környezetszennyezés és klímaváltozás költségeit magasabb rezsikérekön keresztül a magyar családokkal fizettesse meg.

9. Soros György által finanszírozott szervezetek széles körű nemzetközi támadást indítottak Magyarország ellen a gyermekek védelméről szóló törvény miatt. Ez a törvény megtiltja a gyermekekre irányuló szexuális tartalmú propagandát az óvodákban, az iskolákban és a gyermekek számára elérhető médiában.

10. Soros György a járvány után újra meg fogja támadni Magyarországot, mert a magyarok ellenzik az illegális migrációt. Vannak, akik szerint ellen kell állni a Soros-szervezetek nyomásgyakorlásának, mások szerint Magyarországnak engednie kell a migrációs vitában.

11. Sokak szerint a járványok korában óriási veszélyt jelent, ha mindenki szabadon beutazhat Magyarországra. Fenn kell tartani annak a lehetőségét, hogy újabb járványhullámok felbukkanása esetén járványügyi korlátozásokat lehessen előírni, és a járványok által sújtott országokból csak egészségügyi vízummal lehessen belépni Magyarországra. Mások szerint a járvány véget ért, a szabad beutazás lehetőségét minden országból korlátlanul biztosítani kell.

12. A brüsszeli bürokraták és Soros György szervezetei szerint a járvány utáni években fel kell gyorsítani a bevándorlók behozatalát. A tengeri úton érkező migránsokat pedig kötelezően szét kell osztani az európai országok között. Magyarország Kormánya nem támogat semmilyen kötelező szétosztást. A kormány álláspontja szerint a járvány után is csak önkéntes alapon lehet befogadni migránsokat, és nem lehet kötelező módon szétosztani őket az unió országai között.

13. Vannak, akik szerint a járvány utáni két évben járványügyi migránsSTOP-ra van szükség. Teljesen le kell zárni a határokat a migránsok előtt, mert újabb vírusmutációkat hurcolhatnak be Magyarországra. A brüsszeli bürokraták szerint nem szabad visszautasítani a járvány idején érkező migránsok befogadását.

14. A járvány idején látható volt, hogy a nemzetközi piacon nagy küzdelem alakult ki a vakcinákért. Vannak, akik szerint a járványok korában meg kell szüntetni ezt a

kiszolgáltatottságot, ezért szükség van magyar vakcinagyárra. Mások szerint erre nincs szükség.

2022:

1. Brüsszel olajsankciók bevezetéséről döntött. A háború kirobbanása után még egyetértés volt abban, hogy Oroszországgal szembeni szankciók nem terjednek ki az energiára. Ennek ellenére Brüsszelben júniusban arról döntöttek, hogy megtiltják az Oroszországból érkező olaj és olajtermékek importját. Magyarország mentességet harcolt ki, mert több évre és több száz milliárd forintos beruházásra lenne szükség az orosz nyersolaj helyettesítéséhez. Az olajembargó Magyarország esetében komoly ellátási problémákhoz vezetne, és óriási terhet jelentene a gazdaságnak.

2. A gázszállításokra is kiterjesztenék a szankciókat. A brüsszeli vezetők a szankciókat a gázszállításokra is ki akarják terjeszteni. Az európai gazdaság jelentős mértékben függ az orosz gáztól (Magyarország esetében a függés mértéke 85 százalékos). A gázszankciók lebegtetése nagyobb energiaár-emelkedéseket hozott, mint a háború kirobbanásának ténye. A következmények már most is súlyosak. A rezsizsámlák szerte Európában rekordszintre emelkedtek. Oroszország azzal fenyeget, hogy a szankciókra adott válaszul leállítja a gázszállítást. Ez veszélyezteti a lakások fűtését és az európai gazdaság működőképességét.

3. A nyersanyagokra is vonatkoznak a brüsszeli szankciók. Brüsszel betiltotta az Oroszországból érkező szilárd tüzelőanyagok (például szén) behozatalát is. Tilalom vonatkozik az acélra és a fára is, és ezt más nyersanyagokra is ki akarják terjeszteni. Az intézkedés nagy áremelkedést eredményezett, tovább növelve a családok terheit. Az energiaválság következményeként Európának a korábbiaknál nagyobb mennyiségű szilárd tüzelőanyagra van szüksége, és igényeit nem képes saját kitermelésből fedezni.

4. A nukleáris fűtőelemekre is kiterjesztenék a szankciókat. Az Európai Parlament és több tagállam a nukleáris fűtőelemekre is ki akarja terjeszteni a szankciókat. Az atomerőművek megkerülhetetlen szerepet játszanak az európai áramellátásban. Jelentős részük orosz fűtőelemekkel működik, amelyek helyettesítése a műszaki feltételek miatt rövid távon nem lehetséges. Ezért, ha nukleáris fűtőelemekre is kiterjesztenék a szankciókat, az veszélyeztetné a stabil áramellátást és növelné az árakat.

5. A paksi atomerőmű bővítése a szankciós politika célkeresztjében van. A Paksi Atomerőmű Magyarországon az olcsóbb árak garanciája. Bővítése orosz vállalatok közreműködésével történik. A nukleáris szankciókat sokan a Paksi Atomerőmű bővítésére is ki akarják terjeszteni. Az EP és egyes ellenzéki pártok szerint is meg kell szakítani a fejlesztési együttműködést az orosz vállalatokkal. A bővítés felfüggesztése további áremelkedésekhez és ellátási zavarokhoz vezethet.

6.A szankció politika a turizmust sem kíméli. A szankciók károkat okoznak az európai turizmusban is, amelye egyébként sincs könnyű helyzetben a járvány utáni időszakban. A beutazási korlátozások miatt jelentősen visszaesett az Oroszországból érkező turisták száma. Az intézkedés Magyarországot is érinti, különösen annak figyelembevételével, hogy a külföldről érkezők száma még mindig elmarad a járvány előtti szinttől. Olyan ágazatról van szó, amely hazánkban több százezer embernek ad munkát.

7.A szankciók növelik az élelmiszerárakat, és újabb bevándorlási hullámhoz vezethetnek. A szankciók az élelmiszer-ellátásra is súlyos hatással vannak. A gázáremelkedés nagymértékben növeli a mezőgazdasági termelés költségeit, ráadásul a szankciók a műtrágya egyes összetevőire is kiterjednek. Az élelmiszerárak növekedése a fejlődő országokban növeli az éhínség kockázatát. Ez az eddigieknél is nagyobb migrációs hullámokhoz vezet, és növeli az Európa határaitra nehezedő nyomást.